- 1) Output per worker: Output calculated as GDP minus value added in the miningindustry (which includes oil and gas). 2) Urbanization: % population living in urban areas with a population of at least 5,000 in 1995. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 3) Stock market capitalization : Market value of all traded stocks as a % of GDP, average over 1990-95. Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine(2003) 10) Colonial Origin: Dummy variable indicating whether country was a British, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Belgian, Dutch or Portuguese colony. Source: La Porta et al (1999) 11) Ethnolinguistic homogeneity : Percentage of a country’s population belonging to the largest ethnic group. Each ethnolinguistic group is identified by religion, race, or language depending on which of the appears to be the most important cleavage in the given community. Source: Sullivan (1991).
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- 1) Protection against expropriation risk: A measure of risk of expropriation of foreign private investment by government, from 0 to 10, where a higher score indicates less risk. Originally used by Knack and Keefer (1995). Source: IRIS Center, also known as Political Risk Services 4) Index of country's openness: Sachs-Warner index which measures fraction years between 1950 to 1994 that the economy has been open, measured on a 0-1scale. A country is open if it satisfies the following criteria: (i) nontariff barriers cover less than 40% of trade, (ii) average tariff rates are less than 40%, (iii) any black market premium was less than 20 % during 1970s and 1980s, (iv) country is not classified as socialist by Kornai (1992), and (v) government does not monopolize major exports. Source: Sachs andWarner (1995).
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- 1) Settler Mortality: Log estimated mortality for European settlers during European colonization (before 1850). It is calculated from the mortality rates of European-born soldiers, sailors and bishops when stationed in colonies. It measures the effects of local diseases on people without inherited or acquired immunities. Source: Curtin (1989).
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- 11) Legal formalism: Measures number of formal legal procedures necessary to resolve a simple case of collecting on an unpaid check or evicting a non-paying tenant (from 1 to 7). "Check measure" and "Eviction measure" from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003). Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002, 2003).
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- 13) Liquid liabilities: Currency plus demand and interestbearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries, divided by GDP 16) Institutional Quality: Combines bureaucratic quality, law/order, and property rights protection indices. (Political Risk Services; similar to Knack-Keefer (1995), Hall- Jones (1999).
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- 14) Bank Assets: Ratio of all credits by banks (but not other financial intermediaries) to GDP 9) Executive constraints : 1-7 category scale, higher score means more constraints on the executive. Equals one if country not independent. (Polity III data set, Gurr (1997)) 10) Initial executive constraints: Executive constraints in the first year that country appears in the Gurr's (1997) Polity III data set. Source: Polity III data set, Gurr (1997) 17) Contract-intensive money: Ratio of noncurrency money to total money supply. An objective measure of enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights based on the citizens' decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. 12) Private credit: Value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector, divided by GDP.
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- 19) Index of democracy: Average of 8 indicators ranking policymaker selection process and the constraints on them. Index of centralization: Geographic devolution of state decision-makingauthority, values of 1 and 3 assigned to federal and unitary systems, respectively, and 2 to intermediate categories. (Polity III data set, Jaggers and Gurr's (1996)).
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- 21) Index of institutional quality: Measured by scores for corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy for 1990. Three different measures are scaled from 1 (worst) through 6 (best). They have followed Rodrik in employing a rescaled unweighted average of the three measures. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset, Political Risk Services.
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- 24) These indicators are: (i) ICRG (Knack&Keefer(1995)) (ii) bureaucratic efficiency (Mauro (1995)) 18) Adverseness of policy environment: Measured by black market premium on the foreign exchange rate. (Barro and Lee (1994)). 22) Index of democratization: Measured using the "polity" variable in the Polity IV dataset. Autocrats are defined as having a polity score less than or equal to 0. Democrats are those leaders with a polity score greater than 0. 15) Commercial-central bank: Ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial plus central bank assets, which has been used by others.
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- 5) Predicted trade share: Log value, based on a gravity trade model that only uses a country’s population and geographical features. Source: Frankel and Romer (1999).
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- 6) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization : Measures probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Source: Taylor and Hudson, Worl Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 1972 2) Distance from equator: Center of county or province within a country that contains the most people. Source:Global Demography Project, University of California, Santa Barbara. 3) English speakers: Fraction of the population speaking English at birth.
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- 7) Indigenous population density: Population density is calculated as total population divided by land area usable for agriculture. Source: McEvedy and Jones (1978). 4) European-language speakers: Fraction of the population speaking one of the five principal languages of Europe (English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish) at birth. 9) State antiquity: Index for the depth of experience with state-level institutions . Scales from zero to one.
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- 8) Legal Origin: Legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country (French Commercial Code versus English Common Law Origin) Source: La Porta et al (1999). Notes on Institution Measures: 2) Index of social infrastructure: Institutions and government policies that provide incentives for individuals and firms in an economy.
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- A community cannot sell land, but can cede it to other villages or rent it to strangers. In Masisi, after promulgation of the 1973 law it became impossible to buy or sell land without the permission of the Hunde chiefs; this encouraged clientelism as they profited from selling large parcels. Inheritance “Primary rights,†gained through original settlement or direct allocation, include permanent occupation, control of land use, and inheritance without interference; this is similar to western ownership. Women borrow land from their husbands to cultivate vegetables and rice, though some own land that is passed from mother to daughter.
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- “Public land†categories in Ghana are (i) land compulsorily acquired (under the 1962 State Lands Act), and (ii) land invested in the president (1962 Administration of Lands Act). The State Lands Act allows the state to acquire any land “in the public interest.†Outstanding compensation claims on the government are more than $100 million USD, with some claims dating back to the 1970s.
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Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson. 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review 91, no. 5:1369-1401.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson. 2005. Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy 113, no. 5:949-995.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 4:1231-1294.
Acemoglu, Daron. 2005. Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Consitutions". Journal of Economic Literature.
- African Development Fund. 2004. Democratic Republic of Congo: Agricultural and Rural Sector Rehabilitation Support Project in Bas-Congo and Bandundu Provinces (PARSAR) Appraisal Report.
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- Aghion, Howitt&MayerFoulkes (2005) Average growth rate of GDP per capita (1960-1995) relative to the United States I. Private credit12 II. Liquid liabilities13 III. Bank assets14 IV. Commercial-central bank15 I. Legal origin II. Settler mortality One SD increase in private credit (0.28) increases steady-state GDP by 21% in Belgium2 Alcala&Ciccone (2004) Log GDP per capita (1995) Index of institutional quality16 I. Settler mortality II. European-language speakers III.Predicted trade share (AC)12 One SD increase in index of institutional quality increases GDP per capita by 35% (IV) (controls include log real openness3 )
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Aghion, Philippe, Peter Howitt, and David Mayer-Foulkes. 2005. The Effect of Financial Development on Convergence: Theory and Evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, no. 1:173-222.
- Aide et Action pour la Paix. 2004. Ce Qu'il Faut Connaitre Sur le Sol en Droit Congolais.
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Alston, Lee J., Gary D. Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller. 2000. Land Reform Policies, the Sources of Violent Conflict, and Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 39, 162-188.
Alston, Lee J., Gary D. Libecap, and Robert Schneider. 1996. The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights; Land Titles on the Brazilian Fronteir. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 12, no. 1:25-61.
- Amanor, Kojo S. 1999. Global Restructuring and Land Rights in Ghana: Forest Food Chains, Timber and Rural Livelihoods. Vol. 108. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstutet. Antle, John, et al. Endogeneity of Land Titling and Farm Investments: Evidence from the Peruvian Andes. Bozeman, MT: Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics, Montana.
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- Aportela, F. 1998. Effect of Financial Access on Savings by Low-Income People.Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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- Article Dependent variables Key results1 Measures Instrument Acemoglu, Johnson &Robinson (2001) Log GDP per capita (1995) Protection against expropriation risk1 (1985-1995) Settler mortality1 One standard deviation (SD) increase in protection against expropriation risk (1.5) increases GDP per worker by 118% (OLS) and 309% (IV) .
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- Aryeetey, Ernest, Harrigan, Jane, and Nissanke, Machiko. 2000. Economic Reforms in Ghana : The Miracle and the Mirage. Oxford :James Curry ; Accra, New Town, Ghana: Woeli Publishing Services; Africa World Press.
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- Asiama, Seth O. 2003. Comparative Study of Land Administration Systems: Case Study - Ghana.UK Department for International Development.
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- Austin, Gareth. 2004. Labour, Land, and Capital in Ghana : From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante, 18071956. Vol. 18. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
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- Average investment for USAID-funded farmers was twice that of others. A greater proportion of these farmers received credit, and in larger amounts. The difference in yields between the two groups was statistically significant in 1993 but not 1983. Rate of return to the titling project was 17%.
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Banerjee, Abhijit V. 1997. A Theory of Misgovernance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4:12891332.
Banerjee, Abhijit V., Paul J. Gertler, and Maitreesh Ghatak. 2002. Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal. Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 2:239-280. Barro, Robert J., and Lee, Jong-Wha. Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries. 1999Available from http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html.
- Bassett, J. T. 1993. Cartography, ideology, and power: the World Bank in northern Côte d'Ivoire. Passages: A Chronicle of the Humanities.
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- Bates, Robert H. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa : The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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Behrman and T. N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam: Elselvier Science, B.V. Bockstette, V., A. Chanda, and L. Putterman. 2002. States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start. Journal of Economic Growth 7, no. 4:347-369.
Bell, C., and P. L. Rousseau. 2001. Post-independence India: a case of finance-led industrialization? Journal of Development Economics 65, no. 1:153-175.
- Benneh, George. 1988. The Land Tenure and Agrarian System in the New Cocoa Frontier: Wassa Akropong Case Study. In Agricultural Expansion and Pioneer Settlements in the Humid Tropics, edited by Walther Manshard and William B. Morgan. Tokyo: The United Nations University.
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- Berry, Sara S. 2001. Chiefs Know Their Boundaries : Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996. Portsmouth, NH :Heinemann ; Oxford; Cape Town: J. Currey; D. Philip.
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Besley, T., and R. Burgess. 2004. Can labor regulation hinder economic performance? Evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 1:91-134.
Besley, T., R. Pande, and V. Rao. 2005. Participatory Democracy in Action: Survey Evidence from South India. Journal of the European Economic Association 3, no. 2-3:648-657.
Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case. 2003. Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States. Journal of Economic Literature 41, no. 1:7-73.
Besley, Timothy. 1995. Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana. The Journal of Political Economy 103, no. 5:903-937.
- Biebuyck, Daniel, ed. 1963. African Agrarian Systems; Studies Presented and Discussed. Foreword by Daryll Forde.Oxford University Press.
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- Binswanger, H., and M. Rosenzweig. 1986. Behavioral and Material Determinants of Production Relations in Agriculture. Journal of Development Studies 22, 503-539.
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- Binswanger, H., Deininger, K., and Feder, G. 1995. Handbook of Development Economics. In . Amsterdam: North-Holland.
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Binswanger, Hans P., Deninger, Klaus, and Feder, Gershon. 1995. Power, Distortions, Revolt and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations. In Handbook of Development Economics, Volume III, edited by J.
- Broegaard, Rikke J., Heltberg, Rasmus, and Machlow-Moller, Nikolaj. 2002. Property Rights and Land Tenure Security in Nicaragua.Center for Economic and Business Research, Copenhagen.
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Bromley, Daniel. 1989. Property Relations and Economic Development: The Other Land Reform. World Development 17, no. 6:867-877.
- Brown, John, and Timothy Guinnane. 2005. Regions and Time in the European Fertility Transition: Problems in the Princeton Project's Statistical Methodology. Explorations in Economic History.
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- Bruce, J., and Migot-Adholla, S. E., eds. 1994. Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa. Iowa: Kendall/Hunt.
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- Bruce, J., and Migot-Adholla, S., eds. 1994. Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt.
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Burgess, R., and R. Pande. 2005. Do rural banks matter?: evidence from the Indian social banking experiment. American Economic Review 95, no. 3:780-795.
- Côte d'Ivoire. 2003. Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Crook, Richard C. Civil War in Cote d'Ivoire; Behind the Headlines.
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Carter, Michael R., and Olinto, Pedro. 2000. Getting Institutions ‘Right’ for Whom: Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment.University of Wisconsin-Madison.
- Cartier, Michael R., Wiebe, Kieth D., and Blarel, Benoit. 1994. Tenure Security for Whom? Differential Effects of Land Policy in Kenya. In Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, edited by John W. Bruce and Shem E. Migot-Adholla. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
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Chattopadhyay, R., and E. Duflo. 2004. Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India. Econometrica 72, no. 5:1409-1443.
- Chauveau, Jean-Pierre. 2000. Question Foncière et Construction Nationale en Côte d’Ivoire. Les Enjeux Silencieux d’un Coup d’Etat. Politique Africaine 17, 94-125.
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- Chauveau, Jean-Pierre. 2002. La Loi Ivoirienne de 1998 sur le Domaine Foncier Rural et L’agriculture de Plantation Villageoise: Une Mise en Perspective Historique et Sociologique. Land Reform: Land Settlement and Cooperativesno. 1:62-79.
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Chavas, Jean-Paul, Ragan Petrie, and Michael Roth. 2005. Farm Household Production Efficiency: Evidence from the Gambia. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87, no. 1:160-179.
- Chemin, M. 2004. Does the Quality of the Judiciary Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from India. Ph.D. diss., London School of Economics.
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Clague, C., P. Keefer, S. Knack, and M. Olson. 1999. Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance. Journal of Economic Growth 4, no. 2:185-211.
- Country (Paper) Outcomes of Interest Data Set Policy Findings Year: March 2000 (middle of the program) Region:Urban Unit: 2750 households Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (2000) Alston, Libecap, and Schneider (1996) Antle, Yanggen, Valdivia, and Crissman (2003) Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) Besley (1995) Broegaard et al, (2002) Carter and Olinto (2000) Cartier, Wiebe and Blarel (1994) de Laiglesia (2004) Deninger and Chamorro (2003) Do and Iyer (2003) Dowall and Leaf (1991) Feder and Onchan (1987) Field (2003), Field and Torero (2004) Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1993) Golan (1994) Lanjouw and Levy (2002) Lopez (1996) Notes on empirical strategies used in above papers: Conflict incidence estimated as a function of settlements, squatting, forest clearing, farm size, value, and number of establishments. Instrument for settlements are federal versus provincial jurisdiction, distance from state capital, and area of projects receiving institutional credit.
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- Curtin, P. D. 1989. Death by Migration: Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in the 19th Century. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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- Customary law has limited recognition. The 1992 Constitution recognizes chiefs' authority over stool and skin lands, and of families over family lands.
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de Laiglesia, Juan R. 2004. Investment and Credit Effects of Land Titling and Registration: Evidence from Nicaragua.London School of Economics.
Demetriades, P. O., and K. B. Luintel. 2001. Financial restraints in the South Korean miracle. Journal of Development Economics 64, no. 2:459-479.
Deninger, Klaus, and Juan S. Chamorro. 2004. Investment and Equity Effects of Land Regularization: The Case of Nicaragua. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 30, 101-116.
Djankov, S., et al. 2003. The New Comparative Economics. Journal of Comparative Economics 31, no. 4:595-619.
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2002. The Regulation of Entry. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 1:1-37.
Dowall, David E., and Michael Leaf. 1991. The Price of Land for Housing in Jakarta. Urban Studies 28, no. 5:707-722.
Duflo, E., and Banerjee, A. V. 2004. Do Firms Want to Borrow More? Testing Credit Constraints Using a Directed Lending Program.Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Extent 99% (i.e.outside Banjul & Kombo) 98% of land 80-90% of Ghanaian land 97% of land ( de facto) De jure status Authority under the Lands (Provinces) Act is given to the District Authorities, who are the head chiefs (seyfos) under 1990 Laws of the Gambia. District Tribunals may administer customary and Islamic law, so long as these are not "repugnant to justice." Customary tenure has limited legal stature. The 1998 land law allows only the state, public institutions and native Ivorians to own rural land. Though intended to create individual tenure, it makes customary rights the basis of claims. Communities registered as village cooperatives or associations have had their rights upheld by the courts.
Feder, Gershon, and Tongroj Onchan. 1987. Land Ownership Security and Farm Investment in Thailand. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69, no. 2:311-320.
- Field, Erica, and Torero, Maximo. 2004. Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among the Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program.Harvard University.
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- Field, Erica. 2003. Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru.Harvard University.
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- Field, Erica. 2003. Fertility Responses to Urban Land Titling Programs: The Roles of Ownership Security and the Distribution of Household Assets.Harvard University.
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Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn, and Patrick Sellers. 1999. Expected Failures and Unexpected Successes of Land Titling in Africa. World Development 27, no. 7:1115-1128.
- Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn. 1996. The Transformation of Property Rights in the Gold Coast : An Empirical Analysis Applying Rational Choice Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Fisman, R. 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91, no. 4:10951102.
Fisman, R., and S. J. Wei. 2004. Tax rates and tax evasion: Evidence from "missing imports" in China. Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 2:471-496.
- Foster, A. D., and Rosenzweig, M. R. 2001. Democratization, Decentralization and the Distribution of Local Public Goods in a Poor Rural Economy.University of Pennsylvania.
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Francisco, Alcalá, and Antonio Ciccone. 2004. Trade and Productivity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 2:613-646.
Frankel, J. A., and D. Romer. 1999. Does Trade Cause Growth? American Economic Review 89, no. 3:379399.
Frankel, J., and A. Rose. 2002. An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade and Income. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 2:437-466.
- Fred-Mensah, B. K. 1996. Changes, Ambiguities and Conflicts in Buem, Eastern Ghana.Johns Hopkins University.
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Freudenberger, Mark S. 2000. Tenure and Natural Resources in the Gambia: Summary of Research Findings and Policy Options. Vol. 40. University of Wisconsin-Madison: Land Tenure Center.
Friedman, Joseph, Emmanuel Jimenez, and Stephen K. Mayo. 1988. The Demand for Tenure Security in Developing Countries. Journal of Development Economics 29, 185-198.
Furth, Rebecca. 1998. Ivory Coast Country Profile. In Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa, 1996, edited by John W. Bruce. University of Wisconsin-Madison: Land Tenure Center.
Galiani, S., P. Gertler, and E. Schargrodsky. 2005. Water for life: The impact of the privatization of water services on child mortality. Journal of Political Economy 113, no. 1:83-120.
- GHANA Besley(1995) i. Land Rights ii. Productivity None Having a deed has a significant positive effect on land rights that require approval in Wassa. In Anloga, the correlation is negative, suggesting lineage sanctions and title are substitutes. Land rights increase productivity. Empirical strategies used in the papers are n the notes below.
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Glaeser, E. L., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2004. Do Institutions Cause Growth? Journal of Economic Growth 9, no. 3:271-303.
- Golan, Elise H. 1994. Land Tenure Reform in the Peanut Basin of Senegal. In Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, edited by John W. Bruce and Shem E. Migot-Adholla. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
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Goldberg, P. K., and N. Pavcnik. 2003. The response of the informal sector to trade liberalization. Journal of Development Economics 72, no. 2:463-496.
- GUATEMALA Pagiola (1999) i. Program Rate of Return i. Productivity ii. Investment iii. Access to Credit Project funded by USAID, initiated in 1983.
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- Guerty, M. K., and Miguel, E. 2000. Community Participation and Social Sanctions in Kenyan Schools.Harvard University.
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Hall, R. E., and C. I. Jones. 1999. Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 1:83-116.
- Hart, Terese B., and Robert Ducarme. 2005. Forestry and Conservation Activities During a War Fought over Land and Resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo. ETFRN News42-44.
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Hayes, Joseph, Michael Roth, and Lydia Zepeda. 1997. Tenure Security, Investment and Productivity in Gambian Agriculture: A Generalized Probit Analysis. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79, 369-382.
Heckman, James J., and Vytlacil, Edward J. 2000. Local Instrumental Variables. In Nonlinear Statistical Modeling: Essays in Honor of Takeshi Amemiya, edited by C. Hsiao, K. Morimune and J. Powell. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
- Hill, Polly. 1963. The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana; A Study in Rural Capitalism. Cambridge Eng.: University Press.
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- Household Size Number of Adults Table-10: Responses to Land Scarcity Nonfarm Activity Cultivation of CommerciallyObtained Plots (Hours/Day) (% of total cultivated area) (1) (2) Office-4.169-0.219 (1.078) (0.143) Abusua land per household-2.415-0.392 (0.978) (0.122) Office * Abusua land per household 5.534 0.489 (1.418) (0.319) Number of observations 325 222 Notes: All specifications include full set of plot characteristics, full set of family background variables, and household fixed effects. All regressions also include spatial fixed effects, with radius of 250 meters. Standard errors,corrected for spatial correlations as in Conley (1999), are given in parentheses.
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- Huggins, Chris, et al. 2005. Land, Conflict and Livelihoods in the Great Lakes Region: Testing Policies to the Limit. Vol. 14. Nairobi: African Center for Technology Studies.
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- Human Rights Watch. 2004. Côte d’Ivoire: Accountability for Serious Human Rights Crimes Key to Resolving Crisis.
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- i. Land Value ii. Perceptions of Tenure Security iii. Ability to Transfer Land EQUADOR Lanjouw and Levy (2002) Programa Nacional de Catastro, Titulacion y Registro, since 1992, which encourages titling and registration. Full registration increases investment; title without registration has only an insignificant impact. Registration affects plot-level, not household-level, investment, suggesting access to credit is unaffected. Registration increases land values by 30% (same effect as 20 years of continuous possession).
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- ii. Fourth Development Plan (1979-1983): approved de facto subdivisions of land.
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- ii. Law of National Domain 1964: stopped new registrations. Very few original registered titles, and these were owned by the elite. No surviving investments on titled land but title is used to obtain credit. Areas more affected by the Law of National Domain have greater tenure insecurity. No link between tenure security and farm investments.
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Imbens, Guido, and Joshua Angrist. 1994. Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects. Econometrica 62, no. 3:467-475.
- In 1963 Houphouët-Boigny declared “la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur†(the land belongs to those who develop it). This has since changed -- in 2001, one minister declared that land belongs to the owner, not the farmer. Under the 1998 law, land holders must obtain a land certificate within 10 years, and after another 3 years individual registration and private property will be enforced. Only 12 hectares can be individually owned; the rest comes in a 25 year lease from the state, which may be sold, mortgaged, inherited, and renewed. The length and expense of the process implies most land remains under community-based tenure.
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- In addition to comparing descriptive statistics, factors that were statistically similar between USAID and non-USAID farmers in 1983 and dissimilar in 1993 were identified. Yield was insignificantly different in 1983, but significantly different in 1993.
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Jansen, Kees, and Esther Roquas. 1998. Modernizing Insecurity; The Land Titling Project in Honduras. Development and Change 29, 81-106.
Jin, H. H., and Y. Y. Qian. 1998. Public versus private ownership of firms: Evidence from rural China. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 3:773-808.
- Johnson, Nancy L. 2001. Tierray Libertad: Will Tenure Reform Improve Productivity in Mexico's Ejido Agriculture? Economic Development and Cultural Change291-309.
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Kan, K. 2000. Informal capital sources and household investment: evidence from Taiwan. Journal of Development Economics 62, no. 1:209-232.
- Kasanga, Kasim, and Kosey, Nii A. 2001. Land Management in Ghana: Building on Tradition and Modernity. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
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Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2004. Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. World Bank Economic Review 18, no. 2:253-287.
- KENYA & TANZANIA Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) i. Access to Credit ii. Investment iii.Land Market iv. Inequality i. 1906 Regime d'immatriculation: allowed some to apply for registration.
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Knack, S., and P. Keefer. 1997. Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4:1251-1288.
- Knack&Keefer (1995) I. Annual GDP per capita growth (19741989) II. Private investment/GDP (1974-1989) (all averages) I. ICRG index5 II. BERI index6 No IV estimates.
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- Knox, Anna. 1998. Gambia Country Profile. In Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa, 1996, edited by John W. Bruce. University of Wisconsin-Madison: Land Tenure Center.
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- Knox, Anna. 1998. Ghana Country Profile. In Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa, 1996, edited by John W. Bruce. University of Wisconsin-Madison: Land Tenure Center.
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- Kogel, T. 2005. Youth Dependency and Total Factor Productivity. Journal of Development Economics 76, no. 1:147-173.
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- Kone, Mariatou. 2002. Gaining Rights of Access to Land in West-Central Côte d'Ivoire. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
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La Ferrara, E. 2003. Kin Groups and Reciprocity: A Model of Credit Transactions in Ghana. American Economic Review 93, no. 5:1730-1751.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1999. The Quality of Government. Journal of Law Economics & Organization 15, no. 1:222-279.
- Land Code (1954), which created both title deeds and utilization certificates for private land.
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- Land Tenure derives from tradition and English Common Law. Allodial, customary freehold, common law freehold, leasehold and customary tenancy are recognized. The 1986 Land Titling Registration Law applies only in a few urban areas.
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- Land tenure is in a state of confusion. The 1998 law 98-750 on Rural Land Tenure initiated a transition to private ownership, but tenure issues have become linked with political upheavals since the early 1990s. Critically, more than a third of the population consists of foreigners, and most conflict is over the status of both Ivorian and nonIvorian migrants.
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- Land Titling Project, Phase 2, 1991-1994 Credit use increased faster in provinces where the program was implemented. This increase was greatest in provinces that were poorest at the outset. Results for productivity were too sensitive to model specification to be useful. Anecdotal information suggests titles increase land values. The estimated rate of return from the program is 34%. Titles increase capital accumulation, except in Lop-Buri, where there is an ample non-institutional credit, more commercialization, and lower-risk cash cropping. Investment in bunding of land and clearing of stumps are positively affected by land title, but effects are insignificant in Lop-Buri.
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- Lanjouw, Jean O., and Phillip I. Levy. 2002. Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal Property Rights in Urban Equador. The Economic Journal986-1019.
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- Leisz, Steve. 1998. Zaire Country Profile. In Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa, 1996, edited by John W. Bruce. University of Wisconsin-Madison: Land Tenure Center.
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- Lopez, R. 1996. Land Titling and Investment in Honduras.Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD.
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- Mahama, Suleimana. 2003. The Ghana Land Administration Project: The Process and Challenges. Marburg, Germany: Philipps-University.
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Manning, Alan. 2004. Instrumental Variables for Binary Treatments with Heterogenous Treatment Effects: A Simple Exposition. Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 3, no. 1:1273-1273.
Masters, W. A., and M. S. McMillan. 2001. Climate and Scale in Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Growth 6, no. 3:167-186.
Mauro, P. 1995. Corruption and Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 3:681-712.
- McEvedy, C., and Jones, R. 1978. Atlas of World Population History. New York: Facts on File.
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- Miceli, Thomas J., C. F. Sirmans, and Joseph Kieyah. 2001. The Demand for Land Title Registration: Theory with Evidence from Kenya. American Law and Economics Review 3, no. 2:275-287.
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- Migot-Adholla, Shem E., Place, Frank, and Oluch-Kosura, W. 1994. Security of Tenure and Land Productivity in Kenya. In Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, edited by John W. Bruce and Shem E. Migot-Adholla. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
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- Ministry of Lands and Forestry. 2003. Ghana: Emerging Land Tenure Issues.Accra, Ghana.
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- Most of the country is governed by a mix of customary rules and legislation (e.g. the 1992 constitution and the 1962 State Lands Act).
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- Moyroud, Celine, and Katunga, John. 2002. Coltan Exploration in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In Scarcity and Surfeit. Nairobi: African Centre for Technology Studies.
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- N/A Land conflict between Hema and Lendu in Ituri has a long history. ‘Zairianisation’ involved transferring several foreign concessions to Hema, and conflicts over these concessions are frequent. Violence since 1999 has displaced half a million people from Ituri, killed 50,000 and caused the state to lose control of several areas. Forced migration, crop theft by armed forces, and short-run gains to mining coltan, gold and diamonds led many to abandon food production. Illegal resource exploitation by foreign armed groups has affected locals' land access.
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- NICARAGUA de Laiglasia (2004) i. Investment ii. Determinants of Registration iii. Credit Access Programa Nacional de Catastro, Titulacion y Registro, since 1992, which encourages titling and registration. Land registration increases the probability of land-attached investment by 35% -- the specific type of title (excluding indigenous forms) is unimportant. No link between credit and land registration.
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- North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton & Co.
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- One SD increase in contract enforcement (0.24) increases GDP per capita growth by 5.8% (OLS) (includes other institutional quality measures as controls) Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes &Shleifer (2004) I. Log GDP per capita (2000) II. Growth rates of GDP per capita 19602000, overall and by decade III. Years schooling IV. Political institutions (III and IV are 5-year change) Executive constraints I. Settler mortality II. Legal origin III. Log indigenous population density in 1500 One SD increase in constraints on executive (0.185) decreases GDP per capita by 6% (IV), controlling for population in temperate zone (1995) and years of schooling Jones&Olken (2005) Change in annual growth rate of real GDP per capita comparing 5-year growth averages before and after leader deaths Index of democratization22 No IV estimates.
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- One SD increase in ICRG index (13.50) increases annual per capita income growth rate by 1.24 (OLS) LLSV (1999) Dependent variables are classified in five groups (data from 1990s): I. Interference with private sector II. Efficiency III. Output of public goods IV. Size of public sector V. Political freedom I. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization II. Legal origin III. Religion No IV estimates.
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Pande, R. 2003. Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? Theory and evidence from India. American Economic Review 93, no. 4:1132-1151.
Pender, John L., and John M. Kerr. 1999. The Effects of Land Sales Restrictions: Evidence from South India. Agricultural Economics 21, 279-294.
- Percentiles of median headcount ratio Panel C: First Stage (Dependent Varibale: Protection Against Expropriation Risk (1985-1995)) Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares (Dependent Variable: Median Headcount Ratio) The Gambia Ivory Coast Ghana DRC Coding of Institutions Expropriation Risk 8.27 7.00 6.27 3.50 Legal Origin English French English French Urbanization 26% 46% 44% 30% Overview of Land Tenure Urban land legislation only applies to Banjul and Kombo (St. Mary State Lands Act (1990)). Under this, land is state-owned except if held in "fee simple" or subject to grants. Customary land occupiers hold a 99 year renewable lease. The Lands (Provinces) Act 1946, which recognizes customary law holds elsewhere else, and district tribunals may apply Islamic law.
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- Peters, Pauline E. 1994. Dividing the Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
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Pinckney, Thomas C., and Peter K. Kimuyu. 1994. Land Tenure Reform in East Africa: Good, Bad or Unimportant? Journal of African Economies 3, no. 1:1-28.
Place, Frank, and Peter Hazell. 1993. Productivity Effects of Indigenous Tenure Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75, no. 1:10-19.
Place, Frank, and S. E. Migot-Adholla. 1998. The Economic Effects of Land Registration on Smallholder Farms in Kenya: Evidence from Nyeri and Kakamega Districts. Land Economics 74, no. 3:360-373.
- Raynaut, Claude. 1997. Sahel Diversité et Dynamiques des Relations Société Nature. Edited by Claude Raynaut, Emmanuel Grégoire. London; New York: Routledge.
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- Relations between indigenous cultivators and migrants are the most important aspect of Ivorian tenure. The 1998 law bars non-Ivorians from owning rural land. Non-Ivorian farmers can at best hope for a long-term lease from the certificate-holder or the state. The HouphouëtBoigny government encouraged migrants, who obtained land mainly through “tutorat," whereby one remits a debt of gratitude and continuing regular payments to a local patron or "tuteur".
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Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Growth 9, no. 2:131-165.
Rodrik, Dani. 1999. Democracies Pay Higher Wages. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 3:707-738.
- Roth, Michael, Cochrane, Jeffrey, and Kisamba-Mugerwa, W. 1994. Tenure Security, Credit Use, and Farm Investment in the Rujumbura Pilot Land Registration Scheme, Uganda. In Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, edited by John W. Bruce and Shem E. Migot-Adholla. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
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- Roth, Michael, Unruh, Jon, and Barrows, Richard. 1994. Land Registration, Tenure Security, Credit Use, and Investment in the Shebelle Region of Somalia. In Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, edited by John W. Bruce and Shem E. Migot-Adholla. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
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Sachs, J. D., and A. Warner. 1995. Economic-Reform and the Process of Global Integration. Brookings Papers on Economic Activityno. 1:1-95.
- SENEGAL Golan (1994) i. Investment ii. Credit Access KENYA Cartier, Wiebe and Blarel (1994) i. Input Use ii. Output Table-5: Impact of Land-titling and Registration Programs: Micro Evidence Country (Paper) Outcomes of Interest Data Set Policy Findings Year: 1987 Region: Kigezi District Unit: 228 households with 505 parcels Year: 1979-1993 Region: West Bengal and Bangladesh Unit: District Year: 1993 Region: Aurepalle and Dokur, Andhra Pradesh Unit: Survey of 291 households with 563 plots.
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- Several laws, including article the 1992 Constitution (giving Land Commissions a veto over land transactions) and the 1994 Office of the Administrator of Stools Land Act circumscribe chiefs authority. Customary arrangements are not recognized by law. De facto status The state has given customary law legal legitimacy. A “truly muddled and ad hoc system†has resulted from combined assertion of government contol and tolerance of customary systems.
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- State Acquisition and involvement The 1994 coup of Yayeh Jammeh mantained the status quo on tenure issues. All land not in freehold in Banjul and Kombo St. Mary is vested in the state, as are resources such as forests, watercourses and expropriated land (State Lands Act, 1990). The Land Acquisition Act permits government appropriation of land for a broad range of “public purposes,†including defense, conservation, and planning.
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- Sullivan, M. J. 1991. Measuring Global Values. New York: Greenwood.
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- Taylor, C. L., and Hudson, M. C. 1972. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. Ann Arbor, MI: ICSPR.
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- The 1973 General Property Law made all lands, including forest resources, state property. Edict 81013 of 1981 and Constitution Article 10 make the under-soil, including mineral and petroleum wealth, state property. The Mobutu “kleptocracy†encouraged land tenure “informalization†which allowed favored groups and individuals to expropriate land. The political deadlock between Mobutu and parliament in the early 1990s prevented legal redress to resolve the agricultural crisis or land-related issues.
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- The 1973 General Property Law makes all land state property. At the local level, customary rules apply where state power is weak; less than 1% of land in the DRC is registered. In much of the country the dominant factor in determining access to land has been war, which has brought armed occupation and population displacement.
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- The 1998 law vests all unregistered land in the state. Though a 1962 law asserted state ownership over all land, the government allowed farmers to retain land used in production. Government attempts to delineate mining, forest and tourist lands have been ineffective. Politicization of the land question has become part of the larger politics of Ivorianness.
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- The Role of War During the 1990s N/A The 1998 law 98750 on Rural Land Tenure has not been effectively enacted. Article IV of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (2003) reaffirms this law and charges the Government of National Reconciliation with implementation. The Accra III agreement of July 2004 specified changes to land tenure laws in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement were to be implemented by August 2004. This deadline was not met.
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The World Bank. 2005. 2005 World Development Indicators.Washington D.C. Topalova, P. 2005. Trade Liberalization, Poverty, and Inequality: Evidence from Indian Districts.NBER.
- Toure, Mahamane D. 2003. Rural Land Tenure and Sustainable Development in the Sahel and West Africa; Secure Land Tenure Problems in the Sahel and West Africa: Nine Years After PRAIA; Regional Summary Report. Bamako, Republic of Mali: Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel.
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- Udry, Christopher, and Goldstein, Markus. 2004. Gender, Power and Agricultural Investment in Ghana. New Haven, CT: Yale University.
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- Unit: panel of 4000+ households. Provincelevel data on LUC issuance in 1994, 1998 and 2000.
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- USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. 2004. Cote d'Ivoire Solid Wood Products Annual, 2004. Vol. IV4013.
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- VIETNAM Do and Iyer (2003) i. Investment ii. Productivity iii. Credit Access iv. Land Transfers Land Law (1993), which allows for transferable leases from the state implemented using Land Use Certificates (LUCs).
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- Visaria, S. 2005. Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India. Ph.D. diss., Columbia University.
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- Vlassenroot, Koen, and Chris Huggins. 2004. Land, Migration and Conflict in Eastern D.R. Congo. EcoConflicts 3, no. 4:1-4.
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- Wily, Liz A., and Hammond, Daniel. 2001. Land Security and The Poor in Ghana: Is There a Way Forward? A Land Sector Scoping Study.UK Department for International Development.
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- Year: 1983 Region: Manila Unit: 1688 households Year: 1987 Region: Lop-Buri, Nakhon Ratchasima, and Khon-Kaen Provinces Unit: 48 compounds Year: 1991/92 and 1995/96 Region: National Unit: Household survey Year: 1992-1993 and 1997-1998 Region: Not available.
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