Education, Rent Seeking and Growth
Binyamin Berdugo () and
Uri Meir
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
This paper studies the role of education as a way of reducing private rent seeking activities and increasing output. In many underdeveloped economies, for most individuals, there is no private return to education. Nonetheless, according to this paper, governments are better off by investing in public education. We view education as a means to build personal character, thereby affecting macroeconomic long run equilibrium by reducing the number of individuals who are engaged in private rentseeking activities. We show that education is more efficient than ordinary law enforcement because it has a long-run effect. The policy implication of this result is that even when education does not increase human capital, compulsory schooling will be beneficial in pulling underdeveloped economies out of poverty.
Keywords: Rent Seeking; Decency; Education; Growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A20 I21 O10 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-edu, nep-fdg, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:18369
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