Towards Behavioral Political Economy of Institutional Change: With Field Facts from China

No 4956, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This study proposes an analytical framework towards behavioral political economy of institutional change. It considers institutional changes as central government’s choices under uncertainty, which are largely driven by the strategic outcomes in a behavioral coordination game between local officials and private businessmen. With field facts in China, this study suggests that institutional changes begin with pro-competition policies, then a better protection of property rights, followed by a possible standstill or even worse rule of law.

Keywords: behavioral economics; China; institutional change; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D70 O43 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4956

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