Political Oppositions

On 13 June 2024, the Democratic Progress Institute (DPI) held an event at the Embassy of Finland in Ankara, as part of its ongoing series, Mapping Dividends of Peace in Turkey. The event, titled Peace Dividends: Role of Business in Conflict Resolution, aimed to explore the intricate connections between conflict, peace, and the economy, and to contribute to the economic argument for peace in Turkey and the broader region. The meeting was opened by Finland’s Ambassador to Turkey, Pirkko Hämäläinen, who highlighted the increasingly recognised role that business can play in peacebuilding. She emphasised how businesses can contribute to peace by fostering stability, creating employment, lifting people out of poverty, and breaking the economic cycles that generate conflict. Later, Ali Bayramoğlu, political commentator and columnist, Gerry Horkan, politician, Fianna Fáil Senator Party and Spokesperson, and Mehmet Kaya, Head of Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry joined us as speakers. While Bayramoğlu analysed the current situation following the recent local elections and emphasised the possibility of a reconstruction of society-politics relations in Turkey, Horkan focused on the Northern Irish peace process and underlined the positive effect of peace on economic development. Lastly, Kaya highlighted the implications of the ongoing conflict on the economy and mentioned the potential dividends of peace in Turkey and the region.
This event is part of a larger series of activities planned in the context of the project Supporting the Pro-Peace Agenda in Türkiye and the Region, supported by the Norwegian, Irish, and Swiss governments.

This essay, published in three parts in successive issues of Banatul Azi, tried to point out the main milestones of Viktor Orban's political career, starting with the almost mythical moment held in Heroes' Square, Budapest, June 1989, on the occasion of rehabilitation and reburial of Imre Nagy and his "group", passing through the first mandate in power, through the pitfalls of the opposition and culminating with Orban s return to power. Important to notice is the evolution of his position towards liberalism, the European Union and the political opposition in the country, the formation of his political speech and the strength with which he learned to support his views despite and even against everyone. The text ends with an inventory of the "people s enemies" topped by George Soros, as well as the instruments used by the Orban regime to silence their voices.

Acest eseu, publicat în trei părți în numere succesive din Banatul Azi a încercat să puncteze principalele repere ale carierei politice a lui Viktor Orban, începând cu aproape miticul moment al celebrării lui Nagy Imre și a ”grupului său” în Piața Eroilor, în iunie 1989, trecând prin fotoliul puterii, prin capcanele opoziției și culminând cu revenirea la putere. Important de urmărit este evoluția poziției sale față de liberalism, de Uniunea Europeană și față de opoziția politică din țară, formarea discursului său politic și a tăriei cu care a învățat să-și susțină punctele de vedere în ciuda și chiar împotriva tuturor. Textul se încheie cu un inventar al ”dușmanilor” poporului, în frunte cu George Soros, precum și cu pârghiile preferate de regimul Orban pentru amuțirea vocii acestora.

This is the result of an innovative project in the ambit of creative writing / storytelling with students of the University of Aveiro, enrolled in two different degrees related to Marketing and Languages. The project won an incentive of pedagogical innovation. Students wrote 11 short stories concerning contemporary and relevant societal issues and challenges in Portuguese and translated them into German.

The paper considers the functioning of institute of the political expulsion in Soviet Russia in 1920-s. The big importance refers to the economic, public and political life of repressed people. The article explores the variability of behavior strategies, positive and non-positive factors of everyday life. It expands the empiric material belong to the theme.

کابینه ایی با مارک مافیای قدرت بر پیشانی، پزشکیان استغفار کند یا ما
https://mostafa111.ir/neghashteha/articel/2485.html
مسعود پزشکیان را اگر با سید محمد خاتمی، حسن روحانی، میر حسین موسوی مقایسه کنی، او تنها در اِشِل یکی از وزرای آنان است، حال آنکه هر چه پیش رفت، بعد از این بزرگوران نیز، دایره مافیای قدرت و ثروت بسته تر، خالص تر، یکدست تر، قدرتمند تر، منسجم تر و... در دست "خودی" هایشان به انحصار بیشتر و عمیق تری در آمد، و پیشروی مافیای قدرت و ثروت در ارکان کشور، این روزها در اوج خود، و بی نظیر شده است،
و حال در زمانی که آن استوانه هایی عظیم از اصلاح طلبی و تحول خواهی چون آنان، با آن کارنامه های قطور در کار، مبارزه و جهادِ در این راه، در مقابل این چالش بزرگ کشور و انقلاب، کمر خم کرده اند، چگونه باید از مسعود پزشکیان انتظار معجزه داشت. حضور او با همه ی داغ هایی که به پیشانی و تنش خواهد خورد، بهتر از نبودش در چنین میدانی است، پس نه از رای خود پشیمانم، و نه از تلاشم برای بودنش در کرسی ریاست بر جمهور ایرانیان بیمناک.                ادامه این پست را در لینک بالا بخوانید

This study focuses on the issue of the Spanish Communist exile in state socialist Czechoslovakia. It analyses the everyday resistance of the heterodox Spanish political emigrant José Valledor, which was carried out in the form of consentful contention – a tactic, through which a subordinate actor contests the government's decisions whilst performing the role of a dutiful citizen. Valledor was able, with his petitions to the state organs while appealing to the regime's own legitimating value system, to threaten the Czechoslovak authorities with the loss of the regime's international prestige.

Celem opracowania jest opisanie różnych politycznych i społecznych uwarunkowań działalności opozycyjnej na Węgrzech i w Polsce w latach 1956–1989 oraz nakreślenie relacji między poszczególnymi węgierskimi i polskimi grupami opozycyjnymi. Autor wychodzi z założenia, że po 1956 roku w obu krajach wytworzyły się radykalnie odmienne warunki polityczne, gospodarcze i społeczne. Podczas gdy w Polsce sytuacja była stosunkowo korzystna dla działalności opozycyjnej, na Węgrzech możliwości były ograniczone i dopiero pod koniec lat siedemdziesiątych, a zwłaszcza po narodzinach Solidarności, doszło do poszerzenia pola działania. Z drugiej strony, autor twierdzi, że aktywność opozycyjna nie była wystarczająca do tego, by stosunki polsko-węgierskie się rozwinęły, bowiem decydujący wpływ miały w tym zakresie różnice polityczne, ideologiczne i pokoleniowe wewnątrz węgierskich grup opozycyjnych. Dla węgierskiej opozycji ważniejsze były więc kwestie światopoglądowe i strategia polityczna, dla Polaków...

The Zionist-Israeli Right and the Kibbutz Movement have shared a longstanding and powerful historical rivalry, but their interrelationships were more complex than presented in historiography and recollected in public consciousness. The relations were affected by the political power of the two groups, their position within the socio-economic fabric in Israel, and the issues that were at the core of the public agenda in Israel.
This article seeks to examine the interfaces between Menachem Begin, the parties under his leadership, and the kibbutzim, from the establishment of the state until the end of 1981. Such exploration reveals different stages, discrete trends as well as more complex political relations than the rather superficial image engraved in collective memory. The first stage (1948-1966) and the later period (1972-1983) are characterized by confrontation and poignant polemics that have not yet been systematically presented and analyzed.
Between these, there was an interim that has received almost no attention or theorized in historiography–the late 1960s and early 1970s–an interval characterized by rapprochement and reconciliation. The deterioration in the relationships between the Likud and the Kibbutz Movement came about in the wake of the political “upheaval.” The article examines the contribution of both sides to the dynamics of escalation, the various economic, social, and political contexts within which it manifested itself, and its place in the political history of Israel at large.
Between these, there was an interim that has hardly been researched or theorized in historiography–the late 1960s and early 1970s–an interval characterized by rapprochement and reconciliation. The deterioration in the relationships between the Likud and the Kibbutz Movement came about in the wake of the political “upheaval.” The article examines the contribution of both sides to the dynamics of escalation, the various economic, social, and political contexts within which it manifested itself, and its place in the political history of Israel at large.

Für die Enquetekommission des Bundestages, die sich mit der Geschichte der DDR beschäftigte, schrieb ich - unter Mithilfe von Thomas Voss - eine Expertise zum Thema DDR-Opposition. Wir verglichen oppositionelle Bestrebungen in Dresden und Ost-Berlin.

Esen, B. (2016) ‘Persuading the electorate: The main problem of the opposition in Turkey’, Daily Sabah, 18.01.2016.

ABSTRACT:
Many political analysts formulate the problem of the CHP as a problem of persuasiveness. Although the CHP has injected quite a bit of fresh blood to its cadres under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership and has changed its ideology and discourse toward ambitious social-democratic policies, these changes have not been successful in attracting any real support. In fact, this point is true for all opposition parties. Opposition parties' problem lies in their lack of persuasiveness over the electorate. The average voter who believes that opposition parties means it and are willing to do it, does not believe that they can door are capable of doing it. In other words, opposition parties have a problem convincing the electorate that they have enough motivation, resources, cadres, political will and administrative skills to realize their promises. THE CASE OF THE CHP'S SOCIAL POLICY PROMISES To scrutinize this phenomenon, the CHP's social policy promises in the latest two elections make a great case. Both in the June 7 and Nov. 1 snap elections, the CHP made comprehensive social policy promises from the offer of providing family insurance nationwide to an expansion of labor rights and from new jobs for the youth to generous grants for students. The party gave further assertive
promises. They promised to give personnel status to all subcontracted employees and a significant increase in the national minimum wage. In fact, the idea of raising the minimum wage was first proposed by CHP in the June 7 elections. In other words, it was an original invention of the CHP's as a political will. The party strongly believed in its social policy promises. Kılıçdaroğlu even notarized his party's social policy promises to show their decisiveness. They were vigorously keen that these social policy promises would attract great support from the poor and vulnerable sections of society. Despite all of these efforts though, when the ballots were opened the CHP gained almost no - less than 0.5 percent - votes from these promises. The same occurred in the following Nov. 1 elections, as well. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) adopted most of the CHP's social policy promises, including the one to increase the minimum wage, in its Nov. 1 election campaign. The same promises that gained almost no support for the CHP gave AK Party an increase of almost 9 percent to its share of the vote. The very similar social policy promises that did not work for the CHP attracted strong support from voters when adopted by the AK Party. This quite interesting political phenomenon in Turkey's modern politics needs to be understood.

THE PROBLEM OF PERSUADING THE ELECTORATE
In fact, persuasiveness is the most necessary mechanism that would translate political will and promises into political gains - this is a crystal clear political fact. To be a convincing politician is of the utmost importance in politics, especially if you are competing with a political party that mastered persuading the electorate
that it is serious and capable of realizing change like the AK Party. Only if as the CHP and the other opposition parties start to re-evaluate their situation in a seriously manner by thinking about the question of why the electorate does not believe in them instead of having the attitude that the masses do not understand them and that is their problem, a real political change remains only a distant possibility.

This report provides an overview of the second regional panel organized by the ECPS titled “Crisis of Democratic Political Legitimacy and Emerging Populism in Africa,” which took place online on May 9, 2024. Moderated skillfully by Dr. Chipo Dendere, the panel included experts from Southern Africa, Central Africa, and beyond. They offered a comprehensive examination of the largely overlooked phenomenon of populism in Africa. Through their insightful presentations, the panelists analyzed the various forms and behaviors of populism on the continent, tracing its historical role as a galvanizer during anti-colonial struggles for self-determination to its current impacts on social and political affairs. A common theme emerged: as both Africa and the globe witness a decline in democratic integrity despite the rise in populist movements, it is crucial to understand the complex roles populism plays—both beneficial and detrimental—in shaping local political landscapes.

Autour des années 1968, le président Léopold Sédar Senghor développe un corpus offensif de discours, déclarations et prises de position contre ce qu’il appelle la « néo-traite des nègres » ou « la traite des nègres intellectuels ». Se joue là un renversement de l’accusation en aliénation : le président Senghor, critiqué par son opposition de gauche comme étant un valet de l’impérialisme français au Sénégal, en serait en réalité le premier résistant, tandis que ses opposants seraient eux les véritables valets, à la solde de la gauche française. Cette communication s’est tenue le 6 juin 2024 à la bibliothèque universitaire de l’université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar (UCAD) dans le cadre de la journée d’étude « Autour du fonds Senghor ».

The parliamentary paradiplomacy of the Assemble´e Nationale du Que´bec (ANQ) has been growing rapidly since the second half of the 1970s and more particularly since the 2000s. This growth in international activities is achieved in two ways. First, the ANQ plays a unique role in the implementation of international treaties negotiated by Canada. Since 2002, the Ministry of International Relations Act has required the ANQ's intervention in the approval process of international commitments of importance to the Government of Que´bec before the executive declares itself bound. Que´bec is the only Canadian province to be so closely involved in the process of concluding the Government of Canada's international commitments. Second, the ANQ has developed bilateral and multilateral relationships with several international parliaments. Within the framework of its bilateral relations, it can count on sixteen partner parliaments located in Canada, the United States, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. It is also a member of five multilateral inter-parliamentary organizations. The ANQ is also active in parliamentary cooperation, particularly in the area of supporting democracy. * Full Professor at the É cole nationale d'administration publique, Researcher, and Director of the Groupe d'e´tudes et de recherche sur l'international et le Que´bec. ** D. candidate at the É cole nationale d'administration publique and Researcher at the Groupe d'e´tudes et de recherche sur l'international et le Que´bec.

Lorsque l'on compare la politique internationale actuelle du Québec avec celle de l'Ontario, on perçoit deux cas très contrastés : alors que le gouvernement ontarien met en œuvre une paradiplomatie de faible intensité, le gouvernement du Québec déploie une paradiplo- matie identitaire de forte intensité dont l'objectif fondamental est le renforcement ou la construction de la nation québécQise. La paradi- plomatie identitaire diffère de la protodiplomatie, car l'objectif n'est pas la réalisation de l'indépendance politique (Paquin, 2005, 2002). Le dessein de la politique internationale au Québec est de favoriser le développement de la nation québécoise en plus de chercher à faire reconnaître le Québec comme nation au plan international. La dis- tinction est importante, car le Québec tend ainsi dans ses activités
internationales à être très institutionnalisé, autrement dit, il cherche à imiter, à une plus petite échelle, le degré d'institutionnalisation des Etats souverains alors que l'Ontario propose une paradiplomatie sans réel centre de gravité et de très faible intensité.

Notre article souhaite offrir des pistes de réflexion sur la démocratie en temps de crise, ainsi que sur les manières d’affronter les crises de la démocratie. Nous nous basons sur deux conceptions de la démocratie, soit une première qui la définit comme un processus de prise de décision et de résolution des problèmes collectifs et une seconde qui l’envisage plutôt comme un idéal qui permet d’orienter nos pratiques, un horizon vers lequel tendre. La démocratie politique et la démocratie sociale sont deux composantes de cet horizon. En partant de cette double définition de la démocratie comme un processus et comme un horizon, au moins deux questions peuvent être posées. D’une part, comment pouvons-nous favoriser le développement des pratiques et des institutions démocratiques, qui encouragent le maintien d’une société civile forte et engagée, tant durant les crises que durant les périodes plus stables ? D’autre part, comment pouvons- nous intervenir politiquement durant les crises afin qu’elles mènent au renforcement de la démocratie politique et sociale, plutôt qu’à une aggravation des inégalités ?

Vineri 3 martie 2023 au fost pronunțate patru sentințe pe numele unor lideri Viasna (Centrul Viasna pentru drepturile omului) iar luni 6 martie, alte cinci pentru Svetlana Tihanovskaia și colaboratorii săi. Nimic neobișnuit în Belarus, nici măcar după ce, Ales Bialaski, fondatorul Viasna a fost anul trecut, laureat Nobel pentru pace. ”Judecățile motivate politic împotriva lui Bialatski și a activiștilor Viasna 96 reprezintă o insultă la adresa justiției”, a declarat Roberta Metsola, președinta Parlamentului European. Si totusi, în Belarus vorbim despre un regim autoritar, cu sindicate interzise, tabere patriotice pentru copii, monism politic, condamnări lungi pentru dizidenți și o prea numeroasă diasporă.

Belarusul a scos în afara legii Comitetul Helsinki pentru drepturile omului, ceea ce ne-a ocazionat o scurtă trecere în revistă a discuției despre contractul social, despre războiul individului împotriva statului și despre capacitatea regimurilor autoritare de a reprima orice posibilitate de a le contesta. Cel mai cunoscut ONG belarus în materia drepturilor omului este Viasna 96/ Primăvara 96, creat de Ales Bialatski, cunoscut dizident. Organizația a avut ca obiective monitorizarea alegerilor, promovarea drepturilor fundamentale, abolirea pedepsei cu moartea, susținerea inițiativelor civice, apărarea deținuților politici, educația civică. ”Prizonier al conștiinței”, laureat Nobel (2022), arestat, bătut și umilit acasă, premiat în Europa , Bialatski răspândește bunătate, demnitate și curaj. Chiar și de dincolo de gratiile care l-au înghițit din nou.

Roman Protasevici, tânăr jurnalist belarus, aflat în exil la Vilnius, a fost capturat de autoritățile de la Minsk prin deturnarea avionului Ryanair cu care acesta se întorcea din Grecia spre Lituania. Nimic nu legaliza acest act terorist, nimic nu l-a putut împiedica. Raportul între nevoia noastră de știri și (lipsa de) protecție pentru jurnaliștii reali pune în lumină o vulnerabilitate enormă a lumii democratice. Am subliniat acest raport, am relatat evenimentele și primele reacții europene. Insuficient pentru a salva o viață de om care a făcut mult bine, celor din jurul său. Suntem slabi și dezarmați în fața autoritarismului.

La scurtă vreme după decesul lui Alexei Navalnyi, conducerea politică de la
Moscova a declarat-o ”agent străin” pe scriitoarea Ludmila Ulitskaya, opozant vehement al invaziei ruse în Ucraina și a numeroaselor pârghii autocratice adoptate de Kremlin. Articolul conține un număr de reacții ale cunoscutei romanciere, completate cu declarații ale dizidentului Mikhail Hodorkovski și, respectiv, cu fragmente din discursul Yuliei Navalnaya rostit în Parlamentul European. Textul se încheie citând câteva măsuri propuse în legislativul european cu privire la sprijinirea dizidenților ruși și înăsprirea sancțiunilor împotriva Federației Ruse.

Pegas is not only the name of a bicycle but also of a very dangerous investigative program in the hands of present governments. With its help, journalists, opposition politicians or simply, disturbing persons might be under permanent surveillance with regard their phones, pictures or friends.

Turkey has switched to a presidential system via a referendum held in April 2017 that will take full effect after the 2019 presidential elections. Turkish presidentialism increases the prominence of the executive at the expense of the legislative branch and concentrates power in the office of the president. Executive aggrandizement will deepen ideological polarization and electoral mobilization by significantly raising the stakes of the game for both the incumbent and the opposition. As such, we posit that the new presidential system will institutionalize the de facto personalism and majoritarian rule that the AKP has hitherto established in recent years. This trend is likely to trigger a transition from a competitive authoritarian to hegemonic electoral authoritarianism in case of Tayyip Erdoğan’s election, thus placing Turkey on par with the strongest executive systems around the globe such as Russia and Venezuela.

ABSTRACTScholars tend to assume that consolidated democracies are free from the global retreat of democracy due to their strong institutions and economic development. Yet, populist forces that challenge the liberal democratic model have started to increase their support even in Western countries. However, in no country has democratic backsliding taken scholars by more surprise than in the United States. This article addresses the question of how a populist figure like Donald Trump managed to win the presidential election and subsequently undermined the democratic institutions in one of the world’s oldest democracies. We contend that the upsurge of populist leaders in contemporary Western democracies resulted from the political establishment’s failure to juggle responsiveness and responsibility simultaneously. In addition to our discussion of American politics, we draw parallels with the Turkish case to demonstrate our causal argument and offer suggestions on how to reverse democrati...

Ce chapitre analyse les changements dans les stratégies de légitimation ciblant des publics nationaux de l'opposition bélarusse, reconnue par l'Occident, suite à l'agression russe contre l'Ukraine à partir de 2022. Ces groupes comprennent, d'octobre 2020 à août 2022, la direction anti-crise (NAU) dirigée par Pavel Latushka, située à Varsovie, et le bureau de Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, situé à Vilnius. Le chapitre applique l'analyse du discours de Teun van Dijk aux entretiens des représentants de l'opposition avec les médias indépendants biélorusses avant l'invasion à grande échelle (d'octobre 2020 à février 2022) et au cours des six premiers mois de l'invasion. Le chapitre conclut que la guerre a entraîné des changements considérables dans les stratégies de légitimation de l'opposition biélorusse ciblant les publics nationaux. Le régime est « altéré » sur de nouvelles bases liées à la guerre. L' « identification collective » avec le peuple est plus souvent construite sur des bases ethnolinguistiques. Auparavant, l'opposition en exil promouvait un projet identitaire hybride qui comportait des éléments des discours identitaires du régime et de l'opposition. La guerre a également vu l'émergence de la dimension géopolitique, malgré les intentions initiales de l'opposition.

This article argues that populism in power translates into a greater tendency to politicize foreign policy, in the sense of defining and articulating foreign policy preferences in opposition to political predecessors, using foreign policy as an instrument and ground to battle political opponents, and over-prioritizing domestic incentives and considerations over external ones. Paradoxically, compared to other classical determinants of foreign policy, how populism relates to domestic political competition has received scant attention. Yet, populist actors' strategies in dealing with political opposition are at the same time distinctive and consequential. This article advances a typological theoretical framework shedding light on the pathways, patterns, and implications of populist politicization, which it illustrates empirically with reference to the case of Poland.

The Greek political scene was shaken by large worker and student protests last week. Specifically, the narrative of the "uncontested" government of the  New Democracy Party has taken a strong blow since last week's protests followed a large farmer demonstration in Athens the week before. The idea that government opposition always needs a "contester" party is not true after all. (PARON 3/3/2024)

In September 2023, five Bulgarians--Orlin, Rusev, Vanya Gaberova, Ivan Stoyanov, and Bizer Dzhambazov and Katrin Ivanova as a couple--appeared in a British court charged with 'conspiring to collect information intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy', in other words, espionage. Some have assessed that the five Bulgarians were Russian intelligence illegals similar to others arrested since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, like Mikhail Mikushin/José Assis Giammaria, who was arrested while working at the Arctic University of Norway in Tromsø, and Sergey Cherkasov/Viktor Muller Ferreira, who was refused entry into the Netherlands to start a position at the International Criminal Court. Both Mikushin and Cherkasov were affiliated with the Russian military intelligence service, the GU (formerly known as the GRU). However, several aspects of the Bulgarians' case are different and cast doubt on the assessment that they were illegals like Mikushin and Cherkasov.

On September 25th, 2023, DPI held an online Assessment Meeting titled: ‘How to Build Common Interests: Current Situation in Türkiye and Opportunities for Conflict Resolution.’ The event aimed to generate an in-depth conversation about the current situation in Türkiye and realistic prospects for a possible resolution process. Our speakers for the event were academic and Director of the Istanbul Policy Centre, Professor Dr Fuat Keyman, and academic and UN Standby Team Senior Mediation Advisor, Esra Çuhadar. While Keyman gave an overview of the current situation in Türkiye, Çuhadar focused on the opportunities and challenges that the situation presented from a conflict resolution perspective.
The discussion focused on the current state of civil society in Türkiye, and the importance of civil society in keeping the prospect of peace alive in Türkiye and moving the peace agenda forward. Other topics covered included the current state of the opposition in Türkiye, brain drain, the spread of the conflict into the wider region through Northern Iraq and Syria, and a collective sense of dissatisfaction and hopelessness. Participants and speakers both emphasised the importance of rekindling hope, and empathy, and the important role that civil society organisations, and especially DPI can play in building hope and empathy for those in the country.
We would like to express our gratitude to the speakers and participants for an engaging and timely discussion. DPI will continue to organise Assessment Meetings in regular intervals to host speakers representing the broad spectrum of different political affiliations in Türkiye.
This event is part of a larger series of activities planned in the context of the project Supporting the Pro-Peace Agenda in Türkiye and the Region, supported by the Norwegian, Irish, and Swiss governments.

Colombia está viviendo una honda crisis política debido al fraccionamiento del sistema de partidos (37 partidos con personería jurídica) y a la ausencia tanto de un verdadero partido de gobierno como de un verdadero partido de oposición. Tres escenarios se vislumbran: una parálisis institucional, un viraje autoritario del gobierno (indeseables) o un gran acuerdo nacional (deseable). ¿Cuál de estos escenarios va a prevalecer?

In this study, I delve into the history of the Hungarian language samizdat journal Ellenpontok (Counterpoints) that appeared in Romania in 1982, primarily focusing on its impact and reception. On one hand, I argue that despite its brief existence and limited distribution, the samizdat journal had a significant social and political impact. To highlight a few of these positive effects, Ellenpontok inspired further dissident activities in Romania, led to a shift in editorial policy at Radio Free Europe in favor of Hungarian minority communities, and brought human rights and ethnic minority issues from Romania to international forums and diplomatic discussions. On the other hand, I contend that the samizdat journal received far less appreciation at the time compared to how it is remembered collectively today. While a transnational support network facilitated its creation and message dissemination, within Romania, it faced nearly unanimous rejection from state authorities, Romanian intellectuals, and the vocal segment of the Hungarian elite. The dismissive attitude of the Hungarians can be attributed in part to frustration and personal resentments, but it also stemmed from the decisive incompatibility of active resistance with the informal-individual bargaining model of minority interest representation and claim-making employed by the Transylvanian Hungarian cultural and political elite. One can ascertain that the informal model of representation operated by the Hungarian political and cultural elite effectively limited active resistance. To analyze the reception of the samizdat journal, I draw upon interviews and recollections of the journal's editors and their contemporaries, secret service documents (Securitate), as well as the literature on the Romanian dissidence.