Rawls

This paper explores the epistemological impact of the idea of post-secularism on the concept of public reason. It does so by examining a strand of the Rawls-Habermas debate
on the role of religious beliefs within public reason. The paper identifies a difficulty in the liberal solution that depends upon the unwillingness to challenge the proviso-like conception of
public reason and contends that this difficulty is overcome neither by Habermas’ “institutional” version of proviso nor by Cristina Lafont’s version of “mutual accountability” proviso. Once
acknowledged this blind spot in the theory of public reason, the paper proceeds to show that a pragmatist-based conception of public reason can overcome this shortcoming as it grants
to religious beliefs a role that does not compromise the liberal ethics of citizenship while at the same time does not frustrate the communitarian and religious call for a less restrictive
conception of the public sphere. The conclusion this paper brings home is that a proviso-free public reason is necessary for tackling the theoretical challenge of defending liberalism in a
post-secular society.

Like most egalitarian political philosophers, John Rawls believes that a just society will rely on markets and business firms for much of its economic activity—despite acknowledging that market systems will tend to create very unequal distributions of goods, opportunities, power, and status. Rawls himself remains one of the few contemporary political philosophers to explore at any length the way an egalitarian theory of justice might deal with fundamental options in political economy. This article examines his arguments and conclusions on these topics. It argues that contemporary Rawlsians will reach different conclusions if they take more seriously than Rawls himself did: (1) the implications, for the political culture and the democratic regulatory state, of large firms competing in adversarial markets characterized by the inevitable “fact of market failure,” and (2) the relevance of ownership and governance relationships involving different kinds of business firms. And with respect to the second point, Rawlsians and other egalitarians have much to learn from contemporary economic, legal, and sociological theories of the firm, and their role in studying the structure of and rationale for corporate law. This is the kind of social theory that Rawls believes is relevant to the justification and application of theories of justice, but he himself did not appeal to it in his writings on political economy. Contemporary egalitarians can and should appeal to it now, and in doing so correct errors and omissions in Rawls’s analysis. But taking seriously the two points mentioned above will also force egalitarians who support efficient markets to face difficult dilemmas or compromises of their own.

This article aims to open a new line of debate about religion in public schools
by focusing on religious ideals. The article begins with an elucidation of the concept
‘religious ideals’ and an explanation of the notion of reasonable pluralism, in order to be able to explore the dangers and positive contributions of religious ideals and their pursuit on a liberal democratic society. We draw our examples of religious ideals from Christianity and Islam, because these religions have most adherents in Western liberal democracies that are the focus of this article. The fifth and most important section ‘‘Reasonable pluralism and the inclusion of religious ideals in public secondary schools’’ provides three arguments for our claim that public schools should include religious ideals, namely that they are important to religious people, that they are conducive for the development of pupils into citizens of a liberal democracy, and that the flourishing of pupils as adults is advanced by encountering religious ideals. We also offer a more practical reason: religious ideals can more easily be included within public education than religious dogmas and rules.

Bu çalışma J. Rawls’ın Adalet Teorisi eserinde teorik bağlamda temellendirdiği ve Siyasal Liberalizm adlı çalışmasında çeşitli gerekçelendirmelerle açıkladığı kapsamlı kuramını adalet ve iktisadi adalet perspektifinde analiz etme gayesini gütmektedir. Amaca uygun şekilde ilk olarak J. Rawls’ın Siyasal Liberalizm’inin içeriği hakkında bilgi verilecektir. Sonra Rawls’ın iyi düzenlenmiş olarak öngördüğü liberal, demokratik ve anayasal yapıya sahip toplumsal organizasyonlarda istikrar için gerekli saydığı kurumlar ele alınacaktır. Buradan hareketle temel yapı içinde ahlaki hissiyata sahip özgür ve eşit kişilerin hangi ilkelerden dayanak bularak toplumsal ve ekonomik eşitsizlikleri hakkaniyete uygun şekilde sürdürülebilir addedebileceği sorusu irdelenecektir. Daha sonra çizilen çerçeve dâhilinde iktisadi adaleti tesis edeceği tasvir edilen makul ve rasyonel siyasal özne kavramı Rawls’ın ‘’makul’’ ve ‘’rasyonel’’ açıklamalarıyla birlikte değerlendirilecektir. Siyasal süreçlerin doğurduğu çatışmaları ve uzlaşmaları idrak ederek çözümleyebilen birey motifinden türeyen kolektif akıl olarak örtüşen görüş birliği ve kamusal akıl tanımlamaları analiz edilecektir. Zira Rawls’ın ortaya koyduğu teori içerisinde farklı dini, felsefi, ahlaki olmakla birlikte aynı zamanda makul (olsun veya olmasın) ve fakat karşıt kapsamlı doktrinlerin çokluğu halinde bu kavramların tatbiki birlikte yaşamanın zeminini güçlü ve işler hale getirebilecek öğeler içermektedir. Bu bilgilerden hareketle teorinin savunması şeklinde ele alınan ve Rawls’ın, Habermas’ın eleştirilerine karşı yanıtlarını içeren bölüm sonuç kapsamında açıklanacaktır. Rawls’ın Siyasal Liberalizm eserinin iktisadi boyutunun irdelenmesi günümüzde yaygın olarak görülen heterojen toplumların yapısına dair anekdotlar sunmaktadır.

This study aims to analyze that J. Rawls’ comprehensive theory in the context of justice and economic justice perspective that based on the theoretical sheaf of Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism that he explained with various reasons. Within the scope of purpose first will be given informations about the content of J. Rawls’ Political Liberalism. Then will be contextualised the institutions that are considered necessary for stability in social organizations with liberal, democratic and constitutional structure which Rawls foreseen as well ordered. From this point of view will be examined the question of which principles can be considered as equitable and sustainable by social and economic inequalities by considering the principles of free and equal persons in the basic structure. Within the scope of drawn borders will be analyzed the concept of reasonable and rational political subject which will be described as establishing economic justice within the framework will be evaluated along with the ‘’reasonable’’ and ‘’rational’’ explanations of Rawls. Later on will be analyzed ‘’overlapping consensus’’ and  ‘’public reason’’ definitions as the collective mind derived from the individual design that can resolve the conflicts and compromises created by political processes. Because of the theory put forward by Rawls the application of these concepts include elements that different in terms of religious, philosophical, moral but at the same time reasonable (or not) in the case of a large number of opposing doctrines that can make the basis of living together strong and functional. Based on these informations will be explained the section as the conclusion which is considered as the defense of theory and includes the responses of Rawls against Habermas’s criticism. The analysis of the economic dimension of the work of Rawls' Political Liberalism presents anecdotes about the structure of heterogeneous societies that are common these times.

Contemporary debates about ideal and non-ideal theory rest on an underlying consensus that the primary practical task of political theory is directing action. This overlooks other urgent practical work that theory can do, including showing how injustice can be made bearable and how resisting it can be meaningful. I illustrate this important possibility by revisiting the purpose for which John Rawls originally developed the concept of ideal theory: reconciling a democratic public to living in a flawed world that may otherwise seem more of a home for catastrophe than justice. However, Rawls's account of reconciliation is flawed; because of his methodology, the realistic utopia he constructs as a source of hope can be used to defend an unjust status quo. By drawing lessons from Theodor Adorno's contrasting view of reconciliation after the Holocaust, I offer a more democratic method for political theory to offer sources of hope to the public.

One of John Rawls's major aims, when he wrote A Theory of Justice, was to present a superior alternative to utilitarianism. Rawls's worry was that utilitarianism may fail to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of persons in its attempt to maximize total social welfare. Rawls's main argument against utilitarianism was that, for such reasons, the representative parties in the original position will not choose util-itarianism, but will rather choose his justice as fairness, which he believed would securely protect the worth of everybody's basic rights and liberties. In this paper, I will argue that, under close formal examination, Rawls's argument against utilitari-anism is self-defeating. That is, I will argue that Rawls's own reasons, assumptions, and the many theoretical devices he employs demonstrably imply that the representative parties in the original position will choose utilitarianism instead of justice as fairness.

Uma das diferenças principais entre o liberalismo político e a teoria da ação comunicativa repousa na fundamentação oferecida por seus formuladores da neutralidade de procedimento para alcançar princípios
que devam reger as práticas e instituições políticas diante da pluralidade das doutrinas abrangentes em sociedades marcadas por uma grande heterogeneidade social e cultural. Tal distinção na fundamentação aparece com clareza na noção de razão pública, tema central do famoso debate no qual Rawls lança mão da
idéia de overllaping consensus para explicitar uma concepção política da justiça que possa ser aceita pelas diversas doutrinas abrangentes de uma sociedade democrática bem-ordenada. Já o procedimento ideal de
Habermas é o da deliberação, que pressupõe uma associação que se julga capaz de regular de um modo imparcial as condições de convivência numa sociedade, fazendo uso, para isso, de uma racionalidade procedimental para a justificação moral. Trata-se assim, aqui, de elucidar e debater duas fundamentações distintas (neutralidade de objetivo e princípio racionalmente justificável) da noção de razão pública.

Technological and societal changes have made downward social and economic mobility a pressing issue in real-world politics. This article argues that a Rawlsian society would not provide any special protection against downward mobility, and would act rightly in declining to provide such protection. Special treatment for the downwardly mobile can be grounded neither in Rawls's core principles—the basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference prin-ciple—nor in other aspects of Rawls's theory (the concept of legitimate expectations, the idea of a life plan, the distinction between allocative and distributive justice, or the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory). Instead, a Rawlsian society is willing to sacrifice particular individuals' ambitions and plans for the achievement of justice, and offers those who lose out from justified change no special solicitude over and above the general solicitude extended to all. Rather than guaranteeing the maintenance of any particular individual or group's economic position, it provides all of its members—the upwardly mobile, the downwardly mobile, and the immobile—a form of security that is at once more generous and more limited: that they will receive the liberties, opportunities, and resources promised by the principles of justice.

The first principle of Rawls's conception of justice secures a set of 'basic liberties' equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The 'worth' of citizens' liberties, however, may vary depending upon their wealth. Against Rawls, G.A. Cohen contends that an absence of money often can directly constrain citizens' freedom, and not simply its worth. This is because money often can remove legally enforced constraints on what citizens can do. Cohen's argument – if modified to apply to citizens' 'moral powers' rather than 'negative liberty' – threatens a core feature of Rawls's conception of justice, as it is unclear why the parties within the 'original position' would endorse the lexical priority of the first principle over the 'difference principle' (which concerns the distribution of wealth) if both principles similarly shape citizens' freedom. I concede Cohen's point regarding the relation between freedom and money, but argue that it is not fatal to Rawls's conception of justice if the 'basic needs principle' is understood to enjoy lexical priority over the first principle, and is modified to include a right to adequate discretionary time. Nonetheless, Cohen's argument helpfully highlights the infelicitous nature of Rawls's terminology with respect to liberty: the basic needs principle, the first principle, and the difference principle all should be understood as shaping citizens' freedom to exercise their moral powers.

One of the significant developments in the interdisciplinary field of judgment and decision making is the classification of environments as a function of (a) their capacity to enable people to learn from experience (kind environments vs. wicked environments) and (b) the consequences of having failed to understand and adapt to them (exacting environments vs. lenient environments). Based on the premise that 'environment' is a key geographical concept, I explore the usefulness of appropriating these classifications in geography and argue that they can stimulate normative work on the possible contours of a better world as well as illuminate in novel ways long-standing geographical concerns with the problematic of fairness. Les figures de l'environnement : ´ eléments de réflexion sur les bases envisageables d'un monde meilleur Parmi les innovations qui ont marqué la recherche interdisciplinaire sur le jugement et la décision, se trouve la classification des environnements définie en fonction : a) d'un mécanisme de base par lequel on peut tirer des enseignements de l'expérience (des environnements sains par opposition aux environnements hostiles) et b) des effets néfastes liés au fait que l'on n'a pasété en mesure de comprendre et de s'adapter (des environnements rigoureux par opposition aux environnements permissifs). En partant du principe selon lequel « l'environnement » est un concept central en géographie se pose la question de la pertinence de situer ces classifications dans une perspective géographique. Cetté etude fait valoir qu'elles peuvent en effet dynamiser les travaux afin de formuler des normes permettant d'´ etablir les bases envisageables d'un monde meilleur et de jeter un nouveí eclairage sur les enjeux géographiques autour de la problématique de l'´ equité. Mots clés : environnement, normativité, néolibéralisme, géographies de la moralité, apprentissage, ´ equité

This essay assesses the compatibility of Eva Kittay's dependency critique with Rawlsian political liberalism. I argue for the inclusion of a modified version of Kittay's revisions within Rawlsian theory in order to yield a theory that supports much of dependency work. Beyond these selected changes, however, I argue that Kittay's other proposed changes should not be included because they are incompatible with Rawls, and furthermore, their incorporation does not yield a theory that includes utter dependents.

Rawls’ primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that he standardised a particular method of arguing about it: justification via reflective equilibrium. Yet this method, despite such standardisation, is often misunderstood in at least four ways. First, we miss its continuity across his various works. Second, we miss the way in which it unifies other justificatory ideas, such as the ‘original position’ and an ‘overlapping consensus’. Third, we miss its fundamentally empirical character, given that it turns facts about the thoughts in our head into principles for the regulation of our political existence. Fourth, we miss some of the implications of that empiricism, including its tension with moral realism, relativism, and conservatism.

Toleration and neutrality are not always distinguished. When they are, they are often offered as two complementary solutions for the problem of achieving political unity and a degree of mutual acceptance within a pluralist liberal polity. The essay shows the concepts to be fundamentally distinct, and then argues that instead of being mutually supporting, they are mutually exclusive. Neutralist liberals, it is argued, must give up toleration in favour of the virtue of neutrality on the part of citizens.

The paper proposes a general account of the structure and stages of typical political TEs, largely analogous to the structure of TEs in other domains. It takes into account historical considerations, discussing the two dominant families of political TEs in the history of Western political thought, first, the Platonic tradition of ideal states, out of which arguably derives the tradition of utopian thinking continuing in literary fiction as well as in philosophical and narrowly political writing. It then passes  to the other family of political TEs, i.e. the  social contract tradition. It turns out  that literary anti-utopias typically deploy crucial philosophical ideas traditionally typical of the social contact tradition in their criticism of their traditional positive counterparts. The concluding discussion combines a historical sketch and a topical-conceptual discussion for and against political TEs, arguing in their favor against the critical tradition from Aristotle to present day.

In this article I examine the main conceptions of public reason in contemporary political
philosophy (Rawls, Habermas, critical theory) in order to set the frame for appreciating the
novelty of the pragmatist understanding of public reason as based upon the notion of
consequences and upon a theory of rationality as inquiry. The approach is inspired by
Dewey but is free from any concern with history of philosophy. The aim is to propose a
different understanding of the nature of public reason aimed at overcoming the limitations
of the existing approaches. Public reason is presented as the proper basis for discussing
contested issues in the broad frame of deep democracy.

Se comprende por "contractualismo" la teoría por la cual se explica y justifica el fundamento y la posibilidad de la sociedad a partir de un pacto entre sus miembros y que fuera desarrollado en toda su expresión en la Modernidad. Los motivos que condicionaron en la Modernidad el surgimiento de esta teoría social fueron la secularización de la sociedad, que ya había comenzado a gestarse en el Medioevo y una concepción atomista de la sociedad. Rastreando los orígenes de esta doctrina pueden hallarse desarrollos incipientes en los sofistas. Otros teóricos teóricos del Derecho y del Estado, como M. Villey, colocaron el acento en el papel que le cupo en este aspecto a William of Ockham. En este sentido es posible afirmar que sobre el contractualismo moderno se perciben influencias no puramente políticas, provenientes de la corriente nominalista fundada por Ockham.

Are intellectual property rights for talented people justified by Rawls’ criteria of justice? In this paper, I argue that Rawls’ theory of justice is ill-equipped to answer this question. Tailored for rival goods and, as a result, centred on the distribution of benefits, it tends to restate questions of justice about unequal rights as questions about economic inequalities. Therefore, it lacks the tools necessary to distinguish among different forms of incentives for talented people. Once social and economic inequalities observe equality of opportunity and improve the least advantaged, the theory is indifferent as to whether talented people are allowed to compete for monopoly rights or for direct financial reward.

I show that John Rawls’s idea of an overlapping consensus cannot solve the stability problem on Rawls’s own terms. Overlapping consensus and modus vivendi, are, Rawls says, “agreements in judgment.” As such, however, they are indistinguishable from, and therefore theoretically superfluous to each other. If, to avoid this problem, either idea is construed as that of anything but some kind of agreement in judgment, it becomes absurdly identical with Rawls’s categories of either “strict consensus” or “strictly-partitioned consensus.” The idea of an overlapping consensus must therefore be either incoherent or superfluous, and either way cannot solve the stability problem.

This paper articulates Rawls's conception of toleration within international political and law-making activity set out in "The Law of Peoples" within and by reference to the architectonic first set out in "Theory" and then recast in "Political Liberalism." The aim of so doing is to shed much needed light on Rawls's discussion in "Peoples" of so-called decent well-ordered peoples and of benevolent absolutisms.

A review of Ronald Beiner's Political Philosophy: What It Is and Why It Matters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). In affirming political philosophy as a clash of epic theories, Beiner aestheticizes it, since he treats it as a kind of competitive game. A shorter version of this review was published in the The Review of Politics 78, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 307–308

Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity has been regularly discussed and criticized for being inadequate regarding natural inequalities. In so far as this egalitarian goal is sound, the purpose of the paper is to see how the prospect of radical genetic intervention might affect this particular inadequacy. I propose that, in a post-genetic setting, an appropriate response would be to extend the same rules regulating societal inequalities to a regulation of comparable genetic inequalities. I defend this stance against recent arguments from the authors of From Chance to Choice and from Colin Farrelly’s alternative of the genetic difference principle.

Este artículo parte de la premisa de que en las democracias liberales actuales se extiende un nuevo estilo discursivo propiamente cínico. El artículo traza una genealogía de este cinismo político partiendo del liberalismo político de John Rawls y recalando en la teoría agonística de la democracia de Chantal Mouffe, e intenta mostrar que la superación del liberalismo político que la teoría agonística lleva años proponiendo parece realizarse finalmente a través del cinismo, aunque con resultados diferentes de los esperados: la expansión del cinismo en la esfera pública debe entenderse como una degradación del debate público con consecuencias políticas inquietantes.

Resumen
El presente trabajo de grado profundiza y desarrolla las características de la objeción de conciencia y la desobediencia civil proporcionadas por el filósofo John Rawls en Teoría de la Justicia. Así mismo, se articularán con el concepto de 'dignidad humana' al caso colombiano proponiendo algunos parámetros de análisis y de fundamentación de criterios para una teoría unitaria de estas dos instituciones.

Abstract
This paper grade explores and develops the characteristics of conscientious objection and civil disobedience providad by the work of philosopher John Rawls in his Theory of Justice. These are linked to the concept of human dignity to the Colombian case proposing some parameters of analysis and justification of legal criteria for a unified theory of these two institutions.

This is the PDF-Powerpoint of the paper I used for my exposition during the Webinar on ““A Theory of Justice” at 50: Revisiting John Rawls’ Legacy”, organised by Prof. B S Bhargava Chair on Decentralized Governance & Development Centre for Rural Management (CRM), Kottayam, Kerala on Saturday, 29th May 2021 Time: 14.30 - 17.30 India Time.

In Equal Citizenship and Public  Reason, Watson and Hartley dispute the claim that Rawls’s doctrine of political liberalism must tolerate gender hierarchy because it counts conservative and orthodox religions as reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  I argue that their defense in fact contains two arguments, both of which fail.  The first, which I call the “Deliberative Equality Argument”,  fails because it does not establish conclusively that political liberalism’s demand for equal citizenship forbids social practices of domination, as the authors contend.  The second, which I call the “Equal Liberties Argument”, fails because it supports a particular version of political liberalism and not the doctrine itself.

En este artículo se analizan las teorías del contractualismo de Hobbes, la cual postula que los seres humanos deben cumplir con mínimos deberes pactados, y de la justicia social de Rawls, la cual impone el deber de ayuda mutua. Lo anterior con la finalidad de evidenciar cómo la solidaridad, a manera de adhesión a las causas de los demás, se erige en un concepto que justifica al JDLS. Este trabajo se desarrolla gracias a una metodología analítica e interpretativa de las corrientes filosóficas mencionadas y se encontró que esas perspectivas teóricas coinciden en cuanto a la necesidad de que los integrantes de un estado se ayuden unos a otros. Tales hallazgos sugieren que la solidaridad es, precisamente, uno de los motivos justificadores de ese juicio democrático, ya que la adhesión a las causas de los demás que esto implica, significa un cuidado de parte de los demás miembros de la sociedad e involucra que la ciudadanía, en esa acción de cuidado, realice ciertas acciones relacionadas con ese JDLS.

This paper adresses Rawls’ theory of desert. Objecting to the classical account of distributive justice, the Rawlsian theory of justice rejects the formula "to each according to his own merit". Rawls considers that our natural endowment in intelligence is no more fair than any inequality associated with inheritance. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of a person does not give by itself any right. In the well-ordered society, the regulation of inequalities defines a system of legitimate expectations independent of merit, whether related to performance, skills or efforts. The classical rationale of justice as adapting retribution and contribution is here dismissed. As long as the principles of justice apply, everyone has a right to what is theirs, but this does not imply that they deserve it.

RESUMO: Neste trabalho pretende-se fazer algumas considerações sobre o que seria um Estado Laico Razoável, com base no pensamento de John Rawls. Para tanto, apresenta-se a concepção liberal política rawlsiana por meio da discussão sobre igual liberdade, questionando o que seria uma doutrina abrangente e razoável e como conviver com doutrinas não-razoáveis em uma sociedade democrática que preza pelo pluralismo, assim como a discussão acerca da relação Estado/Religião na esfera pública. Adota-se a perspectiva de um Estado Laico baseado nos conceitos de igual liberdade e consenso sobreposto rawlsianos, onde toma-se por ponto de partida a concepção de Igual liberdade e procura-se o consenso entre doutrinas abrangentes, sejam elas filosóficas, religiosas ou morais, respeitando assim o pluralismo de formas de vida.


Palavras–chave: Consenso Sobreposto. Razoabilidade. Igual Liberdade. REASONABLE SECULAR STATE: SOME CONSIDERATIONS

Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century has, in the words of Paul Krugman, “transformed our economic discourse” about wealth and inequality. It is difficult to think of a recent work of social science that has received as much attention, or had so much impact, both within academic debates and in terms of broader public discourse. Piketty’s work clearly carries weighty implications not only for economics, but also for many neighboring disciplines, among which we can count political philosophy. Now that the dust has settled after the initial round of scholarly engagement with Piketty’s book, and after Piketty himself has had the opportunity to refine and finesse the central points of his analysis in a slew of post-Capital writings, the time is ripe for an assessment of the book’s full significance from the standpoint of political philosophy, and to consider its full implications in terms of how we should think about public policy.

In this article I examine the main conceptual, historical, and normative
claims of Piketty’s Capital, and show how the book provides an important impetus towards an egalitarian research agenda in political philosophy and public policy. I begin in sections II through IV by considering Piketty’s main conceptual and historical claims about the dynamics of inequality. In section V, I consider the normative commitments of Piketty’s account of inequality, look at the (partially submerged or implicit) ways in which Capital in the Twenty-First Century can itself be read as a work of political philosophy, and relate Piketty’s egalitarianism to philosophical accounts of the badness of socio-economic inequality. Section VI addresses some aspects of the general significance of Capital for the discipline of political philosophy. Finally, sections VII and VIII consider a range of strategies for egalitarian public policy, showing the role of political philosophy in laying out the space of possible alternative approaches, and maps an agenda for future research.

This paper argues that citizens have a basic right to invite family members and spouses into their society on the basis of Rawlsian egalitarian premises. This right is argued to be just as basic as other recognized basic rights, such as freedom of speech. The argument suggests further that we must treat immigration and family reunification, in particular, as central issues of domestic justice. The paper also examines the implications of these points for the importance of immigration in liberal domestic justice and suggests avenues for further research on the interplay of considerations of justice towards citizens and non-citizens.

In this essay I first set out the advantages the " multivariate democratic polity " framework proposed by Ferrara offers in comparison to other more consensus-based notions of democratic legitimacy. Secondly, I highlight some ambiguities concerning the meta-theoretical status of this frame, since it is not clear whether it consists of an adaptive realistic description, or otherwise is a normative argument. Thirdly, I cast some doubts on the compatibility between the multivariate frame and the " dualist conception of democratic constitutionalism " adopted by Ferrara, since the latter seems too indebted to the domestic analogy, and to a consensus-based model of legitimacy. Finally, I argue that the dualist approach does not seem a convenient way to include citizenship in deliberative processes, and the question of the emergence of a transnational demos should rather be reconsidered as crucial for this purpose.

I reply to the critics of my book In A Better World? Public Reason and Biotechnologies. The discussion is framed through several issues: normativity (I describe Estlund's difference between aspirational and concessive justice, and I indicate that the discussion in my book is framed in terms of concessive justice; further, I explain why we must endorse a public reason justification in matters of biotechnologies), fair equality of opportunity and equal liberty (in terms of concessive justice, I reject their strict priority in relation to questions of justice about genetic enhancement), self-respect (I defend the thesis that under fair respect of the interests of the least advantaged, there are no conclusive reasons to think that unequally available genetic enhancement harms self-respect), disease and treatment (I offer a public reason defence of treatment), parental rights (they do not include the right to impose sectarian conceptions of value) and talents (there are no conclusive reasons to think that talents enhanced by genetic interventions would strongly harm social equality).

Resumen El presente trabajo busca recorrer cómo ha sido la recepción y reformulación durante los últimos veinte años del viejo anhelo kantiano sobre la posibilidad de alcanzar la paz perpetua entre los hombres. Para ello; primero, se presentará la propuesta originaria de Kant, establecida en 1795, y, luego, se analizarán las revisiones y posturas críticas que generó después de haberse cumplido el bicentenario del lanzamiento del sueño kantiano. De este modo, se recorrerán las posiciones asumidas por Jünger Habermas, Samuel Huntington, John Rawls y Negri-Hardt, presentando en cada uno de los casos su peculiar mirada dentro de la actual era de la globalización.