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Learning from private information in noisy repeated games. (2011). Fudenberg, Drew ; Yamamoto, Yuichi.
In: Journal of Economic Theory.
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1733-1769.

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  1. Daily commuting. (2023). Berliant, Marcus.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:116529.

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  2. Daily Commuting. (2022). Berliant, Marcus.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:113862.

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  3. Daily commuting. (2020). Berliant, Marcus.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:100169.

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  4. Repeated coordination with private learning. (2020). Tamuz, Omer ; Hoshino, Tetsuya ; Chatterjee, Kalyan ; Basu, Pathikrit.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:190:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120300995.

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  5. Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games. (2019). Yamamoto, Yuichi ; Sugaya, Takuo.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:19-008.

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  6. Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Fifth version. (2018). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:18-028.

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  7. Belief-free price formation. (2018). Horner, Johannes ; Tomala, Tristan ; Lovo, Stefano.
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:127:y:2018:i:2:p:342-365.

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  8. Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion. (2018). Bhattacharya, Vivek ; Straub, Ludwig ; Manuelli, Lucas.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:175:y:2018:i:c:p:1-37.

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  9. Repeated Coordination with Private Learning. (2018). Tamuz, Omer ; Hoshino, Tetsuya ; Chatterjee, Kalyan ; Basu, Pathikrit.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:1809.00051.

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  10. Belief-free Price Formation. (2017). Hörner, Johannes ; Lovo, Stefano ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:31598.

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  11. We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known. (2017). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:17-011.

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  12. Stochastic Games With Hidden States, Fourth Version. (2017). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:16-012.

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  13. Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting. (2014). Peski, Marcin.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:1390.

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  14. Welfare and Optimal Trading Frequency in Dynamic Double Auctions. (2014). Du, Songzi ; Zhu, Haoxiang.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20588.

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  15. Markov Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Supermodular Games with Imperfect Private and Public Information. (2013). Woźny, Łukasz ; Reffett, Kevin ; Balbus, Łukasz ; Wony, Ukasz.
    In: Dynamic Games and Applications.
    RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:3:y:2013:i:2:p:187-206.

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  16. Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games. (2013). Tomala, Tristan.
    In: Mathematics of Operations Research.
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:38:y:2013:i:4:p:617-637.

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References

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