Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

create a website
We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known. (2017). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
RePEc:pen:papers:17-011.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 0

Citations received by this document

Cites: 26

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

    This document has not been cited yet.

References

References cited by this document

  1. Athey, S., and K. Bagwell (2001): “Optimal Collusion with Private Information,” RAND Journal of Economics 32, 428-465.

  2. Athey, S., and K. Bagwell (2008): “Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks,” Econometrica 76, 493-540.

  3. Connault, B. (2015): “Hidden Rust Models,” mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  4. Dutta, P. (1995): “A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games,” Journal of Economic Theory 66, 1-32.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  5. Fudenberg, D., and D.K. Levine (1994): “Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players,” Journal of Economic Theory 62, 103135.

  6. Fudenberg, D., and Y. Yamamoto (2010): “Repeated Games where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure are Unknown,” Econometrica 78, 1673-1710.

  7. Fudenberg, D., and Y. Yamamoto (2011a): “Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games,” Journal of Economic Theory 146, 1733-1769.

  8. Fudenberg, D., and Y. Yamamoto (2011b): “The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring,” Journal of Economic Theory 146, 1664-1683.

  9. Fudenberg, D., D.K. Levine, and E. Maskin (1994): “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,” Econometrica 62, 997-1040.

  10. Green, E.J., and R.H. Porter (1984): “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,” Econometrica 52, 87-100.

  11. Hörner, J., and S. Lovo (2009): “Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information,” Econometrica 77, 453-487.

  12. Hörner, J., S. Lovo, and T. Tomala (2011): “Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence,” Journal of Economic Theory 146, 1770-1795.

  13. Hörner, J., S. Takahashi, and N. Vieille (2015): “Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games,” Econometrica 83, 1795-1848.

  14. Hörner, J., T. Sugaya, S. Takahashi, and N. Vieille (2011): “Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: an Algorithm for δ → 1 and a Folk Theorem,” Econometrica 79, 1277-1318.

  15. Kandori, M., and H. Matsushima (1998): “Private Observation, Communication and Collusion,” Econometrica 66, 627-652.

  16. Koren, G. (1992): “Two-Person Repeated Games where Players Know Their Own Payoffs,” mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  17. Levin, J. (2003): “Relational Incentive Contracts,” American Economic Review 93, 835-857.

  18. Radner, R., R. Myerson, and E. Maskin (1986): “An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria,” Review of Economic Studies 53, 59-70.

  19. Sekiguchi, T. (1997): “Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Private Monitoring,” Journal of Economic Theory 76, 345-361.

  20. Seneta, E. (1981): Non-negative Matrices and Markov Chains, Springer.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  21. Shalev, J. (1994): “Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs,” Games and Economic Behavior 7, 246259.

  22. Shapley, L. (1953): “Stochastic Games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 39, 1095-1100.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  23. Wiseman, T. (2005): “A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions,” Econometrica 73, 629-645.

  24. Wiseman, T. (2012) “A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning,” Theoretical Economics 7, 217-239.

  25. Yamamoto, Y. (2014): “Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games,” Review of Economic Studies 81, 473-500.

  26. Yamamoto, Y. (2016): “Stochastic Games with Hidden States,” mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Endogenous Price Commitment, Sticky and Leadership Pricing: Evidence from the Italian Petrol Market. (2013). Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick ; Franck, Jens-Uwe.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenec:16182.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets. (2013). Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick ; Franck, Jens-Uwe.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenec:16179.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination. (2013). Reuter, Tim.
    In: Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    RePEc:knz:dpteco:1309.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Explicit vs. tacit collusion: The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments. (2012). Normann, Hans-Theo ; Fonseca, Miguel.
    In: DICE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:dicedp:65.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Solving payoff sets of perfect public equilibria: an example. (2012). Du, Chuang.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:38622.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. (2012). Harrington, Joseph E. ; Zhao, Wei.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:3:p:277-289.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case. (2012). Lavi, Ron ; Oren, Sigal .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:439-456.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. A dynamic analysis of collusive networks. (2011). Okumura, Yasunori.
    In: Review of Economic Design.
    RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:4:p:317-336.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry. (2011). Miklós-Thal, Jeanine ; Miklos-Thal, Jeanine.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:46:y:2011:i:1:p:99-125.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Optimal International Agreement and Treatment of Domestic Subsidy. (2011). Lee, Gea M..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:siu:wpaper:01-2011.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions. (2011). Rachmilevitch, Shiran.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201109.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Bribing in second-price auctions. (2011). Rachmilevitch, Shiran.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201107.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Which Way to Cooperate. (2011). Ruffle, Bradley ; Kaplan, Todd.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201105.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Learning from private information in noisy repeated games. (2011). Fudenberg, Drew ; Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1733-1769.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Persistent markups in bidding markets with financial constraints. (2011). Hernando-Veciana, Angel ; Beker, Pablo.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:we1133.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices. (2011). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Harrington, Joseph E..
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:6:p:2425-49.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma. (2010). Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., ; Zhao, Wei.
    In: Economics Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:jhu:papers:559.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Optimal collusion with internal contracting. (2010). Lee, Gea M..
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:2:p:646-669.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. How to Coordinate Value Generation in Service Networks. (2009). Conte, Tobias ; Dinther, Clemens ; Weinhardt, Christof ; Blau, Benjamin ; Xu, Yongchun .
    In: Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK.
    RePEc:spr:binfse:v:1:y:2009:i:5:p:343-356.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements and Private Information. (2009). Bagwell, Kyle.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14812.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Optimal Collusion with Limited Severity Constraint. (2009). Billette de Villemeur, Etienne ; Versaevel, Bruno ; Flochel, Laurent .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gat:wpaper:0909.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion. (2009). Gerlach, Heiko.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:6:p:655-666.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of using lotteries ...). (2008). Gruyer, Nicolas .
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:enc:abcdef:auction6.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. On the role of patience in collusive Bertrand duopolies. (2008). Andersson, Ola.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:60-63.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting. (2008). Lee, Gea M..
    In: Development Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:eab:develo:22466.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks. (2007). Bagwell, Kyle ; Athey, Susan.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000898.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Antitrust. (2007). Shapiro, Carl ; Kaplow, Louis.
    In: Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:compol:qt9pt7p9bm.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Stochastic Market Sharing, Partial Communication and Collusion. (2006). Gerlach, Heiko.
    In: Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0501009.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Bargaining in Collusive Markets. (2006). Andersson, Ola.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2006_021.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication. (2006). Mouraviev, Igor .
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0672.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels. (2006). Rey, Patrick ; AUBERT, Cécile ; Kovacic, William E..
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:24:y:2006:i:6:p:1241-1266.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. Examining models of collusion: The market for lysine. (2006). de Roos, Nicolas.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:24:y:2006:i:6:p:1083-1107.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. EFFCIENCY IN TWO PLAYER REPEATED GAMES OF IMPERFECT MONITORING. (2006). Moreira, Humberto ; Monteiro, Eduardo.
    In: Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting].
    RePEc:anp:en2006:113.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey. (2005). Feuerstein, Switgard.
    In: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.
    RePEc:kap:jincot:v:5:y:2005:i:3:p:163-198.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude. (2005). Gruyer, Nicolas .
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:enc:abcdef:auction2.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Games Suppliers and Producers Play : Upstream and Downstream Moral Hazard with Unverifiable Input Quality. (2005). Guha, Brishti.
    In: Microeconomics Working Papers.
    RePEc:eab:microe:22427.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing. (2004). Heidhues, Paul ; Koszegi, Botond.
    In: CIG Working Papers.
    RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2004-17.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Antidumping: Welfare Enhancing Retaliation?. (2004). Vergote, Wouter ; Martin, Alberto.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:5416.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause. (2004). Staiger, Robert ; Bagwell, Kyle.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10987.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy. (2004). Kehoe, Patrick ; Athey, Susan ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: Staff Report.
    RePEc:fip:fedmsr:326.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. The competitive effects of mergers between asymmetric firms. (2004). Thomas, Charles.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:22:y:2004:i:5:p:679-692.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers. (2004). Park, Jee-Hyeong.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:feam04:736.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy. (2004). Kehoe, Patrick ; Athey, Susan ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2004338.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. Collusion and Price Rigidity. (2004). Bagwell, Kyle.
    In: Theory workshop papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000081.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient. (2004). Takahashi, Satoru ; Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000865.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause. (2004). Staiger, Robert ; Bagwell, Kyle.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:att:wimass:200423.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy. (2003). Kehoe, Patrick ; Athey, Susan ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10109.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority. (2003). Harrington, Joseph.
    In: Economics Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:jhu:papers:487.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority. (2002). Harrington, Joseph.
    In: Economics Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:jhu:papers:460.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. Optimal Repeated Auction with Tacit Collusion (joint with Atila Abdulkadiroglu). (2002). Chung, Kim-Sau.
    In: Theory workshop papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000093.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2024-11-28 20:42:18 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.