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Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient. (2007). Takahashi, Satoru ; Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
In: Scholarly Articles.
RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196336.

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  1. Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games. (2021). Rady, Sven ; Klein, Nicolas ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03187515.

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  2. Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games. (2020). Klein, Nicolas ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:124603.

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  3. A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games. (2020). Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00735-z.

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  4. Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games. (2020). Ziliotto, Bruno ; Renault, Jerome.
    In: Mathematics of Operations Research.
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:45:y:2020:i:3:p:889-895.

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  5. Myopic perception in repeated games. (2020). Wen, Quan ; Aramendia, Miguel.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:119:y:2020:i:c:p:1-14.

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  6. Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games. (2019). Rady, Sven ; Klein, Nicolas ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14075.

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  7. Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games. (2019). Rady, Sven ; Klein, Nicolas ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:1910.08953.

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  8. Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring. (2017). Tomala, Tristan ; Laclau, Marie.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:400-424.

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  9. Repeated games with public information revisited. (2016). Tomala, Tristan ; Laclau, Marie.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01285326.

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  10. Repeated games with public information revisited. (2016). Tomala, Tristan ; Laclau, Marie.
    In: PSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-01285326.

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  11. How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?. (2016). Takahashi, Satoru ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:165:y:2016:i:c:p:332-359.

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  12. How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games?. (2016). Takahashi, Satoru ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2029.

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  13. Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting. (2015). Sugaya, Takuo.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:1425.

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  14. Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring. (2015). Zame, William ; Xiao, Yuanzhang ; Schaar, Mihaela.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:60:y:2015:i:1:p:1-34.

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  15. Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games. (2014). Rady, Sven ; Klein, Nicolas ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
    RePEc:trf:wpaper:469.

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  16. On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games. (2014). Vieille, Nicolas ; Takahashi, Satoru ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:70-83.

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  17. Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games. (2014). Rady, Sven ; Klein, Nicolas ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1956.

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  18. Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games. (2013). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:13-038.

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  19. Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games. (2013). Tomala, Tristan.
    In: Mathematics of Operations Research.
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:38:y:2013:i:4:p:617-637.

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  20. Designing Efficient Resource Sharing For Impatient Players Using Limited Monitoring. (2013). Zame, William ; van der Schaar, Mihaela ; Xiao, Yuanzhang .
    In: EIEF Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:eie:wpaper:1320.

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  21. On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games. (2012). Vieille, Nicolas ; Takahashi, Satoru ; Hirner, Johannes .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:metric:wp037_2012_horner_takahashi_vielle_on%20the%20limit%20equilibrium.pdf.

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  22. Solving payoff sets of perfect public equilibria: an example. (2012). Du, Chuang.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:38622.

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  23. Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games. (2012). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:12-044.

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  24. Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact. (2012). Kobayashi, Hajime ; Ohta, Katsunori .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:636-647.

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  25. A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting. (2012). Takahashi, Satoru ; Chen, Bo.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:571-581.

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  26. On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games. (2012). Vieille, Nicolas ; Takahashi, Satoru ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1848.

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  27. On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games. (2012). Vieille, Nicolas ; Takahashi, Satoru ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000412.

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  28. General Properties of Long-Run Supergames. (2011). Tomala, Tristan ; Renault, Jérôme.
    In: Dynamic Games and Applications.
    RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:1:y:2011:i:2:p:319-350.

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  29. Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games. (2011). Fudenberg, Drew ; Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: Scholarly Articles.
    RePEc:hrv:faseco:9962008.

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  30. Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring. (2011). Tomala, Tristan ; Contou-Carrere, Pauline .
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:14-21.

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  31. Learning from private information in noisy repeated games. (2011). Fudenberg, Drew ; Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1733-1769.

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  32. The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games. (2010). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:3:p:431-443.

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  33. Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring. (2010). Contou-Carrere, Pauline ; Tomala, Tristan.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00524134.

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  34. Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games. (2009). Kinateder, Markus.
    In: Faculty Working Papers.
    RePEc:una:unccee:wp1809.

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  35. Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games. (2009). Kinateder, Markus.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:20443.

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  36. A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games. (2009). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:2:p:802-824.

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  37. Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. (2009). Tomala, Tristan.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:682-694.

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  38. Repeated Games Played in a Network. (2008). Kinateder, Markus.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.22.

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  39. On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting. (2008). Chen, Bo.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:105-107.

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  40. Repeated Games Played in a Network. (2008). Kinateder, Markus.
    In: Coalition Theory Network Working Papers.
    RePEc:ags:feemct:6377.

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