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Vertical Restraints in the Bromine Cartel: The Role of Distributors in Facilitating Collusion. (1993). Levenstein, Margaret.
In: NBER Historical Working Papers.
RePEc:nbr:nberhi:0049.

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Cited: 3

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Cites: 17

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Cocites: 50

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  1. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CARTELS: EFFECTIVENESS, WELFARE, AND ANTICARTEL ENFORCEMENT. (2003). Connor, John.
    In: Staff Papers.
    RePEc:ags:puaesp:28645.

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  2. What Determines Cartel Success?. (2002). Suslow, Valerie ; Levenstein, Margaret.
    In: UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:ums:papers:2002-01.

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  3. ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND: PRICE-FIXER TO THE WORLD. (2000). Connor, John.
    In: Staff Papers.
    RePEc:ags:puaesp:28664.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti (1986), Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring, Journal ~ Economic Theory 39 (June): 251-269.

  2. Bernheim, B. Douglas and Michael D. Whinston (1985), Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion, Rand Journal ~ Economics 16:2.

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  7. Dewing, Arthur S. (1924). Corporate Promotion ~ Reorganizations. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
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  8. Eskew, Garnett Laidlaw (1948). Salt: The Fifth Element, The StorY ~ Basic American Industry. (Chicago: J. Ferguson and Associates).
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  9. Friedman, James W. (1971), A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames, Review p.~ Economic Studies 38(January): 1-12.

  10. Green, Edward J. and Robert H. Porter (1984), Non-cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, Econometrica 52 (January) : 87-100.

  11. Levenstein, Margaret (1993), The feasibility and stability of collusion: a study of the pre World War I bromine industry, Ann Arbor, Michigan: mimeo.

  12. Porter, Glenn and Harold C. Livesay (1971). Merchants ~ Manufacturers: Studies in the Changing Structure of Nineteenth-Century Marketing (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press).
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  13. Ripley, William Z., editor (1916). Trusts, Pools and Corporations. (Boston: Ginn and Company).
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  14. Rotemberg, Julio J. and Garth Saloner (1986), A SupergameTheoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms, American Economic Review 76(3), 390-407.

  15. Rotemberg, Julio J. and Garth Saloner (1989), The Cyclical Behavior of Strategic Inventories Quarterly Journal p1 Economics 104(February), 73-97.

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  17. United States Geological Survey (1880-1914). Mineral Reports p1 ~g United States Washington, D.C.
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  2. Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model. (2007). Wen, Quan ; Houba, Harold.
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  4. Stochastic Market Sharing, Partial Communication and Collusion. (2006). Gerlach, Heiko.
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  6. Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline. (2006). Versaevel, Bruno ; van Norden, Simon ; Gagne, Robert .
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  12. Collusion under Monitoring of Sales. (2005). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Harrington, Joseph.
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  13. Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games. (2004). Smith, Lones ; Prokopovych, Pavlo.
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  14. An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy. (2004). Tambalotti, Andrea ; Schaumburg, Ernst.
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  19. Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai). (2004). Obara, Ichiro.
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  24. Sticky prices, coordination and enforcement. (2003). Driscoll, John ; Ito, Harumi .
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  44. Vertical Restraints in the Bromine Cartel: The Role of Distributors in Facilitating Collusion. (1993). Levenstein, Margaret.
    In: NBER Historical Working Papers.
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  45. Testing Game Theoretic Models of Price-Fixing Behaviour. (1990). hajivassiliou, vassilis.
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  46. Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games. (1989). Pearce, David G. ; Stacchetti, Ennio ; Abreu, Dilip.
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