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An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy. (2003). Tambalotti, Andrea ; Schaumburg, Ernst.
In: Staff Reports.
RePEc:fip:fednsr:171.

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Cited: 4

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Cites: 26

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Cocites: 50

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Citations received by this document

  1. Do Markets Care Who Chairs the Central Bank?. (2010). Posen, Adam ; Kuttner, Kenneth N.
    In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
    RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:42:y:2010:i:2-3:p:347-371.

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  2. Do Markets Care Who Chairs the Central Bank?. (2007). Posen, Adam ; Kuttner, Kenneth.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13101.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Do Markets Care Who Chairs the Central Bank?. (2007). Posen, Adam ; Kuttner, Kenneth.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp07-3.

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  4. An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy. (2007). Tambalotti, Andrea ; Schaumburg, Ernst.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:54:y:2007:i:2:p:302-324.

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References

References cited by this document

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  10. Cukierman, Alex, Steven B. Webb and Bilin Neyapti (1992), Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes World Bank Economic Review 6:353-398.

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  15. Kara, A. Hakan (2002), Optimal Monetary Policy Rules under Imperfect Commitment, mimeo, New York University.

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  23. Svensson, Lars E. O. (1999b), How Should Monetary Policy Be Conducted in an Era of Price Stability? in New Challenges for Monetary Policy, a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

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  26. Woodford, Michael D. (1999), Commentary: How Should Monetary Policy Be Conducted in an Era of Price Stability?in New Challenges for Monetary Policy, a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

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