Daily commuting

Marcus Berliant

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Workers generally commute on a daily basis, so we model commuting as a repeated game. The folk theorem implies that for sufficiently large discount factors the repeated commuting game has as a Nash equilibrium any strategy profile that is at least as good as the maximin strategy for a commuter in the one shot game, including the efficient ones. This result applies whether the game is static, in the sense that only routes are chosen as a strategy by commuters, or dynamic, where both routes and times of departure are chosen. Our conclusions pose a challenge to congestion pricing. We examine evidence from St. Louis to determine what equilibrium strategies are actually played in the repeated commuting game.

Keywords: Repeated game; Nash equilibrium; Commuting; Folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-ore, nep-tre and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Daily commuting (2024)
Working Paper: Daily commuting (2023)
Working Paper: Daily commuting (2023)
Working Paper: Daily Commuting (2023)
Working Paper: Daily Commuting (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:100169

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