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Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission. (2014). Cassar, Lea.
In: ECON - Working Papers.
RePEc:zur:econwp:150.

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Cited: 8

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Cites: 42

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  1. Efficiency Wages with Motivated Agents. (2020). Dereky, Anna ; Cassar, Lea ; Armouti-Hansen, Jesper.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8474.

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  2. Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics. (2017). Dur, Robert ; van Lent, Max.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11095.

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  3. Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics. (2017). Dur, Robert ; van Lent, Max.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6553.

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  4. Envy in Mission-Oriented Organizations. (2017). Manna, Ester ; Barigozzi, Francesca.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1108.

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  5. Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics. (2016). Dur, Robert ; van Lent, Max.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160109.

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  6. Complementarities of HRM Practices. (2015). Schuessler, Katharina ; Schüßler, Katharina ; Schüßler, Katharina ; Schüßler, Katharina ; Englmaier, Florian ; Schuler, Katharina .
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
    RePEc:trf:wpaper:503.

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  7. Complementarities of HRM Practices - A Case for Employing Multiple Methods and Integrating Multiple Fields. (2015). Schüßler, Katharina ; Schüßler, Katharina ; Schüßler, Katharina ; Schuessler, Katharina ; Englmaier, Florian ; Schuler, Katharina .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5249.

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  8. Job mission as a substitute for monetary incentives: experimental evidence. (2014). Cassar, Lea.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:econwp:177.

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References

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