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Delegation and Information Revelation. (2000). Paolini, Dimitri ; Gautier, Axel.
In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1292.

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  14. [7] Felli L. Preventing Collusion through Discretion, mimeo LSE, London
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