Delegation and information revelation

Axel Gautier () and Dimitri Paolini

No 2000015, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organization where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques à la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we posit that the decision and the state of the world parameter cannot be contracted for. With these simple contracts, we show that delegation is an alternative to contracting to elicit agent's information. We can show that delegated decisions completely reveal the state of the world to the principal. Therefore the principal can extract agent's information by giving up the control right over some decisions. As the organization takes a sequence of decisions, the information learned by the principal can be used for the other decisions. So delegation is only partial: the principal delegates some decisions and keeps control over other.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Delegation; Incomplete contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G31 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2000-09-01
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http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2000-15.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Delegation and Information Revelation (2007)
Working Paper: Delegation and information revelation (2007)
Working Paper: Delegation and Information Revelation (2002)
Working Paper: Delegation and Information Revelation (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2000015

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