Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics

Robert Dur and Max van Lent
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Max van Lent: Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands

No 16-109/VII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We develop a model where people differ in their altruistic preferences and can serve the public interest in two ways: by making donations to charity and by taking a public service job and exerting effort on the job. Our theory predicts that people who are more altruistic are more likely to take a public service job and, for a given job, make higher donations to charity. Comparing equally altruistic workers, those with a regular job make higher donations to charity than those with a public service job by a simple substitution argument. We subsequently test these predictions using the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, which contains data on self-reported altruism, sector of employment, and donations to charity for more than 7,500 workers. We find support for our predictions, though some results are sensitive to the exact definition of a public service job or the estimation method.

Keywords: altruism; charitable donations; public service motivation; public sector employment; self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 H11 J45 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Serving the public interest in several ways: Theory and empirics (2018)
Working Paper: Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics (2017)
Working Paper: Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160109

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