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Delegation and Dynamic Incentives. (2014). Strausz, Roland ; Shin, Dongsoo.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4774.

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Cited: 11

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Cites: 32

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  1. Optimal transparency of monitoring capability. (2023). Tan, Teck Yong.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:209:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000169.

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  2. Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures. (2023). Strausz, Roland ; Shin, Dongsoo ; Celik, Gorkem.
    In: Journal of Industrial Economics.
    RePEc:bla:jindec:v:71:y:2023:i:1:p:256-290.

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  3. Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures. (2022). Strausz, Roland ; Celik, Gorkem ; Shin, Dongsoo.
    In: Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:rco:dpaper:356.

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  4. Wasteful procedures?. (2022). Honryo, Takakazu ; Arve, Malin.
    In: Journal of Economics and Business.
    RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:122:y:2022:i:c:s0148619522000248.

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  5. Contracting with Endogenously Incomplete Commitment: Escape Clauses. (2021). Gick, Wolfgang ; Tangers, Thomas.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1390.

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  6. Disagreement and informal delegation in organizations. (2021). Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos ; Ekinci, Emre.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:74:y:2021:i:c:s0167718720301193.

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  7. Disagreement and Informal Delegation in Organizations. (2019). Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos ; Ekinci, Emre.
    In: University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:ucy:cypeua:11-2019.

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  8. Informal Delegation and Training. (2018). Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos ; Ekinci, Emre.
    In: University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:ucy:cypeua:02-2018.

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  9. Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures. (2018). Strausz, Roland ; Shin, Dongsoo ; Celik, Gorkem.
    In: Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:rco:dpaper:105.

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  10. Optimal Allocation of Decision-Making Authority and the Provision of Incentives under Uncertainty. (2016). Schöttner, Anja ; Rohlfing-Bastian, Anna ; Schottner, Anja.
    In: Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145670.

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  11. Optimal Allocation of Decision-Making Authority and the Provision of Incentives under Uncertainty. (2015). Schöttner, Anja ; Rohlfing-Bastian, Anna ; Schottner, Anja .
    In: Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113200.

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References

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  32. Williamson, O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, The Free Press, New York, NY. L W W !Ý0Þ Delegation Ψ = D W !ÝSlÞ W !ÝShÞ Centralization Ψ = C Centralization Ψ = C         − ≡ = μ γ γ ~         − ≡ = Δθ μ θ μθ γ γ 2 l h ˆ L W W !Ý0Þ Delegation Ψ = D W !ÝSlÞ W !ÝShÞ Centralization Ψ = C Centralization Ψ = C         − ≡ = μ γ γ ~         − ≡ = Δθ μ θ μθ γ γ 2 l h ˆ
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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Delegation and Dynamic Incentives. (2014). Strausz, Roland ; Shin, Dongsoo.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4774.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. (2006). Jeon, Doh-Shin.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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  3. Torts, Expertise, and Authority: Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations. (2004). Macleod, W. Bentley ; Arlen, Jennifer .
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  4. A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations. (2003). Hvide, Hans ; Leite, Tore .
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    RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0311003.

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  5. The demand for intercity public transport: the case of business passengers. (2003). Carlsson, Fredrik.
    In: Applied Economics.
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  6. The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies. (2003). Rajan, Raghuram ; Wulf, Julie .
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  7. On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control. (2002). Lagerlof, Johan ; Heidhues, Paul.
    In: CIG Working Papers.
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  8. A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents: Employment Contracts, Common Law, and the Theory of the Firm. (2002). James, Harvey.
    In: Law and Economics.
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  9. Effects of Ownership and Financial Status on Corporate Environmental Performance. (2002). Lizal, Lubomir ; Earnhart, Dietrich.
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  10. The Effects of Ownership Forms and Concentration on Firm Performance after Large-Scale Privatization. (2002). Svejnar, Jan ; Kočenda, Evžen.
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
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  11. A Refinancing Model of Decentralization with Empirical Evidence from China. (2002). Shen, Minggao ; Park, Albert.
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  12. Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders. (2002). Cespa, Giovanni ; Cestone, Giacinta .
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  13. Corporate Governance and Control. (2002). Bolton, Patrick ; Becht, Marco ; Roell, Alisa.
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  14. Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks. (2002). Stein, Jeremy ; Rajan, Raghuram ; Petersen, Mitchell ; Berger, Allen ; Miller, Nathan H..
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  17. Centralization Versus Decentralization in Credit Lending. (2002). GHODBANE, Idriss M..
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  18. Effects of Ownership and Financial Status on Corporate Environmental Performance. (2002). Lizal, Lubomir ; Earnhart, Dietrich.
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  42. Balancing Incentives: The Tension Between Basic and Applied Research. (1999). Henderson, Rebecca ; Cockburn, Iain ; Stern, Scott.
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  43. Financial contracts and the legal treatment of informed investors. (1999). Mester, Loretta ; Berlin, Mitchell.
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  47. Costly Coasian Contracts. (1997). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
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  50. Costly Coasian Contracts. (1996). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
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