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Chapter 6—Business-to-Business (B2B) Marketing
TRUE/FALSE
1. Business marketers advertise primarily to announce new products, to enhance their company image
and presence, and to attract potential customers who would then deal directly with a salesperson.
ANS: T PTS: 1 DIF: 1 REF: 167

OBJ: 6-1
NAT: AACSB Analytic | CB&E Model Customer | R&D Knowledge of technology, design, &
production TYP: KN
2. Organizational buyers tend to purchase standardized products, unlike the consumer market where
customization is more prevalent.
ANS: F PTS: 1 DIF: 1 REF: 167

OBJ: 6-1
NAT: AACSB Analytic | CB&E Model Customer | R&D Knowledge of general business functions
TYP: KN
3. B2B relationships tend to last longer than those in the consumer market.

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
4. Due to the complexity of the buying process and potential need for technical assistance, the
distribution channels in the B2B marketplace tend to be longer than those in the consumer market.

OBJ: 6-1
NAT: AACSB Reflective Thinking | CB&E Model Distribution | R&D Knowledge of general
business functions TYP: AP
5. Personal selling and customer service are more important in business markets than in consumer
markets.

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
201
© 2010 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. This edition is intended for use outside of the U.S. only, with content that may be different
from the U.S. Edition. May not be scanned, copied, duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part.
Business-to-Business (B2B) Marketing
6. Purchasing decisions in the B2B sectors are more complex, take longer to negotiate, and often include
many levels of decision making.

OBJ: 6-1
NAT: AACSB Reflective Thinking | CB&E Model Customer | R&D Knowledge of general business
functions TYP: AP
7. Business marketers advertise primarily to announce new products.

OBJ: 6-1
functions TYP: AP
8. The biggest distinction between B2B marketing and consumer marketing is the lack of advertising and
visibility in the marketplace the company services.

OBJ: 6-1
NAT: AACSB Analytic | CB&E Model Promotion | R&D Knowledge of general business functions
TYP: KN
9. Personal selling is less important in business markets than in consumer markets because of the longer
distribution channels involved.

OBJ: 6-1
NAT: AACSB Reflective Thinking | CB&E Model Customer | R&D Knowledge of general
business functions TYP: AP
10. The primary purchasing need of an organization is meeting the demands of its own customers.

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
11. An organization’s goals must also be considered in the B2B buying process.

OBJ: 6-1
functions TYP: AP
202
12. The four categories that define the business market are the commercial market, producers, institutions
and government agencies.

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
13. The commercial market purchases products for use directly and indirectly in the manufacturing of
other products.

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
14. When Cannondale purchases aluminum for use in its bicycle frames, the company is participating in
the commercial market.

OBJ: 6-1
functions TYP: AP
15. The commercial market consists of retailers and wholesalers who purchase goods primarily for resale
to other businesses and to the consumer.
ANS: F PTS: 1 DIF: 1 REF: 168-169

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
16. Members of the trade industries acquire goods and services primarily for use in production.

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
17. The term reseller is often used to describe wholesalers and retailers that comprise membership in the
trade industries.

OBJ: 6-1
NAT: AACSB Analytic | CB&E Model Distribution | R&D Knowledge of general business functions
TYP: KN
203
18. The trade industries include manufacturers, wholesalers, and individual consumers.

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
19. Because of its size, the government represents the largest segment of the B2B marketplace.

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
20. Organizations such as hospitals, universities and museums comprise the commercial segment of the
business market.

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
21. Not-for-profit organizations are considered part of B2B marketplace.

OBJ: 6-1
TYP: KN
22. The Internet is intended to replace, not just enhance, personal selling and the traditional relationships
between businesses.

OBJ: 6-1
functions TYP: AP
23. In general, the consumer has more at stake in purchasing decisions because the money they are
spending is actually theirs. Business customers have less at stake and are less concerned with value
and utility of the materials purchased.

OBJ: 6-1
functions TYP: AP
204
24. Geographic location is considered a demographic basis for segmenting the business market.

OBJ: 6-2
TYP: KN
25. Organizational size is regarded as a demographic basis for segmenting business customers.

OBJ: 6-2
TYP: KN
26. Compared to the old SIC system of classification, the NAICS not only standardizes classifications
among nations, but also provides flexibility for each country to measure its own business activity.
ANS: T PTS: 1 DIF: 2 REF: 171-172

OBJ: 6-2
functions TYP: AP
27. The NAICS codes provide information about businesses that allows users to compare business sectors
among the member nations of NAFTA.

OBJ: 6-2
TYP: KN
28. The NAICS classification system provides a useful tool for segmenting B2B markets by customer
type.

OBJ: 6-2
TYP: KN
29. With the implementation of the NAFTA accord, the SIC system replaced the NAICS system to
subdivide the business marketplace into detailed segments.

OBJ: 6-2
TYP: KN
205
30. Some companies segment markets into categories such as small business, large business, consumers,
educational institutions and government. This is an example of end-use segmentation.

OBJ: 6-2
functions TYP: AP
31. End-use application segmentation focuses on the precise way in which a business purchaser will use a
product.

OBJ: 6-2
functions TYP: AP
32. Geographic concentration of an industry has no effect on the location decisions of the industry's
suppliers.

OBJ: 6-3
TYP: KN
33. Ford recently established a first-of-its-kind campus for suppliers near its Chicago
assembly plant, which enabled them to reduce costs, control parts inventories, and increase flexibility.

OBJ: 6-3
functions TYP: AP
34. The Internet is changing the buying process of many customers, including the federal government,
making it less likely that suppliers will need to be geographically close to their customers.

OBJ: 6-3
NAT: AACSB Technology | CB&E Model Customer | R&D Knowledge of general business functions
TYP: KN
35. Purchase decision making in B2B is more formal and professional than in the consumer market.

OBJ: 6-3
TYP: KN
206
36. Evaluating foreign market opportunities is a complex and somewhat difficult task for businesses.

OBJ: 6-3
NAT: AACSB Analytic | CB&E Model Strategy | R&D Managing decision-making processes
TYP: KN
37. Global sourcing involves contracting to purchase goods and services from suppliers worldwide.

OBJ: 6-3
NAT: AACSB Reflective Thinking | CB&E Model International Perspective | R&D Knowledge of
general business functions TYP: KN
38. If Product A is used primarily to manufacture Product B, then the demand for product A is derived
from the demand for Product B.

OBJ: 6-3
NAT: AACSB Reflective Thinking | CB&E Model Product | R&D Knowledge of general business
functions TYP: AP
39. As demand for personal computers increases the demand for computer microprocessor chips will also
increase. This is an example of derived demand.

OBJ: 6-3
functions TYP: AP
40. Companies that sell products affected by derived demand can avoid the negative affects of downturns
by diversifying the markets in which they sell their products.
ANS: T PTS: 1 DIF: 3 REF: 176-177

OBJ: 6-3
functions TYP: AP
41. Organizational buyers basically purchase two categories of products: capital items and expense items.

OBJ: 6-3
NAT: AACSB Analytic | CB&E Model Product | R&D Knowledge of general business functions
TYP: KN
42. Capital purchases are expended quickly, whereas expense items are more expensive and last longer.

OBJ: 6-3
TYP: KN
207
43. The difference between capital and expense items is not only the size and length of use, but also the
way the accounting department handles production costs.

OBJ: 6-3
TYP: KN
44. Volatile demand means that even slight shifts or variations in the market can have an affect on sales.

OBJ: 6-3
TYP: KN
45. If consumer demand for dishwashers increases, dishwasher manufacturers will buy more raw materials,
components and supplies as a result of the link between the consumer market and the industrial market.
This linkage is called coordinated demand.

OBJ: 6-3
functions TYP: AP
46. Business markets tend to have more buyers and suppliers than found in the consumer marketplace.

OBJ: 6-3
TYP: KN
47. Assume the price of jet fuel rises, but airlines continue to purchase the same amount of fuel in order to
meet operational needs. As a result, the demand for jet fuel is said to be inelastic.

OBJ: 6-3
functions TYP: AP
48. JIT II inventory systems may require suppliers to have on-site representatives at their customers’
production facility.

OBJ: 6-3
TYP: KN
208
49. When a firm can manufacture the product it needs, it may experience a significant cost savings
because it will not have to pay the overhead costs and profit to an outside supplier.

OBJ: 6-3
functions TYP: AP
50. Offshoring and nearshoring refer to the method of acquiring natural resources.

OBJ: 6-4
TYP: KN
51. India has become a major supplier of customer service labor, while China offers inexpensive
manufacturing labor.

OBJ: 6-4
TYP: KN
52. Turning to outsiders to provide products or services that were formerly provided in-house is referred to
as external acquisition.

OBJ: 6-4
TYP: KN
53. If a company wants to concentrate its resources on its core business, it may be wise to outsource
support departments.

OBJ: 6-4
functions TYP: AP
54. Lower-than-anticipated cost savings is one potential downside to offshoring.

OBJ: 6-3
TYP: KN
209
55. To understand organizational buying behavior, business marketers require knowledge of influences on
the purchase decision process, the stages in the organizational buying model, types of business buying
situations, and techniques for purchase decision analysis.

OBJ: 6-5
TYP: KN
56. Successful organizational marketers understand their customers’ organizational structures, policies and
purchasing systems.

OBJ: 6-5
TYP: KN
57. Personal and interpersonal influences affect consumer purchasing decisions, not B2B decisions.

OBJ: 6-5
functions TYP: AP
58. Centralized purchasing units may contract with only a few suppliers to service multiple locations
because they lack interest in long-term relationship building and place greater reliance on immediate
results.

OBJ: 6-5
functions TYP: AP
59. A sales representative can waste valuable time creating a sales relationship with decision makers in a
decentralized purchasing office of a Fortune 500 company.

OBJ: 6-5
functions TYP: AP
60. When selling to organizational customers, sales representatives need to be able to interact effectively
with employees of the various departments involved in the purchase decision.

OBJ: 6-5
functions TYP: AP
210
61. Organizational purchasing decisions tend to be standardized, resulting in the same procedures being
used for both capital and expense items.

OBJ: 6-5
TYP: KN
62. Purchase decisions for capital items vary significantly from those of expense items.

OBJ: 6-5
NAT: AACSB Analytic | CB&E Model Product | R&D Managing decision-making processes
TYP: KN
63. “Merchandiser” is the common designation for a purchasing agent in wholesale and retail trades.

OBJ: 6-5
TYP: KN
64. Lockheed Martin wins a contract to produce 14 state-of-the-art helicopters for the U.S. Navy.
Coordination of labor, purchasing, and manufacturing is a tremendous undertaking, so Lockheed
would have the option of streamlining the purchasing process through systems integration.

OBJ: 6-5
NAT: AACSB Reflective Thinking | CB&E Model Product | R&D Knowledge of technology, design,
& production TYP: AP
65. Business purchase decisions begin when the recognition of problems, needs, or opportunities activates
the buying process.

OBJ: 6-6
TYP: KN
66. A firm deciding to purchase more energy-efficient machines in response to rising fuel prices illustrates
the first step in the business buying process.

OBJ: 6-6
functions TYP: AP
211
67. After determining the characteristics and quantity of needed products, B2B buyers must translate these
ideas into detailed specifications

OBJ: 6-6
functions TYP: AP
68. When government agencies seek to acquire proposals from potential suppliers, they participate in a
process called competitive bidding.

OBJ: 6-6
TYP: KN
69. Once a supplier has been chosen, buyer and vendor must work out the best way to process future
purchases.

OBJ: 6-6
TYP: KN
70. Although order procedures vary from supplier to supplier, the one constant in all transactions is the
inclusion of the terms of sales including price, quantity, delivery and payment terms.

OBJ: 6-6
TYP: KN
71. A straight rebuy is to the business market what a routinized purchase is to the consumer market.

OBJ: 6-7
functions TYP: AP
72. A company that believes in “quality, service and reliability” will have a better chance of experiencing
straight rebuys from their customers.

OBJ: 6-7
NAT: AACSB Reflective Thinking | CB&E Model Customer | R&D Managing decision-making
processes TYP: AP
212
73. Straight rebuys resemble limited problem solving in consumer markets.

OBJ: 6-7
functions TYP: AP
74. The purchasing decision can move to a modified rebuy status with either the introduction of new
products or poor performance by the original supplier.

OBJ: 6-7
TYP: KN
75. When a business purchases a new product that requires considerable effort on the decision maker's part,
it is called new-task buying.

OBJ: 6-7
TYP: KN
76. Marketers who want to encourage modified rebuy behavior by their customers should focus on
providing excellent service and delivery performance.

OBJ: 6-7
functions TYP: AP
77. New-task buying for businesses is comparable to the extended problem solving that takes place in
consumer markets.

OBJ: 6-7
functions TYP: AP
78. In the B2B market, the practice of buying from suppliers who are also customers is called reverse
reciprocity.

OBJ: 6-7
TYP: KN
213
79. Reciprocal arrangements are common in industries where products are homogeneous and prices are
similar, such as the chemical, paint, rubber and steel industries.

OBJ: 6-7
functions TYP: AP
80. On an international level, attitudes toward reciprocity vary from country to country.

OBJ: 6-8
TYP: KN
81. Value analysis is a continuous process of evaluating the cost of doing business with a particular buying
unit. Suppliers must ensure they are receiving adequate benefits from the time invested in a customer.
ANS: F PTS: 1 DIF: 2 REF: 185-186

OBJ: 6-7
functions TYP: AP
82. The ongoing evaluation of a supplier's performance on such criteria as price, EDI capability, delivery
times, and attention to special requests is called vendor analysis.

OBJ: 6-7
TYP: KN
83. A company’s buying center encompasses everyone who is involved in any aspect of its buying
activity.

OBJ: 6-8
functions TYP: AP
84. A buying center is a part of a firm's formal organization structure.

OBJ: 6-8
TYP: KN
214
85. Gatekeepers in the buying center affect the buying decision by determining which individuals within
the organization will be part of the buying process.

OBJ: 6-8
TYP: KN
86. Influencers in the purchasing decision can be both internal and external to the organization.

OBJ: 6-8
NAT: AACSB Analytic | CB&E Model Customer | R&D Managing decision-making processes
TYP: KN
87. While many individuals participate in the buying process, it is the buyer’s role to make the final
decision and confirmation of the sale.
ANS: F PTS: 1 DIF: 2 REF: 186-187

OBJ: 6-8
TYP: KN
88. In the B2B purchasing process, the user, the influencer, and the decider might all be the same
individual.
ANS: T PTS: 1 DIF: 2 REF: 186-187

OBJ: 6-8
functions TYP: AP
89. The participants in international buying centers are generally easier to identify than those in domestic
buying centers.

OBJ: 6-8
NAT: AACSB Analytic | CB&E Model International Perspective | R&D Knowledge of technology,
design, & production TYP: KN
90. The structure of the buying center varies from culture to culture. For example, 50 individuals might be
involved in the purchasing process in some countries.

OBJ: 6-8
NAT: AACSB Reflective Thinking | CB&E Model International Perspective | R&D Knowledge of
technology, design, & production TYP: AP
215
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important, for the moment, of the ports along the coast which the
Emperor had commended to him for destruction.
Meanwhile the Biscayan insurgents collected opposite Bilbao, on
the Eastern side, and Mendizabal brought up Longa’s troops and
some of the smaller bands to threaten it from the West. The idea was
to give Clausel so much trouble about his head-quarters that he
would be unable to march away against Castro. The days slipped by,
and farther East Mina was more active than ever in Navarre. He had
at last become the happy possessor of two siege guns, landed at
Deba on the Biscay coast, and dragged by incredible exertions across
mountain paths to the farthest inland. When they came to hand he
set to work to beleaguer the French garrison of Tafalla, an outlying
place, but less than thirty miles from Pampeluna. This was a
challenge to General Abbé, the Governor of Navarre: a force which
has dug trenches and brought up heavy guns is obviously asking for
a fight, and not intending to abscond. Abbé marched with 3,000
infantry and 150 chasseurs to raise the siege, and found Mina with
four of his battalions and his regiment of cavalry drawn up across the
high road, in a mountain position at Tiebas, ten miles north of Tafalla.
After a hard day’s fighting, Abbé failed to break through, and had to
fall back on Pampeluna[387] (February 9). The news of his repulse
disheartened the garrison, whose walls were crumbling under the fire
of Mina’s heavy guns, and they surrendered on February 11th to the
number of 11 officers and 317 men—the post-commander and many
others had been killed during the siege.
This success of Mina’s meant nothing less than that the whole
open country of Navarre was at his mercy, since Abbé had been
beaten in the field; wherefore Clausel hastened to dispatch the first
reinforcements from the Army of Portugal which reached him—
Barbot’s division—to this quarter. But the affair created less
excitement than an exploit of reckless courage carried out by one of
Mina’s detachments in the following month. The old castle of
Fuenterrabia commands the passage of the Bidassoa, and looks
across its estuary into France: on March 11 it was surprised by
escalade by a handful of guerrilleros, the garrison taken prisoner, the
guns thrown into the water, and the whole building destroyed by fire.
The flames were visible far into France—troops hurried up from Irun
and Hendaye, but of course found the guerrilleros gone[388].
This exploit was rather spectacular than harmful to the French—
quite otherwise was the last event of the month of March. Barbot’s
division, on entering Navarre, was directed to help Abbé to clear the
country between Pampeluna and the Ebro. Having reached Lodosa on
March 30, Barbot sent out two battalions to raise requisitions in the
neighbouring town of Lerin. The place was being sacked, when the
scattered French were suddenly attacked by two of Mina’s battalions,
while two more and 200 Navarrese lancers cut in between the enemy
and Lodosa. The French, thoroughly surprised, lost heavily in the first
shock, but rallied and started to cut their way back to their division,
only eight miles away. In a running fight they were much mauled,
and finally had to form square to receive the cavalry. In this
inconvenient formation they were forced to a long musketry fight
with the Navarrese, which so shook the square that it finally broke
when Mina’s lancers charged. The two battalions were annihilated, 28
officers and 635 men taken prisoners—the rest cut down. Gaudin, the
colonel commanding the detachment, escaped with a few mounted
officers[389]. The extraordinary part of the affair was that its last crisis
took place at only two miles from Lodosa, where Barbot was lying
with his remaining six battalions. The French general never stirred,
but only put himself in a posture of defence, thereby provoking
Mina’s surprise[390], for he could have saved the column by going out
to its help. After the disaster he retired to Pampeluna, with a division
reduced to little over 3,000 men. But not long after Taupin’s division
of the Army of Portugal also entered Navarre, and joined Abbé. This
gave the latter a very heavy force—at least 13,000 men, and when
Clausel had finished his own operations in the direction of Bilbao, and
marched from Biscay to encircle Mina on one side, while Abbé was to
hold him on the other, the great guerrillero was in grave danger. But
this was only in late April and May, and before the chronicle of these
weeks is reached we have to turn back westward for a space.
Napoleon’s orders had told Clausel to attack at all points at once,
and to lose no time in setting to work. But it was quite clear that no
general synchronized move could be made, until the divisions
borrowed from Reille had all arrived. What active operations meant,
before the reinforcements had come up, had been sufficiently proved
by Abbé’s defeat at Tiebas: and Clausel’s own doings in March were
equally discouraging, if not so disastrous. He had resolved to carry
out one of the Emperor’s urgent orders by capturing Castro-Urdiales,
the touching-place of British cruisers and the one fortified port which
the Allies possessed on the Biscay coast. Undervaluing its strength,
he marched out on March 21 with the bulk of Palombini’s Italian
division and a single French battalion, intending to take it by
escalade. For he had been told that its ancient walls had been
indifferently repaired, and were almost without guns. When, however,
he had reached the neighbourhood of Castro on the 22nd, he had to
own on inspection that the enterprise would be hopeless—his
commanding engineer, the historian Vacani[391]—maintained that it
would take 6,000 men and a siege train of at least six heavy guns to
deal with the place. And, as subsequent events showed, this was
quite true. Castro is built on a rocky spit projecting into the sea, with
a stout wall 20 feet high drawn across the isthmus which joins the
headland to the coast. The narrow front of this wall, from water to
water, had been well repaired; there were some 20 guns mounted,
and an old castle on the extreme sea-ward point of the spit served as
a citadel or inner fortification. Mendizabal and his lieutenant,
Campillo, had come down from the interior with three or four
thousand men, and were visible on the flank, ready to fall upon the
Italian column if it should approach the town, through the labyrinth
of vineyards and stone fences which covered its outskirts.
Clausel, always venturesome, was inclined at first to go on with
his enterprise, when news reached him that Bilbao, which he had left
rather weakly garrisoned, was threatened by the guerrillero Jauregui,
and the battalions of the volunteers of Biscay and Guipuzcoa. He
returned hastily to his head-quarters with his French battalion, but
found that the danger had been exaggerated for the moment, so
sent out General Rouget with two battalions to join Palombini, who
had meanwhile on the 24th fought a severe action with Mendizabal.
The Spaniard had tried to surround him in his camp at San Pelayo,
with several outflanking columns—the Italian sallied out and drove
him off with loss—but suffered himself no less[392]. Clausel, on
reaching the front, came to the conclusion that Castro must not be
attacked without heavy guns and a larger field-force. He directed
Palombini to burn the ladders, fascines, &c., prepared for the assault,
and to go off instead to raise the blockade of Santoña, while he
himself returned to Bilbao. The Italian division therefore marched
westward on Colindres, on the other side of the bay on which
Santoña stands, thrusting aside the Spanish blockading forces, and
communicated with the governor, General Lameth. A supply of small
arms and ammunition, money, and food was thrown into the place.
On the other hand, Lameth was ordered to get six heavy guns on
shipboard, and to be prepared to run them down the coast, when
next a French force should appear in front of Castro-Urdiales, along
with a provision of round shot, shells, and entrenching tools. Lameth
got the siege material ready, but was not asked for it till another full
month had gone by, for Clausel had other business pressed upon
him.
Palombini thereupon turned back, and regained Bilbao in three
forced marches, unmolested by the Spaniards, for they had gone off
in the direction of Balmaseda, not expecting him to return so quickly.
He had only been in Bilbao for two days when Clausel sent him out
again, eastward this time and not westward, with two of his
regiments, for a surprise attack on Guernica, the head-quarters of the
Biscayan insurgents and the seat of their Junta. A French column of
two battalions of the 40th Line from Durango was to co-operate and
to assail the enemy in the rear. This expedition was quite in
consonance with Napoleon’s orders to strike at the enemy’s central
dépôts in front and rear by unexpected raids. But it also showed the
difficulty of carrying out such plans. Palombini reached Guernica,
driving before him bands which gave way, but were always growing
stronger: behind Guernica they made a stand—the French flanking
column failed to appear—having found troubles of its own—and
Palombini was repulsed and forced to cut his way back out of the
hills. He reported his loss as only 80 men—but it was probably
somewhat more[393] (April 2). Having picked up the stray French
column, and replenished his ammunition from Bilbao, Palombini, with
a laudable perseverance, attacked the Guernica position again on
April 5, and this time forced it. Thence pushing east, he tried to drive
the enemy before him along the coast road, on which, in the
neighbourhood of St. Sebastian, a brigade from the Bayonne reserve
had been set to block their flight. But the Biscayans and El Pastor
evaded him and slipped south into the hills: the Guipuzcoan
battalions, instinctively falling back on their own province, were in
more danger. But warned in time that the coast road was stopped,
some of them took refuge in the boats of English warships at
Lequeytio and Motrico, and were shipped off to Castro-Urdiales in
safety, while others simply dispersed. No prisoners were taken, but
Palombini captured the petty magazines of the Guipuzcoans at
Aspeytia and Azcoytia, and thinking that the insurrection was
scotched returned to the Bayonne chaussée at Bergara (April 9).
So far was this from ending the campaign, that while Palombini
was devastating Guipuzcoa, the Biscayans and El Pastor had
concerted a new attack on Bilbao with Longa and Mendizabal, who
had been left with no containing force in front of them when the
enemy had retired from before Castro-Urdiales.
Clausel had gone off from Bilbao on March 30, with a large escort,
to join at Vittoria the newly arrived divisions of the Army of Portugal,
those of Taupin and Foy, and was set on organizing a new attack on
Mina. In the absence of both the Commander-in-Chief and of
Palombini, Bilbao was very weakly garrisoned—not more than 2,000
men were left to General Rouget to defend a rather extensive system
of outworks. On April 10th the Spaniards attacked him on both sides
of the Nervion river, and would probably have broken into Bilbao but
for the incapacity of Mendizabal, whose main body did not come up
in time to assist the attack of the Biscayans on the other bank of the
river. Rouget was still holding out when Palombini came to his rescue
from Bergara via Durango, in two forced marches. The Spaniards
thereupon dispersed, after their usual fashion, Mendizabal
disappearing to the east, the Biscayans falling back on their old head-
quarters at Guernica. Palombini was strong at the moment, having
been joined by the brigade from Bayonne, under General Aussenac,
which had been blocking the coast road. He therefore tried to
surround the Biscayans with converging columns—but when he
thought that he had cut them off from the inland, and was about to
drive them into the water, the bulk of them were picked up at
Bermeo by English cruisers, and landed farther down the coast. Only
some baggage and a store of munitions fell into the pursuer’s hands
(April 14).
On this, Palombini, ‘convinced,’ says his admiring chronicler
Vacani, ‘of the uselessness of trying to envelop or destroy local bands
among mountains which they knew too well, when he could only
dispose of columns of a few battalions for the pursuit,’ resolved to
halt at Bilbao, and prepare for the siege of Castro. He put the brigade
from Bayonne in charge of the high road to San Sebastian, and
waited for the arrival of Foy from Vittoria. For he had been informed
that this general, with his division of the Army of Portugal, was to be
detailed to help him in the subjection of Biscay. Meanwhile April was
half over, the insurgents had been often hunted but never caught,
and Wellington might be expected to be on the move any morning: it
was strange that he had not been heard of already.
Leaving Biscay to Palombini and Foy, Clausel had collected at
Vittoria one of his own divisions, hitherto scattered in small
detachments, but relieved by the reinforcements sent him from the
Army of Portugal. For beside the four divisions lent for active service,
he had taken over the whole Province of Burgos, to which Reille had
sent the division of Lamartinière. With his own newly-collected
division, under Vandermaesen, and Taupin’s of the Army of Portugal,
Clausel set out for Navarre on April 11th, to combine his operations
with those of Abbé and to hunt down Mina. As he had already sent
forward to the Governor of Navarre the division of Barbot, there was
now a field-force of 20,000 men available for the chase, without
taking into consideration the troops tied down in garrisons. This was
more than double the strength that Mina could command, and the
next month was one of severe trial for the great guerrillero.
Clausel’s first idea was to catch Mina by a sweeping movement of
all his four divisions, which he collected at Puente la Reyna in the
valley of the Arga (April 24). Mina answered this move by dispersion,
and his battalions escaped through intervals in the cordon with no
great loss, and cut up more than once small detachments of their
pursuers. Clausel perceiving that this system was useless, then tried
another, one of those recommended by the Emperor in his letter of
instruction of March 9, viz. a resolute stroke at the enemy’s
magazines and dépôts. Mina kept his hospitals, some rough munition
factories which he had set up, and his store of provisions, in the
remote Pyrenean valley of Roncal, where Navarre and Aragon meet:
it was most inaccessible and far from any high road. Nevertheless
Clausel marched upon it with the divisions of Abbé, Vandermaesen,
and Barbot, leaving Taupin alone at Estella to contain Western
Navarre. He calculated that Mina would be forced to concentrate and
fight, in order to save his stores and arsenal, and that so he might be
destroyed. He was partly correct in his hypothesis—but only partly.
Mina left four of his battalions in Western Navarre, in the valleys of
the Amescoas, to worry Taupin, and hurried with the remaining five
to cover the Roncal. There was heavy fighting in the passes leading
to it on May 12 and 13, which ended in the Navarrese being beaten
and dispersed with the loss of a thousand men. Clausel captured and
destroyed the factories and magazines, and made prisoners of the
sick in the hospitals, whom he treated with unexpected humanity.
Some of the broken battalions fled south by Sanguesa into lower
Navarre, others eastward into Aragon. Among these last was Mina
himself with a small party of cavalry—he tried to fetch a compass
round the pursuing French and to return to his own country, but he
was twice headed off, and finally forced to fly far into Eastern Aragon,
as far as Barbastro. This region was practically open to him for flight,
for the French garrison of Saragossa was too weak to cover the
whole country, or to stop possible bolt-holes. Mina was therefore able
to rally part of his men there, and called in the help of scattered
partidas. Clausel swept all North-Western Aragon with his three
divisions, making arrests and destroying villages which had
harboured the insurgents. But he did not wish to pursue Mina to the
borders of Catalonia, where he would have been quite out of his own
beat, and inconveniently remote from Pampeluna and Vittoria.
But meanwhile the division which he had left under Taupin in
Navarre was having much trouble with Mina’s four battalions in the
Amescoas, and parties drifting back from the rout in the Roncal vexed
the northern bank of the Ebro, while Longa and Mendizabal,
abandoning their old positions in front of Bilbao, had descended on to
the Bayonne chaussée, and executed many raids upon it, from the
pass of Salinas above Vittoria as far as the Ebro (April 25-May 10).
The communications between Bayonne and Burgos were once more
cut, and the situation grew so bad that Lamartinière’s division of the
Army of Portugal had to be moved eastward, to clear the road from
Burgos to Miranda, Sarrut’s to do the same between Miranda and
Bilbao, while Maucune detached a brigade to relieve Lamartinière at
Burgos. Of the whole Army of Portugal there was left on May 20th
only one single infantry brigade at Palencia which was still at Reille’s
disposition. Five and a half divisions had been lent to Clausel, and
were dispersed in the north. And Wellington was now just about to
move! The worst thing of all for the French cause was that the
communications of the North were as bad in May as they had been in
January: after Clausel had taken off the main field-army to the
Roncal, and had led it from thence far into Aragon, the roads behind
him were absolutely useless. Only on the line Bayonne-Vittoria, where
the new blockhouses were beginning to arise, was any regular
passing to and fro possible. Clausel himself was absolutely lost to
sight, so far as King Joseph was concerned—it took a fortnight or
twenty days to get a dispatch through to him.
Meanwhile, before turning to the great campaign of Wellington on
the Douro, it is necessary to dispose of the chronicle of affairs in
Biscay. Foy and his division, as we have seen, had marched from
Vittoria to Bilbao and reached the latter place on April 21st[394]. On
the way they had nearly caught Mendizabal at Orduña, where he
chanced to be present with a guard of only 200 men; but, warned
just in time, he had the luck to escape, and went back to pick up his
subordinates Longa and Campillo nearer the coast.
Soon after Foy’s arrival at Bilbao he was joined by Sarrut’s division
of the Army of Portugal, which had followed him from Vittoria. He
had therefore, counting Palombini’s Italians, the brigade of Aussenac,
and the regular garrison of Bilbao, at least 16,000 men—ample for
the task that Clausel had commended to him, the capture of Castro-
Urdiales, with its patched-up mediaeval wall. The only thing
presenting any difficulty was getting a siege train to this remote
headland: Lameth, the Governor of Santoña, as it will be
remembered, had been ordered to provide one, and there were four
heavy guns in Bilbao:—the roads on both sides, however, were
impracticable, and the artillery had to come by water, running the
chance of falling in with British cruisers.
On April 25th Foy marched out of Bilbao with his own, Sarrut’s,
and Palombini’s divisions, more than 11,000 men,[395] leaving
Aussenac on the Deba, to guard the road from San Sebastian, and
Rouget in garrison as usual. On the same evening he reached the
environs of Castro, and left Palombini there to shut in the place, while
he went on himself to look for Mendizabal, who was known to be
watching affairs from the hills, and to be blocking the road to
Santoña, as he had so often done before. Foy then moved on to
Cerdigo where he established his head-quarters for the siege, on a
strong position between the sea and the river Agaera. Mendizabal
was reputed to be holding the line of the Ason, ten miles farther on,
but in weak force: he had only the partidas of Campillo and Herrero
with him, Longa being absent in the direction of Vittoria. On the 29th
Foy drove off these bands at Ampuero, and communicated with
Santoña, into which he introduced a drove of 500 oxen and other
victuals. The governor Lameth was ordered to ship the siege train
that he had collected to Islares, under the camp at Cerdigo, on the
first day when he should find the bay clear—for three English sloops,
the Lyra, Royalist, and Sparrow, under Captain Bloye, were lying off
Castro and watching the coast. Foy then established Sarrut’s division
to cover the siege at Trucios, and sent two Italian battalions to
Portugalete to guard the road to Bilbao, keeping his own division and
the three other Italian battalions for the actual trench work. The
heavy guns were the difficulty—those expected from Bilbao were
stopped at the mouth of the Nervion by the English squadron, which
was watching for them—but in the absence of the sloops on this
quest, the governor of Santoña succeeded in running his convoy
across the bay on May 4th. The guns from Bilbao were afterwards
brought up by land, with much toil.
Foy then commenced three batteries on the high slopes which
dominate the town: two were completed on the 6th, despite much
long-distance fire from the British ships, and from a heavy gun which
Captain Bloye had mounted on the rocky islet of Santa Anna outside
the harbour. On the 7th fire was begun from two batteries against the
mediaeval curtain wall, but was ineffective—one battery was silenced
by the British. On the 10th, however, the third battery—much closer
in—was ready, and opened with devastating results on the 11th, two
hours’ fire making a breach 30 feet wide and destroying a large
convent behind it.
The Governor, Pedro Alvarez, one of Longa’s colonels, had a
garrison of no more than 1,000 men—all like himself from Longa’s
regiments of Iberia; he made a resolute defence, kept up a
continuous counter-fire, and prepared to hold the breach. But it was
obvious that the old wall was no protection from modern artillery, and
that Foy could blow down as much of it as he pleased at leisure. On
the afternoon of the 11th part of the civil population went on board
the British ships: the governor made preparations for holding the
castle, on the seaside of the town projecting into the water, as a last
stronghold: but it was only protected by the steepness of the rock on
which it stood—its walls were ruined and worthless. Late in the day
the British took off the heavy gun which they had placed on the islet
—it could not have been removed after the town had fallen, and the
fall was clearly inevitable.
Foy, seeing the curtain-wall continuing to crumble, and a 60-foot
breach established, resolved to storm that night, and sent in at 7.20
three columns composed of eight French and eight Italian flank
companies for the assault—the former to the breach, the latter to try
to escalade a low angle near the Bilbao gate. Both attacks
succeeded, despite a heavy but ill-aimed fire from the defenders, and
the Spaniards were driven through the town and into the castle,
where they maintained themselves. Alvarez had made preparations
for evacuation—while two companies held the steep steps which
were the only way up to the castle, the rest of the garrison embarked
at its back on the boats of the British squadron. Some were killed in
the water by the French fire, some drowned, but the large majority
got off. By three in the morning there were only 100 men left in the
castle: Alvarez had detailed them to throw the guns into the sea, and
to fire the magazines, both of which duties they accomplished, before
the early dawn. When, by means of ladders, the French made their
way into an embrasure of the defences, some of this desperate band
were killed. But it is surprising to hear that most of them got away by
boat from the small jetty at the back of the castle. They probably
owed their escape to the fact that the stormers had spent the night
in riotous atrocities vying with those of Badajoz on a small scale.
Instead of finishing off their job by taking the castle, they had spent
the night in rape and plunder in the town[396].
The Spaniards declared that the total loss of their garrison was
only 100 men, and the statement is borne out by the dispatch of
Captain Bloye of the Lyra. Foy wrote to Clausel that the whole
business had only cost him fifty men. The two statements seem
equally improbable, for the siege had lasted for six days of open
trenches, and both sides had fought with great resolution[397].
But the really important thing to note about this little affair is that
it absorbed three French divisions for sixteen days in the most critical
month of 1813. Eleven thousand men were tied down in a remote
corner of Biscay, before a patched-up mediaeval wall, while Longa
was running riot in Alava and breaking the line of communication
with France—and (what is more important) while Wellington’s
columns were silently gliding into place for the great stroke on the
Douro. Colonel Alvarez could boast that his thousand men had served
a very useful and honourable end during the great campaign. He and
they were landed by Captain Bloye at Bermeo, and went off over the
hills to join Longa: the majority of them must have been present at
the battle of Vittoria, some six weeks after their escape by sea.
Having discharged the first duty set him by Clausel, Foy left the
Italians at Castro, to guard the coast and keep up communications
with Santoña. He sent Sarrut southward to hunt for Longa, by way of
Orduña; but the Spaniard crossed the Ebro and moved into the
province of Burgos, evading pursuit. Then, finding that Lamartinière’s
division was guarding the great road in this direction, he turned off
north-westward, and escaped by Espinosa to the mountains of
Santander. Sarrut, having lost him, turned back to Biscay.
Meanwhile Foy himself, after retiring to Bilbao to give a few days
of rest to his division, started out again on May 27th for a circular
tour in Biscay. His object was to destroy the three Biscayan volunteer
battalions which had given his predecessor so much trouble. Two he
dispersed, but could not destroy, and they ultimately got together
again in somewhat diminished numbers. The third was more unlucky:
caught between three converging columns near Lequeytio, it was
driven against the seashore and nearly annihilated—360 men were
taken, 200 killed, only two companies got off into the hills (May
30th). But to achieve this result Foy had collected three brigades—
5,000 men—who would have been better employed that day on the
Esla, for Wellington was crossing that river at the moment—and
where were the infantry of the Army of Portugal, who should have
stood in his way?
So while the British Army was streaming by tens of thousands into
the undefended plains of Leon, Foy and Sarrut were guerrillero-
hunting in Biscay, and Taupin and Barbot had just failed in the great
chase after Mina in Aragon and Navarre. Such were the results of the
Emperor’s orders for the pacification of the North.
Battle of CASTALLA April 13 1813
SECTION XXXV: CHAPTER VI
AN EPISODE ON THE EAST COAST.
CASTALLA, APRIL 1813
During the winter months, from November to February, affairs

had been quiet on the Mediterranean side of the Peninsula. The
transient sojourn of the Armies of Soult and King Joseph in the
kingdom of Valencia, which had so much troubled the mind of
General Maitland, had lasted no more than a few weeks. After they
had marched off to retake Madrid, no traces remained of them, in
the end of October, save the mass of sick, convalescents, and
Spanish refugees which they had left behind—guests most undesired
—in charge of Suchet. There was no longer any fear of a siege of
Alicante, or of the expulsion of the Anglo-Sicilian expeditionary corps
from Spain.
When the shadow of this fear had passed, the Allied forces
resumed something like their old position. The Anglo-Sicilians had
passed under many commanders since the autumn: Maitland had
resigned owing to ill-health before October 1st: he was succeeded
for six weeks by John Mackenzie, the senior Major-General at
Alicante, who was superseded about November 20th by William
Clinton (brother of Henry Clinton of the 6th Division). But Clinton
was only in charge of the expeditionary force for twelve days, being
out-ranked by James Campbell, Adjutant-General of the Army of
Sicily, who turned up with a large body of reinforcements on
December 2nd. Campbell, however, only bore rule at Alicante for a
period of three months, giving place to Sir John Murray on February
25th. It was therefore on the last-named officer that the stress of
co-operating with Wellington in the campaign of 1813 was to fall.
The unlucky man was quite unequal to the position, being singularly
infirm of purpose and liable to lose his head at critical moments, as
he had shown at Oporto on May 12th, 1809[398]. It is surprising that
Wellington, knowing his record, should have acquiesced in the
appointment—perhaps he thought that here at least was a general
who would take no risks, and have no dangerous inspirations of
initiative.
The strength of the Alicante army had risen by January 1813 to
something like 14,000 men, but it remained (as it had been from the
first) a most heterogeneous force, consisting in the early spring of
1813 of six British[399], three German[400], and two foreign battalions
belonging to the regular forces of the Crown[401], with four Italian
units[402] of various sorts. The cavalry consisted of one British and
one Sicilian regiment and an odd squadron of ‘Foreign Hussars.’ The
artillery was partly British, partly Sicilian, and partly Portuguese. In
addition to these troops the commander at Alicante had complete
control over General Whittingham’s ‘Majorcan division,’ a Spanish
corps which had been reorganized in the Balearic Islands by that
officer, and which had been clothed, armed, and paid from the
British subsidy. It consisted of six infantry battalions and two weak
cavalry regiments, and was in the spring about 4,500 strong. They
were rightly esteemed the best Spanish troops on the Eastern front,
and justified their reputation in the subsequent campaign. There was
a second Spanish division in the neighbourhood, that of General
Roche, which, like Whittingham’s, had been taken on to the British
subsidy, and re-clothed and re-armed. But this unit was not
reckoned part of the Alicante force, but belonged theoretically to
Elio’s Murcian army, in which it was numbered as the 4th Division. It
counted only five battalions and was at this time not more than
3,500 strong. But though it was registered as part of the Army of
Murcia, it often acted with Murray’s Anglo-Sicilian troops, being
cantoned alongside of them in the Alicante region. When Wellington
became Generalissimo of the Spanish armies, he not infrequently
gave orders to Roche to join Murray rather than Elio—apparently
conceiving that the fact that the division lived on the British subsidy
had placed it on a somewhat different footing from the rest of the
Murcians.
If we count Whittingham and Roche as attached to the
Expeditionary Army at Alicante, the strength of that heterogeneous
host would have been rather over 21,000 men—a total perceptibly
greater than Suchet’s field-force encamped over against it on the
Xucar. And in addition there lay close behind, within the borders of
the kingdom of Murcia, Elio and his ‘Second Army,’ which, even after
deducting Roche’s division, was a considerable accumulation of
troops. But the Murcian army’s record was more unhappy than that
of any other Spanish unit, and it had been dashed to pieces once
more in the preceding July, at the discreditable battle of Castalla.
Though it nominally counted 30,000 men in its six divisions, only
three of them were available[403], for two were really no more than
the old guerrillero bands of the Empecinado and Duran, who hung
about in Southern Aragon, and shifted for themselves. They were
both remote and disorganized. Since Roche’s division was also often
out of Elio’s control, he really had no more than 13,000 infantry and
2,000 horse in hand.
There were facing Suchet, of allied troops of one sort and
another, some 35,000 men, a fact which the Marshal never ceased to
utilize in his correspondence with Madrid, when he wished to excuse
himself from lending aid to his neighbours. But the Murcian army
had still not recovered from the demoralization caused by the battle
of Castalla, and the Alicante army was suffering from two evils which
reduced its value as a campaigning force to a very low level. The
first was a terrible deficiency of transport. When Lord William
Bentinck sent out the first expeditionary force from Sicily, he
intended it to equip itself with mules, horses, and carts in Spain. But
in the summer of 1812 the Kingdom of Murcia was the only
unoccupied region on the east side of the Peninsula, and all its not
too copious resources were wanted for its own army. Successive
captains-general refused, not unnaturally, to help Maitland or Murray
in the task of collecting sumpter-beasts, and suggested that they
ought to draw both animals and food from Sicily. Food was indeed
procured from thence, and even from Algeria and the Levant, so that
the army did not starve. But there was insufficient means to move
that food from the water’s edge. A certain number of mules were
collected by paying very heavy hire—not at all to the gratification of
the Spanish authorities, who wanted them for their own use. But
they were so few that the Army could make no long general
marches, and could count on little more than what the men carried
in their haversacks. The best that could be done was to move it
forward from the immediate neighbourhood of Alicante, so that it
could live upon the resources of the inland, where there were many
fertile and well-peopled valleys. The main object, indeed, of James
Campbell’s forward move was to get food for Whittingham’s and
Roche’s divisions, which were (though paid by the British subsidy)
dependent for their rations on the Spanish Government, and seldom
received them. Local food for these troops had to be sought, as the
only possible means of keeping them alive. In February the line of
occupation reached as far as Biar, Castalla, and Xixona, all held by
Whittingham’s division, while Roche and the Anglo-Sicilians were
mostly in second line, at Elda, Monforte, and Alicante. But the
problem of making the Anglo-Sicilian army a mobile force was not
much further advanced in March 1813 than it had been in October
1812.
The second weak point of the Alicante army was the extremely
doubtful quality of some of its foreign elements. It is true that the
German Legion battalions were as steady as those of the same corps
in Wellington’s own army. But all the others were crammed with
deserters from the enemy’s ranks, or prisoners of war who had
enlisted in order to escape the miseries of the prison-camp or the
hulks. The ‘Calabrese Free Corps’ was a trifle better than the rest,
being mostly composed of genuine exiles. But the only difference
between the recent recruits of Dillon’s cosmopolitan regiment in the
British service and of the ‘Italian Levy’ and ‘Estero regiment’ was
that the former corps contained more French and Swiss deserters,
and the latter pair more Italians. All had the usual sprinkling of
Poles, Dutch, Croats, and other miscellaneous adventurers. A lurid
light was thrown upon their possibilities on February 11th, when 86
men of the 2nd Italian Levy deserted to the French lines, bringing
over their officer as a prisoner. It was discovered that the rest of the
battalion were in a plot to betray Xixona to Suchet, and with it one
of Whittingham’s Spanish regiments, which was encamped beside
them. There was just time to march in the 1 /27th and a second
Spanish battalion, who surrounded and disarmed the Italians, before
a French column appeared at dawn. It directed itself to the quarters
from which the traitors had just been drawn off, was surprised to be
received with a heavy fire, and rapidly withdrew [404]. Such an
incident was certainly not calculated to inspire a timid general, like
Sir John Murray, with any great craving for a bold offensive.
On the other hand, Murray had a formidable force on paper, and
when Suchet reflected that there lay close behind him, first Elio’s
army in Murcia—at least 13,000 men without counting the
Empecinado’s and Duran’s bands—and farther back Del Parque’s
Andalusian ‘3rd Army,’ which had also some 13,000 effectives, he
could not but see that 50,000 men might march against his
comparatively weak force in Valencia at any moment. His strength
on the Xucar was very modest—not much over 15,000 bayonets and
sabres: for though he had 60,000 men of all arms effective, and
75,000 on his rolls, including sick and detached, yet such a force
was not enough to control the whole of the ancient lands of the
Aragonese crown—Aragon Proper, Catalonia, and Valencia. He was in
possession of all of them save the Catalan inland, where the ‘First
Army’ still maintained itself, the extreme southern region of the
Valencian kingdom round Alicante, and the mountains between
Aragon and Castile, which were the hunting ground of the
guerrilleros of Duran and the Empecinado. The garrison was small
for such a widespread occupation, and the only thing that made the
Marshal’s position tolerable was the fact that (unlike Catalonia)
Aragon and Valencia had shown themselves very ‘quiet’ regions.
Suchet’s rule had been severe, but at least orderly; there had been
little of the casual plunder and requisitioning which made French
rule detested under other commanders. The coast-plain of Valencia
and the broad stretch of the Ebro valley in Central Aragon were
districts less suitable for the operations of guerrilleros than almost
any other part of Spain. On the Valencian frontier there was only one
active partida, that of the ‘Fraile’ (Agostin Nebot), whose welcome
gift of 60 captured French transport mules to the Alicante army is
acknowledged in one of Wellington’s dispatches. It is true that the
sub-Pyrenean parts of Aragon were exposed to Mina’s raids, and that
the solid block of sierras round Molina and Albaracin was always the
refuge of Duran and Villacampa, but these were not essential
regions for the maintenance of the hold on the Mediterranean coast.
With the exception of these tracts the land was fairly quiet: there
was a general submission to the French yoke, and an appreciable
proportion of afrancesados. The blow inflicted on public opinion by
the fall of Valencia in January 1812 was still a recent thing.
Wellington’s army had been heard of, but never seen; and the
operations of the Alicante expeditionary force had hitherto served to
depress rather than to encourage insurrection. Hence it was possible
that 35,000 men could hold the broad lands that lay between Tudela
and Saragossa and Lerida on the North, and Denia and Xativa on the
South—though Decaen’s 28,000 had a much more precarious grip on
Catalonia. But the occupation was a tour de force after all, and was
liable to be upset at any moment by an active and capable enemy.
Fortunately for Suchet his opponent on the East Coast during the
spring of 1813 was neither active nor capable.
As long as King Joseph kept his head-quarters at Madrid and
occupied the province of La Mancha, extending his line eastward to
San Clemente, he had been in touch with Suchet’s front, and
communications were open. Indeed Daricau’s division marched to
the borders of Valencia in the end of January, and took over from
the Marshal the large body of Spanish refugees and convalescents of
the Army of the South, who had been under his charge since
October. But the whole situation was changed when the orders of
the Emperor compelled Joseph to draw back his head-quarters to
Valladolid, and to hold Toledo as his extreme post towards the
South. When this change was made, the touch between Valencia
and Madrid was lost—the Spanish cavalry of the Army of Andalusia
advanced across the Sierra Morena into La Mancha: Villacampa’s
division descended from the hills to occupy the more level parts of
the province of Cuenca. For the future the King and Suchet could
only keep touch with each other by the circuitous route through
Saragossa. The situation of the French Army of Valencia was
rendered far more isolated and dangerous—it was in a very
advanced position, with no communication whatever with any
friendly force save through Aragon. And its inland flank was exposed
to all manner of possible molestation—if Villacampa, Duran, and the
Empecinado had represented a serious fighting force, capable of
regular action in the field, Suchet would have been bound to retire
at once to the line of the Ebro, on pain of finding himself surrounded
and cut off. But these irregular ‘divisions’ of the Army of Murcia
were, as a matter of fact, good for raids and the cutting of
communications, but useless for battle. They were local in their
operations, seldom combined, and only obeyed their nominal
commander, Elio, when it pleased them. It was very hard for any one
of them to move far from its accustomed ‘beat,’ because they had no
magazines, and lived each on their own region.
Suchet accordingly resolved to try the hazardous experiment of
preserving his old positions, even when communication with Madrid
had been cut off. He left on his inland flank only a flying brigade or
two, and the normal garrisons of the small fortified towns of upper
Aragon, and kept his main striking force still concentrated on the line
of the Xucar, in order to cover the plain of Valencia from the one
serious enemy, the Alicante army. The available troops consisted of
the three small infantry divisions of Habert, Harispe, and Musnier
(this last temporarily under Robert), and the cavalry division of
Boussard, the whole amounting to about 12,500 foot and 1,500
horse, or a gross total of all arms of some 15,000 men. They were
disposed so as to cover the front of 50 miles from Moxente, at the
foot of the Murcian mountains, to the mouth of the Xucar, and were
not scattered in small parties, but concentrated in four groups which
could easily unite. The right wing was covered by an entrenched
camp at Moxente, the centre by another at San Felipe de Xativa.
Denia on the sea-coast was held as a cover to the left wing. Cavalry
was out in front, and in a rather exposed position a brigade of
Habert’s division held Alcoy, a considerable town in a fertile upland
valley, whose resources Suchet was anxious to retain as long as
possible.
Soon after he had taken over command at Alicante on February
25th, Murray obtained accurate local information as to the exact
distribution and numbers of the French, and noting the very exposed
position of the brigade at Alcoy, made an attempt to cut it off by the
concentric advance of four columns. The scheme failed, partly
because of the late arrival of the right-hand column (a brigade of
Whittingham’s division), partly because Murray, having got engaged
with the French in front, refused to support his advanced troops until
the flanking detachments should appear, and so allowed the enemy
to slip away (March 6th)[405]. He then halted, though his movement
must obviously have roused Suchet’s attention, and rendered a
counter-attack possible. But after a week, finding the enemy still
passive, he sent forward Whittingham to drive the French outposts
from Consentaina, and the pass of Albeyda, in the mountain range
which separates the valley of Alcoy from the lowland. This was to
ask for trouble, and should only have been done if Murray was
proposing to challenge Suchet to a decisive general action:
Whittingham indeed thought that this was the object of his
commanding officer[406]. At the same time two British battalions
under General Donkin made a demonstration against the French
right, ten miles farther east, in the direction of Onteniente. Habert,
whose whole division was holding the line of hills, gave way after a
sharp skirmish, and allowed Whittingham to seize the pass of
Albeyda (March 15th). Every one supposed that the Alicante army
was now about to attack the French main position between Moxente
and Xativa.
But Murray’s plan was different: having, as he supposed,
attracted Suchet’s full notice, by his forward movement, he was
proposing to send out an expedition by sea, to make a dash at the
town of Valencia, which (as he calculated) must be under-garrisoned
when heavy fighting was expected on the Xucar. He told off for the
purpose Roche’s Spanish division, strengthened by the British
provisional battalion of grenadier companies and a regiment
borrowed from Elio. The orders were to land on the beach south of
the city, make a dash for it, and if that failed to seize Cullera at the
mouth of the Xucar, or Denia, farther down the coast. The project
looked hazardous, for to throw 5,000 men ashore in the enemy’s
country, far from their own main body, was to risk their being cut up,
or forced to a re-embarkation on a bare beach, which could not fail
to be costly. Unless Murray at the same moment attacked Suchet, so
that he should not be able to send a man to the rear towards
Valencia, the force embarked was altogether too small. Murray’s
calculation was that the Marshal would make a heavy detachment,
and that he would then attack the line of the Xucar himself. With this
object he invited Elio to co-operate, by turning the French right on
the inland on the side of Almanza. The Spanish General, though he
had been quarrelling with Murray of late, was now in an obliging
frame of mind[407] and so far consented that he brought up one
infantry division to Yecla, a place which would make a good starting-
point for a flank march round the extreme right of Suchet’s
positions.
Meanwhile, for ten days after the combat of Albeyda nothing
happened on the main front. Whittingham was still left in an
advanced position north of Alcoy, while the rest of the Alicante army
was concentrated at Castalla fifteen miles farther back. The marvel is
that Suchet did not make a pounce upon the isolated Spanish
division pushed up so close to his front. He had not yet taken the
measure of his opponent, whose failing (as the whole campaign
shows) was to start schemes, and then to abandon them from
irresolution, at the critical moment when a decisive move became
necessary.
Meanwhile, on March 26th Roche’s division and the attached
British battalion were actually embarking at Alicante, for the dash at
Valencia, when Murray received a dispatch from Lord William
Bentinck at Palermo, informing him that a political crisis had broken
out in Sicily, that civil strife there had become probable, and that he
was therefore compelled to order the immediate recall of two
regiments of trustworthy troops from Spain. The fact was that the
new Sicilian constitution, proclaimed as the solution of all discontent
in the island in 1812, had failed to achieve its purpose. The old King
Ferdinand had carried out a sort of mild coup d’état, and proclaimed
his own restoration to absolute power (March 13th, 1813): the
Neapolitan troops who formed the majority of the armed force in the
island had accepted the position. The Sicilian constitutional party
seemed helpless, and the attitude of the local battalions under their
control was doubtful. Nothing could save the situation but a display
of overpowering force. Wherefore Bentinck directed Murray to send
back to Palermo, without delay, the 6th Line battalion K.G.L. and the
battalion of grenadier companies belonging to British regiments still
quartered in Sicily. This was not a very large order, so far as mere
numbers went—the force requisitioned being under 2,000 bayonets.
But the prospect of the outbreak of civil war in Sicily scared Murray—
if the strife once began, would not more of his best troops be
requisitioned, and the Alicante force be reduced to a residuum of
disloyal foreign levies? Moreover, one of the units requisitioned by
name was the battalion of grenadiers just about to sail for Valencia.
Perhaps not without secret satisfaction, for he hated making
decisions of any sort, Murray declared that Bentinck’s orders
rendered the naval expedition impossible, and countermanded it. He
sent off, on the transports ready in harbour, the grenadier battalion
ordered to Sicily, and returned the Spanish contingent to its old
cantonments[408]. The K.G.L. battalion was just embarking when
news arrived (April 1st) that the Sicilian crisis was now over,
wherefore Murray retained it for a few more day[409].
For the counter-revolution at Palermo had only lasted for four
days! Finding Lord William Bentinck firm, and prepared to use force,
King Ferdinand withdrew his proclamation, and resigned the
administration into the hands of his eldest son, the Prince Royal. The
Queen, whose strong will had set the whole affair on foot, promised
to return to her native Austria, and actually sailed for the Levant, to
the intense satisfaction of every one save the knot of intriguers in
her Court. The scare was soon over—its only result was the
abandonment of the raid on Valencia. Murray had now received
orders from Wellington to await the arrival of a detailed scheme for
the way in which his army was to be employed. Pending the receipt
of these[410] directions he lapsed into absolute torpidity—the only
record of his doings in the last days of March and early April being
that he set the troops concentrated at Castalla to entrenching the
hillsides around that formidable position—a clear sign that he had no
further intention of taking the offensive on his own account.
Suchet had been much puzzled by the advance of his enemy to
Alcoy and Albeyda, followed by subsequent inactivity for a whole
month. When he found that even the movement of Elio’s troops to
Yecla did not foreshadow a general assault upon his lines, he
concluded that there must be some unexplained reason for the
quiescence of the Allies, and that the opportunity was a good one
for a bold blow, while they remained inexplicably waiting in a
disjointed and unconcentrated line opposite his positions. The
obvious and easy thing would have been to fall upon Whittingham at
Alcoy, but probably for that very reason the Marshal tried another
scheme. He secretly passed all his available troops to Fuente la
Higuera, on his extreme right flank, leaving only a trifling screen in
front of Murray’s army, and on April 10th marched in two columns
against the allied left. One consisting of six battalions of Harispe’s
division and two cavalry regiments aimed at the isolated Murcian
division at Yecla, the other and larger column four battalions of
Habert’s division, and seven of Musnier’s (under Robert during the
absence of its proper chief), with his cuirassier regiment, marched
by Caudete on Villena, to cut in between the Spaniards and Murray,
and intercept any aid which the latter might send from Castalla
towards the Spaniards.
The blow was unexpected and delivered with great vigour:
Harispe surprised General Mijares’ Murcians at Yecla at dawn; they
were hopelessly outnumbered, only four battalions being present-the
fifth unit of the division was at Villena. And there was but a single
squadron with them, Elio’s cavalry being in its cantonments thirty
miles away in the Albacete-Chinchilla country. Mijares, on finding
himself assailed by superior numbers, tried to march off towards
Jumilla and the mountains. Harispe pursued, and seeing the
Spaniards likely to get away, for the retreat was rapid and in good
order, flung his hussars and dragoons at them. The Spaniards turned
up on to a hillside, and tried a running fight. The two leading
battalions of the column made good their escape—the two rear
battalions were cut off: they formed square, beat back two charges
with resolution, but were broken by the third, and absolutely
exterminated: 400 were cut down, about 1,000 captured. Of these
two unlucky regiments, 1st of Burgos and Cadiz, hardly a man got
away—the other two, Jaen and Cuenca, took little harm[411]. The
French lost only 18 killed and 61 wounded, mostly in the two cavalry
regiments, for Harispe’s infantry were but slightly engaged.
Ill news flies quickly—the fighting had been in the early dawn, by
noon mounted fugitives had brought the tidings to Villena, fifteen
miles away. Here there chanced to be present both Elio and Sir John
Murray, who had ridden over to consult with his colleague on a
rumour that Suchet was concentrating at Fuente la Higuera. He had
brought with him the ‘light brigade,’ under Colonel Adam, which he
had recently organized[412], and 400 horse[413]. The Generals soon
learned that beside the force which had cut up Mijares, there was a
larger column marching on their own position. They were in no
condition to offer battle, Elio having with him only a single battalion,
Murray about 2,500 men of all arms. They agreed that they must
quit Villena and concentrate their troops for a defensive action. Elio
sent orders to his cavalry to come in from the North and join the
wrecks of Mijares’ division, and for the reserves which he had got in
the neighbourhood of Murcia to march up to the front[414]. But it
would obviously take some days to collect these scattered items.
Meanwhile he threw the single battalion that he had with him (Velez
Malaga) into the castle of Villena, which had been patched up and
put into a state of defence, promising that it should be relieved
when his army was concentrated.
Murray, on the other hand, retired towards his main body at
Castalla, but ordered Adam’s ‘light brigade’ to defend the pass of
Biar for as long as prudence permitted, so as to allow the rest of the
army to get into position. Whittingham was directed to fall back from
Alcoy, Roche to come up from the rear, and by the next evening the
whole Alicante army would be concentrated, in a position which had
been partly entrenched during the last three weeks, and was very
strong even without fortification. Murray refused (very wisely) to
send back Adam to pick up the Spanish battalion left in Villena,
which Elio (seized with doubts when it was too late) now wished to
withdraw.
Suchet reached Villena on the evening of the 11th, and got in
touch with the cavalry screen covering Adam’s retreat. Finding the
castle held, he started to bombard it with his field artillery, and on
the morning of the 12th blew in its gates and offered to storm. He
sent in a parlementaire to summon the garrison, and to his surprise
it capitulated without firing a shot—a mutiny having broken out
among the men[415], who considered that they had been deserted by
their General. Suchet now intended to fall on Murray at Castalla,
reckoning that Elio’s concentration had been prevented by the blows
at Yecla and Villena, and that he would have the Alicante army alone
to deal with. He ordered the troops that were with him to drive in
without delay Adam’s light brigade, which his cavalry had discovered
holding the village of Biar and the pass above it. His other column,
that of Harispe, was not far off, being on the march from Yecla.
Finding that it was gone, Mijares cautiously reoccupied that place
with his two surviving battalions.
The combat of Biar, which filled the midday hours of April 12th,
was one of the most creditable rearguard actions fought during the
whole Peninsular War. Colonel Adam had only one British and two
Italian battalions, with two German Legion rifle companies, four
mountain guns, and one squadron of the ‘Foreign Hussars’—about
2,200 men in all. He had prepared a series of positions on which he
intended to fall back in succession, as each was forced. At the
commencement of the action he occupied Biar village with the
Calabrese Free Corps, flanked by the light companies of the 2/27th
and 3rd K.G.L. The rest of the brigade was above, on the hills
flanking the pass, with the guns on the high road. The leading
French battalion assaulted the barricaded village, and was repulsed
with heavy loss. Then, as was expected, the enemy turned Biar on
both flanks: its garrison retired unharmed, but the turning columns
came under the accurate fire of the troops on the slopes above, and
the attack was again checked. Suchet, angered at the waste of time,
then threw in no less than nine battalions[416] intending to sweep
away all opposition, and turning Adam’s left flank with swarms of
voltigeurs. The Light Brigade had, of course, to retire; but Adam
conducted his retreat with great deliberation and in perfect order,
fending off the turning attack with his German and British light
companies, and making the column on the high road pay very dearly
for each furlong gained. His four mountain guns, on the crest of the
pass, were worked with good effect to the last moment—two which
had each lost a wheel were abandoned on the ground. When the
crest had been passed, Suchet sent a squadron of cuirassiers to
charge down the road on the retreating infantry. Foreseeing this,
when the cavalry had been noted on the ascent, Adam had hidden
three companies of the 2/27th in rocks where the road made a sharp
angle: the cuirassiers, as they trotted past, received a flank volley at
ten paces distance, which knocked over many, and sent the rest
reeling back in disorder on to their own infantry. After this the
pursuit slackened; ‘the enemy seemed glad to be rid of us,’ and after
five hours’ fighting the Light Brigade marched back in perfect order
to the position beside Castalla which had been assigned to it[417]. Its
final retirement was covered by three battalions which Murray had
sent out to meet it, at the exit from the pass[418].
So ended a very pretty fight. Whittingham, who had witnessed
the later phases of it from the hill on the left of Castalla, describes it
as ‘a beautiful field-day, by alternate battalions: the volleys were
admirable, and the successive passage of several ravines conducted
with perfect order and steadiness. From the heights occupied by my
troops it was one of the most delightful panoramas that I ever
beheld.’ The allied loss was about 300[419], including Colonel Adam
wounded in the arm, yet not so much hurt but that he kept the
command and gave directions to the end. On the ground evacuated
41 ‘missing’ and two disabled mountain guns were left in the
enemy’s hands. The French must have suffered much the same
casualties—Suchet gives no estimate, but Martinien’s invaluable lists
show two officers killed and twelve wounded, which at the usual rate
between officers and men implies about 300 rank and file hit.
On emerging from the pass of Biar in the late afternoon Suchet
could see Murray’s army occupying a long front of high ground as far
as the town of Castalla, but could descry neither its encampment,
behind the heights, nor the end of its right wing, which was thrown
back and hidden by the high conical hill on which the castle and
church of Castalla stand. Seeing the enemy ready, and apparently
resolved to fight, the Marshal put off serious operations to the next
day. He had to wait for Harispe’s column, which was still coming up
many miles in his rear.
Murray had long surveyed his ground, and had (as we have seen)
thrown up barricades and entrenchments on the hill of Castalla and
the ground immediately to its right and left. He had very nearly
every available man of his army in hand, only a minimum garrison
having been left in Alicante[420]. The total cannot have been less than
18,000 men; he had divided his own troops into the Light Brigade of
Adam, and the two divisions of Mackenzie and Clinton. The first
named had three and a quarter battalions—not quite 2,000 men
after its losses at Biar on the previous afternoon[421]. Mackenzie
seems to have had one British, two German Legion, and two Sicilian
battalions[422]: Clinton three British, one composite Foreign, and one
Italian battalion[423]. Whittingham had six Spanish battalions with
him[424]—Roche only five[425]. The cavalry consisted of three
squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons, two of Sicilian cavalry, one of
‘Foreign Hussars,’ and about 400 of Whittingham’s Spanish horse[426],
under 1,000 sabres in all. There were two British, two Portuguese,
and a Sicilian battery on the ground.
The sierra on the left, known as the heights of Guerra, was held
by Whittingham’s Spaniards for a mile, next them came Adam’s
brigade, above a jutting spur which projects from the sierra towards
the plain, then Mackenzie’s division, which extended as far as the hill
on which the castle of Castalla stands: this was occupied by the
1/58th of Clinton’s division, and two batteries had been thrown up
on the slope. With this hill the sierra ends suddenly; but a
depression and stream running southward furnished a good
protection for Murray’s right, which was held by the rest of Clinton’s
division. The stream had been dammed up, and formed a broad
morass covering a considerable portion of the front. Behind it
Clinton’s troops were deployed, with three of Roche’s battalions as a
reserve in their rear: two batteries were placed on commanding
knolls in this part of the line, which was so far thrown back en
potence that it was almost at right angles to the front occupied by
Mackenzie, Adam, and Whittingham. The Spanish and Sicilian cavalry
was thrown out as a screen in front of Castalla, with two of Roche’s
battalions in support. The 20th Light Dragoons were in reserve
behind the town. The east end of the sierra, near Castalla, was
covered by vineyards in step-cultivation, each enclosure a few feet
higher than the next below it. Farther west there was only rough
hillside, below Whittingham’s front. The whole position was excellent
—yet Murray is said by his Quartermaster-General, Donkin, to have
felt so uncomfortable that he thrice contemplated issuing orders for
a retreat, though he could see the whole French army, and judge
that its strength was much less than his own[427]. But he distrusted
both himself and many battalions of his miscellaneous army.
Suchet, contrary to his wont, was slow to act. It is said that he
disliked the look of the position, and doubted the wisdom of
attacking, but was over-persuaded by some of his generals, who
urged that the enemy was a mixed multitude, and that the Spaniards
and Sicilians would never stand against a resolute attack. It was not
till noon that the French army moved—the first manœuvre was that
the whole of the cavalry rode out eastward, took position opposite
the angle en potence of Murray’s position, and sent exploring parties
towards Clinton’s front. Evidently the report was that it was
inaccessible. While this was happening the infantry deployed, and
Habert’s and Robert’s division advanced and occupied a low ridge,
called the Cerro del Doncel, in the plain facing Murray’s left and left-
centre. Harispe’s division, minus a detachment left behind the pass
of Biar to watch for any possible appearance of Elio’s troops on the
road from Sax, formed in reserve. The whole of Suchet’s infantry
was only 18 battalions, individually weaker than Murray’s 24; he was
outnumbered in guns also—24 to 30 apparently—but his 1,250
cavalry were superior in numbers and quality to Murray’s. He had
certainly not more than 13,000 men on the ground to the Allies’
18,000.
His game was to leave Clinton’s division and Castalla alone,
watched only by his cavalry; to contain Mackenzie by
demonstrations, which were not to be pushed home; but to strike
heavily with Robert’s division at the Spaniards on the left. If he could
break down Whittingham’s defence, and drive him off the sierra, he
would attack the allied centre from flank and front alike—but
meanwhile it was not to be pressed. When, therefore, Habert faced
Mackenzie nothing serious happened, the French sent out swarms of
tirailleurs, brought up eight guns and shelled the position with
grape. Mackenzie’s light companies and guns replied, ‘but there was
nothing more than a skirmish: the columns shifted their ground
indeed more than once, but they did not deploy, and their officers
took good care not to bring them under the fire of our line[428].’
On the left, however, there was hard fighting. Suchet first sent
out five light companies to endeavour to turn the extreme western
end of Whittingham’s line, and, when they were far up the slope,
delivered a frontal attack on the heights of Guerra with six battalions
of Robert’s division: the 3rd Léger and 114th and 121st Line[429]: of
these the left-hand battalions (belonging to the 121st) came up the
projecting spur mentioned above, and faced the 2/27th on the left of
Adam’s brigade. The other four were opposed to the Spaniards.
Whittingham was caught in a rather dangerous position, for a
little while before the attack developed, he had received an order
from head-quarters bidding him execute against Robert’s division
precisely the same manœuvre that Suchet was trying against
himself, viz. to send troops to outflank the extreme French right. He
was told by the bearer of the orders, a Sicilian colonel, that this was
preliminary to a general attack downhill upon the French line, which
Murray was intending to carry out. The Spanish division was to turn
its flank, while Adam and Mackenzie went straight at its front. There
is some mystery here—Murray afterwards denied to Whittingham
that he had given any such order[430], and Donkin, his Chief of the
Staff, maintained that his general was thinking of a retreat all that
morning rather than of an attack. Yet Colonel Catanelli was a
respectable officer, who was thanked in dispatches both by Murray
and Whittingham for his services! Three hypotheses suggest

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7. Business marketers advertise primarily to announce new products.

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21. Not-for-profit organizations are considered part of B2B marketplace.

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