Hezbollah

Hezbollah is the archetype and so far the most important and efficient of all Iranian proxy forces in the Middle East, and it demonstrates all the traits that eventually became the trademarks of Iran’s proxy networks in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and beyond. While embedding itself in the national government of Lebanon, Hezbollah receives its portfolio from Tehran and advances the agenda of the Islamist regime of Iran. While pressing the regime’s interests at the expense of the West and its regional allies through widespread terrorism and proxy warfare, Hezbollah provides Tehran with just enough plausible deniability to still appear as a somewhat “respectable actor” on the world stage.

Lebanon is among the most developed Arab countries concerning freedom of expression, and its press and media are famous for their openness and critical approach toward domestic and Arab affairs. The openness and criticism notwithstanding, there are various restrictions, not always formal ones, on the freedom of expression in Lebanon. While much has been written about Lebanese freedom of expression and media, few researches have concentrated on Lebanese political TV satire. This article aims to examine the limits of freedom of expression in Lebanon, as reflected in the various political TV satire shows. The article examined five satire shows: Basmat Watan, La Youmal, Ma Fi Metlo, Chi.N.N. and Awal ‘Ala Akhir. For each show, the article referred to three controversial issues: the attitude toward politics and politicians; the attitude toward Hezbollah and its weapons; and the attitude toward Lebanese presidents, foreign heads of states and Syria. Focusing on the different Lebanese TV s...

A lo largo del último lustro se asiste a una reactivación de las actividades terroristas de la organización Hezbollah fuera de su zona mesooriental de origen. Esas actividades parecen encuadrarse en la búsqueda de represalias por la muerte de su conspicuo miembro ImadMoughnie, responsable histórico de su brazo armado,

In the developing world and unstable regions, illicit non-state actors often become involved in planning activities such as providing basic services, managing land use, and organizing the real estate market. This paper will look at the scholarly and journalistic conversations surrounding criminal groups engaged in planning activities that are traditionally seen as the government’s province. The first section of the paper will explain the rationale for treating criminal 1 groups as planners and provide an overview of existing literature on criminal planning. The second section will propose a typology of illicit non-state actors based on their structure, planning involvement, and relationships with the formal government, finding commonality among these disparate groups. It will discuss three broad types of criminal planners—traffickers, mafias, and militant groups—using the examples of Brazilian trafficking gangs and militias, the Medellín cartel, Indian mafias, ISIS, and Hezbollah. The third section will look at two forms of criminal involvement in planning: first, as a replacement for an absent government, and second, as an obstacle to government planning. Both are designed to assert and maintain the criminal group’s territorial and social control, and they rarely exist independently of each other. In fact, they are usually intertwined, creating complex symbiotic relationships between official and unofficial authority.

The case of Hizbullah offers an important opportunity to examine Islamist actors. Created during the 1980s as a religious-oriented movement with a clear Islamic agenda, it gradually shifted towards a more pragmatic position, entering Lebanese political life in 1992. In its early days Hizbullah adopted a clear anti-system posture and strongly criticised the consociational Lebanese system and the international order. By comparing three key moments in the political evolution of the movement this article analyses the strategy of Hizbullah from an anti-system perspective. The aim is to demonstrate how playing as a dual anti-system actor (as both social movement and party) on two interrelated levels (domestic and external) has been a strategic and informed political choice. Hizbullah has been able to juggle these positions over the years, activating or silencing its domestic anti-system attitude to the benefit of the external one. To have a differentiated anti-system attitude has allowed it to maintain a double (but always coherent) position in the different systems it plays, adapting its anti-system posture to the political circumstances, to its goals and to the international context.

There is no discussion that adversaries, past and present, have developed creative uses of the "full-spectrum" of warfare, including the use of regular and irregular tactics across all dimensions of war. In the view of many Western analysts it is the non-military tools, such as information, that are seen as the biggest threat in information society today.

What kind of decolonial possibilities exist in today’s world? Exploring the rise of Islamic activism in Lebanon and the Middle East, and drawing transnational parallels with other revolutionary religious struggles in Latin America and South Africa, Sarah Marusek offers a timely analysis of the social and political evolution of Islamic movements.The growing popularity of Islamic movements means that many groups, which emerged in opposition to Western imperialism, are now also gaining increasing economic and political powers. Based on more than two and a half years of ethnographic fieldwork in Lebanon, Marusek paints a picture of how resistance is lived and reproduced in daily lives, tracing the evolution of the ideas and practices of the charities affiliated with Hizbullah and the wider Islamic resistance movement. Adopting a dialectical approach, Faith and Resistance discusses the possibility for resistance groups to reconcile acquiring power with their decolonial aspirations. In doing so, the book acts as a guide for liberation struggles and those engaged in resistance the world over.

The author examines Hezbollah, a Shiite militant and political organization. The analysis is focused on the strategy employed in Lebanon against Israel between 1982 to 2000. The discussion follows the tactical, operational, and strategic developments that evolved progressively and how they aligned with the changes within Hezbollah's political sphere.

This essay looks at why terrorism is a contested concept and its disability in providing institutions, the public and states with a reliable definition that can be applied anywhere. There are particular issues associated with defining terrorism, it relates to multiple models such as communication and religion, particular terms associated with ‘terrorism’ may be misconstrued, the lack of historical validity terrorism does not possess, how state terrorism is ignored in larger terrorism studies and formations of terrorism may appear unreliable. In practice, this essay will look at how terrorism as a contested concept has lead to innocent civilian deaths, the ‘acceptable’ of state terrorism and brushed under the rug topics such as terrorist groups turned political parties.

Sectarian rhetoric is escalating across the Middle East region in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq, the Arab Spring moment of 2011, the recent Iran nuclear deal, as well as the Saudi-lead campaign in Yemen intended to curb Iranian influence in the region. This sectarian tone has colored not just the region’s politics, but also its media, most evident in satellite television broadcasting. Hezbollah’s Al Manar
(the Beacon) is widely watched by the region’s Shi’a, many of whom live in the Gulf, and the channel often conflates religious and political content. Saudi Arabia and their Sunni allies have worked to remove overtly Shi’a channels (such as Al Manar and the Iranian Arabic-language Al Alam) from the region’s satellites, while military personalities in the region have singled out Al Manar as a threat to regional
security. These disputes over satellite broadcast content even prompted some to brand this as the new “Middle Eastern War of the Airwaves.” Spanning the issues of media, religion, and politics, this paper focuses on the predominance of sectarian politics in satellite television in the Gulf sub-region using
Al Manar as a case study. While censorship of channels and content based on rationales other than sectarianism does exist, this paper focuses on the specific impact of sectarianism and Shi’a religious and political content in satellite television within the contemporary political environment. This paper explores how Al Manar, as the most prominent Shi’a religious and political outlet in the Gulf, has been targeted by Sunni powers for censorship, and how the channel’s content, as both religious and political, is perceived as threatening by Sunni rulers in the Gulf. These
themes are explored in the context of fierce Saudi-Iranian geopolitical and regional competition that has transcended the political realm and become intricately infused in the region’s media and public sphere.

The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World by Mohammed Ayoob is an introductory book on political Islam. Main objective of Ayoob in writing the book, as he puts, was to provide an introductory text for the non-specialist reader while trying to highlight the complexity of the issue and avoid oversimplification of the subject. The book achieved more than it aimed, and filled the gap for an introductory book for students of different studies such as international relations, religion, sociology and history.

Judging by recent media reporting and pronouncements by senior
US military and security officials, the use of drones by militant
groups is both reshaping conflict between armed non-state actors
and state parties and now presents a grave and direct threat to
nations in the West and elsewhere. But does this threat warrant
the attention it is currently receiving? To answer this question, this
article surveys how various militant groups have used drones both
tactically on the battlefield and for wider strategic purposes.
Closely examining how drones have been employed and by
whom provides a basis for understanding variation in adoption.
The article shows how drone usage or non-usage is highly
contingent on the setting of the conflict, the aims of different
groups, and the capacity of groups to adopt the technology.
Though advances in drone technology could make the use-case
more appealing for militant groups, drones will be subject to the
same back-and-forth, techno-tactical adaptation dynamic between
adversaries that have accompanied prior military innovations.

This book hopes to explain the reasons behind the creation of violent ideologies as alternative modes of governance given perceived injustice. Emotion and sentimental attachment form an important part of developing one’s politics and preferences. Politics and thus shaped by an emotional reaction to an existing structure of knowledge which then constructs human behavior. In this sense, politics is far from objective, rational process of the mind. The purpose of any political ideology, whether Democracy, Fascism (and its varieties), or Communism, is to escape human suffering by combining ideas, emotion, and people to produce fundamental societal change. Ideologies must possess these three variables to attain the necessary power to succeed as a political force. Power gives the ideology the structural ability to transform society, trapping the once free individual into the ideology. The theory also explains democracy’s success and the failure of Communism and the Fascism.

The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World by Mohammed Ayoob is an introductory book on political Islam. Main objective of Ayoob in writing the book, as he puts, was to provide an introductory text for the non-specialist reader while trying to highlight the complexity of the issue and avoid oversimplification of the subject. The book achieved more than it aimed, and filled the gap for an introductory book for students of different studies such as international relations, religion, sociology and history.

Ο πόλεμος είναι ένα φαινόμενο το οποίο συνεχώς εξελίσσεται και αλλάζει μορφές, προσαρμοζόμενο κάθε φορά στην πραγματικότητα και τις ιδιαιτερότητες της κάθε εποχής. Όπως χαρακτηριστικά αναφέρει ο μεγάλος θεωρητικός του πολέμου Carl von Clausewitz, «κάθε εποχή έχει τις δικές της μορφές πολέμου, τις δικές της περιοριστικές συνθήκες και τις δικές της προκαταλήψεις». Η νέα δομή του διεθνούς συστήματος, μετά την κατάρρευση της ΕΣΣΔ, η αύξηση της σημασίας των μη κρατικών δρώντων στο διεθνές σύστημα και η ραγδαία ανάπτυξη της τεχνολογίας δημιούργησαν τις προϋποθέσεις για την ανάδειξη μια νέας μορφής συγκρούσεων. Αυτό το νέο είδος πολέμου που έχει αρχίσει να εμφανίζεται κυρίως την τελευταία δεκαετία είναι ο Υβριδικός Πόλεμος (Hybrid Warfare), που αποτελείται από έναν συνδυασμό συμβατικών επιχειρήσεων και ανορθόδοξου πολέμου (irregular warfare). Έτσι, τα όρια μεταξύ συμβατικού και ανορθόδοξου πολέμου δεν είναι πλέον διακριτά, πράγμα που δυσχεραίνει την αναγνώριση και αντιμετώπιση των απειλών από τα κράτη. Χαρακτηριστικά παραδείγματα αυτού του νέου είδους συγκρούσεων αποτελούν ο Πόλεμος του Λιβάνου, το 2006, οι Ρωσικές επιχειρήσεις στην Ουκρανία, το 2014, και ο Συριακός εμφύλιος πόλεμος με την εμπλοκή του Ισλαμικού Κράτους.

With the re-establishment of Bashar al-Assad’s power in Syria, the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finally the political and military victory of pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, it is clear that an Iranian axis now prevails in the Levant. The strength of this geopolitical axis is reinforced by the territorial continuity between Tehran and Beirut via Damascus and Baghdad: “the Iranian land bridge” or “Iranian corridor,” controlled by Iranian troops directly and by proxies.

Unlike other Arab revolution which were found relatively quickly exits, the Syrian revlt is continuing for more than two years and it can not seem to find a rapid conclusion. The geostrategic position of the Syrian Arab Republic, ruled by Assad family since 1970, and communitarianism explain the transformation of the Syria crisis into a civil war.

Contrairement aux autres révolutions arabes auxquelles ont été trouvées des issues relativement rapides, la révolte syrienne court depuis plus de deux ans et ne semble pas prête à trouver un dénouement rapide. Les enjeux géostratégiques que représente la République Arabe Syrienne gouvernée par les Assad depuis 1970, et le communautarisme expliquent la transformation de la crise syrienne en une guerre civile.

After conquering large swaths of Syria and Iraq, the IS undertook an aggressive sectarian campaign in which they not only enacted horrific violence against the Shia people, but also damaged or destroyed several key Shia mosques and shrines. Drawing on Social Movement Theory (SMT), this article analyzes the response by various Shia nonstate actors—militia leaders, religious clergymen, populist preachers, and seminal poets. It argues that they used the IS threat to Shia holy sites to develop and deploy a mobilization frame that has come to be referred to as the “shrine protection narrative.” The article also documents the manifold consequences of the shrine protection narrative: it underpinned a mass recruitment drive that saw tens of thousands enlist; it legitimized foreign Shia militias to enter the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq; it justified the formation of entirely new militias who declared the centrality of shrine protection to their mandate; and it mobilized them to enact political violence. In doing so, this article extends existing studies of SMT to demonstrate that “sacred spaces”—and particularly the need to protect religious sites from specific threats—can serve as a powerful mobilization frame towards political violence.

The RUSI paper, entitled ‘Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict’ provides a comprehensive assessment of Iran’s involvement in, and degree of influence over Syria and how this is seen by the governments and non-state actors in the region. The paper is the result of field research by RUSI staff and associate fellows who investigated the issue from the perspective of the five main actors in the conflict, including those states from the Gulf region, Russia and non-state groups fighting on the battlefield.

The paper points to a consensus amongst non-Iranian actors who see Iran’s objectives to seek in Syria ‘a non-hostile regime that continues to act as a conduit to Hizbullah, a stable and whole country without pockets of independent Kurdish territory that might encourage greater fragmentation in Iraq, and, although not a priority, the degradation of Daesh’.

However, there are significant differences between capitals over how far they are willing to accommodate Iranian objectives, even in the case of those fighting on the same side of the conflict.

The paper confirms that the apparently close relationship between Moscow and Tehran is far more fragile than is often assumed. In Syria, ‘while Iran and Russia are  co-ordinating closely on the ground to advance the war, they are less bound together in terms of their goals, and there is little trust between the two over their respective long-term aims in Syria’. Iran is worried that Russia could use Syria as a bargaining chip to resolve the Ukraine question, at the expense of Iran’s localised interests in Syria, whereas Moscow is concerned about Iran’s activity on the ground and its support for Hizbullah to preserve its long-term territorial influence. The goal for Western policy-makers should thus be to explore ways in which they can ‘work ‘between’ Russia and Iran’.

The paper reveals how  ‘Damascus is more comfortable dealing with Russia than the seemingly sectarian agenda of Iran. This offers a point of engagement for Western policy-makers to advance their own interests.’

‘It may be possible to persuade Russia that it can gain from a deal in Syria that counters some of the more objectionable elements of Iran’s behaviour – and in turn make the deal easier to sell to those in the Gulf who are supporting the armed opposition groups.’

At the same time, policy-makers should look closely at the disagreement among GCC states about Iran’s role in Syria and across the region. ‘Through shuttle diplomacy, in particular between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Jordan, it might be possible to increase understanding of the different attitudes toward Iran in the Gulf States.’ This might facilitate finding a common ground between those, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which appear considerably more flexible than Saudi Arabia, and Iran, increasing the likelihood of a political settlement on Syria.

This means that there are points of entry and engagement for Western policy-makers with regard to Tehran, particularly on issues such as the future of Assad or the status of Hizbullah forces beyond Lebanese borders. Furthermore, ‘Iran has shown that it is able to strike bargains with some of the anti-Assad forces on the ground in pursuit of specific goals’, and is generally likely to have greater influence than Russia on local issues, such as ceasefires and humanitarian access in specific areas. Calibrating these differences accurately and seeking ways to engage on specific issues in specific places would be a productive way to engage with Iran on Syria.

As ‘pragmatic elements in Iran’s leadership are seeking to re-emerge on the international stage, in economic and political terms’, Tehran seems keen to be involved in global geopolitical discussions and has previously demonstrated its ability to compartmentalise specific issues in its engagement with the West. Therefore, it is possible that Syria might allow for a similar approach.

The objective of this paper is to emphasize the phenomenon of transformation in understanding and (sometimes) complete changes of meanings in Qur'anic phrases used by modern khatib (preachers), imam or scholars in order to prove specific points of view. It is argued that such khatibs may use phrases from the Qur'an, while applying new meanings, according to the present-day needs of the orator or writer.As a test case for this line of thought, the Qur'anic idiom relating to ‘the Spider’s Web’ [bayt Al-'Ankabūt], is used here to illustrate this phenomena.

This article aims to explore emerging trends for the Sunni religious elite and the Islamic legal tradition in the new context of the Arab Uprisings by focusing on Yusuf al-Qaradawi, arguably the most prominent of these ʿulamāʾ alive today. The article will follow al-Qaradawi’s articulation, transmission and reconstruction of the Islamic legal tradition in his own discourse as he has attempted to negotiate the politically fraught contexts of the Arab Uprisings while also maintaining his horizontal commitments to a diverse base of supporters be they the wider Arab Muslim public, the Muslim Brotherhood or indeed the Qatari royal family. The article will focus on al-Qaradawi’s highly publicised interventions and fatwas in relation to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria from the perspective of Islamic studies, and also draw on personal interviews with al-Qaradawi, his personal staff, as well as supplementary media. In so doing, the article will elucidate al-Qaradawi and his colleagues’ attempts, ranging from the highly creative to the markedly conservative, to respond to unfolding events through the legal tradition and play an increasingly active role in the public sphere while their own status simultaneously becomes ever more vulnerable and unstable.

موضوع هذه الرسالة ينتمي إلى طائفة الأدبيات التي اهتمت بقضية "محددات" سلوك الفاعلين من غير الدول المتعدين للحدود، والتي هي من القضايا الحديثة في مجال العلاقات الدولية، بالنظر إلى سيطرة الاهتمام بالدولة لفترة طويلة من الزمن على ماتم تطويره من أطر تحليلية للتفاعلات الإقليمية والدولية، وإلى أن الأدبيات الخاصة بالفاعلين من غير الدول المتعدين للحدود، اهتمت بصورة رئيسية بتعريفهم وتطوير معايير لتصنيفهم، وللتمييز بينهم والدولة، دون الاهتمام بتقديم أطر تحليلية تسمح بتحديد المتغيرات التي تؤثر على سلوكهم.
وترجع أهمية هذا الموضوع إلى عدد من الاعتبارات. أولها تزايد تأثير الفاعلين من غير الدول، خاصة الفاعلين من غير الدول المتعدين للحدود والمستندين لهوية Transnational Identity based non-State Actors  ، والتي ينتمي لها كل من حزب الله وحركة حماس-حالتي الدراسة- في الأمن والاستقرار في المنطقة العربية، فعلى سبيل المثال، شهد العقد الأخير العديد من الحروب غير المتماثلة التي كان أحد طرفيها فاعل ينتمي لهذا النوع من الفاعلين، التي زادت من حالة عدم الاستقرار في المنطقة، على نحو أصبح يمثل ضغوطاً على الدوائر الأكاديمية والسياسية في المنطقة العربية لتطوير استراتيجيات للتعامل معهم، وللتأثير على سلوكهم، على نحو لايضر بمصالح تلك الدول، وعلى نحو لايضر بالاستقرار في المنطقة.
وثانيها، أن هناك فجوة بين ما تقدمه الأدبيات من أطر تحليلية للتفاعلات في إقليم الشرق الأوسط بصفة عامة، والمنطقة العربية بصفة خاصة، وبين ما يحدث فعلا، حيث لاتزال الدولة مسيطرة بصورة كبيرة على تلك الأدبيات، مع إغفال تأثير الفاعلين من غير الدول المتعدين للحدود بصورة عامة، وبالتالي، تمثل هذه الرسالة إسهاما في سد هذه الفجوة.
وثالثها أن حالتي الدراسة تعدان من الحالات المؤثرة في تفاعلات المنطقة العربية، ومن الحالات أيضا التي تسيطر على الأدبيات التي اهتمت بتحليل سلوكهما مواقف أيديولوجية أو قيمية تحول دون تقديم تحليل موضوعي لسلوكهما، حيث تسعى هذه الرسالة لتقديم تحليل موضوعي منضبط، لتأثير الهوية على سلوكهما.   
تنقسم هذه الدراسة إلى أربعة فصول وخاتمة. يحلل الفصل الأول، الاتجاهات النظرية المختلفة في مجال العلاقات الدولية التي اهتمت بتحليل سلوك الفاعلين من غير الدول المتعدين للحدود بصفة عامة، والفاعلين من غير الدول المستندين لهوية المتعدين للحدود بصفة خاصة، ويناقش الاتجاهات المختلفة لتعريف هذا النوع من الفاعلين من غير الدول المتعدين للحدود، ومعايير تصنيفهم، كما يحلل الفصل اتجاهات الجدل المختلفة حول الهوية كمحدد لسلوك الفاعلين المتعدين للحدود من غير الدول المستندين لهوية، وطبيعة العلاقة بين المصلحة والهوية. ويعرض الفصل الإطار التحليلي الذي تم تطويره للتطبيق على حالتي الدراسة، وهو يتألف من مجموعة من المقولات البنائية والواقعية، وكذلك الخطوات العملية المتبعة لتحليل تأثير الهوية الخاصة بكل من حزب الله وحركة حماس على سلوكهما تجاه قضيتين، هما قضية التغيير السياسي الداخلي، وقضية الصراع مع إسرائيل.
إلى جانب ذلك، يحلل هذا الفصل أهمية كل من حزب الله وحركة حماس في خريطة الفاعلين من غير الدول المتعدين للحدود في المنطقة العربية، ويعرف بالهوية المركبة لكل منهما، من خلال تحديد المكونات المادية والمكونات غير المادية لها.
ويهتم الفصل الثاني بتحليل مقارن لتأثير الهوية المركبة لكل من حزب الله وحركة حماس على سلوكهما تجاه قضية الصراع مع إسرائيل، بالتطبيق على حرب يوليو 2006 في حالة حزب الله، وحرب ديسمبر 2008-يناير 2009 في حالة حركة حماس، وتجاه قضية التغيير السياسي الداخلي، بالتطبيق على أزمة مايو 2008 في حالة حزب الله، وأزمة يونيو 2007 في حالة حركة حماس. وتم التمييز بين بعدين للسلوك، البعد الأول هو التوجهات المعلنة لكل من حزب الله وحركة حماس، والبعد الثاني هو السياسات الفعلية لكل منهما. كما تم التمييز بين مستويين لتأثير الهوية، المستوى الأول هو التأثير البنائي للهوية، الخاص بتحديد تصورات الفاعل للقضية ولمصلحته الإستراتيجية، والمستوى الثاني هو التأثير التنظيمي للهوية، وينصرف إلى تحديد أي السياسات يتسق ومعاني الهوية، أي يتسم بشرعية ما، وأيها لايتسق ومعاني الهوية.
بينما يحلل الفصل الثالث بصورة مقارنة تأثير التفاعلات الخاصة بحرب يوليو 2006 على هوية حزب الله، وبحرب 2008-2009 على هوية حركة حماس، حيث تعد هاتان الحربان حالتين تطبيقيتين لقضية الصراع مع إسرائيل. كما يحلل تأثير التفاعلات الخاصة بأزمة مايو 2008 على هوية حزب الله، وبأزمة يونيو 2007 على هوية حركة حماس، واللتين تعدان حالتين تطبيقيتين لقضية التغيير السياسي الداخلي. وذلك بهدف اختبار صحة الفرض الخاص بأن دخول الفاعل في تفاعلات خاصة بقضية ما، يحدث تغيراً في هويته، سواء كان تغيراً كلياً أو جزئياً.
كما يحلل الفصل الرابع بصورة مقارنة تأثير التغير في هوية حزب الله وحركة حماس على سلوكهما تجاه قضية الصراع مع إسرائيل، وقضية التغيير السياسي الداخلي، بهدف "اختبار" مدى استقرار التغير في هوية حزب الله والناتج عن تفاعلات حرب 2006، وكيفية تأثيره على سلوكه تجاه قضية الصراع مع إسرائيل في الفترة التالية للحرب، وكذلك مدى استقرار الثبات في هوية حركة حماس في الفترة التالية على حرب 2008-2009، وكيفية تأثيرها على سلوكها تجاه قضية الصراع مع إسرائيل.
إلى جانب ذلك، يحلل الفصل مدى استقرار الثبات في هوية حزب الله في الفترة التالية على أزمة مايو 2008، وكيف أثرت على سلوك الحزب تجاه قضية التغيير السياسي في لبنان، وكذلك مدى استقرار التغير في هوية حركة حماس في الفترة التالية على أزمة يونيو 2007، وكيف أثرت على سلوكها تجاه قضية التغيير السياسي في فلسطين.
وأخيرا اهتمت خاتمة الدراسة، ببيان أهمية ماتم التوصل إليه من نتائج خاصة بتأثير الهوية كمحدد لسلوك كل من حزب الله وحركة حماس، ومدى صلاحية هذه النتائج في تفسير سلوك أنواع أخرى من الفاعلين من غير الدول المتعدين للحدود والمستندين لهوية، وكذلك مدى فائدة هذه النتائج بالنسبة لدوائر صنع القرار في المنطقة العربية، من حيث توفيرها إطارا عاما يساعد هذه الدوائر في التأثير على سلوك هاتين الحالتين سواء بصورة مباشرة أو بصورة غير مباشرة، أو على الأقل كيف يمكن لها أن تتجنب إتباعهما سياسات تضر بمصالحها الإستراتيجية، وبأمنها الوطني؟. ويرجع اهتمام الدراسة بهذا البعد، إلى إدراكها أن التحليل الأكاديمي بصورة عامة، يهدف لدعم صانع القرار، بخيارات، وبأطر عامة تقود تفكيره، أو تؤطره framing، حين يفكر في اتباع سياسات محددة، لاسيما حين يتعلق الأمر بقضايا يتزايد فيها تأثير هذا النوع من الفاعلين، وتهدد مصالح الدول، مثل حزب الله في حالة سوريا، وحركة حماس فيما يتعلق بالأمن الوطني لمصر بعد سقوط حكم الأخوان في 3 يوليو 2013.

This chapter examines how the Arab Spring was gradually sectarianized, leading to the emergence of much more rigid and puritanical sect-based identities and inter-communal conflicts across the Middle East and extending even further outside of the region and across the Muslim-majority world.  Using the social movement theory concept of ‘framing,’ it considers how the various political and armed actors involved in the Syrian civil war and the conflict in Iraq, including regional actors such as the Iranian government, Hizbullah, Sunni and Salafi actors in the Arab Gulf states, and Sunni rebel and other militant jihadi organizations such as Jabhat al-Nusra/Jabhat Fath al-Sham, Islamic State, Jaysh al-Islam, and Ahrar al-Sham, have drawn on competing historical narratives and memory in combination with contemporary events to produce a thoroughly modern but also selectively ‘historicised’ social mobilization narrative meant to encourage activism from their target audiences.  The ways in which clashing historical memory and narratives are deployed in regional conflicts, which constitutes a form of re-fighting the past in the present, are analyzed.  Specific historical references, such as the invocation of Shi‘i legendary heroes of Karbala such as Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, which are today deployed as rhetorical weapons in geopolitical contests over power and political dominance, are also considered in detail.

https://global.oup.com/academic/product/jihadism-transformed-9780190650292?cc=us&lang=en&#

This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to ‘franchise’ worldwide, and the role of the regional governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic approach of the “clash of civilizations” theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina and USA).

This article analyses how Hezbollah’s gradually growing role in the Syrian conflict has been paralleled by its adversaries’ decision to wage lawfare against this pivotal player supporting the Asad regime, in order to raise the political cost for Hezbollah’s military engagement in Syria. Compared to earlier steps taken by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 2013, the resolutions adopted in 2016 by three Arab and Islamic regional organisations targeting the militant group are more assertive and potentially effective, in particular if considered in combination with complementary steps such as the US HIFPA (Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act) and a media campaign aimed at undermining Hezbollah’s reputation. However, it remains debatable to what extent the
terrorist designation will effectively constrain Hezbollah’s financial and operational capabilities, let alone motivate its retreat from the Syrian war zone.

El crimen organizado transnacional se sitúa en el centro de casi todas las grandes amenazas que enfrentan hoy las Américas. Estas organizaciones degradan sistemáticamente las instituciones democráticas y al Estado de derecho, dificultando el crecimiento económico y sofocando las actividades comerciales y de inversión legítimas.
La amenaza del crimen organizado transnacional en las Américas requiere más concentración e inversión por parte de los responsables políticos para combatir efectivamente las redes de tráfico ilícito, funcionarios corruptos, las actividades y violencia de pandillas, y la presencia creciendo de actores hostiles extra-regionales como Irán y su apoderado, Hezbolá.
El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos debe trabajar con sus aliados regionales para restablecer la coalición hemisférica contra el crimen organizado transnacional. La administración del presidente Trump puede liderar el camino mediante la aplicación de herramientas asimétricas—como sanciones financieras—y trabajando para mejorar las capacidades locales para el cumplimiento de la ley, la promoción del desarrollo económico, y el desarrollo de marcos legales antiterroristas en países vecinos.

From the beginnings of Wahabism in the 18th century to the so called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, ISIS) violence has occasionally been justified in the name of Islam, which is problematic for secular and traditional scholars alike. This paper demonstrates that there are three complex, interrelated causes for this violence: foreign military intervention, Salafi-Jihadism and a utopian state founded upon faith and justice, i.e. a caliphate.

Since its emergence in the 1980’s, the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah has played a leading role in the military struggle against Israeli occupation in Lebanon. With the liberation of Southern Lebanon in May 2000 and the 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah emerged as a regional resistance movement and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, as a transnational figure. During this decades-long conflict, the movement was active not only militarily, but also politically, socially, and in the media. 
This book offers a closer look at Hezbollah’s media strategies, exploring their development and transformation within a shifting political context, by tracing the emergence of Hezbollah in the framework of post-colonial liberation movements and in relation to the failure of the Arab nationalist experience of Gamal Abdel Nasser. In this context, Hezbollah’s media strategies reveal a desire to acquire a voice and the ability to define oneself.
Contesting the discursive space, on screen and in the streets, allows Hezbollah to articulate new meanings of resistance within the religious community, the nation, and the region as a whole. This study suggests an analysis of four of Hezbollah’s most widespread media forms: speeches, military videos, music videos, and scenes from everyday life. It draws on discourse theory and notions of hegemony and political identification in order to better understand the military role of these media productions and the way in which the movement articulates a versatile popular identity in Lebanon and the Arab world.

Selefism is known as living the words and actions of Prophet Mohammad’s and first three generations after him without making any changes. Today, Selefism has became a political ideology for Islamic thought. According to Selefi ideology, Islam has completed. So, there is no space for making argument and personal opinions through religion. Also for Selefist ideology, the whole area and whole moment of life should be suitable with Islamic understanding. These exact and excluded attitude of Selefism is making hate and violance. In Turkey, there are not any movement connected with Selefist ideology. Because the Turkish Islamic understanding and the Anatolian Sunnism would not allow it. But there are some foreign attempts to install Selefist ideology in Turkey. Even the movements like Raiders movement, The National Union of Turkish Students, National Vision are in Islamic line, they have not marginalized as much as Selefist ideology and they have not legalized the violence. But, depending on the different interpretation of religious texts, some radical movements found support from small groups especially at South Eastern Anatolia in Turkey. Organizations like Hezbollah, Hizbutt Tahrir, Al Qaeda, ISIS and GEIR aresome of these.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in early 2011, Lebanon has seen a drastic deterioration in security: domestic supporters and opponents of the Syrian government have confronted each other in armed clashes and Lebanese groups also got involved in the war in Syria. The extremist groups that emerged in Syria also found supporters in Lebanon and a series of suicide bombings rocked civilian areas. Violent conflict affected several regions in Lebanon, but Tripoli, in particular, was called “little Syria” because it seemed to mirror the hostilities in the neighboring country. Many authors have pointed at the Syrian crisis spillover in order to explain the conflict in Tripoli. The thesis aims at explaining the mechanisms that led to polarization and radicalization in the Sunni community in Tripoli. It looks at the conflict through the lens of sectarian identity, explaining how the already existing political polarization turned to sectarian conflict in the presence of the catalysts provided by the Syrian crisis.

What is the relationship between Mizrahi feminism and Israeli ultranationalism? What is the relevance of gender justice activism to the 2014 Gaza War and Israel’s foreign policy?

Wrapped in the Flag of Israel Second Edition examines neoliberal bureaucracy in the Global South using feminist critical race theories. It interrogates the relationship between the State of Israel and its Mizrahi single mothers who are at the forefront of Mizrahi feminism. It also presents a model of bureaucracy as divine cosmology that preempts the agency of disenfranchised Mizrahim who are Israel’s demographic majority. Mizrahi protests fall flat when the Israel-Palestine conflict dominates the headlines. While most studies of neoliberal bureaucracy employ a Foucauldian or Marxian lens, this book illustrates how Israeli bureaucracy draws on a theological essence that fuses religion, gender, and race into the foundations of citizenship. It sets out to understand why Mizrahi mothers remain loyal to a state that injures them though its bureaucratic system.

The extensive Afterword to the Second Edition connects intra-Jewish racial and gendered dynamics to the 2014 Gaza War. It tracks sequences that began with social protest and ended with elections that bolstered Israel’s political right. In between came bloodletting between the IDF, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel’s neighboring Arab states. The 2014 Gaza War was a watershed, but not only in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Under the smokescreen of war, Israel accelerated neoliberal economic reform. The first victims of this restructuring were Mizrahi single mothers. Palestinians, however, would pay the highest price for Israel’s Mizrahi-Ashkenazi rift.

Depuis 2011, la révolte et le conflit en Syrie ont généré une masse considérable d’images produites par des manifestants, des activistes et des combattants. Disséminées sur Internet ou dans des cartes mémoires de téléphones portables, elles rendent compte de manières de documenter, de raconter et de vivre la protestation, l’engagement, la guerre et la violence extrême. Cet ouvrage explore ce vaste territoire d’images et de sons pour éclairer d’un nouveau jour ce conflit, ses acteurs, ses temporalités et les imaginaires qui s’y déploient. À partir d’enquêtes numériques mais aussi d’entretiens auprès de ceux qui ont filmé, il s’agit de saisir les multiples formes d’expression de la révolte et son basculement dans une guerre dont les enjeux dépassent les frontières syriennes. Au plus près de la fabrique, des usages et des grammaires de productions audiovisuelles issues de différents espaces du conflit, l’objectif est de comprendre aussi comment ces images coexistent et s’affrontent.

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) pursues missions both domestic and foreign, chief of which are to maintain the power of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to expand Iran's prestige throughout the world. This article explores the wide-ranging political and military capabilities of the IRGC, including its export of Iran's Islamic Revolution to neighboring countries; its antagonism toward Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States; its command of a multinational, multidivision Shia Liberation Army; and its financial support for numerous proxy terrorist groups that are active in the Greater Middle East region.