Hezbollah

''The region is undergoing historic days with Yemen, Iraq, partly Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, has been on fire since the 7th of October. The region may really be at the dawn of a ‘new order.’ Only time will tell whether this order will be in the shape that Israel aspires to have.''

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is likely to discover that the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah will not shift the paradigm of Middle East politics.
It’s a lesson Mr. Netanyahu should have drawn from decades of Israeli targeted assassinations.

Plan
Introduction – « De gauche » ou « à gauche »
De la constitution à la crise d’une notion
L’autonomie du peuple
La distinction droite-gauche à l’épreuve du fascisme : un réexamen
La gauche et les ambiguïtés de l’émancipation
Révolutions, Terreurs et Restaurations
L’imaginaire des folles années 1990 et la crise de 2008
Le retour du théologico-politique
La nouvelle question d’Orient
La question laïque en Occident
Conclusion – Au-delà de la société de marché ?

There has been a notable link/correlation between the rise of China and U.S.–Iran standoff in recent years. The year 2012 marks a watershed moment in U.S. strategic calculation on its relations with China and Iran. Before that year, China was not a peer competitor capable of challenging U.S. preeminence on the world stage and Iran was merely a regional adversary. After 2012, U.S. intelligence reports have consistently assess that China is the only great power with the intent and ability to undermine the liberal world order and its growing ties with U.S. adversaries, Iran included, will pose the biggest threat to U.S. and Western interests. The China factor has become an independent variable in U.S.–Iran relation, and as Beijing continues to grow its economic and military power, the United States will resort to more hawkish policy toward China and Iran, further escalating the U.S.–Iran standoff. Tehran will continue to play a crucial role in its asymmetrical relationships with Beijing and Washington as the two superpowers seek their respective leverage in the triangular relationship to outcompete the other party.

עוד ב-2019, בעזרת נתוני שיגור רקטות משנת 2005, גיליתי שאויבי ישראל מבצעים תקיפות בצורה כזו שקל לחזות מתי יחליטו להגביר את עוצמת התקיפות הללו. על ידי התבוננות מתי מאדים יהיה בטווח של 30 מעלות מצומת הירח בתוך שנה קלנדרית (מינואר עד דצמבר), הצלחתי למצוא מתאם חזק בין ההסלמה של ירי הרקטות מעזה לישראל ביחס לשאר ימות השנה. התגלה שמאז 2005, חמושים בעזה יירו את העוצמה הגבוהה ביותר של ירי הרקטות כאשר מאדים יהיה בטווח של 30 מעלות מצומת הירח. לאחר שנים של תחזיות מוצלחות, מתבקש לספק הסבר מדעי שיעזור להבהיר את העניין הזה. ראשית, הרשו לי לספק את הבסיס וההצדקה לפתיחת חקירה על השפעת מאדים על התנהגות אנושית.

בשנת 2024, חוקרים גילו שמאדים מפעיל כוח משיכה על הטיית כדור הארץ, חושף את כדור הארץ לטמפרטורות חמות יותר ויותר אור שמש, הכל בתוך מחזור של 2.4 מיליון שנה. אני טוען שזה מאפשר לנו לשער שגם בתוך פרקי זמן קטנים יותר, מאדים עדיין מפעיל כוח משיכה על הטיה הצירית של כדור הארץ, מספיק כדי להעלות טמפרטורות כאשר כוכב הלכת נמצא בטווח של 30 מעלות מצומת הירח, מה שישפיע על התנהגות האדם. אני מצטט את העובדה של מחקרים רבים הקושרים תוקפנות לטמפרטורות חמות יותר, אני קובע אקסיומה ואז טוען שמאדים בטווח של 30 מעלות מצומת הירח אמור להביא טמפרטורות גבוהות מהממוצע לאותה תקופה ובכך להשפיע על המוח על ידי הפחתת הקוגניציה ומשכנעת. תוֹקפָּנוּת.

Did the IDF succeed in realizing the principle of subterfuge from the tactical to the operative level in a way that dismantled the enemy’s system and shortened the duration of the war? Considering the possibility that the IDF will be required to maneuver in Lebanon, we must carefully study the campaign in the Gaza Strip to improve the readiness of the forces for the next campaign, should it begin.

In what they characterized as the most severe security breech in many years, leaders of the U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, reported more than 3000 members were wounded and at least 10 died from injuries sustained when pagers used by the group exploded. Hezbollah fighters in Syria were also injured when their pagers exploded.

Hezbollah is an Iranian proxy group with close ties to Iran's Republican Guards. According to Iran’s semi-official Mehr news agency, Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon was also reported to be among the wounded. Among the reported dead was the son of a Hezbollah MP, Ali Ammar Mahdi Ammar.

Hezbollah blames Israel for the blasts and vows retaliation. (download to read more)

The July 31 assassination of Hamas’s head, Ismail Haniyeh, after the inauguration of Iran’s new president in Tehran was a significant victory for Israel, signaling that Jerusalem could eliminate any leader of the Islamic Republic at will. This appears to reflect a deeper strategic shift in the way Israel’s policymakers view Iran and its proxies, and could spell the end of the longstanding shadow war between the two. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s change in strategic posture is likely due to political pressures emanating from domestic opposition and fatigue over the ongoing war in Gaza and long-term concerns over Israel’s ability to restore deterrence in the face of continuous attacks from Iranian proxies. Iran could respond to Haniyeh’s assassination in a number of ways, including an all-out surprise attack, a coordinated strike from its proxies, assaults on Israeli citizens and/or Jewish communities abroad, threatening total war to force a ceasefire, or deciding to wait and see until it knows who will win the U.S. presidential election in November.

The term security comes from the latin sine cura which most security studies authors like Johannes Stripple, translate it as «without worry»  Albeit the correct translation is "without remedy or treatment" as the word cura both in Latin and in Italian means treatment or remedy. If security means "without remedy", the whole structure of the security ambitus should be questioned.In order to understand how security issues are constructed, the securitization theory focuses on the speech acts of political elites. The elites convince the audience that an issue is an existential security threat to a referent object that must be protected. They thereby legitimize the subsequent implementation of extraordinary measures to overcome this threat. In this paper we have examined the major global emergencies of the past 20 years and found out that they are basically narrative plots whose main marketing property is to have enough credibility to be "bought" by the global audience and to saturate the media.

Western media outlets have incorrectly portrayed Massoud Pezeshkian, who was elected as Iran’s new president on July 5, as a “moderate” and a “Reformist.” Though Pezeshkian’s background as an ethnic Azeri may strengthen efforts to try to calm rising ethnic tensions in Iran, he offers no meaningful domestic reforms, and Pezeshkian’s foreign policy views are in alignment with the reactionary/hardliner “Principalist” wing of Iranian politics. In the long run, the fact that Khamenei was forced to elevate Pezeshkian rather than a loyal non-partisan like the late Raisi will lead to increased internal conflict within the regime. Pezeshkian represents the latest Reformist president permitted by Supreme Leader Khamenei to take power in order to present a friendly face with the West and stave off the worst effects of domestic dissatisfaction with the regime.

In reaction to the Revolutionary Guards’ rocket attack on Pakistani territory on January 16, in which Tehran claimed to have targeted separatist Baluchis, Pakistan retaliated on January 18 by bombarding what it said to be Baluchi separatists deep into Iranian territory. As such, Pakistan became the first foreign country to openly attack Iran since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. The attacks, although ostensibly against the opposing Baluchis in the neighboring country, are in fact a reflection of the larger conflict in the Middle East. They closely correlate with the Israeli war against Hamas and Hezbollah as well as the American and British attacks on the Houthis, and can prove the harbinger of a larger invasion of Iran by its age-old enemies.

Parts of Islamist Studies, Security and Conflict Studies, and Terrorism Studies reduce Shia combatants to indoctrinated masses due to their biased scholarship. Their approach remains top-down and macro-level, overlooking lived experiences and individual perceptions of those engaged in political violence. Accordingly, this article critically engages with such scholarship by highlighting how lived experiences and individual perceptions configure non-ideational paths toward political violence. I propose an ethnographically guided phenomenological inquiry of Shia nonstate armed actors and their situatedness in warscapes. I use the concept of warscapes and the complexities of individuation in warscapes to highlight the conceptual necessity of theorizing political violence from relational grounds that blurs the boundaries of micro-level and meso-level analysis. These relational grounds are shaped by inhumanities that predate conflicts and political violence reticulate inhumanities into a network that constitutes warscapes. I show this by combining the ethnography of Shia transnational militancy with the political histories of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. My critical interventions propose that Shia militancy is not only about sectarian divisions in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria or Yemen and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s defending its territories by other means. Shia militancy is also about individual worldviews, governing the multitudes, domestic politics, taming the Shia citizenry and the state keeping entropy and disorder low.

The Middle East and the world fear the escalation of Israel_Hamas war which is hanging by a weak thread as Iranian partners in Axis of Resistance indulge in their revenge for killing of their respective leaders Israel continues its security driven policy in Gaza and elsewhere . US seems to have lost influence over Tel Aviv

Usar exceso de terminología occidental para explicar el Medio Oriente siempre se quedará corto. En esa región aplican dinámicas sociales, políticas, religiosas y militares propias, difíciles a veces de comprender en Occidente, por lo que recetas que pueden servir en ciertos lugares para resolver disputas, no necesariamente son efectivas en una zona del planeta que a través de su historia ha visto imperios llegar e irse, civilizaciones religiosas nacer y expandirse, Estados que un día fueron y ya no son, conflictos que mutan y se reinventan. Parafraseando a la inversa la obra visionaria de Immanuel Kant, "La Paz Perpetua", en el Medio Oriente la paz ha sido elusiva; quizás habría que hablar más bien de la "guerra perpetua", esperando que los varios conflictos que afectan la región encuentren finalmente una salida.

You can read, quote, reference and link this working paper, but you cannot reproduce or post it in any form unless permitted in writing by the authors

*****

The war that started in 2023 between Hamas and Israel is driven by various long-lasting processes, but it also brings to the fore a new cause that hitherto seemed marginal: the armed militias of the Rabbinate and Islamic churches. The Rabbinate militias, embodied in Jewish settler organizations, have taken over not only Palestinian lands, but, gradually, also Israeli society. The Islamic militias, represented by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, rose to prominence after the traditional resistance groups of the Palestinians – primarily the PLO and the PFLP and, by extension, also the Palestinian Authority – weakened and proved unable to reverse, let alone stop, the Israeli occupation.

The rise of these militias, though, is hardly unique to Israel/Palestine, or even the Middle East. It is part of a broader, global process, in which ‘private’ military organizations, financed by states, church-related NGOs and/or organized crime, fight for and against states as well as each other. The ascent of such groups is closely related to the decline of the nation-state and its popular armies, a model that developed in the wake of the French Revolution but no longer resonates with the increasingly globalized nature of capital accumulation.

Our previous studies of Middle East wars emphasized the ‘state of capital’ – our notion that the capitalist mode of power fuses state and capital into a single logic in which dominant capital groups are driven by the power quest for differential accumulation. We showed that, in the Middle East, this logic was imposed by a Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition of large oil and armament corporations, OPEC, financial institutions and construction firms, whose differential incomes and profits were tightly correlated with – and helped predict – the cyclical eruption of ‘energy conflicts’.

But this mode of power comprises not two elements, but three. In addition to state and capital, it also includes the supreme-God churches, and in this paper we outline the role of these churches and their militias in capitalism generally and in Middle East wars specifically.

ABSTRACT & RÉSUMÉ & ZUSAMENFASSUNG: Since the 1960s, both the regime of Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) and, subsequently starting from 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran, have intervened in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). While the Chah's policies were motivated by a virulent anti-communist stance, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) pursued a 'radical' policy of changing the political status of the Western world, including the Western Arab allies, who were hostile to the survival of the mullah regime. While the Chah focused on geopolitical interests, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the vital sea route to the Red Sea, and in South Africa, and ignored the interests of African Muslims, the IRI exploited increasingly radicalized Islamists to expand Iranian influence on the continent. For example, the IRI has spent billions of dollars in the region to provide Muslim schools and free social services through hospitals and orphanages supported by the Iranian Red Crescent. The IRI's strategy aimed to build grassroots support among Muslim communities rather than focusing exclusively on African governments. Tehran's expansionist policies included arms sales to state and non-state actors and the destabilization of regimes. The goal was to build partnerships that would help evade international sanctions while opening new terrain for its axis of resistance against its global and regional adversaries, particularly its arch-enemy Israël. Tehran's version of political Islam involved building up proxies, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels, most recently in Yemen, who have wreaked havoc on international shipping lanes in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Tehran expanded its influence in the Sahel region, taking advantage of self-serving French Africa policy and the policies of other Western powers in West Africa to establish contacts with the anti-Western ASE military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Russia, China and Turkey paved the way for this new alignment. The rivalry between Iran and Israël has intensified in recent decades, with several confrontations between the two countries in the Red Sea and East Africa since the 2010s. Iran has continuously expanded its engagement throughout the region, leading to a ‘balance of deterrence’ between the two countries. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RÉSUMÉ:  Depuis les années 1960, le régime de Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) et, à partir de 1979, la République islamique d’Iran, sont intervenus en Afrique subsaharienne. Alors que la politique du Chah était motivée par une position anticommuniste virulente, la République islamique d’Iran (RII) a poursuivi une politique « radicale » de changement du statut politique du monde occidental, y compris des alliés arabes occidentaux, hostiles à la survie du régime des mollahs. Alors que le Chah se concentrait sur des intérêts géopolitiques, en particulier dans la Corne de l’Afrique, la voie maritime vitale vers la mer Rouge, et en Afrique du Sud, et ignorait les intérêts des musulmans africains, la RII a exploité des islamistes de plus en plus radicalisés pour étendre l’influence iranienne sur le continent. Par exemple, la RII a dépensé des milliards de dollars dans la région pour fournir des écoles musulmanes et des services sociaux gratuits par le biais d’hôpitaux et d’orphelinats soutenus par le Croissant-Rouge iranien. La stratégie de l’IRI visait à renforcer le soutien populaire au sein des communautés musulmanes plutôt qu’à se concentrer exclusivement sur les gouvernements africains. Les politiques expansionnistes de Téhéran comprenaient la vente d’armes à des acteurs étatiques et non-étatiques et la déstabilisation de régimes. L’objectif était de nouer des partenariats qui permettraient d’échapper aux sanctions internationales tout en ouvrant un nouveau terrain à son ‘axe de résistance’ contre ses adversaires mondiaux et régionaux, en particulier son ennemi juré Israël. La version La version de Téhéran de l’islam politique impliquait la constitution de mandataires, notamment le Hezbollah au Liban et les rebelles Houthis, plus récemment au Yémen, qui a semé le chaos sur les voies maritimes internationales en solidarité avec la cause palestinienne. Téhéran a étendu son influence dans la région du Sahel, profitant de la politique africaine égoïste de la France et des politiques d’autres puissances occidentales en Afrique de l’Ouest pour établir des contacts avec les juntes militaires anti-occidentales de l’ASE au Burkina Faso, au Mali et au Niger. La Russie, la Chine et la Turquie ont ouvert la voie à ce nouvel alignement. La rivalité entre l’Iran et Israël s’est intensifiée au cours des dernières décennies, avec plusieurs confrontations entre les deux pays dans la mer Rouge et en Afrique de l’Est depuis les années 2010. L’Iran n’a cessé d’étendre son engagement dans toute la région, conduisant à un « équilibre de dissuasion » entre les deux pays. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Seit den 1960er Jahren intervenieren sowohl das Regime von Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) als auch seit 1979 die Islamische Republik Iran in Subsahara-Afrika (SSA). Während die Politik des Schahs von einer virulenten antikommunistischen Haltung motiviert war, verfolgte die Islamische Republik Iran (IRI) eine ‚radikale‘ Politik der Veränderung des politischen Status der westlichen Welt, einschließlich der westlichen arabischen Verbündeten, die dem Überleben des Mullah-Regimes feindlich gegenüberstanden. Während sich der Schah auf geopolitische Interessen konzentrierte, insbesondere am Horn von Afrika, dem lebenswichtigen Seeweg zum Roten Meer, sowie in Südafrika, und die Interessen afrikanischer Muslime ignorierte, nutzte die IRI zunehmend radikalisierte Islamisten, um den iranischen Einfluss auf dem Kontinent auszuweiten. So hat die IRI beispielsweise Milliarden von Dollar in der Region ausgegeben, um muslimische Schulen und kostenlose soziale Dienste durch Krankenhäuser und Waisenhäuser bereitzustellen, die vom iranischen Roten Halbmond unterstützt wurden. Die Strategie des IRI zielte darauf ab, Unterstützung an der Basis unter muslimischen Gemeinschaften aufzubauen, anstatt sich ausschließlich auf afrikanische Regierungen zu konzentrieren. Teherans Expansionspolitik umfasste Waffenverkäufe an staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure sowie die Destabilisierung von Regimen. Ziel war es, Partnerschaften aufzubauen, die helfen würden, internationale Sanktionen zu umgehen und gleichzeitig neues Terrain für seine Widerstandsachse gegen seine globalen und regionalen Gegner, insbesondere seinen Erzfeind Israël, zu eröffnen. Teherans Version des politischen Islam beinhaltete den Aufbau von Stellvertretern, vor allem der Hisbollah im Libanon und den Houthi-Rebellen, zuletzt im Jemen, die aus Solidarität mit der palästinensischen Sache verheerende Schäden der internationalen Schifffahrtswege anrichteten. Teheran erweiterte seinen Einfluss in der Sahelzone und nutzte die eigennützige französische Afrikapolitik und die Politik anderer westlicher Mächte in Westafrika aus, um Kontakte zu den antiwestlichen Militärjuntas der ASE in Burkina Faso, Mali und Niger aufzubauen. Russland, China und die Türkei ebneten den Weg für diese neue Ausrichtung. Die Rivalität zwischen dem Iran und Israël hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten verschärft. Seit den 2010er Jahren kam es zwischen den beiden Ländern im Roten Meer und in Ostafrika zu mehreren Konfrontationen. Der Iran hat sein Engagement in der gesamten Region kontinuierlich ausgeweitet, was zu einem ‚Gleichgewicht der Abschreckung‘ zwischen den beiden Ländern führte.

Trump'ın resmen başkan adayı olmasında ve şimdiye kadarki anketlerde önde gidiyor olmasının arkasında; kendisine uygulanan baskıları dile getirip Amerika'nın güçsüzleştiği ve demokrasiden uzaklaştığını ileri sürmesinin yanı sıra, ilk döneminde kullandığı "Amerika'yı yeniden büyük yapacağız" şeklindeki sloganlarını tekrar etmesinin önemli payı olduğu söylenebilir. Ama ABD'de kuvvetli olduğu bilinen bazı cemaatlerin, lobilerin ve aşırı sağcı toplulukların desteğini almış olması da yadsınmamalıdır.

Hamas's al-Aqsa Flood operation, Israel's brutal response, and the regional escalation of the conflict, including Iran's and Israel's unprecedented strikes on each other's territory, mark a critical juncture for the Middle East. These events have brought a renewed focus on the Levant as a key area of Iranian geopolitical interest and rivalry with Israel. Syria and the broader subregion are viewed by Tehran as vital for its national security and that of its alliance network, the Axis of Resistance, and for the survival of the regime.

ABSTRACT & RÉSUMÉ & ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Since the 1960s, both the regime of Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) and, subsequently starting from 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran, have intervened in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). While the Shah's policies were motivated by a virulent anti-communist stance, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) pursued a 'radical' policy of changing the political status of the Western world, including the Western Arab allies, who were hostile to the survival of the mullah regime. While the Shah focused on geopolitical interests, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the vital sea route to the Red Sea, and in South Africa, and ignored the interests of African Muslims, the IRI exploited increasingly radicalized Islamists to expand Iranian influence on the continent. For example, the IRI has spent billions of dollars in the region to provide Muslim schools and free social services through hospitals and orphanages supported by the Iranian Red Crescent. The IRI's strategy aimed to build grassroots support among Muslim communities rather than focusing exclusively on African governments. Tehran's expansionist policies included arms sales to state and non-state actors and the destabilization of regimes. The goal was to build partnerships that would help evade international sanctions while opening new terrain for its axis of resistance against its global and regional adversaries, particularly its arch-enemy Israel. Tehran's version of political Islam involved building up proxies, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels, most recently in Yemen, who have wreaked havoc on international shipping lanes in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Tehran expanded its influence in the Sahel region, taking advantage of self-serving French Africa policy and the policies of other Western powers in West Africa to establish contacts with the anti-Western ASE military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Russia, China and Turkey paved the way for this new alignment. The rivalry between Iran and Israel has intensified in recent decades, with several confrontations between the two countries in the Red Sea and East Africa since the 2010s. Iran has continuously expanded its engagement throughout the region, leading to a ‘balance of deterrence’ between the two countries.  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RÉSUMÉ: [Élargir les horizons : les engagements stratégiques de l'Iran en Afrique subsaharienne - Perspectives d'Afrique du Sud, du Nigéria et de Tanzanie] – Depuis les années 1960, le régime de Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) et, à partir de 1979, la République islamique d’Iran, sont intervenus en Afrique subsaharienne. Alors que la politique du Shah était motivée par une position anticommuniste virulente, la République islamique d’Iran (RII) a poursuivi une politique « radicale » de changement du statut politique du monde occidental, y compris des alliés arabes occidentaux, hostiles à la survie du régime des mollahs. Alors que le Shah se concentrait sur des intérêts géopolitiques, en particulier dans la Corne de l’Afrique, la voie maritime vitale vers la mer Rouge, et en Afrique du Sud, et ignorait les intérêts des musulmans africains, la RII a exploité des islamistes de plus en plus radicalisés pour étendre l’influence iranienne sur le continent. Par exemple, la RII a dépensé des milliards de dollars dans la région pour fournir des écoles musulmanes et des services sociaux gratuits par le biais d’hôpitaux et d’orphelinats soutenus par le Croissant-Rouge iranien. La stratégie de l’IRI visait à renforcer le soutien populaire au sein des communautés musulmanes plutôt qu’à se concentrer exclusivement sur les gouvernements africains. Les politiques expansionnistes de Téhéran comprenaient la vente d’armes à des acteurs étatiques et non-étatiques et la déstabilisation de régimes. L’objectif était de nouer des partenariats qui permettraient d’échapper aux sanctions internationales tout en ouvrant un nouveau terrain à son axe de résistance contre ses adversaires mondiaux et régionaux, en particulier son ennemi juré Israël. La version La version de Téhéran de l’islam politique impliquait la constitution de mandataires, notamment le Hezbollah au Liban et les rebelles Houthis, plus récemment au Yémen, qui a semé le chaos sur les voies maritimes internationales en solidarité avec la cause palestinienne. Téhéran a étendu son influence dans la région du Sahel, profitant de la politique africaine égoïste de la France et des politiques d’autres puissances occidentales en Afrique de l’Ouest pour établir des contacts avec les juntes militaires anti-occidentales de l’ASE au Burkina Faso, au Mali et au Niger. La Russie, la Chine et la Turquie ont ouvert la voie à ce nouvel alignement. La rivalité entre l’Iran et Israël s’est intensifiée au cours des dernières décennies, avec plusieurs confrontations entre les deux pays dans la mer Rouge et en Afrique de l’Est depuis les années 2010. L’Iran n’a cessé d’étendre son engagement dans toute la région, conduisant à un « équilibre de dissuasion » entre les deux pays. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: [Erweiterte Horizonte: Irans strategisches Engagement in Afrika südlich der Sahara – Einblicke aus Südafrika, Nigeria und Tansania] – Seit den 1960er Jahren intervenieren sowohl das Regime von Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) als auch seit 1979 die Islamische Republik Iran in Subsahara-Afrika (SSA). Während die Politik des Schahs von einer virulenten antikommunistischen Haltung motiviert war, verfolgte die Islamische Republik Iran (IRI) eine ‚radikale‘ Politik der Veränderung des politischen Status der westlichen Welt, einschließlich der westlichen arabischen Verbündeten, die dem Überleben des Mullah-Regimes feindlich gegenüberstanden. Während sich der Schah auf geopolitische Interessen konzentrierte, insbesondere am Horn von Afrika, dem lebenswichtigen Seeweg zum Roten Meer, sowie in Südafrika, und die Interessen afrikanischer Muslime ignorierte, nutzte die IRI zunehmend radikalisierte Islamisten, um den iranischen Einfluss auf dem Kontinent auszuweiten. So hat die IRI beispielsweise Milliarden von Dollar in der Region ausgegeben, um muslimische Schulen und kostenlose soziale Dienste durch Krankenhäuser und Waisenhäuser bereitzustellen, die vom iranischen Roten Halbmond unterstützt wurden. Die Strategie des IRI zielte darauf ab, Unterstützung an der Basis unter muslimischen Gemeinschaften aufzubauen, anstatt sich ausschließlich auf afrikanische Regierungen zu konzentrieren. Teherans Expansionspolitik umfasste Waffenverkäufe an staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure sowie die Destabilisierung von Regimen. Ziel war es, Partnerschaften aufzubauen, die helfen würden, internationale Sanktionen zu umgehen und gleichzeitig neues Terrain für seine Widerstandsachse gegen seine globalen und regionalen Gegner, insbesondere seinen Erzfeind Israel, zu eröffnen. Teherans Version des politischen Islam beinhaltete den Aufbau von Stellvertretern, vor allem der Hisbollah im Libanon und den Houthi-Rebellen, zuletzt im Jemen, die aus Solidarität mit der palästinensischen Sache verheerende Schäden der internationalen Schifffahrtswege anrichteten. Teheran erweiterte seinen Einfluss in der Sahelzone und nutzte die eigennützige französische Afrikapolitik und die Politik anderer westlicher Mächte in Westafrika aus, um Kontakte zu den antiwestlichen Militärjuntas der ASE in Burkina Faso, Mali und Niger aufzubauen. Russland, China und die Türkei ebneten den Weg für diese neue Ausrichtung. Die Rivalität zwischen dem Iran und Israel hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten verschärft. Seit den 2010er Jahren kam es zwischen den beiden Ländern im Roten Meer und in Ostafrika zu mehreren Konfrontationen. Der Iran hat sein Engagement in der gesamten Region kontinuierlich ausgeweitet, was zu einem ‚Gleichgewicht der Abschreckung‘ zwischen den beiden Ländern führte.

There is a pattern in which the time frame of Mars's position within 30 degrees of the lunar node correlates with the highest concentration of rocket fire from Gaza into Israel in relation to the rest of the year. This pattern is outlined and explained in Chapter 24 of Ares Le Mandat(4th ed) and substantiated going all the way back to 2007.

This article focuses on the 'enchanted' materiality of state militarism by offering an anthropological analysis of 'gun culture' within the reservist ranks of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Through primarily ethnographic observations of one reserve combat unit over the span of a decade, we will argue that the ways in which firearms are handled by individual soldiers symbolically mirrors much broader strategic and political tensions between two competing forms of organizational logic. On the one hand, there is what can be described as an enchanted allure with the tools of violence. This may include personal excitement around the expectation of combat, learned experience, and a curiosity regarding the weapons of war. On the other hand, there is a broader institutional and professionalizing tendency towards disciplining these individualistic modalities by distancing soldiers from both the tools and the results of battle itself. Ultimately, we argue that while the IDF may seek to harness individual enchanted engagements with firearms to further militaristic goals, on the ground, this process occurs amidst a stark clash of institutional logics and a good deal of ambivalence around the nature of warfare and uncertainty about the ethos of violence. Introduction: Wassach or the enchanted materiality of firearms Sitting in his Ramat Gan clinic one cloudy afternoon in 2022, the first author asked Avihu 1-a reserve Israel Defense Forces (IDF) firearms instructor and a full-time civilian acupuncture therapist-what he thought about the phenomenon of welltrained, disciplined soldiers 'playing' with their firearms. ' A gun is like a magnet' , he noted. 'It pulls you in, you want to use it, point it, see how it works'. For Avihu, firearms bore their own enchanted aura that drew the (sometimes unsafe and unauthorized) interest of Israeli combat soldiers. It was the role of firearms instructors, and the military more broadly, to balance this magnetic allure with professional standards and safety procedures. Conversing in his clinic that afternoon, it became apparent that Avihu was not the first to sketch out a certain relationship between state violence (in the guise of military firearms) and individual enchantment. Over a century ago, Max Weber drew a similar

Publie le 15 novembre 2015 par Said Bouamama A l'heure ou nous ecrivons le bilan des tueries parisiennes est de 128 morts et de 300 blesses. L'horreur de cette violence injustifiable est absolue. La condamnation doit l'etre tout autant, sans aucune restriction et/ou nuance. Les acteurs et/ou commanditaires de ces meurtres aveugles ne peuvent invoquer aucune raison legitime pour justifier ces actes immondes. La tragedie que nous vivons debouchera sur une prise de conscience collective des dangers qui (...)