Islamist actors from anti-system perspective: the case of Hizbullah

This art icle was downloaded by: [ Universit a degli St udi di Torino] On: 17 February 2015, At : 12: 57 Publisher: Rout ledge I nform a Lt d Regist ered in England and Wales Regist ered Num ber: 1072954 Regist ered office: Mort im er House, 37- 41 Mort im er St reet , London W1T 3JH, UK Politics, Religion & Ideology Publicat ion det ails, including inst ruct ions f or aut hors and subscript ion inf ormat ion: ht t p: / / www. t andf online. com/ loi/ f t mp21 Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective: The Case of Hizbullah Rosit a Di Peri a a Universit y of Turin Published online: 21 Jul 2014. Click for updates To cite this article: Rosit a Di Peri (2014) Islamist Act ors f rom an Ant i-syst em Perspect ive: The Case of Hizbullah, Polit ics, Religion & Ideology, 15: 4, 487-503, DOI: 10. 1080/ 21567689. 2014. 934360 To link to this article: ht t p: / / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 21567689. 2014. 934360 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTI CLE Taylor & Francis m akes every effort t o ensure t he accuracy of all t he inform at ion ( t he “ Cont ent ” ) cont ained in t he publicat ions on our plat form . However, Taylor & Francis, our agent s, and our licensors m ake no represent at ions or warrant ies what soever as t o t he accuracy, com plet eness, or suit abilit y for any purpose of t he Cont ent . Any opinions and views expressed in t his publicat ion are t he opinions and views of t he aut hors, and are not t he views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. 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Term s & Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 Condit ions of access and use can be found at ht t p: / / www.t andfonline.com / page/ t erm sand- condit ions Politics, Religion & Ideology, 2014 Vol. 15, No. 4, 487–503, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2014.934360 Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective: The Case of Hizbullah Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 ROSITA DI PERI∗ University of Turin A BSTRACT The case of Hizbullah offers an important opportunity to examine Islamist actors. Created during the 1980s as a religious-oriented movement with a clear Islamic agenda, it gradually shifted towards a more pragmatic position, entering Lebanese political life in 1992. In its early days Hizbullah adopted a clear anti-system posture and strongly criticised the consociational Lebanese system and the international order. By comparing three key moments in the political evolution of the movement this article analyses the strategy of Hizbullah from an anti-system perspective. The aim is to demonstrate how playing as a dual anti-system actor (as both social movement and party) on two interrelated levels (domestic and external) has been a strategic and informed political choice. Hizbullah has been able to juggle these positions over the years, activating or silencing its domestic anti-system attitude to the benefit of the external one. To have a differentiated anti-system attitude has allowed it to maintain a double (but always coherent) position in the different systems it plays, adapting its anti-system posture to the political circumstances, to its goals and to the international context. Introduction Hizbullah – the ‘Party of God’ – is one of the main actors in both the Lebanese and the wider regional political scene. Created as a religious-oriented movement, the ‘Party of God’ has been able to juggle its radical inclinations and the need for pragmatism. Analysis of the oscillation between the ‘religious’ and the ‘political’ is what characterised the earliest studies of the party. On the one hand are those who have analysed its more ‘revolutionary’ aspects, concentrating on Islamic militancy and its consequences at the regional and international levels.1 The focus of these studies was mainly on the movement’s politics of violence and on its ‘proxy’ dimension, namely its connections with Syria and Iran. On the other hand are those who have focused on the transformations that have led Hizbullah to play an active role in Lebanese political life, arguing that such changes have altered the project of the movement, namely the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon and the fight against ‘Western’ intrusion in the country.2 According to this scholarship, the political Email: rosita.diperi@unito.it M. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin Press, 1997); H. Jaber, Hizbullah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); A. Saad Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 2 E. Picard, ‘The Lebanese Shi’a and Political Violence’, Discussion Paper 42, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1993; E. Zisser, ‘Hizballah in Lebanon: At The Crossroads’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 8:2 (1997), pp. 90–106; A. R. Norton, Hizbullah a Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). ∗ 1 © 2014 Taylor & Francis Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 488 R. Di Peri rather than the religious vein of the movement has prevailed over time, both at the domestic and at the international level. There is also a third cluster of studies which sees the choices of the ‘Party of God’ as dependent on circumstances and as never genuinely in opposition to its ideology and religious nature. Hamzeh in particular focuses on the local dimension of Hizbullah’s political activities, arguing that for Islamists the functions and power of local government are the new tools for the Islamisation of all aspects of society.3 Alagha, for his part, concentrates on how Hizbullah has transformed and will transform its identity according to internal and external factors, but always keeping in mind the guidelines of Islamic constants (thawabit). This shifting identity is the element that has allowed Hizbullah to find a compromise between its religious and political natures.4 More recently a very fruitful series of studies emerged, focused on Hizbullah’s character as a social movement.5 Karagiannis in particular uses a framing analysis to understand how the party communicates its goals and mobilises support within its Shiite base and in Lebanese society. On the one hand Kargiannis offers a theoretical analysis of the party, which has traditionally been studied more descriptively, while on the other hand he shows how Hizbullah, ‘has succeeded in finding successful frames that resonate with the local culture and the current political and economic realities as perceived by a large fraction of the Lebanese population’.6 Taking a similar angle, some studies have examined the social networks and different structures established by the party in Shiite majority areas.7 Within these networks the roles of specific groups such as women, or young people, have been elucidated.8 Other scholars have focused on the political skills of Hizbullah, in particular through the analysis of local political power management9 or the party’s use of propaganda and awareness campaigns10 and the media.11 In general, however, all these studies are excessively descriptive and tend to separate the domestic dimension – namely the relationship of the party with its Shiite base and with the 3 See A. N. Hamzeh, ‘Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation’, Third World Quarterly, 14:2 (1993), pp. 321–337; A. N. Hamzeh, ‘Lebanon’s Islamists and Local Politics: A New Reality’, Third World Quarterly, 21:5 (2000), pp. 739–759; A. N. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004). 4 J. Alagha, The Shift In Hizbullah’s Ideology. Religious Ideology, Political Ideology and Political Program (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006); and J. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011). 5 E. Karagiannis, ‘Hizballah as a Social Movement Organization: A Framing Approach, Mediterranean Politics, 14:3 (2009), pp. 365–383; A. Saouli, ‘Hizbullah in the Civilizing Process: Anarchy, Self-restraint and Violence’, Third World Quarterly, 32:5 (2011), pp. 925–942; I. Salamey and F. Pearson, ‘Hezbollah: A Proletarian Party with an Islamic Manifesto – A Sociopolitical Analysis of Islamist Populism in Lebanon and the Middle East’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 18:3 (2007), pp. 416–438. 6 Karagiannis, op. cit., p. 366. 7 S. T. Flanigan, ‘Hizbullah’s Social Jihad: Nonprofits as Resistance Organizations’, Middle East Policy, 16:2 (2009), pp. 122–137; S. Mervin (ed.), Le Hizbullah, États Des Lieux (Paris Beyrouth: Actes Sud/IFPO, 2008); M. Harb, ‘La banlieue du Hizb’Allah: Images Alternatives de Beyrouth d’après-guerre’, Annales de la Recherche Urbaine, 96 (2004), pp. 53–61. 8 L. Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’a Lebanon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); B. Lefort, ‘Être jeune au Hizbullah’, Revue Internationale et Stratégique, 2:66 (2007), pp. 25–36. 9 M. Harb, ‘La gestion du local par les maires du Hizbullah au Liban’, Critique Internationale, 1:42 (2009), pp. 57–72. 10 K. Chaib, ‘Les identités chiites au Liban-Sud. Entre mobilisation communautaire, contrôle partisan et ancrage local’, Vingtième Siècle D’histoire, 3:103 (2009), pp. 149–162; and, K. Chaib, ‘Les mises en scène des martyrs dans les cimetières de village au Liban sud’, Le Mouvement Social, 4:237 (2011), pp. 55–71. 11 K. Chaib, ‘Le Hizbullah libanais à travers ses images’ in S. Mervin (ed.) Les Mondes Chiites et l’Iran (Paris Beyrouth: Khartala/IFPO, 2007), pp. 113–135; O. Lamloum, ‘Histoire sociale du Hizbullah à travers ses médias’, Politix, 3:87 (2009), pp. 169–187. Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective 489 Lebanese political system – from the international one. Many of them, in addition, tend to concentrate on its religious dimension, ignoring the political one. In this article the focus is instead on an element that has been overlooked: Hizbullah’s anti-systemic attitude. The understanding of this aspect is crucial because it provides an innovative frame to account for Hizbullah’s political strategy both at the domestic level and at the international one. If, often, the anti-systemic posture is seen as a threat to democracy and to politics more broadly, in the case of Hizbullah this attitude is an evident sign of a calculated and strategic political choice.12 What does it mean, operationally, to be antisystemic for an Islamic actor such as Hizbullah? And to what extent is this aspect relevant to understanding its political behaviour? To be anti-systemic is generally assumed to be against democratic arrangements, but the term can be stretched. Thus, it might relate to a definition of anti-system that is a function of the system against which the anti-systemic actor ‘is fighting’. In this regard, substantial differences exist dependent on whether the anti-systemness is considered through theories of political parties or of social movements. According to Sartori’s party theory, anti-systemness can be ‘relational’ (i.e. anti-systemness can be referred to the other parties or the system of parties), or ‘ideological’ (the anti-systemness is built against the system of government). According to the theory of social movements, by contrast, anti-systemness is seen as a means to fight against the ‘world-system’. If we consider Hizbullah’s evolution according to these two theoretical frameworks, we have a useful tool to read the party’s strategy both from the domestic perspective (the relationship between the party and the Lebanese political system) and the external one (the relations between the party and the international context). Both frameworks allow for a novel interpretation of Hizbullah’s role in democratising the Lebanese system, and this double theoretical framing centred on the notion of anti-systemness is the innovative contribution of this research. Consequently the aim of this article is to demonstrate how playing as a dual anti-system actor (as both social movement and party) on two interrelated levels (domestic and external) is a strategic and informed political choice that has had a crucial impact on Hizbullah’s policies. The hypothesis advanced here is that a calculated use of anti-system labels at domestic and international levels has allowed Hizbullah to retain its religious followers and, at the same time, promote the policies necessary to its political survival and its accreditation at national and international levels.13 Hizbullah has demonstrated, in fact, an extraordinary ability to separate an ‘internal’ anti-system dimension from an ‘external’ one. This has permitted the juggling of these positions, modulating its domestic anti-system attitude to the benefit of the external one. Specifically, Hizbullah has worked hard at maintaining its external anti-system posture, especially when the domestic anti-system vein has become less pronounced. The adaptation of the party to Lebanese consociational democracy might have had a negative impact on the Shiite base, but having a differentiated anti-system attitude domestically and externally has allowed Hizbullah to maintain a double – and always coherent – position in different systems. Methodologically the above-mentioned hypothesis is examined by comparing three key periods in the political history of Hizbullah, using party documents, declarations, 12 In the case of Islamic movements/parties considered anti-systemic, then this aspect appears relevant because it is one of the arguments of those who support the thesis of the incompatibility between Islam and democracy. 13 Historically the Shiite community, considered a non-qualified minority inside the Lebanese state, was deemed unable to participate in political life. This was due not only to the labels applied to them over the years (‘poor’, ‘communist’, etc.), but also to the fact that they had a very strong religious connotation. See Y. Hazran, ‘The Rise of Politicized Shi’ite Religiosity and the Territorial State in Iraq and Lebanon’, The Middle East Journal, 64:4 (2010), pp. 521–541. Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 490 R. Di Peri commentaries, secondary sources and a series of interviews conducted in Lebanon between 2010 and 2012. The article is divided into two main sections. In the first, Islamist actors are considered in the frame of anti-system theory and then in the second section the case of Hizbullah in three crucial periods of its political life is analysed. The first period considered starts with the official foundation of the party in 1985 up until the end of the civil war (1989–1990). In this time Hizbullah clearly adopted a ‘social movement’ anti-system attitude both at the domestic and external levels. The second period begins in 1991 and ends in 2005 with the Hariri assassination. In this period Hizbullah’s transformation from antisystem social movement to anti-system party is evident at the domestic level but not at the international one. The third moment begins just after the Hariri assassination and lasts until 2009, the year of the publication of Hizbullah’s new political manifesto. In this period the positions of the previous period, both at the domestic and international levels persist, even though some relevant changes do occur. Islamist Groups and Democracy: An Anti-system Perspective Islamist movements have been increasingly influential in the Arab world since the late 1970s and they have consolidated their presence since the beginning of the 1990s. This revival14 has coincided, more generally, with a worldwide Islamic resurgence. Considering their increasing political relevance, in recent years a significant part of the literature has concentrated on the Islamist movements’ role as actors of political mobilisation rather than on their religious aspects.15 In contrast with previous studies, some scholars have argued that Islam is not necessarily an obstacle to democracy and democratisation, but it could be analysed as one of the variables in a dialectical relationship.16 In this article, it is emphasised that a significant (and underestimated) element that needs to be considered in analysing the relationship between Islamist actors and the state is whether they have an anti-system attitude or not. Playing the ‘anti-system card’ is an informed choice that is often used by Islamist parties to their own advantage and for a very precise political strategy. This informed choice is, in this regard, influenced by the surrounding environment within which Islamists are operating, because it affects their political choices. Anti-system actors can be analysed from different perspectives. The anti-system label has been used to describe non-democratic parties or groups17; parties or groups that support their ideals through non-conventional, illegal or violent means18; or parties that are particularly isolated from other political actors.19 In the social sciences two dominant 14 V. Nasr, ‘Democracy and Islamic Revivalism’, Political Science Quarterly, 110:2 (1995), pp. 261–285. C. Garcìa-Rivero and H. J. Kotzé, ‘Electoral Support for Islamic Parties in the Middle East and North Africa’, Party Politics, 13:5 (2007), pp. 611–636; F. Volpi, ‘Political Islam in the Mediterranean: The View from Democratization Studies’, Democratization, 16:1 (2009), pp. 20–38; S. S. Shehata, Islamist Politics in the Middle East. Movements and Change (London: Routledge, 2012). 16 A. Jamal, ‘Reassessing Support for Islam and Democracy in the Arab world? Evidence from Egypt and Jordan’, World Affairs, 169:2 (2006), pp. 51–63. J. Schwedler, ‘Democratization, Inclusion, and the Moderation of Islamist Parties’, Development, 50 (2007), pp. 56–61. 17 See, for example, H. Daalder, ‘Parties, Elites and Political Development in Western Europe’, in J. La Palombara and M. Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 43–78. 18 Among others see, E. Zimmermann, ‘Political Unrest in Europe: Trends and Prospects’, West European Politics, 12 (1989), pp. 179–96. 19 L. Bille, ‘Denmark: The Oscillating Party System’ in P. Mair and G. Smith (eds) Understanding Party System Change in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 42–58. 15 Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective 491 approaches emerge. The first one is that of the anti-system party, included in political party theory. The second one is within the theory of social movements. Even if the latter is relevant for the case of Hizbullah between 1985 and 1989, the focus here is mainly on the antisystem party theory because it is crucial to understand Hizbullah transformations in recent years. The concept of anti-system party began with the works of Sartori.20 In his definition, an anti-system party is a party that would change not the government but ‘the system of government’. The concept, at least initially, was applied to two distinct fields of analysis: on the one hand to the study of party systems and on the other to empirical studies of democracies, their legitimacy and their consolidation. In Sartori’s theory of party systems, the antisystem party attitude is part of the ‘party’s ideological character’. According to Sartori, the ‘anti-systemness attitude’ could be ‘relational’, depending on the ideological differences between one or more parties and the other parties and the system. More frequently, however, the property of ‘anti-systemness’ is ‘ideological’: namely it is given to a party on the basis of its ideology and not in relation to its distance from the other parties.21 Accordingly, an anti-system party could be seen as a threat to the whole system and to democracy itself.22 The hard core of the concept is singled out by noting that an anti-system opposition abides by a belief system that does not share the values of the political order within which it operates. According to the strict definition, then, the anti-system parties represent an extraneous ideology – thereby indicating a polity confronted with a maximal ideological distance.23 One of the consequences of this view is that the system to which the anti-system party is opposed changes according to the two definitions: the ‘relational’ and the ‘ideological’. In the ‘relational’ case the system considered is the party system (and system of government), while in the ‘ideological’ dimension the system against which the struggle is carried out is that of power arrangements in liberal democracies. If the anti-systemness is ‘relational’, anti-system parties do not cooperate with government coalitions because they do not recognise the principles within which these coalitions work. At the same time they tend to adopt the system’s delegitimising tactics, acting as what Sartori calls an ‘irresponsible opposition’.24 Consequences of this are the polarisation of the political spectrum and its delegitimisation. Frequently anti-system parties use the instruments of the ‘anti-politicalestablishment parties’.25 According to Schedler, in its modern form, an anti-political establishment party is characterised by certain key variables.26 It is generally a party that refuses to be a part of a system that it does not recognise; it is a party that refuses other political parties (and coalition with them) because they are not able to represent the population: it presents itself as ‘new’ (ideological distance with other parties); it is a party that is guided, often, by charismatic figures and/or leaders; and it is a party that uses the rhetoric of populism to attract attention to the inefficiencies of the system. Turning to anti-systemness from the perspective of the theory of social movements, the situation partially changes. In this framework, the system against which groups or 20 See in particular G. Sartori, ‘European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism’ in La Palombara and Weiner, op. cit., pp. 137–176; and, G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 21 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, op. cit. 22 G. Capoccia, ‘Anti-system Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 14:1 (2002), pp. 9–35. 23 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, op. cit., p. 133. 24 Ibid. 25 A. Mastropaolo, Is Democracy a Lost Cause? Paradoxes of an Imperfect Invention (Essex: ECPR Press, 2012). 26 A. Schedler, ‘Anti-Political-Establishment Parties’, Party Politics, 2 (1996), pp. 291–312. Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 492 R. Di Peri movements (national or international) advance claims is the ‘world-system’ and its preestablished rules.27 The main element of this position is that ‘movements repeatedly proclaim[ed] themselves to be “revolutionary”, that is, to stand for fundamental transformations in social relations’.28 Groups stand against the established system of power relations and their economic assets according to the so-called ‘two-step strategy’: first gaining power within the state structure and then transforming the world.29 According to the literature, two typologies of movement are identified: social and national.30 They largely present common characteristics: they have strong and clear structures, welldefined strategies and are very familiar with the power structures of the ‘world-system’. The above-outlined theoretical frameworks provide useful lenses to analyse the relationship between Islamist actors, democracy and the state. One can assume that a calculated use of anti-system labels (as a party or as a movement) could allow Islamist actors to maintain their religious followers and, at the same time, promote the policies needed for their political survival. A part of the literature on Islamist actors is based on the assumption that this type of party/movement is a threat for democracy because Islamic values are anti-systemic (in the sense of anti-democratic) by definition. However the relationship between Islamic parties/movements, democracy and the state is more complex than that and it is therefore necessary to look beyond the party’s ideological values to see how this ideology is operationalised in the system within which the party is active. In short, in order to analyse an actor from an anti-system perspective it is necessary to take into account the following characteristics: . An anti-system actor stands out for its opposition to ‘a system’. We have seen that this ‘system’ changes depending on whether we are talking about anti-system parties or antisystem movements. The domestic dimension seems to have a predominant role in the case of anti-system parties because, generally, they stand against the state system of power because it embodies values that the anti-system parties do not share, or they are against (state) democracy itself. In the case of anti-system groups/movements, the system to subvert or to resist is, instead, the ‘world-system’ because of its dominant liberal values or its neoliberal economic arrangements. Here the international dimension prevails. . An anti-system actor, then, is characterised by the tools it uses to conduct its fight against the system. These instruments can go beyond the merely political. An interesting point of this discussion is related to the use of violent tools (in the case of anti-system parties, often only at the symbolic level) but also to the use of delegitimisation strategies. Independent of the instruments adopted, changing the rules of the game requires, for the party or the movement, strong internal discipline and organisation, shared rules, and explicit goals and strategies. . Finally an anti-system actor should be analysed for its mobilisation capability, which is a crucial element for both cases. This capability is closely linked to the strategies and tools adopted. 27 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730–1840s (New York: Academic Press, 1989); C. Chase-Dunn and T. D. Hall, Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997). 28 I. Wallerstein, ‘New Revolts Against the System’, New Left Review, 18 (2002), p. 30. 29 Ibid. 30 G. Arrighi, T. K. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein, Antisystemic Movements (London and New York: Verso, 1989). In the case of Hizbullah, the notions of social and national tend to overlap. To simplify, in the course of this discussion ‘social movement’ instead of ‘social/national movement’ will be used. Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective 493 Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 With the domestic and external anti-system levels in mind, in the following pages these characteristics will be located (for each of the identified periods) in relation to Hizbullah’s anti-system posture (as party or movement); to its position in opposition to the system; to the strategies and tools adopted, and to the weaknesses and strengths of the Lebanese system. Far from being a purely theoretical exercise, this attempt is relevant to explain why Hizbullah’s pragmatism at the domestic level, often underlined in the literature, is part of a calculated strategy necessary for the party to accredit itself at the international level as anti-systemic. This anti-system international posture is, in turn, crucial for the party in order to maintain its strong Shiite base. Hizbullah as Anti-system Actor ‘in Practice’ 1985–1990 The sectarian nature of the Lebanese political system is something Hizbullah has had to confront from the outset. It is a consociational system that has remained in place even after the end of the Lebanese civil war, finding new legitimacy in the Doha Agreement signed in May 2008.31 In order to function, it is necessary that all actors share the same rules of the game and that all segments of society accept the consociational model.32 In February 1985, the ‘Party of God’ officially set forth its political manifesto (the Open Letter) that summarised the characteristics of the movement well, reflecting the reality on the ground.33 The Open Letter is strongly imbued with the message of the Iranian revolution and stands in contrast to the West and its worldview. It emphasises that Islam is the only viable solution to bring mankind out from darkness and ignorance.34 The document stresses that not only the West but also the Soviet Union deviates from the correct interpretation of the world and society. The letter also contains a war message against France, due to its support for the Lebanese Maronite community and arms sales to Iraq. The central idea of the letter is that compromise and mediation cannot be an answer to the problem of how to liberate the Arab region from foreign intrusions. According to Hizbullah, where, in the Arab world, governments have resorted to such practices, this has produced a Western imperialistic intrusion, creating disunity in the umma. The only possible solution is, therefore, a revolutionary armed struggle in the name of Islam with the objective of accelerating the departure of the imperialistic powers from the Arab region (and from Lebanon in particular) and the destruction of Israel for the liberation of Palestine. The universality of the Quranic message is the only one able to cut across class, and cultural and religious cleavages to achieve this objective. It is interesting to note that the Open Letter lacks a specific political programme for Lebanon. This omission is highly noteworthy given Hizbullah’s struggle against the 31 The National Pact of 1943 is, along with the Taif Agreements (1989), one of two ‘founding’ moments of Lebanese socio-political life. These two ‘pacts’ outlining the political and social framework of the country, were designed to be temporary but are becoming entrenched. 32 R. H. Dekmejian ‘Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon’, Comparative Politics, 10:2 (1978), pp. 251–265; T. Fakhoury, Democracy and Power-sharing in Stormy Weather: The Case of Lebanon (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag for Social Sciences, 2009); R. Di Peri ‘Il modello della democrazia consociativa e la sua applicazione al caso libanese’, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 2 (2010), pp. 219–249. 33 After the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) from the country, the combatant groups, and among them the Shiite groups, took control of the military operations against Israel in the south of the country. 34 The text of the Open Letter is reported in Augustus R. Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), pp. 167–187. Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 494 R. Di Peri Lebanese political system, believed to be unable to preserve the country from foreign invasions. ‘The Lebanese tragedy has proven that the sectarian privileges are one of the main causes of the big explosion that has brought about the collapse of the country and that the alliance with America, France and Israel did the Christians no good when they needed the support of these forces’.35 The only reference to future plans is the statement that, when Lebanon is free of foreign occupation, its citizens would then freely choose Islam: ‘We are committed to Islam, but we do not impose it by force.’36 The letter does not specify the type of political system the movement wishes to build but it can be deduced that the Iranian Islamic Republic would be the most plausible model.37 Accordingly, Hizbullah does not hide its alliance with Iran and, more generally, its support for the Islamic Shiite resurgence after the 1979 Iranian revolution. It should however be emphasised that the early years of Hizbullah were marked by chaos and disorganisation, especially because the movement had to deal, almost daily, with Israeli attacks. In this context the watchword was: resistance. At least initially, therefore, it is possible to affirm that Hizbullah presents anti-system social movement characteristics both at the domestic and at the international level. On the domestic front, criticism of the Lebanese confessional system and the Lebanese state as a whole was very strong. Hizbullah’s political ideology supported the end of ‘political Maronism’, rejecting any participation in Lebanon’s confessional political system.38 The consociational system (and consequently the state as an expression of it) had been unable to avoid the outbreak of civil war or to find a solution to it. In addition, it could not protect its territorial integrity. In this phase, the domestic anti-system objectives were pursued mostly through rhetoric rather than concrete actions. The chaotic situation of the Lebanese civil war and the consequent absence of meaningful political life prevented Hizbullah from operating directly on the ground to modify Lebanese political arrangements. However, Hizbullah operated indirectly to achieve this end. After the PLO’s departure in 1982, Hizbullah called on all Lebanese to fight against Israel and to overthrow the ‘oppressive’ confessional system.39 It was uncompromising with respect to any possible mediation. Moving on to analyse the international anti-systemness posture, it is possible to argue that this was very strong, both rhetorically and in practice. In this early period the external anti-system posture was violent and was conducted through a top-down approach. Through the Islamic Resistance Hizbullah led a violent and very aggressive campaign against Western powers in Lebanon throughout the course of the 1980s.40 During this period kidnappings were carried out, as well as hijackings and attacks on foreign military positions, particularly American and French ones. Hizbullah advocated the right to conduct the ‘smaller military jihad’ (defensive) against them.41 In this sense, Hizbullah was far removed from the gradualist vision of the Imam Musa al Sadr42 and from his exhortation that violence should not be the only tool of activism. However, rather than damaging 35 Text reported in Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a, op. cit., p. 176. Open Letter section 9 in ibid., pp. 174–175. 37 The contrasts on this point were relevant: a part of the movement, guided by Mohammed Zartir, indeed called for a stronger and less pragmatic approach and the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction, op. cit., p. 17. 38 Alagha, The Shift In Hizbullah’s Ideology, op. cit., p. 23. 39 N. Qassem, Hizbullah. A Story from Within (London & Beirut: Saqi Book, 2010), p. 178. 40 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, op. cit. 41 In The Open Letter Hizbullah justifies the use of violence as the only tool, albeit within the frame of Islamic rules. 42 Upon his arrival in 1950, Musa al-Sadr began to urge Shiites to react to their condition of oppression and poverty by building a ‘story’, a new narrative for the community. In 1974, he founded the Movement of the Disinherited 36 Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective 495 Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 its image, this strategy contributed to give credit to the party on the Lebanese scene as an alternative to Amal.43 The discussion above demonstrates Hizbullah’s anti-system posture both at domestic and international levels. The movement wanted to emerge as a novel force in Lebanon, championing resistance without losing sight of its clear religious affiliation. This attitude stood in clear contrast to the outdated and oppressive Lebanese confessional system. Hizbullah also clearly demonstrated knowledge of the rules of the game and understood the weakness of the ‘world-system’, of which the corrupt Lebanese state was an expression. Being an anti-system social movement, thus, appears to be a distinctive feature at this stage. 1991–2005 The civil war was devastating and extremely polarising for Lebanon. Thus, the end of the fighting necessitated a heavy dose of compromise and mediation. From Hizbullah’s perspective, a first change in its strategy occurred just at the end of the 1980s due to two interconnected events. On the one hand was the fratricidal struggle between Hizbullah and Amal for the ‘ideological conquest’ of the south of the country, which led to a slow marginalisation of Amal.44 On the other hand, the change in Iran after Khomeini’s death in 1989 led to a redefinition of the strategies and policies of the Islamic Republic, both at home and abroad. The new President Rafsanjani opposed the fighting between Shiites in Lebanon and strongly condemned both movements.45 In addition, the new international environment, with the end of the Cold War and the creation of the UN-sanctioned international coalition against the occupation of Kuwait, forced Iran to reconsider its position in the global and regional balance of power. In 1989 when the Taif Accords were signed, Hizbullah and the Maronites refused to accept them.46 The agreements, and the system they perpetuated, represented everything Hizbullah had fought against over the years, namely the consociational system and its patronage practices. Even if the movement had started to change slightly in its perspective, at the beginning of 1990s the anti-system vein of Hizbullah as a social movement still prevailed. However, on the eve of 1992, the date set for the first elections after the civil war ended, Hizbullah partially changed its tack, accepting the Taif Agreements and deciding to participate in Lebanese political life. Why did it begin this process of ‘Lebanonisation’?47 There are many reasons that prompted Hizbullah to nuance its hard-line stance. First was the alteration of the sectarian balance that the agreements brought in. The balance of power between that, in 1975, was converted into the armed organisation ‘Amal’. See F. Ajami, The Vanished Imam. Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). 43 A. Abukhalil, ‘Syria and the Shiites: Al-Asad’s Policy in Lebanon’, Third World Quarterly, 12:2 (1990), pp. 1–20. 44 At that time Hizbullah considered Amal an excessively secular and moderate movement. 45 M. A. Faksh, ‘The Shi’a Community of Lebanon: A New Assertive Political Force’, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, XIV:3 (1991), pp. 33–56. 46 The Taif Agreements gave rise to a cross-veto system between the three highest offices of the state (the so-called troika), which represented the three main communities (Maronite, Sunni and Shiite) which, with the aim of reconciling the forces in the field, made the taking of political decisions very difficult, incentivising practices of clientelism and corruption. See J. Bahout, ‘Lebanese Parliamentarism: Shadow Plays and the Death of Politics’, The Lebanon Report, 1 (1996), pp. 27–31. T. Hanf and N. Salam (eds), Lebanon in Limbo (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003); M. C. Hudson, ‘Lebanon after Ta’if: Another Reform Opportunity Lost?’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 21 (1999), pp. 27–40. 47 M. Ranstorp, ‘The Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah’s Current “Lebanonization” Process’, Mediterranean Politics, 3:1 (1998), pp. 103–134; Qassem, op. cit. Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 496 R. Di Peri communities had changed during the civil war as well as the demographic weight of each of them. The Shiite community was able to obtain greater visibility and bargaining power. According to Wärn, Hassan Nasrallah, the General Secretary of Hizbullah elected in 1993, believed that the inclusion of the party in the political process was the price that had to be paid in order for it to continue to legitimise itself as a resistance force capable of defending the country from Israel.48 On this point, it is relevant to note that Nasrallah never talked about ‘Lebanonisation’, which implied an acceptance of the Lebanese confessional political system, but, rather, of infitah (opening), a much more nuanced term that allowed Hizbullah to maintain the pretence of an impartial role and distinguish itself from other Lebanese parties. Nasrallah’s position, according to Qassem, was strongly criticised by many within the party and there were intense debates on, for instance, this choice leading to the expulsion from the party of al-Tufayli.49 Second, the new Iranian leadership of Rafsanjani had promoted a much more pragmatic and less militant foreign policy. This affected Shiites factions in Lebanon.50 Third, the rise of Syrian influence in Lebanon literally ‘pushed’ Hizbullah to cooperate with the Lebanese government. Hizbullah, conscious of the fact that Syria would take advantage of this situation to strengthen its presence in the country, made the best of a bad situation, accepting the Taif Accords. For its part, Syria took advantage of the Shiite movement as a proxy in the fight against the state of Israel. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the Taif Agreements implicitly legitimised the presence and the action of Hizbullah. Its refusal, de facto approved by the government, to give up weapons like the other militias, as the agreements set out, with the argument that they were needed to fight against the Israeli occupation, put the party in an anomalous and privileged position.51 The party’s change of position emerges clearly in the analysis of its electoral programmes,52 and from the decisions taken during its political meetings – the ‘conclaves’.53 At the domestic level Hizbullah gradually but inexorably shifted from being an anti-system social movement to an anti-system party, trying to preserve its Islamic and anti-establishment identity, and at the same time, working within the confines of the Lebanese political system. The interesting point is the attention it dedicates to the Lebanese confessional system. In the 1992 electoral programme we can read: ‘The first duties of Hizbullah’s nominees are to follow up the efforts, in cooperation with all friends and loyal ones, to abolish it [political sectarianism], during the first constitutional cycle of the new parliament.’54 In the 1996 electoral programme an entire section is entitled ‘Achieving Equality and Establishing the Just State’. Here the focus is the establishment of a ‘just’ state, and one of the tools to do so is to abolish the confessional system, with the party committed to: 48 M. Wärn, ‘Forever at the Crossroads. Hizbollah’s Combined Strategies of Accomodation and Resistance’ in C. Jones and S. Catignani (eds) Israel and Hizbollah. An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 124–146. 49 Subhi Al-Tufayli was the first General Secretary of Hizbullah. He strongly criticised the changing attitude of Hizbullah towards the Lebanese political system. See Qassem, op. cit., p. 223. 50 From a religious point of view Hizbullah is linked to the ideology of the velayat-e faqih, which is considered the authority entitled to change the strategy of the movement according to internal and external circumstances. 51 Mervin, Le Hizbullah, op. cit. Qassem, op. cit. 52 Legislative elections were 1992, 1996 and 2000; Municipal elections were 1998 and 2004. The electoral programmes of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 are reported in J. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents. From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications-Amsterdam University Press, 2011). 53 Hamzeh, Lebanon’s Islamists and Local Politics, op. cit. A synopsis of the main decisions taken during the conclaves is presented in Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, op. cit. 54 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, op. cit., p. 66. Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective 497 ‘the abolition of political sectarianism that represents the central flaw in the Lebanese political system and its social structure’.55 In the 2000 electoral programme the reference to the Lebanese system is contained in section four where, again, the emphasis is on ‘the development of political life and the establishment of social justice among all the Lebanese without any discrimination; the building of a stable country’.56 Hizbullah decided that the ‘fight’ could be waged by participation and that its presence in parliament (and from 1998 in municipal councils) and the role that it could play as an opposition party would stimulate Lebanese political life. This new way of conceiving the fight, according to Qassem, was defined as ‘political jihad’.57 At the symbolic level the use of this label was strategic for Hizbullah because it made it possible to maintain solid roots within the religious base and the Islamic welfare network through the use of the label jihad and, at the same time, play the card of its ‘politicisation’. The religious and political ideology of Hizbullah continues to promote the establishment of an Islamic state but the party claims that this is not viable as a political programme because of the confessional and sectarian nature of Lebanon and the opposition of the majority of the Lebanese, both Christian and Muslim.58 However it should be noted that the entry of Hizbullah into parliament did not mean that the party accepted wholesale the concepts of full participation and democracy. In this regard, for example, Hizbullah refused at the time to enter government59 and it rejected participating in political offices that provided for the management of money or too wide decision-making responsibilities. According to the new infitah strategy, during the 1990s the party entered a sort of ‘post-Islamist phase’. The focus was increasingly on the construction of an Islamic social order from below through concrete activities at the grass-roots level rather than an Islamic political order.60 The party widened its presence across Lebanese territory, constructing the so-called ‘society of resistance’ through the consolidation of the system of welfare services offered to the population, which overlapped those of the state. The growth and legitimacy of the party had its apotheosis with the success in the municipal elections of 1998 and then in 2004.61 These victories were built on clearly articulated electoral programmes based on the principles of honesty and reliability to ensure benefits for all, regardless of confession. The activities of the party at the municipal level helped to strengthen its image among the population, marking a clear difference from municipalities operated by other parties.62 Specific Islamic themes that could have kept away sectors of the electorate were set aside but, at the same time, Islam was presented as a ‘guardian’ of poor people (regardless of the confession) and human rights63 and, ultimately, of democracy. This also facilitated Hizbullah’s forging of alliances with a number of parties that had always opposed it.64 55 Ibid., p. 71. Ibid., p. 79. 57 Qassem, op. cit. 58 This appears clearly from the incipits of the 1992 and 1996 electoral programmes. 59 Decision taken only in 2005. 60 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction, op. cit. 61 Harb, La gestion du local, op. cit. 62 Author’s interviews conducted in Tyre in 2010: Ali el-Ezzedine, Association pour le Développement Rurale (1 February 2010), Clementine Laratte, SDTAL (3 March 2010), Yousra el Ghorayeb, UNDP (1 February 2010). 63 Alagha, The Shift In Hizbullah’s Ideology, op. cit., p. 167. 64 Such as the Kataeb Party, Amal, the Lebanese Forces and the Party of Hariri. This choice was justified by the need to maintain a sectarian balance in favour of the Shiites, which otherwise would not be guaranteed. See Hamzeh, Lebanon’s Islamists and Local Politics, op. cit. 56 Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 498 R. Di Peri In order to continue its resistance activity Hizbullah needed a ‘peaceful’ and ‘democratic’ environment. A compromise to bring stability to Lebanon became a necessary condition to continue with resistance. In the words of Mohammed Fneish, a Hizbullah representative in parliament: ‘The entry of Hezbollah in Parliament is a form of resistance at the political level. Members of the “resistance” need to have a political base of support, a political assistance for their armed resistance.’65 At the domestic level the party was not officially and explicitly against the democratic system. It maintained its anti-system party stance as an opposition party within a political system that it did not recognise by using the tactics of ‘system delegitimisation’ in the form of ‘irresponsible opposition’. However, it deviated from Sartori’s classic definition by forming alliances with other parties. These alliances were, generally, limited in time and functional to elections. The sole exception has been the partnership with Aoun’s party (Christian), which persists today. If we look instead at the grass-roots level, Hizbullah adopted the typical instruments of a social movement in order to legitimate its political activities. So in this period, at the domestic level, Hizbullah mixed some stances typical of anti-system social movements and anti-system parties. However, it needs to be noted how Hizbullah is not perceived, nor does it represent itself, as a party in the traditional meaning of the word. The party, in fact, attracts people more because it is considered a symbol of resistance and a bulwark of the faith rather than a classical political party.66 This last point allows us to connect with the other level of Hizbullah’s anti-systemness, namely the international one. Hizbullah’s legitimation as a political actor through the ‘Lebanonisation’ process was likely to have a negative impact on the Shiite base. Although it may seem like a paradox, the need to maintain an anti-system posture at the international level required a transformation of the domestic anti-system attitude: to have a peaceful internal environment is the basis for being able to be anti-system outside. The motivation that drove Hizbullah to ‘Lebanonisation’ was the opportunity to play the role of champion of the resistance against Israel. At the same time, Hizbullah also perceived and presented itself as the champion of the fight against imperialism, the capitalist system and as the defender of the umma. This pan-Arab posture recurs both in the electoral programmes and in Nasrallah’s speeches of the period.67 At the international level the antisystem posture was evident and Hizbullah did not hesitate to use violence to fight against the system that it identified with Israel and its allies, namely the USA. In the 2000 electoral programme, just after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, we can read: ‘[ … ] This will lead to inflicting a “retreat” on the US–Israeli project, which aims at imposing their hegemony on the region and imposing their dictates, forcing its people to grant them concessions.’68 Between 1991 and 1997 Hizbullah did not hide its anti-systemic vein as the increase in military activity demonstrates. In that period the party faced two cycles of violence: ‘Operation Accountability’ in 1993 and ‘Grapes of Wrath’ in 1996. However the unsatisfactory results of the 1996 elections, in spite of the great efforts (and good results) to raise its visibility at a social level, pushed Hizbullah to redefine its strategy of combining domestic and international levels.69 The aim was to stress the commitment of the party as the main 65 Personal communication, Mohamed Fneish, Tyre, 15 February 2010. Karagiannis, op. cit. 67 Hassan Nasrallah, Speech during the Festival of Victory in Bint Jbeil city on 26 May 2000. http://www.english. moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=14178&cid=322; N. Noe (ed.), Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (London: Verso, 2007), pp. 244–255 and pp. 314–317. 68 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, op. cit., p. 76. 69 E. Azani, ‘Hezbollah’s Strategy of “Walking on the Edge”: Between Political Game and Political Violence’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 35:11 (2012), pp. 741–759. 66 Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective 499 guardian of the safety of the residents of south Lebanon against the external aggression and this was achieved, for example, through a concerted propaganda campaign about its role in the Grapes of Wrath agreement and by underlining its contribution to the reconstruction process. Hizbollah sought to validate their effort by framing it as a resistance movement for the benefit of all of the Lebanese people. The party presented the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in 2000 as a victory won through the actions of ‘the Resistance’ and was able to keep its weapons and use them as a tool to continue its international anti-system posture. Thus, in this period the transformation of the domestic anti-system attitude from social movement to party was functional to the continuation of the international anti-systemic one. In order to do this, Hizbullah chose to use politics and social activism domestically, rather than violence. This decision also helped the party deconstruct its image of promoting a ‘culture of death’ and sectarianism, which had characterised the first period of its activity.70 As argued earlier, the decision taken by Hizbullah to enter the Lebanese consociational system – a sui generis democratic system – has allowed the ‘Party of God’ to continue to use violent tools at the international level. Thus, it has been able to exploit to its advantage the ‘democratisation’ of the Lebanese system. 2006–2009 Beginning in 2005, strong political tensions characterised Lebanese political life. The assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri forced Syria, considered responsible for the murder, to withdraw from Lebanon in the wake of widespread popular protests. The elections held in the spring of 2005, shortly after the Hariri assassination and the Syrian withdrawal, saw the strengthening of the anti-Syrian coalition in parliament. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora formed a government of national unity that Hizbullah, for the first time, joined while General Aoun stayed out of it. The government was sorely tested by electoral compromises that saw the emergence of a renewed alliance between Hizbullah and the ‘Aounist’ coalition.71 Siniora faced pressure both at the political and the constitutional level. On the one hand, he had to handle a difficult co-existence between the parliamentary majority, largely anti-Syrian, and President Lahoud who was pro-Syrian. On the other hand, he was frequently in the minority in government and this slowed down and complicated the work of the Council of Ministers. In this political scenario the new Israeli invasion of Lebanon took place in 2006. The war was unpredictable in intensity and duration and contributed, in part, to undermining the image of Hizbullah, even though the war was presented by the party as a ‘divine victory’.72 Many Lebanese accused the party of being responsible for the war and for maintaining a pro-Syrian position.73 Despite the policy of opening up to the other communities, the movement had set limits to its pragmatic approach for fear of losing credibility within the Shiite base, the core of its electorate.74 70 Saouli, op. cit., p. 933. Text of the memorandum of understanding between Hizbullah and Free Patriotic Movement. http://english. moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=4442&fid=25 72 Interview with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah, by Al-Jazeera Beirut Bureau Chief Ghassan Bin-Jiddu, on 20 July 2006. http://www.globalresearch.ca/interview-with-hezbollah-secretary-general-hasannasrallah/2790 73 ICG, Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm, International Crisis Group 48:5 (2005). http://www.crisisgroup. org 74 Author interview with Maronite cleric, Sidon, 31 January 2010. 71 Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 500 R. Di Peri Thus, in order to preserve its role in Lebanese society, both for Shiites and non-Shiites, the Party of God concentrated on its double legitimating strategy. First, the fortification of its pan-Arab Islamic transnational identity, bringing together the fight against the imperialist system (Israel and the USA) and the defence of the Arab world from foreign intrusion, conflating the Lebanese Resistance with the Palestinian one.75 This attitude confirmed Hizbullah as a transnational Islamic movement: Islam provides, as a transnational ideology, a supra-state identity for the people of the region. Second, Hizbullah mounted an impressive propaganda campaign76 in order to promote itself as the defender of Lebanese integrity, which helped the party legitimate itself at the domestic level, mixing Lebanese, Arab and Islamic elements.77 As we have seen, Hizbullah entered government in 2005 and strengthened its welfare provision activities across Lebanon through its work at the municipal level. These two stances clearly emerged in the new Hizbullah political manifesto, published in November 2009, as well as in its 2009 electoral programme.78 After the ‘events of 2008’ (see below) and as a consequence of the 2009 elections, Hizbullah needed to find new legitimation, especially at the domestic level where the increased sectarian polarisation led to a new political crisis in December 2006. This crisis led to a longstanding boycott of institutional activities, causing the de facto paralysis of the Lebanese government and deeply impairing its decision-making process. In the spring of 2008, in a very tense political climate, the decision taken by the Siniora government to remove men close to Hizbullah from some key positions sparked a strong and violent reaction from the ‘Party of God’. The country saw armed battles between the latter and the army and the crisis ended just after the withdrawal of the decision by Siniora against Hizbullah that led to a difficult confessional compromise, the Doha Agreement (21 May 2008). Hizbullah’s new political platform focuses on the international anti-system stance. The manifesto underlines the need to continue to fight ‘the path of US–Israeli oppression and hegemony, with its various dimensions, alliances and direct as well as indirect extensions’. To this aim, the Islamic Resistance has a key role that transcends the domestic dimension: ‘Today, the Resistance has become an international human value, with its model representing a source of inspiration and its achievements a paradigm to be emulated by all those seeking freedom and independence across the world.’79 This anti-system position opposes the globalised system in particular, an expression of the most brutal form of capitalism. In doing this, Hizbullah borrows many formulae and ideas that spring from leftist traditions. We see a ‘new master frame of Hizbullah’ in this period, which is substantiated by the participation of the party in anti-globalisation conferences.80 According to Hizbullah, the Middle East is one of the most relevant arenas in which the USA plays its hegemonic game. ‘American oppression has left our nation and its people with no choice but to resist for a better life, for a more humane future, for brotherly diversity and interdependence, for peace and harmony.’81 It is however interesting to note how, at the domestic level, Hizbullah refrains from openly calling for the elimination of the confessional political system. The 75 H. Nasrallah, ‘Speech at the Divine Victory Rally Held in Beirut’, 22 September 2006. http://www.english. moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=709&cid=321; H. Nasrallah, ‘Speech on REdwan Operation’, 16 June 2008. http://www.english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=4673&cid=319 76 Especially with al-Manar TV coverage of the Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008. 77 Nasrallah, ‘Speech on Redwan’, op. cit. 78 Both documents are available in Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, op. cit. 79 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, op. cit., p. 118. See also Paragraph 1.1. 80 Karagiannis, op. cit. 81 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, op. cit., p. 122. Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective 501 Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 party has clearly decided to use a different language in order to legitimate itself as a party for all Lebanese, ready to form alliances. This stance needs to be seen as a part of a strategy of moderation, along with the new manifesto not mentioning the idea of establishing an Islamic state.82 In other words, Hizbullah is ‘marketing moderation’.83 As in the previous phase, the international anti-system posture is again functional to the domestic one, but with a stronger anti-global perspective. At the same time, at the domestic level, the violent events of 2008 when the party did not hesitate to use its military apparatus, demonstrate that its acceptance of the rules of the game is always conditional on the preservation of its military and strategic interests. Conclusions The hypothesis advanced in this article is that a calculated use of anti-system labels at domestic and international levels allows Hizbullah to maintain its Shiite base and accredit itself and its strategies at national and international levels. Shifting between domestic and international anti-system attitudes also changes its anti-system posture (see Table 1). As has been argued, the particular position of Hizbullah in the regional and international context has pushed the party to develop a particular form of anti-system strategy, adapted to the different ‘systems’ it plays against. The adaptive policy of Hizbullah worked until the Lebanese system attained credibility and legitimacy. As we have seen, anti-system politics were strong and evident (both at domestic and international level) in the first phase (1985–1990), when the Lebanese system was weak. During that phase the party used mainly rhetorical, religious tools and Jihad to fight against the Lebanese political system and the ‘world-system’ as a whole, adopting a top-down approach. At that time a social movement posture prevailed. In the second stage (1991–2005) the Lebanese state gained increased legitimacy and the process of reconstruction markedly improved the economy. In that phase, the antisystem position of Hizbullah was less overt at the domestic level and was functional to the international one. The decision to create a ‘society of resistance’ through an Islamic network of services helped Hizbullah to preserve the religious dimension but with a more nuanced and bottom-up approach. At the international level the anti-systemness was clear and it was part of the strategy of legitimation of the party at the domestic level as well. The tools used were socio-political at the domestic level and violent at the external one. Finally, in the last phase, new weaknesses in the Lebanese system have once again brought into the open the anti-systemic nature of the party at the domestic level and, in 2009, the party sought a new internal legitimation through a new political manifesto among other things. If the institutionalisation of Hizbullah and its participation in the Lebanese political system have rendered the party ‘accountable’, making it less sensitive to domestic antisystemic posture, we have seen how, at the same time, this has not made Hizbullah immune to it, especially at the international level. This tactical repositioning at the two levels provides an original lens through which the relationship between Islamic actors and democracy can be analysed, given the often transnational nature of many Islamist movements and parties. 82 83 The Manifesto is reported in Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, op. cit. L. Khatib, ‘Hizbullah’s Political Strategy’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 53:2 (2011), pp. 61–76. R. Di Peri Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 502 Table 1. Hizbullah as anti-system actor (1985–2009). 1985–1990 1991–2005 2006–2009 Anti-systemic levels Domestic External Anti-system posture Anti-system social movement Position against the system Rejecting Lebanese confessional system: creation of an Islamic state Strategy and tools adopted Symbolic violence (indirect) Lebanese state Rejecting the ‘worldsystem’, the Western neocolonial system (USA, France and Israel) Violence Weak Domestic External Domestic External Mix of social anti-system social movement and anti- system party Entering Lebanese political system as opposition party (parliament and municipal councils) Anti-system social movement Anti-system party Anti-system social movement Rejecting the ‘worldsystem’, the Western neo-colonial order of which Israel is the avant-garde Entering government Anti-globalisation stance. Fight against USA and its representatives, namely Israel Political; symbolic violence (refusal to consign weapons) Violence Political tools and ‘strategic’ violence Violence Gains legitimacy Loses legitimacy Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective 503 Acknowledgements Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Torino] at 12:57 17 February 2015 This article is the result of fieldwork carried out in Lebanon between 2010 and 2012 in the frame of a research project of the Department of Culture, Politics and Society focused on democracy and democratisation. The author would like to thank Professor Francesco Cavatorta, Dr Luca Ozzano and the anonymous referees for comments on early drafts. The author’s gratitude is also for Professor Alfio Mastropaolo for his inspiring work. Notes on contributor Rosita Di Peri is Assistant Professor in Political Science and International Relations at the Department of Culture, Politics and Society of the University of Turin. She is author of the book The Contemporary Lebanon. History, Politics and Society (Roma: Carocci, 2009, in Italian); ‘The Lebanon and Lebanon Still Looking … The Lebanese Consociativism at the Test of the Arab Spring’ in S. Panebianco and R. Rossi (eds) Winds of Democratic Change in the Mediterranean: Processes, Actors, and Possible Outcomes (Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2012); and of the chapter ‘Perceive the Democracy in Migration: The Case of Moroccans in Piedmont’, in P. Seeberg and Z. Eyadat (eds) Migration, Security, and Citizenship in the Middle East. New Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013).