Constitutional Economics

This dissertation addresses a debate about the proper relationship between democratic theory and institutions. The debate has been waged between two rival approaches: on the one side is an aggregative and economic theory of democracy, known as constitutional economics, and on the other side is deliberative democracy. The two sides endorse starkly different positions on the issue of what makes a democracy legitimate and stable within an institutional setting. Constitutional economists model political agents in the same way that neoclassical economists model economic agents, that is, as self-regarding, rational maximizers; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and stability depend on the extent to which the design of institutional rules and practices maximize individual utility by promoting efficient schemes of collective choice. Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, understand political agents as communicative reason-giving subjects who justify their preferences and positions on issues that jointly affect them in a process of consensus-directed discourse, or deliberation; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and order depend on the degree to which institutional norms and practices promote deliberation and draw upon deliberated public judgment. I argue that despite the numerous incompatibilities between constitutional economics and deliberative democracy—which amount to a 'deep divide'—an opportunity to produce a genuine synthesis of the two approaches arises inasmuch as it is possible to overcome several points of opposition in their separate research programmes. The central thesis of the dissertation is that it is possible to construct a bridge spanning the divide between constitutional economists and deliberative democrats, and that Dewey and Bentley's transactional view can facilitate this bridge-building project. Pursuant to this end, the points of opposition between the v research programmes are mediated by way of five concepts which, on balance, favor deliberative democracy and its feasible institutionalization. In charting a transactional middle way between the two programmes, deliberative institutional designers should be empowered to achieve two objectives: (i) to integrate deliberative practices into new and existing democratic institutions and (ii) to heed the critical insights and caveats of constitutional economists, who have identified genuine limitations to realizing the deliberative ideal in modern constitutional democracies.

"Le thème dominant en droit constitutionnel comparé des rapports entre « Constitution » et « économie » dans les démocraties libérales est celui de la neutralité de la Constitution, plus précisément de la neutralité des juges constitutionnels, à l’égard des politiques économiques dont la responsabilité principale est ainsi reconnue au Parlement et au gouvernement. La neutralité de la Constitution s’entend au sens de l’ « ouverture » de la Constitution à différents choix de politiques économiques.
  "

... POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAW AND ... By changing the name of his research programme to constitutional political economy Buchanan distanced himself from those parts of the public choice literature that remained too close to the traditional welfare economics approach. ...

Consequences of the constitutional adjudication and an impact of the constitutional system on the economy, when the court seems to be a political actor, could be comprised in a term
“constitutional economic adjudication” or a “constitutional economic judicial review.” The constitutional economic adjudication is a complex issue, which could be examined from the legal, economic as well as political perspectives. This research does not assess the topic from any
particular viewpoint and the scope of the paper would not suggest the detailed scrutiny or the in-depth constitutional analysis of the case-law. The general tool of this study is a comparative method of analysis. American constitutional development as well as politics and history of
judicial review in the United States offers significant pattern for the study of the current constitutional and judicial developments in Georgia as well as the other Post-Soviet countries in transition.
The current study is dedicated to examine the role of the Georgian Constitutional Court, which is a special institution created to safeguard the basic human rights established by the Constitution of Georgia. The aim of this research is to derive general observations from the inter-disciplinary research about the constitution and economy, the role of the judge, judicial power and activism related to the economic issues and policy implications, summed up in the concluding observations. It is an attempt to facilitate future discussions and a more in-depth study about this topic.

available on the web-site of the Carnegie Research Fellowship Program: http://www.nceeer.org/Programs/Carnegie/Reports/Sekhniashvili_final_report.pdf

Esta contribución a la obra colectiva "Constitucionalizando la globalización", analiza el verdadero alcance del concepto Economía Social de Mercado, incorporado e institucionalizado en el Tratado de la Unión Europea como un principio vertebrador de su constitución económica.

Когда передовые страны соревновались в улучшении делового климата Израиль сильно отстал. Однако сегодня, когда те же страны соревнуются в ухудшении его, Израиль снова имеет неплохие шансы отстать. Могущественная бюрократия, чрезмерно активный суд и прокуратура, принудительная социальная «солидарность» и «исправляющая» дискриминация-все это наносит и будет наносить ущерб бизнесу. В то же время есть обоснованные надежды на то, что в долгосрочной перспективе и относительно других развитых стран ситуация в Израиле значимо улучшится.

У монографії розглянуто питання конституційно-правового регулювання економічної системи України. Визначено особливості побудови економічної системи держави на основі системи принципів правової держави. Розроблено пропозиції з вдосконалення конституційно-правового регулювання выдносин власності як основи економічної системи держави. Висвітлено основні положення конституційної теорії і практики підприємницької діяльності як детермінанти ефективного функціонування економічної системи. Розкрито зміст концепції конституційної економіки в контексті сучасного економічного розвитку України.
Для науковців, викладачів, аспірантів, студентів юридичних і економічних спеціальностей вищих навчальних закладів, юристів-практиків, працівників органів державної влади і місцевого самоврядування, всіх тих, хто цікавиться проблематикою конституційно-правового регулювання економічної системи країни.

Il saggio prende le mosse dalla concezione dello Stato nel pensiero degli economisti classici per valutare se e come l'applicazione del principio  di sussidiarietà insieme a quelli di autonomia, responsabilità e solidarietà possano contrastare i malfunzionamenti dello Stato in Italia addebitati sovente all'esigenza di una revisione della legge costituzionale piuttosto che a una cattiva politica presente nella legislazione ordinaria. Alcune proposte di riforma  concludono il lavoro.

Even though much effort has been undertaken in studying the institutional dynamics, most analysis is on representation, structuring and separation of democratic institutions. Often it is argued that analyzing institutions has to challenge their lack of efficiency but usually, this kind of analysis simplifies the framework as it stops where the institutions dramatically affect the participant actors’ interests. This paper explores the prerequisites of effective institutions while keeping their legitimacy by representing the interests of citizens. First, I will argue that the legitimacy of constitutional contract - as the primary institutional level where the interests are organized - affects the institutional performance of the subsequent institutional levels. Then, I will highlight that ability of focusing on the institutional dynamics and efficiency from the constitutional moment point of view is a compulsive investigation method to analyze the democratization in Romania.

Keywords: institutions, constitutional choice, institutional efficiency, post-constitutional level

Sayın Prof. Dr. Coşkun Can Aktan ömrünün kırk yıla yakın bir bölümünü kurallar ve kurumların önemi üzerine çalışarak harcamış bir bilim insanıdır.  Sosyal bilimlerin bir çok alanına katkılar sağlamış, onlarca esere imza atmıştır. Ayrıca, lisans ve lisansüstü öğrencilerinin yanı sıra nice genç bilim insanlarının da yetişmesinde büyük emekleri olmuştur.

Sayın Aktan'ın literatüre en önemli katkılarından biri Türkiye'de hukuk ve iktisat yaklaşımının ve bu yaklaşım içerisinde şekillenen anayasal iktisat, kurumsal iktisat, regülasyon iktisadı, mülkiyet hakları iktisadı, işlem maliyetleri iktisadı gibi disiplinlerin tanınmasında öncü olmasıdır. Bütün bu yaklaşımların Türkiye için değeri paha biçilemezdir.

Bu kitap içerisinde Sayın Aktan ile anayasal iktisat, kurumsal iktisat, hukuk ve iktisat ile ekonomik anayasa konuları üzerine gerçekleştirilmiş muhtelif söyleşilerimiz yer almaktadır.

Ülkemizde hukuk ve iktisat yaklaşımı, hukukun iktisadi analizi, anayasal iktisat, kurumsal iktisat ve saire alanlarındaki çalışmaların maalesef oldukça sınırlı olması gerçeği karşısında Sayın Aktan ile ger-çekleştirdiğimiz söyleşilerin literatüre ilave bir katkı sağlamasını temenni ediyorum.

Anayasal İktisat Teorisi devletin güç ve yetkilerinin nasıl sınırlandırılabileceğini ve nasıl sınırlandırılması gerektiğini incelemektedir. Bu kapsamda Anayasal iktisatçılar tarafından, hazırlanacak olan ekonomik anayasa ile devletin vergilendirme yetkisinin belli bir kısmının yerel yönetimlere devredilmesi gerektiği savunulmaktadır. Çalışma, üniter ve federal yapılı devletlerde vergilendirme yetkisinin yerel yönetimlere devrini ve yerel mali özerklik olgusunu olumlu ve olumsuz yönleriyle objektif bir bakış açısıyla incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

The constitutional economics theory examines how government's power and authority could be limited and how should be limited. In this context, through the instrument of economic constitution, it is argued by constitutional economists that, a certain part of government's tax-raising power should be transferred to local governments. This study aims to analyse the transfer of governments' tax-raising powers to local governments in unitary and federal states and to research the local fiscal autonomy phenomenon in its positive and negative aspects from an objective point of view.

Indonesia’s oil and gas governance has been specified in certain laws. The first oil and gas law was Emergency Law No. 44 of 1960. This law was changed to Law No. 8 of 1971 which gave a dual function, namely to Pertamina National Oil Company (NOC), as an operator and regulator. Meanwhile, the function of policy making was carried out by the government. These two functions are known as “two feet.” Furthermore, with the promulgation of the Oil and Gas Law No. 22 of 2001, there was a separation of regulatory functions by Pertamina and giving them to state institutions known as BP Migas. The agency was later converted into two different institutions, SKK Migas for regulating upstream oil and gas and BPH Migas for downstream regulation. These functions are known as ‘three feet’. However, the Oil and Gas Law No. 22 of 2001 received a lot of criticism, because this law was considered too liberal and put Pertamina as a NOC to compete openly with the International Oil Company (IOC) which was considered to have more good advantages in technology, capital, and risk management. The existing Oil and Gas Law has caused prolonged stagnation in the national oil and gas industry, and reduced the performance of this strategic industry in terms of lifting, exploration, exploitation and oil production. This study is intended to provide a description regarding the various design concepts of oil and gas law governance by referring to the oil and gas management and performance models in various countries and IOC. Furthermore, this study empirically offers a comparison of the NOC model in managing oil and gas, and the advantages and disadvantages of institutional selection over the oil and gas administration

Nella logica della Costituzione, il credito è un’attività imprenditoriale di rilievo pubblico funzionale al lavoro, al sistema produttivo, alla crescita e all'inclusione economica e sociale. Alla luce di tale considerazione, il contributo – dopo aver indagato la dimensione assiologica dell’art. 47 Cost. – si sofferma su alcune questioni che riguardano l'attività creditizia e intercettano il tema dell'effettività della democrazia economica: l’accessibilità del credito e il controllo giurisdizionale sul merito creditizio; l'accountability degli istituti bancari; la definizione di una destinazione costituzionalmente privilegiata del risparmio; e, infine, il rapporto tra risparmio, credito e territorio.

We provide a short introduction into the concept of Constitutional Economics. This approach is a subfield within Public Choice Theory. Public Choice and Constitutional Economics are closely related to the name of James Buchanan who, together with his colleagues, initiated Public Choice Theory in the 1950’s and Constitutional Economics in the 1980’s. The latter emphasizes the choice of these rules, e.g. the constitutional framework of a society that structures social order. The choice of rules is modeled as acts of exchange in the political process.


Резюме:
Накратко е представена концепцията на конституционната икономика, която може да се разглежда като подобласт на теорията на обществения избор. Общественият избор и конституционната икономика са тясно свързани с името на Джеймс Бюкянън, който заедно със свои съавтори през 50-те години на миналия век поставя началото на теорията на обществения избор, а през 80-те години – и на конституционната икономика. При последната фокусът е върху избора на правилата, например конституционната рамка на обществото, която структурира социалния ред. Изборът на правила се моделира под формата на актове на размяна в политическия процес.

No weakening, but rather an expansion, of statehood can be observed in the contemporary world. This does not, on the other hand, imply that extensive forms of constitutional ordering do not exist outside the realm of states. Instead, the evolution of world society has been characterized by a protracted dual movement where the expansion and densification of statehood and autonomous forms of transnational ordering gradually emerged in a mutually constitutive fashion. One implication of this is that neither the concept of the state nor the concept of nonstate transnational entities is adequately capable of delineating the object of constitutional analysis. Instead, the concept of normative orders has been introduced as an overarching category capable of identifying the contexts within which constitutional ordering emerges.
Subsequently, a distinction between the internal and external dimensions of the law of normative orders has been introduced, specifying them as respectively oriented towards establishing internal condensation of a given normative order and external compatibility between different normative orders. With this background, a framework for the analysis of constitutional frameworks of normative orders is developed. The central element is a distinction among three dimensions: First, a constitution implies a coupling between a constitutional object, in the form of a hierarchical organization of a given normative order capable of reproducing an autonomous source of authority, and a concordant legal framework. Second, constitutionalization implies a coupling between an internal reconstruction of an external constitutional subject within the constitutional object, and the register of legal rights, establishing a framework for exchanges between the constitutional object and the wider world as represented by the constitutional subject. Third, constitutionalism denotes the institutionalization of a double function, in the form of a principle-based and legally fortified striving toward universal inclusion, providing a sense of direction in time through an articulated form of constitutional consciousness.
The insights developed are briefly illustrated by the case of the global Fairtrade Certification System.

"Resumen: Este artículo trata de delimitar el contenido del concepto de Constitución económica aplicado a la Unión Europea. Una expresión que no es nueva, que ha recuperado su vigencia en los doctrinales actuales pero que es escurridizo y que es objeto de apropiación por parte de unos y otros, sin escapar a una compleja y constante evolución. Para ello se analizarán los conceptos de Constitución y Constitución económica aplicados a la realidad de la Unión Europea, todo ello desde una óptica ordoliberal. También se estudiará la inclusión de la regla de oro en el constitucionalismo europeo antes de destacar las principales reformas económicas que se han producido en el seno de la Unión. Finalmente, se hará hincapié en la necesidad de que los poderes públicos se mantengan fieles a los fundamentos de la Constitución económica europea.

Palabras clave: Constitución económica, ordoliberalismo, regla de oro.

Abstract: This article attempts to define the content of the concept of economic Constitution applied to the European Union. An expression that is not new, it has regained its relevance in the current doctrinal debates but is elusive and has become object of appropriation by each other, without escaping from a complex and constantly evolution process. In order to do so, this paper will analyze the concepts of Constitution and economic constitution applied to the reality of the European Union, taking into account an ordoliberal perspective. It will also be considered the inclusion of the “golden rule” in European constitutionalism before highlighting major economic reforms that have taken place within the Union. Finally, we will emphasize the need for public authorities remain faithful to the fundamentals of the European economic constitution.

Key words: Economic constitution, ordoliberalism, golden rule."

Especially for Europe, a growing socio-economic divide can be observed, both between nations and within the nations themselves. In light of this division, and of Europe’s differing economic cultures, the question must be asked as to whether – and if so, how – a European form of Ordnungspolitik can even be constructed, and what this regulatory, ‘ordoliberal’ concept might mean for the development of European society. Our argument in the following paper is as follows: Ordoliberalism – elaborated here with reference to constitutional political economy and Amartya Sen’s capability approach – supplies a normative, regulatory organizational template for a modern Europe, one which legitimizes the relevance of a genuinely European social policy. The goal here – as in what is perhaps Walter Eucken’s most widely quoted remark – is to create a „funktionsfähigen und menschenwürdigen Ordnung der Wirtschaft, der Gesellschaft, des Rechtes und des Staates“ (Eucken 1940/1989: 239). This goal is key to European development, and should not be lost sight of.
However, for such an order to be realized, two problems must first be solved. Firstly, there is the problem, also of central importance to the Freiburg School, of the restriction of power. Secondly, an observation from constitutional political economy, namely that the members of a polity must be able to freely decide upon their shared social arrangements, and in such a way that they agree upon a societal order that is in the interests of all the individuals involved. Whereas Eucken’s ordoliberal concept primarily elaborates upon the necessity of so-called ‘negative civil liberties’ (referring, essentially, to rights of protection against state intervention, that is, the absence of force), Amartya Sen in particular systematically supplements these observations – albeit by no means as a direct reaction to Eucken – by positing the genuine validity of ‘positive civil liberties’ (that is, material and social rights which enable every citizen to exercise their civil liberties). Although Eucken’s work can be drawn on for the construction of a positive conception of freedom – explicitly noting as he does that necessary for the functionality of an economic order are both the formation of negative civil liberties, or rights of protection, and the realization of positive civil liberties, or genuine, material rights of performance – in our opinion, the focus of Eucken’s research (a result, chiefly, of exposure to the Weimar Republic and National Socialism) is the question of power, and thus the establishment of protective rights. For this reason, too, we shall also sketch out here Alexander Rüstow’s concept of Vitalpolitik (‘organic policy’), which while discussing positive civil liberties might also be able to offer inspiration for the creation of a “highly competitive social market economy” (Art. 3(3) of the EU Treaty) in the European Union.
This paper is structured as follows: First, we sketch out the traditional definition of the objectives of Walter Eucken’s Freiburg School (Section 2). Subsequently, in Section 3, the potential of a normative amendment to the above, revolving around citizens’ ability to give voluntary consent, will be discussed from the perspective of constitutional political economy. However, societal circumstances cannot be legitimized solely by fundamentally positive functional characteristics such as the efficient regulation of competition; legitimation derives instead from the actual consent of the individuals involved. As such, the rules of a society and the resulting patterns of the distribution of goods must be the object of economic and ordopolitical analysis, something which Alexander Rüstow has already advocated in his calls for Vitalpolitik (Section 4). One concept which meets the Freiburg School’s traditional demands for sociopolitical inclusion while simultaneously accounting for the affected individuals’ ability to consent is Amartya Sen’s capability approach (Section 5). Finally, we discuss the observations sketched out here in the context of a modern European economic framework, demonstrating that the EU’s Cohesion Policy can be considered a kind of Vitalpolitik of nations, with the goals of anchoring the concept of inclusion on a European level, and realizing a European social market economy in line with the Freiburg School’s ordoliberalism (Section 6). The paper closes with a brief summary (Section 7).

El objeto de ensayo es desbancar a la narrativa dominante acerca de la estructura de nuestro ordenamiento constitucional económico asociada a la supuesta vigencia de un principio de subsidiariedad del Estado. Para ello, se complementa el análisis crítico ya realizado a la dogmática constitucional del Estado empresario con una reinterpretación de las cláusulas sobre autonomía de los grupos intermedios y de servicialidad del Estado, sustentada en criterios exegéticos, valorativos y vinculados a nuestra reciente praxis constitucional. De este modo, el ensayo busca articular una com- prensión más atractiva de nuestro régimen constitucional económico vigente que la arraigada en el inconsciente colectivo en torno al imaginario de la subsidiariedad, atendidas sus virtudes explicativas y compromisos valorativos.

Este artículo pretende analizar la operatividad de las cláusulas de
escape que permiten la suspensión temporal de las reglas de estabilidad presupuestaria en la Unión y España, enmarcando éstas en el contexto normativo del gobierno económico europeo. Para ello se estudiarán los mecanismos que acogen tal posibilidad ante la existencia de situaciones de crisis extraordinarias, como la que ya se ha dado
en Europa como consecuencia de la expansión del Covid-19.

Sommario: 1. Tensioni oggettive e pressioni sovranazionali sulle Costituzioni finanziarie e monetarie degli Stati.-2. L'impatto del modello Maastricht sulle Costituzioni nazionali.-3. Il Regno Unito e l'euro: opting out.-4. La Costituzione finanziaria e monetaria inglese nella prospettiva europea: working in.-5. Il futuro presente: la convergenza è più forte delle dissonanze? 1.-Bilancio e moneta costituiscono il nucleo atomico delle Costituzioni economiche. Le funzioni monetaria e finanziaria possono essere definite secondo diversi punti di vista, ma hanno un'importanza cruciale, perché chi controlla bilancio e moneta controlla i presupposti economici delle politiche, e questo principio vale per tutte le entità chiamate Stato (Wildavsky, 1986), ed anche per quelle che si accingono a sostituirle, o che già lo stanno facendo. Condizionare bilancio e moneta significa condizionare il core della sovranità, e nel terzo millennio la transizione di questi poteri dagli Stati verso le entità sovranazionali ha subito una accelerazione irreversibile, senza "se" e senza "ma". In particolare nell'area dell'Unione europea i processi politici e i processi di policy making non sono più coincidenti al livello degli Stati nazionali, che continuano a conoscere i primi, mentre l'elaborazione delle politiche pubbliche, la definizione delle strategie, le scelte macroeconomiche di fondo appartengono sempre più al livello transnazionale. In argomento vi è abbastanza chiarezza negli studi politologici (Fabbrini, 2002), e non sempre altrettanta in quelli giuspubblicistici. In una recente, pregevole pubblicazione sulla crisi dello Stato (Labriola, 2003a), non vi è alcun saggio specificamente dedicato alla finanza pubblica, e, fatta eccezione per alcune importantissime indicazioni (Ortino, 2003), solo uno sulla moneta, o meglio solo sull'aspetto dell'indipendenza delle Banche centrali in rapporto al principio democratico. In pratica, tra le varie forme della crisi esaminate, si è un po' trascurata, forse dandone per presupposte le configurazioni, la crisi fiscale dello Stato (Di Plinio, 1998); a chi scrive pare, sommessamente, che il quadro dovrebbe essere maggiormente approfondito con indagini sempre più accurate del ruolo che la disciplina delle grandezze macroeconomiche svolge nell'interpretazione costituzionale, come da tempo ha suggerito una magistrale dottrina (Bognetti, 1995).

After the Mortgage-debt Financial Crisis and the European Debt Crisis, some remarkable and significant changes can be identified in public finances. In connection with this, new elements were incorporated into constitutions. The main hypothesis can be formulated as, is there any correlation between the constitutional provisions (or other relevant law sources) and the performance of the economy (GDP growth), sound and sustainable fiscal policy (budgeting, government debt, taxation, audit), furthermore monetary policy (price and exchange rate stability) and national assets. The paper will analyse and compare the 29 NISPAcee countries’ constitutional provisions. The research is based on legal and economic methodology with quantitative approach.

Resumen: El artículo analiza las cláusulas económicas de la Constitución de la República Dominicana de 2010. Esas cláusulas establecen un sistema de economía social de mercado, según el cual la economía debe basarse en el mecanismo del mercado, a pesar de que el Estado tiene la potestad de intervenir, para adoptar el marco institucional necesario para el correcto funcionamiento del mecanismo del mercado, así como para promover la igualdad de oportunidades. Particularmente la Constitución reconoce la libertad económica, como un derecho subjetivo que asegura el emprendimiento individual bajo autonomía privada.
Palabras clave: cláusulas económicas de la Constitución, Derecho Constitucional en República Dominicana, economía social de mercado, libertad económica.
Abstract: The article analyzes the economic clauses of the 2010 Dominic Republic Constitution. Those clauses establish a social market economy system, according to which the economy should be based on the market mechanism, even though the Government has the authority to intervene, in order to adopt the institutional framework needed by the market mechanism, but also, to promote equality of opportunities. Particularly the Constitution recognizes the economic freedom, as a subjective right that assures the individual entrepreneurship under private autonomy.
Keywords: economic clauses of the Constitutional, Dominican Republic Constitutional Law, social market economy, economic freedom

O presente trabalho se debruça sobre o estudo das relações entre Estado e economia através do direito, especialmente o direito constitucional. Parte do surgimento das relações entre direito constitucional e economia ao redor do mundo para, em seguida, examinar como estes sistemas sociais se relacionam na história brasileira e, principalmente, através da Constituição de 1988. Em seguida, promove uma análise crítica destes tipos de relação a partir da Escola Austríaca de Economia, tradição de pensamento que vem ganhando força no Brasil. Conclui pela possibilidade da existência de um desenvolvimento econômico e social não dirigido pelo Estado.

Does economic growth create democracy, as suggested by the proposition known as the Lipset hypothesis? According to this paper, for the Lipset hypothesis to be valid, it is sufficient for an ideological and a technological condition to be fulfilled. The ideological condition is that the political agenda-setting ideology should be classical liberalism, which can be characterized as combining an aversion towards democracy with a positive assessment of economic and civil liberties. The technological condition is that the country in question should be advanced enough in the technological sense, because in such a country there is no economic growth without innovation maintained by a free market for ideas. Logit regressions run with panel data show that in the period up until the early 20th century a higher per capita income increases the probability of a democratic regime change, but afterwards it does not. The explanation is that before the early 20th century the two conditions were met, but they were not met in those countries that were about to become democratic after the first two decades of the 20th century.

Transformacja z definicji swojej jest zmianą. Postrzegając i opisując tę zmianę, można zadawać sobie kolejno pytania-co było przyczyną tej zmiany? Czy była to zmiana ilościowa czy jakościowa? Jeśli ilościowa-to czy w kierunku malejącym czy rosnącym? Jeśli jakościowa-to czy zmiana dotyczyła przypadłości czy też istoty rzeczy? W końcu, czy była to zmiana na lepsze, sugerująca etap wzrostu w cyklu rozwoju, czy też zmiana na gorsze-będąca oznaką regresu albo kryzysu we wspomnianym procesie? Chociaż, aby móc to stwierdzić, niezbędna jest perspektywa czasu i odpowiedź na jeszcze jedno, może najważniejsze pytanie-co było celem owej zmiany? To przez pryzmat celu będziemy oceniali racjonalność zmiany oraz efektywność jej przeprowadzenia, tzn. czy ów cel był dobry sensu largo i czy został osiągnięty. Nie inaczej należy podejść do transformacji porządku konstytucyjnego. Biorąc pod uwagę specyfikę zmiany ustroju jest to zawsze tzw. zmiana jakościowa. Jednakże wszystkie pozostałe pytania-przyczyna i cel? Istota czy przypadłości? Wzrost czy regres?-pozostają aktualne. Odpowiedź na nie stanowi warunek sine qua non wyjścia poza pracę opisową, w próbie wyciągnięcia wniosków, które mogą znaleźć zastosowanie także w innych przypadkach. Dlaczego tak ważne jest spojrzenie wstecz i zrozumienie przeszłych wydarzeń? Syntetycznej odpowiedzi udzielił George Santayana trafnie stwierdzając, że "ci, którzy nie pamiętają o historii, są skazani na jej powtarzanie".

Al calor de la constitucionalización de la estabilidad presupuestaria y su teorización, se ha ido configurando una serie de mecanismos ajenos a la misma que tienden a reforzar sus objetivos desde parámetros institucionales de diferente calado. La utilización de instrumentos de democracia semidirecta para la determinación de las políticas fiscales, el establecimiento de fondos de reserva o la creación de órganos independientes de control presupuestario con poder de veto sobre el Parlamento constituyen algunos de los elementos clave de una nueva concepción de la constitución económica que hunde sus raíces en la experiencia norteamericana y en las contribuciones académicas de la llamada economía constitucional.

Questo lavoro indica i limiti della sostanziale estensione a tutti i cittadini dell'uso semi-gratuito delle prestazioni sanitarie che contradice i principi di solidarietà e sussidiarietà oltre che i vincoli di bilancio. The law 833/1978 has been inefficiently and unfairly applied producing three failures in the long run objectives of sanitary assistance: accessibility, quality and financial sustainability. La legge 833 del 1978 è stata applicata in modo inefficiente ed iniquo dando luogo a tre fallimenti in altrettanti obiettivi di lungo periodo dell'assistenza sanitaria: l'accessibilità, la qualità e la sostenibilità finanziaria.

This essay deals with the limits of the generalization towards all the citizens of quasi-free health services. This policy has denied the principles of solidarity, subsidiarity and the budget constraints. The law 833/1978 has been inefficiently and unfairly applied producing three failures in the long run objectives of health assistance: accessibility, quality and financial sustainability.

Although neoclassical environmental economics provides deeper insights into the study of environmental issues, the approach has had only a modest impact on shaping environmental policy. Theoretical and abstract neoclassical models often fail to give adequate policy advice on the precise instrumental and institutional political design. Among social scientists many thoughts have been given to the fact that the choice of any individual is constrained by social institutions evolved over time and space. Recognizing the small importance environmental economists give to social institutions and the “rules of the game” when analysing environmental problems, the purpose of this paper is to highlight the link between economy, ecology, and society. The research program of ecological economics integrates both economic and ecological models. By applying the framework of constitutional economics (in line with James Buchanan) the study of ecological economics is broaden twofold. First, a constitutional ecological economics approach is capable to legitimize environmental action normatively. Second, a constitutional ecological economics approach is suitable to compare the existing institutional arrangement to alternative rule settings.

This paper analyzes the constitutional change in Africa by focusing on the current
phenomenon of the change in the presidential term limits. The analysis covers the period 1990 -
2010 for a set of 32 countries. Two cases are analyzed: the attempt to change and success. The
results obtained with the logit models show that individual factors related to the personality of
the President, the quality of the political system, socio-cultural and economics factors are the
main factors explaining the will of amending Article and success. The article also shows that in
some parts of Africa, the legal origin is an obstacle to constitutional change. Finally, when the
opposition is not polarized, it is an obstacle to change, while it serves the interests of the
dominant political group wishing to change when it is weak and highly fragmented.

Despite much theoretical discussion the enforceability of constitutional constraints, the question has received little empirical attention. After discussing the theoretical arguments for and against the proposition that constitutions are capable of protecting individual liberty against encroachment by the state, I use the Reporters without Borders index of press freedom and a content analysis of national constitutions to ask whether constitutions protect freedom. I find that, controlling for a number of other factors, constitutional prohibition of censorship is correlated with greater press freedom, and that constitutions seem to be most effective at times when liberty is most at risk. Vague constitutional guarantees of press freedom, on the other hand, seem to have little effect. While the results indicate that parchment does matter, constitutions should not be seen as binding rules which preclude particular actions by government, but as constraints which reduce the likelihood of certain political outcomes. The results reveal both the strengths and limitations of the constitutionalist project of James M. Buchanan and other pubic choice scholars.

In the middle of the 20th century, Joseph Schumpeter described the process of technological innovation “that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (2006, p. 83). This phenomenon makes market competition a process in which nobody ever can be sure of its position, and as a result: “The businessman feels himself to be in a competitive situation even if he is alone in his field” (Schumpeter, 2006, p. 85). The changes that the great economist had observed already in the inter-war Europe accelerated in the following decades until they led to the emergence of the modern digital economy.
The degrees of market concentration reached nowadays as consequence of digital technologies like Internet commerce are described as “consolidation beyond anything we have ever seen in the physical world” (Lynn, 2010, p. 54). In result of economic effects, network externalities or increasing returns to scale, many vital areas of modern life became dominated by a single tech company: Facebook, Google, Netflix. Facing the digital age consequences, some antitrust experts predict the “end of competition as we know it” (Stucke, Ezrachi, 2016, p. 203). One of the precursors of economic analysis of law even declared: “antitrust is dead” (M-Lex Report, 2017, p. 11).

Una delle conclusioni principali della odierna teoria del benessere è che non c'è differenza tra interessi privati e interessi pubblici, purché prevalga la concorrenza. Questo saggio prende le mosse dai malfunzionamenti dello Stato in Italia per discutere alcune proposte di riforma soprattutto con riferimento al decentramento fiscale, alla privatizzazione e alla sicurezza sociale.

Legal philosophers like Montesquieu, Hegel and Tocqueville have argued that lay participation in judicial decision-making would have benefits reaching far beyond the realm of the legal system narrowly understood. From an economic point of view, lay participation in judicial decision-making can be interpreted as a renunciation of an additional division of labor, which is expected to cause foregone benefits in terms of the costs as well as the quality of judicial decision-making. In order to be justified, these foregone benefits need to be overcompensated by other – actually realized – benefits of at least the same magnitude. This paper discusses pros and cons of lay participation, presents a new database and tests some of the theoretically derived hypotheses empirically. The effects of lay participation on the judicial system, a number of governance variables but also on economic performance indicators are rather modest. A proxy representing historic experiences with any kind of lay ...

What are the factors driving the choice of the form of government? To address this question, the paper presents a theoretical model of the choice between a parliamentarian and presidential system. So far, it has been argued that higher income inequality makes a parliamentarian system less likely. In this article, it is argued that the likelihood of a parliamentarian system changes with the level of income inequality, but the direction of that change depends on the composition of the constitutional assembly. This finnding casts doubts on models which are purely focusing on income inequality.

This essay considers the implications of the Seasteading Institute upon notions of law and sovereignty and argues that seasteading could make possible the implementation or ordering of polycentric legal systems while providing evidence for the viability of private-property anarchism or anarchocapitalism, at least in their nascent forms.  This essay follows in the wake of Edward P. Stringham’s edition Anarchy and the Law and treats seasteading and polycentric law as concrete realities that lend credence to certain anarchist theories.  Polycentric law in particular allows for institutional diversity that enables a multiplicity of rules to coexist and even compete in the open market as well as the marketplace of ideas.