Antitrust (Law)

Antitrust litigation against the NCAA has focused on its members' collusive restraint on athlete compensation at levels below marginal revenue product. The recent O'Bannon v. NCAA and In Re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation have both prescribed a relevant market for "college education" where schools compete for athlete labor by offering tuition and fee or cost-of-attendance offsets. This article argues that this unitary definition conflates two separate products, academic education and athletic participation, that NCAA members offer as a bundled tie. The NCAA has mandated purchase of the tied product, academic education, as a prerequisite for access to intercollegiate athletics participation, the tying product. Paradoxically, the NCAA has then argued that this bundled tie, which this article argues violates the Supreme Court's three-pronged 'quasi' per-se rule prohibiting tying arrangements, represents a claimed 'pro-competitive justification' by integrating athletics and academics. This article offers evidence that this tying arrangement serves no legitimate pro-competitive purpose under the NCAA model of amateurism. Rather, it extracts consumer surplus, enhances dominant cartel members' market power, and forecloses competition not only from non-members but also from smaller NCAA member-schools. As such, the NCAA model of amateurism violates antitrust law governing tying arrangements and should be enjoined.

Il commento muove dalla decisione del Collegio di Coordinamento A.B.F. sulla sorte di un contratto di fideiussione omnibus che contempla le clausole dello schema contrattuale uniforme predisposto dall’A.B.I., qualificate come anticoncorrenziali dal provvedimento della Banca d’Italia n. 55/2005. L’analisi si concentra esclusivamente sulla nullità della fideiussione stabilita dalla decisione. In questo senso, tale nullità viene fatta discendere dall’art. 2 l. 287/1990, il cui divieto abbraccia non solo le intese, ma anche i contratti attuativi, nella misura in cui ne realizzino il risultato. Con riferimento al caso in esame, la nullità investe, quindi, la fideiussione, nella parte in cui concretizza l’intento uniformatore contemplato dallo schema contrattuale A.B.I. Si tratta, pertanto, di nullità parziale, e non già di nullità «necessariamente parziale», poiché non risulta applicabile, come invece sostiene il Collegio in commento, la disciplina della nullità di protezione.

This book is designed as a working tool for the study and practice of European Competition Law. It is an enlarged and updated fifth edition of the highly practical guide to the leading cases of European Competition Law. This new edition also contains detailed coverage of State Aid law. Each chapter begins with an introduction which outlines the relevant laws, regulations and guidelines for each of the topics, setting the analytical foundations for the case entries. Within this framework, cases are reviewed in summary form, accompanied by analysis and commentary. This seminal text is essential reading for competition law students and practitioners.
Further details: http://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/eu-competition-law-9781509909858/
For a 20% discount when ordering from publisher, use discount code: CV7

This unique book is designed as a working tool for the study and practice of European competition law, focused on case law analysis. Each chapter begins with an introduction which outlines the relevant laws, regulations and guidelines for each of the topics, setting the analytical foundations for the case entries. Within this framework, cases are reviewed in summary form, accompanied by useful analysis and commentary. The 7th edition includes recent judgments from the European Court of Justice on the scope of object and effects based analysis (including Generics and Budapest Bank), as well as those on abuse of dominance. It examines developments in parallel trade, online sales restrictions, advertising bans, enforcement powers and procedure. Expanding its coverage of merger decisions, it explores non collusive oligopoly (including CK Telecoms) and the treatment of innovation and data under the EU Merger Regulation.

O objetivo deste trabalho é verificar, com base em uma pesquisa de história legislativa e história do pensamento econômico, se houve uma “revolução do antitruste” no Brasil. A tese da “revolução do antitruste” parte do pressuposto de que, antes da década de 1990, quando teria ocorrido no Brasil a “revolução”, o antitruste brasileiro não utilizava “elementos de análise da teoria econômica”. Esta tese procura demonstrar não somente que, desde seus primeiros anos, o antitruste nacional se utiliza de elementos de teorias econômicas, mas também que há uma convergência entre antitruste e as correntes de pensamento econômico dominantes no período em estudo. O corte cronológico do trabalho vai de 1930 a 1964, por duas razões: primeiro, por falta de literatura significativa especificamente a respeito do antitruste brasileiro do período e, segundo, para demonstrar que, desde o primeiro período de existência da legislação concorrencial brasileira, antitruste e pensamento econômico estão próximos um do outro. A pesquisa se divide em quatro capítulos: no primeiro, situa-se o problema estudado, fixando-se o conceito de “revolução do antitruste”, a origem do debate nos Estados Unidos e como essa perspectiva foi importada para o Brasil; no segundo, faz-se uma análise do antitruste brasileiro no período estudado, buscando elementos não só jurídicos, mas também políticos e econômicos acerca dos tópicos propostos; no terceiro, traça-se um panorama das correntes de pensamento econômico dominantes no período, de modo a ter um quadro teórico e ideológico das ideias econômicas mais influentes à época; no quarto e último capítulo, cotejam-se os dois quadros traçados – ou seja, o antitruste nacional, de um lado, e as correntes de pensamento econômico, de outro – com o intuito de verificar a convergência entre eles, examinando o acerto da pressuposição histórica concernente à “revolução do antitruste”, a saber, que, antes da “revolução”, o antitruste não se utilizara de elementos de teoria econômica ou, em outras palavras, que antitruste e produção intelectual de natureza econômica não estavam relacionados um ao outro.
Palavras-chave: antitruste; história do direito econômico; Estado; pensamento econômico; Brasil.

Faced with significant antitrust scrutiny, particularly from ongoing cases, the NCAA has sought to justify, under the rule of reason, the competitive restrictions its collegiate model of amateurism imposes by claiming procompetitive benefits. This article examines the NCAA's arguments and presents five findings: (1) the procompetitive justifications that the NCAA has offered for its restraint on athlete payments have little, if any, economic merit and do not justify the consumer injury resulting from the restraint; (2) absent the restraint, the minimum amount public P5 conference schools alone could have paid athletes is approximately $5.2 billion between 2003–2004 and 2014–2015, approximately two-thirds of which would have been used to compensate football and men's basketball players, indicating that the consumer injury resulting from the NCAA's restraint on trade has caused significant antitrust damages; (3) contrary to the NCAA's claims, empirical and documentary evidence demonstrates that directly compensating FBS/D1 athletes would not result in decreased consumer demand; (4) " competitive balance, " when analyzed in an antitrust setting, does not support the NCAA's claims; and (5) evidence, including the over one million documents released from the academic/athletic fraud investigation at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, demonstrates significant consumer injury associated with the integration of academics and amateur revenue sport athletics. Such findings stand in direct opposition to the NCAA's claim of procompetitive benefits from integrating athletics and academics under its amateur model.

The ultimate objective of the present paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of competition policy in developed and developing countries. Although its importance is continuously increasing, the effectiveness of competition policy still seems to lack the attention that it would deserve. At the present state of art, the number of academic contributions that attempts to estimate its impact on relevant economic variables appears very limited, in particular for the less developed countries. However, an empirical literature aimed at measuring in objective terms the effect of competition policy on economic growth is emerging, starting from narrow variables of interest, such as Gross Domestic Product and Total Factor Productivity. As a result, the principal aim of the current work is to contribute to this branch of research, focusing on broader indicators of market performance, in order to understand whether the presence of an antitrust authority has a significant impact, thus an effective utility, on the level of competition of a country. | Samà, Danilo (2013), The effectiveness of competition policy: an econometric assessment in developed and developing countries, Law & Economics LAB, LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Rome, Italy, pp. 1-50.

A Lei de Defesa da Concorrência de 2011 inseriu dentre as hipóteses de ato de concentração sujeitas ao controle de estruturas os chamados “contratos associativos”. Por se tratar de categoria que carecia de definição legal, essa previsão ensejou debate a respeito de quais modalidades contratuais deveriam ser notificadas previamente ao Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica – CADE, o que motivou a edição de duas resoluções por esta autarquia para disciplinar a matéria. Nesse contexto, o presente trabalho almeja discutir o enquadramento de contratos envolvendo direitos de propriedade intelectual como associativos e, consequentemente, a obrigatoriedade de notificação dessas operações ao CADE, além da adequação da regulamentação brasileira à prática internacional antitruste relativamente a esses contratos. Para alcançar esses desígnios, verificamos a legislação internacional pertinente, a literatura brasileira e realizamos uma pesquisa jurisprudencial junto ao CADE. Concluímos que, embora o Brasil preveja uma categoria de ato de concentração que não encontra paralelo nos Estados Unidos e na União Europeia, os atuais critérios de notificação dos contratos associativos afastam os contratos de licenciamento não exclusivo de propriedade intelectual da incidência do controle preventivo, o que deixa o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro em linha com esse benchmark internacional.

Im April 2019 ist das Gesetz zum Schutz von Geschäftsgeheimnissen („GeschGehG“) in Deutschland in Kraft getreten und hat die bisherigen Regelungen hierzu im Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb („UWG“) abgelöst. Was Geschäftsgeheimnisse eigentlich sind und warum man sie besonders schützen muss, soll hier kurz zusammengefasst werden. Dieser Beitrag ist am 31.8.2019 in Fuldaer Zeitung (Hessen, Deutschland) erschienen.

We discuss issues of the application of antitrust law and regulatory rules to network industries. In assessing the application of antitrust in network industries, we analyze a number of relevant features of network industries and the way in which antitrust law and regulatory rules can affect them. These relevant features include (among others) network effects, market structure, market share and profits inequality, choice of technical standards, relationship between the number of active firms and social benefits, existence of market power, leveraging of market power in complementary markets, and innovation races. We find that there are often significant differences on the effects of application of antitrust law in network and non-network industries.

In June 2017, NBA commissioner Adam Silver made headlines by stating that the NBA and the NBPA would once again explore changing the league’s 2005 age eligibility rule for incoming players.  The rule—colloquially known as the “one and done” rule—has been controversial due to the perceived notion that it forces athletes to wait a year until they can earn a living playing in the NBA.

The NBA and NBPA’s legal right to negotiate this rule is without question, thanks in large part to Clarett v. NFL, a 2004 case where a player sued the NFL to overturn their own longstanding age rule.  The Second Circuit found that such rules are protected by the non-statutory labor exemption through a finding that analyzed not the age rule itself, but instead “the relationship between the challenged eligibility rules and the current collective bargaining agreement.”

In that spirit, this Article probes not the legality of age rules themselves, but instead looks to the interests of the various parties involved and affected by age rules in sports.  The Clarett case featured briefs filed by various amicus curiae with a wide variety of divergent—and sometimes conflicting—interests.

Through an analysis of the interests and positions of these parties in their Clarett filings, their interests as stakeholders in professional sports eligibility rules—both then and now—can be revealed.  As leagues and unions change these interests within the larger context of changes to league structure, new potential avenues to challenge these age rules may emerge.

Resumen: La expansión de las plataformas digitales que permiten la interacción entre proveedores y consumidores está dando lugar a que se produzca una sustitución generalizada de las personas físicas por programas informáticos capaces de adaptar el precio de bienes y servicios a las condiciones cambiantes del mercado, en breves intervalos y de forma automatizada. Este proceso podría facilitar nuevas formas de colusión entre dichos proveedores. El objeto de este trabajo es analizar la adecuación de las actuales tipificación e interpretación de las conductas prohibidas para abordarlas, prestando atención, además, a los problemas relacionados con las personas responsables de una eventual infracción y con su detección.

Abstract: The expansion of online platforms enabling the interaction between providers and consumers is leading to a widespread replacement of natural persons by software programs that, automatically and with high frequency, can adapt the price of goods and services to the changing conditions of the market. This process could facilitate new forms of collusion. The aim of this paper is to analyze the adequacy of the current competition law provisions to deal with them, taking into account some additional problems related with the responsibility and the detection of a possible infringement. Palabras clave: competencia, colusión, práctica concertada, inteligencia artificial, algoritmo de precios, plataforma digital.

We propose a simple and accurate test method for recognizing anticompetitive sham suits. We consider the problem of testing the null hypothesis that a lawsuit vis-´a-vis an actual or potential competitor is not sham against the alternative that the suit is sham. We develop game theoretical model of bargaining and litigation in the context of entry deterrence, to analyze the incentive of a predator, reacting strategically to the judicial norm creating process, to pursue sham litigation and achieve anticompetitive goals. The theory implies that the question of whether an illegal sham act is baseless or not is irrelevant. When considering open suits-against-competitors to antitrust liability, assessing whether the
alleged predator’s legal expenditures can be expected to pay off is necessary, but insufficient. An appropriate test for sham litigation should be based on close examination of the market structure and thorough analysis of the economic relationship between the parties in dispute. Reputation is the hallmark of the test: the incumbent battles to maintain others’ perception of its readiness to fight entry via frivolous legal battle.

Em 1986, David Teece publicou o artigo Proting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy, que contribuiu significativamente para o estudo dos impactos das inovações tecnológicas no mercado. A sua análise da gestão da inovação colaborou na construção de concepções mais realistas da forma, contrapondo-se e aprimorando as perspectivas teóricas mais tradicionais. Como reconhecimento da importância dessa pesquisa, em 2006, a Research Policy, revista na qual foi publicada o referido trabalho, organizou uma edição especial de comemoração dos 20 anos de sua publicação. A relevância daquele artigo se confirma ao saber que, em julho de 2006, ele era o mais citado dos que já foram publicados pela revista, com um total de 681 citações naquela época. Isso se deve à perspectiva interdisciplinar que o autor conferiu à abordagem do tema da inovação, o que acabou garantindo uma dimensão mais ampla do assunto. Nesse contexto, o presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar as contribuições e a atualidade do artigo de David Teece de 1986, especialmente no que tange ao debate relacionado aos direitos de propriedade intelectual. Foi realizada pesquisa teórica que se ancora no diálogo entre o artigo da década de oitenta e alguns autores que publicaram na edição especial da Research Policy de 2006 (vol. 35, nº 8), dentre eles o próprio Teece. O presente trabalho foi, portanto, dividido em duas seções. Na primeira, serão abordados os principais aspectos do artigo de 1986, evidenciando, sobretudo, a visão do autor sobre a importância dos ativos complementares na obtenção de lucros com a inovação e sua interface com os regimes de apropriabilidade. Na segunda, fundamentalmente a partir dos artigos de Gary Pisano, Giovani Dosi, Luigi Marengo, Corrado Pasquali e Richard Nelson publicados na Research Policy, vol. 35, nº 8, (2006), serão expostas as conclusões destes autores e de outros no que tange à aplicação da teoria Profiting from Innovation (PFI) sobre os regimes de apropriabilidade, sob a luz das mudanças contemporâneas na natureza da propriedade intelectual.

Climate change is one of the most pressing issues of this century. Due to the urgency of the issue and the
pressure on governments to act, the debate on climate change is moving quickly from the political level to
focused conversations on policy choices and implementation options.
This background paper discusses the role of competition policy and enforcement in supporting and
incentivising sustainable and pro-competitive business practices. It analyses the practical approaches that
competition authorities may take when assessing cases with an environmental dimension.
Looking at past experiences in cartels, co-operation agreements, abuses of dominance and merger
control, the paper explores the question of how competition authorities can integrate economic and noneconomic environmental effects into the competitive assessment from the legal and economic perspective.
It also identifies the challenges posed by the current legal and economic frameworks, highlighting best practices to overcome them.

The facilitators or informers have become important subjects in the field of Competition Law. However, just as they have served to fight against the cartels, they have also been used by the latter to facilitate and cover up their organization and activities.
In the present article, the author seeks to explain and analyze the first cases resolved by the national competition authority in which said facilitators have been immersed. Likewise, an analysis of the jurisprudence on the subject is made in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. Finally, the national legislation and jurisprudence on the subject is analyzed in the light of comparative law.

Los facilitadores o delatores se han convertido en importantes sujetos en el campo del Derecho de la Competencia. Sin embargo, así como han servido para la lucha en contra de los cárteles también se han usado por parte de estos para facilitar y encubrir su organización y actividades.
En el presente artículo, el autor busca explicar y analizar los primeros casos resueltos por la autoridad de competencia nacional en los cuales dichos facilitadores se han visto inmersos. De igual manera, se realiza un análisis de la jurisprudencia sobre el tema en Estados Unidos, Reino Unido y la Unión Europea. Finalmente, se analiza la legislación y jurisprudencia nacional acerca del tema a la luz del derecho comparado.

The work, starting from a recent judgement of the Administrative Regional Court of Lazio, focuses on several topics related to the legitimate right of organizing the regularity rallies, with particular attention on the topics of insurance and competition law.

Aux temps de Wikileaks et des médias sociaux, la maitrise de l'information par les Hommes ne s'est jamais trouvée aussi complète. Dans la sphère économique, les intervenants s'acharnent de plus en plus pour « s'approvisionner » en information. On dirait que cette dernière représente, au même titre que les ressources financières, à la fois une richesse et une arme fatale entre les mains de ceux qui entendent la manipuler. Ainsi, des données comme les prix, l'effectif du personnel d'un concurrent, les barrières à l'entrée au marché, les attitudes des individus, et même leurs vies privées, peuvent défigurer drastiquement la structure du marché. A l'évidence de ce constat, il nous parut opportun, de traiter le sujet de l'information en droit de la concurrence et de la régulation.

The key findings of the study are that monopoly power in the stock market can be created and exercised through information-based market manipulation by a strategic trader. Successful execution of manipulation can result in substantial profit to the strategic trader but unfair losses to other investors, as well as excess volatility to the manipulated stocks. In addition, we propose that creation and exercise of monopoly power in the stock market is one mechanism that contributes to a widening income gap between market manipulators and the investing public.

How the examples from the liberalization of the UK rail markets and the case law from the ECJ can benefit us to tackle possible inefficiencies, vertical and horizontal restraints, barriers to access and cross-subsidies by States in the implementation of the Railway Packages of the EC, from the competition law perspective.

Presented as the final paper of the International Law LL.M. at ISDE in 2013 (tutor Mr. Helmut Brokelmann).

The article revisits the relevance and contours of ‘special responsibility’ doctrine and argues that an intense application of special responsibility doctrine may have a shrinking effect on the effects-based analysis that lies between the determination of dominance and its abuse, the preservation of which is fundamental to the foundations of assessment framework of unilateral conduct cases. The article also proposes broad parameters/principles to guide discretion on application of special responsibility.

This chapter brings into focus various structural threats to journalism, including monopoly control over media, the loss of public interest protections, digital divides, and the “Facebook problem”. The chapter also provides an overview of why media policy matters for journalism and how different ownership structures affect media content. The chapter concludes with an in-depth discussion of Facebook’s relationship to journalism and the different schools of thought regarding how we should rein in monopolies.

Field-of-use limitations are contractual restrictions in which the licensee is limited in the use of the license to one or more technical fields, product markets or industrial sectors. Field-of-use restrictions are one of the most frequently stipulated clauses in a licensing agreement and as such, it is crucial to understand the likely pitfalls accompanying them. In today’s economy, transatlantic agreements are ever more common and require familiarity with both US and EU legal framework. It is for this reason, that the paper takes a comparative approach, comparing the US and EU legal framework, when it comes to field-of-use restrictions.

"This is a paper about UK competition law’s goals. It focuses on Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 (CA98). The Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which is a key actor in this area, seems to pursue consumer welfare as Chapter I’s sole goal. The Office of Communications (Ofcom) and the OFT have concurrent powers to apply Chapter I, when the competition issue relates to activities connected with ‘communications matters’. The High Court can hear private Chapter I actions too.

It is problematic if these actors would decide the same case differently. This could create contradictions in legal duties, making ‘knowing the law’ impossible. It certainly undermines legal certainty for firms and their customers, increasing legal risk.

This paper focuses on one potential area of divergence, which goes to the heart of almost every decision in this area, the objectives of Chapter I. I will argue that if the OFT pursues consumer welfare as Chapter I’s sole goal, then this is wrong in law. Furthermore, I believe that Ofcom is unlikely to follow the OFT’s lead on this issue. My focus is on the OFT and Ofcom; but, the High Court could diverge too.

Let me start by presenting a factual scenario where a disagreement as to Chapter I’s goals might matter. Public service broadcasting (PSB), for example, regional news, does get made by the market, but not in any quantity. Furthermore, outside the BBC, the UK’s PSB system is under great pressure. Ofcom believes that it is unsustainable; some firms might not renew their PSB licenses in 2014.

Given this scenario, how can Ofcom ensure that innovative and original programs, fulfilling public purposes, are delivered? The BBC has offered to set up partnerships with others to enhance PSB. They would help new entrants into the market through horizontal co-operation of some kind. Ofcom welcomed this, principally because of its duty to protect citizens as well as consumers. Is it possible that Ofcom, if applying Chapter I to such arrangements, would accept less competition than the OFT, if it meant that some of these public policy goals to protect citizens (which Ofcom also pursues) would be delivered in this new system?

This paper argues that the OFT should consider public policy goals in its Chapter I analysis. Part 2 starts by sketching out the UK’s concurrency regime; I show why I think the OFT pursues the sole consumer welfare goal in Chapter I and why Ofcom is likely (at least sometimes) to disagree. To explain why the OFT should consider wider public policy goals, Part 3 explores Article 101 TFEU’s goals; Chapter I is based upon this EU provision. Many believe that consumer welfare is now Article 101’s sole goal; however, several Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments belie this view. Part 4 unpicks Chapter I’s substantive provisions, looking at internal and external aids to interpretation to see what the UK law’s goals should be. Once again, I argue that public policy is relevant there. Part 5 concludes."

The GDPR is the Magna Carta of data protection, the importance of which cannot be overstated. Yet, as this article shows, the price of data protection through the GDPR is much higher than previously recognized. The GDPR creates two main harmful effects on competition and innovation: it limits competition in data markets, creating more concentrated market structures and entrenching the market power of those who are already strong; and it limits data sharing between different data collectors, thereby preventing the realization of some data synergies which may lead to better data-based knowledge.

To illustrate its claims, the article analyzes the competitive dynamics created by the GDPR, focusing on how it affects the options available to firms for amassing the data necessary for their operations, and their resultant ability to realize economies of scale and scope in data analysis. It identifies seven main parallel and cumulative market dynamics that may limit data collection and data sharing, only some of which have been recognized so far. As shown, under some market conditions the GDPR has unintended and so far unrecognized effects on competition, efficiency, innovation, and the resultant welfare.

The dynamics identified in this article offer partial explanations for some of the troubling empirical evidence regarding investment in EU data-driven markets following the adoption of the GDPR. Furthermore, the analysis enables us to identify which effects are short-term and which are here to stay.

The effects on competition and innovation identified may justify a reevaluation of the balance reached to ensure that overall welfare is increased. The article suggests some means of reducing harmful competitive effects, while still protecting the vital goal of privacy, including reaching a better balance between data protection and competition law, reducing uncertainty in the GDPR, creating certification mechanisms for GDPR compliance, and structuring of mandatory data-sharing obligations under other laws in a way which is sensitive to the dynamics of data markets.

This reflection paper focuses on European competition law by a technological perspective. Tech companies have started to increase their impact in European market. However their businesses are not compatible with traditional market definition.
On the other hand, possession of personal data by these tech companies brought a new dimension to competition law. Relation between data protection and competition law had just started, but will cause much ink to flow.
In its decision of 6 February 2019, the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) prohibited Facebook Inc.’s data processing policy, which imposes on its users for collecting and combining their data. Even though this decision is in consequence of the violation of the German Competition Act (GWB), it’s a case that melted technology and law at the same pot.