Advisory Opinion

La función consultiva de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos es un estudio de las veinte opiniones consultivas emitidas por la Corte Interamericana hasta el 2010 que no tiene parangón en la literatura jurídica del sistema interamericano. El texto está construido sobre tres ejes: la caracterización normativa de la función consultiva; la descripción de la práctica consultiva de la Corte; y las implicaciones del divorcio entre la norma y la práctica consultiva, caracterizado en lo que el autor llama las “fisuras de la función consultiva”: la extensión de la competencia y la indeterminación de sus efectos. Jorge Roa demuestra cómo la práctica de la Corte Interamericana, concretada en estas dos fisuras, ha conducido al deterioro de la seguridad jurídica internacional y a una pérdida relativa de la autoridad de la Corte, y señala, con razón, la urgencia de un cambio de rumbo en la materia.

Juan Carlos Upegui Mejía.
Docente-Investigador del departamento de derecho constitucional de la Universidad Externado de Colombia.

Desde su publicación, la Opinión Consultiva 24/17 de la Corte IDH ha sido empleada como parte de los argumentos para exigir a los Estados que cumplan con reconocer los derechos de las personas LGTBI. Como contraargumento, se ha afirmado que las opiniones consultivas no son vinculantes, pues no deciden un caso concreto. En esta publicación, Carlos Zelada, profesor de la Universidad del Pacífico y experto en Derecho Internacional, responde la pregunta planteada.

While interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights through consultative opinions, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has also impacted its adjudicatory function on several occasions. In some recent opinions, it is claimed that the Inter-
American Court has expanded the scope of its contentious jurisdiction. In this article, we analyze the interpretative techniques employed by the IACtHR, through advisory opinions, to increase the scope of its adjudicatory jurisdiction. An analysis will be made of both the Court’s decisions as well as the specialized literature and the position of some States in relation to the Court. In a context of resistance and contestation of international courts, it is stated that the activity of expanding the jurisdiction of the Court may have positive and negative effects in relation to its authority and legitimacy, but that greater caution in relation to the expansion of its jurisdiction and the utilization of article 26 to circumscribe the consent of States would avoid any negative effects.

The Protocol 16 to the ECHR, constituting a step in the ongoing process of the Strasbourg human rights protection system reform has been opened to signature at the 2nd October 2013. It accompanies another still opened for signature and not yet in force Protocol 15 to the Convention. Of course there is still a long way to go to the point when the Protocol will be ratified by the necessary number of state-parties to the Convention and thus enter into force, nevertheless, both documents show a very interesting development in the process of the ECHR reform. The aim of this paper is to assess the Protocol 16 by identifying some week and strong sides of this document in the light of its main goals, which place it among endeavors aimed at enhancing the long term effectiveness and efficiency of the Strasburg human rights protection system through enhancing the domestic implementation of the Convention and developing judicial dialogue between highest domestic courts and tribunals and the ECtHR.

Per la prima volta, la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo si è espressa mediante lo strumento di interpretazione preventiva introdotto dal Protocollo n. 16 alla CEDU, confermando che il diritto del minore al rispetto della vita privata pretende che gli ordinamenti nazionali ne riconoscano il rapporto con la madre d’intenzione, anche ove mancasse un legame genetico. Tuttavia, l’osservanza dello stesso non impone che debba farsi luogo alla trascrizione dell’atto di nascita, in quanto la costituzione del rapporto filiale sarebbe conforme alla Convenzione anche se all'esito del ricorso ad altri istituti, quali l’adozione, purché venga assicurata la rapidità e l’effettività dell’attuazione del diritto del minore. Resta però immutato il dubbio, non affrontato dalla Corte Edu, se l’adozione basti a riconoscere il rapporto anche tra la madre genetica e il minore.

Protocol n'16 expands the advisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) by introducing a mechanism of litigation-related opinions ("ovis contentieux"). It affords the highest national courts and tribunals the ability to ask the ECtHR for an advisory opinion on questions of principle related to the interpretation and application of the rights and freedoms defined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protocols thereto.

SUMARIO: I. Introducción.— II. La competencia de la Corte Internacional de Justicia en su función consultiva.— III. La consulta formulada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. La presentación de Argentina.— IV. Reflexiones sobre las principales consideraciones en la opinión de la Corte. Posible vinculación con la Cuestión Malvinas .— V. Conclusión.

This paper analyzes Advisory Opinion OC 24/17 issued by the Inter American Court of Human Rights on November 24, 2017 at the request of Costa Rica on Gender Identity and Equality and nondiscrimination to same-sex couples. In it, the Court considers sexual orientation, gender identity and the expression of gender as categories protected against discrimination by Art. 1.1 of the Convention. It determines the need to have an expedited procedure (regardless of its nature) for the purpose of adapting names and registers with gender identity. The Court also establishes the need for States to guarantee access to marriage to ensure the protection of all the rights of families formed by same-sex couples, without discrimination with respect to those that are constituted by heterosexual couples. Finally, this paper analyzes the binding, mandatory and enforceable nature of the Advisory Opinions of the Court.

Citación: Horna, Angel, “Responsabilidad internacional de los Estados en materia ambiental a la luz de la experiencia consultiva del Tribunal Internacional del Derecho del Mar”; en: Moreira, Alberto y Rafael Prieto (eds.), La responsabilidad internacional del Estado y el medio ambiente: un debate urgente, Colección Estudios de Derecho Internacional, n° 16, Medellín: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana / Sociedad Latinoamericana para el Derecho Internacional / Biblioteca Jurídica Diké (2016): 341-362.

ROA ROA, JORGE ERNESTO. “La funzione consultiva della Corte interamericana sui diritti umani”. En: LAURA CAPPUCCIO y PALMINA TANZARELLA (eds.). Commentario alla prima parte della Convenzione americana dei diritto dell’uomo. Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2017, pp. 829-853.

The second advisory opinion ex Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights, the first in criminal matters provided by the European Court of Human Rights on 29 May 2020 at the Armenian Constitutional Court's request, presents profiles of interest on a procedural and substantive level. Under the first profile, it pronounces on the admissibility requirements and further clarifies the functioning of the advisory mechanism, introducing novelties oncerning  the  conformation  of  the  opinion  itself.  From  a  substantive  point  of  view,  it  first  establishes the conditions of conventional compatibility for the use of the "legislation by reference"  technique  and,  secondly,  adds  elements  to  compare  two  different  versions  of  law  according to  the  principle of non-retroactivity of the criminal law established by art. 7 ECHR.

O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito (PPGD) da UFPR e, nele, o Centro de Estudos da Constituição (CCONS), tem ao longo da última década, produzido conhecimento crítico, reflexivo e aplicado, por meio de pesquisa teórica e empírica, nos seus respectivos campos de saber. As/Os professoras/es e pesquisadoras/es, e suas orientadas/os são os sujeitos responsáveis pela realização desta desafiadora tarefa que é fazer pesquisa de excelência e responsabilidade social na área do Direito, sempre na fronteira entre as Ciências humanas e as Ciências Sociais Aplicadas (para suar as classificações das agências de fomento). Somos cientes de que nossa produção de conhecimento só acontece porque estamos em uma instituição como a Universidade Federal do Paraná, isto é, uma instituição pública, suportada majoritariamente pelo orçamento público e, mesmo com o descaso e desmantelamento que lhe acomete, nos últimos anos, ela persevera, com resiliência, resistência e criatividade. Como diz Leminski "Isso de querer ser exatamente aquilo que a gente é ainda vai nos levar além".

The Eurasian Economic Union (‘EAEU’) – an international organization of regional economic integration in post-Soviet space – has a judicial body aimed at ensuring uniform application of law. This article argues that the EAEU Court will struggle in achieving its aim as there are issues of independence, it has diminished powers, and limits have been imposed on its interpretative practices, at least as compared to its predecessor. This may lead to problems in respecting the rule of law and “dis-integrates” the judiciary in the sense of a common system involving national courts. Nevertheless, it is also argued that, although the Court’s procedural and substantive powers have been limited, the attempt to limit certain interpretative powers of the Court can hardly result in meaningful consequences for the development of law.

Protocol n°16 expands the advisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) by introducing a mechanism of litigation-related opinions (“avis contentieux”). It affords the highest national courts and tribunals the ability to ask the ECtHR for an advisory opinion on questions of principle related to the interpretation and application of the rights and freedoms defined in the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter Convention) and the Protocols thereto.

FRANÇAIS Les avis consultatifs font partie intégrante de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle canadienne. L’exécutif fédéral a le privilège exclusif de pouvoir soumettre pratiquement toute question de droit, abstraite ou non, à la Cour suprême du Canada, alors que les exécutifs provinciaux peuvent en faire autant auprès de leur Cour d’appel respective. Ces tribunaux ont, en principe, l’obligation de répondre. Au fil des ans, les « renvois » ont traité d’une multitude de sujets, y compris de la répartition fédérale des compétences, du rapatriement de la Constitution, du mariage entre personnes de même sexe, de la réforme du Sénat et de la possible sécession d’une province. Si l’analyse du contenu des renvois constitue un pilier de la plupart des cours de droit constitutionnel, l’institution même a étonnamment largement échappé à une analyse approfondie. 
Deux ouvrages majeurs, publiés à quelques mois d’intervalle, comblent avec brio cette lacune. Dans Courts Without Cases: The Law and Politics of Advisory Opinions et Seeking the Court’s Advice: The Politics of the Canadian Reference Power, la constitutionnaliste Carissima Mathen et la politologue Kate Puddister décodent habilement la théorie et la pratique des avis consultatifs sous des angles disciplinaires distincts, mais complémentaires. Deux aspects problématiques ressortent particulièrement de cette analyse croisée. 
Il s’agit, en premier lieu, du risque d’instrumentalisation des tribunaux par la branche exécutive. De fait, l’apparent affront à la séparation des pouvoirs a conduit plusieurs pays de common law (mais pas tous) à rejeter la pratique des avis consultatifs. Pourquoi n’est-ce pas le cas du Canada? En second lieu, malgré leur caractère officiellement non contraignant, les renvois sont lus, enseignés, cités, critiqués, plaidés et largement rédigés comme s’il s’agissait d’arrêts rendus en appel, arrêts qui eux sont évidemment contraignants. Comment expliquer la force normative déroutante d’« avis » qui n’ont plus de « consultatifs » que le nom? 
Cet essai critique place les deux ouvrages en conversation l’un avec l’autre. L’auteure y ajoute ses propres interrogations et réflexions, notamment sur le rôle et le statut des renvois dans une perspective comparative. L’essai examine les origines, l’évolution et le cadre normatif des « avis consultatifs », ainsi que les motivations « stratégiques » qui fondent la décision de l’exécutif de demander — ou non — un avis consultatif. En conclusion, l’auteure avance une hypothèse sur cette singulière institution qui ne fonctionne pas en théorie, mais plutôt bien en pratique. Les « renvois » représenteraient-ils un autre élément de la culture constitutionnelle du Canada, qui voit s’entrecroiser et s’influencer de manière si fluide les sources formelles et informelles, écrites et non écrites, officielles et effectives du droit?

ENGLISH Advisory opinions form an integral part of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. The federal executive has the exclusive privilege of requesting that the Supreme Court of Canada provide answers on basically any question of law, abstract or not. The provincial executives can request the same of their respective Courts of Appeal. By law, Courts have to respond. Over the years, “references” have dealt with a flurry of topics, including the federal division of powers, patriation of the Constitution, same-sex marriage, Senate reform, and the eventual secession of a province. While canvassing the content of references is a mainstay of most constitutional law courses, the actual institution of “advisory opinions” is surprisingly understudied.
Two significant books, published just months apart, valiantly address this lacuna. In Courts Without Cases: The Law and Politics of Advisory Opinions and Seeking the Court’s Advice: The Politics of the Canadian Reference Power, constitutionalist Carissima Mathen and political scientist Kate Puddister skillfully decode the theory and practice of advisory opinions from distinct, but complementary disciplinary lenses. Two issues particularly stand out in this overlapping and interrelated analysis.
First is the risk of the executive’s instrumentalization of courts. In fact, the apparent affront to the separation of powers has led several (but not all) common law jurisdictions to reject the practice of advisory opinions. Why is this not the case in Canada? Second, despite their officially non-binding nature, references are read, taught, cited, critiqued, argued and largely drafted just as regular appeal decisions. How can the puzzling normative force of advisory opinions—which have, over time, become “advisory” in name only—be explained?
This review essay puts the two books in conversation with one another. The author adds her own interrogations and insights, notably on the role and legal status of references in comparative perspective. The essay surveys the origins, evolution and normative framework of “advisory opinions,” as well as the “strategic” motivations behind the executive’s decision to request—or not—an advisory opinion. In conclusion, the author offers a hypothesis on this odd institution that does not work in theory, but actually works in practice: could “references” be another element in Canada’s singular constitutional culture, in which formal and informal, written and unwritten, official and effective sources of law so fluidly dance together?

This paper analyzes the preliminary questions in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the Separation of the Chagos Archipel- ago from Mauritius in 1965. In the first Section, it deals with the issue of jurisdiction, and in particular with the object of the request made by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2017. The aim of this Sec- tion is to underline that the formulation of the request has played a crucial role for the determination, by the Court, of the legal ground on which it based its opinion. The question has been treated correctly as a matter of de-colonization and self-determination, as suggested by the General Assembly (GA), and this choice has influenced both the admissibility and the merits of the case.
The second Section analyzes the questions of admissibility raised in the course of the Chagos proceeding. It is argued that, although the conclusions reached by the opinion are correct, the last and most important objection to the admissibility should have been treated by the Court so as to point out that consent, as such, is not a condition for the exercise of the advisory ju- risdiction, especially when “community interests” come at issue. In the bal- ance between the discretion not to render the opinion and the duty to coop- erate with other United Nations (UN) organs, the latter prevailed, given the importance of the legal values – protected by obligations erga omnes – in- volved in the legal questions put to the Court’s assessment.

European Court of Human Rights – Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights – Protocol No. 16 as part of the European Court of Human Rights reform – Advisory opinions under Protocol No. 16 – Authority requesting an advisory opinion – The subject matter of an advisory opinion – Legal consequences of advisory opinions

Ao interpretar a Convenção Americana sobre Direitos Humanos através de opiniões consultivas, a Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos (CtIDH) em diversas ocasiões impactou também sua função contenciosa. Em algumas opiniões recentes, sustenta-se que a Corte Interamericana expandiu o âmbito de sua jurisdição contenciosa. Nesse artigo, são analisadas as técnicas interpretativas empregadas pela CtIDH para, através da via consultiva, aumentar o alcance de sua jurisdição contenciosa. Será realizada uma análise tanto das decisões da Corte bem como da literatura especializada e do posicionamento de alguns Estados em relação à Corte. Num contexto de resistência e contestação de cortes internacionais, sustenta-se que a atividade de expansão da jurisdição da Corte pode possuir efeitos positivos e negativos em relação à sua autoridade e legitimidade, mas que uma maior cautela em relação à expansão de sua jurisdição e ao uso do artigo 26 para circunscrever o consentimento dos Estados evitaria ...

On 2 October 2013, Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was opened for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE). The protocol, that has so far been signed by sixteen States and ratified by Albania, Georgia, Lithuania, San Marino and Slovenia, will enter into force in case of ratification by at least ten Member States. If the protocol becomes effective, it will expand the European Court of Human Rights’ competence to give advisory opinions upon request by domestic high courts and tribunals.

Ao interpretar a Convenção Americana sobre Direitos Humanos através de opiniões consultivas, a Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos (CtIDH) em diversas ocasiões impactou também sua função contenciosa. Em algumas opiniões recentes, sustenta-se que a Corte Interamericana expandiu o âmbito de sua jurisdição contenciosa. Nesse artigo, são analisadas as técnicas interpretativas empregadas pela CtIDH para, através da via consultiva, aumentar o alcance de sua jurisdição contenciosa. Será realizada uma análise tanto das decisões da Corte bem como da literatura especializada e do posicionamento de alguns Estados em relação à Corte. Num contexto de resistência e contestação de cortes internacionais, sustenta-se que a atividade de expansão da jurisdição da Corte pode possuir efeitos positivos e negativos em relação à sua autoridade e legitimidade, mas que uma maior cautela em relação à expansão de sua jurisdição e ao uso do artigo 26 para circunscrever o consentimento dos Estados evitaria quaisquer efeitos negativos.

On 1 August 2018, barely five years after it was signed, Protocol 16 to the European Convention of Human Rights (‘Protocol’, ‘P16’, or ‘Protocol 16’) entered into force. This entry to the newly launched Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law sets out the new procedure the Protocol has introduced. It also provides background information on the reasons for the Protocol's drafting and the expectation of the drafters as to its effects. Finally, it pays attention to the benefits of the procedure and its disadvantages.

This paper focuses on addressing agreed fundamentals between fundamentalists, relating to contrast and weighting, diligence and advisory opinion with an explanation of each vocabulary base, the statement of the overall meaning, and the jurisprudence application to each rule. Basically, four rules were stated in this paper. This paper has shown that there were agreed fundamentals between fundamentalists. Hence, this serves as an alert to students of Shari school when reading fundamentalist rules, so as to be able to distinguish between what was agreed and what was disagreed. In addition, this paper contributes to the development of jurisprudential talent of students of Islamic Sharia through explaining the vocabularies of the rules, the statement of their meaning, and the jurisprudential applications on the fundamentalism rules.