Surrogacy

Le présent article vise à appréhender la gestation pour autrui (GPA) sous l’angle de l’accès aux origines et à mettre en exergue les difficultés et les questions susceptibles de se poser lors de la recherche de ses origines par un enfant/adulte né par le
biais de cette méthode particulière.

Due decisioni in tema di delibazione del provvedimento giurisdizionale affrontano il tema della costituzione del rapporto di filiazione in seguito, rispettivamente, a un accordo di gestazione per altri e all’adozione a favore di una coppia omosessuale. Trait d’union Cass. 19599/2016, che riconduce all’ordine pubblico internazionale le valutazioni in merito agli status familiari costituiti all’estero, sottolineandone l’analogia col giudizio di costituzionalità. Applicando questo test alle due decisioni dovremmo concludere che non sono incompatibili con valori costituzionali primari l’abrogazione sia del divieto di gestazione per altri, sia del requisito della differenza di sesso tra gli adottanti. Nel commento si dimostra che solo la seconda affermazione è sostenibile.

Questo studio prende spunto dallo scarto che, a causa di un diritto scritto non sempre al passo coi tempi, viene a crearsi tra la realtà sociale concretamente vissuta dalle famiglie create ricorrendo alla procreazione medicalmente assistita (PMA) e la loro totale o parziale (in)esistenza sul piano del diritto. Oltre ad accrescere le modalità di formare la propria famiglia, l’avvento della PMA ha comportato la frammentazione delle nozioni – un tempo, unitarie – di maternità e paternità, producendo quindi potenziale confusione sul versante della determinazione dello status filiationis del nato. A fronte di una pluralità di figure potenzialmente e/o fattualmente genitoriali, la responsabilità di ‘fare ordine’ e di rispondere alle diverse istanze e ai bisogni delle famiglie moderne è caduta sulle spalle dei giudici, i quali – almeno nel contesto europeo – hanno talvolta trovato fonte d’ispirazione nella giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti umani. Spingendosi oltre i confini europei, il presente studio mira pertanto ad indagare il ruolo giocato dai giudici nazionali nel ‘fare da ponte’ tra diritto e società, portando alla luce le logiche, le tecniche e i principi che hanno guidato la loro opera di ricostruzione del diritto vigente.

On January 27th 2015, in the case of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decided, by five votes to two, that a child born by surrogacy abroad and those who ordered him enjoy protection of the right to family life even though the child was obtained fraudulently, against payment, without genetic link and after a very short period of cohabitation. The Court concluded that Italy could refuse to recognise the filiation established in Russia, but that taking the child away from the sponsors infringed their right to private and family life.

Општи циљ овог рада је да истражи да ли хибридна права која се стварају у оквиру регионалног система заштите људских права у Европи могу да успоставе правни оквир на националном нивоу за пружање хибридних услуга. Општи циљ је истражен на примјеру сурогатства као врсте хибридног права из групе репродуктивних права. Сходно томе, главни предмет истраживања је питање да ли заштита сурогатства на регионалном нивоу, која је по свом карактеру посредна, доводи до увођења националног правног оквира за пружање повезаних (хибридних) услуга. Истраживање је проведено тако што је прво објашњен појам хибридних права као и начин њиховог стварања а касније је дефинисан појам хибридних услуга за потребе овог рада. Након дефинисања појма хибридних права анализирано је да ли репродуктивна права могу да се сврстају у ту групу као и то да ли сурогатство има карактеристике хибридног права. Главни метод који је коришћен током истраживања јесте студија случаја у комбинацији са другим методама. Општи резултати истраживања указују да хибридна права доводе до успостављања правног оквира на националном нивоу за пружање хибридних услуга; да су репродуктивна права хибридна права и да сурогатство спада у групу хибридних права.  Најважнији резултат истраживања јесте да чак и посредна заштита сурогатства путем регионалног система заштите људских права производи два ефекта на национално законодавство и то: 1) либерализацију односно укидање рестрикција тамо гдје оне постоје и 2) увођење правног оквира за регулисање повезаних хибридних услуга. Најзначајнији допринос овога рада јесте у објашњењу начина на који хибридна права развијају правни оквир за пружање хибридних услуга. Споредно, рад доприноси развоју доктрине о хибридним правима у домаћој правној мисли.

Surrogatmödraskap är en fråga som har börjat diskuteras i allt större utsträckning i Sverige. År 2013 tillsatte regeringen en utredning där frågan ska granskas. Utredningen beräknas vara klar i december 2015. I väntan på utredningen ämnar studien att bidra till ökad förståelse för var politiska riksdagspartier står i frågan, deras problemframställningar av surrogatmödraskap samt deras förslag till lösningar. I studien undersöks även om ideologiska inslag går att finna i argumentationen som framförs. Studien är kvalitativ till sin karaktär och den metodologiska ansatsen består av en form av argumentationsanalys med inslag av Douglas Walton samt Carol Bacchis ramverk. Materialet består av motioner samt semistrukuterade intervjuer med representanter från politiska riksdagspartier. Studiens tidigare forskning berör främst surrogatmödraskap i Sverige men tar även upp utländska perspektiv. Det teoretiska ramverket består av två delar, Carol Bacchis "What's the problem (represented to be)?" samt Alan Finlaysons "Rhetoric and the Political Theory of Ideologies". Resultatet av studien visar att majoriteten av riksdagspartierna är för altruistiskt surrogatmödraskap samt framställer olika problem och lösningar. Studiens resultat tyder även på att partiideologiska inslag i viss grad förekommer inom argumentationerna.

Tıp ve teknoloji alanındaki gelişmeler, sağlık problemleri veya biyolojik nedenlerle çocuk sahibi olamayan kişilerin taşıyıcı annelik yöntemiyle çocuk sahibi olmalarını sağlamıştır. Ancak Türkiye’nin de aralarında bulunduğu pek çok ülkede taşıyıcı anneliğe izin verilmemektedir. Hayatlarını sürdürdükleri ülkede taşıyıcı annelik uygulamasından yararlanamayan kişilerin, bu uygulamaya izin verilen ülkelere giderek çocuk sahibi olmaları ise mümkündür. “Sınıraşan taşıyıcı annelik” olarak adlandırılan bu durum, milletlerarası özel hukuk açısından çeşitli hukuki sorunlara yol açmaktadır. Bu çalışmada Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nin sınıraşan taşıyıcı annelikle ilgili kararları milletlerarası özel hukuk ve Türk kamu düzeni perspektifinden incelenecektir.

Portuguese report to the Common Core of European Private Law volume on "immoral contracts". Report includes analysis of case scenarios on a range of issues, from sex work to surrogacy, from freedom to marry to inheritance issues, from suretyships to usury.

My theory of "baby love" has developed from my own experience of reunion with my mother from whom I was separated at birth. After reunion I had a real feeling of "this woman is so familiar, so much like me, we were part of each other, yet she is a complete stranger - how can I ever love her?" This feeling of being unable to "love my mother" is then followed by a feeling of an unsought and unasked for rage against those who made this so, whomever they may be. If I had never loved my mother then I have no doubt I would not feel this rage - I would feel "Oh yes, I completely understand, she just wasn't able to parent at this time." So what my rage says to me - and what the rage of adoptees say to the world - is that babies love their gestational mothers at birth and that the permanent separation of mother and neonate destroys something that is already there. It follows that to deliberately destroy this love without good cause should be considered a violation of the human rights of the child. If it is not, then we need to enshrine the relationship between gestational mother and child in human rights legislation.

Despite the position of the Joint Divisions of the Italian Court of Cassation, which appears to hold that altruistic surrogacy is prohibited, a different-narrow-interpretation of the Italian ban on surrogacy is still possible. Altruistic surrogacy does not fall within the scope of the ban, according to the reasoning of the Italian constitutional judges in Judgment 9 April 2014 no 162, which declared it unconstitutional to forbid heterologous fertilization. Doubts arise, first, from the broad interpretation of the right to physical and mental health, which the Constitutional Court attributed as a whole to couples and, second, from the inclusion of the right to reproductive freedom as part of the right to self-determination. As a fundamental right, its exercise may be limited only if there is a need to protect rights of the same level, such as to safeguard the dignity and health of the surrogate mother or the well-being of the child.

This paper discusses some of the major themes contained in the position paper La maternità surrogata: profili etici (Surrogate Pregnancy: Ethical Profiles) drafted by the Ethics Committee of the Fondazione Veronesi. In particular, the text highlights the ethical and legal path that ties the freedom of reproductive choices both to the individual right of self-determination and to the related right of benefitting from scientific progress. Building on the view articulated in the position paper, the text argues in favor of recognizing the right to access to surrogate gestation within the Italian context.
Il testo analizza il Parere La maternità surrogata: profili etici, redatto dal Comitato Etico della Fondazione Umberto Veronesi, mettendo in risalto il percorso etico e giuridico che lega la libertà delle scelte riproduttive al diritto all'autodeterminazione della persona e al correlato diritto al godimento dei benefici del progresso scientifico, auspicando che la gestazione per altre/i possa diventare accessibile anche in Italia.

Brown Bodies, White Babies examines surrogacy as a location that reveals the cultural and political context in which traditional notions of family and race are shored up, and potentially disruptive social phenomenon are reabsorbed into the hegemonic norm. What I term “cross-racial gestational surrogacy”—when a surrogate carries a pregnancy for intended parents of a different race—demonstrates how boundaries of likeness and difference are drawn and negotiated. . Surrogacy is an example of a social practice that has the potential to destabilize hegemonic ideologies, yet is recast through popular, medical, and legal discourse as a means to uphold traditional social constructs. Through an analysis of surrogacy, I unpack the ideological work that is done socially, politically, and legally to draw distinct boundaries around very limited definitions of “family,” “kinship,” and “mother,” and which reifies races into biologically distinct, genetically based categories.

Surrogacy is an arrangement when a woman carries in her womb a couple’s sperm and ovum to produce a child for the intended parents. The objective of this paper was to determine the permissibility of surrogate from the Quranic perspective.

The analysis suggests that, traditional surrogacy, in which a woman other than the spouse gets artificially inseminated with the father's sperm, is outside the constraint imposed by the Quran and is, therefore, not permissible. The Quran requires that the biological mother (the egg donor) must be the spouse of the person donating the sperm, not the surrogate. The gestational surrogacy, in which the embryo is formed by the egg donated by the spouse of the father who is donating the sperm, is within the constraint imposed by the Quran, and should, therefore, be permissible.

The Quran does not make it incumbent upon the mother to be the sole provider of nutrients to the baby. Incubators have successfully been used to complete the gestation (prenatal nourishment) period of premature babies. There is a potential for artificial womb to extend this period further. The surrogate mother falls in the same category and should be permissible to provide prenatal nourishment during the gestational period.

Contrary to scholars assertion, implanting an embryo in the womb of a surrogate mother cannot be called ‘zina’. Many medical procedures require vaginal insertion and have never been labelled as ‘zina’. Implanting an embryo in the womb of a surrogate mother which require penetration in the vagina falls in the same category. Calling it ‘zina’ would make all medical procedures, which requires penetration of medical devices in the uterus per standard medical protocol, illegal.

Their concern about the corruption of the embryo with surrogate mother’s egg is also misplaced. Once the egg is fertilized, which is done outside the uterus, its genetic composition is locked. It cannot be corrupted by other egg or sperm.

The gestational surrogacy should have the same constraint, the constraint imposed in case of wet nursing: Once the milk relationship is established, marriage to the consanguineous kin of a milk-parent is prohibited i.e. the children of the wet-nurse cannot marry the person who was wet-nursed by their mother. The same constraint should be applicable to the surrogate mother i.e. marriage to the consanguineous kin of the surrogate mother should be prohibited, the children of the gestational mother will be ‘mahram’ to the child born out of surrogacy.

growth in the surrogacy market has been rapid and widespread, the Indian government has struggled to regulate it as a business, a medical practice, and for the protection of surrogates. After nearly a decade of proposed draft bills, the government has yet to enact comprehensive regulation. It is now clear that the state will not ban such a lucrative source of income. Scholars of surrogacy have begun to take note of the Indian market. In the United States, where surrogacy has provoked debate and theorizing among feminists, scholars are increasingly interpreting the meaning and the effects of surrogacy in other countries using theories developed from the experience with surrogacy and assisted reproductive technology (ART) in the United States. Despite the academic discourse, no proposals for regulation of Indian surrogacy have been forthcoming. The discussions remain theoretical and decontextualized with Indian surrogacy described with generalizations and media-driven stereotypes. Mor...

Resumen El debate actual en relación con la gestación subrogada parece retomar la discusión tradicional sobre la libertad de disponer del propio cuerpo, sus posibilidades y sus límites. En un contexto de avances científicos en materia reproductiva, la exclusiva capacidad de gestación de la mujer parecen situar a ésta en el centro de un debate que discurre entre su consideración como sujeto vulnerable y su capacidad de decisión en relación con su cuerpo. En este marco, el presente trabajo tiene el objetivo de intentar analizar las premisas teóricas que permiten configurar la capacidad de decisión de la mujer en relación con las decisiones que afecten a su cuerpo y a su integridad, definiendo el umbral de autonomía que permite tomar decisiones y, después, aplicándolo a la gestación subrogada para intentar determinar si es posible que una mujer pueda decidir tener hijos para otras personas y en qué condiciones puede hacerlo. Palabras clave Autonomía, capacidad de decisión de las mujeres, derecho de propiedad, libre disposición sobre el propio cuerpo, gestación subrogada. Abstract The current debate about surrogate motherhood is taking up the traditional discussion about the right to the own body, its possibilities and its limits. The scientific advances about assisted reproduction and women's exclusive ability to have children place the woman at the center of a debate that runs between her consideration as a vulnerable subject and her ability to decide in relation to her own body. In this context, the present paper analyzes the theoretical 1 Este artículo forma parte del Trabajo Fin de Máster realizado en el seno del Máster Universitario en Derecho Constitucional (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales/Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo), defendido el 28 de junio de 2016 y dirigido por la Dra. María Caterina la Barbera.

This article tracks surrogate mothers’ wage labor trajectories in the southern Indian city of Bangalore. From work in garment factories women sell their eggs and become surrogate mothers, after which they cycle back to garment factories. I show that while women are exploited in the intimate industries, they do not necessarily feel disempowered. Perversely, deepening forms of bodily commodification are experienced as deliverance from social degradation. Many surrogate mothers describe their social degradation because of gender; they have weaker positions in the home, they earn lesser wages than their husbands, and they are sexually harassed on the garment shop floor. Yet, they explain that it is precisely because of their womanly bodies they can earn large sums of money in Bangalore’s reproduction industry. Their ability to bring capital facilitates their capacity to negotiate powerful positions in their extended households, and solidify
their social positions.

In der vorliegenden Arbeit, die sich auf Deutschland, Österreich und Italien iVm der Judikatur des EGMR konzentriert, möchte man beleuchten, inwieweit und in welche Richtungen die Rechtsprechung Bezug auf Kindeswohlerwägungen nimmt, um die ihr vorgelegten Fällen zu entscheiden.
Nach einem einführenden Teil, der sich hauptsächlich mit der verwendeten Terminologie und der derzeitigen Rechtslage beschäftigt, werden die wichtigsten in die Thematik involvierten Rechtsinteressen grob skizziert. Anschließend wird dargestellt, wie die jüngste Rechtsprechung der drei analysierten Länder und des EGMR dazu tendiert, das Kindeswohl bzw das Wohl des jeweiligen Kindes als ausschlaggebendes Argument zu verwenden. Diese Forschungsergebnisse werden dann einer kritischen Analyse unterzogen. Die Arbeit wird mit einigen Gedanken de jure condendo abgeschlossen.

The essay offers a critical look at the recent Italian case law on same-sex parenting, investigating the relationship between the adult freedom of self-determination in the family sphere and the best interests of the child. After investigating the legal meaning of this formula as it is understood under the Italian legal system, the essay examines whether the original legislative framework aimed at the superiority of the child's interest has given way, in the case law, to an adult-centric path. Moreover, this topic represents an important challenge for the 'argumentation by principles' and for the subsidiary role of the legal institutions (Legislator and Courts), with regards to the freedom of self-determination of adults and the position of the child.

The article comments on a recent decision of the BGH (German Supreme Court) regarding the recognition of a “judgment of paternity” which was obtained by a German couple in California after concluding an agreement with a surrogate mother in California. The German law is strictly opposed to any form of surrogacy; therefore earlier courts had usually denied recognition in similar cases for ordre public reasons. In this decision the BGH decided on the matter for the first time. Contrary to the lower instance courts she recognized the “judgment” after a careful weightening of all rights and policies involved. He came to the conclusion that the preponderant interests of the child outweighed all interest opposing a denial of recognition. The article describes the legal background of surrogacy and cross-border parenthood law. Afterwards, it explains the decision and which controversial issues the BGH decided. Finally it gives an outlook on those questions the BGH did not decide and how she probably will decide if she keeps her line of argument.

L’esperienza è fatta di eventi. Alcuni si ripetono senza farsi notare; altri sono così radicali da cam­biare in modo decisivo i significati dell’esperienza stessa. La maternità surrogata rientra in questa seconda categoria, dando luogo a uno strano connubio tra ‘tecnologia’ e ‘carnalità’ in cui l’au­mento della prima segna lo scindersi e il rarefarsi della seconda.
Per questo la pratica della surro­gacy rappresenta qualcosa di mai visto prima: con essa non solo si appalta alla tecnologia l’atto generativo, ma anche il materno, che così viene scomposto, assegnando a tre figure femminili ciò che – nella generazione – avviene nel corpo dell’unica madre. Quanto accade durante i nove mesi della gravidanza esce semplicemente di sce­na, sulla base di quella stessa logica che conside­ra irrilevanti per il ‘prodotto’, una volta finito, le circostanze e le procedure della sua produzione. Eppure, i piani di lettura del fenomeno di sostitu­zione di maternità sono davvero molto più estesi. Tanto che, inavvertitamente, sotto il nostro sguar­do si va realizzando un mutamento di civiltà che espone lo statuto dei figli e di ciascuno al ‘defla­grare’ della differenza tra le ‘persone’ e le ‘cose’.
A rischio, così, è ciò che nell’etica ha il linguaggio della dignità e nelle relazioni quello dell’amore: il senso dell’unicità.

As the law of parentage is striving to meet the challenges of new reproductive technologies, dealing with cross-border surrogacies emerges as one of the most pressing topics in international family law. The current legal situation as regards surrogacy is quite diverse – throughout the world but also within Europe. Legal diversity has recently made a lot of people engage in so-called “procreative tourism”: Coming from a country with a rather strict approach, they commission women in one of the more liberal countries to carry a child for them, and once the baby is born, they try to take it to their home country, thereby obviating the surrogacy ban that prevents them from entrusting a surrogate mother at home. European courts struggle with a coherent approach on how to treat those citizens who went abroad to have a baby. Meanwhile, legal research and the Hague Conference on Private International Law think about a convention in order to ease cross-border recognition of surrogacy.

The best book for those perplexed by the philosophical and ethical conundrums of genetics in the 21st century. (CHOICE)

McGee develops a very powerful line of reasoning about genetic enhancement. (The Philadelphia Inquirer)

He combines a rich body of clinical material with informed pragmatic critique. (Mary Briody Mahowald, University of Chicago)

A pioneering, landmark work in pragmatic bioethics. (John J. Stuhr, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Penn State University)

This captivating book offers balanced new insights for individual decisions and for public policy. (John Lachs, Centennial Professor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University)

A welcome alternative to work that force fits the issues either to scholarly abstractions or to myths of popular culture. (Caroline Whitbeck, Ethics Center for Engineering & Science, MIT)

A provocative account of this emerging, cutting-edge issue that will greatly profit future commentators and policymakers. (John Robertson, School of Law, University of Texas)

A useful road map as we enter the complex territory of genetic medicine in the 21st century. (James M. Wilson, director, Institute for Human Gene Therapy, University of Pennsylvania)

A remarkably well-informed and sensitive exploration of the opportunities and challenges presented by the new science of genetics. (Jonathan D. Moreno, State University of New York, Brooklyn)

Extremely readable and provocative . . . succeeds at something that few scholars in Bioethics have even attempted: to speak in ordinary language and in a conversational voice about the nest of subtle issues that entangle new advances in human genetics. (Eric Juengst, Ph.D. Center for Biomedical Ethics, School of Medicine)

McGee is one of the most energetic and inquisitive writers in the emerging 'next generation' of bioethicists . . . His work is interesting, important, and has the kind of self-reflective courage we need to face these issues squarely. (Margaret P. Battin, University of Utah)

McGee's application of the pragmatic method to issues in bioethics is both timely and effective. McGee's excellent final chapters will give students of all levels a perspective that cannot be found in other books of the kind. (Teaching Philosophy)

McGee's book breathes all the virtues of a pioneering work. it puts the issue of human genetic engineering in a fresh perspective, draws the attention to many valuable points, and raises a number of important questions. (Cornelis de Waal, Newsletter of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy Newsletter Of The Society For The Advancement Of American)

McGee's well-written and intriguing new book adds little to the content . . . .he does offer a unique and much needed practical approach to the critical analysis of the relevant issues. (Timothy Caulfield, Universtiy of Alberta Phil Review, Vol. Xvii N0.. 4-6 Aug.-Dec. 97)

McGee's book is an excellent introduction to the issues and he provides especially good treatments of the nature/nurture debate and the relationship between genetics and allocation decisions. Many will find his views provocative. His work is breezy and fun to read. (L.M.P. Ethics, Jan. 1998)

So where do ordinary folk, faced with a life-or-death decision, get some useful information? This book might be a good starting ground. (Beverly Kelley, California Lutheran University Sunday, June 29, 1997)

The philosophical tradition of American pragmatism has had a fresh life in recent years. In McGee's hands it is richer, more suggestive . . . Not everyone will find The Perfect Baby acceptable, but McGee will give the opponents reason to pause. Weneed that kind of initiative, and McGee's book will provoke some useful, much needed debate. (Daniel Callahan, The Hastings Center)

Finally— a good book about genetics— that makes these fascinating issues understandable to the families who need to know. (N. P. R.'S Voices In The Family)

. . . useful to just about everyone who must grapple with the new genetics. (The Washington Times)

The book is appropriately directed to a diverse audience and makes refreshing use of plain language to address relevant issues present in the choices we must now make in everyday life. (Bruce C. Trafnell, Genetic Therapy, Inc. Dept. of Virology Nature Medicine, Vol. 3 No. 6)

Published in 1985, The Handmaid’s Tale is Margaret Atwood’s
most famous work and her first dystopian novel, since all her
previous fiction had adjusted to the conventions of realism. In
general the plot of any dystopia should be based on factuality, or
in other words, it has to be a plausible representation of the
future of a concrete society. However, either when the novel was
published or now that more than thirty years have passed, there
is no such thing as “handmaids.” Nothing of the sort exist in any
democratic country (Kay n.p.). However, as Chaterjee points out,
there are many “disturbing” overlaps between Atwood’s
handmaids’ struggle and the real experience and events that take
place in contemporary surrogacy agreements. (n.p.). This paper
examines Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale from a 21stcentury posthumanist perspective, which discusses the economic
and ethical implications and no insignificant shocking similarities
between the handmaids in the novel and our present-day
surrogate mothers.

Scholars have long debated the relationship between morality and the market. Some argue that morality tempers market interests, while others argue that the market has its own moral order. Meanwhile, feminist scholars have argued that a false binary between altruism, family, and intimacy on the one hand, and the cold calculus of the market on the other, is based in gender ideologies. Norms around motherhood, in particular, emphasize self-sacrifice, love, and altruism in opposition to self-interested market logics. Commercial surrogacy blurs the line between family and
commerce and is therefore an ideal setting for studying tensions between altruism and profit. Drawing on ethnographic research and interviews with 114 actors in
the Mexican surrogacy industry, I demonstrate that treating altruism and commercialism as dichotomous can further market interests by preserving the moral palatability and profitability of the industry while perpetuating power asymmetries rooted in gender, race, class, and nationality between surrogate mothers and intended parents.

The goal of this paper is to argue that, while commercial surrogacy is not inherently a source of oppression for women, the context in which this practice currently takes place can have noxious effects on the women who become surrogates.

Writing sample for graduate admissions in 2015

Otra subrogación es posible aborda el polémico tema de la subrogación gestante, cuyo debate es aún incipiente en nuestro país, desde el marxismo, el feminismo y la teoría queer, y lanza un grito radical en favor de la justicia gestacional.

Ampliamente documentado, el libro analiza las condiciones materiales en las que actualmente se desarrolla la subrogación a nivel internacional, y dedica una especial atención a la prestigiosa clínica Akanksha, fundada y dirigida por la doctora Patel en el estado indio de Guyarat, que en algunas ocasiones ha sido definida como la fábrica de bebés del mundo.

Partiendo de la base de que la gestación y la crianza son siempre un trabajo productivo, y como tal merece ser retribuido, Sophie Lewis defiende la subrogación sin límites y se muestra crítica con el marco liberal-capitalista en el que se da en la actualidad, cuyas argucias pone al descubierto.

Con la subrogación en el centro, y la gestación cíborg como perspectiva, desarma la familia por diversas que sean sus formas, y la concepción tan largamente asentada de que la prole pertenece a quienes comparten su material genético. La crianza colectiva, sostiene, transformará radicalmente las actuales nociones de parentesco y nos ayudará a comprender que se necesita a la comunidad entera para criar a un bebé.

International commercial surrogacy (ICS) is a growing phenomenon in which the dynamics of global economic inequality between women are often reproduced in the effort to produce children. ICS, in which a commissioning parent(s) goes abroad to hire a surrogate mother to carry a child for them, confounds a number of 'feminist' interpretations and evaluations of the practice: while some believe it provides poor women with an opportunity to use their bodies to increase their wealth while providing a service, others see it as outsourcing reproduction through economic exploitation of surrogate mothers. ICS thus raises interesting questions not only about the commodi-fication of bodies – women's and children's – but the naturalisation of the woman– child dyad premised on the notion of motherhood. With new assisted reproductive technologies (ART) such as trans-border gestational surrogacy, successful physical reproduction in the form of giving birth to a child is actually a severing link between the surrogate mother who gives birth and the child, who is not genetically linked to the surrogate mother. Surrogacy thus challenges the 'natural' equation of woman/ child with mother/ child, shifting those relations through financial transaction. Moreover, 'the best interests of the child' are often invoked in ICS arrangements to defend political positions that tend to reify the 'natural' genetic family – construed as heteronormative and patriarchal. The best-interest principle of children's rights also highlights the lack of consideration for the actual politics of childhood in surrogacy...

This article critiques the complex hybrid model that has been proposed for regulating domestic surrogacy arrangements in Ireland, and the reasons why this model came about. It proposes an alternative model for regulating surrogacy, one that is in operation elsewhere and achieves a better balance between the rights of the surrogate, the intending parents and, most importantly, the surrogate-born child. The proposed establishment of the National Surrogacy Register, its interaction with the Register of Births and the issuing of 'surrogacy certificates' is also analysed, and a far less complex means of respecting the surrogate-born child's right to knowledge of its identity is proposed. The article concludes that Ireland's current legislative proposals for regulating surrogacy need to be substantially revised before ever being placed on the statute book. In their present form, they are so restrictive that, rather than facilitating domestic surrogacy arrangements, they are far more likely to discourage them.

Although estimated as a multi-billion dollar industry, surrogacy has still not found prominence in legislation in India, neither does it feature in the nation’s public discourse. This short introduction explores how surrogacy is practiced and understood in India and across the world. Why is a surrogate hired? Why does a woman carry a child for an infertile couple? Why is there a need to delve deeper into the motivations for and notions attached with entering a surrogacy arrangement for all involved?
This book focuses on the relationship between surrogacy and issues of reproduction, kinship, women’s bodies, assisted reproductive technologies, and transnational reproductive tourism. At the same time it places surrogacy in the context of mythology, popular imagination, and legal and public discourses. In exploring the differences between various forms of surrogacy—commercial and altruistic, genetic and gestational, domestic and transnational—the book seeks to move beyond these opposing dualities and begin a dialogue regarding the practice.

This book takes a reproductive justice approach to argue that surrogacy as practised in the contemporary neoliberal biomarkets crosses the humanitarian thresholds of feminism. Drawing on her ethnographic work with surrogate mothers, intended parents and medical practitioners in India, the author shows the dark connections between poverty, gender, human rights violations and indignity in the surrogacy market. In a developing country like India, bio-technologies therefore create reproductive objects of certain female bodies while promoting an image of reproductive liberation for others. India is a classic example for how far these biomarkets can exploit vulnerabilities for individual requirements in the garb of reproductive liberty. This critical book refers to a range of liberal, radical and postcolonial feminist frameworks on surrogacy, and questions the individual reproductive rights perspective as an approach to examine global surrogacy. It introduces ‘humanitarian feminism’ as an alternative concept to bridge feminist factions divided on contextual and ideological grounds. It hopes to build a global feminist solidarity drawing on a ‘reproductive justice’ approach by recognizing the histories of race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, age and immigration oppression in all communities. This work is of interest to researchers and students of medical sociology and anthropology, gender studies, bioethics, and development studies.

Introducción. En torno a las técnicas de reproducción asistida todo es discutido, y no solo desde el punto de vista legal. Una de las más polémicas es la llamada convencionalmente maternidad subrogada, que es rechazada por un número importante de países, dentro y fuera de la Unión Europea, mientras que es admitida en algunos otros. Estas diferencias en la regulación hacen que exista un creciente turismo reproductivo desde los países que no permiten los contratos de gestación por subrogación, hacia los países que sí los admiten, en algunos de los cuales ha llegado a ser un lucrativo negocio: naturalmente, la idea es volver al país de origen con los niños nacidos a consecuencia de ese contrato, y obtener su reconocimiento legal como hijos de quienes los encargaron. Esta pretensión es muy habitualmente rechazada por los países que no admiten la maternidad subrogada, por entender que la operación entraña un fraude a su propio Derecho. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH) ha tenido ocasión de afrontar en varias decisiones esta cuestión: en las páginas que siguen se va a dar noticia de la doctrina sentada por dicho. El TEDH se ha ocupado de estos problemas, por un lado en las sentencias recaídas en los asuntos Mennesson (demanda 65192/11) –que utilizaré como referencia por ser la primera– y Labassée (demanda 65941/11), ambas de 26 de junio de 2014, seguidas después por la sentencia conjunta en los asuntos Foulon (demanda 9063/14) y Bouvet (demanda 10410/14), de 21 de julio de 2016. Por otro lado, debe ser mencionada la sentencia dictada por la Gran Sala en el asunto Paradiso (demanda 25358/12), de 24 de enero de 2017, que revoca la sentencia pronunciada por la Sala el 27 de enero de 2015. Conviene diferenciarlas porque los hechos no son coincidentes, y tampoco lo es la decisión final del TEDH. El asunto Mennesson. En este caso, el matrimonio formado por Dominique y Sylvie Mennesson, ante sus problemas de infertilidad, decidió recurrir a la maternidad subrogada (prohibida por el Derecho francés) en California, donde esa técnica es legal. El marido aportó los espermatozoides, que fecundaron un óvulo de donante, y los embriones resultantes fueron implantados en el útero de la madre gestante, que dio a luz gemelos. El Tribunal Supremo de California había decretado previamente que los gemelos tendrían como padre genético al Sr. Mennesson, y como madre legal a la Sra. Mennesson. El consulado francés en Los Ángeles rehusó inscribir a los niños en el Registro civil como hijos de los Mennesson. Después de un largo y complejo proceso judicial, el Tribunal Supremo francés acabó rechazando definitivamente dicha inscripción, sentencia que fue recurrida ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos por el matrimonio Mennesson y por los gemelos nacidos a consecuencia del contrato de maternidad subrogada. De este relato me interesa destacar ahora: 1) la existencia de un vínculo biológico entre el Sr. Mennesson, que aportó los gametos, y los gemelos nacidos como consecuencia de la maternidad subrogada: él es, biológicamente, su padre; 2) la duración de la convivencia entre los niños y el matrimonio Mennesson, que se prolongó durante más de 10 años, si se cuenta hasta la sentencia del TEDH; 3) que fueron parte en el procedimiento no solo el matrimonio que encargó la gestación, sino también los niños nacidos a consecuencia de ella. En su sentencia, el TEDH analiza si ha habido violación del art. 8 de la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos 1 , y llega a la conclusión final de que sí la hubo. En concreto, vale la pena resaltar las siguientes ideas: 1 " 1. Toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de su vida privada y familiar, de su domicilio y de su correspondencia. 2. No podrá haber injerencia de la autoridad pública en el ejercicio de este derecho, sino en tanto en cuanto esta injerencia esté prevista por la ley y constituya una medida que, en una sociedad democrática, sea necesaria para la seguridad nacional, la