Navy Matters: Littoral War Zone

Showing posts with label Littoral War Zone. Show all posts

Monday, January 2, 2023

What Happened To Streetfighter?

Let’s start the new year with a post that may ruffle a few feathers and contradict some dearly held beliefs..

The LCS is an abject failure. Even its staunchest supporters have been reduced to talking not about what LCS is but what it might have been. Yes, the LCS failed but, oh, Streetfighter! The Mighty Streetfighter! If only the LCS had remained true to the Streetfighter concept, what a magnificent combat vessel we would have had!

Streetfighter … it has assumed the status of myth and legend; capable of total domination of the seas and able to defeat vast fleets of the most powerful ships. It would have ensured world peace, solved global hunger, and established democracy throughout the known universe! … And now we have the LCS. What happened? Where did Streetfighter go? Why was its self-evident superiority not developed?

Streetfighter?

Let’s take a look and see if we can figure out what happened.

Here’s a timeline to help keep track and make sense of the various events that led from the origin of Streetfighter to the LCS we have today … or was it the reverse?

Streetfighter / LCS Development Timeline
	1987	SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21^st Century) predecessor studies begin
Jan	1991	End of the Cold War
	1992	DD-21 / SC-21 officially begins
	1993	Navy begins to focus on small combatant ships (approx. time period)
	1995	LCS foundational design wargames (Joint Multi-Warfare Analytical Game) take place in mid-1990’s
Nov	1999	Cebrowski and Hughes publish “Rebalancing the Fleet” which is the first mention of Streetfighter
Jul	2001	Cebrowski unveils Streetfighter ship in Wall Street Journal article by Greg Jaffe
Oct	2001	Cebrowski appointed to head Office of Force Transformation by SedDef Donald Rumsfeld
Late	2001	DD-21 terminated
Apr	2003	Lockheed Martin shows initial LCS concept offering
	2003	Adm. Clark declares LCS his number one budget priority
May	2004	Initial LCS construction contracts awarded
Jun	2005	LCS Freedom laid
Nov	2005	Cebrowski died

As we see from the timeline, the end of the Cold War, in 1991, left the Navy with a fleet of large combatants and no peer enemy. Faced with potentially declining budgets, the Navy opted to create a new enemy which it dubbed ‘littoral’. Despite having absolutely no evidence that ‘littoral’ required anything new or unique, the Navy latched onto it as a rationale for continued funding (see, “Littoral Warfare – Is There Such A Thing?”). The solution to defeating the littoral bogeyman was the LCS, according to the Navy. Well, wait ... what about Streetfighter? Wasn’t it the answer to the littoral challenge?

Here’s where we start to see the myths surrounding Streetfighter.

One of the [many] misconceptions surrounding Streetfighter was that it preceded the LCS. In fact, as we see in the timeline, the LCS originated with a series of wargames in the mid-1990’s (see, “LCS Conceptual Origin”). The first mention of Streetfighter does not occur until 1999, some four or five years later.

Whether Cebrowski/Hughes got their inspiration for Streetfighter from the LCS origin games or whether they developed their concept independently is unknown. I can find no reference to Cebrowski having participated in or referencing the LCS origins.

In fact, I can find no actual link between Streetfighter and LCS. There is no document stating that one flowed from, or morphed into, the other. As best I can tell, the two concepts never overlapped. Possibly there was informal, undocumented cross pollination but, if so, there’s no evidence of it.

Again, the timeline demonstrates that the LCS concept arose prior to Streetfighter as evidenced by the mid-1990’s design wargames. Streetfighter first appeared several years after the original LCS design beginnings. Thus, all the questions and moanings about the LCS failing to ‘stick’ to the original Streetfighter concept appear to be after-the-fact fantasies and reversed fantasies, at that!

To sum up, the Navy’s official response to the end of the Cold War was, initially, the DD-21/SC-21 program which began in 1992. However, within a few years, small combatant studies and wargames had begun and the SC-21 program was on the road to termination. The LCS concept took hold and quickly began to metamorphose into the directionless, do-everything-but-do-it-poorly fantasy ship that we have today. Streetfighter appears to have been a very brief, parallel but not overlapping, side road on the LCS development path.

Now, let’s take a closer look at Cebrowski and Hughes article, “Rebalancing the Fleet”, that first mentions the word ‘Streetfighter’.

“Rebalancing the Fleet”

Cebrowski and Hughes published their landmark piece describing a future fleet structure that incorporated small combatants dubbed Streetfighters, in Nov-1999.

While the piece discussed several important, noteworthy issues such as the cost-risk relationship, it failed to offer any details and relied heavily on non-existent technologies and unproven concepts for its envisioned success. The article was more of a marketing brochure than a substantive technical analysis. For example,

Foremost, Streetfighter will be able to clear out the clutter and sort friend from foe.[1]

That’s a great marketing campaign slogan but offers no actual, technical insight or methodologies for its claimed ability to “clear out the clutter and sort friend from foe”.

Another myth about Streetfighter is that it was a single, specific ship. However, in the ‘Rebalancing the Fleet’ article, Streetfighter is described as a family of ‘capabilities’, not a ship.

The Economy B force is a family of capabilities—often referred to as the "Streetfighter Concept"—that, in conjunction with power-projection forces, will enable the U.S. Navy to operate anytime, anywhere … [1]

Indeed, Cebrowski/Hughes never actually described what Streetfighter was beyond generalities. There are suggestions of vessels in the 300-1200 ton range with no specifics. There was no description of size, speed, weapons fit, sensors, etc. This has led every subsequent naval analyst to assign their own vision to Streetfighter, just as happened to the LCS.

The reality is that ‘Streetfighter’ seems to have originally been a reference to a concept of a family of smaller vessels acting as a group. It was described as a ‘family of capabilities’, not as a type of ship.

A noteworthy follow up piece by Hughes addresses Streetfighter concerns that were raised at the time.

“22 Questions for Streetfighter”

Hughes, himself, offers criticisms of the Streetfighter concept although he does so in what he believes are positive statements. For example,

One of the first things learned by a task analysis of coastal operations is that low-flying aircraft, not big ships or submarines, are the alternative to streetfighters.[2]

Thus, Hughes, himself, offers a far more cost effective and combat effective alternative to Streetfighter in the form of aircraft!

In attempting to extol the virtues of Streetfighter, Hughes falls back on the common claim that the enemy will be paralyzed with fear at the thought of a single vessel roaming undetected no matter how individually incapable that vessel might be.

… if there is a flock of small ships, each powerfully armed yet hard to detect, then the enemy will live in continuing fear over whether he has found them all.

An enemy probably also will see deviltry and cunning in a squadron of streetfighters.[2]

This is, again, great as a marketing slogan but woefully short on combat reality.

Regarding Streetfighter’s self-defense,

A 300-ton streetfighter would depend on stealth characteristics, soft kill, numbers, and the ability to lose itself "in the clutter." It could carry light antiair weapons such as Stingers. The design philosophy should be that visual detection of it will predominate, no present missile guidance system will detect and home on it, and added safely comes from confronting an enemy with a swarm of targets.[2]

Even a larger 1200 ton Streetfighter was recognized as having inherent defensive problems,

A larger version of 1,200 tons might carry not only soft kill systems but also deployable decoys and Rolling Airframe missile (RAM) or the equivalent, while accepting that low observability and active defense are conflicting characteristics.[2]

As Hughes recognizes, you can’t defend without broadcasting (radar) your position and if you broadcast your position, you die since you have no credible defense.

Hughes does offer one brilliant and prescient observation,

The biggest danger is that streetfighter will be conceived as a junior variation of the projection navy: the same habitability standards, spacious bridge, electronically comprehensive combat information center, offices, and paperwork; a galley with cooks and mess cooks; defenses that are supposed to defeat every attack; stocks for months at sea; standard damage-control teams and procedures; and a guarantee for each young captain that one grounding or failed inspection will send him packing.[2]

Indeed, this is exactly what happened to the LCS!

Analysis

‘Wired’ website offers interesting thoughts about the lack of CONOPS, which doomed the LCS.

The confusion over the LCS' roles has gone on so long it has created a bizarre feedback loop, with the Navy, its shipbuilders, the Pentagon and America's regional commanders each developing plans and technologies for the LCS based on conflicting assumptions. The result is a warship theoretically capable of almost anything, and increasingly optimized for nothing.[3]

This vagueness and lack of a concept of operations also extended to Streetfighter.

For all Cebrowski's and Hughes' passion about small-ship theory, and Clark's and Rumsfeld's determination to build the diminutive vessels, no one had clearly defined exactly what a small warship should look like, and what it should and shouldn't do. On at least one key point – expendability – the strategists and the mainstream Navy were totally at odds.[3]

This fundamental flaw – the lack of a viable CONOPS - continues to this day and not just for the LCS but for any conceptual small combatant. I have yet to hear any viable CONOPS for any small combatant in US service. Supporters of small combatants are wildly enthusiastic about the ships, themselves (meaning, the weapons, speed, stealth, and other physical characteristics), but totally ignore the fundamental question of how the ship will be used.

This was the problem with Streetfighter.

This was the problem with the LCS.

This is the problem with any small combatant.

We’ve thoroughly discussed the problems that arise from the lack of a CONOPS when a ship is designed. Well, here’s someone else’s discussion of the problem as it relates to the LCS.

The only thing everyone agreed on was that the LCS would sail close to shore. But no one specified how close "close" really was. One mile? Twenty-five miles?

As theorists, Hughes and Cebrowski never had to be specific. Rumsfeld, for his part, was notorious for ignoring the nitty-gritty details of running the military. Clark tried his best to keep his boss happy and grow the fleet.

"As a result, the Navy’s leadership was forced to test out arguments for the new ship on the fly," [DepSecDef] Work recalled. "Sometimes the LCS was labeled transformational because of its high speed ... other times it was because the ship was designed to defeat 'asymmetric' littoral threats." On still other occasions, the Navy chose to emphasize LCS' supposed "transformational impact on the American shipbuilding industry."

"The constantly changing rationale for the new ship helped to confuse both the Navy’s internal and external audiences," Work concluded.

In short, the circumstances of the LCS' genesis were a perfect recipe for a shipbuilding fiasco.[3]

And the utterly predictable result occurred.

The [LCS] plan was, in a word, ambitious – which was not what Cebrowski and Hughes had in mind when they argued for the Navy to add smaller, simpler, cheaper ships. In the course of just four years, the Navy fought, embraced, and then completely corrupted the small-ship philosophy. Instead of compact, brute-simple coastal brawlers, it would get over-inflated, gas-guzzling, gutless ships dependent on ultrahigh-tech gizmos.

In the absence of clear missions and realistic capabilities, LCS became everything to everyone, as long as no one thought too hard about anything.[3]

More generally, the following illustrates a (the?) fundamental flaw in all the ‘streetfighter’, small combatant type ship designs and force structures. It makes the assumption that large ships are unable to function in a littoral scenario – an assumption that is utterly unsupported by any evidence and, in fact, a great deal of evidence exists to support the exact opposite conclusion! For example, the destroyers at Normandy that sailed right up to shore to do battle with German shore batteries conclusively proved that large, ocean-going ships had no problems operating and fighting successfully in shallow waters.

In the late 1990s, the Navy realized it had a problem. Its 9,000-ton cruisers and destroyers, inherited from the Cold War, were great for open-ocean warfare against the Soviets. But the same ships were considered too vulnerable to safely operate in the shallow, crowded, chaotic coastal waters – aka, the "littorals" – that were fast becoming the next naval battleground.

Here, dangers might include gun-armed speedboats, missile-firing fast-attack craft, small submarines and sea mines, plus antiship missiles and aircraft launched from land.

The preceding assumption, that large, ocean-going ships can’t function and survive in shallow waters is valid only if one cedes all offensive operation to the opponent … which is exactly what we’ve done; witness Iran’s constant harassment (to include mining of merchant ships – an act of war or piracy or both). If, on the other hand, one retains the right of offensive action, any large, ocean-going combatant can wipe away littoral threats with no effort.

Conclusion

It seems clear that the common belief that Streetfighter preceded the LCS is incorrect. The corollary belief that LCS ‘abandoned’ the Streetfighter design is also false as there is no evidence that the LCS ever had any formal connection with Streetfighter. Further, Streetfighter was never a Navy program of record and, therefore, there was never any official embrace of Streetfighter other than, perhaps, some informal and undocumented hope that Cebrowski’s appointment by Rumsfeld to head his pet Office of Force Transformation might result in some degree of incorporation of the Streetfighter concept into the LCS. By that time, however, the LCS was already pretty well set, at least in concept.

Most importantly, Streetfighter appears to have never been given any definitive form in the way of specifications. In fact, I can find no Cebrowski-Hughes artist’s concept drawing of what the Streetfighter vessel might have looked like. The lack of any formal description has given rise to endless versions proposed by subsequent naval commentators but none have the slightest connection to Cebrowski and Hughes’ concept which, indeed, never actually specified an actual vessel – only a ‘family of capabilities’.

Thus, all the romanticism about Streetfighter is just that: romantic notions that were never actually espoused by Cebrowski and Hughes.

All subsequent Streetfighter discussion has been pure, individual speculation with no attached CONOPS – just a vague array of marketing slogans by people who are more enamored of ship weapons than any useful description of how a Streetfighter would actually function. If you want to begin to get an understanding of just how flawed the small combatant concept is, read the post, “Undisputed and Unaccepted”, which discusses some of the flaws in Hughes small combatant concept as described in his fleet tactics book.

We can blame the LCS for a host of failings but failing to follow the design of Streetfighter is not one of them.

Disclaimer: Information from the beginnings of the LCS and Streetfighter are hard to find. If someone can produce information I haven’t found, I’ll gladly consider it and modify my conclusions, if appropriate.

________________________________

[1]USNI Proceedings, “Rebalancing the Fleet”, Vice Admiral A. K. Cebrowski, USN, and Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.), Volume 125/11/1,161, Nov-1999

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1999/november/rebalancing-fleet

[2]USNI Proceedings, “22 Questions for Streetfighter”, Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.), Vol. 126/2/1,164, Feb-2000

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2000/february/22-questions-streetfighter

[3]https://www.wired.com/2011/08/future-warship-ran-aground/

Monday, September 30, 2019

Heading Off The Tracks

At its most basic, our armed forces exist to fight and win wars of existential concern: true threats to our national security and existence. This means peer wars.

Yes, we assign many other tasks to our armed forces but those are lesser concerns and, frankly, the wisdom of many of them is suspect. But, I digress …

Our armed forces exist to fight and win peer wars. Every plan we make, every item we buy, and every exercise we conduct must be run through the filter of, ‘how will this enhance our peer war capability?’. If we can’t answer that with a good, solid rationale then we shouldn’t do it. Yes, we can plan, equip, and train for lesser contingencies after we’ve completely nailed down our peer war capabilities and nothing we do should detract from our peer war capabilities.

With that in mind, let’s take a look at the latest nonsense and drivel being put forth by the Navy/Marines.

Consider this statement,

The Navy and Marine Corps recently used a new Littoral Combat Force concept to command and control units spread over 2.2 million square miles of land and sea, in the latest demonstration of what a future operation near and on the shore might look like. (1)

Outstanding! A demonstration of future peer war combat capabilities! I mean, what else could such a momentous effort be geared towards, right? But, hey, how about some more detail? Okay, there’s this:

After the two services signed out the Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) concept in 2017, they’ve been trying to understand what gear they’d need to support moving small units of Marines around the littorals to take a beach, establish sea control from ashore, and more. (1)

Uh, wait … what now? Small units of Marines? How is that related to a high end, peer war with China? How are small units going to defeat China? I’m getting a bad feeling about this.

There was also no command and control model that adequately reflected that, under LOCE, there would no longer be a traditional blue-in-support-of-green or green-in-support-of-blue relationship. Rather, ships at sea would provide cover for Marines trying to get ashore, who could then set up temporary anti-ship missile launchers and contribute to sea control from ashore … (1)

Ships at sea provide cover for Marines trying to get ashore who then establish sea control??? This is classic Catch-22, circular logic and we've discussed it before (see, "Land To Enable Landings????"). We have to land Marines in order to establish sea control but if we can land Marines don’t we already have sea control? The Marines have stated before that they envision landing and establishing sea control so as to enable landings. Landing to enable landing? Again, circular logic! If you need to establish sea control to enable landings (and you do!) then how do you land the Marines who will establish the sea control? I know … I’ve got a headache, too, but this is the Marine’s latest vision of future war.

Surely this major concept and core foundation for future war can’t all be about small units, can it? Well, there’s this,

Last year, the Navy and Marines first tested out a key tenet of LOCE: the Littoral Combat Group, which would combine a traditional ARG and embarked Marine force with at least one surface combatant … (1)

So … a key tenet … an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG/MEU) plus one escort ship? That’s the big game changer for future war? This is not peer war combat power. If we’re going to war against anything more than an irate Boy Scout troop we’re going to be in trouble!

I think the real problem and the real goal is incorporated in the following statement.

He’s [CNO Gilday] certainly intrigued by that, and I [Expeditionary Strike Group 3 Commander Rear Adm. Cedric Pringle] owe him a few things as we capture all of our lessons learned and try to rewrite and organize the Navy’s integrated maritime power and talk about how we fight and how we also render assistance” in a disaster relief type of scenario. [emphasis added] (1)

You see it right there at the end of the statement. I think this is all geared towards the ‘render assistance in a disaster relief type of scenario’ because it sure isn’t geared towards peer war! Troublingly, the Navy does not seem to see peer war as a either a responsibility or a likelihood. Instead, they seem focused on very low end threats, humanitarian response operations, and budget expansion.

Of course, what would all this be without some good buzzword bingo?

“I suspect that when he [Marine Commandant] comes out with his guidance here real soon, there’s going to be a heavy portion of it that discusses naval integration and how the Navy and Marine Corps and the Coast Guard can work better as an integrated American seapower team.” (1)

An ‘integrated American seapower team’! I’m bursting with pride! In fact, I think I just wet myself a little.

What a bunch of garbage all around. We have no concept of how to wage a peer war and, far worse, we seem to have absolutely no interest in trying to develop a concept. The Navy and Marines seem to believe that peer war is not even a possibility which must make the Chinese very happy.

The part I don’t understand is why the Navy is allowing the Marines to drive this effort. It’s the Marines who came up with the Catch-22 ‘land to enable landings’ idiocy and they’re, somehow, getting the Navy to play along. Baffling. Our Navy and Marines are most definitely headed off the tracks.

_____________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Navy, Marines Practice ‘Littoral Combat Force’ Construct in Alaska”, Megan Eckstein, 23-Sep-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/09/23/navy-marines-practice-littoral-combat-force-construct-in-alaska

Monday, January 7, 2019

Littoral Combat Group Analysis

We recently noted the Navy’s formation of a so-called Littoral Combat Group which consisted of an LPD-17 class amphibious ship and a Burke class destroyer. On the face of it, It was a bafflingly idiotic concept but there was very little information available about the concept so we had to hold off on drawing any definitive conclusions. We even speculated that it might have been a one-time public relations stunt with a catchy name rather than an actual combat concept. Now, a little more information has become available and the concept does, indeed, seem to be an actual combat concept that the Navy is testing out.

The Navy deployed a new ship pairing – a destroyer (DDG-51) and an amphibious transport dock (LPD-17) – to test out a new concept that could supplement amphibious squadrons and surface action groups as a formation in future operations. (1)

Okay, it seems the Navy is serious about this as a combat group (again, are two ships really a group?). What was the immediate goal of the deployment? According to the Navy,

The goal of the LCG-1 deployment was to work out the command and control, which placed a Navy captain as the commodore of two ships … (1)

Is this for real? The Navy has to “work out” how to command and control two ships?????!! Have things gotten that bad that we don’t already know how to command and control two ships?

How complex is command of two ships? Well, apparently, it requires a staff … and not a small one.

LCG-1 was led by Capt. Ken Coleman, the PHIBRON 3 commodore, and included a staff of 30 to 35 on temporary assignment and embarked on Somerset. (1)

It requires a staff of more than 30 people to command and control two ships?????!!

A commodore? Seriously? For two ships? Why not just put an admiral in command – we’ve got enough of them sitting around with nothing productive to do.

Well, since the Navy seems serious about this lunacy, let’s go ahead and analyze the concept.

Combat Power – What combat power does an LPD and a Burke have? An LPD is the smallest of the three ships that typically make up an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and, therefore, carries around a quarter of a MEU and almost no aviation (an LPD has room for a single MV-22 in the hangar). What is a quarter of a MEU going to do in combat? They could deal with an angry Boy Scout troop, I guess but that’s about it. Remember the Somalia (Blackhawk Down) debacle? Small units simply haven’t got the combat power to deal with actual combat. That pretty well limits the “group” to very low end, non-combat scenarios which, of course, is at odds with the word “combat” in the group description.

The Burke, itself, has combat capability, of course, but it has that without the LPD and, in fact, is less capable with the LPD than without because it has to protect the LPD as well as itself, thus diluting the Burke’s combat capability somewhat.

The pair have no more credible combat capability than the Burke alone. This is stupidity on a plate.

Risk – Doctrinally, the Navy won’t risk ships within 25-50 miles of land so how will this pair conduct operations? Again, a quarter of a MEU, with no significant aviation element, can’t transfer power ashore from 25-50 miles out in any peer level combat scenario, even setting aside the ineffectiveness of a quarter of a MEU. Again, that limits the “group” to inshore, non-combat scenarios.

This grouping also puts a rare and valuable amphibious ship in harm’s way for no gain in combat power.

Thus, there seems to be no combat enhancement to this “group” over and above the Burke, itself. So why is the Navy even looking at this? I have no idea. From the article, we see the supposed guidance that the Navy is operating under.

The Navy and Marine Corps are revising their concepts to align with the National Defense Strategy that focuses on warfare against a peer or near-peer adversary. (1)

That makes this all the more baffling. How does a single LPD and a single Burke contribute to warfare against a peer?

Navy leadership needs to be drug tested.

________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Navy Tests ‘Littoral Combat Group’ Concept That Pairs DDG, LPD in South America Deployment”, Megan Eckstein, 3-Jan-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/01/03/navy-tests-littoral-combat-group-concept-that-pairs-ddg-lpd-in-south-america-deployment

Saturday, August 23, 2014

New Navy Fighting Machine

Many commenters have, over the last couple of years, made reference to the New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) (Naval Postgraduate School, “The New Navy Fighting Machine”, Hughes et al, Aug 2009) as a viable and desirable alternative to the current naval force structure. It’s time to take a closer look at the concept. This is a long post but, hey, the NNFM document is long!

The first aspect of the NNFM that requires understanding is the definition of the role of the Navy under the NNFM which is quite different from the Navy’s current role. The document introduces this change in role,

“… a substantially different American Navy, the purposes of which were, first, to influence

China

at one end of the conflict spectrum, and second, to support “small wars” on the ground and conduct maritime constabulary operations6 in many places around the world.”

This is the key to understanding and evaluating the NNFM. The NNFM is envisioned to serve two purposes,

Influence China
Support small wars

Note the word “influence”. It is key to understanding the NNFM force structure.

As the document states in closing,

“… the most important goal of this study is to describe a more distributed combat capability for sea control and the projection of national influence from the sea.”

Notable is the change in direction away from an emphasis on fighting large, regional wars. As the document states,

“Our study conjectures the ships of such a new fighting fleet, … is affordable because it puts less emphasis on fighting large regional wars than in the past two decades.”

However, this change in emphasis has its own potential flaws and any fleet premised on these flawed points may, itself, be flawed. For example, the document goes on to say,

“… the threat of striking the Chinese mainland seems less and less valuable as a way to influence affairs in East Asia.”

That is an utterly ridiculous statement and concept. The threat of striking the Chinese mainland is, ultimately, the only viable threat that can influence them, militarily. Physical or economic destruction are the only credible threats any country will respond to. If the military rules out physical destruction then the military can have no influence on

China

which directly contradicts the initial premise that the one of the two main roles for this new Navy is to influence

China

Moving on, NNFM postulates several components of the strategy of influence, some good and some questionable. For example,

“Forward offense with many submarines, to sink Chinese warships and merchant ships and lay mines near Chinese ports.”

This is an example of a good component. Submarine warfare offers the

an effective combat force that is able to operate in the A2/AD zone with relative impunity. Submarines offer the

a substantial advantage and we should emphasize it and build upon it.

Another component,

“Affordable numbers of small, lethal inshore combatants capable of demonstrating commitment to defend, alternatively, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, or Malaysia.“

This statement is an example of a questionable component. No conceivable small combatant is going to have the power to counter the type of attacks they would likely see. Pitting patrol vessels or missile boats against cruise/ballistic missiles and aircraft is a lopsided mismatch, to say the least. The likelihood of appropriate levels of combat for these small combatants is, at best, questionable, and, more likely, unlikely.

The document further pursues this emphasis on small combatants by postulating their use in potentially high risk, high end combat situations.

“Hold open the option of putting a large number (say, twenty) of new, small, lethal American coastal combatants in survivable locations on the

Taiwan

coast. (Thirty are included in the green water component of the new fighting machine.) This is less risky than deploying a high-value CVN task force near Taiwan to demonstrate American commitment to resist an invasion, should we chose to do so.”

This is just an illogical concept. While there is a certain validity to using low end, expendable vessels as a tripwire, they will certainly not demonstrate our “commitment to resist an invasion”. A handful of easily destroyed, nearly defenseless vessels hardly demonstrate any commitment to resistance. Arguably, their presence could be interpreted as a lack of commitment and a signal to the Chinese to take action. After all, if we weren’t willing to risk a carrier group why would we respond to the sinking of a handful of small vessels?

The document continues to focus on the small combatants.

“Emphasis in the new fighting machine is on the flexibility of the green water component to scale to the intensity and duration of the operation.”

This concept is valid within limits. Obviously, small combatants can only be “scaled up” so far before they exceed their combat capabilities. I say “obviously” but it’s far from clear that it’s obvious to the authors given their belief that small combatants can be successfully used in defense of

Taiwan

The document offers some outstanding observations about training and the need to return to professionalism in areas such as MCM, ASW, and anti-swarm warfare. It further describes the link between failing education levels of society and the performance of personnel in the Navy. The ultimate conclusion drawn is that simpler ships may be easier to man and train for. This is a particularly astute observation although the conclusion stops short of full application. Overly complex and technologically demanding ships and systems are inherently unmaintainable (witness the fleetwide Aegis degradation). Simpler systems operating at full effectiveness may actually be more effective than more advanced systems operating at degraded levels. A comparison between a rotating radar system versus Aegis comes to mind.

The NNFM notes that maintaining the industrial base will be easier with a more distributed (smaller, single purpose ships) force structure. ComNavOps concurs!

Following is a brief discussion of the various types of vessels that the NNFM envisions.

Coastal Combatant. The NNFM envisions a class of small (600 t), fast ships armed with short range, multi-purpose missiles, 4 Harpoons, and a gun. Their role would be to clear the littorals for subsequent operations. Cost is estimated at $100M. This may be an optimistic estimate. Also, the concept of operations is, in my mind, somewhat suspect. I’ll do a post on this particular topic, shortly.

Gunfire Support Ship. The concept of a dedicated gun ship is outstanding, however, the suggested use of the AGS may well put the size and cost of the ship and gun out of reach. In its automated guise, the AGS is a volume hog in ship design and very expensive given its very low production rate. A better option might be the Mk71 8” gun. Regardless, this is an excellent conceptual ship class.

Green Water CVL. The NNFM calls for 8 CVLs intended primarily as green water support ships. They will operate UAVs and vertical aircraft including 20 F-35Bs. The document’s cost estimate of $3B per ship is reasonable based on the demonstrated cost of the

America

class assuming the size can be significantly reduced over the

America

class.

MCM. The NNFM calls for 12 MCM vessels. This number is nowhere near adequate for MCM operations and represents one of the biggest weaknesses of the conceptual force. Numbers aside, the idea of a dedicated MCM vessel is outstanding as it will keep costs down and maximize competence.

ASW. The NNFM calls for 12 inshore ASW vessels. The same comments apply as for the MCM vessels.

Arsenal Ships. The NNFM proposes small corvette size arsenal ships containing 50 land attack missiles (Tomahawk). These ships would specifically replace the current SSGNs which carry around 150 missiles. The document acknowledges the SSGN’s superior stealth but claims the Arsenal Ships will have an acceptable degree of risk. This is another dubious claim that is unsupported. These ships would offer tempting, lucrative, and visible targets for enemy forces. The vastly superior stealth and survivability of the SSGNs more than compensates for any perceived advantage of distributed power.

Submarines. The NNFM proposes a mix of 40 SSNs and 40 SSKs (AIP). The document states that the focus of the submarine force is

China

. That’s an outstanding observation. Unfortunately, the viability and combat effectiveness of SSKs in a

China

scenario is unknown and represents a substantial risk. If SSKs are not viable, that leaves the Navy with a very small SSN force. In addition, the projected cost of the SSK at $700M each is highly suspect. Nothing in the Navy’s procurement and construction history suggests such a price is achievable.

SSBN. The NNFM calls for a force of 9 SSBNs which is substantially below current and historical levels. I can’t address the wisdom of this as it involves nuclear strategic considerations and capabilities that I don’t have access to or data for. I’ll leave this aspect with the simple observation that this is a substantial red flag that may or may not be wise. In addition to a suspect number of submarines, the assumed cost is $4.5B per ship which even the Navy doesn’t believe can be achieved for the new SSBNs. A far more likely cost is on the order of $6B.

BMD. The NNFM calls for 9 BMD vessels and, in a departure from current design philosophy, envisions them as dedicated, single function ships incapable of anti-cruise missile defense or general area AAW. In fact, the document suggests that the BMD ships may have to be protected by other ships. Again, though, a force this small only allows for three ships to be routinely deployed and that seems woefully insufficient given the apparent emphasis on ballistic missiles by potential enemies.

Amphibious. The NNFM proposes a mix of sealift ships but, significantly, does not support large opposed assaults. As the document states,

“We emphasize amphibious lift, but not forcible entry.”

Again, this is an example of the NNFM’s de-emphasis on high end combat.

Green water ship support needs are acknowledged but somewhat glossed over with reference to tenders and vague, non-specific host nation basing. The later, in particular, is a suspect assumption, given the historical difficulties in arranging host nation base rights and flyover rights during previous conflicts and events.

NNFM proposes a mix of carriers, 6 CVNs and 10 CVLs. This results in a total aircraft reduction of 12% but that reduction is claimed to be offset by greater flexibility. While flexibility may be an attractive quality (and that’s a dubious claim in this context), at some point numbers of combat aircraft matter and accepting a 12% reduction over an already reduced combined air wing size is problematic. This also optimistically assumes the F-35 will be procured in the required amounts. A realistic prognosis indicates that the F-35 buy will be significantly curtailed.

NNFM calls for the CVNs to be procured at a cost of $10B each. This cost has already been shown to be $2B-$4B short for new carrier construction and the document, to be fair, acknowledges exactly this shortfall. However, it then proceeds to use the suspect number in the cost calculations thus demonstrating a greater NNFM procurement capacity than can actually be had. This aspect of the document is a bit disingenuous. To estimate a low-ball cost, acknowledge that it’s low, and then proceed to use it to make a better looking case is deceptive, to say the least.

The NNFM addresses sealift and takes note of the total number of vessels available of all types. The document offers an interesting statement,

“Delivery and sustainment ships are not expected to be attacked and so they are, properly in our judgment, large with very big capacities.”

That statement totally ignores the history of submarine warfare. Do we really think

China

will not devote effort toward submarine attacks on these ships? The entire history of U-Boat wars strongly suggests the reality of this issue.

The NNFM proposes a relatively small investment in sealift vessels based on the premise that these ships have very long lifetimes. As we just stated, that may be true in peacetime but in a war with

China

those ships will have the same short lifetimes that cargo ships of all nations had during WWII.

The document addresses the conventional amphibious assault ships with some very pertinent observations. Among them is this gem,

“At the same time, for forcible entry, the amphibious ships are too large and there are too few in an Expeditionary Strike Group—only three or four—to be effective when an enemy counterattack is possible. The loss of even one ship would probably abort the landing.”

Unfortunately, the document does not go on to specify a specific alternative beyond calling for a moratorium on new construction while studies are carried out. That’s fair but a bit weak considering the scope and purpose of this document.

The NNFM notes that the surface combatant force (Burkes and Ticos, currently) is susceptible to anti-ship missiles. The document proposes substantially reducing the DDG force to a level of 30. Given the standard 3:1 deployment ratio, that only allows for 10 ships to be deployed at any given moment. The reduction in numbers would be made up for by acquisition of 90 highly capable, blue water frigates at a cost of $400M each according to the NNFM force structure. Given the cost of the LCS which has only a fraction of the capabilities that the proposed frigate would have, this seems an absurdly low cost estimate!

The NNFM proposes operating ships in tactical units of two which would pair ships with similar or complementary capabilities although what those complementary characteristics would or should be is not spelled out. This is an interesting departure from the Navy’s tendency to operate ships individually and is worth exploring. The document astutely notes that this type of tactical thinking has been lost due to the development of expensive, multi-purpose ships.

Finally, to repeat, the NNFM is founded on certain assumptions that are, themselves, suspect. For example,

“… the weaknesses of the present fleet—which is excessively focused on delivery of combat power at an enemy on land …”

The famous and true saying is that the seat of purpose is on the land. That being the case, delivery of combat power at an enemy on land IS the purpose of the Navy. To base a force structure on some other premise is wrong.

In summary, the NNFM study makes some good points, some highly suspect ones, and is based on some highly questionable costing which is acknowledged in the document but used anyway.

The biggest problem with the concept is its underlying assumption that a less high end combat capable navy is preferred. The assumption is skewed towards the lower end of the combat spectrum and peacetime, policing actions. Admittedly, these constitute the vast number of tasks a fleet performs. Still, when the time comes for serious, high end combat, you do not want to find your fleet at a disadvantage and this is exactly the state that the NNFM creates with proposed decreases in numbers of SSNs, CGs, DDGs, SSGNs, SSBNs, and CVNs.

The second biggest problem is the overvaluation of the small combatant capabilities and this is, undoubtedly, a direct result of Hughes’ involvement. While I’m totally in favor of building a prototype small combatant and exercising it to find out what it can do for us, I’m highly skeptical that it will perform anywhere near as well as suggested either individually or as a component of an overall force. I also highly doubt the need for the extent of green water capability that the NNFM assumes. As I said, I’ll offer a post on this topic in the near future.

The emphasis on CVLs is also potentially troubling. A CVL with a capacity of 20 F-35Bs is a marginal fighting force. In any contested combat scenario, even of a lower order than all out war with

China

, the prime responsibility of the air wing will be defense of the carrier. Given sortie rates, maintenance requirements, and some combat attrition, it’s difficult to imagine much of a useful offensive sortie rate from the air wing. Of course, multiple CVLs can come together to generate greater combat capacity but then one has to wonder why a CVN wouldn’t be the preferred choice. In an uncontested scenario, a CVL would certainly be adequate and useful but, then, so would a barge! Again, this is a concept worth testing and gaming out. Operation of the

America

class may offer some insight on this issue.

Finally, the consistent use of suspect cost figures renders the NNFM model invalid. Even the document repeatedly admits that the cost figures may be too low and even provides much more reasonable values but declines to use them. Thus, the numbers of ships called for seems patently unachievable. An otherwise coherent NNFM model is thus reduced to the level of fantasy much as the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan is.

On the plus side, the emphasis on single function vessels is spot on and offers an opportunity to field greater numbers of ships at a lower unit cost. In particular, the recognition that MCM and ASW, among other functions, are better performed by dedicated vessels is astute and in this respect alone the document is valuable and worthy.

The overall goal of generating a greater number of ships is worthy although achieving that goal at the expense of high end combat power is suspect.

The goal of building an in-shore patrol capability is also worthwhile. Again, the extent of such a program needs to be strategized and gamed out. The small combatants are a very worthwhile experiment. Although I’m dubious about the widespread usefulness of such a vessel, I believe that there is a need for at least some small number of such a ship.

In summation, the NNFM is a worthwhile study offering a mix of good and bad ideas but, overall, well worth serious examination. The biggest potential flaw is the underlying premise of a shift in emphasis from high end combat capability to lower end patrol, peacekeeping, and minor conflicts. The emphasis on green water combat capability without a corresponding analytical basis renders the concept suspect but still worth a careful evaluation.

Pages

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