MEUs (Marine Expeditionary Units) currently deploy without
tanks, artillery, or heavy mortars. Thus,
they are no different than light, air mobile infantry in terms of firepower
and, barring dumb luck that a crisis just happens to break out right next to
them, are much slower to respond to a global crisis, requiring days or weeks to
reach the area of concern.
One of the limitations of a MEU is that, contrary to popular
impressions, a MEU cannot conduct an opposed landing although, presumably, they
could deal with minor resistance.
Now, consider the Army’s global crisis response units which
are supported by Air Force transports and can deposit troops anywhere in the
world in 24 hours.
A common objection to the Army as the global crisis response
force is that they must have a secure airfield to land and that is not a sure
thing and might even be considered unlikely.
However, it should be noted that the airfield requirements are pretty
minimal with dirt strips being adequate.
From the AF fact sheet about the C-17, for example,
In addition, the Army does have the capability to seize an
airfield. The 2nd Ranger
battalion, 75th Ranger regiment is specifically tasked with airfield
seizure. Of course, an airfield is not
even absolutely necessary as troops can be parachuted in.
The design of the aircraft (high-lift wing, slats, and externally blown flaps) allows it to operate through small, austere airfields. The C-17 can take off and land on runways as short as 3,500 feet (1,064 meters) and only 90 feet wide (27.4 meters).
In fact, once upon a time, the Army had some fairly
significant airborne armor support with the ability to air-unload M551 Sheridan
tanks using the LAPES (Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System) method (an
impressive operation readily viewable on Youtube!) or medium altitude
multi-parachute drops. Similarly, I’m
aware that the Army conducted Stryker air drops, at one time. I don’t know whether the Army still maintains
such a capability, or not.
1st Battalion (Airborne), 321st Field Artillery Regiment maintained a full capacity to provide 155mm howitzer fires anywhere in the world within 18 hours in support of the 82d Airborne Division and while supporting other global responsibilities. The unit had the unique ability to employ 155mm howitzer platforms through a "Howitzer Heavy Drop Package" capability which essentially allowed for the weapon system to be dropped from an aircraft while its paratroopers would then place the weapon into action.
Again, I don’t know whether the Army still maintains airborne artillery capability.
The following units are considered to be rapidly
deployable. I don’t follow Army matters
that closely so there may be others.
- XVIII Airborne Corps
- 75th Ranger Regiment - Can deploy can deploy one Ranger
battalion within eighteen hours of alert notification.[1]
Discussion
It is clear that the Army/AF can provide firepower and
numbers equal to, or greater than, a MEU and with much quicker response times. Given the Marine’s elimination of tanks and a
great deal of artillery and mortars, one can’t help but wonder why we don’t eliminate
the MEUs and use Army units as our crisis response force.
One of the key aspects of this discussion is armor. At one time, the MEU deployed with tanks
which offered a justification for the use of MEUs. Unfortunately, the Marines eliminated their
tanks several years ago – along with heavy mortars and much of their artillery
- and that justification has now vanished.
In light of the Marine’s ill-advised move away from being a medium
weight combat force and toward being a light infantry force, we need to
re-evaluate the rationale for MEUs. Add
to that the cost of acquiring, maintaining, and operating a fleet of amphibious
ships to give the MEUs something to ride around on and the rationale looks very
suspect.
_____________________________
- 3rd Infantry Division
- 10th Mountain Division
- 82nd Airborne Division
- 101st Airborne Division
15 Assault Amphibious Vehicle
6 155mm howitzer: M777
8 M252 81mm mortar
63 Humvee