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Showing posts with label Lasers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lasers. Show all posts

Friday, July 3, 2020

Airborne Laser Test Delayed

Airborne lasers have been perpetually just a few years away for many decades, now.  ComNavOps has read articles declaring airborne lasers to be just around the corner as far back as the 1980’s and there are probably reports and articles older than that, proclaiming the same thing.  So, other than just a few years away from fruition, where are we now?

Well, in May 2020, Mike Griffin, Undersecretary of Defense for research and engineering, had this to say,

“I’m extremely skeptical that we can put a large laser on an aircraft and use it to shoot down an adversary missile, even from fairly close.” (1)

Why was Mr. Griffin skeptical?  Here’s what he had to say,

“It has been done as an experiment, but as a weapon system — to equip an airplane with the kinds of lasers we think necessary, in terms of their power level, and all their support requirements, and get the airplane to altitudes where atmospheric turbulence can be mitigated appropriately — that combination of things doesn’t go on one platform.” (1)

Now, we learn that the Air Force is pushing a planned test of an airborne laser on a fighter back to at least 2023.

The U.S. Air Force’s long-planned test of an airborne laser weapon aboard a fighter jet has been delayed until 2023 due to technical challenges and complications spurred by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, its program head [Jeff Heggemeier, SHiELD program manager for the Air Force Research Laboratory] said.

More,

… Air Force acquisition czar Will Roper acknowledged that the service is rethinking how it could best use directed-energy technologies. Perhaps the most optimal use for SHiELD wasn’t onboard a fighter, he said.

While I am not a laser expert, by any means, it is clear that the challenges involved in mounting a laser on an airplane are far more challenging than anyone cares to admit.  It is also clear that a practical, fighter-mounted laser is not in the foreseeable future.

Not Happening!


Now, let’s delve into a bit of nearly unfounded speculation – isn’t that always the best kind?!

If airborne lasers have zero hope of successful missile defense, what does that suggest for the prospect of using lasers for missile defense on board ships?  To me, reading the blurry, out of focus tea leaves, I see no hope of an effective missile defense for shipboard lasers in the next, say, twenty years.  The combination of extremely fast and maneuverable missiles plus the pitching and rolling of the firing platform (the ship) suggests that maintaining a precise, fixed ‘burn’ point for a sufficiently long time to produce a catastrophic effect on an incoming missile will not be possible.

Now, toss in other mitigating factors like turbulence, humidity, weather, clouds, temperature, and whatever else (remember, I’m not a laser guy!) and the chance of producing a catastrophic effect is even further reduced.

Finally, what happens when the first successful anti-ship missile laser actually works?  You’ve got it, of course … the enemy will begin to incorporate anti-laser measures into their missiles.  One can easily imagine incorporating thicker ‘noses’ to increase burn time, inducing a continuous rolling action by the missile (Rolling Airframe Missile, anyone?), making the missile body more reflective, and many more measures that I, a barely informed amateur in the field, can’t even begin to imagine.  This will set practical laser development back another decade or two.

Of course, for less demanding applications like destroying a low, slow drone, lasers could prove practical and effective in the moderately near future.  Therefore, continued development effort is certainly warranted but to believe high end combat lasers are just around the corner is to believe in fairy tales.

The short of it is that lasers are, and will always remain, just a few years from practical application for many more decades to come.



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(1)Defense News website, “Griffin ‘extremely skeptical’ of airborne lasers for missile defense”, Aaron Mehta, May-2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/2020/05/20/griffin-extremely-skeptical-of-airborne-lasers-for-missile-defense/

Friday, May 10, 2019

Lasers In Combat

One of the topic suggestions from the recent open post was for a discussion of the future of rail guns and lasers so, here it is.  We’ll look at lasers in this post and then rail guns in a second post.

There are many articles and papers about the technology of lasers and you can read those on your own.  There are also numerous articles about laser power improvements and the latest thickness of steel that some new laser burned through.  You can also read all the Navy’s glowing, raving PR announcements about lasers.  What you can’t readily find is any analysis of the real world combat applicability of lasers.  It’s pointless to develop a laser with a city block of dedicated power generating equipment that can burn through two feet of steel in only ten minutes because none of that is applicable in a real world combat situation.  We’ll focus on the real world considerations.

Practical lasers already exist – practical in the sense that the laser and its associated power supply can be fitted on a ship and will produce a coherent beam that can, under the right conditions, produce a destructive effect.  However, the ‘right conditions’ generally preclude any real world usefulness.  We’ll take a look at those ‘right conditions’ and see what they are and how they impact the future of lasers as shipboard weapons.


Dwell Time

Barring development of the far, far future (in a galaxy far, far away) Star Wars type lasers that instantaneously disintegrate whatever they touch, lasers in our lifetime will be limited to prolonged contact types.  That means just what it says – that in order to produce a destructive effect the laser will have to maintain contact with the target for an extended period (dwell time) and, what’s more, that contact will have to be on the same pinpoint spot to allow the laser enough time to ‘burn through’.  Even ‘burning through’ the initial material of the target may only be the first step in destruction of the target.  For example, a laser hitting a missile will have to burn through the outer shell of the missile, which will have no effect whatsoever on the missile, to reach the inner works of the missile that can, in turn, be burned to, hopefully, produce the desired destructive effect on the missile.

Of course, for a smaller, more fragile target, like a small quadcopter or UAV, the outer contact may be sufficient on its own to destroy the target by, for example, shearing off a fin/wing or destroying a propeller hub.

The developmental goal in laser development will be to produce effects with less and less contact time (more powerful lasers), ultimately moving towards the Star Wars instantaneous disintegration.

Dwell time is a function of the system’s fire control.  Whatever fire control aiming system we’re using has to be fine enough to maintain laser dwell for the required burn through time.  Consider what that means, today.  A laser fire control would have to be able to maintain contact on the exact same spot of, say, a missile while it moves at Mach speed and jinks in terminal approach while the laser firing platform (our ship, presumably) also moves, maneuvers, rolls, and pitches.  That is some exquisitely fine fire control and nothing like that is even remotely possible today. 

Yes, we have stabilized fire control but that’s exceedingly crude by comparison.  Motors are used to move the firing weapon (guns, currently) in train and elevation to stay on target.  Consider what that means, however.  It means staying close enough on the target to achieve, at best, a 10% hit rate somewhere on or near the target.  Do you grasp how far that is from maintaining a pinpoint lock on a target when both the firing platform and the target are moving fast and maneuvering violently?  You’ve seen videos of Navy tests where a laser slowly destroyed a small boat motor or a UAV but have you seen a video of a speeding, maneuvering shipboard laser destroying a fast, violently maneuvering target?  Of course you haven’t because it can’t be done!

The real world consequence of extended dwell time is extended engagement time.  If we have a battery of shipboard lasers defending against an incoming volley of anti-ship missiles and each individual missile engagement requires a dwell time of, say, 30 seconds, to make up a number, you can readily see that, given the Mach speeds of the incoming missiles and the resulting minute or so engagement window (we’ve run through the arithmetic on this in previous posts or you can run through it yourself), we’ll only be able to engage a few missiles before the remainder reach us.  In comparison, bullets (CIWS) or defensive missiles (SeaRAM or ESSM) can be fired at numerous targets simultaneously (well, nearly so for the purposes of this discussion) and a hit will produce an instantaneous kill.

In order to be effective in real combat in the AAW role, a laser system has to produce a kill in about 10 seconds or less.  Any more than that and you simply can’t engage enough targets to mount an effective defense. 

One way to compensate for longer dwell time is to increase the number of defensive lasers.  We’ve noted that the number of close range SeaRAM and CIWS systems on modern ships is far too few for an effective defense and the same situation would apply to lasers.


Lethality

Let’s now turn our attention to lethality.  We’ve already noted that laser lethality requires dwell time.  Assuming we’ve achieved that, we now need lethality.  For a conventional explosive shell, lethality is high.  An explosion taking place in or near the target is very likely to damage or destroy something critical to the target and produce the effect of destroying it.  For a laser, however, it is quite possible that the focused beam, being relatively quite narrow and having no explosive effect, may damage or destroy something that is not critical to the target or not critical in a relevant time frame.  For example, a laser may burn through the exposed motor shell on a small swarm boat only to hit and damage an exhaust port underneath which is not critical to the engine’s continued performance, at least for the time needed for the boat to complete its attack.  Or, a laser may burn through the shell of a missile only to hit an empty fuel tank or an ECM component, neither of which would stop the missile.  Consider the case of a laser used against a ship and imagine a narrow beam passing through the ship on a straight line.  With no explosive effect, the odds of the beam hitting a component that would destroy or mission kill the ship is near zero.

One conclusion from this analysis is that lasers will work best when the target is most densely packed with critical components.  Thus, quadcopters, UAVs, and missiles would be more susceptible to laser effects while large aircraft and tanks would be less susceptible and ships would be nearly invulnerable.  This suggests the target classes we should be developing lasers for.


Power

Lasers require a great deal of power although I would imagine that the power can, and is, supplied in pulses (a capacitor like function).  Thus, it’s not necessary to provide continuous power but only pulses of power.  I’m way out of my field here so feel free to correct me if I’m wrong.  This is interesting and has implications for power management and power system architecture but is only marginally relevant to this discussion.  What is relevant is the need for power, however it is supplied.  If the power is disrupted the laser is rendered inoperative.  Power represents a single point of failure for a ship’s entire battery of lasers.  Lose power and you lose all the lasers.  Of course, this applies to conventional guns as well.  Ideally, what you’d like to see is a local power system that can continue to operate if the main power is disrupted.  To an extent, conventional gun systems of WWII had this capability with local fire control and, for smaller guns, local manual train and elevation.  For lasers, the analogous local capability would be a battery or capacitor backup that could supply power for at least enough shots to continue the immediate engagement before ultimately failing.


Countermeasures

As with all weapons throughout history, the implementation of laser weapons will be immediately followed by the implementation of countermeasures.  If the countermeasures turn out to be cheaper than the weapon, then the weapon is on the wrong side of the cost curve and will be at least an economic failure, if not a practical failure.  Early anti-ship missiles were expensive and the early countermeasures, such as chaff and flares, were very cheap.  Eventually, the curve flipped and now we see that anti-ship missiles are far cheaper than the defensive Aegis/Standard weapon.  So goes the perpetual back and forth of weapons and countermeasures development.

Lasers of the foreseeable future are susceptible to countermeasures.  Noting the requirement for significant dwell time, simple countermeasures could include ablative coatings, reflective coatings, ‘rolling’ to prevent extended contact (rolling airframe missile?), multi-shelled sacrificial layers, jinking, sea skimming to reduce the engagement window (lasers are, of course, line of sight and the engagement range against a sea skimming target is around 15 miles or so), stealth to deny fire control solutions, and many other possibilities that I’m sure I haven’t thought of.  The takeaway from that list is that most of the possible countermeasures would be very cheap to implement relative to the cost of the laser – in fact, some already exist.

Thus, for the foreseeable future, lasers appear to be on the wrong side of the cost curve.


Applicability Summary

So, where does this analysis leave us?  It appears that, in order to produce destructive effects, lasers will require small, slow targets so as to maximize the chance of achieving sufficient dwell time.  This suggests that the applicable target set will be drones, UAVs, and small boats.  The challenge, even for this target set, is fire control.  Laser development would do well to go on hiatus and instead focus (a laser joke there - sorry) on fire control.  To put it simply, the key to effective lasers is dwell time and the key to dwell time is fire control.  This also suggests that the most effective lasers will be land based which eliminates one half of the movement issue.

With sufficient fire control, there is no reason why lasers can’t be quite effective for the small, slow target set.  Interestingly, the anticipated target set suggests that the most useful application for lasers will be on land as anti-drone weapons.  That being the case, the development trend should be towards smaller lasers that can be vehicle mounted.  For ships, I would see lasers being mounted on smaller ships like Cyclones, LCS, and, possibly, the new frigate for use as anti-small boat and anti-drone weapons.  I don’t see the benefit of lasers with the noted target set on larger ships since they shouldn’t encounter those types of targets.



Disclaimer:  This is, by its nature, a highly technical topic in its underlying foundation and I am not a laser expert, by any means.  Some of my assumptions about the technology may not be completely correct and I welcome any discussion that can correct and enhance our grasp of the topic.  What I will not welcome is ‘gotcha’ type comments, even if correct.  This is an attempt at a discussion, not a contest to see who can score the most points.

Tuesday, December 6, 2016

... And What's Behind It

One of the four major rules of gun safety is to be sure of your target and what’s behind it.

In WWII, we frequently caused friendly fire damage and casualties by firing at attacking aircraft within the task force and hitting friendly ships behind and beyond the target aircraft.  It was almost unavoidable and considered an acceptable and necessary unfortunate consequence of trying to prevent a ship from being hit and sunk.

The same problems and concerns occur during infantry firefights and urban streetfights as well as during tank battles.

The same problem has occurred with Phalanx CIWS.  Here’s an example from Wiki,

“On 11 October 1989USS El Paso was conducting a live-fire exercise off the East Coast of the United States using the Phalanx against a target drone. The drone was successfully engaged, but as the drone fell to the sea, the CIWS re-engaged it as a continued threat to El Paso. Rounds from the Phalanx struck the bridge of USS Iwo Jima, killing one officer and injuring a petty officer.”

And another from Wiki,

“On 25 February 1991, during the first Gulf War, the Phalanx equipped frigate USS Jarrett was a few miles from the US battleship USS Missouri and the British destroyer HMS Exeter. The ships were thought to be under attack by an IraqiSilkworm missile (often referred to as the Seersucker), at which time Missouri fired its SRBOC chaff. The Phalanx system onJarrett, operating in the automatic target-acquisition mode, fixed on Missouri's chaff, releasing a burst of rounds. From this burst, four rounds hit Missouri which was 2–3 miles (3.2–4.8 km) from Jarrett at the time. There were no injuries.”

Note that we’re not discussing the closely related issue of identification/misidentification.  This post is concerned with the issue of stray rounds impacting friendly forces behind and beyond the target.  The distinction is critical for the discussion.  With this issue, identification is not a problem.  The friendly forces are well known and their location is clearly observed.  The problem is rounds that don’t hit the target and continue on to strike a friendly unit. 

Okay, this is a tragic but almost unavoidable consequence of close combat, especially in naval scenarios where friendly ships may be spread out over many miles and enemy aircraft, ships, and missiles can penetrate the force and intermingle with friendly forces but what’s the point?  The point is that with the advent of rail guns, lasers, and hyper velocity projectiles (HVP) that we’re all so excited about, the behind and beyond issue becomes immensely larger and more deadly.  For example, CIWS rounds have a range of couple miles.  A friendly ship that is in the line of fire but five or 10 miles beyond is perfectly safe.  However, with rail guns, lasers, and HVP’s, the behind and beyond range borders on unlimited.  We could miss a target that’s one mile away and inadvertently hit a friendly task force 50 miles beyond!

Consider the case of an enemy missile that has penetrated the perimeter of a naval task force spread out over many miles.  What might have been an adequate safety margin in WWII is now non-existent with lasers, rail guns, and HVPs.  Potentially, this means that far fewer, possible no, ships can fire on the incoming missile out of fear of hitting a friendly unit many miles beyond and behind the target.

Consider the case of a naval task force 50-100 miles from land and trying to defend itself using lasers, rail guns, and HVPs.  Misses in the direction of the land may see the land showered with projectiles and lasers.

Could we be hobbling our defensive fires by moving to lasers, rail guns, and HVPs?  At the very least, our zone of awareness will have to increase from a couple of miles to dozens or hundreds of miles.  In a situation like the Middle East or the first island chain, there may not be a safe direction in which we can fire!
Basic Gun Safety On A Grand Scale



I’m not suggesting that we don’t adopt lasers, rail guns, and HVPs but I do hope that someone is looking very carefully at the implications and impact on our defensive doctrine and tactics rather than just blindly pursuing the technology “just because we can”.  Sadly, like the Navy that forgot to check whether the LCS helo could safely tow the mine countermeasures equipment and then found out the hard way that it couldn’t, I’m fearful that we aren’t looking at the “behind and beyond” issue and won’t recognize it until it’s too late.  I just see a bunch of future laser and rail gun armed escorts paralyzed and unable to fire defensively because of friendly units and land dozens or hundreds of miles away.

Saturday, August 9, 2014

Navy Lasers

According to reports, an Israeli Patriot missile shot down a Hamas drone.  If the report is accurate, consider the cost effectiveness of the engagement.  A $3M missile was used to shoot down a drone costing a few thousands of dollars.  No one knows the exact drone type but it was unlikely to have been too sophisticated.  This is not exactly an economical exchange rate.

The Navy has been pursuing laser weapons and possibly in a realistic manner.  While Navy laser development news is hard to come by, it appears that the Navy laser development is aimed not at Star Wars type technology but at a much more realistic and scaled back goal.  Reports suggest that the Navy is looking for a laser weapon that can engage small, slow objects such as mortar shells, small boats, and drones.  It is the latter goal, targeting drones, that offers a reasonable and effective use of a laser. 

As noted with the Israeli example cited above, shooting down cheap drones with expensive missiles is a waste.  A laser would offer a much more cost effective solution and presents a technical challenge that may well be achievable in a reasonable time frame.  Of course, power and effective range are among the technical obstacles that remain to be overcome.  Still, that level of performance may well be realistically achievable.

The US military is firmly committed to operating drones of all types over the battlefield and there is no reason to expect that our enemies won’t do the same.  We need a cost effective method for dealing with them.  If this type of use is the goal of the Navy’s laser program then they deserve praise.

To be fair, I have no explicit confirmation of the Navy’s goals for its laser program.  I’m ascribing a goal based on bits of information rather then hard documentation.  I’ll continue to look for confirmation.  For those of you who are interested in more information, CSBA put out an excellent report on the subject (1).


(1) Center For Strategic And Budgetary Assessments, “Changing The Game, The Promise of Directed Energy Weapons”, Gunzinger and Dougherty, 2012

Wednesday, May 14, 2014

Lasers As Weapons

Do you recall, a while back, the Navy’s video of the “highly successful” laser anti-small craft demonstration?  You know, the one where a laser was focused on a boat’s outboard engine and eventually melted the engine cover?  The video didn’t say, but the impression was that the process took somewhere between several minutes and many minutes.

Have you ever seen a small boat approach at high speed?  Can you see the engine?  No, all you can see is the shiny, reflective bow bouncing up and down.  Depending on the sea state, the boat may actually vanish from sight, momentarily, as it plunges up and down.

Let’s briefly review what a laser is.  In incredibly simplified terms, a laser is a narrow, focused beam of light unlike a flashlight where the light spreads out from the source.  The focus allows the beam to transmit high levels of energy to a pinpoint spot thereby causing damage.  The amount of damage is a function of the intensity of the beam and the duration of contact between the beam and the target.  The laser, being light, travels at the speed of light, 186,000 miles per second, and, for all practical purposes, is an instantaneous event.  Like all light, a laser can be reflected by mirrors or shiny surfaces or attenuated (diminished) by dust and water in the atmosphere.

The Navy’s goal is to create a laser weapon.  We’ve all watched Star Wars and have a mental image of what a laser will do:  an instantaneous vaporizing beam of destruction.  I don’t know what the Navy’s ultimate goal is but presumably it’s along those lines.  Specifically, I suspect the Navy is interested in lasers as an anti-missile defense, in particular as an anti-ballistic missile defense.  Of course, in the shorter term, they may have a lesser goal such as blinding a person in a small boat or some such.

Despite the Navy’s PR claims of wild success with the laser demo film clip, it’s obvious that we’re many years, probably decades, away from anything approaching a Star Wars type laser weapon.  OK, that just means it will take a while longer, yet, right? 

Here, though, is the problem:  I think the potential for effective countermeasures far exceeds the potential for the laser as a weapon.  For example, something as simple as making the attacking missile shiny and reflective would negate the laser’s effect.  I could imagine other, equally simple countermeasures.  For instance, attaching a spinning cap over the missile’s nose would prevent the laser from focusing long enough in one spot to have an effect.  And so on …

That’s the technical problem and here is the consequence:  the cost of developing an effective laser weapon is going to be grossly, insanely greater than the cost of developing countermeasures.  With any foreseeable future laser technology, laser development is headed down a rabbit hole of runaway costs.  Consider that the Air Force recently terminated their airborne laser test bed after decades of work dating back to the 1970’s, as I recall.  I wonder what the cumulative cost of that effort was?  I remember reading Aviation Weekly articles about the Air Force’s laser and the prediction that a practical laser weapon was just a relatively few years away.  Now, several decades later, the Navy is suggesting that we’re just a relative few years away from an effective laser weapon.  Nothing’s changed despite decades of work.  This is just one of those technologies that isn’t going to come quickly to fruition. 

Now I’m absolutely not suggesting that we halt laser research;  quite the opposite.  It’s well worth pursuing but it should be as a pure research effort and only at a low level of funding.  Every dollar spent by the Navy on lasers is a dollar not spent on a practical, near-term weapon.  Building future laser (and rail gun) support capability into the ships we’re building today is pointless.  Lasers won’t be an effective weapon during the lifetime of the ship’s we’re building now.  On a related note, the Ford clearly incorporates laser or rail gun sponsons.

So, let’s enjoy our scifi movies and let’s fantasize about Star Wars lasers but let’s keep a realistic view of the state of the technology.  Building ships based on non-existent technology is what got us the LCS.  Let’s not repeat the mistake with lasers.