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Showing posts with label Deployment Cycles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Deployment Cycles. Show all posts

Friday, June 23, 2023

This is NOT How You Prepare for War

The Independence variant LCS-18, USS Charleston, just completed a 26 month overseas deployment.  That’s incredible!  More than two years at the tip of the spear.  They must have done lots of realistic exercises and live fire events to demonstrate their readiness and maintain the honed edge of readiness. 
… the ship successfully launched a Rolling Airframe Missile (SeaRAM) during an at-sea, live-fire exercise … [1]
While deployed, Charleston was embarked with the Naval Strike Missile …  “We do have a typical load-out that we maintain throughout the deployment,” Knuth [Cmdr. Matthew Knuth, gold crew commanding officer] said of the NSM. “That said, we did not do any live fire testing of the missile.”[1]
Let’s add up the live fire testing of the various weapon systems over the 26 month period.  This involves high level math and large numbers so, don’t worry, I’ll do it for you.
 
1 RAM + 0 NSM = 1 launch
 
That’s the raw data.  Let’s do some analysis and calculate the average weapon firings per year.
 
1 launch / 2.2 years = 0.4 launches per year
 
There’s your Navy.  Prepared for anything and, why not?  They did enough live fire exercises to be supremely proficient at combat launches and utterly confident that their equipment and systems would work under any of the 1 or 0 conditions that were tested.
 
The LCS, as you know, operates with a 2-crew, Blue-Gold, manning system wherein the crews rotate on and off the ship.  Just out of curiosity, I wonder which of the two crews got to do the 1 RAM launch?  The other crew, of course, would have spent two years with the ship and never fired a weapon.  How’s that for readiness and training?!
 
At the end of the 26 month deployment, this ship and its crews were the epitome of trained maritime warriors based on all the live fire exercises they did.
 
Idle thought:  Did anyone even look inside the NSM canisters to see if there were actually missiles there?  They didn’t do any test launches so one can’t help but wonder …  German soldiers have trained with broomsticks instead of rifles so is it really that much of a stretch to wonder if we really have missiles on board the LCS?  Just saying …
 
On a seemingly unrelated note … WWII US torpedoes …  Am I the only one who can see the parallels?
 
 
____________________________
 
[1]USNI News website, “Littoral Combat Ship USS Charleston Completes 26-Month Deployment to Western Pacific”, Gidget Fuentes, 21-Jun-2023,

Friday, May 6, 2022

Sorry, Can’t Do It

The Marine Corps, our national crisis response force, couldn’t respond to an emergency deployment request to deal with the Ukraine-Russia war.

 

As Russia prepared to invade Ukraine, the head of U.S. European Command asked for a Marine Expeditionary Unit and Amphibious Ready Group to deploy early to Europe as a hedge against the conflict expanding.

 

But the Marine Corps couldn’t meet the request, Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, told the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee today.[1]

 

The Marines couldn’t respond?!?!  Isn’t that their entire reason for existence?  Isn’t that why we have them around? 

 

According to Marine Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, crisis response is the Marine’s responsibility.  As he stated,

 

“Within force design is our ongoing requirement as a Marine Corps and by law to be the crisis response force for the nation.”[1]

 

So what happened?

 

According to Heckl, U.S. European Command chief Gen. Tod Wolters asked that the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit and the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group “sortie early to be on station as the Ukrainian situation evolved, or devolved. And we were not able to sortie the ship[s].”[1]

 

So, according to the Marine general, the blame lies with the Navy.  He further states,

 

The 22nd MEU was already prepared to go. However, the maintenance status of the three warships of the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group was “so bad” they were not prepared to leave then or after the invasion, Heckl told Defense One on Thursday.[2]

 

On March 16—a month and a day after the orders came down—most of the MEU departed Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, aboard the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge (LHD 3) and the amphibious transport dock Arlington.  The rest left aboard the dock landing ship Gunston Hall about a week or so later, Heckl said.[2]

 

The Navy owns 31 amphibious ships and the Navy and Marines are telling me that they couldn’t even muster 3 functional amphibious ships during a crisis?  If the three ships designated for the 22nd MEU weren’t functional, are you telling me that the Navy couldn’t pick three other ships out of the remaining 28 amphibious ships in the fleet?  Is our amphibious fleet in that bad a shape that we can’t find 3 functional ships out of 31?  Or, is our Navy/Marine force so inflexible that only the three designated ships could be used for the 22nd MEU and no other ships could be allowed to take their place?

 

If the Navy can’t even keep 3 amphibious ships out of 31 functional, why would we give the Navy any more new ships?

 

Whatever the answers are to the various questions, it looks very bad for the Marines and Navy.

 

Here’s what the Marine general had to say about the Navy’s readiness,

 

Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan, … assumes the ships have an 80 percent readiness rate, Heckl said Thursday.

 

“The 10-year running average for the amphib Navy is 63 [percent]. Last month, it was 46 [percent],” he said. “So the number is only valid if the readiness rates are achieved and maintained, which today is simply not the case.”[2]

 

The general threw the Navy under bus, big time.  The question is whether it was with good reason or not.  This is one side of the story – the Marine’s side.  We don’t know the Navy’s side.  Was it 100% the Navy’s failure, as the general claims, or were the Marines also not ready?  Unknown.

 

Regardless, this is a very bad incident.

 

The Navy’s vaunted and much hyped Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP), which was supposed to solve the entire Navy maintenance and readiness problem and which failed instantly with the first aborted carrier deployment, by the way, was intended to prevent exactly this kind of scenario.  The OFRP has been a dismal failure.  The Navy has failed utterly and completely at ship maintenance.  Having ships ready to go is kind of like your only job, Navy.  You had one job and you failed.

 

 

Recommendations

 

Here’s my recommendations as a result of this embarrassing and humiliating fiasco:

 

  • Cut the Marines down to one MEU.  Get rid of all the rest.  There’s no point having a bigger force that can’t be deployed.  There’s also no point maintaining a purely defensive, light infantry force – we’ve got the entire Army that can do that job better.
  • Cut the Navy shipbuilding budget to zero until the Navy can prove that they can keep the ships they have functional.

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “Marines Couldn’t Meet Request to Surge to Europe Due to Strain on Amphibious Fleet”, Mallory Shelbourne, 26-Apr-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/04/26/marines-couldnt-meet-request-to-surge-to-europe-due-to-strain-on-amphibious-fleet

 

[2]Defense One website, “‘We Should Have Been There’: Marine General Laments the State of the Amphib Navy”, Caitlin Kenney, 29-Apr-2022,

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/04/we-should-have-been-there-marine-general-laments-state-amphib-navy/366314/

Wednesday, April 15, 2020

Peacetime Navy Activities

ComNavOps largely focuses on peer war combat, quite correctly, because that is, after all, the number one responsibility of the military.  Lesser conflicts are a subset of the main responsibility and peacetime activities are a distant third responsibility although they are the most common.  For a change of pace, let me now focus on the Navy’s peacetime activities.

As always, there are two levels to this:  one, is the activities that the Navy actually does and, two, is the activities that the Navy should be doing.  Predictably, we’ll focus on what the Navy should be doing.

Just to gather our thoughts and set the table for the comparisons to come, let’s ever so briefly review what the Navy actually does during peacetime.

The Navy engages in interminable deployments (see, “Deployments or Missions?”), usually several months long, that amount to nothing more than austere, low budget cruise ship ‘vacations’ for the crews.  The cruises accomplish nothing other than adding wear and tear to the ships and running up huge operating costs while plinking occasional pickup trucks and colliding with commercial cargo ships. 

The deployments are supposed to promote deterrence but are utterly ineffective as such.  China is still engaged in annexation of the entire East and South China Seas and ordering us out of the area while seizing our UUVs and expanding into Africa and other countries.  Iran is mining commercial ships and shooting down our UAVs.  Russia is engaged in annexation and invasion of neighboring countries while engaging in unsafe harassment of our ships and planes.  North Korea continues their ballistic missile program.  Houthi rebels launch anti-ship missiles at our ships, if the Navy is to be believed.  Clearly, our enemies are unimpressed with our deterrence cruises.

In addition, we engage in chasing pirates in skiffs, showing the flag to anyone who cares, hosting foreign dignitaries, and exercising with foreign navies whose biggest warship is, all too often, a patrol boat or corvette – none of which prepares us for war.

So, if deployments accomplish nothing and we’re not deterring anyone from anything, what should the Navy be doing during peacetime?

Well, the answer is obvious – we should be preparing for war.  We should be training hard, exercising constantly, and performing maintenance when we aren’t training.  We’ve discussed this in previous posts so I won’t belabor it. 

Beyond this, is there anything legitimate that the Navy could and should be doing?  Yes!  The world is an unhappy, angry place marked by unfriendly peers and near-peers, terrorists, and third world countries full of unrest.  These represent a threat to our interests and should be monitored and dealt with before they become major problems.  In addition, we should be preparing the battlefield for potential future wars (as distinct from training for wars).

Let’s look a bit closer at these peacetime activities.

Monitoring.  This consists of monitoring our potential enemy’s capabilities and developments.  If we can better understand their capabilities then we can be better prepared for the inevitable war.   We need to monitor signals, electronic capabilities, military testing and exercises, and the like.  This is where the Navy can make a huge contribution.  Surveillance ships should be parked 13 miles off the coast of every potential trouble spot in the world.  As a nation, we have many types of surveillance capabilities but ships offer the one thing that no other surveillance asset can and that is persistence.  A ship can sit off a trouble spot continuously, providing uninterrupted, real time surveillance. 

A lot of people will object to this out of fear that we might offend or upset an enemy.  Hey, they’re called enemies for a reason.  Who cares what they think?  If they don’t want us monitoring them that closely then maybe they should consider being a little more friendly.

For the case of countries that are harboring terrorists, whether intentionally or not, we should be flying UAVs over those trouble spots regardless of international law (see, “The Navy and the War on Terror”).  There are two justifications for this:

1. I’ve previously discussed that a country that won’t or can’t stop terrorists in their country forfeits their right to the protections of international law. 

2. Given the world’s evolving cavalier attitude towards unmanned assets (the Chinese have seized our unmanned underwater drones and Iran has shot down our UAVs) UAVs are quickly taking on the characteristic of being above/beyond/outside of the constraints and protections of international law. 


If terrorists are forming, we need to know about it before it becomes a major problem.  If an unfriendly country is testing and developing new radars to missiles, we need to know about it so that we can develop countermeasures.

Interestingly, a suitably modified LCS would make an outstanding surveillance platform (see, “The Electronic LCS” and “LCSAlternative Uses”).  Modifications would have to include a larger crew and facilities to conduct onboard maintenance as well as specific surveillance equipment.  Such an LCS would have the speed to avoid trouble and enough firepower to discourage troublemakers.


Pre-emptive Action.  Monitoring is only half the peacetime activity.  Pre-emptive action is the other half.  We need to stop problems before they become major.  America should not be apologizing for aggressively exercising our legal rights and our inherent right to self-defense.

The Navy has much to offer in the realm of pre-emptive action.  In addition to the obvious direct action such as air strikes and Tomahawk strikes, the Navy is ideally positioned to support other, less obvious actions, direct or indirect.  Navy ‘barges’ (could be a MLP, JHSV, AFSB or, gods forbid, an actual barge) could be parked just outside territorial waters (or inside, if needed) and used to host special forces and UAVs.  That terrorist training camp that we’ve been monitoring should be struck before it actually generates functioning terrorists.  That corrupt government that is unofficially supporting terrorism should be ‘visited’ in various ways to encourage them to cease their support.


Battlefield Preparation.  We know where war is likely to occur (looking at you China and Iran) so let’s study the battlefield.  Let’s map the underwater domain.  Let’s map the electronic ‘geography’.  Let’s practice trailing enemy subs.  Let’s fly practice missions to the extent we can.  Let’s intercept any aircraft or ships that venture into international air/water.  Let’s insert ourselves into enemy exercises and observe the reactions and capabilities (China has done exactly this during RIMPAC, for example).



Summary. 

We see that there is much productive work that the Navy could be doing during peacetime but it all starts with ending the useless, interminable deployments that wear out ships and accomplish nothing.  We need to pull our ships back and engage in intensive maintenance and hard, realistic training.  That will free up ships to conduct the missions described above.

It is noteworthy that none of the peacetime missions described require high end, sophisticated ships.  Thus, the bulk of the fleet can undergo maintenance and training without adversely affecting the peacetime missions that should be done.  Indeed, converted commercial ships could perform most or all of the peacetime missions.

We need to make the Navy truly productive during peacetime and now we know how to do it.

Monday, July 30, 2018

War Deployments

There are a couple of common complaints about US naval capabilities that stem from the same misunderstanding about how naval combat is waged.  Consider these common complaints,

  • Ships lack the ability to reload missiles at sea.  Thus, the Burkes, with 96 VLS cells will, after a few to several battles, be out of missiles and they and the ships they’re escorting will be sitting ducks, waiting to be sunk unless we can provide at-sea reloading.

  • We lack the needed 3 or 4:1 ratio to maintain useful numbers of forward deployed ships during war.  Among other applications, this seems to arise often in people’s calculations of required escort numbers.  For example, in previous posts and comments I’ve stated that carrier groups will need around 20-30 escorts.  People immediately apply the peacetime 3 or 4:1 deployment support ratio and instantly conclude that we would need 60 to 120 escorts just to support a single carrier group and that we don’t have, and can’t afford, enough escorts to even come close to filling our needs.

The misunderstanding that leads to these erroneous conclusions lies in how naval combat is waged.  Too many people seem to think that peacetime ship deployments will continue more or less unchanged during war.  Nothing could be further from the truth!  Ships will not deploy at all.  Every available ship will fight “continuously” for the duration of the war.  There will be no routine, scheduled, rotational deployments in and out of the war.

The history of naval combat is one of very brief missions and battles followed immediately by return to port for repair and replenishment.  Combat, both naval and land, is not continuous.  It ebbs and flows.  Forces gather, conduct recon, maneuver, commit to a battle, and then settle back into a “stagnant” period while they re-strategize, reorganize, repair, reassemble, replenish, and rest.  Eventually the cycle repeats itself.  This cycle is even more evident at sea than on land.

As an example, let’s take a closer look at how one ship, the USS Enterprise (CV-6), operated during the first, frantic year of WWII.  Below is a calendar of 1942 with the days blocked in red (at sea) or green (in port, mostly Pearl Harbor).  

During the year, Enterprise participated in strikes and battles at Kwajalein, Wake, Marcus Island, the Doolittle raid, Midway, Guadalcanal, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz.  A very busy year, indeed, and yet note the amount of time in port - roughly equal to the time at sea.  Also, note that the longest sea periods were only around 7-8 weeks as opposed to today's peacetime deployments of several months or more!  So, in the middle of the first desperate year of the war, the Enterprise still did not put to sea and stay there for extended periods.

As seen from the calendar, Enterprise did not deploy for months on end, as so many people seem to believe a ship would, and then rotate back to the US.  Instead, as with every other ship in the fleet, she put to sea for a few weeks at a time, executed a mission (strike or battle), and returned to port to repair, refit, and replenish.  Enterprise continued this pattern for the duration of the war.



Calendar 1942
 


Note:  Lacking complete ship's logs, a few sea/port days had to be guesstimated but 95%+ of the days are confirmed via data from various sources.

I apologize for the fuzziness of the image but the Blogger engine has only very limited graphics capabilities.


The widely held belief that ships will deploy during wartime is incorrect.  Every ship in the fleet will fight continuously in a pattern of brief missions and battles followed by returns to port.  The pattern is generally one battle followed by an immediate return to port. 

So, what are the implications of this pattern of naval warfare?

  • Reloading VLS cells at sea is unnecessary.  Ships will not be at sea or engaged long enough to run out their collective magazines. 

  • Peacetime forward deployment ship ratios of 3:1 or 4:1 simply don’t apply during war.  If you need 20 escorts for a carrier group then you only need 20 ships to support that effort.  Deployments are a peacetime artifact.

  • Upgrades will occur continuously, in theater, as new equipment becomes available.  Enterprise underwent two fairly major upgrades in 1942 alone and did so at Pearl Harbor, thereby remaining in theatre.  Ships will not need to rotate stateside for upgrades.  This strongly suggests the need for robust forward situated repair facilities and dockyards/drydocks.

  • Maintenance will be reduced to the bare minimum for the duration of the war.  This is not a problem since the Navy tends not to do required maintenance, anyway!  It does, however, strongly suggest the need for on-board maintenance and repair capability to the greatest degree possible.  Ships need machine shops and machinists, pipefitters, welders, electricians, etc.  Shore repair facilities will be in high demand and less critical repairs will have to be done by the ship’s company.  The trend towards minimal manning is flat out wrong.

  • Ships will not be continuously at risk.  Only during the course of a mission will significant risk occur.  Thus, risk can be managed through calculated exposure based on anticipated gain.

  • Ships will not stake out a chunk of ocean and just sit there.  Instead, ships will come and go on specific missions.  This suggests that the “sea control” concept is invalid.

This post clearly demonstrates that wartime operations bear little or no similarity to peacetime operations.  Naval analysts need to keep this distinction firmly in mind while considering combat operations, fleet size and structure, and forward basing needs.  Of course, this also begs the question, why are we conducting peacetime deployments that won't be the mode of operation in a war (train like you fight, fight like you train) instead of conducting peacetime missions?

Hopefully, we now all have a better understanding of how naval warfare is conducted.

Wednesday, July 18, 2018

Dynamic Force Employment

ComNavOps has argued for the abandonment of the traditional naval deployment model in favor of a mission based model (see, "Deployments or Missions?").  The result of a mission based model is that readiness, in all its manifold expressions, increases dramatically.  It appears that SecDef Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dunford have begun implementing a naval activity model that lies somewhere between deployments and missions.  By way of example, the Truman carrier group is returning home after just a three month deployment instead of the more common 8-12 months. 

“In a statement, new Fleet Forces Command head Adm. Christopher Grady said the order for Truman to return to home port was a “direct reflection of the dynamic force employment concept, and the inherent maneuverability and flexibility of the U.S. Navy.” (1)

Cutting a deployment short does indicate flexibility, to an extent, I guess.  I’m not sure how it demonstrates maneuverability nor am I sure what maneuverability even means in this context.  It sounds like a meaningless buzz-phrase.

Mattis’ hybrid activity model, which he refers to as ‘dynamic force employment’ (DFE – another buzz-phrase), is intended to make naval forces “more agile and less predictable” (1).  Again, I’m not sure how a shorter deployment make the Navy more agile or what that even means.  The returning Truman group will enter a surge-ready sustainment phase, whatever that means.

“… all returning units are 100 percent mission-capable and will remain in the sustainment phase of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, which means they will sustain war-fighting readiness and be ready to surge forward or redeploy when called upon.”

In Navy-speak, the sustainment phase means that the ship will be held at deployment-level manning, training and general readiness so that it can surge on short notice in a crisis.”

As a reminder, the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) was an attempt by the Navy to better manage regular deployments so as to ensure proper maintenance through the course of the deployment cycle.  Unfortunately, the OFRP immediately failed upon its initial implementation.  Regardless, the OFRP is predicated on rigid adherence to planned deployment schedules.  Returning a group early from a deployment is the antithesis of the OFRP.

The DFE is a hybrid type of deployment model.  Insofar as it reduces pointless deployment time and increases home port maintenance time (if it does?) and training time (does it?), ComNavOps can buy into it.  After all, it’s not all that far removed from a pure mission based activity model which is what I’ve advocated.

The DFE does, however, lead to the question, why deploy at all?  An actual, short deployment is a whole lot of pointless sailing, not much meaningful activity, a lot of operating cost, and a near suspension of training in favor of routine ‘operations’.  It would make far more sense to stay home, save money, forego pointless sailing, and concentrate on meaningful training and maintenance – in other words, a mission based activity model.

The cynical among you, myself included, might wonder if this DFE is just a thinly disguised way to reduce operating costs?  After all, it’s always about the money, right?

On a practical note, deployments that end unexpectedly (if the end was actually a surprise to the crews?) must create problems for the crews and their families due to the uncertainty.  Yes, there would be a great deal of happiness at the unexpected good news but also a great deal of confusion and disruption of carefully laid plans.

All in all, I’m cautiously in favor of this DFE pending additional evidence of the detailed workings and scope.  Was this a one time cost savings measure, not to be repeated?  Will the group simply be ‘parked’ to save money and not actually use the time to train, maintain, and improve readiness?  The answer to these kinds of questions will determine whether I’m in favor of this over the long haul.  So, this may be a step in the right direction but the better approach is no deployments and implementation of a purely mission based model.




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(1)Defense News website, “Jim Mattis’ ‘dynamic force employment’ concept just got real for the US Navy”, David B. Larter, 17-Jul-2018,


Monday, June 4, 2018

Crew Comfort

A couple of recent discussions hit on a common theme – that being that WWII ships packed a lot more weapons and sensors/fire control in a given ship size than modern ships do.  One of the reasons suggested for that was the greater degree of crew comforts that modern ships offer.  I don’t think that’s the entire explanation but it’s certainly part of it.  Today’s berthing is larger and more comfortable.  Lounge areas are provided.  Sanitary and wash facilities are more extensive and expansive.  And so on.  These amenities require additional deck space and internal volume.  I also suspect, but don’t know for sure, that food storage spaces are larger today.

Why do today’s ships have larger crew comfort facilities?

The common answer, which is generally given as an article of faith, obvious to anyone but an idiot, is that today’s sailor has to have greater comforts or else the Navy couldn’t meet its manning needs in a volunteer navy.  Sailors just wouldn’t put up with any less comforts than are currently provided.

Is this true?  Were yesterday’s sailors tougher?  Are today’s sailors softer and unable to withstand the harsher aspects of life at sea?  Are comforts the only way we can entice young men to a life at sea?

Are we missing something in this little story?

I think we are.  What we’re missing is deployments. 

Today’s deployments run 6-12 months with 8-10 being quite common.  In the not very distant past, deployments ran 2-6 months with 6 months being the extreme maximum.

Interestingly, “deployments” during WWII were generally very short because, as we discussed, they weren’t deployments – they were missions (see, "Deployments or Missions?").  Ships would go out on a mission, execute the mission, and return home.  Missions would typically be a few weeks.  Even submarine patrols were only 4-8 weeks or so.

Do you see where this is going? 

People can put up with a lot for a relatively short period.  The problem arises when we ask people to put up with a lack of comforts for months on end, pushing a year.

The solution, of course, is to execute missions not deployments.  A mission is 1-4 weeks.  A 1-4 week mission doesn’t need all the comforts of an 8-12 month deployment.  Sailors will put up with some crowding and discomfort for a short period especially when they’re doing something worthwhile, like a specific mission.  It’s when the ship simply sails endlessly in circles on a deployment that the crew recognizes as worthless, that comforts become increasingly important.

There’s another aspect of modern deployments that impact crew comforts and that is adventure.  The old slogan was, “Join the Navy and see the world”.  This included some epic and memorable liberty calls around the world.  Sailors could put up with cramped conditions while they relived and recovered from the last liberty and eagerly anticipated the next.

Today, however, liberty opportunities have been curtailed.  Many ports are off limits.  Those that are available are strictly supervised.  Sailors are encouraged to keep a low profile, exercise moderation and, preferably, participate in volunteer school building rather than engage in the type of liberty that becomes the stuff of legend.  In fact, it goes well beyond “encouragement” to the point of threats and punishment.  Heaven help the unfortunate sailor who overindulges or has a run-in with local police.  Ship’s Captains are judged on how meek and mild their crews are during liberty.  That’s a sad commentary.  Let’s loosen the reins and let sailors enjoy the world and liberty calls.

There’s also a practical aspect to crew comforts.  More expansive crew comforts require more internal ship’s volume, more infrastructure for networks and entertainment cabling, electronics, and power.  In short, the greater the crew comforts, the larger and more expensive the ship must be.  Now, let’s be realistic, the increase, while real, is not terribly significant compared to the overall size and cost of the ship but it does add up.

Consider the ship and crew size of the LCS versus the WWII Fletcher. 

The Fletcher class was 380 ft long, 2500 ton displacement, and had a crew of 329.

The Freedom class LCS with a crew of only 65-80 (with module and helo detachment) would, you’d think, be a fraction of the size of the Fletcher and yet it’s the same 380 ft long and, incredibly, has a displacement over 50% greater at 3900 tons.

I’m not saying that the LCS’ greater size relative to the crew size is just due to crew comforts but it is a part of it.  More to the point, it illustrates that the Fletcher was able to operate with a crew size around five times greater than the LCS because it didn’t go on endless, nearly year long deployments.  The crews would put to sea, execute a mission that they clearly saw as important, and return to port.


Fletcher - Five Times the Crew

Okay, you say, all this may be true but, really, where’s the harm?  Well, aside from the impact on ship size and cost, admittedly not all that great compared to the overall size and cost, the lethal consequences of crew comforts were made abundantly clear during the recent McCain and Fitzgerald collisions.  The reports painted a vivid picture of survivors trying to battle their way through loose debris to escape flooding berthing compartments and having to fight through an obstacle course of lockers, couches, exercise bikes, TV screens, game consoles, etc.  Every physical comfort added to a ship is a potential life-threatening obstacle in a damage/rescue scenario.

One of the things that ships used to do was to strip down for battle when war was declared.  All the loose items were removed from the ship and nothing was left that wasn’t essential for combat.  The problem today is that we’re always a split second from combat even though we aren’t, technically, at war.  We’ve had ships blown up in port, attacked with missiles while on patrol, run aground, and severely damaged in collisions.  Given that environment, our ships should be stripped for battle all the time.

The conclusion from this discussion is that we can design less comforts into a ship and, thus, a smaller ship if we would simply limit the deployments to more reasonable lengths or, as suggested in the recent post, no deployments – just missions.

Thursday, May 3, 2018

Deployments or Missions?

Our current system of 6-12 month deployments is badly broken.  The driving force behind the perceived need for such lengthy deployments is the Combatant Commander’s insatiable and, generally, worthless requests for forces to enhance their prestige and importance combined with the Navy’s absolute refusal to say no to any request because they perceive excessive demand, however worthless, as justification for larger budget slices.  All of this gains us … nothing.

Our deployments certainly aren’t deterring the Russians from seizing Crimea, invading Ukraine, and harassing our ships and aircraft in unsafe passes.  We absolutely aren’t deterring the Chinese from ignoring international law and seizing the South and East China Seas and building illegal artificial island bases.  We haven’t deterred the Iranians from developing nuclear weapons and sponsoring terrorism.  We didn’t deter North Korea from developing nuclear ballistic weapons – although Trump may have single-handedly accomplished more than any of our military deployments.  We haven’t deterred Syria from using chemical weapons.

So, if we aren’t deterring anyone, what are we accomplishing?  Well, we’re running our ships and aircraft into early retirements, we’re putting ships to sea that have training and certification waivers and have proven incapable of conducting basic seamanship evolutions, we’re reducing readiness, we’re creating a hollow force, we’re creating a mountainous backlog of maintenance, and we’re placing enormous strain on our personnel.

Clearly, our current deployment model is badly broken.

So, given what we are and are not accomplishing, what should we be doing?

The answer is simple.  Until such time as we decide to allow our forces to respond forcefully to harassment and misbehavior, which might actually enable effective deterrence, we should bring our ships and aircraft home.  I’ve discussed this before.  Deployments aren’t accomplishing anything so let’s leave everything and everyone home to conduct non-stop maintenance and training.  Let’s get readiness up to warfighting levels.  After all, isn’t that where we should be – ready to fight a war tonight?  Isn’t that where real deterrence comes from?

Ships should be constantly training.  Periods of pierside and shore training should alternate with frequent at-sea training exercises punctuated by ample maintenance periods.  In other words, ships, aircraft, and people should be either training or maintaining – there is nothing else.

Now, can we utterly pull back from the world stage?  No.  There are some areas that need attention.  However, what those areas don’t need is worthless deployments where a ship plows back and forth accomplishing nothing.  Instead, what we need are missions.  Yes, missions.  You know what a mission is, right?  It’s a specific task with a specific, achievable goal.

Let’s say there’s an area that is having trouble with piracy.  You don’t deploy and just wander around, hoping that your presence will somehow deter pirates (assuming they even recognize what a warship is which has proven not to be the case!).  Besides, your Rules of Engagement don’t really allow you to do anything effective.  Instead, we conduct a mission to exterminate the pirates at their source.  We collect intel, find and fix the pirates and their supporting elements, and execute a mission to wipe them out.  Then, we return home to train and maintain.  Mission accomplished.  There’s your deterrence!

Is China building another illegal, artificial island?  You don’t conduct another absolutely worthless Freedom of Navigation exercise that only reinforces their territorial claims.  Instead, if we have the willpower and courage to stop them, we conduct a mission to that end.  We collect intel, come up with a plan to actually stop their activities, plan for contingencies and escalation, and execute a mission to stop them.  Then, we return home to train and maintain.  Mission accomplished.  There’s your deterrence!

Tired of Russian aircraft making unsafe passes and maneuvers around our ships and aircraft?  You don’t continue to send unescorted ships and aircraft to sail/fly back and forth with no freedom to take any action.  Instead, you plan a mission to put a halt to the unsafe activities, presumably by “accidentally” downing some aircraft.  Then, we return home to train and maintain.  Mission accomplished.  There’s your deterrence!

Now, what if we don’t have the stomach for confrontations with China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea?  Fine.  So be it.  Then we sit home and train and maintain.  If we don’t have the stomach to confront then deployments aren’t going to accomplish anything, anyway, are they?  If and when we develop the will to confront someone then we can execute a mission with our, at that point, highly trained, well maintained, combat ready forces.

Deployments accomplish nothing.  Missions accomplish a specific task.

Stop deployments and start executing missions.

Monday, December 23, 2013

Longer Carrier Deployments

Here's a Christmas gift nobody wants ...  As reported by Navy Times website (1), just months after declaring that 8 month deployments would become the new standard, CNO Greenert now states that carriers will routinely deploy for 9 months for next couple of years. 

We recently discussed Deployment Lengths and noted the trend towards increased lengths.  This is yet more evidence of the increasing trend.  The stress on family life is only going to continue to get worse.


Sunday, November 17, 2013

Shoup Returns

The Burke class destroyer USS Shoup, DDG-86, is wrapping up an extended deployment just shy of 10-1/2 months, having left on 9-Jan-2013 and scheduled to return on 18-Nov-2013.  Wanna bet there will be a few extra divorces and ultimatums waiting pierside?  The answer to dwindling ship numbers is not longer deployments.

Tuesday, October 29, 2013

State of the Marine Corps

What the heck is going on with the Marine Corps?  This is a Navy blog and I don’t follow the Marine Corp to the same degree but recent Marine Corps news is disturbing, to say the least.  I listened to a presentation by MGen. Frank McKenzie speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and it was eye-opening.  This is a bit long but has some stunning revelations.  It's worth the time to read this.

The General opened by stating that the Corps was directed to develop a “new” Corps in response to budget pressures and the need to implement a 20% overall cut with a target of FY17.  The new Corps will have an end force of around 174,000 with a deploy:dwell of 1:2  (example, 7 months deployed and 14 months home) in order to meet demands with the available resources and will be focused on forward presence and crisis response as opposed to heavy combat.  The Corps will become lighter and more mobile.  McKenzie noted that the other services target 1:3 dwell.

He identified two programs that he views as vital to the Corps moving forward.  The Marines want to protect the JSF, at all costs, and the amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) but noted that Corps needs significant time, still, to define what that vehicle will be.  Really?  How many years have the Marines been working on AAV upgrades, the EFV, and similar options?  -and they still don’t know what they want?

He further noted that the new force will have reduced numbers of artillery and tanks and be more focused on crisis response and humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR).  Huh?!!  The Corps is deemphasizing combat?  Who’s in charge of this movement?  I know Commandant Amos is unpopular in many circles but this is almost criminal.


Semper Fi?

McKenzie noted, “If we were developing a strategy driven force, we’d take a 186.8K force at 1:3 dwell.”  He went on to note that the 1:2 dwell would not be an issue for the “4 and out” portion of the Corps but represented a severe challenge for the career personnel and would have to be carefully managed going forward.

The new structure will be structured around:

3 MEBs - east coast, west coast, Okinawa
7 MEUs
2 MEFs
2 SPMAGTF-CR
21 Infantry Battalions

When asked about the apparent imbalance between air, ground, and logistics as evidenced by the MV-22 and JSF garnering the vast majority of budgets for the last several years, McKenzie opined that the balance is just fine and that the air component is the number one priority in order to maintain a proper balance.  This stunned me until he offered a further comment later in the session.  Read on and you’ll see what I mean.

McKenzie stated that the Marines are not in the business of conducting opposed beach landings.  How he reconciles this statement with his characterization of the ACV as the number two acquisition priority is unclear.

Questioned about the Navy’s amphibious lift capacity, he responded that the Marines are very happy with the Navy’s amphibious force structure.  Really?  An already understrength force that’s going to continue to shrink is cause for happiness?

Questioned about the Marines role in ASB, he responded by saying that the best way the Marines could fit into the ASB would be as an “expeditionary air force operating [the JSF] from a dispersed basing structure”.  This is an eye-opening statement that assumes the enemy will allow the establishment of air bases and ignores the short range nature of the F-35B as far as potential contributions to an overall military effort.  This “plan” seems optimistic in the extreme.  He went on to suggest that the Marines would establish far more bases than an enemy could detect and deal with.  He neglected to describe how the Marines would supply the logistical support necessary to operate numerous dispersed bases requiring highly technical maintenance, parts, and support.  This statement would seem to provide the rationale behind the Marines single-minded focus on air power.  Apparently, the Marines are transitioning from an amphibious land combat force to an expeditionary air force that is merely transported by ship to their expeditionary bases.  This is an absolutely stunning change in direction for the Corps.  Either that, or I really haven’t been paying close enough attention.

Questioned in more detail about the new force structure, he stated that in order to fit within the budget limitations the decision was made to predominantly take capabilities away from the high end combat forces in favor of emphasizing presence and crisis response.  This is really disturbing.

Regarding the ACV, McKenzie stated that the Marines did not want to build the “son of EFV”.  Fair enough but if the EFV was that bad, why was it pursued in the first place?  Has something changed so drastically as to render the EFV concept so unsuited, now?  Again, this speaks to very poor leadership decisions then, now, or both.  Speaking further, he noted that the ACV would spend 90% of its life on land, driving Marines around as a sort of armored personnel carrier while still being required to fill the amphibious landing transport role.  That statement leads one to wonder if this is, perhaps, too much to ask of a single vehicle?  The moderator noted that the ACV has been three years in conceptual development with no end in sight.  Again, this bespeaks a degree of indecision uncharacteristic of Marines.

Marines have always been noted among the services for their candor, outspokenness, disregard for politics, and single-minded focus on warfighting.  This presentation exhibited none of those characteristics.  This was the kind of generic, politicized mumble that routinely comes from the other services.  What happened to the Marines?

Here’s the link if you wish to listen to the presentation.  It lasts just under an hour.



Thursday, October 17, 2013

Deployment Length

Here’s a quick check on deployment lengths over the last few years.  Shown below is the percentage of deployments that exceeded 6 months and, in parentheses, the longest deployment for that year.


2008    12%    (7 months)
2010    35%    (8 months)
2012    56%    (10.5 months)


The data is taken from the annual USNI Proceedings Naval Review issue for the corresponding year.  There is a bit of ambiguity in some of the reported deployments and the data isn’t complete but it shouldn’t change the percentages more than a few points one way or the other.

The data clearly shows that deployments are still trending sharply upward despite the attention that CNO says is being paid to the issue.  While the Navy claims that re-enlistments have not been markedly affected it is reasonable to assume that there is an upper limit beyond which it will have an effect.

Further, the rate of cross-decking of personnel which effectively doubles deployment lengths is also increasing significantly.  CNO and MCPON have stated that they are watching this trend closely.  I would offer CNO this free bit of advice:  stop watching and start doing something about it!

CNO has stated that average deployments will increase to around 8 months with some scheduled for 8-10 months.  The impact on family life and subsequent re-enlistment rates seems obvious.

Deployment lengths are increasing because the fleet is shrinking while demand from the Combatant Commanders is increasing.  Despite this obvious mismatch between demand and resources, the Navy remains firmly on a construction/retirement path leading to a continually shrinking fleet.  Does this make sense to anyone? 

Wednesday, September 18, 2013

Surge Capacity

One of the cornerstones of naval readiness has been the capacity to surge non-deployed ships in a crisis.  A portion of the ships that were not currently deployed but were conducting maintenance and working up for deployments have always been capable of being surged.  In other words, their maintenance, readiness, and training was sufficient that they could be deployed in a crisis and still be functional and safe even if not fully ready.

Of late, though, CNO and other Navy leaders have described extensive reductions in maintenance, deferred maintenance, idled air wings, air wings operating at the bare minimum to even be qualified for flight, and so on.  Additionally, cross-decking appears to be at an all time high.  Even CNO has alluded to the practice as a means of ensuring that deploying ships have the equipment and personnel they need.  Of course, when equipment and personnel are cross-decked to outgoing ships, the ships and units they came from are left with sizable gaps meaning that they are no longer surge capable.  CNO has specifically stated that the current surge capacity is well below normal and that the situation will only get worse as sequestration continues.

As budget cuts, continuing resolutions, and sequestration continue to further impact the Navy, we are not only losing our forward deployed capabilities but also our surge capacity.  It’s the loss of surge capacity that is not readily apparent to many people but is just as serious as the potential loss of deployed assets.  Of course, a portion of the impact on maintenance, training, and surge capacities is due to voluntary decisions by Navy leadership which has prioritized new construction over all else.  Still, the various budget pressures are impacting surge capacity and all signs indicate that it will get worse before it gets better.

We can juggle deployment schedules, extend deployment times, reduce coverage, and play other games to scrape by during peacetime but if a true crisis erupts and we have no surge capacity we’ll be in serious trouble.

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

The Navy's Death Spiral

Do you know what a death spiral is?  It’s when an organization is locked into a path leading to collapse and each action it takes in an attempt to deal with the situation only makes the situation worse.

Here’s an example.  My business is losing money so I cut costs across the board.  Unfortunately, the reduced salesman travel expenses and smaller advertising budget results in fewer sales so I lose more money which means I have to make more cost cuts which means still fewer sales which means even more cost cuts which means …  Eventually, I’m bankrupt.  I was caught in a death spiral.

The Navy is firmly caught in a death spiral and seems blissfully unaware of it.

The fleet is shrinking faster than new construction can be funded and built.  So, the Navy has to send ships on longer deployments to compensate for having too few ships.  But that wears out the ships even faster and results in more premature retirements and the fleet shrinks further which means the remaining ships have to deploy longer and with shorter maintenance availabilities and so their wear is accelerated even more which means the fleet gets smaller …



Navy - Caught in a Death Spiral?

Cost enters into this, too.  The Navy wants to build more new ships to increase fleet size but they’re on essentially a fixed budget.  So, they early retire ships to free up funds for new construction.  Unfortunately, the new ships are so expensive that fewer ships are being built than are being retired and so the fleet shrinks.  The Navy’s solution?  More early decommissionings and slashed maintenance to fund new ships but that just results in ships wearing out faster and the fleet shrinking even more …

The death spiral also applies to Navy aircraft.  Aircraft only have a certain number of allowable arrested landings and flight hours before they have to be retired.  Because of the last decade of higher than expected op tempos, aircraft are being used up faster than anticipated resulting in aircraft shortages.  As a result, returning air wings are cross decking aircraft to deploying air wings to cover shortages.  However, this simply leads to accelerated landing rates and flight hours which causes more shortages.   

Here’s some of the evidence for what I’m describing.  From a Navy Times article (1)

"The Navy’s top officer says he’s not concerned by the fleet’s operational pace, even though ship deployments are becoming more frequent and longer, stretching out to what officials have described as the new norm of seven months and beyond."

"Over the next two years, 11 ships are scheduled for eight-month deployments — a length once limited to crises and surges — a top personnel official said in February."

"Meanwhile, short-notice deployments are cropping up. The Carl Vinson carrier strike group, for example, deployed in late November, only 5½ months after returning from a 6½-month cruise."
The Navy's policy is for ships to have two months undeployed for every month deployed so as to allow time for crew rest, ship maintenance, and training.  The example of Vinson shows a ratio of less than one as opposed to the desired two.  Maintenance and training are being shorted.  Down the road, when Vinson is early retired due to being in poor physical shape, everyone will wonder how that came to be.  Well, this is how.  This is the definition of a death spiral.  We don't have enough ships so we skip maintenance but skipping maintenance and more frequent deployments means the ships wear out sooner which means we have even fewer ships which means we have to skip more maintenance and deploy even more often which means ...

Not enough evidence for you?  It was just announced that USS Stennis would deploy four months early to cover the carrier gap in the Mid East.  That’s a lot of maintenance and training time lost.  The death spiral is wearing out even (or especially!) our carriers.

But, on the plus side, CNO Greenert isn't concerned!  We're walking off the cliff with smiles on our faces!

Can the death spiral be stopped and, if so, how?

Obviously, the first step is for the Navy to recognize that it’s in a death spiral.  Unfortunately, to all outward appearances the Navy seems unaware of the phenomenon and you can’t fix what you can’t see.  Perhaps the Navy is aware of the problem privately but, if so, none of their public actions or policies show any sign of it.  Longer deployments are becoming the norm.  Several Ticonderoga cruisers are being retired early.  INSURV failures are at an all time high.  Spare parts shortages are common.  If the Navy recognizes the death spiral, none of their actions show it!

For the sake of discussion, let’s assume they were aware of the problem and wanted to break out of the death spiral – what could be done?  It starts by deciding what your true priority is.  Is it fleet size?  Is it fleet quality?  Is it fleet readiness?  Is it, as CNO Greenert claims, “warfighting first”? 

At the risk of grossly oversimplifying, the answer is readiness.  It doesn’t matter how big the fleet is if the ships aren’t ready to fight.  That means that maintenance and training of existing ships and crew is more important than putting new hulls in the water.  Witness the LCS which has no credible combat capability or the LPD-17 class which is currently deemed unsuitable for its intended purpose by the DOT&E/DTE – lots of new hulls with no readiness.

Having identified the proper priority, resources and funds need to be reallocated to support readiness.  Specifically, new construction funding needs to be cut in half, at least, and the resulting freed up funds devoted to bringing the existing fleet up to full maintenance levels and vastly improved training levels.  That will actually increase the fleet numbers by a few since we won’t have to retire usable ships.  Moving forward, new construction needs to be focused on larger numbers of solid, basic ship designs as opposed to win-the-war-single-handed designs that wind up being money pits. 

I won’t go further with details of the solution.  The thrust of the solution is obvious and I’ll leave a more detailed discussion for another time.


(1) Navy Times“CNO Not Concerned by Higher Operational Tempo”, Sam Fellman,  Mar 26, 2012, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/03/navy-chief-of-naval-operations-operational-tempo-032612w/