Titong vs. CA
Titong vs. CA
Titong vs. CA
*
G.R. No. 111141. March 6, 1998.
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* THIRD DIVISION.
103
104
105
ROMERO, J.:
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106
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2 Rollo, p. 17.
3 TSN, May 8, 1995, p. 4.
4 TSN, May 8, 1985, p. 6.
5 TSN, February 11, 1986, pp. 4-6.
6 Exh. 11.
107
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108
14
survey was made for petitioner, while the second was the
relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As
anticipated, certain discrepancies between the two surveys
surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s allegation in his
complaint that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he
was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of
Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot
No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa, was left with only an area
of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by
petitioner to him. Apprised 15
of the discrepancy, private
respondent filed a protest before the Bureau of Lands
against the first survey, likewise filing a case for alteration
of boundaries before the municipal trial court, the
proceedings of which,
16
however, were suspended because of
the instant case.
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the
four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the
Extrajudicial Settlement with17
Sale of Estate of the
deceased Leonida Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated unto
themselves the 3.6hectare property of the deceased. The
property involved is described in the instrument as18
having
been declared under Tax Declaration No. 3301 and as
bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by
Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon River and
on the West by Benigno Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax
Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner for his
corresponding share in the estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare
19
as his
rightful share in the extrajudicial settlement petitioner’s
share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It therefore appeared to
private respondent that petitioner encroached upon his
(Laurio’s) property
20
and declared it a part of his
inheritance.
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14 Exh. B.
15 Exh. 15.
16 TSN, October 26, 1989, pp. 7-11, 45-49.
17 Exhs. 12 & 12-B.
18 Exh. 13.
19 Exh. 12-A.
20 TSN, October 26, 1989, p. 35.
109
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21 Exh. 14-A.
22 Exh. 8-B.
23 Exhs. 6 & 6-B.
110
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111
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26 Ibid., p. 11.
27 Vda. de Aviles v. Court of Appeals, supra at p. 482.
28 Inland Trailways, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 457, 462 (1996);
Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 374, 383 (1996);
112
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113
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36 37
survey, and the survey plan. Respondent court correctly
held that these documents do not conclusively demonstrate
petitioner’s title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of
land is ascertained and also a paper containing
38
a statement
of courses, distances, and quantity of land. A survey under
a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument
sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode
in which a proprietor has 39 set off to himself in severalty a
part of the common estate. Therefore, a survey, not being
a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey
plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not
conclusive as to ownership 40
as it may refer only to a
delineation of possession.
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by
the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph
5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec.
1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private
surveyors send their original field notes, computations,
reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of
property 41to the Bureau of Lands for verification and
approval. A survey plan not verified and approved by said
Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due
execution and authenticity of which must be proven in
accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence
without any objection as to its due execution and
authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give
proba-
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115
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42 Ledesma v. Realubin and Court of Appeals, 118 Phil. 625, 629 (1963).
43 Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 57 (1995); Republic v. IAC, G.R.
No. 74380, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 285, 296; De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 57092, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 307, 317.
44 Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA
339, 348.
45 Sapu-an v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91869, October 19, 1992, 214
SCRA 701.
46 Decision, p. 6.
116
sioner’s report dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit 3-3-A), the area
47
claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants (Exhibit 2)” or
the private respondents. A careful reading of the decision
would show that this statement is found in the summary of
defendants’ (herein private respondents) evidence.
Reference to Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be attributed to
mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state
the defendants’ assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of
their 5.5hectare property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude
that either petitioner misapprehended the lower court’s
decision or he is trying to contumaciously mislead or worse,
deceive this Court.
With respect to the awards of moral damages of
P10,000.00 and attorney’s fees of P2,000.00, the Court finds
no cogent reason to delete the same. Jurisprudence is
replete with rulings to the effect that where fraud and bad
faith have 48
been established, the award of moral damages is
in order. This pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219
(10) of the Civil Code allowing the recovery of moral
damages for acts enumerated in Art. 21 of the same Code.
This article states that “(a)ny person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.” The moral damages are hereby
increased to P30,000.00. We agree with the respondent
court in holding that the award of attorney’s fees is
justified
49
because petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil
action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision
of the Court
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47 Petition, p. 9.
48 Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
109937, March 21, 1994, 231 SCRA 370, 377; Pasibigan v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 90169, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 202, 208; De Guzman v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 90856, July 23, 1992, 211 SCRA 723, 731.
49 Art. 2208 (4), Civil Code.
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