Petitioners: Third Division
Petitioners: Third Division
Petitioners: Third Division
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
DECISION
Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision of the First Division of the
Court of Appeals dated November 14, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27220, entitled
"Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr., et. al. versus Spouses Angeles Supelveda Uy, et.
al.," and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1998 which
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents of this case may be traced as far back as August 1970; it
involves a 128-hectare parcel of land located in the barrios of Dunga and
Cahumayhumayan, Danao City. On December 27, 1973, the late Congressman
Ramon Durano, Sr., together with his son Ramon Durano III, and the latter's
wife, Elizabeth Hotchkiss Durano (petitioners in the herein case), instituted an
action for damages against spouses Angeles Supelveda Uy and Emigdio Bing
Sing Uy, spouses Faustino Alatan and Valeriana Garro, spouses Rufino Lavador
and Aurelia Mata, Silvestre Ramos, Hermogenes Tito, Teotimo Gonzales,
Primitiva Garro, Julian Garro, Ismael Garro, Bienvenido Castro, Glicerio Barriga,
Beatriz Calzada, Andrea Mata de Batulan, Teofista Alcala, Filemon Lavador,
Candelario Lumantao, Gavino Quimbo, Justino Tito, Marcelino Gonzales,
Salvador Dayday, Venancia Repaso, Leodegario Gonzales, Jose de la Calzada,
Restituta Gonzales, and Cosme Ramos (herein respondents 1 ) before Branch
XVII of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Danao City.
Petitioners further alleged in their complaint before the CFI that during
the course of the above investigations, respondents kept spreading false
rumors and damaging tales which put petitioners into public contempt and
ridicule. 3
In their Answer, respondents lodged their affirmative defenses, demanded
the return of their respective properties, and made counterclaims for actual,
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moral and exemplary damages. Respondents stated that sometime in the early
part of August 1970 and months thereafter they received mimeographed
notices dated August 2, 1970 and signed by the late Ramon Durano, Sr.,
informing them that the lands which they are tilling and residing in, formerly
owned by the Cebu Portland Cement Company (hereafter, "Cepoc"), had been
purchased by Durano & Co., Inc. The notices also declared that the lands were
needed by Durano & Co. for planting to sugar and for roads or residences, and
directed respondents to immediately turn over the said lands to the
representatives of the company. Simultaneously, tall bamboo poles with
pennants at the tops thereof were planted in some areas of the lands and metal
sheets bearing the initials "RMD" were nailed to posts.
As early as the first week of August 1970, and even before many of the
respondents received notices to vacate, men who identified themselves as
employees of Durano & Co. proceeded to bulldoze the lands occupied by
various respondents, destroying in their wake the plantings and improvements
made by the respondents therein. On some occasions, respondents alleged,
these men fired shots in the air, purportedly acting upon the instructions of
petitioner Ramon Durano III and/or Ramon Durano, Jr. On at least one instance,
petitioners Ramon Durano III and Elizabeth Hotchkiss Durano were seen on the
site of the bulldozing operations.
On September 15, 1970, Durano & Co. sold the disputed property to
petitioner Ramon Durano III, who procured the registration of these lands in his
name under TCT No. T-103 and TCT No. T-104.
Respondents contended that the display of force and the known power
and prestige of petitioners and their family restrained them from directly
resisting this wanton depredation upon their property. During that time, the
mayor of Danao City was Mrs. Beatriz Durano, wife of Ramon Durano, Sr. and
mother of petitioner Ramon Durano III. Finding no relief from the local police,
who respondents said merely laughed at them for daring to complain against
the Duranos, they organized themselves and sent a letter to then President
Ferdinand Marcos reporting dispossession of their properties and seeking a
determination of the ownership of the land. This notwithstanding, the bulldozing
operations continued until the City Fiscal was requested by the Department of
Justice to conduct an investigation on the matter. When, on July 27, 1971, the
City Fiscal announced that he would be unable to conduct a preliminary
investigation, respondents urged the Department of Justice to conduct the
preliminary investigation. This was granted, and the investigations which
spanned the period March 1972 to April 1973 led to the conclusion that
respondents' complaint was untenable. 4
On April 22, 1975, petitioners moved to dismiss their complaint with the
trial court. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, without prejudice to
respondents' right to proceed with their counterclaim.
Respondents, for their part, also presented their affidavits and supporting
documentary evidence, including tax declarations covering such portions of the
property as they formerly inhabited and cultivated.
SO ORDERED. 9 EHCcIT
The RTC found that the case preponderated in favor of respondents, who
all possessed their respective portions of the property covered by TCT Nos. T-
103 and T-104 thinking that they were the absolute owners thereof. A number
of these respondents alleged that they inherited these properties from their
parents, who in turn inherited them from their own parents. Some others came
into the properties by purchase from the former occupants thereof. They and
their predecessors were responsible for the plantings and improvements on the
property. They were the ones who sought for the properties to be tax-declared
in their respective names, and they continually paid the taxes thereto.
Respondents maintained that they were unaware of anyone claiming adverse
possession or ownership of these lands until the bulldozing operations in 1970.
As for Venancia Repaso, Hermogenes Tito and Marcelino Gonzales, the
Court found that the properties they laid claim to were not part of the land that
was purchased by Durano & Co. from Cepoc. Thus, it found the bulldozing of
these lands by petitioners totally unjustified and ordered not only the total
reimbursement of useful and necessary expenses on the properties but also the
return of these properties to Repaso, Tito and Gonzales, respectively. As for all
the other respondents, the RTC found their possession of the properties to be in
the concept of owner and adjudged them to be builders in good faith.
Considering that petitioners in the instant case appropriated the improvements
on the areas overran by the bulldozers, the RTC ruled that "(t)he right of
retention to the improvements necessarily should be secured (in favor of
respondents) until reimbursed not only of the necessary but also useful
expenses." 10
NO. T — 104 —
From the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the issuance of
the TCT Nos. T-103 and T-104 in favor of petitioner Ramon Durano III was
attended by fraud; hence, petitioners could not invoke the principle of
indefeasibility of title. Additionally, the Court of Appeals found that the alleged
Deed of Absolute Sale, undated, between Cepoc Industries, Inc. and Durano &
Co. was not notarized and thus, unregistrable.
The Court of Appeals went on to state that while, on the one hand, no
valid issuance of title may be imputed in favor of petitioners from the private
Deed of Sale and the alleged reconstituted titles of Cepoc that were not
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presented in evidence, respondents, in contrast — who although admittedly
had no registered titles in their names — were able to demonstrate possession
that was public, continuous and adverse — or possession in the concept of
owner, and which was much prior (one or two generations back for many of
respondents) to the claim of ownership of petitioners.
Thus, the Court of Appeals ordered the return of the properties covered by
TCT Nos. T-103 and T-104 to all respondents who made respective claims
thereto. Corollarily, it declared that petitioners were possessors in bad faith,
and were not entitled to reimbursement for useful expenses incurred in the
conversion of the property into sugarcane lands. It also gave no merit to
petitioners' allegation that the actual damages awarded by the trial court were
excessive, or to petitioners' argument that they should not have been held
personally liable for any damages imputable to Durano & Co.
SO ORDERED. 13
On October 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ASaTHc
Moving now to the other errors assigned in the petition, the return of the
properties to respondents Repaso, Tito and Gonzales was premised upon the
factual finding that these lands were outside the properties claimed by
petitioners under TCT Nos. T-103 and T-104. Such factual finding of the RTC,
sustained by the Court of Appeals, is now final and binding upon this Court.
In respect of the properties supposedly covered by TCT Nos. T-103 and T-
104, the Court of Appeals basically affirmed the findings of the RTC that
respondents have shown prior and actual possession thereof in the concept of
owner, whereas petitioners failed to substantiate a valid and legitimate
acquisition of the property — considering that the alleged titles of Cepoc from
which TCT Nos. T-103 and T-104 were supposed to have derived title were not
produced, and the deed of sale between Cepoc and Durano & Co. was
unregistrable.
The records clearly bear out respondents' prior and actual possession;
more exactly, the records indicate that respondents' possession has ripened
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into ownership by acquisitive prescription.
The evidence shows that respondents successfully complied with all the
requirements for acquisitive prescription to set in. The properties were
conveyed to respondents by purchase or inheritance, and in each case the
respondents were in actual, continuous, open and adverse possession of the
properties. They exercised rights of ownership over the lands, including the
regular payment of taxes and introduction of plantings and improvements.
They were unaware of anyone claiming to be the owner of these lands other
than themselves until the notices of demolition in 1970 — and at the time each
of them had already completed the ten-year prescriptive period either by their
own possession or by obtaining from the possession of their predecessors-in-
interest. Contrary to the allegation of petitioners that the claims of all twenty-
two (22) respondents were lumped together and indiscriminately sustained, the
lower courts (especially the RTC) took careful consideration of the claims
individually, taking note of the respective modes and dates of acquisition.
Whether respondents' predecessors-in-interest in fact had title to convey is
irrelevant under the concept of just title and for purposes of prescription.
Since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles, they were
correctly held by the Court of Appeals to be builders in bad faith.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or
sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or
sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the
expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or
planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to
damages from the builder, planter or sower.
Based on these provisions, the owner of the land has three alternative
rights: (1) to appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay
indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that the builder remove what he had built,
or (3) to compel the builder to pay the value of the land. 32 In any case, the
landowner is entitled to damages under Article 451, abovecited.
The right of the owner of the land to recover damages from a builder in
bad faith is clearly provided for in Article 451 of the Civil Code. Although said
Article 451 does not elaborate on the basis for damages, the Court perceives
that it should reasonably correspond with the value of the properties lost or
destroyed as a result of the occupation in bad faith, as well as the fruits
(natural, industrial or civil) from those properties that the owner of the land-
reasonably expected to obtain. We sustain the view of the lower courts that the
disparity between respondents' affidavits and their tax declarations on the
amount of damages claimed should not preclude or defeat respondents' right
to damages, which is guaranteed by Article 451. Moreover, under Article 2224
of the Civil Code:
Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal
but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
The last issue presented for our resolution is whether petitioners could
justifiably invoke the doctrine of separate corporate personality to evade
liability for damages. The Court of Appeals applied the well-recognized principle
of "piercing the corporate veil," i.e ., the law will regard the act of the
corporation as the act of its individual stockholders when it is shown that the
corporation was used merely as an alter ego by those persons in the
commission of fraud or other illegal acts.
The test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction is as follows:
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1. With the exception of Rufino Lavador, Jose de Calzada and Cosme Ramos,
who respondents in their Answer before the trial court declared were only
witnesses for respondents, not claimants to the disputed property. RTC
Decision, 3; Records of the Case.
2. CA Decision; Rollo, 48-49.
3. RTC Decision, 2; Records of the Case.
4. CA Decision; Rollo, 49-55.
5. Ibid., 55.
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6. Ibid., 50-54.
7. CA Decision; Rollo, 56-58.
8. Ibid.; Rollo , 58.
9. RTC Decision: Rollo, 114.
25. Mallilin vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000; Eduarte vs. Court of
Appeals, 311 SCRA 18; P.D. 1529, Sec. 48.
26. Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(e).
27. P.D. 1529 Sec. 112.