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Lee Hong Kok Vs David

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No. L-30389. December 27, 1972.

PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK,


ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK,
petitioners, vs.ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Public land; Validity of government grants.—Only the Government,
represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate
of title issued pursuant to a void patent Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may
raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the
defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question
between the grantee and the government.
Same; Imperium distinguished from dominium.—The government
authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in
the concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium;its
capacity to own or acquire property under dominiun. The use of this
term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including
their disposition, -except aslimited by the Constitution.
373
VOL. 48, 373
DECEMBER
27, 1972
Lee Hong Hok vs.
David
Same; Jura regalia, adopted by the Constitution.—The concept
of jura, regalia was adopted by the present Constitution. ownership
however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof.
Same; When property considered of public domain.—There being no
evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by
the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title or by any
other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be
held to be public domain, For it is well-settled that no public land can
be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government. It is indispensable then that there be a showing
of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by
law.
Same; Proceedings under Land Registration Law and under
Chapter VI of the Public Land Law; Similarities between—The
proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the
provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that
both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial
proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive
and final.

APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.


The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court,
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents
FERNANDO, J.:
Petitioners in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse
1

a decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower


court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens
Title of respondent Aniano David de-
2

_______________
1 Petitioners are Pedro Lee Hong Hok, Simeon Lee Hong Hok, Rosita Lee Hong Hok and
Leoncio Lee Hong Hok,
2 Original Certificate of Title No. 510 of the Registry of Naga City.

374
374 SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lee Hong Hok vs.
David
clared null and void. What makes the task for petitioners quite
difficult is that their factual support for their pretension to
ownership of such disputed lot through accretion was rejected
by respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning,
they must perforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it
mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far
from persuasive. A grant by the government through the
appropriate public officials exercising the competence duly
3

vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise,


unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise passing into
private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such an
assumption is at war with settled principles of constitutional
law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of
the lower court makes clear that there is no legal justification
for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the
disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by
respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he
"acquired lawful title thereto pursuant to his miscellaneous
sales application in accordance with which an order of award
and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of
Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area
of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga
Cadastre, On the basis of the order of award of the Director of
Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued
by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee
Aniano David on October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation
of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano
David and during all the proceedings in connection with said
application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his
f avor, the plaintif fsappellants did not put up any opposition
or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the
registra-
_______________
3 The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands were
likewise named respondents.
375
VOL. 48, 375
DECEMBER
27, 1972
Lee Hong Hok vs.
David
tion and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of
title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496
subject to all the safeguards provided therein * * *. Under
Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of
the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within
one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter
the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible * * *.
In this case the land in question is not a private property as
the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources have always sustained the public character
thereof for having been formed by reclamation. * * * The only
remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an action for
reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this case we do not see
any fraud committed by defendant-appellant Aniano David in
applying for the purchase of the land involved through his
Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in
the records of the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry
No. V-9033, because everything was done in the open. The
notices regarding the auction sale of the land were published,
the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not
clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the
Government. The application was merely a renewal of his
deceased wif e's application, and the said deceased occupied the
land since 1938." 4

On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a


different conclusion is likely to be attended with frustration.
The first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken
place, notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of
Appeals, would seek to disregard what was accepted by
respondent Court as to how the disputed lot came into being,
namely by reclamation. It does not therefore call for any
further consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed
to respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative
doctrines preclude a party other than the government to
dispute the validity of a grant and
_______________
4Decision, Appendix A, Brief for the Petitioners, 54-56.
376
376 SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lee Hong Hok vs.
David
the recognition of the indefeasible character of a public land
patent after one year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as
set forth at the outset, there is no justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaf t of criticism was let loose by
petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in the
exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the
Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is,
furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. Only the
Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an
action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a
void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of
Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31,
1959). This was not done by said officers but by private parties
like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title
issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as
owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after
claiming it as their private property. The cases cited by
appellants are not in point as they refer to private registered
lands or public lands over which vested rights have been
acquired but notwithstanding such fact the Land Department
subsequently granted patents to public land
applicants." Petitioner ought to have known better. The above
5

excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement of a


principle that dates back to Maninang v. Consolacion, a 1908
6

decision. As was there categorically stated: "The fact that the


grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the
grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which
the government may raise, but until it is raised by the
government and set aside, the defendant can not question it.
The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and
the government" The above citation was repeated ipsissimis
7

verbis in Salazar v. Court of


_______________
5 Ibid, 56-57.
6 12 Phil. 342.
7 Ibid, 349.

377
VOL. 48, 377
DECEMBER
27, 1972
Lee Hong Hok vs.
David
Appeals. Bereft as petitioners were of the right of ownership
8

in accordance with the findings of the Court of Appeals, they


cannot, in the language of Reyes v. Rodriguez, "question the
9

[title] legally issued." The second assignment of error is thus


10

disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of
outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law
between the government authority possessed by the state
which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty,
and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not
inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes
under the heading of imperium and the latter
of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with
reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character,
In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of
lands and other natural resources, including their disposition,
except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of
the confusion that existed during the medieval era between
such two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicaeas
a corollary to dominium. As far as the Philippines was
11

concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño


v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain
12

in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that


all lands were held from the Crown * * *." That was a
13

manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was 14

adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being


vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What
was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive
discussion of the matter in the leading case of Valenton v.
Murciano, decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was
15

incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes


_______________

8 87 Phil. 456 (1950).


9 62 Phil 771 (1936).
10 Ibid, 776.
11 Cf. 3 Pound, Jurisprudence, 108-109 (1959).

12 212 US 449 (1909).

13 Ibid, 458.

14 Cf. Radin, Law Dictionary, 288 (1955).

15 3 Phil. 537.

378
378 SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lee Hong Hok vs.
David
de las Indias in these words: "We having acquired full
16

sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and


possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal
predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the
royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which
are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to
us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving
before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,
pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled,
taking into consideration not only their present condition, but
also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage
and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and
giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may
wish." 17

It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular


Government that "as to the unappropriated public lands
18

constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is


vested in Congress, * * *." They continue to possess that
19

character until severed therefrom by state granl, Where, as in


20
this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the
disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly
categorized as public land is undeniable. What was held 21

in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands finds 22

application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the


property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or
their ancestors either by
________________
16 Law I, Title 12, Book 4.
17 3 Phil. 537, 542-543.
18 12 Phil. 572 (1909).

19 Ibid, 579. Cf. Insular Government v. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil. 505 (1911); Ankron v.

Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10 (1919).


20 Cf. Archbishop of Manila v. Director of Lands, 27 Phil. 245(1914).

21 Cf. Aragon v. Insular Government, 19 Phil. 223 (1911); Francisco v. Government, 28 Phil.

505 (1914); Government v. Cabangis, 53 Phil. 112 (1929).


22 59 Phil. 600 (1934).

379
VOL. 48, 379
DECEMBER
27, 1972
Lee Hong Hok vs.
David
composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title or by any other means for the
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be
public domain." For it is well-settled "that no public land can
23

be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or


implied, f rom the government." It is indispensable then that
24

there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode


of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement
25

of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes,


follows: "The applicant, having failed to establish his right or
26

title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the
present controversy, and there being no showing that the same
has been acquired by any private person from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains
part of the public domain." To repeat, the second assignment
27

of error is devoid of merit.


3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion
of the opinion of Justice Esguerra: "According to the
Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of
Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection
with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales
patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any
opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them
because after the registration and issuance of the certificate
and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent,
the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein * * *. Under Section 38 of Act 496 any
question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based
on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the
issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of
_______________
23 Ibid, 603.
24 Padilla v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 967, 969 (1934).
25 Cf. Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771 (1936).

26 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 Phil. 634.

27 Ibid, 639.

380
380 SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lee Hong Hok vs.
David
title based thereon becomes indefeasible * * *."28 Petitioners
cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent
David's title is impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In
thus manifesting such an attitude, they failed to accord
deference to controlling precedents. As f ar back as 1919,
in Aquino v. Director of Lands, Justice Malcolm, speaking for
29

the Court, stated: "The proceedings under the Land


Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the
Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the
whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and
for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and
final." Such a view has been followed since then. The latest
30 31

case in point is Cabacug v. Lao. There is this revealing excerpt


32

appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a


holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably
situated than that ef an owner of registered property. Not only
does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but
in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his
favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years." It 33

is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally


indefensible.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are
affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
_______________

28 Decision, Appendix A to Brief for Petitioners, 54-55.


29 39 Phil. 850 (1919).
30 Ibid, 858.

31 Cf. Manalo v. Lukban, 48 Phil. 973, (1924); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil.

17 (1934); Republic of the Philippines v. Abacite, L-15415, April 26, 1961, 1 SCRA
1076; Panimdim v. Director of Lands, L-19731, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 628; Director of Lands
v. The Court of Appeals, L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 71; Antonio v. Barroga, L-23769,
April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 357; Dela Cruz v. Reano, L-29792, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 585.
32 L-27036, November 26. 1970, 36 SCRA 92.

33 Ibid, 96.

381
VOL. 48, 381
DECEMBER
27, 1972
Lee Hong Hok vs.
David
Concepcion,
C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Maka
siar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Decision and resolution affirmed.
Notes. a) Nature of title over public lands.—While with the
due registration and issuance of a certificate of title over a land
acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law, said property
becomes registered in contemplation of Act 496, in view of its
nature and manner of acquisition, such certificate of title, when
in conflict with one obtained on the same date through judicial
proceedings must give way to the latter (Nieto vs. Quines, 6
SCRA 74).
1. b)Public lands still subject to tax.—Public lands granted
by the State to private persons are subject to tax even
though title remains in the State (Francisco vs. City of
Davao, 12 SCRA 628).
See also copious annotationson Jurisdiction of Director of
Lands and Judicial Review of Decisions of the Secretary of
DANR, 16 SCRA 548-551; and on Concepts and Procedures of
Public Land Disposition, 31 SCRA 191204.
LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE
See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 2, page 1792 on Public
Lands.
See also Velayo's Digest,volume 18, page 257 on Public
Lands.
Bautista, C.A., The Public Land Act, Annotated, 1957
edition.
Miravete, L.F., Commentaries on the Law on Natural
Resources, 1956 edition.
Noblejas, A.H., Law on Natural Resources, 1972 edition.
Peña, N., Natural Resources, 1969 edition.
______________

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