India 7
India 7
India 7
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ordinated by others? There are two directions that military preparations of a state,
big, medium-sized or small, can take. One
is to insist that the level of military preparations must be sufficient to protect one's
Notes
disarmament.
the notion of power projection well beyond one's territorial boundaries. In thewill follow from the establishment of strategic relations and its
VERGHESE KOITHARA
normative dimension to strategic political
thinking and ambitions. The vision of the
humans who are neither so morally debased an historic strategic alignment with thethat.
US Moreover, serious practical problems
Email: pamela@del3.vsnl.net.in
The post-1962 military assistance relationship between India and the US was
short and soon unravelled. but the threads
to CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-off TreatyOn the face of it, the joint statement
of IGMDP, while two of its five missiles September and Strategy to Combat WMD
programme could ensure not only its own
(nuclear capable Prithvi and Agni) werein December- were judged as compatible
release from quarantine but also that of the
with, if not in furtherance of Indian interests.
beyond the possibility of securing outside
missile progralmme. This, in turn, could
In February 2002, the US cleared the sale
help, three others (anti-aircraft Trishul and
lower technology transfer barriers considAkash, and anti-tank Nag) were not. Thisof eight Raytheon counter-battery radars,
erably in other defence fields.
period also saw a slow enhancement ofthe first US-India arms deal in four deBut can the Bush administration square
the NPT circle for India? The US-India
military-to-military relationship, particucades. Equally important, the US supported
larly with the US Pacific Command. the sale of several advanced Israeli weapon
nuclear cooperation project calls for considerable domestic and international efIndia's sweeping economic liberalisationsystems including Phalcon mini-AWACS.
in the early 1990s and the collapse of the
India and the US signed a General Security
forts on the part of US administration.
of Military Information Agreement
Soviet Union paved the way for the January
Domestically there is the need to modify
1995 US-India 'Agreed Minutes of Defence
(GOSMIA) in August 2002 and a US-Indiathe 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act
Relations'. Through the constitution of a
(HTCG) was constituted in November 2002. mindsets across several agencies. Today
Defence Policy Group and a Joint Technology Group this agreement raised ties toDuring
a
spring-summer 2003 the USIndia enjoys considerable support within
markedly higher level. Structured strategic
exerted considerable pressure on India the
to US congress, but how this body will
consultations began, and cooperationprovide
in
a contingent of troops in Iraq. The
act when it comes to changing major
legislation, crafted after long consensustechnology as well as in training and
Indian security establishment was largely
exercises got a boost. A setback occurred
in favour, but the idea was politically
building, remains to be seen.
of sub systems and components that would two countries shall "conduct joint and
talks of increasing "opportunities for techenable it to produce its own major weaponcombined exercises and exchanges" and
nology transfer, collaboration, co-producsystems. But here US companies and the US also "collaborate in multinational operation, and research and development",
government, for commercial and security tions when it is in their common interest".
establishes a joint Defence Procurement
reasons, are likely to be even less forth-On the face of it, the cooperative ideas
and Production Group to "oversee defence
coming than the Russians and west Euro- spelt in the document commits India less
trade as well as prospects for co-producpeans. A BrahMos type joint development in the military field than in the defence
tion and technology collaboration". and
and production deal is difficult to conceiveindustrial one. But when both political and
promises to "expand collaboration relatwith the Americans. It is likely that techno- military leaderships are enthusiastic about
ing to missile defence".
logies that are approaching shelf life will military collaboration, which is the case
The key idea here is that each defence
be passed on, but that will be little help.today in both countries, the process can
transaction is to be looked at not only fromIt is crucial to recognise that technologi- gain momentum beyond what words can
the angle of its intrinsic worth but also from
cal superit)rity is the foundational basis ofindicate. It is worth noting that the military
the angle of its contribution to strengthUS military power and therefore technol- ties envisaged are unprecedented for India.
ening the strategic partnership between the
ogy control is a cornerstone of US defenceThe country's defence relationship with
two countries. This has major implications
policy. The US guards defence technology the Soviet Union had been confined to
for India, as the beneficiary of this logic will
tighter than any other country. A plethora equipment and technology; it had no
be the seller which is the US. It will be
of agencies in the US state. commerce and 'military' content. We are now entering
argued that mutual privileging will help
defence departments come into play on uncharted waters with the US.
India too by paving the way for easier
each transaction, be it a major system or With a military geared to operate in
technology transfer. But to judge if this
a sub system. Agreements like GOSMIA every part of the globe, the US has interests
('access to technology' matching 'purchase
that India signed in August 2002 play onlyin developing military-to-military ties with
of material') would happen it is important
a minor role. Political relations of the day as many countries as possible. The US has
to look at the scope that there exists for each.
as well as long-term confidence in alliance such ties, of varying intensity, with about
The US wants military sales to promote
integrity influence each clearance.
150 countries. India is particularly attracAs for joint R&D. there are few coun- tive because of its size and potential, the
inter-operability and garner commercial
competence and infrastructure of its milibig a share of India's defence market aspartnerships. The experiences of Britaintary, and its geographic position within
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ground support for its aircraft worldwide. cooperation. At the same time, military
India's geographic position and excellentaction in this context, except when integral
partly under Indian control, and some power balance - that have a serious strategic
term that conceals within it a wide spectrum
In the inter-operability field, communica- capabilities in reconnaissance and signal/But the US has also not been able to help
India solve its core problem in south Asia,
tion compatibility could be followed by electronic intelligence fields can be valuwhich is Pakistan. The latter's nuclear weaco-ordination of C&C systems and some able to India. India's human intelligence
pons have not made it coercion-proof, but
assets
and
ground
support
resources
can
sensor interfacing. By developing an inhas raised the coercion threshold not just
frastructure for co-operation. these steps be very useful to the US in turn.
that do not exist today. The Indian military Interests and Calculations
China's
regional security and Asian power
bal- rise and the difficulties in engag-
started. While the potency of US ships, sub-ance. Economic relations is an arena where
ing that country economically and conmarines and naval aircraft has not declined,there is great scope for mutually beneficial fronting it politically. The position of US
their numbers have. Today, the US canexpansion. But economic vibrancy betweenas the dominant Asian power is under
certainly do with Indian help in keepingfree-market democracies does not need to
growing threat. With Japan in relative
track of happenings in the Indian Ocean.be propped up by strategic partnerships.
decline and South Korea's dependability
Indian ports would also be useful to USAnd promotion of democracy, while unin question, the US wants to increase India's
ships for R&R and logistics stops. Indiandoubtedly valuable, hardly lends itself toweight in the Asian power balance. Views
Ocean and its approaches are crucial arenasbe pursued as a joint project.
such as Washington must "not only acquifor the US-initiated Proliferation Security Energy is of vital interest to both counesce but support the active development
Initiative, intended to intercept WMD ship- tries. There is a scramble today to build
of India's strategic deterrent" and that
ments at sea. There is a good chance of India gas and oil pipelines, not only to achieve
"India's nuclear weapons at some point
could become an asset to the United States"
joining the current 11-member group.
cheaper transportation but also to create
It is the combat-toughened Indian Armystrategically advantageous pathways of
do not reflect broad US strategic thinking,
that Pentagon is eyeing keenly today, flow. Interests of countries, except ofbecause the military help that the US would
need in the future is not at the nuclear level.
although army operations are more politi-neighbours, are unlikely to coincide here.
cally sensitive than those at sea. The USNuclear electricity generation, as a propor-On the other hand, the US desire to see
army, marine corps and the national guardtion of total energy generation, has beenan economically and politically stronger
are all painfully stretched and desperatelyflat or declining in most countries for two
India is palpably obvious.
in need of supportive boots-on-ground. decades and more. Higher petroleum prices The security establishments of India and
Pentagon is still hopeful of getting the Indian and climate change fears are unlikely to the US share a largely common view of
army into Iraq and is looking for a combi-reverse this soon. Technological breakChina today, but this is unlikely to last
nation of UN cover and pacified areas throughs in cost reduction, plant safety and long. India's problems with China are
to make it possible. Peacekeeping, peace spent fuel disposal are still distant. Econo- not structural. Growing power and selfenforcement and combat operations nowmically decisive India-US cooperation in confidence will gradually open many
overlap considerably, and India and the USthe nuclearenergy field is not on the horizon. options for India relative to China. While
could find themselves moving across a large, India and the US have a vital interest in
India badly needs US political support in
politically problematic operational spectrum.combating terrorism and WMD prolifera-the current unipolar phase, it cannot afford
Airlift capabilities of the Indian Air Force,tion, and given Pakistan's involvement in to get locked into a 'follow-the-US' line
both fixed and rotary wing, are useful toboth activities, the two countries have
vis-a-vis China or any other country. A
the US. although Indian capabilities are considerable scope for cooperation.
distinguished south Asian observer recently
not very strong in this field and groundIntelligence is now the key issue in this
commented, "They (Indians) will ride our
logistics largely incompatible. Purchasesstruggle. Raising its quality and actionbus to the point where they think they can
of US aircraft could change this over acycle speed has become critical and so
ride their own bus". Very true, but equally
period. Pentagon is very keen to ensure has the need for much closer international
true would be the observation that the US
Prospects
Many in the two security communities
perceive a window of opportunity today to
that the incipient partnership of AsiaPacific nations would "develop and transfer cleaner, more efficient technologies to
meet not only...individual national pollu-
what different. [
Email: koithara@sancharnet.in
India is now being asked to choose between a course offinn commitment industrialised
the problem in the first place. But a diplomatic offensive by the US in particular,
demanding the 'meaningful participation'
defence minister Pranab Mukherjee's visitof developing countries, played a signifi-
SUKUMAR MURALIDHARAN
to Washington, DC, which began with cant part in ensuring that the binding targets
modest expectations and ended with a agreed at Kyoto were rather modest. Even
as the consummation of a process begun Singh's visit to the US capital when he third range of interests in this unlikely
many years before. 'Transformation' was issued a joint declaration with president 'Asia-Pacific partnership' is Japan,
the term of art applied to the process, a George Bush that seemingly injected India which accepted the binding commitments
into the exclusive orbit of recognised of Kyoto and has shown little reserve since
nuclear weapons states. Though it involvedabout implementing them.
relatively minor players and occurred on Specific details about the deal remain
the periphery of public attention, India's sketchy. Explanations offered by US deputy
accession at the end of July to a plurilateral secretary of state Robert Zoellick and
deal on climate change was also integrally Australian foreign minister Alexander
part of the cycle. Brokered by the US andDowner, have in no way cleared the conAustralia - two recalcitrant elements in the fusion. The 'Vision Statement' offers no
Congress. But all assurances that the di- context of the Kyoto Protocol on climate targets on reducing emissions and only
rection of foreign policy set by the NDA change - the deal also involves China, holds out a vague assurance to bring to-
would be reviewed have proved mere South Korea and Japan. It involves no gether all participants in a 'nonbinding
verbiage. The strategic alliance with the binding agreements and is provisionallycompact' that will function on the prinUS, which was a matter of moods and
titled a 'vision statement' uniting the sig-ciples of consensus and cooperation. Far
attitudes during the NDA regime, hasnatories
in
in a 'partnership for clean devel-from curbing growth, the partnership would
the dramatic space of one month, acquired
opment and climate'.
seek its enhancement through advanced
substance and form under its successor
The three events spread over a month technologies. The deal is portrayed by its
The cycle was set underway with are strongly interlinked in logical and authors as an effort to complement the