On Great Power ConflictAuthor(s): Charles A.

Kupchan
Source: Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 4 (WINTER 2019), pp. 3-9
Published by: Air University Press

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POLICY FORUM

On Great Power Conflict:

Entangled or Untangled Alliances?
An Interview with Charles A. Kupchan
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University
Conducted 13 June 2019

SSQ: Can you offer a general historical view of alliances in preserving

peace and preventing conflict?
CAK: Historically, alliances have tended to be tools of warfare more
than they have been tools of deterrence. In that sense, the Cold War may
have been a bit of an outlier because war never occurred between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact—most likely because of the presence of nuclear
weapons. The alliances that formed when Sparta faced off with Athens,
the Quadruple Alliance that opposed Napoleon, the Triple Entente in
WWI—they were all associated with war. We could likely find other alli-
ances that were not associated with war, but I suspect these would be the
exception and not the rule. NATO is an anomaly in another respect: it is
still here almost three decades after the end of the Cold War. Most alli-
ances disappear when the threat that brought them into being disappears.
But that has not happened with NATO. Because it has been very good at
adapting to geopolitical circumstances—such as going out of area, dealing
with unconventional threats, and building global partnerships—NATO
has been the exception and not the rule.
SSQ: Has the historical view of alliances changed since the end of the
Cold War?
CAK: Especially in the 1990s, NATO viewed itself as a political orga-
nization more than as a traditional military alliance. NATO adapted and
was no longer focused on territorial defense against an external aggressor.
It became more of an all-­purpose institution for military and nonmilitary
cooperation in Europe and beyond.
One consequence of the changing character of NATO was that it was
used as a tool for promoting democracy and helping facilitate reform in
the new democracies emerging from the Soviet Union. That role was an
appropriate one, but it also entailed the formal enlargement of NATO.
Enlargement was, in my mind, a mistake. I was opposed to NATO expan-

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 An Interview with Charles A. Kupchan

sion because of my concerns about its effect on Russia. Alliance decision-­

makers underestimated the degree to which Russia sees NATO as a threat,
as a military alliance encroaching on its sphere of influence. The United
States certainly would respond with alarm if Russia formed a military
alliance with Mexico and Canada and deployed Russian troops near the
US border. As a consequence, we are now in an awkward position where
NATO pledged to make Ukraine and Georgia NATO members at its
2008 summit. Some now realize that may not be a wise thing to do. In-
deed, Russia now has troops in both countries—in part to block their path
to NATO membership. Russia’s aggressive behavior has in turn encour-
aged NATO to focus more on its traditional mission of territorial defense.
SSQ: In the case of NATO, is the alliance more likely to draw the US
into a great power conflict or prevent such a conflict?
CAK: NATO is more likely to prevent a conflict and preserve stability,
at least for now. Russia has been probing the gray zones such as Georgia
and Ukraine but not NATO territory. The Russians are not going to test
Article 5, which serves as an effective deterrent. It is also important not to
underestimate the political and social consequences of NATO. It remains
the premier institution that binds North America to Europe’s democra-
cies at a time when democratic norms and institutions are being tested by
the rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic. NATO plays an impor-
tant role in consolidating transatlantic solidarity and cooperation. That
role is important today in light of illiberal trends among Western democ-
racies and the illiberal agenda of powers like Russia and China. Despite
the transatlantic tensions that have emerged during the Trump presidency,
the alliance is actually in very good shape. NATO militaries are working
together closely, and European defense spending is rising. Publics on both
sides of the Atlantic continue to support the alliance. The US Congress
has repeatedly made clear its backing of NATO. These are all signs of the
health of the alliance at a time of political strain.
SSQ: If Russia violates Article 5 provisions of the NATO treaty, to
what extent should the US react?
CAK: Treaty commitments are sacrosanct. One of the pillars of a rules-­
based system is for nations to live by their commitments. They do not
cherry-­pick. They don’t only show up on a sunny day and disappear on a
rainy day. The US should stand by its Article 5 commitments if the Rus-
sians test those commitments whether it concerns Estonia, Latvia, Poland,
or any other member. We should lead a coalition to defend the territory of

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 On Great Power Conflict: Entangled or Untangled Alliances?

alliance members. If the US were to fail to uphold its NATO commit-

ments, it would raise doubts about US commitments globally—in Asia,
the Middle East, everywhere.
SSQ: Will US alliances and agreements with Indo-­Pacific nations
precipitate or likely restrain a great power conflict?
CAK: In the end, US commitments in the Indo-­Pacific are a source of
stability. The presence of the US in South Korea, Japan, Guam, and other
forward locations helps prevent the regional jockeying and balancing that
would otherwise occur. The Chinese may complain about the US pres-
ence; however, in many respects they benefit from that presence because it
helps prevent an arms race in China’s neighborhood. Japan and South
Korea could seek nuclear weapons in the absence of a US commitment to
their security. Over the long term, one would hope East Asia could pursue
a self-­sustaining regional project of integration that would make it un-
necessary for the US to remain the extra-regional guarantor. But this out-
come depends a great deal on how China exercises its growing power. If
rapprochement and cooperation are to emerge among the region’s nations,
China’s neighbors need to believe that Beijing has benign strategic inten-
tions. That is not now the case. However, it is unlikely that the US will be
the strategic guarantor of East Asia indefinitely. A key challenge of our
time is managing the relationship between the US and China. America
has only one peer competitor on the horizon: China. That makes the US-­
China relationship a defining one for the twenty-­first century.
SSQ: Are some US alliance agreements in the Indo-­Pacific more
likely to create the conditions for great power conflict?
CAK: Taiwan has to be on the top of the list of territories in East Asia
that could precipitate great power conflict. Some accidental event could
precipitate hostilities—for example, a collision between a Chinese vessel
and a US vessel in the South China Sea. Of course, there have been airborne
incidents already. Other pathways to conflict are increased nationalist senti-
ment in Taiwan that leads to a formal declaration of independence or events
in China that ramp up nationalism and the pressure it exerts on Taiwan.
However, today, the likelihood of a deliberate war between China and Tai-
wan is less likely than hostilities stemming from an inadvertent escalation.
SSQ: If China forcefully violates a US agreement with an Asian part-
ner, to what extent should the US respond?
CAK: Just as I said with reference to NATO, treaty commitments are
sacrosanct. If they start to unravel, the rules-­based international system

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 An Interview with Charles A. Kupchan

starts to unravel. It is in the US interest to facilitate conversations between

China and Taiwan and to help de-­escalate tensions as the two parties
search for a permanent settlement. Until that comes about, the US should
stand by its commitments.
SSQ: What do you see as the prospects of a great power conflict in
this century?
CAK: The rise of China has considerable potential to lead to the kind
of geopolitical tensions that are usually associated with hegemonic transi-
tions. China’s push into the South China Sea, trade tensions between the
US and China, growing anti-­US sentiment in China, and growing anti-­
China sentiment in the US—there is much to worry about. The bipartisan
consensus in the US is to take a hard line against China. In China, the
same consensus exists—to stand up to the US on most fronts.
Let me offer two caveats when it comes to the prospect of great power
conflict. First, nuclear weapons have so far done a good job of averting
great power war; they should encourage caution and restraint in the US-­
China relationship. The second caveat is interdependence: the US and
China are much more entangled economically than the US and Soviets
were. That means a stronger mutual interest in containing geopolitical ri-
valry. On the security front, things will continue to be rocky—even more
so than now. The Chinese are uncomfortable with US naval primacy in the
Pacific. They are developing capabilities that will test that primacy. The US
is likely to hold its ground. The key question going forward is whether
restraint or confrontation will prevail. Economic interdependence can
help, but the US-­China relationship will ultimately turn on the core geo-
political issues in play.
SSQ: What steps should the US and its international alliance part-
ners take to prevent a great power conflict?
CAK: Transparency and communication are extremely important. I
worry about the degree to which Russia’s narrative of global affairs is so
different than the one that exists in the US and other Western democra-
cies. It is important to agree on a set of shared facts, especially when it
comes to Ukraine, Syria, and Russian interference in democratic elections.
Those shared facts don’t exist right now.
The US should be more sensitive to the realistic and legitimate security
concerns of other great powers. As I mentioned earlier, it doesn’t make
sense for NATO to be expanding into Russia’s underbelly. The US and
China should similarly look for ways to become more comfortable with

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 On Great Power Conflict: Entangled or Untangled Alliances?

each other’s intentions. China’s rise does mean that its security interests
are expanding. When the US emerged as a great power, it unveiled the
Monroe Doctrine and eased the UK, France, Spain, and Russia out of its
neighborhood. That is what great powers do as they rise. A broadening of
China’s ambitions is to be expected. However, China also needs to mod-
erate its ambition so as not threaten others. Moving forward, the US,
China, and other regional players will need to engage in a conversation
about security and responsibility in the Indo-­Pacific. The best outcome
would be an adjustment to the rise of China that occurs in a consensual
and peaceful fashion.
SSQ: What steps should China and Russia take to prevent a great
power conflict?
CAK: In the case of Russia, it needs to stop playing the role of spoiler in
an effort to undermine a rules-­based international system. It works to tear
down that system without offering anything in its place. Its actions in
Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; its ongoing interference in democratic elec-
tions in other countries; its violation of the INF Treaty—these and other
actions give the US every reason to be suspicious of Russian intentions and
to behave accordingly toward the Kremlin. Have we made mistakes in our
policies and missed opportunities to deepen cooperation with Russia? Yes,
we have. But it is Russia that backed away from the “reset” that took place
during the Obama presidency. Putin returned to the Russian presidency
and has ever since embraced a brand of leadership that relies on standing
up to the West as his main source of legitimacy. Instead of governing by
manipulating Russian nationalism, he should start investing in the Russian
people, building a knowledge economy, and weaning the Russian economy
from its dependence on energy revenue. Russia needs to become a stake-
holder in the international system rather than a troublemaker.
China has been a more cautious player than Russia. Only recently has
China gone from a near-­exclusive focus on growing its economy to also
pushing out geopolitically. It is too early to tell if China’s rise will be ac-
companied by strategic caution and restraint—or aggressive intent. Bully-
ing of its neighbors over disputed islands and militarization of offshore
outposts are not reassuring signs. Ideally, the US and China should find a
way to mutually chart a path for China’s rise that does not involve con-
frontation. Strategic restraint by both parties will help.

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 An Interview with Charles A. Kupchan

SSQ: Should the US seek to deepen our commitments to existing al-

liances and seek new ones with new partners?
CAK: The US is in retrenchment mode. The political climate moving
forward will be to do less, not more, and allies will pressed to share more
of the defense burden. President Obama campaigned on the idea of na-
tion building at home, and President Trump adopted a neo-­isolationist
agenda. Both have had problems operationalizing retrenchment, but they
accurately perceived that the electorate is looking to scale back overseas
commitments. “Endless” wars in the Middle East have taken their toll. So
expect the US to lighten its footprint abroad. In the first instance, this
retrenchment will come not by backing away from existing alliances but
by getting out of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Iran of course is a wild card.
President Trump has said he doesn’t want a war with Iran. He prefers to
offload commitments, not take on new ones. But tensions with Iran have
the potential to escalate and lead to conflict—whether inadvertent or de-
liberate. The trend line will be an America that does less abroad, but not in
a way that compromises treaty-­based alliance commitments—at least for
now. Perhaps smart diplomacy and processes of rapprochement can over
time make at least some alliances unnecessary.
SSQ: Is it unrealistic to think the US and China or Russia could es-
tablish some kind of formal regional or international alliance?
CAK: After WWII, Pax Americana emerged and the US and its demo­
cratic partners became the overseers of a liberal international order. After
the end of the Cold War, more countries joined that liberal order. Now
history seems to be going in reverse. Illiberal forces have been gaining
strength in Western democracies, and the rules-­based international order
is being threatened from within by these forces and from without by Rus-
sia and China. It is too early to tell how these trends will play out. I think
the top geopolitical priority for the United States and other Western de-
mocracies is to get their own houses in order: address economic uncer-
tainty, put in place functioning and effective immigration policies, and
restore trust in and the effectiveness of democratic institutions. Otherwise,
this illiberal “moment” may last a very long time.
Whether or not the Western democracies recover and reclaim liberal
values and practices, the global landscape is fast changing toward multi­
polarity. As a consequence, for the first time in history, the world will be
globalized and interdependent but no longer led by a coalition of liberal
great powers. We are headed toward “No One’s World”—a world in which
there will be no captain at the helm. Accordingly, the best option for pre-

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 On Great Power Conflict: Entangled or Untangled Alliances?

serving stability and fashioning a new rules-­based world may be a global

concert of major players. The US, the European Union, Russia, China,
Japan, India, Brazil, the Arab League, and the African Union—perhaps an
informal grouping along these lines can contribute to efforts to arrive at a
cooperative means of managing global affairs.
SSQ: Do alliances have a future in the liberal international order?
CAK: Yes, I think they do. We still live in a world in which geopolitical
threats and uncertainty require the stability and predictability that come
with alliance networks. It would be desirable to move to a world in which
alliances are no longer needed. President Woodrow Wilson aspired to that
world but failed to achieve it. In some ways, NATO began to move in that
direction immediately after the end of the Cold War—becoming a vehicle
for broad-­based military cooperation rather than one focused on collective
defense. It has to a certain extent become an all-­purpose security organiza-
tion with partners around the world. Now, however, it has also had to focus
once more on its traditional role of balancing against a Russia that has of
late demonstrated malign intent. Especially as the world becomes more
multipolar and prone to power balancing, don’t expect alliances to disappear.
SSQ: Dr. Kupchan, on behalf of team SSQ and the SSQ audience, thank
you for sharing your ideas on how alliances may be the deciding factor in
a future clouded by the prospect of great power conflict.

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