Cordesman ChinasEmergenceSuperpower 2023
Cordesman ChinasEmergenceSuperpower 2023
Cordesman ChinasEmergenceSuperpower 2023
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China’s Emergence as a
Superpower
Anthony H. Cordesman
Emeritus Chair in Strategy
CSIS
1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Revised and expanded August 2023
8/11/2023
Anthony H. Cordesman
Email: acordesman@gmail.com Photo: somartin/Adobe Stock
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Introduction
The Emeritus Chair in Strategy at CSIS is issuing a report written by Anthony H. Cordesman that compares the key trends in civil and
military power in the United States, developed democracies, China, and Russia. The graphs, maps, and tables in this report only
highlight a limited range of the complex changes involved, and reliable data are often lacking for the years after 2020. They still show,
however, that the civil and military role of the world’s major powers is in a process of dramatic and unpredictable change.
The Key Impact of China’s Emergence as a Major Global Economic Power
China has emerged as an economic superpower that rivals the United States in many ways, although the total economic power of
modern democracies—most of which are strategic partners of the United States—vastly exceeds the size of the Chinese economy, trade
efforts, and efforts in technology and research and development. China also faces major internal challenges created by outside
restrictions and economic sanctions, its handling of Covid-19, and state interference in its economic development.
Nevertheless, China is already competing with the economies of developed democratic states on a global level. Its “belt and road”
efforts to establish economic ties to developing states and control critical minerals and resources. It may succeed in creating a rival
economic bloc that can function and grow outside the “rules-based order” democracies created after World War II, and it is already
competing in its relations with a number of developing states and other countries.
The trends presented in this report show that this competition may well become an ongoing confrontation between China and its allies,
and developed democracies and their strategic partners, unless radical changes take place in Chinese policies and leadership. And—as
is discussed shortly—is a growing level of civil confrontation that is being matched by military confrontation as well.
Russia’s Diminished Global Economic Role
The following graphics show that Russia is not an economic superpower now that it has lost control of most East European states and
many of the Central European and Asian elements of the former Soviet Union. Russia has long lagged badly in total economic growth,
trade, research and development, and all the other major areas of economic power. Russia’s size, geographic position, and large oil and
gas reserves do, however, still make it a key global power.
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Key Uncertainties in the Civil Impacts of Economic Power
It should be stressed, however, that current trends can only tell part of the story. Any analysis of economic and civil power will be shaped by
many key trends that cannot be quantified. They include the longer-term impacts of the economic stresses between and within developed states,
the impact of internal politics, the impact of demographic change and population pressure, and the impact of global warming. They also include
the degree to which the developed democracies can succeed in cooperating and creating truly functional economic strategic partnerships. As yet,
governments often rely far more on rhetoric about such cooperation than on taking tangible action, although there are positive indicators as well.
The graphics in this analysis also do not include the developing world. Here, the allocation of international economic power has generally
favored developed states. As the UN, World Bank, IMF, and a host of NGO reports make clear, many states have failed to move towards
effective development and face major challenges from failed or corrupt governance, repression and internal division, population pressure,
limited water supplies, and climate change. For all the former rhetoric about globalism, this includes at least one-third of the world’s nations.
At the same time, there are cases like India, where the trends in global power could move in other directions. While they are not yet positive
enough to include in this analysis, India has overtaken China as the world’s most populous state, has a GDP of some $9.3 trillion, and ranks high
in terms of total military spending. Several major petroleum states in the Gulf are taking positive steps to develop beyond a reliance on energy
exports, as are some states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For all the failings in the developing world, they are also important potential
successes.
The Impact of Trends in Military Power
The graphs and tables that follow show that the United States remains the world’s largest military power, the one with the most combat
experience and highest levels of total spending and investment in modernization, and the one with the strongest strategic partners.
It is also clear, however, that the United States already faces growing competition from China, particularly in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean
as well. In the case of Taiwan, competition has already turned to serious confrontation and the risk of war. Once again, China has vastly
increased its capabilities since 1990, as well as its military links to other Asia power. Much depends on the United States’ ability to strengthen its
strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and other Asian states—as well as European states with major power
projection capabilities like Great Britain and France.
The Uncertainties Driven by the War in Ukraine
At the same time, the United States and its strategic partners face a major challenge from Russia and one that current U.S. national strategy tends
to seriously understate. As the graphics show, Russia may not have an economy that can fully support its present conventional forces, but it
remains a major threat to the United States’ European strategic partners and NATO, and the Russian military threat must be given equal priority
with that from China.
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The trends shown in this analysis do not generally go beyond 2021 and cannot reflect the many longer-term changes in the military balance that
are growing out of the war in Ukraine. It is clear, however, that the United States and its NATO allies are engaged in major proxy war,
supporting Ukraine in its defense against Russia. They also are already rebuilding NATO’s overall level of extended deterrence against Russia,
and doing so at a time when Vladimir Putin, Russia’s leader, has made it clear that he sees NATO as a major and continuing threat.
There is no current way to predict how the war in Ukraine will change the overall balance of military power and how and when it will end. It
seems almost certain, however, that as long as Putin rules Russia, the United States and the rest of NATO will be engaged in a new Cold War,
and one which will effectively match a similar Cold War between the United States and its strategic partners in Asia and China.
A Return to Nuclear Forces
As the final sections of this analysis also show, these two Cold Wars have a major nuclear dimension. The race to build up conventional military
power is, in some ways, being outpaced by a new nuclear arms race. This race not only reflects the near collapse of nuclear arms control but a
potential return to major tactical, theater, and dual-capable nuclear forces. It also is clear that Russia is now only a superpower to the extent it
has inherited a massive legacy of nuclear weapons and technology from the former Soviet Union.
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China’s Rising Economic Power Has
Vastly Outstripped Russia and
Competes with the U.S. and EU
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China as the Emerging Economic Superpower: 1980-2021 - I 2021 in $ current
(in Constant 2015 $US Trillions)
US
20000000
20
United States
US = 23.32
trillion
15
15000000
European Union China = 17.73
trillion
10
10000000
EU = 17.17
trillion
China
5
5000000
18000
• U.S. alone is 14 times Russia,
$14,632
16000 $13,886 1.3 times China
14000
• U.S. and EU are 23 times
Russia, 2.3 times China
12000
10000
8000
6000 $4,381
$3,434
4000 $2,892 $2,410 $1,491 $1,624 $1,416
2000
$58.5
0
United European United South
France Germany Australia Japan China Russia Belarus
States Union Kingdom Korea
$US 19294 13886 2892 2410 3434 1491 4381 1624 14632 1416 58.5
8/11/2023 Source: World Bank, “GDP (constant 2015 US$),” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.
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But, China Does Not Compete in Per
Capita Income and Russia has a Very
Low Per Capita Income
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Population in 2020
(in Millions)
1,410.9
1400
1200
1000
800
600
447.8
400
329.4
125.8 144.1
200
67.2 67.3 83.2 25.6 51.7
9.3
0
United European United South
France Germany Australia Japan China Russia Belarus
States Union Kingdom Korea
Pop 329.4 447.8 67.2 67.3 83.2 25.6 125.8 51.7 1410.9 144.1 9.3
8/11/2023
Source: World Bank, “Population, total,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.
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A Massive Gap Remains in China’s Per Capita Income
(in Constant 2015 $US Trillions)
.
Source: McKinsey Global Institute, Securing Europe’s competitiveness: Addressing its technology gap, September 2022, p. 9
World Bank, “GDP (constant 2015 US$),” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD. 10
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China Has Become the World’s
Dominant Manufacturer While
Russia’s Rank Is Critically Low
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Annual Value Added of Industry (including construction) in
Constant US$ Trillions: 1990-2021
$6.24T
$3.15T
$3.73T
$0.406T
Output measured on value added basis in current US Dollars using data from UN statistic
division
Source: Adapted from Felix Richter, “China Is the World's Manufacturing Superpower,” May 4, 2021, Statista,
https://cdn.statcdn.com/Infographic/images/normal/20858.jpeg.
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China’s Technology Base Has
Outstripped Russia and European
States and Increasingly Competes
with the U.S.
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CRS:
Comparative
National
Expenditure on
Global Research
and
Development:
2000-2020
In $US Billions of PPP
Dollars
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI) Database, March 2022, https://www.oecd.org/sti/msti.htm and http://oe.cd/msti
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Percentage
Growth in Growth
in R&D
Expenditures Since
2000 for Selected
Countries, 2000-
2020
Growth of R&D expenditures for
each of the 10 countries with the
highest 2020 R&D expenditures for
2000 to 2020 as a percentage of its
2000 R&D expenditures.
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Source: Adapted from John F. Sargent, Global Research and Development
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Expenditures: Fact Sheet Congressional Research Service, R44283, Updated September
All use 14, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44283.pdf
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20
Statista: Leading Countries in Gross Global Research and
Development (R&D) Expenditure in 2021
(in $US billions)
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Volume of Trade in 2020
Country Trade as __________Imports_________________ __________Exports_________________
% of GDP Value of Goods Value of Services Value of Goods Value of Services
($US Billions) ($US Billions) ($US Billions) ($US Billions)
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Exports as % of GDP in 2020
70 The U.S. lags badly.
Russia is overdependent 61.90%
60
on fossil fuel and
46.64% agricultural exports.
50
43.41%
40 36.44%
0
United European United South
France Germany Australia Japan China Russia Belarus
States Union Kingdom Korea
% 10.13 46.64 28.12 27.87 43.41 23.98 15.52 36.44 18.49 25.52 61.9
Sources” David J. Lynch, “U.S. companies are buying less from China as relations remain tense,” Washington Post, August 6, 2023,
8/11/2023 26
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Annual Value of U.S. Imports from China,
Adjusted for Inflation, in billions of dollars
Sources” David J. Lynch, “U.S. companies are buying less from China as relations remain tense,” Washington Post, August 6, 2023,
8/11/2023 27
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• Comparative Military Spending is
Highly Uncertain, but the U.S. still has
a Clear Lead.
• China has made sustained major rises
since 2000.
• Russia has lagged badly since the early
1990s, but has made significant
increases as a result of the Ukraine
War
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Wikipedia
Estimate:
Similar Post
FSU Trends
Through
2021
Source: Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Military_budget_of_Russia.
Its graph draws upon on work
by Kaj Tallungs. The full
Wikipedia article has an
excellent analysis of the
differences between
unclassified sources..
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FOI
Estimate
of.
Military
Spending
in a
Global
Context in
2022
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Russia Is Still a Major Military Power
but Its Reported Military Spending
following the break up of the FSU
was Far Below the Level Needed to
Fully Sustain and Modernize Its Force
Structure Through 2020-2021
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U.S. Estimates: The U.S. and Its Partners Have a Massive Lead
in Military Spending If They Use Their Funds Effectively
800
$754.0
•China had no real partners
700
•Japan, Australia, and South Korea spent $130.3 billion
600
•Taiwan alone would add $13.9B and Singapore $15.1B to above total.
$332
•NATO spent $1,113B. NATO Europe and Canada alone spent $359B in 2021 vs.
500 $62.2B to $178B for Russia.
•Russia now may have Belarus as its only partner: $0.652B
400
$336.7
$207
300
$178
200
$62.2
$59.3 $56.2 $71.8 $49.3
100
$23.2 $33.8 $34.3 $46.7
$0.652
0
United United NATO South
Canada France Germany Italy Japan Australia China Russia Belarus
States Kingdom Europe Korea
Official Estimate 754 23.2 59.3 56.2 33.8 71.8 336.7 49.3 34.3 46.7 207 62.2 0.652
PPP Estimate 332 178
US = $887.0 billion
SIPRI China = $292.0 billion
Estimates Russia = $86.4 billion
for 2022 India = $81.4 billion
Show Only Saudi Arabia = $75.0 billion
a Limited United
Kingdom = $68.5 billion
Rise in
Germany = $55.8 billion
Russian France = $53.6 billion
Spending South Korea = $46.4 billion
Relative to Japan = $46.0 billion
the U.S., Ukraine = $44.0 billon
Europe, Italy = $33.5 billion
Australia = $32.3 billion
and China
Canada = $26.9 billion
Israel = $23.4 billion
Rest of
World = $398.0 billion
Source: SIPRI, Military Expenditures, 2023, https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-and-military-expenditure/military-expenditure.
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U.S. Estimate of Asian Official Military Spending Data in 2021
(in Current 2021 $US Billions)
Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress,,2022, pp. 147- 148.
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Some Estimates Do, However, Reflect a
Major Rise in Russian Spending Since 2021
• The previous SIPRI data reflect a major increase from $65.9 billion 2021 to $86.4 billion
in 2022, but this is not a serious rise not relative to the increases made by the U.S., China,
and major NATO states.
• The IISS report that the draft Russian 2023 budget, submitted to to the State Duma on 30
September 2022, showed that final core spending for 2022 rose from an original proposal
of RUB3.50tr (USD50.0bn) to RUB4.68tr (USD66.9bn), with a corresponding rise in total
military spending from RUB4.98tr (USD71.1bn) to RUB6.15tr (USD87.9bn).
• Reuters reports that Russia spent 2 trillion rubles ($26 billion) on defence in January and
February 2023, a 282% rise over the 525.4 billion rubles in the first two months of 2022,
and driven by the conflict in the Ukraine.
• Other estimates emerging from a Google search indicate Russia's official 2022 military
budget could be 4.7 trillion rubles ($75bn), or higher, and reach $84 billion for 2023. This
is 40% more than initial military budget announced in 2021. They also estimate that
Russia plans to spend a total of $600 billion on military and the police between 2022–
2025, or $150 billion a year
8/11/2023 37
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Japanese Estimate of Rise in Chinese Military Spending
by Category: 2013 vs. 2023
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Arms Transfers Provide an Important Indicator of
Comparative Strategic Influence and Security Assistance
• The U.S. has cancelled its report on World Military expenditures and arms transfers, and
there now is no reliable declassified estimate of the actual market value of arms sales.
• SIPRI does, however, provide an well structure estimate of the total value of major weapons
transfers based on estimates of comparable prices.
• These SIPIR estimates indicate the the U.S. retains a massive lead over other providers of
arms transfers and had 40% of the world total in 2018-2022.
• Russia had a 16% share.
• The other major arms sellers were largely strategic partners of the U.S.
• China only had a 5.2% share, although it was increasing.
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SIPRI Estimates That China Still Lags as a Major Arms Exporter
Share of World Arms Exports: 2018-2022 Selected major arms on order or preselected for
future orders for delivery after 2022
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Russia Only Remains a True Military
Superpower in Nuclear Forces
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Chinese Conventional Military Forces in 2021-2022 Have Risen to
Compete with the U.S. While Russian Forces Seem to Be Legacy Forces
Far Too Large for Their Reported Funding
Source: Adapted from IISS, Military Balance 2022; and U.S. military data.
Does not include reserve capabilities by service, Coast Guards, coastal defense,
paramilitary forces, and 175,000 active personnel in Chinese strategic support
forces.
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U.S. and Russia are the Major Nuclear Powers. China Lags But Its Nuclear Inventory
Has Grown Sharply Over the Last Few Years
Source: Hans M. Kristensen. Matt Korda, and Robert Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” 2023, Federation of American Scientists (FAS), March 29, 2023,
https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/,
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Chinese Nuclear Capability Is Growing Sharply
• Seems to be more than doubling its stockpile of nuclear weapons. May have risen from around 200 to 350 by 2020.
272 operational for exiting missiles and bombs and 78 for new systems. Possibly grew by 118 warheads during
2020-2021. Estimates for 2023 are 410 weapons.
• Have detected 270+ new missile silos. 119 in Northwestern China seem to be for ICBMs.
• The Chinese Military Power estimates China may have some 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, most
deployed on systems capable of ranging the continental United States”
• China has rejected arms control initiatives and provides steadily less transparency.
• It is improving nuclear command and control and battle management systems.
• Deploying advanced solid-fuel mobile ICBMs (DF-21 & DF-31/DF-31A/DF-32AG), MIRV’d liquid fuel ICBM
(DF-5B), new MIRV’d DF-41 ICBM, Type 094 SSBN with JL-2 SLBMs.
• Developing low noise 096 SSBNs and a 9,000 kilometer range 096 SLBM.
• Progressively harder to determine what theater and short-range delivery systems may become dual-capable. DF-21
MRBM (2,150 KM) and DF-26 IRBM (4,000 KM) known to be nuclear. DF-21 is precision strike, dual-capable and
could deliver low-yield nuclear weapons.
• Modifying H-6 nuclear bombers to H-6N with refueling, missile carrying capability. H-20 stealth bomber in
. development.
• May be evolving far beyond countervalue second strike capability. Examining use as theater warfare threat?
Source: Hans M. Kristensen. Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds, “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2023,
, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713; SIPRI Yearbook, Section 2: China’s Nuclear Forces: Moving Beyond a Minimal Deterrent, 2021,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_3_Section_2--Chinas_Nuclear_Forces_Moving_beyond_a_Minimal_Deterrent.pdf; and DoD, China, Military Power, 2022.
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U.S. Estimate of Chinese Missile Forces in 2022
Note: For the purposes of this document, the “Taiwan Strait Area” includes the PLA’s Eastern and Southern Theaters.
Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress, 2022, p. 167..
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Russia Has Massive Nuclear and Missile Modernization
Efforts Underway In Spite of Its Constraints on Military Spending
Source: Excerpted from Amy F. Wolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces and Modernization, Congressional Research Service, R45861, March 21, 2022, pp. 28-30;
https://crsreports.congress.cgov.
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The U.S. had Major Nuclear Modernization Plans as of October 2022
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Competing
for Global
Naval
Presence
Peak Recent Naval,
Land, Air, and Other
U.S. Bases;
Staging Points;
and Carrier
Deployments: 2015
53
Source: https://www.transcend.org/tms/2019/03/is-the-united-states-about-to-lose-control-of-its-secretive-diego-garcia-military-base/.
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China’s Growing Global “White
Area” Influence
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Potential Future Impact of Chinese Naval and Land Belt
and Road Initiatives
Source: Ewa Oziewicz and Joanna Bednarz, “Challenges and opportunities of the Maritime Silk Road initiative for EU countries (Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin),” October 17, 2019, ResearchGate,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336616579_Challenges_and_opportunities_of_the_Maritime_Silk_Road_initiative_for_EU_countries_Scientific_Journals_of_the_Maritime_University_of_Szczecin.
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Japanese
Estimate of
in Chinese
Activity in
the Pacific
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U.S. Estimate of China vs. Taiwan Military Balance in 2022
Note: For the purposes of this document, the “Taiwan Strait Area” includes the PLA’s Eastern and Southern Theaters.
Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress, 2022, pp. 165-167.
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58
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European, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean
Vulnerability to Energy Chokepoints –
C hinese and Asian Dependence Is Most
Critical
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Oil Import
Dependence
of Major
Countries in
2022
In Metric Tons
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Gas Import
Dependence
of Major
Countries in
2022
In Billions of
Cubic Meters
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The U.S. No Longer Imports Significant Oil from Outside
North America
https://www.eeia.gov/outlooks/ieo/
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/
Source: Max Bearak, “In strategic Djibouti, a microcosm of China’s growing foothold in Africa,” Washington Post, December 30, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-
strategic-djibouti-a-microcosm-of-chinas-growing-foothold-in-africa/2019/12/29/a6e664ea-beab-11e9-a8b0-7ed8a0d5dc5d_story.html; and Juan Cole, “The Dragon Arrives: 1st Chinese
overseas Military Base in Djibouti,” Informed Comment, August 2, 2017, https://www.juancole.com/2017/08/overseas-military-djibouti.html.
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