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The Elements of
Moral Philosophy
NINTH EDITION

James Rachels
Editions 5–9 by

Stuart Rachels
THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, NINTH EDITION

Published by McGraw-Hill Education, 2 Penn Plaza, New York, NY 10121. Copyright © 2019 by
McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Previous editions
© 2015, 2012, and 2010. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Rachels, Stuart, 1969- author. | Rachels, James, 1941-2003. Elements

of moral philosophy.
Title: The elements of moral philosophy / James Rachels, editions 5-9 by
Stuart Rachels.
Description: NINTH EDITION. | Dubuque, IA : McGraw-Hill Education, 2018. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017059417 | ISBN 9781259914256 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Ethics—Textbooks.
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https://lccn.loc.gov/2017059417

The Internet addresses listed in the text were accurate at the time of publication. The inclusion of a
website does not indicate an endorsement by the authors or McGraw-Hill Education, and McGraw-Hill
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About the Authors
James Rachels (1941–2003) wrote The End of Life: Euthanasia and
Morality (1986), Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of
Darwinism (1990), Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other Essays in
Moral Philosophy (1997), Problems from Philosophy (first edition,
2005), and The Legacy of Socrates: Essays in Moral Philosophy (2007).
His website is www.jamesrachels.org.

Stuart Rachels is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University

of Alabama. He has revised several of James Rachels’ books, includ-
ing Problems from Philosophy as well as the companion anthology to
this book, The Right Thing to Do. Stuart won the U.S. Chess Cham-
pionship in 1989, at the age of 20, and is a Bronze Life Master at
bridge. He is currently writing a book about chess.

iii
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Prefaceix
About the Ninth Edition xi

1. WHAT IS MORALITY? 1
1.1. The Problem of Definition 1
1.2. First Example: Baby Theresa 1
1.3. Second Example: Jodie and Mary 5
1.4. Third Example: Tracy Latimer 7
1.5. Reason and Impartiality 10
1.6. The Minimum Conception of Morality 13
Notes on Sources 13

2. THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM 14

2.1. Different Cultures Have Different Moral Codes 14
2.2. Cultural Relativism 16
2.3. The Cultural Differences Argument 17
2.4. What Follows from Cultural Relativism 19
2.5. Why There Is Less Disagreement Than There Seems to Be 21
2.6. Some Values Are Shared by All Cultures 23
2.7. Judging a Cultural Practice to Be Undesirable 24
2.8. Back to the Five Claims 27
2.9. What We Can Learn from Cultural Relativism 29
Notes on Sources 31

v
vi CONTENTS

3. SUBJECTIVISM IN ETHICS 33
3.1. The Basic Idea of Ethical Subjectivism 33
3.2. The Linguistic Turn 35
3.3. The Denial of Value 39
3.4. Ethics and Science 40
3.5. Same-Sex Relations 43
Notes on Sources 48

4. DOES MORALITY DEPEND ON RELIGION? 50

4.1. The Presumed Connection between Morality and Religion 50
4.2. The Divine Command Theory 52
4.3. The Theory of Natural Law 56
4.4. Religion and Particular Moral Issues 59
Notes on Sources 64

5. ETHICAL EGOISM 66
5.1. Is There a Duty to Help the Starving? 66
5.2. Psychological Egoism 67
5.3. Three Arguments for Ethical Egoism 73
5.4. Two Arguments against Ethical Egoism 78
Notes on Sources 82

6. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 84

6.1. Hobbes’s Argument 84
6.2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma 87
6.3. Some Advantages of the Social Contract Theory 91
6.4. The Problem of Civil Disobedience 93
6.5. Difficulties for the Theory 96
Notes on Sources 100

7. THE UTILITARIAN APPROACH 101

7.1. The Revolution in Ethics 101
7.2. First Example: Euthanasia 102
7.3. Second Example: Marijuana 105
7.4. Third Example: Nonhuman Animals 112
Notes on Sources 116
 CONTENTS vii

8. THE DEBATE OVER UTILITARIANISM 118

8.1. The Classical Version of the Theory 118
8.2. Is Pleasure All That Matters? 119
8.3. Are Consequences All That Matter? 120
8.4. Should We Be Equally Concerned for Everyone? 124
8.5. The Defense of Utilitarianism 125
8.6. Concluding Thoughts 131
Notes on Sources 132

9. ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES? 133

9.1. Harry Truman and Elizabeth Anscombe 133
9.2. The Categorical Imperative 136
9.3. Kant’s Arguments on Lying 138
9.4. Conflicts between Rules 140
9.5. Kant’s Insight 141
Notes on Sources 143

10. KANT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS 145

10.1. Kant’s Core Ideas 145
10.2. Retribution and Utility in the Theory of Punishment 148
10.3. Kant’s Retributivism 150
Notes on Sources 154

11. FEMINISM AND THE ETHICS OF CARE 156

11.1. Do Women and Men Think Differently about Ethics? 156
11.2. Implications for Moral Judgment 162
11.3. Implications for Ethical Theory 166
Notes on Sources 167
viii CONTENTS

12. VIRTUE ETHICS 169

12.1. The Ethics of Virtue and the Ethics of Right Action 169
12.2. The Virtues 171
12.3. Two Advantages of Virtue Ethics 180
12.4. Virtue and Conduct 181
12.5. The Problem of Incompleteness 182
12.6. Conclusion 184
Notes on Sources 184

13. WHAT WOULD A SATISFACTORY MORAL

THEORY BE LIKE? 186
13.1. Morality without Hubris 186
13.2. Treating People as They Deserve 188
13.3. A Variety of Motives 189
13.4. Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism 190
13.5. The Moral Community 193
13.6. Justice and Fairness 194
13.7. Conclusion 195
Notes on Sources 196

Index197
P reface
Socrates, one of the first and best moral philosophers, said that
morality is about “no small matter, but how we ought to live.” This
book is an introduction to moral philosophy, conceived in that
broad sense.
The field of ethics is immense. In the chapters that follow, I
do not try to canvass every topic in the field, nor do I cover any
topic comprehensively. Instead, I try to discuss the ideas that a new-
comer to the subject should encounter first.
The chapters may be read independently of one another; they
are, in effect, separate essays on separate topics. Thus, someone who
is interested in Ethical Egoism could go straight to Chapter 5 and
find a self-contained introduction to that theory. When read in
order, however, the chapters tell a more or less continuous story.
The first chapter presents a “minimum conception” of what morality
is; the middle chapters cover the most important ethical theories;
and the last chapter presents my own view of what a satisfactory
moral theory would be like.
However, the point of this book is not to provide a neat, uni-
fied account of “the truth” about ethics. That would be a poor way
to introduce the subject. Philosophy is not like physics. In physics,
there is a large body of accepted truth that beginners must master.
Of course, there are unresolved controversies in physics, but these
take place against a backdrop of broad agreement. In philosophy,
by contrast, everything is controversial—or almost everything.
Some of the fundamental issues are still up for grabs. Newcomers
to philosophy may ask themselves whether a moral theory such as
Utilitarianism seems correct. However, newcomers to physics are
rarely encouraged to make up their own minds about the laws of
thermodynamics. A good introduction to ethics will not try to hide
that somewhat embarrassing fact.
ix
x PREFACE

In these pages, you will find a survey of contending ideas,

theories, and arguments. My own views, no doubt, color the presen-
tation. I find some of these proposals more appealing than others,
and a philosopher who made different assessments would no doubt
write a different book. But I try to present the contending ideas
fairly, and, when I pass judgment on an argument, I try to explain
why. Philosophy, like morality itself, is first and last an exercise in
reason; we should embrace the ideas, positions, and theories that
our best arguments support.
About the Ninth Edition
In this edition, sex and drugs get more coverage. The section on
same-sex relations (3.5) now discusses gay marriage, adoption rights,
employment rights, Russia’s “gay propaganda laws,” teenage suicide,
and hate crimes. The section on marijuana (7.3) now dips into the
opioid crisis, the origins of the Drug War, the utilitarian rejection
of “evil pleasures,” the relationship between state law and federal
law, and the harms of tobacco and alcohol abuse.
Here and there, the book has been updated to reflect recent
events. For example, the concept of prejudice is now illustrated with
a quotation from Donald Trump (5.4), and Mike Pence now rep-
resents opposition to gay rights (3.1). Some updates reflect a world
that is increasingly online. For example, the importance of finding
reliable sources of information is now discussed solely in terms of
internet searches (1.5).
A few thoughts have been added to existing discussions. We now
say that different societies may share some of the same values due to
their shared human nature (at the end of 2.6), and we now qualify
the claim that morality is “natural for human beings” on the grounds
that morality may require humans to be unnaturally benevolent (13.1).
The initial explanation of the Principle of Utility now includes
the phrase, “maximize happiness” (7.1). The dilemma in which abso-
lute rules might conflict is now about a situation faced by doctors
in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, instead of about Dutch
fisherman having to lie during World War II (9.4).
Gone are Kurt Baier’s argument that Ethical Egoism is logi-
cally inconsistent (from 5.4) and the examples of animal experimen-
tation (from 7.4). I’ve also dropped the claim in Chapter 4 that
Exodus 21 supports a liberal view of abortion, because I am no
longer sure how to interpret that passage.
xi
xii ABOUT THE NINTH EDITION

Finally, the age of the universe has been revised to reflect

recent findings in astronomy (13.1).
For their help, I thank Caleb Andrews, Seth Bordner, Janice
Daurio, Micah Davis, Daniel Hollingshead, Kaave Lajevardi, Cayce
Moore, Howard Pospesel, John Rowell, Mike Vincke, and Chase
Wrenn. My biggest thanks go to my wife, Professor Heather Elliott,
and to my mother, Carol Rachels, for their tremendous help down
the stretch.
My father, James Rachels, wrote the first four editions of The
Elements of Moral Philosophy. It is still his book.
 —Stuart Rachels
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 CHAPTER 1
What Is Morality?
We are discussing no small matter, but how we ought to live.
Socrates, in Plato’s Republic (ca. 390 b.c.)

1.1. The Problem of Definition

Moral philosophy is the study of what morality is and what it
requires of us. As Socrates said, it’s about “how we ought to live”—
and why. It would be helpful if we could begin with a simple, uncon-
troversial definition of what morality is. Unfortunately, we cannot.
There are many rival theories, each expounding a different ­conception
of what it means to live morally, and any definition that goes beyond
Socrates’s simple formulation is bound to offend at least one of
them.
This should make us cautious, but it need not paralyze us. In
this chapter, I will describe the “minimum conception” of morality.
As the name suggests, the minimum conception is a core that every
moral theory should accept, at least as a starting point. First, how-
ever, we will examine some moral controversies having to do with
handicapped children. This discussion will bring out the features of
the minimum conception.

1.2. First Example: Baby Theresa

Theresa Ann Campo Pearson, an infant known to the public as “Baby
Theresa,” was born in Florida in 1992. Baby Theresa had anenceph-
aly, one of the worst genetic disorders. Anencephalic infants are some-
times referred to as “babies without brains,” but that is not quite

1
2 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

accurate. Important parts of the brain—the cerebrum and cerebellum—

are missing, as is the top of the skull. The brain stem, however, is still
there, and so the baby can breathe and possess a heartbeat. In the
United States, most cases of anencephaly are detected during preg-
nancy, and the fetuses are usually aborted. Of those not aborted, half
are stillborn. Of those born alive, most die within days.
Baby Theresa’s story is remarkable only because her parents
made an unusual request. Knowing that their baby would die soon
and could never be conscious, Theresa’s parents volunteered her
organs for immediate transplant. They thought that her kidneys,
liver, heart, lungs, and eyes should go to other children who could
benefit from them. Her physicians agreed. Thousands of infants
need transplants each year, and there are never enough organs avail-
able. However, Theresa’s organs were not taken, because Florida law
forbids the removal of organs until the donor has died. And by the
time Baby Theresa died, nine days later, it was too late—her organs
had deteriorated too much to be transplanted.
Baby Theresa’s case was widely debated. Should she have been
killed so that her organs could have been used to save other children?
A number of professional “ethicists”—people who get paid by univer-
sities, hospitals, and law schools to think about such things—were
asked by the press to comment. Most of them disagreed with the
parents, instead appealing to time-honored philosophical principles.
“It just seems too horrifying to use people as means to other people’s
ends,” said one such expert. Another explained: “It’s unethical to kill
person A to save person B.” And a third added: “What the parents
are really asking for is, Kill this dying baby so that its organs may be
used for someone else. Well, that’s really a horrendous proposition.”
Is it horrendous? Opinions were divided. These ethicists
thought it was, while the parents and doctors did not. But we are
interested in more than what people happen to believe. We want to
know what’s true. Were the parents right or wrong to volunteer their
baby’s organs for transplant? To answer this question, we have to
ask what reasons, or arguments, can be given on each side. What
can be said for or against the parents’ request?

The Benefits Argument. The parents believed that Theresa’s organs

were doing her no good, because she was not conscious and was
 What Is Morality? 3

bound to die soon. The other children, however, could be helped.

Thus, the parents seem to have reasoned: If we can benefit someone
without harming anyone else, then we ought to do so. Transplanting the
organs would benefit the other children without harming Baby Theresa.
Therefore, we ought to transplant the organs.
Is this correct? Not every argument is sound. In addition to
knowing what arguments can be given for a view, we also want to
know whether those arguments are any good. Generally speaking, an
argument is sound if its assumptions are true and the conclusion
follows logically from them. In this case, the argument has two
assumptions: that we should help someone if no harm would come
of it, and that the transplant would help the other children without
harming Theresa. We might wonder, however, about the claim that
Theresa wouldn’t be harmed. After all, she would die, and wouldn’t
dying be bad for her? Yet on reflection, it seems clear that the parents
were right, under these tragic circumstances. Staying alive is good for
someone only if it allows her to do things and to have thoughts and
feelings and relations with other people—in other words, only if the
individual who is alive has a life. Without such things, mere biological
existence has no value. Therefore, even though Theresa might remain
alive for a few more days, it would do her no good.
The Benefits Argument provides a powerful reason for trans-
planting the organs. What arguments exist on the other side?

The Argument That We Should Not Use People as Means. The eth-
icists who opposed the transplants offered two arguments. The first
was based on the idea that it is wrong to use people as means to other
people’s goals. Taking Theresa’s organs would be using her to benefit
the other children, whom she doesn’t know and cares nothing about;
therefore, it should not be done.
Is this argument sound? The idea that we should not “use” peo-
ple is appealing, but this idea is vague. What exactly does it mean?
“Using people” typically involves violating their autonomy—their abil-
ity to decide for themselves how to live their own lives, based on their
own desires and values. A person’s autonomy may be violated through
manipulation, trickery, or deceit. For example, I may pretend to be
your friend, when I am only interested in going out with your sister;
or I may lie to you, so you’ll give me money; or I may try to convince
4 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

you that you would enjoy going to a movie, when, really, I only want
you to give me a ride. In each case, I am manipulating you in order
to get something for myself. Autonomy is also violated when people
are forced to do things against their will. This explains why “using
people” is wrong; it is wrong because it thwarts their autonomy.
Taking Baby Theresa’s organs, however, could not thwart her
autonomy, because she has no autonomy—she cannot make decisions,
she has no desires, and she cannot value anything. Would taking her
organs be “using her” in any other morally significant sense? We would,
of course, be using her organs for someone else’s benefit. But we do
that every time we perform a transplant. We would also be using her
organs without her permission. Would that make it wrong? If we were
using them against her wishes, then that would be a reason for objecting—
it would violate her autonomy. But Baby Theresa has no wishes.
When people are unable to make decisions for themselves, and
others must step in, there are two reasonable guidelines that might
be adopted. First, we might ask, What would be in their own best
interests? If we apply this standard to Baby Theresa, there would be
no problem with taking her organs, for, as we have already noted,
her interests will not be affected. She is not conscious, and she will
die soon no matter what.
The second guideline appeals to the person’s own preferences: We
might ask, If she could tell us what she wants, what would she say? This
sort of thought is useful when we are dealing with people who have
preferences (or once had them) but cannot express them—for example,
a comatose patient who signed a living will before slipping into the
coma. But, sadly, Baby Theresa has no preferences, nor can she ever
have any. So we can get no guidance from her, not even in our imagi-
nations. The upshot is that we are left to do what we think is best.

The Argument from the Wrongness of Killing. The ethicists also

appealed to the principle that it is wrong to kill one person to save
another. Taking Theresa’s organs would be killing her to save others,
they said; so, taking the organs would be wrong.
Is this argument sound? The rule against killing is certainly
among the most important moral precepts. Nevertheless, few peo-
ple believe it is always wrong to kill—most people think there are
exceptions, such as killing in self-defense. The question, then, is
whether taking Baby Theresa’s organs should be regarded as another
 What Is Morality? 5

e­ xception. There are many reasons to think so: Baby Theresa is not
conscious; she will never have a life; she is bound to die soon; and
taking her organs would help the other babies. Anyone who accepts
this will regard the argument as flawed. Usually, it is wrong to kill
one person to save another, but not always.
There is another possibility. Perhaps we should regard Baby
Theresa as already dead. If this sounds crazy, bear in mind that our
conception of death has changed over the years. In 1967, the South
African doctor Christiaan Barnard performed the first heart trans-
plant in a human being. This was an exciting development; heart
transplants could potentially save many lives. It was not clear, how-
ever, whether any lives could be saved in the United States. Back
then, American law understood death as occurring when the heart
stops beating. But once a heart stops beating, the organ quickly
degrades and becomes unsuitable for transplant. Thus, under Amer-
ican law, it was not clear whether any hearts could be harvested for
transplant. So American law changed. We now understand death as
occurring, not when the heart stops beating, but when the brain
stops functioning: “brain death” is now our standard understanding
of death. This solved the problem about transplants because a brain-
dead patient can still have a healthy heart, suitable for transplant.
Anencephalics do not meet the technical requirements for
brain death as that term is currently defined, but perhaps the defi-
nition should be revised to include them. After all, they lack any
hope for conscious life, because they have no cerebrum or cerebel-
lum. If the definition of brain death were reformulated to include
anencephalics, then we would become accustomed to the idea that
these unfortunate infants are stillborn, and so taking their organs
would not involve killing them. The Argument from the Wrongness
of Killing would then be moot.
On the whole, then, the arguments in favor of transplanting
Baby Theresa’s organs seem stronger than the arguments against it.

1.3. Second Example: Jodie and Mary

In August 2000, a young woman from Gozo, an island south of Italy,
discovered that she was carrying conjoined twins. Knowing that the
health-care facilities on Gozo couldn’t handle such a birth, she and
her husband went to St. Mary’s Hospital in Manchester, England.
6 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

The infants, known as Mary and Jodie, were joined at the lower
abdomen. Their spines were fused, and they had one heart and one
pair of lungs between them. Jodie, the stronger one, was providing
blood for her sister.
No one knows how many conjoined twins are born each year,
but the number seems to be in the hundreds. Most die shortly after
birth, but some do well. They grow to adulthood and marry and
have children themselves. However, the outlook for Mary and Jodie
was grim. The doctors said that, without intervention, the girls
would die within six months. The only hope was an operation to
separate them. This would save Jodie, but Mary would die
immediately.
The parents, who were devout Catholics, opposed the oper-
ation on the grounds that it would hasten Mary’s death. “We
believe that nature should take its course,” they said. “If it’s
God’s will that both our children should not survive, then so be
it.” The hospital, hoping to save Jodie, petitioned the courts for
permission to perform the operation anyway. The courts agreed,
and the operation was performed. As expected, Jodie lived and
Mary died.
In thinking about this case, we should distinguish the question
of who should make the decision from the question of what the deci-
sion should be. You might think, for example, that the parents should
make the decision, and so the courts were wrong to intrude. But
there remains the question of what would be the wisest choice for
the parents (or anyone else) to make. We will focus on that question:
Was it right or wrong to separate the twins?

The Argument That We Should Save as Many as We Can. The ratio-

nale for separating the twins is that we have a choice between saving
one infant or letting both die. Isn’t it plainly better to save one? This
argument is so appealing that many people will conclude, without
further thought, that the twins should be separated. At the height
of the controversy, the Ladies’ Home Journal commissioned a poll
to discover what Americans thought. The poll showed that 78%
approved of the operation. People were persuaded by the idea that
we should save as many as we can. Jodie and Mary’s parents, how-
ever, were persuaded by a different argument.
 What Is Morality? 7

The Argument from the Sanctity of Human Life. The parents loved
both of their children, and they thought it would be wrong to kill
one of them even to save the other. Of course, they were not alone
in thinking this. The idea that all human life is precious, regardless
of age, race, social class, or handicap, is at the core of the Western
moral tradition. In traditional ethics, the rule against killing inno-
cent humans is absolute. It does not matter if the killing would serve
a good purpose; it simply cannot be done. Mary is an innocent
human being, and so she may not be killed.
Is this argument sound? The judges who heard the case did not
think so, for a surprising reason. They denied that the operation would
kill Mary. Lord Justice Robert Walker said that the operation would
merely separate Mary from her sister and then “she would die, not
because she was intentionally killed, but because her own body cannot
sustain her life.” In other words, the operation wouldn’t kill her; her
body’s weakness would. And so, the morality of killing is irrelevant.
This response, however, misses the point. It doesn’t matter
whether we say that Mary’s death was caused by the operation, or
by the weakness of her own body. Either way, she will be dead, and
we would knowingly have hastened her death. That’s the idea behind
the traditional ban on killing the innocent.
There is, however, a more natural objection to the Argument
from the Sanctity of Human Life. Perhaps it is not always wrong to
kill innocent human beings. For example, such killings might be
right when three conditions are met: (a) the innocent human has
no future because she must die soon no matter what; (b) the i­nnocent
human has no wish to go on living, perhaps because she has no
wishes at all; and (c) this killing will save others, who can go on to
lead full lives. In these rare circumstances, the killing of the ­innocent
might be justified.

1.4. Third Example: Tracy Latimer

Tracy Latimer, a 12-year-old victim of cerebral palsy, was killed by
her father in 1993. Tracy lived with her family on a prairie farm in
Saskatchewan, Canada. One Sunday morning while his wife and
other children were at church, Robert Latimer put Tracy in the cab
of his pickup truck and piped in exhaust fumes until she died. At
8 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

the time of her death, Tracy weighed less than 40 pounds, and she
was described as “functioning at the mental level of a three-month-
old baby.” Mrs. Latimer said that she was relieved to find Tracy dead
when she arrived home. She said she “didn’t have the courage” to
do it herself.
Robert Latimer was tried for murder, but the judge and jury
did not want to punish him severely. The jury found him guilty of
only second-degree murder and recommended that the judge ignore
the 10-year sentence that is mandatory for such a crime. The judge
agreed and sentenced him to one year in prison, followed by one
year of confinement to his farm. But the Supreme Court of Canada
stepped in and ruled that the mandatory sentence must be imposed.
Robert Latimer entered prison in 2001 and was released on parole
in 2008.
Legal questions aside, did Mr. Latimer do anything wrong?
This case involves many of the issues that we saw in the other cases.
One argument is that Tracy’s life was morally precious, and so her
father had no right to kill her. But in his defense, it may be said
that Tracy’s condition was so catastrophic that she had no prospects
of a “life” in any but the merest biological sense. Her existence
consisted in pointless suffering, and so killing her was an act of
mercy. Considering those arguments, it appears that Robert Latimer
acted defensibly. His critics, however, made other points.

The Argument from the Wrongness of Discriminating against the

Handicapped. When the trial court gave Robert Latimer a light sen-
tence, many handicapped people felt insulted. The president of the
Saskatoon Voice of People with Disabilities, who has multiple scle-
rosis, said, “Nobody has the right to decide my life is worth less
than yours. That’s the bottom line.” Tracy was killed because she
was handicapped, he said, and that is immoral. Handicapped people
should be given the same respect and accorded the same rights as
everyone else.
What are we to make of this? Discrimination is always a seri-
ous matter, because it involves treating some people worse than
others, for no good reason. Suppose, for example, that a blind per-
son is turned down for a job simply because the employer doesn’t
want to be around someone who can’t see. This is no better than
 What Is Morality? 9

refusing to hire someone because she is Hispanic or Jewish or

female. Why is this person treated differently? Is she less able to do
the job? Is she less intelligent or less hardworking? Does she deserve
the job less? Is she less able to benefit from being employed? If there
is no good reason to exclude her, then it is wrong to do so.
Was Tracy Latimer’s death a case of discrimination against the
handicapped? Robert Latimer argued that Tracy’s cerebral palsy was
not the issue: “People are saying this is a handicap issue, but they’re
wrong. This is a torture issue. It was about mutilation and torture for
Tracy.” Just before her death, Tracy had undergone major surgery on
her back, hips, and legs, and more surgery was planned. “With the
combination of a feeding tube, rods in her back, the leg cut and flop-
ping around and bedsores,” said her father, “how can people say she
was a happy little girl?” At the trial, three of Tracy’s physicians testified
about the difficulty of controlling her pain. Thus, Mr. Latimer denied
that Tracy was killed because of her disability; she was killed because
she was suffering without hope of relief.

The Slippery Slope Argument. When the Canadian Supreme Court

upheld Robert Latimer’s long, mandatory sentence, the director of
the Canadian Association of Independent Living Centres was pleas-
antly surprised. “It would have really been the slippery slope, and
opening the doors to other people to decide who should live and
who should die,” she said.
Other disability advocates agreed. We may feel sympathy for
Robert Latimer, they said; we may even think that Tracy Latimer is
better off dead. However, it is dangerous to think in this way. If we
accept any sort of mercy killing, they said, we will slide down a
“slippery slope,” and at the bottom of the slope, all life will be held
cheap. Where will we draw the line? If Tracy’s life is not worth
protecting, what about the lives of other disabled people? What
about the elderly, the infirm, and other “useless” members of soci-
ety? In this context, Adolf Hitler’s program of “racial purification”
may be mentioned, implying that we will become like the Nazis if
we take the first step.
Similar “slippery slope arguments” have been used on other
issues. Abortion, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and human cloning
have all been denounced because of what they might lead to. In
10 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

hindsight, it is sometimes obvious that the worries were unfounded.

This has happened with IVF, a technique for creating embryos in
the lab. When Louise Brown, the first “test tube baby,” was born in
1978, there were dire predictions about what this might mean for
the future of our species. However, nothing awful happened, and
IVF has become a routine procedure.
Without the benefit of hindsight, however, slippery slope
arguments are often tough to assess. As the old saying goes, “It’s
hard to make predictions, especially about the future.” Reasonable
people may disagree about what would happen if mercy killing
were allowed in cases like Tracy Latimer’s. People who want to
condemn Mr. Latimer may see disaster looming, while those who
support Mr. Latimer may have no such worries.
It is worth noting that slippery slope arguments are easy to
abuse. If you are opposed to something but can’t think of a good
reason why, then you can always dream up something terrible that
might happen as a result of that thing; and no matter how unrealistic
your prediction is, no one can prove you wrong. That is why we
should approach such arguments with caution.

1.5. Reason and Impartiality

What can we learn from these cases about the nature of morality?
For starters, we may note two points: first, moral judgments must
be backed by good reasons; and second, morality requires the impar-
tial consideration of each individual’s interests.

Moral Reasoning. The cases of Baby Theresa, Jodie and Mary, and
Tracy Latimer may arouse strong feelings in us. Such feelings might
be admirable; they might be a sign of moral seriousness. However,
they can also get in the way of discovering the truth. When we feel
strongly about an issue, it is tempting to assume that we simply know
what the truth is, without even having to consider the arguments.
Unfortunately, however, we cannot rely on our feelings. Our feelings
may be irrational; they may be due to prejudice, selfishness, or cul-
tural conditioning. At one time, for example, many people’s feelings
told them that members of other races were inferior and that slavery
was part of God’s great plan.
Another random document with
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the place of the Sabbath; and second, that he believed the
consecration of another day to be the work of the adversary of God!
When he wrote these words he certainly did not believe in the
sanctification of Sunday by Christ. But Tertullian and his brethren
found themselves observing as a festival that day on which the sun
was worshiped, and they were, in consequence, taunted with being
worshipers of the sun. Tertullian denies the charge, though he
acknowledges that there was some appearance of truth to it. He
says:—

“Others, again, certainly with more information and greater

verisimilitude, believe that the sun is our God. We shall be
counted Persians, perhaps, though we do not worship the orb
of day painted on a piece of linen cloth, having himself
everywhere in his own disk. The idea, no doubt, has
originated from our being known to turn to the east in prayer.
But you, many of you, also, under pretense sometimes of
worshiping the heavenly bodies, move your lips in the
direction of the sunrise. In the same way, if we devote Sunday
to rejoicing, from a far different reason than sun-worship, we
have some resemblance to those of you who devote the day
of Saturn to ease and luxury, though they, too, go far away
from Jewish ways, of which they are ignorant.”[579]

Tertullian pleads no divine command nor apostolic example for this

practice. In fact, he offers no reason for the practice, though he
intimates that he had one to offer. But he finds it necessary in
another work to repel this same charge of sun-worship, because of
Sunday observance. In this second answer to this charge he states
the ground of defense more distinctly, and here we shall find his best
reason. These are his words:—

“Others, with greater regard to good manners, it must be

confessed, suppose that the sun is the god of the Christians,
because it is a well-known fact that we pray toward the east,
or because we make Sunday a day of festivity. What then?
 Do you do less than this? Do not many among you, with an
affectation of sometimes worshiping the heavenly bodies
likewise, move your lips in the direction of the sunrise? It is
you, at all events, who have even admitted the sun into the
calendar of the week; and you have selected its day [Sunday],
in preference to the preceding day, as the most suitable in the
week for either an entire abstinence from the bath, or for its
postponement until the evening, or for taking rest, and for
banqueting. By resorting to these customs, you deliberately
deviate from your own religious rites to those of
strangers.”[580]

Tertullian, in this discourse, addresses himself to the nations still in

idolatry. With some of these, Sunday was an ancient festival; with
others, it was of comparatively recent date. But some of these
heathen reproached the Sunday Christians with being sun-
worshipers. And now observe the answer. He does not say, “We
Christians are commanded to celebrate the first day of the week in
honor of Christ’s resurrection.” His answer is doubtless the best that
he knew how to frame. It is a mere retort, and consists in asserting,
first, that the Christians had done no more than their accusers, the
heathen; and second, that they had as good a right to make Sunday
a day of festivity as had the heathen!
The origin of first-day observance has been the subject of inquiry
in this chapter. We have found that Sunday from remote antiquity
was a heathen festival in honor of the sun, and that in the first
centuries of the Christian era this ancient festival was in general
veneration in the heathen world. We have learned that patriotism
and expediency, and a tender regard for the conversion of the
Gentile world, caused the leaders of the church to adopt as their
religious festival the day observed by the heathen, and to retain the
same name which the heathen had given it. We have seen that the
earliest instance upon record of the actual observance of Sunday in
the Christian church, is found in the church of Rome about a. d. 140.
The first great effort in its behalf, a. d. 196, is by a singular
coincidence the first act of papal usurpation. The first instance of a
sacred title being applied to this festival, and the earliest trace of
abstinence from labor on that day, are found in the writings of
Tertullian at the close of the second century. The origin of the festival
of Sunday is now before the reader; the steps by which it has
ascended to supreme power will be pointed out in their proper order
and place.
One fact of deep interest will conclude this chapter. The first great
effort made to put down the Sabbath was the act of the church of
Rome in turning it into a fast while Sunday was made a joyful
festival. While the eastern churches retained the Sabbath, a portion
of the western churches, with the church of Rome at their head,
turned it into a fast. As a part of the western churches refused to
comply with this ordinance, a long struggle ensued, the result of
which is thus stated by Heylyn:—

“In this difference it stood a long time together, till in the end
the Roman church obtained the cause, and Saturday became
a fast almost through all the parts of the western world. I say
the western world, and of that alone: the eastern churches
being so far from altering their ancient custom that in the sixth
council of Constantinople, a. d. 692, they did admonish those
of Rome to forbear fasting on that day upon pain of
censure.”[581]

Wm. James, in a sermon before the University of Oxford, thus

states the time when this fast originated:—

“The western church began to fast on Saturday at the

beginning of the third century.”[582]

Thus it is seen that this struggle began with the third century, that
is, immediately after the year 200. Neander thus states the motive of
the Roman church:—
 “In the western churches, particularly the Roman, where
opposition to Judaism was the prevailing tendency, this very
opposition produced the custom of celebrating the Saturday in
particular as a fast day.”[583]

By Judaism, Neander meant the observance of the seventh day as

the Sabbath. Dr. Charles Hase, of Germany, states the object of the
Roman church in very explicit language:—

“The Roman church regarded Saturday as a fast day in

direct opposition to those who regarded it as a Sabbath.
Sunday remained a joyful festival in which all fasting and
worldly business was avoided as much as possible, but the
original commandment of the decalogue respecting the
Sabbath was not then applied to that day.”[584]

Lord King attests this fact in the following words:—

“Some of the western churches, that they might not seem to

Judaize, fasted on Saturday, as Victorinus Petavionensis
writes: We use to fast on the seventh day. And it is our custom
then to fast, that we may not seem, with the Jews, to observe
the Sabbath.”[585]

Thus the Sabbath of the Lord was turned into a fast in order to
render it despicable before men. Such was the first great effort of the
Roman church toward the suppression of the ancient Sabbath of the
Bible.
 CHAPTER XVII.
THE NATURE OF EARLY FIRST-DAY OBSERVANCE.

The history of first-day observance compared with that of the popes—

First-day observance defined in the very words of each of the early
fathers who mention it—The reasons which each had for its
observance stated in his own words—Sunday in their judgment of no
higher sacredness than Easter or Whitsunday, or even than the fifty
days between those festivals—Sunday not a day of abstinence from
labor—The reasons which are offered by those of them who rejected
the Sabbath stated in their own words.
The history of first-day observance in the Christian church may be
fitly illustrated by that of the bishops of Rome. The Roman bishop
now claims supreme power over all the churches of Christ. He
asserts that this power was given to Peter, and by him was
transmitted to the bishops of Rome; or rather that Peter was the first
Roman bishop, and that a succession of such bishops from his time
to the present have exercised this absolute power in the church.
They are able to trace back their line to apostolic times, and they
assert that the power now claimed by the pope was claimed and
exercised by the first pastors of the church of the Romans. Those
who now acknowledge the supremacy of the pope believe this
assertion, and with them it is a conclusive evidence that the pope is
by divine right possessed of supreme power. But the assertion is
absolutely false. The early pastors, or bishops, or elders, of the
church of the Romans were modest, unassuming ministers of Christ,
wholly unlike the arrogant bishop of Rome, who now usurps the
place of Christ as the head of the Christian church.
The first day of the week now claims to be the Christian Sabbath,
and enforces its authority by means of the fourth commandment,
having set aside the seventh day, which that commandment enjoins,
and usurped its place. Its advocates assert that this position and this
authority were given to it by Christ. As no record of such gift is found
in the Scriptures, the principal argument in its support is furnished by
tracing first-day observance back to the early Christians, who, it is
said, would not have hallowed the day if they had not been
instructed to do it by the apostles; and the apostles would not have
taught them to do it if Christ had not, in their presence, changed the
Sabbath.
But first-day observance can be traced no nearer to apostolic
times than a. d. 140, while the bishops of Rome can trace their line
to the very times of the apostles. Herein is the papal claim to
apostolic authority better than is that of the first-day Sabbath. But
with this exception, the historical argument in behalf of each is the
same. Both began with very moderate pretensions, and gradually
gaining in power and sacredness, grew up in strength together.
Let us now go to those who were the earliest observers of Sunday
and learn from them the nature of that observance at its
commencement. We shall find, first, that no one claimed for first-day
observance any divine authority; second, that none of them had ever
heard of the change of the Sabbath, and none believed the first-day
festival to be a continuation of the Sabbatic institution; third, that
labor on that day is never set forth as sinful, and that abstinence
from labor is never mentioned as a feature of its observance, nor
even implied, only so far as necessary in order to spend a portion of
the day in worship; fourth, that if we put together all the hints
respecting Sunday observance, which are scattered through the
fathers of the first three centuries, for no one of them gives more
than two of these, and generally a single hint is all that is found in
one writer, we shall find just four items: (1) an assembly on that day
in which the Bible was read and expounded, and the supper
celebrated, and money collected; (2) that the day must be one of
rejoicing; (3) that it must not be a day of fasting; (4) that the knee
must not be bent in prayer on that day.
The following are all the hints respecting the nature of first-day
observance during the first three centuries. The epistle falsely
ascribed to Barnabas simply says: “We keep the eighth day with
joyfulness.”[586] Justin Martyr, in words already quoted at full length,
describes the kind of meeting which they held at Rome and in that
vicinity on that day, and this is all that he connects with its
observance.[587] Irenæus taught that to commemorate the
resurrection, the knee must not be bent on that day, and mentions
nothing else as essential to its honor. This act of standing in prayer
was a symbol of the resurrection, which was to be celebrated only on
that day, as he held.[588] Bardesanes the Gnostic represents the
Christians as everywhere meeting for worship on that day, but he
does not describe that worship, and he gives no other honor to the
day.[589] Tertullian describes Sunday observance as follows: “We
devote Sunday to rejoicing,” and he adds, “We have some
resemblance to those of you who devote the day of Saturn to ease
and luxury.”[590] In another work he gives us a further idea of the
festive character of Sunday. Thus he says to his brethren: “If any
indulgence is to be granted to the flesh, you have it. I will not say
your own days, but more too; for to the heathens each festive day
occurs but once annually; you have a festive day every eighth
day.”[591] Dr. Heylyn spoke the truth when he said:—

“Tertullian tells us that they did devote the Sunday partly

unto mirth and recreation, not to devotion altogether; when in
a hundred years after Tertullian’s time there was no law or
constitution to restrain men from labor on this day in the
Christian church.”[592]

The Sunday festival in Tertullian’s time was not like the modern
first-day Sabbath, but was essentially the German festival of Sunday,
a day for worship and for recreation, and one on which labor was not
sinful. But Tertullian speaks further respecting Sunday observance,
and the words now to be quoted have been used as proof that labor
on that day was counted sinful. This is the only statement that can
be found prior to Constantine’s Sunday law that has such an
appearance, and the proof is decisive that such was not its meaning.
Here are his words:—

“We, however (just as we have received), only on the day

of the Lord’s resurrection, ought to guard, not only against
 kneeling, but every posture and office of solicitude, deferring
even our businesses, lest we give any place to the devil.
Similarly, too, in the period of Pentecost; which period we
distinguish by the same solemnity of exultation.”[593]

He speaks of “deferring even our businesses;” but this does not

necessarily imply anything more than its postponement during the
hours devoted to religious services. It falls very far short of saying
that labor on Sunday is a sin. But we will quote Tertullian’s next
mention of Sunday observance before noticing further the words last
quoted. Thus he says:—

“We count fasting or kneeling in worship on the Lord’s day

to be unlawful. We rejoice in the same privilege also from
Easter to Whitsunday.”[594]

These two things, fasting and kneeling, are the only acts which the
fathers set down as unlawful on Sunday, unless, indeed, mourning
may be included by some in the list. It is certain that labor is never
thus mentioned. And observe that Tertullian repeats the important
statement of the previous quotation that the honor due to Sunday
pertains also to the “period of Pentecost,” that is, to the fifty days
between Easter or Passover and Whitsunday or Pentecost. If,
therefore, labor on Sunday was in Tertullian’s estimation sinful, the
same was true for the period of Pentecost, a space of fifty days! But
this is not possible. We can conceive of the deferral of business for
one religious assembly each day for fifty days, and also that men
should neither fast nor kneel during that time, which was precisely
what the religious celebration of Sunday actually was. But to make
Tertullian assert that labor on Sunday was a sin is to make him
declare that such was the case for fifty days together, which no one
will venture to say was the doctrine of Tertullian.
In another work Tertullian gives us one more statement respecting
the nature of Sunday observance: “We make Sunday a day of
festivity. What then? Do you do less than this?”[595] His language is
very extraordinary when it is considered that he was addressing
heathen. It seems that Sunday as a Christian festival was so similar
to the festival which these heathen observed that he could challenge
them to show wherein the Christians went further than did these
heathen whom he here addressed.
The next father who gives us the nature of early Sunday
observance is Peter of Alexandria. He says: “But the Lord’s day we
celebrate as a day of joy, because on it he rose again, on which day
we have received it for a custom not even to bow the knee.”[596] He
marks two things essential. It must be a day of joy, and Christians
must not kneel on that day. Zonaras, an ancient commentator on
these words of Peter, explains the day of joy by saying, “We ought
not to fast; for it is a day of joy for the resurrection of the Lord.”[597]
Next in order, we quote the so-called Apostolical Constitutions.
These command Christians to assemble for worship every day, “but
principally on the Sabbath day. And on the day of our Lord’s
resurrection, which is the Lord’s day, meet more diligently, sending
praise to God,” etc. The object of assembling was “to hear the saving
word concerning the resurrection,” to “pray thrice standing,” to have
the prophets read, to have preaching and also the supper.[598]
These “Constitutions” not only give the nature of the worship on
Sunday as just set forth, but they also give us an idea of Sunday as
a day of festivity:—

“Now we exhort you, brethren and fellow-servants, to avoid

vain talk and obscene discourses, and jestings, drunkenness,
lasciviousness, luxury, unbounded passions, with foolish
discourses, since we do not permit you so much as on the
Lord’s days, which are days of joy, to speak or act anything
unseemly.”[599]

This language plainly implies that the so-called Lord’s day was a
day of greater mirth than the other days of the week. Even on the
Lord’s day they must not speak or act anything unseemly, though it is
evident that their license on that day was greater than on other days.
Once more these “Constitutions” give us the nature of Sunday
observance: “Every Sabbath day excepting one, and every Lord’s
day hold your solemn assemblies, and rejoice; for he will be guilty of
sin who fasts on the Lord’s day.”[600] But no one can read so much
as once that “he is guilty of sin who performs work on this day.”
Next, we quote the epistle to the Magnesians in its longer form,
which though not written by Ignatius was actually written about the
time that the Apostolical Constitutions were committed to writing.
Here are the words of this epistle:—

“And after the observance of the Sabbath, let every friend

of Christ keep the Lord’s day as a festival, the resurrection
day, the queen and chief of all the days.”[601]

The writer of the Syriac Documents concerning Edessa comes

last, and he defines the services of Sunday as follows: “On the first
[day] of the week, let there be service, and the reading of the Holy
Scriptures, and the oblation.”[602] These are all the passages in the
writings of the first three centuries which describe early first-day
observance. Let the reader judge whether we have correctly stated
the nature of that observance. Next we invite attention to the several
reasons offered by these fathers for celebrating the festival of
Sunday.
The reputed epistle of Barnabas supports the Sunday festival by
saying that it was the day “on which Jesus rose again from the
dead,” and it intimates that it prefigures the eighth thousand years,
when God shall create the world anew.[603]
Justin Martyr has four reasons:—
1. “It is the first day on which God having wrought a change in the
darkness and matter, made the world.”[604]
2. “Jesus Christ our Saviour on the same day rose from the
dead.”[605]
 3. “It is possible for us to show how the eighth day possessed a
certain mysterious import, which the seventh day did not possess,
and which was promulgated by God through these rites,”[606] i. e.,
through circumcision.
4. “The command of circumcision, again, bidding [them] always
circumcise the children on the eighth day, was a type of the true
circumcision, by which we are circumcised from deceit and iniquity
through Him who rose from the dead on the first day after the
Sabbath.”[607]
Clement, of Alexandria, appears to treat solely of a mystical eighth
day or Lord’s day. It is perhaps possible that he has some reference
to Sunday. We therefore quote what he says in behalf of this day,
calling attention to the fact that he produces his testimony, not from
the Bible, but from a heathen philosopher. Thus he says:—

“And the Lord’s day Plato prophetically speaks of in the

tenth book of the Republic, in these words: ‘And when seven
days have passed to each of them in the meadow on the
eighth day they are to set out and arrive in four days.’”[608]

Clement’s reasons for Sunday are found outside the Scriptures.

The next father will give us a good reason for Clement’s action in this
case.
Tertullian is the next writer who gives reasons for the Sunday
festival. He is speaking of “offerings for the dead,” the manner of
Sunday observance, and the use of the sign of the cross upon the
forehead. Here is the ground on which these observances rest:—

“If, for these and other such rules, you insist upon having
positive Scripture injunction, you will find none. Tradition will
be held forth to you as the originator of them, custom, as their
strengthener, and faith, as their observer. That reason will
support tradition, and custom, and faith, you will either
yourself perceive, or learn from some one who has.”[609]
 Tertullian’s frankness is to be commended. He had no Scripture to
offer, and he acknowledges the fact. He depended on tradition, and
he was not ashamed to confess it. The next of the fathers who gives
Scripture evidence in support of the Sunday festival, is Origen. Here
are his words:—

“The manna fell on the Lord’s day, and not on the Sabbath
to show the Jews that even then the Lord’s day was preferred
before it.”[610]

Origen seems to have been of Tertullian’s judgment as to the

inconclusiveness of the arguments adduced by his predecessors. He
therefore coined an original argument which seems to have been
very conclusive in his estimation as he offers this alone. But he must
have forgotten that the manna fell on all the six working days, or he
would have seen that while his argument does not elevate Sunday
above the other five working days, it does make the Sabbath the
least reputable day of the seven! And yet the miracle of the manna
was expressly designed to set forth the sacredness of the Sabbath
and to establish its authority before the people. Cyprian is the next
father who gives an argument for the Sunday festival. He contents
himself with one of Justin’s old arguments, viz., that one drawn from
circumcision. Thus he says:—

“For in respect of the observance of the eighth day in the

Jewish circumcision of the flesh, a sacrament was given
beforehand in shadow and in usage; but when Christ came, it
was fulfilled in truth. For because the eighth day, that is, the
first day after the Sabbath, was to be that on which the Lord
should rise again, and should quicken us, and give us
circumcision of the Spirit, the eighth day, that is, the first day
after the Sabbath, and the Lord’s day, went before in the
figure; which figure ceased when by and by the truth came,
and spiritual circumcision was given to us.”[611]
 Such is the only argument adduced by Cyprian in behalf of the
first-day festival. The circumcision of infants when eight days old
was, in his judgment, a type of infant baptism. But circumcision on
the eighth day of the child’s life, in his estimation, did not signify that
baptism need to be deferred till the infant is eight days old, but, as
here stated, did signify that the eighth day was to be the Lord’s day!
But the eighth day, on which circumcision took place, was not the
first day of the week, but the eighth day of each child’s life, whatever
day of the week that might be.
The next father who gives a reason for celebrating Sunday as a
day of joy, and refraining from kneeling on it, is Peter of Alexandria,
who simply says, “Because on it he rose again.”[612]
Next in order come the Apostolical Constitutions, which assert that
the Sunday festival is a memorial of the resurrection:—

“But keep the Sabbath, and the Lord’s day festival; because
the former is a memorial of the creation, and the latter of the
resurrection.”[613]

The writer, however, offers no proof that Sunday was set apart by
divine authority in memory of the resurrection. But the next person
who gives his reasons for keeping Sunday “as a festival” is the writer
of the longer form of the reputed epistle of Ignatius to the
Magnesians. He finds the eighth day prophetically set forth in the title
to the sixth and twelfth psalms! In the margin, the word Sheminith is
translated “the eighth.” Here is this writer’s argument for Sunday:—

“Looking forward to this, the prophet declared, ‘To the end

for the eighth day,’ on which our life both sprang up again,
and the victory over death was obtained in Christ.”[614]

There is yet another of the fathers of the first three centuries who
gives the reasons then used in support of the Sunday festival. This is
the writer of the Syriac Documents concerning Edessa. He comes
next in order and closes the list. Here are four reasons:—

1. “Because on the first day of the week our Lord rose from
the place of the dead.”[615]
2. “On the first day of the week he arose upon the
world,”[616] i. e., he was born upon Sunday.
3. “On the first day of the week he ascended up to
Heaven.”[617]
4. “On the first day of the week he will appear at last with
the angels of Heaven.”[618]

The first of these reasons is as good a one as man can devise out
of his own heart for doing what God never commanded; the second
and fourth are mere assertions of which mankind know nothing;
while the third is a positive untruth, for the ascension was upon
Thursday.
We have now presented every reason for the Sunday festival
which can be found in all the writings of the first three centuries.
Though generally very trivial, and sometimes worse than trivial, they
are nevertheless worthy of careful study. They constitute a decisive
testimony that the change of the Sabbath by Christ or by his apostles
from the seventh to the first day of the week was absolutely unknown
during that entire period. But were it true that such change had been
made they must have known it. Had they believed that Christ
changed the Sabbath to commemorate his resurrection, how
emphatically would they have stated that fact instead of offering
reasons for the festival of Sunday which are so worthless as to be,
with one or two exceptions, entirely discarded by modern first-day
writers. Or had they believed that the apostles honored Sunday as
the Sabbath or Lord’s day, how would they have produced these
facts in triumph! But Tertullian said that they had no positive
Scripture injunction for the Sunday festival, and the others, by
offering reasons that were only devised in their own hearts,
corroborated his testimony, and all of them together establish the
fact that even in their own estimation the day was only sustained by
the authority of the church. They were totally unacquainted with the
modern doctrine that the seventh day in the commandment means
simply one day in seven, and that the Saviour, to commemorate his
resurrection, appointed that the first day of the week should be that
one of the seven to which the commandment should apply!
We have given every statement in the fathers of the first three
centuries in which the manner of celebrating the Sunday festival is
set forth. We have also given every reason for that observance
which is to be found in any of them. These two classes of
testimonies show clearly that ordinary labor was not one of the
things which were forbidden on that day. We now offer direct proof
that other days which on all hands are accounted nothing but church
festivals were expressly declared by the fathers to be equal if not
superior in sacredness to the Sunday festival.
The “Lost Writings of Irenæus” gives us his mind concerning the
relative sacredness of the festival of Sunday and that of either Easter
or Pentecost. This is the statement:—

“Upon which [feast] we do not bend the knee, because it is

of equal significance with the Lord’s day, for the reason
already alleged concerning it.”[619]

Tertullian in a passage already quoted, which by omitting the

sentence we are about to quote, has been used as the strongest
testimony to the first-day Sabbath in the fathers, expressly equals in
sacredness the period of Pentecost—a space of fifty days—with the
festival which he calls Lord’s day. Thus he says:—

“Similarly, too, in the period of Pentecost; which period we

distinguish by the same solemnity of exultation.”[620]

He states the same fact in another work:—

 “We count fasting or kneeling in worship on the Lord’s day
to be unlawful. We rejoice in the same privilege also from
Easter to Whitsunday.”[621]

Origen classes the so-called Lord’s day with three other church
festivals:—

“If it be objected to us on this subject that we ourselves are

accustomed to observe certain days, as for example the
Lord’s day, the Preparation, the Passover, or Pentecost, I
have to answer, that to the perfect Christian, who is ever in
his thoughts, words, and deeds, serving his natural Lord, God
the Word, all his days are the Lord’s, and he is always
keeping the Lord’s day.”[622]

Irenæus and Tertullian make the Sunday Lord’s day equal in

sacredness with the period from the Passover to the Pentecost; but
Origen, after classing the day with several church festivals, virtually
confesses that it has no pre-eminence above other days.
Commodianus, who once uses the term Lord’s day, speaks of the
Catholic festival of the Passover as “Easter, that day of ours most
blessed.”[623] This certainly indicates that in his estimation no other
sacred day was superior in sanctity to Easter.
The “Apostolical Constitutions” treat the Sunday festival in the
same manner that it is treated by Irenæus and Tertullian. They make
it equal to the sacredness of the period from Easter to the Pentecost.
Thus they say:—

“He will be guilty of sin who fasts on the Lord’s day, being
the day of the resurrection, or during the time of Pentecost, or
in general, who is sad on a festival day to the Lord.”[624]

These testimonies prove conclusively that the festival of Sunday,

in the judgment of such men as Irenæus, Tertullian, and others,
stood in the same rank with that of Easter, or Whitsunday. They had
no idea that one was commanded by God, while the others were
only ordained by the church. Indeed, Tertullian, as we have seen,
expressly declares that there is no precept for Sunday observance.
[625]

Besides these important facts, we have decisive evidence that

Sunday was not a day of abstinence from labor, and our first witness
is Justin, the earliest witness to the Sunday festival in the Christian
church. Trypho the Jew said to Justin, by way of reproof, “You
observe no festivals or Sabbaths.”[626] This was exactly adapted to
bring out from Justin the statement that, though he did not observe
the seventh day as the Sabbath, he did thus rest on the first day of
the week, if it were true that that day was with him a day of
abstinence from labor. But he gives no such answer. He sneers at
the very idea of abstinence from labor, declaring that “God does not
take pleasure in such observances.” Nor does he intimate that this is
because the Jews did not rest upon the right day, but he condemns
the very idea of refraining from labor for a day, stating that “the new
law,” which has taken the place of the commandments given on
Sinai[627] requires a perpetual Sabbath, and this is kept by repenting
of sin and refraining from its commission. Here are his words:—

“The new law requires you to keep a perpetual Sabbath,

and you, because you are idle for one day, suppose you are
pious, not discerning why this has been commanded you; and
if you eat unleavened bread, you say the will of God has been
fulfilled. The Lord our God does not take pleasure in such
observances: if there is any perjured person or a thief among
you, let him cease to be so; if any adulterer, let him repent;
then he has kept the sweet and true Sabbaths of God.”[628]

This language plainly implies that Justin did not believe that any
day should be kept as a Sabbath by abstinence from labor, but that
all days should be kept as sabbaths by abstinence from sin. This
testimony is decisive, and it is in exact harmony with the facts
already adduced from the fathers, and with others yet to be
presented. Moreover, it is confirmed by the express testimony of
Tertullian. He says:—

“By us (to whom Sabbaths are strange, and the new

moons, and festivals formerly beloved by God) the Saturnalia
and new year’s and mid-winter’s festivals and Matronalia are
frequented.”[629]

And he adds in the same paragraph, in words already quoted:—

“If any indulgence is to be granted to the flesh, you have it. I

will not say your own days, but more too; for to the heathens
each festive day occurs but once annually; you have a festive
day every eighth day.”[630]

Tertullian tells his brethren in plain language that they kept no

sabbaths, but did keep many heathen festivals. If the Sunday
festival, which was a day of “indulgence” to the flesh, and which he
here mentions as the “eighth day,” was kept by them as the Christian
Sabbath in place of the ancient seventh day, then he would not have
asserted that to us “sabbaths are strange.” But Tertullian has
precisely the same Sabbath as Justin Martyr. He does not keep the
first day in place of the seventh, but he keeps a “perpetual sabbath,”
in which he professes to refrain from sin every day, and actually
abstains from labor on none. Thus, after saying that the Jews teach
that “from the beginning God sanctified the seventh day” and
therefore observe that day, he says:—

“Whence we [Christians] understand that we still more

ought to observe a Sabbath from all ‘servile work’ always, and
not only every seventh day, but through all time.”[631]

Tertullian certainly had no idea that Sunday was the Sabbath in

any other sense than were all the seven days of the week. We shall
find a decisive confirmation of this when we come to quote Tertullian
respecting the origin of the Sabbath. We shall also find that Clement
expressly makes Sunday a day of labor.
Several of the early fathers wrote in opposition to the observance
of the seventh day. We now give the reasons assigned by each for
that opposition. The writer called Barnabas did not keep the seventh
day, not because it was a ceremonial ordinance unworthy of being
observed by a Christian, but because it was so pure an institution
that even Christians cannot truly sanctify it till they are made
immortal. Here are his words:—

“Attend, my children, to the meaning of this expression, ‘He

finished in six days.’ This implieth that the Lord will finish all
things in six thousand years, for a day is with him a thousand
years. And he himself testifieth, saying, ‘Behold, to-day will be
as a thousand years.’ Therefore, my children, in six days, that
is, in six thousand years, all things will be finished. And he
rested on the seventh day.’ This meaneth: When his Son,
coming [again], shall destroy the time of the wicked man, and
judge the ungodly, and change the sun, and the moon, and
the stars, then shall he truly rest on the seventh day.
Moreover, he says, ‘Thou shalt sanctify it with pure hands and
a pure heart.’ If, therefore, any one can now sanctify the day
which God hath sanctified, except he is pure in heart in all
things, we are deceived. Behold, therefore: certainly then one
properly resting sanctifies it, when we ourselves, having
received the promise, wickedness no longer existing, and all
things having been made new by the Lord, shall be able to
work righteousness. Then we shall be able to sanctify it,
having been first sanctified ourselves. Further he says to
them, ‘Your new moons and your sabbaths I cannot endure.’
Ye perceive how he speaks: Your present sabbaths are not
acceptable to me, but that is which I have made [namely this],
when, giving rest to all things, I shall make a beginning of the
eighth day, that is, a beginning of another world, wherefore,
 also, we keep the eighth day with joyfulness, the day, also, on
which Jesus rose again from the dead.”[632]

Observe the points embodied in this statement of doctrine: 1. He

asserts that the six days of creation prefigure the six thousand years
which our world shall endure in its present state of wickedness. 2.
He teaches that at the end of that period Christ shall come again and
make an end of wickedness, and “then shall he truly rest on the
seventh day.” 3. That no “one can now sanctify the day which God
hath sanctified, except he is pure in heart in all things.” 4. But that
cannot be the case until the present world shall pass away, “when
we ourselves, having received the promise, wickedness no longer
existing, and all things having been made new by the Lord, shall be
able to work righteousness. Then we shall be able to sanctify it,
having been first sanctified ourselves.” Men cannot, therefore, keep
the Sabbath while this wicked world lasts. 5. Therefore, he says,
“Your present sabbaths are not acceptable,” not because they are
not pure, but because you are not now able to keep them as purely
as their nature demands. 6. That is to say, the keeping of the day
which God has sanctified is not possible in such a wicked world as
this. 7. But though the seventh day cannot now be kept, the eighth
day can be, and ought to be, because when the seven thousand
years are past, there will be at the beginning of the eighth thousand,
the new creation. 8. Therefore, he did not attempt to keep the
seventh day, which God had sanctified; for that is too pure to be kept
in the present wicked world, and can only be kept after the Saviour
comes at the commencement of the seventh thousand years; but he
kept the eighth day with joyfulness on which Jesus arose from the
dead. 9. So it appears that the eighth day, which God never
sanctified, is exactly suitable for observance in our world during its
present state of wickedness. 10. But when all things have been
made new, and we are able to work righteousness, and wickedness
no longer exists, then we shall be able to sanctify the seventh day,
having first been sanctified ourselves.
The reason of Barnabas for not observing the Sabbath of the Lord
is not that the commandment enjoining it is abolished, but that the