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i
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
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Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
iii
The Compleat
Victory
SARATOGA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Kevin J. Weddle
v
For Jeanie
vi
vi
CONTENTS
List of Maps ix
Editors’ Note xi
Acknowledgments xv
vii
vi
viii Contents
Notes 417
Bibliography 485
Index 497
xi
LIST OF MAPS
ix
x
xi
E D I T O R S ’ NOTE
xi
xi
He selected the Saratoga campaign, which had first drawn his atten-
tion when he began to study it as a cadet. His continuing interest in
the campaign centered on problems of leadership. For many years,
the study of leaders had been at the heart of much historical scholar-
ship. More recent generations of scholars have shifted their primary
inquiries to other questions of high importance in social, economic,
demographic, cultural, and intellectual history. Much was gained by
this enlargement of historical research, but something important
has been lost.
In recent years, we in the United States have suffered a decline
in the quality of leadership in high elective offices of our American
Republic. The primary cause is not only a pattern of failure in our
leaders themselves, but in those of us who choose them. Our cul-
ture on many levels has tended to move away from the vital task of
preparing Americans for their primary civic responsibilities in the
choice of those who should lead in a free and open society.
In consequence, historians are returning to the study of lead-
ership. Weddle’s book on Saratoga centers not merely on a few at
the top. It is broadly conceived to include a diversity of people who
functioned in many prominent roles in a world-historical event and
who made a difference, both positive and negative, in its outcome.
It studies a broad array of leaders, senior and junior, civilian and
military, who functioned in the thirteen American states, in Britain’s
constitutional monarchy, in French and British Canada, in German
professional forces, and within American Indian nations. Some have
given rise to an historical literature that is large and often deeply
divided. Weddle, who commands a large range of primary and sec-
ondary materials and whose inquiries draw on his own personal ex-
perience and background, comes to his own balanced conclusions.
His inquiries combine the precise thinking of a professional soldier
with a scholar’s concern for the evidence. At the same time, he has
written a fluent, graceful, and engaging book that brings out the
drama of pivotal moments.
The Saratoga campaign occurred in a flow of events that began
in 1775 and continued to 1777 and beyond. Each of its battles fea-
tured different sets of commanding officers and supporting leaders.
Weddle’s book takes the form of a braided narrative, centering on
several sequences of leaders who made choices, choices that made a
difference in the world. Military history can be confusing to the non-
professional reader, especially when it involves so many characters
operating over such a wide geographic area. Weddle’s skill keeps
xi
AC K N OW L E D G M ENT S
No one can complete a book that takes more than ten years to re-
search and write without being indebted to many people. First and
foremost, David Hackett Fischer not only brought me into the pro-
ject, but he went above and beyond the call of duty by reading at
least two full drafts of the book and many other versions of impor-
tant sections. His feedback and suggestions were instrumental in
fleshing out key themes, and he enthusiastically endorsed my focus
on strategy and leadership. David is an exceptional historian and
a national treasure, and I am fortunate to call him a mentor and
a friend. Jim McPherson, another mentor and friend, provided
helpful feedback and support.
Eric Schnitzer, chief historian at the Saratoga National Historical
Park, cheerfully offered his time and considerable expertise. He
not only shared his own research, he also reviewed and provided
timely expert feedback on major portions of the book. He patiently
answered all my queries, which was especially critical to my under-
standing of how the two major battles unfolded and the details of
the often-confusing orders of battle. His deep knowledge of the
campaign, the sources, and the period came to my rescue time and
time again.
My colleagues at the United States Army War College have been
encouraging and helpful at every stage. My boss, Dr. Clay Chun, was
an enthusiastic supporter. Several of my good friends and fellow fac-
ulty members read and provided invaluable feedback on early drafts,
including Pete Haas, Chris Bolan, Joel Hillison, Bill Johnsen, and
John Paterson. The book is much better because of their generous
efforts.
I spent many days exploring the various sites associated with the
Saratoga campaign. I profited from numerous discussions and cor-
respondence with park rangers and other staff members at the Fort
Ticonderoga Museum, the Mount Independence State (Vermont)
Historic Site, the Hubbardton Battlefield State (Vermont) Historic
Site, the Fort Stanwix National Monument, the Oriskany Battlefield
xv
xvi
xvi Acknowledgments
State (New York) Historic Site, and the Saratoga National Historical
Park. They all enthusiastically responded to my many questions.
While serving as the William L. Garwood Visiting Professor at
Princeton University in 2019, I taught a course on World War II
strategy and leadership, which helped crystalize my thinking about
the two topics that figure so prominently in this book. I owe many
thanks to Robbie George and Brad Wilson of the James Madison
Program for offering me the appointment, the Army War College’s
leadership for approving it, my hardworking and supportive pre-
ceptor, Mark O’Brien, and last but never least, my wonderful
students.
I am indebted to the extremely helpful staffs at all the archives
and libraries I physically and virtually visited during my research.
Librarians and archivists at the British Library, the Library of
Congress, Ellen McCallister Clark and Rebecca Cooper at the
Society of the Cincinnati Library, Miranda Peters and Christopher
D. Fox at the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, and April Miller at the
Firestone Library at Princeton University, promptly responded to
my many requests. Also, the Interlibrary Loan staff at the Army War
College Library was extremely efficient and always cheerful. Three
institutions, at which I spent many weeks researching the book, and
their staffs deserve special mention: the William L. Clements Library
at the University of Michigan, the Army Heritage and Education
Center (AHEC), and the David Library of the American Revolution
(DLAR). Terese Austin and Valarie Proehl helped me negotiate the
marvelous collection of the papers of British senior leaders at the
Clements Library. AHEC, a part of the Army War College, was inval-
uable for its extensive collection of secondary sources and published
primary material as well as the microfilm collection of Horatio Gates’s
papers. Finally, I spent the most time at the DLAR (now the David
Center for the American Revolution at the American Philosophical
Society in Philadelphia), which was one of the most user-friendly
places to conduct research I have ever visited. Its librarian, Kathy
Ludwig, has an encyclopedic knowledge of the DLAR’s unsur-
passed collection of material—British and American—related to the
American Revolution, and I benefitted many times from her wise
counsel and suggestions.
I was very fortunate to receive a Society of the Cincinnati Scholar’s
Grant and a United States Military Academy Omar N. Bradley
Research Fellowship, which helped defray the cost of travel and re-
search. Many thanks to Ellen McCallister Clark, Clifford Rogers, and
Lee Johnston.
xvi
Acknowledgments xvii
My editor, Tim Bent, and the entire staff at the Oxford University
Press were always professional, encouraging, and responsive. Tim
did a superb job of editing, counseling me to let the story unfold,
to keep things moving, to cut extraneous detail, and, whenever pos-
sible, to show not tell. Not only that, but Tim displayed almost infi-
nite patience with me when the project was delayed for an extended
period due to a serious family health crisis. I will be forever grateful
for his support. Joellyn Ausanka carefully and skillfully shepherded
the project through to competition. Joellyn and her team were a joy
to work with.
Finally, my wonderful wife, Jeanie, has cheerfully allowed Saratoga
to live with us for more than a decade. She also patiently and with
great forbearance listened to me for hours as I read major portions
of the book out loud to her, and she offered many useful critiques
and suggestions. Jeanie’s support was essential, and her courage
while successfully fighting a terrible disease was inspirational. This
project would have never reached a conclusion without her.
xvi
xi
setbacks, the British were determined to end the war once and for
all. They devised a complicated plan. Three different British armies
would converge on Albany, New York, take control of the Hudson
River, and split the newly self-proclaimed independent nation in two.
Burgoyne would command the army from Canada; the main army,
under the British commander-in-chief, General Sir William Howe,
was to first seize Philadelphia, then support Burgoyne by moving up
the Hudson. The strategy miscarried badly.
When word of Burgoyne’s surrender reached London on the
evening of December 2, 1777, the country was stunned. Everyone
had been led to believe that victory over the upstart American
colonists was just around the corner. Politicians, newspapers, and the
public clamored for blame to be assigned. Opposition members in
Parliament demanded the resignation of key ministers. Senior mil-
itary officers were embarrassed.3 The American victory at Saratoga
was a major military setback for the British. It profoundly affected
the course of events over the next five years, not least because it led
directly to France’s decision to enter the war on the Patriot side,
which changed the entire character of the American Revolution,
from a colonial rebellion to a world war.
Given that the focus of this series about pivotal moments in
American history is on historical contingency, it would be unthink-
able to omit the Saratoga campaign. The planning and execution of
the campaign are replete with critical decisions by leaders on both
sides, and chance played a major role, as it always does in war. This
book covers the entire campaign in all its complexity, including its
origins, execution, and aftermath, and a more dramatic and conse-
quential American story is hard to find.
I first became interested in the American Revolution and the
Saratoga campaign while a cadet at the United States Military
Academy at West Point, located 130 miles south of the main bat-
tlefield. Throughout a long military career, I have been fortunate
to lead hundreds of staff rides and battlefield tours to sites in the
United States and Europe, ranging from the Battle of Agincourt
to Saratoga to Waterloo to Gettysburg to Gallipoli to the D-Day
landings in Normandy. These trips, combined with two combat
deployments, command of a battalion, and teaching posts at West
Point and the US Army War College, sharpened my interest in lead-
ership and military strategy, which are the two major themes that
run through this book.
Essential to understanding the Saratoga campaign’s outcome is
an appreciation of the origins of the strategy that drove the military
3
Introduction 3
operations and of the leaders whose decisons drove the British and
American forces to their final clashes along the Hudson River.
Who was to blame for Britain’s ignominious defeat? Most have
assigned the lion’s share of the responsibility to Lord George
Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the minister re-
sponsible for British military operations in North America. Howe is
also blamed for wasting time and resources on other campaigns when
he should have been assisting the army from Canada. Yet I argue
that it was the strategy itself that was ultimately responsible. The
foundations for the British defeat at Saratoga were laid in London,
New York, and Quebec, where the strategy was devised in the winter
and spring of 1777.
Indeed, responsibility for the loss at Saratoga spreads wide.
Germain tried to micromanage the war from a continent away and
failed to ensure that all the British commanders in North America,
especially Burgoyne and Howe, coordinated their efforts. By the
summer of 1777, Howe understood that the only way to win the war
was to destroy the American Army under the command of General
George Washington. However, he did not move quickly or synchro-
nize his actions with those of Burgoyne’s army to make this happen.
Finally, Burgoyne, the man who surrendered to Gates, proved to be
simply out of his depth. Despite being an experienced and popular
commander, Burgoyne never understood until it was too late just
how challenging the American environment would be for moving
and supplying and fighting with a large European army.
Despite their ultimate victory, the Americans were not immune to
failures of leadership during the Saratoga campaign. Major General
Arthur St. Clair, commanding Fort Ticonderoga, committed a series
of blunders that led directly to the fortress’ evacuation and ensured
that Burgoyne’s invasion got off to a fast start with a major success.
For the most part, Major General Philip Schuyler, commander of
the so-called Northern Department, made decisions that helped
lay the groundwork for ultimate American success. Still, his wildly
pessimistic reports to Congress and General Washington caused his
superiors to lose confidence in his ability to stem Burgoyne’s seem-
ingly inexorable advance south toward Albany.4
Schuyler’s replacement was Horatio Gates, who built on the foun-
dation that Schuyler had already laid. Later in the war, events would
demonstrate just how fortunate Gates had been in August 1777 to in-
herit a situation in which his talents meshed with the circumstances.
Major General Benjamin Lincoln, Gates’s second-in-command late
in the campaign, proved invaluable to his superiors in handling
4
the sometimes unreliable militia units from the New England states
and in the substantive reinforcement of the Northern Army when it
mattered the most. The Americans also had a depth of strong lead-
ership in many outstanding field officers and junior general officers
who performed admirably during the campaign. Brigadier General
John Stark led his troops to victory at the Battle of Bennington, an
engagement that proved the beginning of the end for Burgoyne and
his army. Though heavily outnumbered, Colonel Peter Gansevoort
successfully defended Fort Stanwix. Colonel Daniel Morgan led his
riflemen at the Battle of Freeman’s Farm and the Battle of Bemis
Heights. All of these American senior leaders—and many more
besides—contributed to the victory at Saratoga.
Perhaps the most dynamic combat leader on either side was Major
General Benedict Arnold. From the moment he joined the Northern
Army, he made a difference—helping to restore morale, managing
militia, conducting reconnaissance missions and raids, and person-
ally leading the final assault at the Battle of Bemis Heights. There is
no doubt that Arnold’s role was central to the American success at
Saratoga, even though he was volatile and easily took offense. But the
advantages Gates derived from having Arnold as one of his combat
commanders far outweighed the disadvantages.
The Americans in the Northern Department were also fortu-
nate that their commander-in-chief was George Washington, even
though he was more than 200 miles away to the south and distracted
by the challenge of facing Howe’s main British Army. Washington
underestimated the threat to and the readiness of the Northern
Department in the winter and spring of 1777. Nonetheless, he
more than made up for his earlier inattention to the theater after
the loss of Ticonderoga in July. Washington patiently counseled
and mentored the anxious Schuyler and provided sound advice. He
also appealed to New England governors and assemblies to muster
and dispatch militia forces to join the Northern Army, hurried
significant reinforcements northward, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, assigned Benedict Arnold and Benjamin Lincoln to report to
Schuyler. Washington’s contributions to the Saratoga campaign are
generally glossed over, but they were essential for American victory.
Washington could have neglected or even ignored the Northern
Army while he faced General Howe, but he did not. He continued
setting priorities and allocating his resources accordingly.
While preparing one of my Army War College courses,
I encountered British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery’s no-
tion of “grip,” a term he used to describe a commander who was
5
Introduction 5
CHAPTER 1
Opening Moves
victory; another such would have ruined us.”2 Howe, writing to an-
other officer, called the battle “this unhappy day” and “I freely con-
fess to you, when I look at the consequences of it, in the loss of so
many brave officers, I do it with horror.”3 Howe soon replaced the
unfortunate Gage and became the commander-in-chief of the British
Army in America in October 1775.
Howe’s counterpart, George Washington, was named the
American commander-in-chief three days before Bunker Hill, arrived
in Boston several weeks after the battle. The fledgling Continental
Army was formed by an act of Congress on June 14, 1775, the
day before Washington received his commission. Two weeks later,
Congress directed that the state militias be incorporated into the
Continental Army.
After Bunker Hill, both sides settled down to a siege that lasted for
months. While the two sides eyed each other from their fortifications,
General Howe (promoted to full general in January 1776, as befitted
his position as commander-in-chief) delayed conducting any major
operations and was content to hunker down in the city. Burgoyne,
who was unable to secure a meaningful position in the army at
Boston, returned to Britain to seek new opportunities.
While the siege of Boston dragged on, Clinton, now Howe’s
second-in-command, became increasingly disenchanted with his
boss, and the feeling was mutual. Clinton thought that a part of his
job was to provide military advice and counsel to the commander-in-
chief. Howe did not see it that way. He believed Clinton should ac-
complish the tasks assigned to him and keep his mouth shut. Where
Clinton was outspoken, if introverted, Howe was amiable and easy-
going. It was almost inevitable that they would clash, and they were
simply unable to reach a meeting of minds, especially involving the
proper strategy to fight the Americans.4 The relationship between
Howe and Clinton was emblematic of one of the major problems
facing the British in America: disagreements among the senior polit-
ical and military leadership.
The siege of Boston finally ended in the midwinter of 1776. The
Americans were able to mount heavy cannon, dragged overland
from Fort Ticonderoga, which had been seized without difficulty by
Patriots under Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold on May 10, 1775,
under the supervision of Colonel Henry Knox. They placed the ar-
tillery on Dorchester Heights, overlooking the town and the harbor.
Although Howe thought about attacking the heights, memories of
Bunker Hill were fresh in his mind, and he decided to evacuate
Boston. On March 17, 1776, British troops and their equipment were
9
Opening Moves 9
embarked on ships and sailed for Halifax, Nova Scotia. By the end of
March, there were no British troops in the American Colonies.
Howe’s frustration with Clinton, newly promoted to lieutenant
general, came to a head in January 1776, when the commander-
in-chief sent his second-in-command on an expedition to the
Southern colonies to explore possible military operations in North
or South Carolina.5 Most British leaders thought that the Southern
colonies were home to large numbers of Loyalists who were being
oppressed by the rebels. Supported by the presence of British
troops, they would be instrumental in putting down the rebellion
and securing territory. Howe both wanted to explore this opportu-
nity and rid himself of his talented but annoying subordinate, at
least for a while.
Further, Howe sought to take advantage of the unsurpassed mo-
bility that the Royal Navy gave him. Howe’s older brother, Vice
Admiral Lord Richard Howe, was the commander-in-chief of the
naval forces in America, ensuring that much of the service parochi-
alism that typically hamstrings joint operations between naval and
ground forces would not be a problem. Clinton’s southern expe-
dition involved only about fifteen hundred troops and never had
much of a chance to accomplish any meaningful objectives. The
joint operation between Clinton and Commodore Sir Peter Parker
in June 1776 went badly when a landing of the troops and a naval
bombardment at Charleston, South Carolina, failed to dent the
American coastal defenses. Horace Walpole, the famous British man
of letters, called the Charleston raid “a disgraceful miscarriage.”6
Clinton’s troops rejoined Howe’s army in Halifax; the British would
not return to the Carolinas again until late in 1778.
After the British Army evacuated Boston in March 1776,
Washington surmised that Howe would return in short order. He
also guessed that Howe would not try to retake Boston, but would in-
stead try to seize the greatest port city in North America: New York.
Consequently, Washington moved the nineteen-thousand-man
Continental Army, augmented by militia units, from Boston to
New York, stationing his troops in forward positions on Brooklyn
Heights on Long Island against an invasion by sea. Major General
Charles Lee, one of Washington’s key leaders, gauged the mas-
sive British advantage as the Americans prepared to defend the
city: “What to do with the city, I own puzzles me; it is so encircl’d with
deep navigable water, that whoever commands the sea must com-
mand the town.”7 This would be an advantage that the British would
enjoy for much of the war.
01
Opening Moves 11
Opening Moves 13
Opening Moves 15
Tryon was right. Howe tried to pass off the loss at Trenton as nothing
more than a skirmish, of little importance to the overall war effort.
A month later, he admitted that Trenton might be more critical
“than what was at first apprehended.”26
Having achieved the first real victory of American arms since the
siege of Boston and knowing that the British would react strongly to
the Trenton defeat, Washington followed up with another offensive
action. With the additional emergency powers granted to him by
Congress, he used the victory, and a ten-dollar bounty, to convince
soldiers to stay on past the January 1 expiration of their enlistments.
Washington was able to field a force of about five thousand men to
cross the Delaware and again take the war to the enemy.
This time there would be no surprise. Howe ordered Lieutenant
General Lord Charles Cornwallis in New York to gather a force
of about nine thousand men, march to Trenton, and confront
Washington should he dare to attack. Washington and his small
force crossed the Delaware on New Year’s Eve day and marched
to Trenton. On January 2, 1777, Cornwallis attacked at Assunpink
Creek. Three times his troops attacked the American positions, and
each time they were driven back. Nightfall convinced Cornwallis to
reconvene the battle the next day. During the evening and into the
early morning hours of January 3, Washington led his men around
Cornwallis’s positions, heading toward the town of Princeton, where
he knew the British had a small detachment.
The resulting Battle of Princeton saw heavy fighting in and
around Nassau Hall, the main building of the College of New Jersey,
now Princeton University. Washington attacked as the British force
was getting ready to join Cornwallis at Trenton. This time instead of
facing sleepy Hessian mercenaries, his men faced British regulars.
After a short, sharp fight, the outnumbered and outgunned British
fled Princeton, leaving behind nearly five hundred casualties, in-
cluding dozens killed in action, and almost three hundred prisoners.
American casualties were less than half that, though Washington
grieved the loss of two key officers, Brigadier General Hugh Mercer
and Colonel John Haslet.27
Hoping to encounter another isolated British or German detach-
ment, Washington wanted to push on to New Brunswick but ulti-
mately decided against it. As he explained to Hancock two days after
the battle, the risk “of losing the advantage we had gained by aiming
at too much induced me by the advice of my Officers to relinquish
the attempt.”28 Instead, he moved the army into winter quarters at
Morristown, New Jersey.
61
For their part, the British also decided to end active operations
and consolidated their outposts at New Brunswick and Perth Amboy
to better defend themselves against American raids. They had been
impressed by Washington’s attacks. Horace Walpole noted that after
the news reached London, it was “now the fashion to cry up the
manoeuver of General Washington in this action,” noting that the
campaign to defeat the colonists “has by no means been wound up.”29
While Washington’s audacious operations at Trenton and
Princeton were expertly carried out, he was undoubtedly aided by
Howe’s desire to capture and hold territory instead of destroying
the American Army. The British Army was overextended, and the
isolated detachments of British and Hessian soldiers made them vul-
nerable. Howe’s strategy, one that began with so much promise after
the succession of British victories on Long Island and Manhattan,
would have to change if the British were to subdue the rebellion.
Trenton and Princeton not only renewed and galvanized sup-
port for the war, they also ensured that Washington would be able to
maintain the army, and indeed increase its size. They also convinced
Howe that he could no longer hope to beat the Americans by simply
intimidating them. He had to adjust his overall strategy. Washington’s
triumphs at Trenton and Princeton, while not sufficient for ultimate
victory, were enough to ensure that the fight would continue.
Eighteen months before Trenton and Princeton, while
Washington and his army surrounded Boston, Congress had begun
to consider an invasion of Canada, which would form a vital ele-
ment of the strategy for both sides. Colonial Americans had long
coveted Canada. Indeed, since the French and Indian War (a sepa-
rate North American theater of the larger Seven Years War), many
Americans served in Canada alongside and in the British Army.
They had been impressed by the vast lands, teeming with game and
rich in resources. On June 27, 1775, two months after Lexington
and Concord, Congress directed Philip Schuyler, then a newly
commissioned major general, in charge of the forces in New York,
that if he “finds it practicable,” to seize as much Canadian territory as
possible, “which may have a tendency to promote peace and security
of these Colonies.”30 Congress hoped the French-Canadians would
join their efforts, assuming that British occupation since their defeat
in the French and Indian War had disaffected them. The Americans
also wanted to strike preemptively, since they had heard that General
Sir Guy Carleton, the British governor of Canada, had very few avail-
able troops and was actively recruiting Indians to help put down the
rebellion.31
71
Opening Moves 17
Opening Moves 19
Opening Moves 21
Opening Moves 23
Language: English
RUSSIAN POETS
PUSHKIN, LERMONTOF, NADSON,
NEKRASOF, COUNT A. TOLSTOI, TYOUTCHEF,
MAIKOF, LEBEDEF, FET, K. R., Etc.
BY
JOHN POLLEN, LL.D., T.C.D.
INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE
LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO., Ltᴰ.
1891
(The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved.)
TO
The chief merit the Translator claims for this little effort is
“faithfulness of translation.” He has endeavoured to translate every
word and every thought of the Russian writer, and to avoid additions.
Most of the poems selected for translation are popular, not only
amongst the higher classes of Russian society, but also with the
Russian soldiery and peasantry, who are very fond of poetry, and
amongst whom education has spread, and continues to spread, with
marvellous rapidity.
The Translator trusts that this little volume may not only prove
interesting to ordinary English readers wishing to get a general idea
of Russian poetry, but may also be found of some service to
Englishmen studying Russian, and Russians studying English.
J. POLLEN.
Sebastopol,
March 21, 1891.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
FROM VLADIMIR VLADISLAVLEF.
Rhymes and Reason 1
FROM LERMONTOF.
The Angel 3
The Voyage 5
Prayer 6
Thanksgiving 7
On Death of Pushkin 8
Dream 9
Clouds 11
Prayer 12
How weary! How dreary! 14
Alone I pass along the lonely Road 15
Men and Waves 17
Ballad: The Queen of the Sea 18
The Prophet 21
When—Then 23
My Native Land 24
To —— 26
The Dagger 27
No! not for thee 29
Dispute 30
“Why” 35
Moscow 36
FROM PUSHKIN.
I wander down the noisy Streets 37
Anacreontic 39
To his Wife 40
Let me not lose my Senses, God 41
I’ve overlived Aspirings 43
Peter the Great 44
The Prophet 45
Play, my Kathleen 47
A Monument 48
The Poet 49
FROM NADSON.
Pity the stately Cypress Trees 51
FROM NEKRASOF.
Te Deum 52
The Prophet 54
Offer my Muse a Friendly Hand 55
Dream 56
A Sick Man’s Jealousy 57
The Landlord of Old Times 59
The Russian Soldier 61
FROM MAIKOF.
A Midsummer Night’s Dream 62
Who was He? 64
The Easter Kiss 66
On Lomonossof 67
Propriety 68
The Singer 69
A Little Picture 70
The Alpine Glacier 73
The Mother 74
The Kiss refused 77
The Snowdrop 78
A Smile and a Tear 79
FROM COUNT TOLSTOI.
Believe it not 80
The Scolding 81
FROM VLADIMIR VLADISLAVLEF.
Reflection 82
The Would-be Nun 83
The Schoolboy’s Devil 84
POPULAR SONG.
The Gipsy Maid 87
FROM TYOUCHEF.
Scarce cooled from Midday Heat 89
The Spring Storm 90
FROM PRINCE VYAZEMSKI.
The Troika 91
FROM LEBEDEF.
Theodora 93
FROM H.
The Lie’s Excuse 95
FROM DERJAVIN.
The Stream of Time 96
NATIONAL SONGS.
Marriage 97
The Grain 98
Wedding Gear 99
FROM DOROSHKEVISH.
Sebastopol 101
FROM POLONSKI.
On Skobelef 102
FROM KRYLOF.
Fable—The Swan, the Pike, the Crab 103
CHILD’S SONG.
Little Birdie 105
FROM LAL.
Advice 107
THE TITULAR COUNCILLOR.
The Titulyárnyi Sovétnik 109
FROM K. P.
No! I can ne’er believe 110
To the Poet Maikof 112
FROM SHENSHIN (FET.).
A Russian Scene 113
Tryst 114
FROM PLESHEEF.
Spring 115
Passion 116
FROM E. KYLAEF.
Billows 117
FROM COUNT T.
No Half-measures 118
FROM THE RUSSIAN OF
VLADIMIR VLADISLAVLEF.