History of Indian Philosophy Vol 2 - Frauwallner, Erich

ERICH FRAUWALLNER
t History of Indian Philosophy

t·
VOLUME II
THE l\ATURE-PHILOSOPHlCAL SCHOOLS

AND THE V AlSE$IKA SYSTEM
t '
THE SYSTEM OF THE JAINA
.1'
I
THE MATERIALISM
Translated from original German ittto English

by
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THE TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD vii-x
U. THE PERIOD OF THE SYSTEMS (CONTINUED)
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND
THE VAISE~IKA SYSTEM 3-180
The tradition of the Vai:~e~ika System, its history
and literature 3. The literature of the related sys-
tems, of the Nyaya and the Mimarµsa 5. The place
of the_Vai;e~ika in the frame of Nature-philosophi-
cal schools. The oldest Nature-philosophy. The
Elements and their qualities 11. W0rld-construc-
tion and the living creatures 21. The man. The
body of the man 24. The sense-organs and their
working 27. The soul. The existence of the soul 39.
The constitution of the soul and psychic occurrence.
The psychical organ 43. The old Nature-philosophy
of the Nyaya 47. New Thoughts. The Atom Doc-
trine 53. The atomic-mechanistic world-picture of
the Vai:;qika. The doctrine of movement and the
oldest theory of Causality 5 7. The Invisible (adntam)
63. The remodelling of the Soul-doctrine 67. Space
and Time 72. The emergence of the doctrine of
categories. The oldest three categories 79. The
Realism of the Vai·kl?ika 82. The category of sub-
stance B'.L The category of qualities. The charac-
teristic qualities of the Elements 8 k The common
qualities B'"i. The qualities of the soul. Further
qualities 93. The category of movement 99. Further
categories. Commonness and particularity l 0 I. The
category of inhcrence l ():). Con truvcrsial categories
108. The remodelling of the: old nature-philosophy in
the light of the doctrine of categories. The l ndian
Scholastics and its role in the Vai.:e::;ika 112. Atoms
and aggregates. The doctrine of the whole 11 r>. The
new form of the theory of causality 11 B. 'J.'he doctrine j.A
j i r i.toC, r.-
~:::.~s ~:.·+~s1·!1 . _. __•
( vi
of perception in the light of the doctrine of catego-.

ries 123. The concluding reformulation of the
Vaise;;ika and the work of Prafastapada 133. The de-
generation of Scholastics in Prasastapada's work 135.
The classical Vaise~ika system according to Pra1:as-
tapada. The six categories 141. The substances 143.
The four Elements. The origination and dissolu-
tion of the world 146. The ether, time and space 147.
Soul and psychical organ 150. The qualities in
general 152. The qualities of the Elements, Form,
taste, smell and touch 153. The common qualities.
The number 157. Extension and Separateness 158.
Connection and Separation 159. Distantness and
nearness 163. The qualities of the soul, knowledge,
pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort 165. The
remaining qualities. Heaviness, fiuidi ty and moist-
ness 167. Impulse or Preparedness (sa1.nskara~) 168.
Merit and guilt. The doctrine of deliverance 170.
The sound 170. The category of movement 171. The
commonness 175. The particularity 176. The inhcre-
nce 177. The importance of the Vaise;;ika System 179.
8. THE SYSTEM OF THE JAINA 181-214
The tradition 182. The system of the Jaina according
to UmasviHi and Kundakunda. The five masses of
cxistencel83. The doctrine of categories 188. The
world-construction and world-occurrence 190. The
living creatures 1CJ3. The man, body and the
sense-organs 195. The soul. The theory of knowledge
of the .J aina 199. The doctrine of deliverance 201.
Appreciative estimate of the system of the .Jaina 211.
9. THE MATERIALISM 215-226
The nature of the Indian materialism. Its connection
\\ith the political theory. King Paesi 216. The oldest
materialistic doctrines 219. The Lokriyata system :.!'.l 1.
SUPPLEMENT
1,SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES 22!J-259
2. INDEX 2UlHIU5
3. ERRATA 265
'
t
FOREWORD
The present second volume of my History of Indian Philo-

wphy is perhaps such as is of the least philosophical interest for a
larger circle of readers. Between the bold beginnings of antiqui-
ty and the grand creations of the Buddhist system, the doctrines
of natural philosophy operate like a valley between two eminences
and that is understandable. Only a small modest material is
' available for the consideration of the natural philosophy of the

ancient times. The development after some beautiful beginnings
soon comes to a stop. New consideration& for it do not come up,
as systematic research is missing. So the doctrines become stiff
or lifeless or degenerate into a hollow scholastics. What has been
attained and presented is for the most part primitive and inade-
quate. In a certain measure, Greek philosophy has al:m not been
spared from this fate. But the Indian philosophy in this sphere
has not attained to a level approaching the performance of the
<~reeks.
In spite of these circumstances, I have considered it desir-
able, nay, necessary to deal also with this part of Indian philo-
sophy with a certain follness. Firstly because it deals with one
of the most important and original spheres of Indian philosophy.
As against other philosophical creations, it was forgotten too
<'asily that there were also other directions which did not create a
philosophy out oflonging for Deliverance but which endeavoured
to explain the world in a scientific manner out of pure striving for
philosophical knowledge. And this must lie properly emphasised.
Further these directions in philosophy played historically an
important role. These directions have exercised influence from
different sides. To him who does not know them, much in other
syste1m would remain unintelligible -much that was created now
in contrast, now in union, with other systems. Finally the
Vaise~ika, -the most impl)rtant of the system~ of Nature-philo-
sophy -bronght f'orth with its doctrine of the categories a creation '
which represent~ an important constituent of the thought-wealth
of Indian philosophy. Wick layers of later Indian Philosophy are
formed through the manner ol' thought of the Vai~e~ika and are
viii
dependent on it. They would be as little understo;d without the

know ledge of this system as the scholastics of the Middle Ages
without the philosophy of Aristotle.
By the way, as against Greek philosophy there appears a
beautiful example of the peculiarity or originality of Indian
philosophy. While the Greek philosophy rises up like a dazzling
firework and produces in a short time an abundance of dazz-
ling splendid creations, the Indian development rolls like a
broad stream slowly through the centuries. But while the
doctrine of categories in Aristotle remains a pretty idea, whose
potentialities or possibilities are in no way worked out, in India
it developed to a complete system, which far exceeds the begin-
nings of Aristotle's and in further stretches gets choked up in arid
'Scholastics'. ·
In certain particular respects, I would like to make a few
following remarks regarding the present volume. As far as the
Vaise~ika is concerned, the treatises written on it up to no"~
are based as a rule on the later handbooks. I have, on the othe1
hand, based my presentation on the work of the classical period.
I have tried, above all, to make intelligible the origin of th~
system. Whoever, in the history of Philosophy, is not satisfied
with a collection of mere dry statements but seeks to understanc
the living thoughts and the men who thought them, must need!
go to their origin. The great difficulty in the case of the Vaise~ik<
is that the tradition preserved for us shows only theend ofa Ion~
development. All the foregoing must be inferred. But I hope tha
I have succeeded to show rightly at least the broad lines. A
reconstruction cannot naturally approach in its livingness a1
effective tradition. But an attempt must once be made. Then
remains a very serious lacuna in tradition which must be bridgec
over. l n the matter of the presentation of the Buddhistic system
which will be dealt with in the next volume, the things arc al
ready incomparably favourable.
The description or the Natnro-philosophical system anc
of the development of the Vai :c~ika may perhaps appear some
what detailed. The excuse for it lil~S in the great irnportanc4
vvhich this system had for Indian philosophy in general. Beside
I request the reader to consider that the development, which l
present here, extended over eight centuries. Besid-es, on this occa
IX
Nlon, I would like to remark byway of principle that my treatise

1tltr.mpts to meet at the same time different needs. Nevertheless, ·
i11 order not to tire the reader through excessive prolixity, I have
r11dravoured to present the matter in such a way that the parti- ·
r11lur sections remain understandable, even if the reader skips
ovr.r certain isolated parts which are of less interest to him. For
rx11rnple, I have considered it desirable to give in the beginning
111 c·vcry chapter the sources and the condition of the handed-
down tradition. He, who finds these concise, necessarily dry, sec-
llonH uninteresting, can turn over these pages and immediately
hrJ.{in with the proper presentation. He who wants only the
I >og111atics of the complete system will find it presented in a nut-
Nll!'l I at the end of the particular chapter and he can estimate the
liiHtory of development. The reader can, therefore, seize that ·
which corresponds to his wishes but has also the possibility to
look 11p also the other, if the need be.
The weakest part of this volume is the treatment of the
MyMtcm of theJaina. It lies therein that only parts of the rich
material, though preserved, are published. Besides, the publi-
Nlrr.d material was partially available to me. What I myself possess /
in this sphere is already on a modest scale and the publications
in the libraries in Vienna are more inadequate in this sphere
than in other spheres of Indology. My presentation is, therefore,
proportionately scanty. Further I have restricted myself under
these circumstances to describe the things as they appear to me.
I must remain here solely responsible for its justification. I could
have, no doubt, presented more but it is unsatisfactory to present.
a work when the means to accomplish it fail, as science recognizes
them. I would like to remark that according to my view, there
i11 much scope for further research in the sphere of Jainism, es-
pecially concerning the philosophical contents.
This is all, in the essentials, what was to be remarked in
regard to this volume. As for the rest, what has been said con-
cerning the whole work in the Foreword to the first volume,
holds good also here.
Concerning the reception which the first volume has receiv-
ed, it was gratifying. The evaluations are preponclcratingly
favourable ; adverse judgments have remained entirely sporadic.
Especially individual reviews have occupied themselves with the
x
work so exhaustively and the aim and the performance have been
assessed with such complete understanding that I have heartily
rejoiced at them. I hope this volume also will find the same
approbation.
Finally I would like to thank all my scholarly colleagues
who have helped me by sending the material, especially by
sending the offprints which would, otherwise, have been
difficult for me to obtain or would have been generally inaccessi-
ble. Above all I mention the name of my revered friend Mr. Et.
Lamotte inBelgium, Messrs. H. v. Glasenapp, W. Ruben and
F. Weller in Germany, Messrs P. Demieville, J. Filliozat and
A. Bareau in France, Prof. V. Raghavan and Prof. A. N. Upa-
dhye in India.Prof. Upadhye has often most kindly helped me
with his advice in the difficult constitution of the J aina-works.
-E. Frauwallner
B. THE PERIOD OF THE SYSTEMS
(Continued)
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS
AND THE V AI$E~IKA SYSTEM
In the history of Indian Philosophy, as we have seen in

our presentation in the first volume, two streams of Development
•land out already in the ancient times. The first has its origin in
the Upani?ads of the Vedic period and is characterized by the
doclrine of the world-soul-the Brahma or the Atmii which plays
in it a 1eading role. The doctrine of the Buddha belongs to it.
Out of it arose the first great philosophical system of the classical
time, viz. the Sa:rp.khya which has proved of decisive influence
with a series of its important and original thoughts for the whole
later development. The second stream of development is of the -
nature-philosophical kind to which active interest in the exter-
nal world has given a characteristic stamp. The doctrine of the
world-soul is foreign to it. It, on the contrary, works with a very
old soul-doctrine which assumes numerous individual souls. We
met with this stream of development while describing Epic phi-
losophy. To it belongs the doctrine ofthejina, the greatcontem•
porary of the Buddha. The second great philosophical system of
the classical time-Vaise~ika-owes its rise to it; its doctrine of
categories forms an important part of the Indian Philosophical
thought-treasure. We shall occupy ourselves with this stream of
development and no doubt, it will be the Vaise~ika system, which
on account of its surpassing importance, shall be the centre of
our consideration. However, before we begin with its presenta-
tion itself, we shall also give here, as we have hitherto done, a
short review about its external history and the literature of the
School under consideration.
What concerns the external history of the Vaise~ika,
tradition unanimously names Kar.1ada as the founder of the
system. He belonged to the family of Ka~yapa who was often
also designated under the name ofUluka ('the owl'). His pupil
was supposed to be a certain Pafica:\ikha-a son of the Brahmin
of Banaras. What is reported about both is fully legendary.
What remains, then, is that we know no other well-known rcpre- ,
sentative of the system of the ancient time. We only know that
4 HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
in the early post-Christian centuries, Vaise~ika was one of the

leading philosophical systems besides the Sarµkhya. We heart
there were numerous schools of the Vaise~ika. Only out of the
last period of the classical system, two men are known to us-
whose works are preserved for us. The one is Candramati (or
Maticandra) who belonged to about the fifth century; and the
second is the final systematizer of the school, Prafastapada or
Prafastadeva, sporadically also named Pra:iastakara, who lived
about the second half of the sixth century. With him ends the
history of the living independent system.
Like the information about the external history of the
Vaise~ika, equally scanty is its literature preserved for us. We
possess the old aphorisms of the school : The Vai§e~ikasiltras
of Kal).ii.da1 • Their text or wording is not testified by any old com-
mentary. Nujllerous quotations in the older philosophical litera-
ture testify to a good old kernel. But much old is lost and is also
variously changed; new things have also been interpolated.
Besides, the language, as is generally in the case of the Siitras,
is difficult to understand and its sense often remains disputable.
On that account their worth for the representation of the system
is greatly diminished. An old commentary on the Sutras, is, as
already said, not preserved. Occasionally we hear of a commen-
tary of one Raval).a ( Riivm;iabha,ryam), counted as one of the
older schools. Atreyabhiivam or Atreyatantram is also quoted
in the later Jaina texts; but to which time this certain Atreya
belonged, we do not know. For the .rest, we possess only two
independent works belonging to the later period of the classical
system. The one is the short Da.fapadiirthasiistram ('doctrinal
book of ten categories'), preserved in Chinese translation, of
the above named Candramati. 2 The second is the concluding
short compendium of the classical system, the Padiirthadharma-
smr1grahalt ('the compendium of the qualities of categories') of
Prafastapada, which is also named, on account of its close
connection with the Siltras, as the Pro.Sastapiidabhii:;yam ('the
commentary of Pra:iastapada') which has remained for the
whole future as the authoritative presentation of the classical
Vaise~ika system. 3 On the Prafastapiidabhavam three commen-
taries are preserved from the older time: the oldest and richest
in contents is the Vyomavati of Vyomasiva (about ninth century
71 THE. NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 5
A.I>.).' The second is that of the famous Nyaya teacher Udayana

(•rcond half of the tenth century A.D.) which carries the name
111' h"im¢vali ('The series of rays' ) 5 . The third is the Nyaya-
A1111d11li ('the blossoming plant of logic') of Sridhara6 which
"n:onJing to the author's own testimony was completed in 991
A.D.'
If we shortly summarise the facts as they are, it can be
-1titl that besides the obscure SUtras and the concise handbook
ol ( :a11dramati, we possess only one work of the classical Vaisell!i-
lut Nystcm, namely the work of Prafastapada with its comment-
ll'irR, that is, a work which stands at the end of the whole
tlrvrlopment. It is, therefore, naturally clear that under such
drrnmstances it is difficult to write a real history of the system.
l\N things are, we are, then, thrown on our own resources, viz.
on drawing inferences regarding the earlier stages of develop-
mrn lout of the constituents of the system itself. Still other sources
iilNo come to help and they supplement, though in a modest
mrarnrc, the scanty tradition of the Vaise~ika. In this connec-
tion there must be named the two related systems-the logical
11'11001 of the Nyaya and the ritualistic school of the Mimarµsa.
Of both the systems, the Nyaya originated through the
111ixi11g of a dialectic with a simple natural-philosophical doc-
trine. It, no doubt, stands near the doctrine of the Vaise~ika but
clid not participate in its later development. Therefore, on many
points, it gives a good picture of the natural philosophy of the
ohlcr period. Later on, the Nyaya developed unilaterally the
Theory of Knowledge and Logic and completely neglected
Nature-philosophy. All the nature-philosophical views which
•rrvc as the basis of its knowledge-theory were taken over by it
0111 of the classical Vaise~ika system from which it deviated only
111 unimportant details. In consonance with these facts, the later
Nyiiya hands down only sporadic supplementary features towards
the picture of the classical Vaise~ika. On the other hand, its old
nature-philosophy offers a valuable help in inferring the first
•lrps of the classical system.
Different is the case with the Mimarµsa. It had originally,
in general, nothing to do with philosophy. It was a school which
occupied itself with the Vedic sacrificial ritual and sought, by a
rigorous systematic interpretation, to bring in unison with one
another the plethora of directions in the old Vedic text and to

settle the standing contradictions. There was only one point
which called for a connection with philosophy. For the representa-
tive of the Mimarµsa, the Veda was valid as a permanent
infallible revefation. Now, in the duration of the philosophi-
cal development, the theory of knowledge came to the forefront
and as an account was demanded of each system as to whereon
its doctrines were grounded, the Mimarµsa was compelled to
justify its appeal to the Veda and to demonstrate its perma-
nence and reliability. So one came to be occupied with the
theory of knowledge and other philosophical questions connected
with it. It occurred with such emphasis and success that the
Mimiqna played a remarkable role beside other philosophical
systems in the last period of Indian philosophy of the classical
period. In that process, the Mimarµsa teachers joined, to a great
extent, in the views of the Vai·3e~ika. Its relation to this system,
however, was much more loose than that of the Nyaya. In many
cases they deviated from the interpretations of the Vai~e~ika.
Besides, within the Mimarµsa itself, there were numerous
divergences of opinion. And it could so happen that on any one
point, one did not hold fast to a definite view. Because it was
enough for the Mimarµsa to exhibit the possibilities which were
permissible to defend successfully the basic views of the system
about the permanence and reliability of the Veda. The p hiloso-
phical knowledge had, on the other hand, only secondary
interest. The multiplicity of views or interpretations, which it
produced, forms, already for us, through their . scantiness, a
welcome supplement to the unilateral tradition of the Vai:ie~ika.
Besides, it shows to us the different possibilities as to how one
could consider things. Through them, we learn to understand
and evaluate better and, more rightly, the interpretation in
favour of which the Vai~e~ika decided. We shall, therefore, draw
upon the pertinent doctrines of the Mimarµsa profitably in our
presentation of the classical Vaise~ika. It contributes, indeed, only
little for making accessible the older steps of the development o
the system.
The Nyaya and the Mimarµsa supplement, therefore, the
tradition of the Vaise~ika on many points in a welcome way.
But seen on the whole, what they have to offer is not much and,
7, THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 7.
nl>ovc all, they fail greatly for the older time. If we want to
clrMcribe the origin and the development of the Vaise~ika, we
nrr, therefore, thrown on the constituents of the handed-down
•yMtrrn itself to infer the earlier stages of development in order
to Rain a picture of its history. Thereby we have a support
through the fact that the knowledge of general development
1elvc~ a frame in which we can arrange what can be inferred
Ml11111t the Vaise~ika. Besides, the tradition of Jinism and
lluddhism comes to our help in a certain measure. The relation_
111 hot h these to the Vaise~ika is, no doubt, entirely different from
tl11\t of the Nyaya and the Mima:rµsa. They stand in no direct
rrlation with it. They belong, however, to the same stream of
<lrvrlopment which brought forth the doctrines of nature-philo-
Mc111hy. They, therefore, provide a valuable evidence for the course
ol development in general. It holds especially valid for Jinism.
Already, in the description of the doctrine of the Jina in the first
volume of this treatise, we have emphasised that its doctrine is
lhr~ most important evidence, in the oldest time, for the nature-
11hilosophical stream of development. Because in spite of unsatis-
lilc:tory tradition and defective working out of the preserved
llll\lcrial, it represents the most embracing and copious source
for this stream of development. As it has preserved bulky
11111t1-rial from the older period, we find in it much handed down
1\1111 testified what we can only infer or conjecture for the older
drvr\opment of the Vaise~ika. And so we can supplement, with
It• help, in important points, the picture of that sector of deve-
lopment for which direct evidence fails on the side of the
V 1fr;qika. A similar thing holds good, though in a far restricted
111rasure, in the case of Buddhism. The doctrine of the Buddha
I• based on that stream of development which issues from the
Upani~ads. But later on, as attempts were made to create full
philosophical systems out of the doctrines of Deliverance pro-
l'laimed by the Buddha, the views such as were held in nature-
philosophical schools were very well seized upon to a great
extent. And as this development in Buddhism set in earlier,
nnd as the old sources out of this period are preserved for us, we
11bo find here different things which contribute to the under-
•tanding of the oldest steps of development of the Vaise~ika.
With the help of all these sources, we shall now try to
describe the origin and the development of the Vaise~ika up

to its final form in the classical system. Before we begin with
that, it will be profitable to name the most important representa-
tives and their works of the other schools which we have
mentioned. In the case of Jinism, it is unnecessary, as it finds
its presentation already in this volume. And we have drawn
upon the Buddhistic sources only in an isolated, sporadic manner.
But we must repeatedly refer to the representatives of the
Nyaya and the Mimarp.sa, before we come to describe these
syst!'!ms themselves. Therefore, it is desirable that their names
do not remain unfamiliar to the reader.
What concerns the oldest work of the Nyaya School, the
oldest work is again a Sutra-text, the NyiiyasiltriitJi. 8 In it is
recognizable the origin of the Nyaya through the mixture of
Dialectics and Nature-philosophy, as the two sections stand
out against each other distinctly and are connected only
through easy touching up.
Ak~apiida from the family of Gautama is deemed to be the
author of the Nyiiyasiltras. About his person, nothing is known.
What are reported are simply legends. The oldest commentary
on the Siltras is the work of Pakl?ilasvami of the Vatsyayana
lineage, called the Nyiiyabhiivam ('a detailed commentary on the
Nyaya system') 9 This commentary presumably belongs to the
first half of the fifth century. It explains, in detail, the whole
Sutra text-the dialectic as well as the Nature-philosophical
sections and clarifies not only the wording but also deals exhaus·
tively with all problems, and presents a precious supplement to
the Siltras. The whole future development stems out of it. Con-
sequently we hear of many sub-commentaries: one sub-commen-
tary (bhiivatikii) of one Bhavivikta and another of Aviddha-
kan:1a. But of all these works there is preserved to us only the
Nyaya-viirttikam ('a supplementary commentary on the Nyaya
system') of Udyotakara from the Bharadvaja family, which may
have been written in 650 A.D. 10 With it begins the later deve-
lopment of the Nyaya which emphasises unilaterally the Logic
and Knowledge-Theory and neglects the Nature-philosophy.
Another Nyaya author who is often mentioned but whose works are
lost is Sankarasvami. About 800 A.D., Trilocana wrote his works.
But his works are also lost, though we possess from his pupil
7, THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 9
v.-1caspatimisra a bulky commentary on the N;·aya-viirttikam of

Udyotakara, called .!Vjaya-viirttika-tatparyatikii ('a sub-commen-
tary on the true meaning of Nyayaviirttikam'), called in short the
''J atparyatika'. 11 Vacaspatimisra is one of the most fertile philo-
1ophical writers of the old times. He has written on the different
ayMtems and we have met him already in the description of the
lilcrature of the Sarµkhya and the classical Yoga system. Still
his performance in the sphere of Nyaya may be considered the
111ost important. After Vacaspatimisra are to be named two
Nyiiya authors who did not write commentaries but who dealt
with the transmitted stuff independently: the first of them is
l1iyantabhatta who lived in Kashmir in the second half of the
'Ith century. His Nyayamaiijari ('blossoming inflorescence of
l.oKic',) 12 in which he, taking as his basis some select Sutras,
proceeds with great freedom in the shaping of the material, can
lie held to be the best and the most systematic presentation of
older Nyaya. The second author Bhavasarvajna or Bhasarvajna
f{ivcs in his Nyayasara& ('Kernel of Logic' )1 3 a short presentation
, 11' I he Ny aya under a onesided emphasis on the Theory of Know-
lrdge. His own exhaustive commentary on it, called .!Vjayabh u.ratzam
('the ornament of Logic') is still preserved for us but remains
1111published. The last great representative of the Nyaya of the
older time is Udayana (second half of the tenth century A.D.),
who already meets us as an author of a commentary on Prasas-
lap:1da's Padarthadharma-sarhgrahab. He wrote a commentary
, 111 Vacaspatimi~ra's Tatparyafikii, called the Nyayavarttikatat•
f111~yaparifaddhib ('rectification of the true meaning of the Nyaya-
1'1Zrttika') 14 and many independent works. This is provisionally,
111 a few words, the most important that is to be said about the
rr.presentatives of the old Nyaya. An exhaustive description of
individual authors and their works will be given in the presenta-
tion of the Nyaya.
We are able to get still less material in the case of the
Mimarµsa. In it also the oldest preserved work is a SCttra text,
the Mimat!lsa-Sutras of Jaimini.a The oldest commentary on the
.Vatras is called Mima~nsabhavam ('A detailed commentary on
1hc Mimarµsa system' ). 16 It is the work of a certain Sabarasviimi,
who may have written it in the beginning of the sixth century
A.D. Both Sutras and Bhavam contain little that is philosophi-
10 HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.
cal. But Sabarasvami, where he comes to speak of the Theory

of Knowledge, quotes an old commentary and cites long frag-
ments from it. The author of this old commentary, Vrttil:i ('A
short commentary' ), whom Sabarasvami merely names as the
Vrtti-author ('Vrttikaral:i), deals, in the quoted passages, already
in details, on the questions of the Theory of Knowledge and it is
his explanations on which is built the philosophy of the later
Mimarµsa. The next greatMimarµsa teachers, who have remained
authoritative for later times, write sub-commentaries on the
Blui!yam of Sabarasvami, and by far the largest part on which
they have to say what is philosophical is contained in their
elucidations on the portions quoted by Sabarasvami as out
of the Vrtti. This holds good, above all, in the case of the greatest
of all Mimarµsa teachers, Kumarila (first half of the seventh
century). Of his bulky commentary distributed in three parts
on the work of Sabarasvami, the first is philosophically the most
important-Slokavarttikam ('a supplementary commentary in
verses') devoted predominantly to the clarification of the named
sections. Indeed, the clarified text serves for him as only the
basis on which he gives his own statements. These statements of
his, exceeding by far the explained text, deal broadly with all
pertinent questions and discuss exhaustively the points raised by
the opposing schools. It was Kumarila who gained, by fighting
arguments for the Mimarilsa an equal place beside other great
philosophical systems. He has always remained the most pre-emi-
nent representative of the Mimarµsa. Besides Kumfi.rila is to be
named in the second place, his pupil Prabhiikara, who also com-
mented on the work ofSabarasvami in a long commentary called
Brhati, also called Nibandhanam) .18 He also wrote a short commen-
tary called (Laghvi, also called Vivara1:zam). Prabhii.kara, as against
Kumarila, shows great independence and has achieved impor•
tant things though he does not approach his teacher in his
stature. The third great Mim:i.rµsa teacher of th<.: same time who
entirely goes his own way is Mar;i<Janami~ra. The whole later
Mimarp.sa depends on these three great teachers. Kumarila as
well as Prabhakara have become the heads of respective Schools
which cultivated their own doctrines and explained their works.
Only Mar;ic,lana has not founded his own school. Or the successors
and the commentators of Kumii.rila and Prabhii.kara, we need
only mention here a few. The oldest exponent of Kumarila is

Uq1veka (first half of the eighth century) who wrote ·a commen-.
tary on the Slokaviirttikam. 19 The same works were commented
11pon by Sucarita Mi~ra (about tenth century) in his Kiisikii
(commentary from Banaras) 20 and by Parthasarathimisra {about
the eleventh century) in his NyiiyaratniikaralJ, ('a mine of
Jr!wcls') 21. Of the commentators of the School of Prabhakara is to
lw named, above all, Salikanatha (eighth century A.D.) who not
only commented on the work of Prabhakara but also wrote an
independent work called Prakarar;apancikii ('Elucidation in the
for111 of an independent work') . 22 This work represents for us
the most important source for the doctrines of Prabhakara,
hrt'ausc the works of Prabhakara himself are preserved in frag-
111r11 ts which also have been only partly published. This is all what
wr need provisionally say about the literature of the Mimarµsa.
At the same time, we have concluded what was to be said about
th~ <:~ternal history and literature of the system. We can now go
ovrr to the presentation of the doctrines. But we shall still pre-
l'•n: it with a few general remarks.
The Nature-Philosophical Schools : We have already said that
thr stream ofphilosophicaldevelopment, with which we are now
tlra Iing, is, above all, characterized by two things: the heightened
hlln<·st in the external world and the assumption of numerous
Individual souls. Of these the second point requires to be supple·
mrnted with additional remarks. Though the plurality of the
1011ls is, no doubt, a striking external sign, what gives a decisive
llamp to this stream of development is not this plurality but
thr place which the souls have assumed in it. In the stream of
tlrv1·lopment which issues out of the U pani~ads, the world-soul-
thr /Jrahma or the Atma-represents a world which, being of a
rli llcrent nature, stands different from this world of phenomena.
This world of Brahma is the only important thing. Metaphysi-
l'lllly, it gives the 'ur-ground' for explaining the world and, in
rt hies, represents the highest of go<rl for which striving holds
trood. It is the centre of interest. Entirely different is the position
of the soul in the stream of development with which we are now
1·rn1n:rned. The souls stand on a stage beside the elements as one
oft he factors out of which the world of phenomena is built.
There is no fundamen1'al contrast. Also with the assumption of
the souls is in no way connected the necessity of ethical inferences

or conclusions. This is shown clearly by the fact that there were
also materialistic doctrines which recognized the existence of a
soul. The soul-doctrine serves, in the first place, the explanation
of the world. It forms only a part of what is essential and predo-
minating in this stream of development i.e. of nature-philosophy
which seeks to understand and explain the world out of pure
philosophical striving for knowledge.
This Nature-philosophy appears in different forms and in
different relations with other doctrines. On the one hand, the
recognition of one individual soul rendered possible a union
with the doctrine of Deliverance, however, external or mechani-
cal it may occur-e.g. in the classical Nyaya where simply a
knowledge of the sixteen dialectical categories was explained as
a pre-requisite for Deliverance or in the finished classical
Vai:'.qika, where, in an entirely similar way, Deliverance was
allowed to depend on the knowledge of the six categories with-
out changing, on that account, anything of the system; more
still, in the whole presentation, in general, the aim of Deliverance
could not receive strong importance. On the other hand, light
materialistic doctrines which considered their chief aim as one of
contesting the belief in the beyond and the ethical inferences
arising out of it, could find support in this nature-philosophy.
In fact, the information preserved for us in spite of its scantiness
shows to us the different sub-varieties of such doctrines. As we
have already occasionally remarked, 23 the Indian attempt after
systematization and numerical understanding of things led early
to the fact that the representatives of several doctrines put
together, in well-arranged enumerations, the factors out of which
the external world was formed according to their views. And
such enumerations, at the place itself where they are preserved,
allow us to know well the basic attitude of different doctrines.
Thus we hear of the contemporary of the Buddha-Ajita Kefa-
kambala who recognized only four elements : Earth, Water,
Fire and Air and represented a gross materialism. Another,
Kakuda Katyriyana enumerated as factors of existence, besides
the four elements, Pleasure, Pain and Soul. As his statements and
the acceptance of ideas of Pleasure and Sorrow in the lists show,
his doctrine was materialistic-hedonistic. The series of six elements
7. THE NATURE•PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 13
( dhiitavab) which we find mentioned in oldest Buddhism 24 , clearly

emanated out of pure nature-philosophical circles and recog-
nized besides Earth, Water, Fire and Air, also Space and Know-
Ir( lge, Knowledge taking the place of the soul according to the basic
views of Buddhism. An old enumeration of the Jaina shows a
111ixing with the doctrine ofDeliverance; it allows after the soul
(jiva) and the inanimate ( (ajiva), also the instreaming of Karma
( nsravab ), its warding off (samvarab), its elimination ( nirjarii),
r11tanglement in the circle of existence (bandhab) and the release
(111ok,rn(l). Thus it counts, among the factors ofexistence belonging
lo nature-philosophy, the basic ideas of the Deliverance-doctrine.
The interest in Deliverance com pletelydominates the old nature-
philosophy of the Nyaya which puts forth the following
r1111rneration : the soul ( atma), body (foriram ), senses and organs
( i11dr£yii~1i), the sense-objects (arthiib ), knowledge ( buddhi(t ),
pMychical organ (manab), activity (pravrttib), defects (dofiib},
rn11tinuance after death (pretyabhiiva[1), fruit of works (phalam),
Morrow (du[ikham) and deliverance (apavargab).
If we now ask the question as to what position is held by
the Vaisqika in the frame of these doctrines, we can say that
the classical system knows a doctrine of deliverance. The doctrine
111' deliverance, as we have already mentioned, was introduced into
thr Vaise~ika system externally, without any inner connection

with the rest of the system. As a matter of fact, it shows itself to
he a later supplement which had originally nothing to do with
the system. It was, on the contrary, a purely Nature-philosophy.
With the Vaise~ika we stand before a philosophical system- a
plwnomenon rare in India-which sets before it as its final goal·
not Ueliverance, but the attempt to understand and explain the
phenomenal world. We stand before a system which developed to
I\ considerable height and which therefore merits our attention
in a special measure.
How did this system originate? What was its oldest form?
This question cannot be answered with certitude; we may assume,
as a starting-point, a doctrine similar to the philosophical doc-
trines of the old Epic. Its subject formed, with greater probabi-
lity, the four Elements, Space (iikiifob), and the Soul(Jiva!1), to
which the psychical organ ( mana[1) was added. As regards the for-
mulation of this doctrine, we may think that it is similar to the one
as in the dialogue between Bhrgu and B~aradvaja (See Vol. I).

It embraced presumably the doctrine of the elements, and des-
cribed how the world was constructed out of these elements and
by what beings it was peopled. Above all, it dealt with men with
regard to their bodily and mental constituents. Accordingly, we
shall describe the oldest form of the Vai·~e~ika so far as it can be
inferred from later tradition. I, therefore, begin with the doctrine
of the Elements which occupies a large place in all Nature-phi-
losophical theories.
The Elements and their qualities(gutw:fl) : The natural-philoso-
phical theories know as a rule four Elements: Earth (Prthvi) , Water
(apab), Fire (tejafz) and Air (vayufz). 25 We may assume the same
also for the oldest V ai~e~ika. The elements are characterized by
definite qualities. To earth was ascribed solidity and hardness
(sar,n!{hata[i and kharatvam), to water humidity and fluidity (snehab
and dravatvatn ), to fire heat (u.l'rzata)and to the airmovement{iratza).
But soon there emerged besides this series of qualities, a second
series of qualities which soon pushed itself to the forefront and
finally crowded out the first completely. They were namely the
series of qualities which formed the objects of sense-perception :
form ( r ilpam), taste (rasab ), smell (gandha/:t) , touch (sparfa ft) and
sound ( .fobdaft) •
We have seen (in Vol. I) that form, taste, smell, touch and
sound played a special role in the Indian Deliverance-Doctrine
as objects of sense-perception. Because desires are aroused by
their perception and it is desires which are the chief causes of
the entanglement in the misery of the cycle of births. Especially
the Buddha emphasised repeatedly the fateful influence of the
qualities towards which the desires directed themselves ( kama-
gur;afl ). In his doctrine of Bondage and Deliverance, they assume
an important place. 26 It was now the next step to connect these
qualities with the Elements and it did occur. How it occurred is
characteristic for different doctrines.
If we recall the doctrines which belong to the stream of
development that has its origin in the Upani~ads, they give the
following picture. In the doctrine of the Buddha, the five objects
of sense-perception and the four elements are still unconnected
with one another. In the doctrine of the Epic, however, the con-
nection is already carried through and, no doubt, in the following
7, THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE*IKA 15
wl\y: 27 Form, Taste, Smell and Touch could, without further

l\clo, he ascribed to the four known elements because the form
Wl\11 <'Xplained as the quality of fire, taste as the quality of water,
t hr H11u·ll as the quality of earth, and touch as the quality of air.
Thr Nound created a difficulty because there was no fifth element
which could be its bearer. Now help was sought in such a way
thnl Lhc old idea of world-space ( iikiisaf.t) was seized upon. It
hl\cl already played a role in the doctrines of the Upani~ads and
111 tlw ancient way it was considered as material ; later on, as
Wl\N xi111ilar in the case of the elements, a quality was ascribed
to It-viz., non-hindrance (aniivaratzam) or allowing space ( avakiifa-
tll11nm). It could, therefore, be made, without any hesitation,
thr lwarer of sound. The fact, that in many Upani~adic texts
thrrr s11hsisted a connection between space and quarters and the
•01111d, helped the development. Finally, it was not far to connect
the xound, which penetrates far and wide and recurs in echo
lrt1111 far away, with space. This moved on or occurred on
thr Name step with the other remaining elements. And we have
111 om presentation experienced that we designate it, in the role
111'1 he bearer of sound, not as space but as Ether. Thus was secured
" •rries of five Elements as the bearer of the five objects of sense-
prrl'cplion which corresponded with the five sense-organs. This
1l111'11i11e has found wide dissemination. Above all, it was taken
11vrr l>y the Sarµkhya system and has penetrated everywhere
whrrc the influence of the Sarµkhya reached.
Essentially different was the development among the Schools
of Nature-philosophy. Here also the connection of the first four
qualities (gutziib) with the four Elements offerednodifficulty. But
t lw rnnnection of sound with Space aroused doubts. Finally, the
po"iting of the five Elements corresponding to the five objects of
,r,11Nc-preception and the five sense-organs was a pure schematic-
thron:tic construction. Still, though the parallelism gave an
hnpl"lus towards seeing in the sound the quality of one element
lu•l as in the remaining objects of perception, the sharper con-
1ltlrration such as was peculiar to the nature-philosophical schools
1·0111<1 not escape the conclusion that the sound was, in essential
poi11Ls, of a different kind from the rest. While the rest adhered
t••l lo definite things of matter, the so11rnl now emerged here,
now there and rose again quickly to disappear. So one was in-
duced to decline the acceptance of the fifth element as the bearer

of sound in general. Where they decided to make Space or Ether
as the bearer of sound, a special place remained conceded to it.
A schematic coordination with the remaining elements as in the
Sarµkhya never ensued in the circles of thinkers of these doctrines.
Each one of them came to the following views : The Jaina
could not decide in favour of assuming a special element as the
bearer of sound. On the contrary, they considered the sound as
an independent entity. It was done so far without any scruples,
as, in ancient time, there was an inclination to regard the q'uality
as material. 28 For example, the speech consisted of small parts
which issued out of the mouth of a speaker. So far as the sound
was considered as quality, it was considered as the quality of the
aggregate formed of other elements 29 • The Buddhists also came
to similar ideas, though these appear to have been formed diffe-
rently under the influence of other views. 30
In contrast, the Vaise~ika decided to follow the prototype
of the Sarµkhya and to posit ether as the bearer of sound. For
them, the thought was not foreign that the bearer of a quality
can itself be invisible and must be inferred; e.g.' they thought
that the air is itself not perceptible but is inferred out of the per-
ception of touch. So in the case of sound, one was inclined to
conclude an invisible bearer and to find it in the ether. But as
distinguished from the Sarµkhya, it was made clear that this
bearer according to its constitution must be different from the
other elements. Because the sound can arise everywhere, it was
taught that the ether is unlimited and is everywhere and the
view was pre&ented that because the sound spread on all sides, it
was assumed that the ether was all-penetrating. The ether is,
therefore, different from the other four elements with their special
limitations and impenetrability. This special place of the Ether
was expressed as follows : In the development-stream to which
the SiiqLkhya belongs, the accumulation theory, according to
which qualities were ascribed to the elements31 in rising number
was widespread. According to it, the ether possessed only one
quality viz. the sound, the air the sound and the touch and so on
further, the last being the earth which possesses all the five qualities.
This theory was taken over by the Vaise~ika but they restricted
it to the four traditional elements. It was, therefore, taught that
111 air was ascribed touch, to fire the form and touch, to water,
li1nn, touch and taste and finally to the earth all the four, viz. the
rnicll, taste, form and touch. The sound is only restricted to the
rt her which thus possesses only one quality.
Again, the doctrine of sound gained a somewhat different
•,h;qw in the Mimarpsa. In the Mimarpsa, the dogma that sound is
p('nnanent, held ground and it was unwaveringly and firmly held.
Urcanse it was the basis for the doctrine that the Veda is a per-
1111111cnt Revelation. On this doctrine depends the whole Mimarpsa
which is intended to serve the exclusive purpose of explaining the
V rda. From this dogma of the permanence of sound, it follows
1hat in the clanking of a sound, the sound does not arise at this
moment. But on the contrary, the sound which exists from eterni-
1y is audible temporarily. But as it is now heard here, now there,
it had to be assumed that like its bearer Ether, it also must be
pr1·s1·11t everywhere and all-penetrating. It became, therefore, the
l(Cncral doctrine of the Mima111sa. Indeed, the relation of the
Mound to its bearer suffered again a shift and in the Mimarpsa
School of Kumarila one went so far as to the length of denying
I hr existence of any such bearer in general and of explaining the
K01111rl as an independent entity.
To summarize what has been said : the oldest Element-
doctrine of the Vaise~ika gives a picture which is somewhat as
1!1llows; First of all there are four elements: earth, water, fire and
air, and these are characterized by definite qualities, the earth
hy lirmness, the water by fluidity, the fire by heat, and the
air by mobility. Besides, these elements possess a second series
of qualities which are the objects of sense-perception and which
l>clong to the elements in an ascending manner in a decreasing
number. 'The earth possesses form, taste, smell and touch, the
water possesses form, taste and touch, the fire possesses form
aLHI touch, the wind possesses touch.' 32 The object of the fifth
~ense-sound has ether as the fifth clement as its bearer which only
possesses this one quality. "The remaining qualities are not
rxistent in Ether.":1 3 Though with these propositions the basic
katures of the V ai~e~ika doctrine of the elements have been given,
they, however, did not end therewith. Rather in conjunction with
it, therewas ushered in afurthercomprchensive development. It
was, no doubt, the doctrine of qualities of the Elements which was
built out of it. Thereby, this development took a course in a way

which in different cases always recurs so that they proved typi-
cally valid for Indian philosophy. When new ideas were found
and new ways discovered of which men became conscious, the
discovery was sought to be fully employed. All things of like
sort -everything that was found to behave in the same way- -
were sought to be systematically understood and put together in
a complete enumeration as far as possible. But this insight was not
sharpened enough for new things at first. As one enrolled in a
series involuntarily what appeared to belong together with one
another, and as one rejoiced in the abundance of such a discovery
it might still appear as accumulated together arbitrarily. Then
came the critical reflection. One began to arrange the assembled
things and to prove it. And much or most of it was differently
arranged or separated until finally a satisfactory solution was
found which could hold its ground on the basis of a more
rigorous proof.
The course of development was similar in the case of
the doctrine of the qualities of the elements. Here also, one
sought, first of all, to understand the total qualities of the
clements a~ far as possible and arranged, in so doing, the
most different things with one another, only in order to separate
them later to a great extent by a thorough-going proof. How
motley such an assemblage of the qualities of the elements looked
is well shown by the list of these qualities with which we have
bcell acquainted in the description of the Sa1µkhya systern.'M
Novv the Natural-philosophical schools would not have, indeed,
ennrnerated such a varirgated list. Here, one account of a thorou
ghgoing occupation with the external world, the way of looking
at things appears to have become more pointed so that at least to
a certain extent, the related things were grouped together. In do-
ing so, one collaborated also with what had been chosen as Lhc
starting point of the traditional elements, viz. form, taste, smell,
touch and sound. Then one attempted to define the Jive qualit ics
more exactly, dislinguished their different sub-varieties an<l in-
cluded in them other sub-varieties also which appeared to be in
any way related and belonging to it. Arni thus the unplanned
arbitrariness was at last subjected to certain restriction.
How the lists, which came into existence, appeared. we can
well imagine. We are acquainted with 8Ueh an ancient list, for
: Tim NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 19
. 1C1u11 pie, in the philosophy of the Epic in the dialogue between

lll1rg11 and Bharadvaja. 35 Among the Buddhists and the J ainas,
,v1· ltnd also equally lists which exhibit right ancient features.
l'11t together, they would present approximately the following
picture :
Relatively simple was the enumeration of the sorts of taste
(rrun(!): Mostly, six kinds of taste were assumed: sweet (madhur-
'''), sour ( amlab), saltish ( lavaT)ab), bitter (tiktal;) , pungent
(k11/11(1) and acrid or astringent (ka,1iiyab). Temporary attempts
tu widen the group did not succeed. Some deviations are unim-
11C>rta11 t e.g., the Jainas recognize only five sorts, as they explain
1hr s;dtish as a sub-variety of sweet.
Greater was the vacillation in the case of smell (gandhab ).
l'roplc differentiated, above all, fragrant (surabhift or sugandhaft)
It 11111 obnoxious smell (asurabhift or durgandhafi ). But other
v11ri1· tics were also added such as sweet-smelling ( madhurab),
dl11ki ng (katub), itching (rilk,rn[l), pure ( vifadab) and such others.
/\ pretty motley list was compounded of the kinds of touch
( ,f/w.rab). One distinguished between hot (u}T)ab) and cold
! llt11b), heavy (gurub) and light { laghuM, hard ( kathinab or
41111111{1) and soft (mrdub), raw or crude ( rilk}ab or karkafab) and
~1111101 It or sleek ( snigdhab or Slakn1ab). The Buddhist doctrinal
-yNtl'tll added also hunger (Jighatsii) and thirst (pipiisii).
By far the most manifold was the list of the kinds of form
( rfl/111111). It, first of all, embraced the colours first, no doubt
thr basic ones : white (fuklafl ), black ( km;ab), red (lohitab,
r,,A111{1), blue ( nilab) and yellow (pitab) as also their different
1nlllt11res. Beside~, there appear also under form different kinds.
ol' Hh<1pes: long (dirghab), short (hrasvab), high (unnataft), low
( a111111fltab), gross ( sthillal1), line ( sflk,1ma(1 ), quadrangular
I 1:r1t1m1sraf.t ), round (vrttab), smooth (cikka1.za fl), slippery
(/1i1chilaf.t) and others. Still other entire things were included
111 this list : smoke (dhilma/.l ), cloud (ab/tram), shadow (chiiyii),
clnrkncss (andhakiirab or tamab), hot rays ( iitapa(i), brightness
( (l/11ka(1 or uddyotab).
Finally, concerning the varieties of sound, there was no'
11niliirm comprehension. One either enumerated the seven sounds
nr notes on a gamut or one <list inguished the sounds as stretched
(lutali) , relaxed ( vitatab), settled (ghanab ), hollow (su,1irab)
and rubbing (gharfafJ), each according to the constitution of

the objects, which produced the sounds or the distinction was
based on whether the sound was produced by living beings or
inanimate objects and also whether it dealt with the sounds of
the alphabet or not.
We must also imagine, in a similar way, the list of the qua-
lities of the elements. Their varieties grew further and were
formulated among the Nature-philosophical schools, out of the
circles of thinkers from which the Vaise~ika arose. The further
development followed in the above-mentioned way : things or
properties not belonging together were gradually separated. It
occurred, for example, in the cases in which further reflection
gave rise to the view that one dealt not with the qualities of the
Elements but with phenomenal forms of the Elements themselves.
Of these new and better explanations were attempted. Light or
brightness was explained as an apparent form of fire. It arises,
it was said, when small particles of fire arise from the source of
light. These parts are more loose and are equally distributed
and their palpability or perceptibility is not distinct (anudbhilta-
sparfob) so that they are not perceived. Thus arise circles of light
particles which offer no opposition to the penetration of moving
horlies. 38 The heat ofrays ( iitapa(t) was also similarly explained.
Vapour and clouds were understood as apparent forms of
water. Darkness ( tamali or andhakiirab) and shadow (chayii)
presented greater difliculties.a 7 Shadow could not be explained
as the apparcn l form of a known element. Therefore, one came
to thF popular view of the existence of the shadow as an inde-
pendent element. It was then'fore, first of all, explained as an
independent stuff beside the element. A proof was adduced
that i l moved like a real thing and possessed quality--cspecially
the quality of colour. But it was only a provisional solution.
Gradnally, a conviction dawned 011 the Vai~qika that the
shadow is nothing else than the absence of light. This absence
of light could not naturally move as it is a mere non-existence.
Its movement is only apparent. In fact, the oliject, which
bars the light, moves. Through that appears the absence of
light, i.e. shadow in different places and it arouses the impres-
sion that as if it is itself moving. In a similar way, the colour of
a shadow or darkness, which was considered as dark blue, was
?, '1'111'. NATURE-PliILOSOPltlCAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 21
• 11pl1Li11ed. A non-existence cannot naturally be the bearer of a

111lo11r. And one still believed that he saw the dark colour in
lhri shadow or the darkness. It was, therefore, said that here
1h1•1·r was a transfer or transmission. For that, one referred to
lhc• rxa111ple of the blue colour of the heavens for which the
lnll111vi11g explanation was given :38 It was said that when look-
lftl( at the heavens, the rays of the eye which emanate from the
•'l•'K arc held up 39 by the stronger light-rays and that they are
il11 ••Wll back and return back to the eyes. Through that they
I'' •• d vc Lhc dark colour of the pupil. But when one looks at
th• ~ky, he ascribes the colour to the heavens. A similar trans-
Ii 1 "nee lies, it was thought, in the case of darkness. The dark
• • tl11111· is only ascribed to it; it really does not belong to it. This
"'"' ussion about the nature of darkness continued by the way
1
11 1hr Vai~e~ika until the time of the formulation of the complete
• I, 1Kiral system; in the Mimamsa school of Kumarila, however,
t 111' old view still asserts itself which understands darkness as
"" independent entity.
That may be provisionally enough to show in which
I"'' hs the further development of the doctrine of the qualities
11111ved. ln general, the following can be said with regard to it:
Ilic 1lcscribed development continued for a long time, ex_tend-
. •1{ over a long period. In Buddhism andjainism in which the
, 1. ,, trine of the qualities of the elements early took iirm root,
W• li11d much old material preserved regarding the doctrine
111 the qualities of the elements. The Vai1c~ika shows, on the
11th~r l1and, a much advanced or progressive stage. But it
'' .1d1cd that position only late. In it the doctrine of the qualities
111 the Elements found ils linal form only during the formula-
t 11111 of the doctrine of categories. Therefore, for the present we
•11.111 restrict ourselves to what has been said here. We shall
'' t 11rn to this subject during the description of the categories.
\Vith Lhis whatever most important was to be said about the
il•1clrines of the elements has Leen already said.
The Construction of the World and the Creation of living
~1mtur1s:- The Elements provide the most important building
~• 1111c· out of which the world is built. The origin of the world
upp<'ars to have been thought somewhat like this: 40
As the first one of all the Elements rises the air or the
wind which fills the space. In the air originates water and it
forms a mighty sea. In this sea, the earth forms itself into a
conglomeration. Finally out of the water, likewise, is formed
fire as a gigantic mass. When these four elements originate,
they form together into a world-egg in which the God Brahma
appears and creates the worlds and creatures.
About the construction of the world, we hear little in the
Vai~e!?ika. The mythological interest was here still less than in
the Sarhkhya. Especially the later system of categories-doctrine
had left nothing worth to be said for the same. In the tradi-
tional writings there have been preserved only a few isolated
interpretations. And as the philosophical worth of the phantastic
world-pictures such as were customary in India is in itself so
very little that we shall abstain from putting together these inter-
pretations into a total picture. It is all the more justified from
our point of view, when we have already got acquainted with a
similar world-picture during the presentation of the Sarhkhya
system. Besides we shall return to this topic when we shall
describe Jainism and Buddhism in which the world-construction
and world-occurrence have been delineated especially at length.
It may be enough if we say here that the Vaise!?ika presupposes
a similar world-picture like the Sarµkhya.
More important and m01 e suitable to the natural-scientific
spirit of the system is how one attempted to define more exactly
and restrict the distribution of the Elements in the construction
of the world. Three functions or the Elements were distinguished
so far as they formed the objects, i.e. the external world, the
bodies of living creatures, and 1hc sense-organs. Concerning the
external workl, the earth appears in a threefold form as earth in
the strict sense i.e. loam or clay, as rock and as the plant-world
In contrast to the s~tqikhya, the plants were not enumerated
among living creatures. Of water, different forms were dis-
tinguished; e.g. streams or rivers, sea, snow and hail. The lire is
of four sorts: the earlhly fire in fuel, Lhc heavc11ly fire in the sun,
moon and stars and in lightning. Ful'tlicr, metal was consider-
ed as the phenomenal form of fire. Also the fire in the abdomen
which cooks and dig<'sts food was also cuumerated under lire,
as one did not know to accommodate il in any other eategory.'1
The air exhibits no differenl phenomenal forms. According to
7, THE NATURE•PHILOSOPltICAL SCHOOLS ANO THE VAISE~IKA 23
the Vai8e~ika, it is itself not perceptible. It makes itself perceiv-
able when it moves the leaves or carries the clouds. Under it,
t lie breath was also included-the breath which works in the
body in different ways.
Besides the elements in the construction of the world, it
must be mentioned that people in older times occupied them-
selves with all possible scientific questions, as, for example, the
origin of the seasons. It was allowed to be dropped in the later
system. We hear of them only as isolated, scattered pieces of
information.
With regard to the living creatures which inhabit the
world, the tradition is equally scanty. There are rich sources
available for anthropology .. Beings who people the world are
named as gods, men and animals. There is little interest in the
mythological elements, so that nothing further about the classes
or groups of gods is reported. Only occasionally there is a mention
of eight groups or gods like Brahma and spirits like ghosts (pis-
acJh.). Among animals are distinguished tame and wild animals
( pafavah, and mrgaM , birds (paksir,za[l ), reptiles (saris1piih,) Of men,
there is only one group. Thus there is the same distribution of
beings with which we have been acquainted in the Sfuµkhya. 42
Only plants are mi.ssing, as they have been reckoned by the
Vaise!]ika among the surroundings.
Besides this classification of creatures, there is also in the
Vai£e~ika the popular distribution, according to the kind
of their origin. But it deviates to a great extent from the
Sarpkhya. First, two groups of creatures are disti11guishcd :
such as are born out of the womb ( ronijiih,), and those which are
not so born (a,yonijiib). Gods, many holy seers of the past and
the smallest living creatures such as Jlies, gnats and lice arc
not born out ol' the 111other's womb. or those beings born
out uf lhe mother's wo111b, men ancl tame and wild animals arc
t born out or the outer ski11 of the embryo (jarii)'ujiif1), birds and
reptiles arc born out of an egg (at1¢aj1l.Q). .Further sub-groups
are not recognized.
And now regarding the doctrine of' men, it was worked
out in the most cletaikd way and for the later times it had
great importa11cc. Still in it, the natural-scientific i.e. the
physiological treatment about it was left, in the later times, very
24 HISTORY OF lNDIAN PHlLOSOPH\"
much in the background.

According to the Vaise~ika, man consists of body and
soul. The system does not know of a fine body, from the begin-
ning. It is quite natural. Because the stream of philosophical
•development, to which the Vaise~ika belongs, presupposes, as
we know, a soul-doctrine accordingto which there are a number
of individual souls spatially limited, who are not only the bearers
of knowledge but also of the wishes and human actions. Under
such presuppositions, a psychical organ and a fine body such
as were taught in the Sarµkhya, are superfluous. The soul itself
is the bearer of the mental personality and it is what goes after
death from one body to another and wanders from existence to
existence in the beginningless cycle of births. There is no place
for any other bearer of soul-transmigration.
The Man and his Bo4f'-Thus, in the Vaise~ika, besides
the soul, there stands only the gross body, of which it is said
that it is composed of earth. 43 In this the Vaise~ika differs
from the popular view, which also the Saq1khya follows, accor-
ding to which the human body is constituted out of all the five
elements. But this difference or deviation is proved and justified
in the system in the course of its development.
We, already, meet with those popular views which are already
in the philosophical doctrines of the old Epic, especially in the
dialogue between Bhrgu and Bharadvaja. 44 They are there put
forth at length and justified in details. There, the qualities of
five Elements, viz. allowing space, movement, heat, fluidity and
firmness or solidity serve as the proof. Because all these qualities
are firmly established in the bodies of men, animals as well as
of plants, it follows therefrom that all the clements also must be
present in them. This was the authoritative proof of the doctrine
in the Epic and it has remained so in the later period. This
proof, however, was soon considered weak by the Vaise~ika, as
it was based on a series of the qualities of th'e elements which
very soon fell in the background in the Vaise~ika and as we
shall see later, entirely given up by them. Thus, their ground-
basis had been lost. It, therefore, so happened that the Vaifo~ika
rlecided for another doctrine that 'the human body is formed
only out of earth.
In the Vaise:;;ika, as we have already seen, in place of
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND TltE VAISE~IKA 25
the old series of the qualities of the elements, a second row

stepped in--viz. smell, taste, form and touch which likewise
distributed themselves among all the elements. Now it would
have been possible to infer the existence of all these elements
out of the existence of all these qualities in the human body.
But the Vaise!iika showed, from the earliest times, a disincli-
nation against the assumption of a mixture of elements. It has,
therefore, early taken over the accumulation theory which
ascribes the named qualities to the elements in a mounting or
rising number. And it explains the existence of several such
qualities with the help of this accumulation theory and allows
the mixture to hold good, where the accumulation theory does
not suffice to explain. The existence of smell in the human body
makes it necessary to assume earth as one constituent of the human
body. Thus, however, according to the accumulation theory, the
existence of the remaining elements would also be assumed in
the same way. The assumption of other elements was, therefore,
unnecessary. Therefore, the body was explained as consisting of
earth only. It was granted that there appeared other elements
in the human body. But the body itself, it was taught, was
formed only out of earth. BesiJes, in the course of the further
development of the system, a still more forceful reason to stick
to this doctrine came up. The Vai,ie~ika has, for example, in
later times, created the doctrine of the Atoms, of which
we shall learn in details in the sequel, according to which
all things were formed out of Atoms. Thereby it was taught
that the aggregates, thus formed, are something new, different
from their parts. The qualities of the aggregates originate out
of the qualities of the parts. Bul that presupposes that the
aggregates which thus arise arc formed out of parts of like sort
which possess all the concerned qualities. Because it was
impossible for the heterogeneous or opposite qualities to
produce a uniform or homogeneous constituent. Consequently
it was concludecl in the case or the body that il also 11111st
have been formed oul of homogeneous parts which possess
the same qualities as itself. That is to say, the same qualities
of the element must also belong throughout to i ls parts.
They mu~;l therefore consist of one element and this clement
can be only earth.
26 HlSTORY OF INDIAN PltlLOSOPllY
Regarding the origin of the body and its functions, the Vaise~ika
considerably participates in the views usually customary in Indian
philosophy. Man is begot through the union of father and
mother. From father comes the semen, from mother the blood.
These form together into coagulated matter in the womb of the
mother. Besides, the nourishing juice which streams forth out of
the body of the mother gathers itself. When it is gathered or
assembled enough, there ensues the formation of the embryo
under the influence of the fire in the body of the mother. This
develops itself, through the stages of small knots( arbudab), small
lumps of flesh (miil!lsape.5i), a small ball or globule ( kalalam) '5,
gradually into a body with all its limbs. Nourished by the
juice of nourishment which flows to it through the navel-string,
it grows further on and is finally ripe for birth. With the birth
is the form of man completed; he later on matures into man-
hood, through boyhood and youth. As regards the construction
of the human body, it consists of six limbs : head, trunk, arms,
and legs. Its constituents are sinews, skin, bones, arteries, mus-
cles and ligaments. 46 • The metabolism is carried out in the
following way : Through the human body, there extend a series
of hollow spaces : mouth, heart, throat, the space for undigested
nourishment, the space for digested nourishment and the
openings of the body leading downwards. The food, which is
received, reaches into the space for the undigested food. Then,
chiefly in sleep, it is digested by the digestive fire. In this way
there is gained, out ofit, the sap of nutrition (rasafl) which is car-
ried to the whole body through a net of arteries (na<fyafl). The
sap of nutrition is the basis of life and well-being, of strength
and soundness or health. Out of it are developed serially the
different basic stulfa or the body ( dhiitavab) : Blood, Flesh, Fat,
Bones, Marrow and Semen. 47 Separated matter and resiLlues
of nourishment are emptied as urine and excreta through the
downward openings of the body.
Besilles the metabolism, the activity of the corporeal wiucls
(J1rii11iii1) is ol' special importance. They penetrate, through the
network of arteries, the whole body and operate everywhere in
it. Five winds are distinguished : the out-breath (prat1a{1 ), the
down-or-away-breath (a/;anaf1), the togcther-l>rcath (smniina{t ),
the up-breath (wld11afi) and Lhruugh-urcath ( vyanab). The out-
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 27
breath is the breath which streams. through the mouth and the
nose. The through-breath (vyt1nafl) distributes the sap of nutri-
tion in the various arteries. The together-breath ( samiinafl)
leads it likewise to the different parts of the body. The up-breath
(urlanali) causes its mounting up in certain arteries. The down-
brea th ( apiina}J) finally drives the separated matter out of the
body. In reality, however, there is only one corporeal wind.
The distinction of five winds depends only upon the difference
of activities already described, which, in reality, are the opera-
tions of one corporeal wind.
Finally is to be mentioned the medical doctrine of the
three saps which plays its part occasionally in the Vaisc~ika.
The human body, according to it, contains three juices or saps
( do~alt) 48 : wind( viitab), bile (pittam), phlegm (Slepnt1 or kapha!T)
which have their scat in definite places, above all, in the
vessels (ko~tha(l). On their right distribution and mutual rela-
tion or behaviour depends the health of the body. For instance,
if their relation is disturbed, different illnesses emerge,
according as this or that sap preponderates. Not only, however,
health and disease but also moods and the behaviour of a
man, why, his whole character is determined by the distribution
of these saps (doyii}J) in his body. It is the one widespread doc-
trine which, in ancient times, was pursued from India through
Persia to Greece. And when we speak today still of melancholy
or phlegmatic temperament, it is to be traced to this theory.
Up to this lime, we have described the processes in the
body which go on mainly unconsciously. Essentially greater
was the interest of the system in those processes which lead to
knowledge and consciousness. We shall now, therefore, next turn
to them and begin with the doctrine of the sense-organs.
The Sense-Organs and their Work: In the description of the
ancient period of Indian pliilosopl1y, as we have already seen,
the idea of the sense-organs arose gradually out oft he doctrine
of the <liffcrmt life-forces in the human body. This dcvelop-
meut was <'arrie<l out in the Vedic period and in the period
directly following. In the philosophical texts of the old Epic, it is
alrca<ly co11cludcd. Tlic idea of the sense-organs i~ already
a Jirm idea i11 tlw Epic. The same holds good also for the oldest
form of the Vai~e~ika which l.iclougs to the same stage of <leve-
28 ltISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
lopment. And no doubt it is already a completely definite and

advanced doctrine, a doctrine which forms the basis, which
counts a fixed number of sense-organs and has a clear and
definite idea of their constitution.
The beginnings, which ascertain the number of sense·
organs, are found in the older Upani~ads. ln the time of the
Buddha, we meet with the usual number five, and against the
five sense-organs are juxtaposted the five qualities of things as
objects: for the eye-the form, for the ear-the sound, for the
nose-the smell, for the tongue-the taste, and for the skin-the
touch. The next step was that these five qualities were brought
into connection with the elements. It has occurred in the philo-
sophy of the Epic. Above all, in the dialogue between Manu
and Brhaspati 49 it is fully carried out where the five elements
and the five qualities of the Elements correspond in strong
parallelism to the five sense-organs. The same view has been
further taken over in the oldest Sa:rp.khya.
In the natural-philosophical schools and, above all, in the
Vai\\e~ika, the number five of the sense-organs also holds good.
The strong parallelism effective in its clarity between the
sense-organs, the qualities of the elements and the Elements,
has, as we have already seen in the description of the doctrine
of the elements, influenced them also. The Vaise~ika, therefore,
besides the traditional qualities, held also the fifth viz. ether,
though it was confronted with various scruples. Because, accord-
ing to the natural-scientific attitude of the system, one could
not overlook the fact that ether, as it was assumed, differed in
essential points from the remaining four elements. The same
view-point compelled them, as we shall still see, to assume for
th1: corresponding sense-organ, the car, another constituent as
in the case of the remaining sense-organs. But one put up
with it and held fast to the once assumed number five of the
sense-organs and the Elements. The Vai~e~ika did not parti-
cipate in the attempt lo widen the number or sense-organs,
like the attempt which we have seen in the Sii:rp.khyar,o and which
we shall still sec in the Buddhistic doctrinal systems.
Concerning the constitution of the sense-organs, we have
already seen likewise <luring the description of the Epic phi-
losophy51, how at the moment when men began not only to
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE V.AISEJ?IKA 29
ponder over the nature of the Atman but also to discuss the
surrounding world in a thorough-going manner, the question
arose how the sense-organs are to be arranged, whether they
were to be placed on the side of the Soul or Matter. The choice
was preponderatingly in favour of Matter-especially among the
nature-philosophical schools. One had been too long accustomed
to consider the sense-organs as independent entities, so that
one would hardly enrol them without any distinction under the
rest of the Matter. The Buddhistic doctrinal system in its
own way, derives them out of peculiar sorts of atoms. The
Vaisqika did not go so far. They taught that they were formed
out of the Elements like the remaining things of the surround-
ing world. But a special position was still conceded to them.
That is indicated by the already mentioned classification into
three of the products of the Elements as objects, body and sense-
organs, the sense-organs having been enumerated separa-
tely. But in the Vaise~ika as also in the other schools, the
proper sense-organs or sense-faculties are sharply distinguished
from the gross bodily organs. They are by their nature some-
what of a completely different kind. The bodily organs are
only their carriers.
The relation between the sense-organs and their bearers
(adhi~thiiniini) is as follows: The bearer of smell is the nose, of
taste the tongue, of eyesight the pupil of the eye (krniasiiram),
the bearer of the touch is the skin and the bearer of hearing is
the ear (karizacchidram). Of Lhese smell, taste and touch have
the same extension as their hearers. or touch, it is to be marked
that not only the external skin is the bearer of touch but also
the internal as e. g. when we feel cold inwardly when we drink
cokl water. As we shall still sec, the sight is greater than the
pupil of the eye; it leaves the body in the form of the rays of the
eye. 52 The car consists of the ether which is infinitely great,
But the ether restricts ilself to the body as it is able to perceive
under the influence ( s11'f{lsk1Irab) of the human body.
Now the constitution ol' the sens<'- organs, viz. its composition:
At the momc~ut whc:n it was decided to consider the sense-organs
as products of the Elements, it was the next step lo confront the
five sense-organs with the five elements with their qualities, to
allow every sense-organ to consist of the element, the quality of
which it perceives. It was also the doctrine of the Vai{;qika.

The opinions fluctuated, no doubt, in a certain degree. Partly,
it was taught that every organ consists of only one element.
Partly, it was also held that parts of other elements participated
in mixing with it. But it was said that the one element fully
overwhelms and is not impaired in its work by the remaining. 53
This doctrine thus, nevertheless, had a deeper basis. For instance,
the view was represented that the qualities of the Element which
formed the objects of perception were known only through the
fact, that the same quality exists in the sense-organ, that this
quality in the sense-organ renders possible the knowledge of the
same quality in the object. The necessary inference out of this
was, however, the doctrine that the sense-organs in their essential
constituents must be composed of the like clement \.vith a like
quality as the object which they perceive.
But, indeed, in the case of the Vaise~ika, the doctrine
required a supplement. We have already said in the description
of the doctrine of the elements that the Vai~e~ika had taken
over, in the earlier period, the accumulation theory, according
to which the elements possess qualities in an increasing number,
and that not merely one Element possesses one quality. Rut that
implied that in the elements which form the sense-organs, there
are present, besides their own proper qualities, also other quali-
ties. So the question came up why only one of these qualities
was effective and not the others. W by, e.g. the smell-organ
consisting of earth perceived only the smell and not also the
remaining qualities, as still to the earth belonged all the four
qualities.
As an answer to this question, the VaiO:e~ika introduced a
new idea. It was taught that the characteristic quality of an
elf'mcnt alone is, no doubt, able to permit the manifestation
of this same quality ( vyai?jakatvam). The same quality (gutw) may
also exist in other elrrncnts aml appear in mani!Cstation there
( 1ryai(uatvmn ). But only as the quality of the element for which
it is characteristic, it can bring into manifestation the same
quality in a similar clement or also in any other element. A
good example or this is the form (r upam) which is present
in water or in earth but is able to illuminate other objects and to
make their form visible only in light i.e. in lire, i.e. in its own
7, THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICl\L SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEljIKA 31
proper element. The same holds good also for the sense-organs.
( )11ly in the eye which is essentially formed out of fire, the form
iN .1ble to permit the knowledge of the forms of objects-but not
111 other organs. Accordingly also, in the organ of smell which
i~ d1icfiy made of earth, the characteristic quality of the earth-
1hr. smell is able to perceive the smells of the surrounding world.
I 'aste, form and touch, no doubt, are also present but they are
11111 able to bring perception into effect.
Among all, only the ear takes a special position. 5 ' The special
1111sition lies in the difference which separates the ether and its
'11rnlity the sound from the rest of the elements and their qualities.
The sound is not a permanent quality (gw:ia~) of ether; it arises
'111 I yin a ringing sound. It was also not therefore possible to regard
11 as a permanent quality of the ear. The ear by itself is only
1·ther without its characteristic quality. Further the sound, when.
11111g or clanked, propagates or transmits itself immediately and
1·1·aches the car which is only a part of the infinite ether. It is
perceived in the ear itself. Thus the relations during the per-
•Tplion of sound through the ear are represented. The
quality of the objects will not, as in the case of the remaining
~rnscs, be perceived by the sense-organ with the help of its own
qualities. The sense organ itself, on the contrary, perceives its
own quality which arises in it temporarily. A difference of the
l11rm of sound which brings into manifestation and another
which appears in manifestation, is omitted under these circums-
tances.
This is how the Vai:'.cf?ika imagined the constitution and
the composition of the sense-organs. But how did they think
about their operation? Here was a decisive question which
separated the diflercnt systems from one another and which
was debated for a long ti111c in the liveliest possi hie way-the
question, viz. whether the senses during perception entered into
contact with the objects (priipyakliritvam) or whether perception
was possible without contact. 55 fn the case of the feeling of
touch and taste, there was no doubt. Herc the contact was
evident. Also i11 the case or smell, tlwrc was unanimity that
the perception comes about through the particle:; or fragrance
streaming into the nose. But what is the position with the eyes
and the cars ?
The Buddhistic doctrine, above all, taught that the eye and
ear are able to perceive their objects without contact-especially
the eye. 56 As proof, it was adduced that we can sec distant
objects and objects which are larger than the eye-which would
be impossible in case there was contact. The Vaise~ika asserted
that here also a contact with the objects takes place. In its
favour it was advanced that we cannot see a covered object.
It becomes, then, understandable, when the covering object
prevents the contact between the eyes and the objects. If,
on the other hand, the eye is able to see an object with
which it has no contact, then it is not explicable why the
covering of the objects shall prevent the perception. Likewise,
the dependence of perception on nearness or distantness of
objects is only explained if a contact takes place which is there-
though facilitated or made difficult. Finally, an analogical in-
ference was put forth, viz., that all tools or instruments operate
through direct contact and that this must also hold good in
the case of sense-organs which are the instruments of the
soul.
When one attempted to refute the opponent's objections,
the following theory was put forth. 67 The sense-organ of the
eye is not the pupil in the eye (kNr;,astiram) but fine particles
of fire or light which dwell in the eyeball. During perception
these go forth from the eye in the form of the so-called fine rays
(cakyurasmaya~) and enter into contact with the perceived
object. As a matter of fact, a contact between the sense-organ
and the obj cct thus does take place. As the rays of the eye, after
leaving the eye spread out further like a cone of light, they
are able to perceive the objects which are incomparably greater
than the eye. That the eye-rays are not seen implies no difficul-
ty. The existence of a perceptible quality does, in no way, lead to
the conclusion that it is also perceived. It must, on the contrary,
be existing in a dear, clear-cut form ( udbhilta); e.g., Fire
possesses the qualities of heat and brightness. In the rays of
the sun both are clear-cut and are, therefore, both perceivecl. In
the rays of the lamp, on the other hand, only the brightness is
clear-cut or marked, the warmth remaining concealed. In the
case of the particles of lire which µcnctrate water and heat it,
it is only the heat that is marked; particles of lire are not scrn
in the case of the eye-rays, neither heat nor brightness is
marked and therefore they cannot be perceived but only
inlerred. Only among nocturnal animals, they are occasionally
visible.
The dependence of perception on the distance of the
objects is explained by this doctrine of the eye-rays as the rays
of the eyes come into contact with it and therefore the eye-rays
must travel over the corresponding stretch or extent. That _we
believe to, be perceiving the near and far objects simultane-
ously does not go against it, because it is explained by the error
or illusion which i~ caused by the immense rapidity of the
eye-rays. If the object is covered, the contact of the eye-rays
is cut off and it becomes imperceptible. That we can see
through glass, depends on the special constitution of these
1!1ings which allow the eye-rays to pass through. The same
l hings offer no resistance to the solar rays or the rays of the lamp.
A special constitution of many things explains also certain
pheno:nena such as reflection. 53 The Vai'.ie~ik~ had broken with
the old idea which assumes the existence of a real image on
the surface of the mirror. On the other hand, the Vaise~ika
doctrine teaches that the surface of the mirror, on account of
its clearness, possesses the ability to throw back the rays of the
eyes so that the latter move in the opposite direction and
through them touch the reflected object. The perception, which
the cone of the tip of the eye-rays brings about, is further led
or transferred to the organ of the eye and is brought to cons-
ciousness by the latter. One is deceived by the situation of the
eye and believes that he secs the object in that direction in
which originally the eye-rays moved - i.e. in that distance
which the eye-rays collectively covered. Again one sees the
object from that side on which the eye-rays meet it, i.e. reverse
to its real position.
This doctrine of the eye-rays deserves special consideration
as it offers a good example of natural-scientific interest of the
old Vai,;qika, which has come into currency in the preserved
tradition only in a restricted measure. It finely shows how one
employed the modest observations which he had made and the
explanations were offered which need not shun comparison with
the corresponding doctrines of Greek philosophy.
To the doctrine of seeing and of sense-perception in gene-

ral, remain to be added a few things : For bringing about
perception, not only the operation of the sense-organs is neces-
sary but certain conditions from the side of the object also must
be fulfilled so that it can be perceived. In many cases, the
qualities of the elements and things made out of them are per-
ceptible without much difficulty, in other cases they require aids
from outside. 59 The brightness of light i.e. its form ( riipam) is seen
off-hand. The form of other things is, however, only seen when
it is illuminated or according to the Indian way of expression
it is brought into manifestation ( vyaktib). We have already
touched this idea when we talked about the composition of the
sense organs and have mentioned that a quality, only in that
element for which it is characteristic, possesses the ability to
allow the same quality to appear in other things.
In cases where a quality is perceptible by itself, its percep-
tion is bound up with the presupposition that it is not over-
shadowed ( abhibhaval:z) .60 The light of the lamp is seen, only
when it is not outshone by the sunlight. A sound is only heard
when it is not drowned by a louder sound. But the following
definition or regulation is above all important :
The theory of the elements and of their qualities and the
views about the composition of the surrounding world out of
these elements brought with itselfor implied that behind the com-
position of several things, the existence of definite qualities must
be presupposed. But as a matter of fact, the reality did not too
often agree wtth these claims or demands. In water whose distri-
bution in the atmosphere was supposed to cause the cold of
winter, the cold was quite distinctly experienced but not seen.
The same holds good of the fire which brings about the heat of
summer. In order to circumvent these and similar difficulties a
new idea was introduced : the idea of clear-cutness or marked-
ness ( udbhava!J,) 61 • A quality, when it is supposed to be perceived,
must not only exist but also be marked in a clearcut manner
( udbh ata!J,) . We have already met with this idea in the dcsc1·iption
of the eye-rays, where it was employed to prove the invisibility of
the eye-rays. There we have already cited a few examples.
The Vai~e~ika could not give a more exact clarification of this
idea. They defined it as a special constituent (dharma!1) of the
q11ality of the Element. 62 Still in future, markedness (to become

'1ulhhiUa') was fixed as one of the most important conditions for
the coming into existence of Perception.
A further condition for the perception by the eye is the size
ol' the perceived object. An object, if it is too small, cannot be
perceived. This condition gained special importance especially,
~Ince the Atom Theory was developed ; an important place was
1'ot1<.:eded to it in the system and it was later emphasised. But
1•11tirdy new ideas began gradually to penetrate. Until now, the
'lllalitiesof the Elements were reckoned as objects of Perception.·
Uut the size belongs not to the qualities but to the things. Do
we perceive, therefore, not only the qualities but the things
themselves? It was a far-reaching question which here newly
1·111crged. Were things and qualities perceived necessarily together?
( )r is it possible to perceive the qualities without the objects and
the objects without the qualities ? Why, under which conditions,
in general, is the perception of things possible ?
Thus were raised important questions whose answers presen-
t rd many difficulties to the system and they were bound to
involve it in lively discussion with the opposing Schools. But we
must here break off and postpone the consideration of this clis-
cussion to a later occasion. For here we have reached a point
which lands us into the second great section of the history of
tlw Vaise~ika, the section which is characterized by the formu-
lation of the Doctrine of Categories.
It still remains to describe how the Vai§e~ika thought
Rhout Perception through the ear. Here operated the special
place of the Ether and its quality the sound ( .fabdaf:i) The Bud-
dhist doctrinal system taught that in this case also the perception
took place without contact. On the other hand, the Vai . le~ika
had to assume, according to their basic views, a contact of the
organ with the perceived object. But the conditions at bottom
were here completely different from those in 'seeing'. As we have
already described, the ear-organ is, according to the doctrine
of the Vai~e~ika, a part of the all-penetrating Ether. Therefore,
every movement of the organ is eliminated or out of consideration.
On the other hand, the activity of the organ is also restricted to
the body. This must be assumed because otherwise in the
illimitability of the Ether, it would not be possible to explain
the spatial limits of the ear-perceptions. From the side of the

ear, therefore, the contact cannot be established. Nothing else,
therefore, remains than to assume that the sound reaches the ear.
As a matter of fact, they decided in favour of this assumption.
But though it sounded so simple, it, in reality, was confronted
with many doubts. This will be especially evident, when we
consider the propagation of sound during speech-an interesting
case for the doctrine of knowledge.
About speech, there prevailed ancient ideas as we still find
them preserved in the J aina. According to them, the speech con-
sists of the small parts of the elements which are uttered during
speech and spread themselves from the body in the form of a thun-
dering sound and are able to reach the limits of the world. The
Vai:ie~ika could not naturally reconcile themselves with the doc-
trine of Ether and its quality-the sound and they rejected it.
For them another prototype held valid-the doctrine of speech
as it was worked out amongst the circles of Grammarians. 63
In these circles, it was early known that during speech,
the uttered breath-air is moulded by the instruments of speech
and becomes a word and reaches, in this form, the hearer's ear.
The Vaise!!ika made an allowance for it or accommodated them-
selves to it so far that they took over at least the role of/breath-air
during the speech-process. It was therefore said64 that the breath-
air during speech moves upwards and touches the articulation-
points of speech-instruments. But now it was asserted that
through this contact the sound is produced in ether-the sound
which moves towards the ear of the hearer. The oddness of this
doctrine and its vulnerability to criticism are obvious. But it
will be evident especially if we compare this doctrine with that
of the Mimiirp.sa which is very closely connected with the views
of the Grammarians.
For the Mimarp.sa, there was a completely different starting
point for the formulation of their theory of sound and its percep-
tion, from that of the Vaise~ika. That was, no doubt, due to
their doctrine of the permanence of sound. According to them,
the sound is not an evanescent and spatially limited quality of
the Ether but it is permanent and all-penetrating. One may
consider it as a quality of ether or as a self-standing entity. Its
perception ensues through the fact that this permanent and, in
7. THE NATURE-PHI_LOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEi?IKA 37
general, inaudible sound is temporarily brought into manifestation

und is made audible through that. Corresponding to these
presuppositions, the question of the perception of sound is
represented by the Mirnarµsa in the following way: It is not
rwcessary to clarify how sound produced in one definite place
comes in contact with the ear, because the sound exists everywhere.
The question, on the other hand, was how the one all-pervading
sound, when it is brought into manifestation in a particular place
through any cause or occasion, appears not everywhere but only
resounding in this one place and which processes affect our ears,
so that we believe that we hear it in this particular place.
In order to answer this question, a theory leaning upon
the theory of the grammarians was thus formulatcd. 65 During
Rpecch, breath-air mounts from the abdomen upwards. It hits
the speech-organs and is formed through their openings and
shut tings (saT[lskrtafz). The air thus formed is called sound
( dhvanilz or niidalz) and moves from the mouth of the speaker
through the surrounding unmoved air, until it reaches the ear
of the hearer. It is not itself heard but affects the ear and lends it
the ability to perceive temporarily the permanent sound ( sabdalz)
which it, otherwise, would not be able to hear. That we thus
believe that we are hearing in a particular place the sound in
spite of its omnipresence, depends on the fact that we ascribe to
the ( fobdab) permanent sound the spatial limitations of sound
and remove it to a place where the sound ( dhvanib) thrusts itself
in to our ears. 68
The assumption that the qualities of the temporary sound
( dhvanilz) are ascribed to the permanent sound offered the possi-
bility to circumvent the different difficulties which the perma-
nence of sound presented. By the idea of the one permanent sound
(fabdalz) the differences in the sounds of the different spea-
kers-the difTerenecs in the (high) pitch of sound and its volume
could not be explained. These were now seen to be the qualities of
the temporary sound ( dhvaniM, they being merely carried over
to the permanent sound ( Jabdab) .67 But the greatest advantage
of this whole Mimarµ~a Theory was as follows : it allowed the
origin and propagation of sound (dhvanilz) in the air and not
in Ether and was, therefore, able to explain a series of pheno-
mena which had confronted the Vai~qika as insurmountable
difficulties. If the permanent sound (.fabda fl) is a quality of

Ether, which propagates itself in it, then the weakening of the
permanent sound ( fabdafz) by a wall and other hindrances is hard
to explain. Because, according to the doctrine of the Vai~e~ika,
the ether is all-pervading and is not hindered and held up in any
way by corporeal ( miirtafz) hindrances. The same holds good for
the weakening of the sound which comes distantly from its place
of origin. Under these presuppositions it is also as little explained
as to how a favourable wind facilitates the hearing of a sound,
while the unfavourable one makes it difficult. All this becomes
intelligible easily in the Mimaqdi doctrine of sound ( dhvanift).
Because the breath-air which is the carrier of sound (dhvanib) is
corporeal and can be held up by hindrances. The impulse, which
it gains during speech, becomes gradually weaker, as it moves
through the unmoved air. That it can be furthered or retarded
by the wind is directly evident.
The advantages of the Mimarµsa Theory are obvious and
they enable us to know with full clarity the weakness of the
Vai::e~ika doctrine. But that the Vai~e~ika as nature-philosophy
held fast, in spite of all difficulties, to the doctrine of the Ether as
a bearer of sound to which man had arrived out of pure theoreti-
cal considerations, and that it stuck to the forced explanations68
rather than depart from its theory, is characteristic of the system
and of Indian philosophy in general.
With the description of the sense-organs and their work we
have concluded the theory regarding the body and now come
to what together with the body makes up man, animates his
body and directs it i.e. the Soul.
The Soul :-As we have repeatedly said, the Vaise~ika,
reg.irding the doctrine of the soul, is based on the old popular
views which regarded numerous individual souls as carriers of
life. The starting-point, in all probability, was the belief in a
soul in the form of a small, shadowy nalure i11 the human body,
the soul which is of the size of a thumb (a1igu$/hamiitraf1puru$al:i). 89
It has ils scat in the heart. From there it directs the body, as
the charioteer a chariot. 70 The life depends on it. When it
departs from body, the man dies.
These old views were sooa remo:ielled in the frame of the
philosophical do::trines an:i were ad:ipted to the governing views
and ideas. In place of the shadowy nature of the soul, it was

taught that it is subtle ( silk)ma) and cannot, therefore, be percei-
ved by the sense-organs. But above all, the view regarding the
size of the soul changed, as soon as man tried to gain clearer
views about its collaboration with the body. It was observed
that the perceptions and sensations are possible in all parts of
the body and that the driving force of the soul works itself in all
limbs. It was, therefore, assumed that the soul is as big as or of
the size of the body. The Jainas have continued to stick to this
view and we may suppose it to be the view, in all probability,
ol' the oldest Vaise~ika. The oldest Vai~qika knew a soul of fine
matter, of the size of the body, which is the bearer oflife.
Simultaneously, it is the bearer of the transmigration of the soul
and it represents, in contrast to the perishable body, the per-
manent in man.
The further occupation with the problem of the soul led
lo a further formulation of this oldest soul-doctrine in two direc-
tions. On the one side, one was compelled to prove the existence
of the soul against the opponents' attacks. On the other side, one
investigated thoroughly into the constitution and the working of
the soul.
The existence of the Soul : We have already said in the
beginning that in the Vai~e~ika, the soul does not occupy a
prominent place ; it is only one of the factors besides the rest
out of which the world is built. But when it came to the formu-
lation of the Deliverance-Doctrine, one naturally joined in the
soul-idea and it became the object of attack by the materialistic
schools which denied the reward and retribution of good and
bad deeds in the life beyond. Further, in the course of peculiar
development in Buddhism itself, schools were formed which denied
the existence of the soul and it led to a lively discussion with
reference to their ,heory. In this way the question reg·arding the
existence of the soul had become one of the must dispull'.<l ones.
Thus the Vai::e~ika were induced to take up a position with
regard to this problem.
The basis which was brought in for the existence of the
soul was connected with the old idea that the body resembled a
chariot, which the soul directs as a charioteer. The body is,
therefore, like a tool, from the activity of which one concludes
about somebody who handles it. Now this idea is executed

further in particular details. The in-and-out-breathing of the
body is like the activity of the bellows which presupposes some-
body who activates it. The opening and shutting of eyes resembles
the movements of a wooden machine which somebody sets in
motion. The healing of injuries, ruptures and wounds reminds
one of the repairing done in the case of damages of a house which
a master of the house gets repaired. Especially one invoked the
activity of the sense-organs in this sense. They are, it was said,
tools like other tools which somebody uses. Particularly, they
are the instruments of knowledge. There must, therefore, be a
knower who knows through them. He can be none else than the
Soul. Other considerations were joined to it. It can happen that
one sees and feels simultaneously the same object. While so
doing, one is conscious that it is the same object. Therefore
there must be something which joins the knowledge of both the
sense-organs with each other. And it is the Soul which stands
above all sense-organs. A similar case is found, when an activity
of the sense-organ affects another e.g. seeing affects the organ of
taste and causes secretion of saliva. It proves the existence of a
central factor which connects the activities of the sense-organs
with one another. And this central factor is the Soul. Thus conti-
nually new proofs for the existence of the Soul are enlisted and
that continued during the whole history of the Vaise~ika. As the
Category-Theory was created and the whole system was re-
modelled after it, new proofs based on the category-theory
were put forth and the progress of logic reflects itself in the
different formulations of the proof. And we shall, therefore, in the
course of our treatise find still many more occasions, to return
to this topic later on.
Though the question of the existence of the Soul was
debated in a lively manner, essentially more important and
interesting still was what one wanted to know and to say about
the constitution of the Soul and its working.
The Constitution of the Soul :-As up to now we have already
said, according to the view of the nature-philosophical schools,
the Soul is spatially restricted and numerous individual souls
were assumed. It showed or implied a basic difference as against
the all~pervading world-soul which was taught in the schools
which had their origin in the teachings of the Upani~ads. But

ultimately this difference between the world-soul and individual
soul is only external. Far more important is the difference in
their nature. In our presentation of the doctrine of the world-
soul in the first volume of our work, we have describgd how one
early came to the idea, according to which the world-soul was
considered as something standing high above everything which
is earthly and remaining incomprehensible to our knowledge,
because all earthly definitions do not prove true in its case.71
Entirely different are the individual souls in N-ature-
philosophical Schools. The individual souls belong to this world,
because they are the bearers of all total psychical occurrences.
The doctrine of Yajfiavalkya in the Upani~ads has, no doubt,
characterized the world-soul as the knowing one. But the consis-
tent carrying out of the old ideas in the Sarµkhya had led to
the conclusion that the soul is nothing else than an undefined,
unrestricted spirit. So it was believed that the proper psychical
occurrences occurred to a psychical organism which belonged
to the world of matter. This psychical organism is the bearer of
soul-transmigration and entanglement in this existence and free-
dom from it are conditioned by it. On the other hand, the
nature-philosophical schools taught that the soul itselfis the bearer
of all psychical processes and that, therefore, it itself wanders
in the cycle of births. There is no psychical organism, according
to the nature-philosophical schools.
The constitution of the individual souls determines also
the position which they occupy in the doctrines of nature-philo-
sophical schools. It shows a pronounced earthly character. The
sublimity of the world-soul is lacking in it. It is, therefore, as
we ha Vt:: already said, only one of the faclors, like the elements,
out oT which the pheuomenal world is built. But on account of
this, all the greater importance is attached to it. It is a decisive
factor in men. Among the already cited proofs for the existence
of the soul, this factor comes to be expressed most distinctly. The
body aw.I the sense-organs are mere dead instruments. It is the
soul, on the other hand, who rules over and directs them. Again,
it is the soul as the bearer of all psychical processes and the quali-
ties, wl1ich constitutes the human personality and determines
it in all features in a decisive way. The self-evident importance
which the psychical organism claimed to win in the Sa:rpkhya

and has, in fact, won in Buddhism is something which would
never occur in the frame of the nature-philosophical schools.
Here everything clings to the soul itself and is exclusively
conditioned by it.
These are the essential features which characterize the
general picture of the soul in the Vai~e~ika and in the remaining
nature-philosophical schools. Concerning the constituion of the
soul, there were made two distinctions. The soul, on the one
hand: is the bearer of the entire psychical occurrences. It is
therefore, the knower (jniitii) . Simultaneously, it is also the
director of the body and is that organ which causes the whole
activity of man. It is, therefore, the doer (kartii) also.
The further formulation of the soul-doctrine followed first
of all in this way : one occupied oneself thoroughly with the
soul in its quality as the knower, as he attempted to compre- ·
hend the psychical occurrences more exactly. Thus ensued a stage
in the course of development which we already know. 72 One trie.d
to comprehend, before all other things, all psychical processes in
a comprehensive enumeration. Then an attempt was made to
arrange and simplify the plethora of phenomena; the related
things were joined and those which did not belong together
were separated ·until one finally was able to give a clear and
coordinated picture of all psychical occurrences.
Of the several stages of this development, so little is pre-
served that we cannot follow them in details. But it does not
matter, because the development, as it is already said, is typical.
We have got acquainted with it in the Sa:rpkhya and shall also
fiH<l it in a detailed form in Buddhism. We, therefore, lose no-
thing if we pass lightly, in short, over the development in the
Vai~.qika. Because what is most important is that the conclud-
ing result lies clearly before us. The concluding result shows
that the\' aLqika has understood it better than any other Indian
system to bring clarity and order in the plethora of psychical
occurrences. The total psychical phenomena were summarized
in fairly big groups which organized the psychical phenomena
in a suitable way. These groups are as follows : Knowledge
(budd!tif1), Pleasure (sukham), Pain ( du[rkham), and Desire ( icc!tii)
and Aversion (dve,fab).
7, THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAI·~E~IKA 43
Regarding this arrangement of groups it should be marked

that it does not embrace merely the knowledge-processes, so that
the old description of the soul as the knower turned out to be too
narrow. And as all the groups, in contrast to the creative activity
of the soul, summarized those processes which dealt with the
making up of external impressions, another general designation
for the soul was chosen in its place, viz. the enjoyer or the consumer
(bhoktii) .In particular, of the named groups, the knowledge-faculty
(buddhil;.) which participates in gaining right or false knowledge
embraces all knowledge-processes. The group of pleasure and
pain embraces all feelings and experiences. Desire and aversion
embrace all wills and desires. Thus the total psychical processes
are broadly ordered in a well-arranged manner. No doubt, the
composition of the group gives an impression of its being motley
or variegated. Thus, there appear, for example, in the group of
desire, besides craving, also compassion, passionlessness, intrigue
and dissimulation. But the appropriateness of arrangement in
its elf cannot be denied.
This arrangement and distribution of psychical occurrences
in the Vaise~ika implies a valuable advance in the sphere of
Psychology and represents, especially in comparison with other
systems, a performance which must be recognised. It is parti-
cularly gratifying that the Vai:ie~ika did not, as is unfortunately
the case in India, restrict itself to external or mechanical distri-
bution in columns and classifications but attempted to compre•
hend more precisely the course of psychical processes which led
to new kinds of knowledge and remarkable theories.
Among such is counted the assumption of a psychical
organ, manab. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it must be
emphasised that the psychical organ of the Vai{;qika has nothing
to do with the psychical organs with which we have been
acquainted in the Saiµkhya, though the same word is employed
for naming what in the Sii1pkhya designates a thinking organ
( manal:z). In the psychological organ of the Vai:iesika, know-
ledge-processes play no part. These belong, as already said,
exclusively to the sphere of the soul. The psychical organ, on
the other hand, in the Vai~·c~ika, is, like the sense-organs with
which it is placed on the same level or stage, a mere tool i.e., a
mediating organ. This role explains how one came to the assu•
mption of such an organ. As soon as a doctrine was formulated

to the effect that the soul is of the size of the body, the question
arose as to why all perceptions did not take place at the same
time, although the soul stood in connection with all sense-organs
in the same way. To answer this question, one seized upon the
assumption of a mediating organ which restricts the activity of
the soul to a particular sphere. It was said that the soul did not
enter into connection with the sense-organs directly; it rather
required its own organ. As this organ is small and tiny, the
activity of the soul can only extend always to a small sphere.
This organ, it was further said, lacked the quality of touchab~
lity. It can, therefore, move unhindered everywhere. 73 The
great rapidity of its movement explains the quick alternation of
the knowledge-processes. As a name for this organ which stands
between the soul and the sense-organs, the name of the thinking ·
organ (manaf:z) was chosen, which in other schools, especially
in the Sarµkhya, has its place as a central organ directly over the
sense-organs.
On this occasion, we shall also mention a second doctrine
which presumably belongs to a later period but which best finds
its place here. During the precise consideration of psychical
processes the question ofrecollection or remembrance naturally
arose. How is it possible, it was asked, that things which are
not present but belong to the past, are known? To answer
this question, the following way, which was also followed by
most other systems, was chosen. 74 It was said that every percep-
tion is able to call forth an impression ( sarrzskarafz or bhiivanii) 75
which may be able later to bring forth a similar knowledge.
This impression, according to the Vai{;e~ika doctrine, clings
naturally to the soul itself and not to a psychical organ. This
assumption led on to further conclusions. Such an im-
pression, it was taught, is specially impressive or effective when
it is called forth by an unusually lively perception or by a
perception which one looks forward to with great interest;
further by practice or study, as is the case in learning a craft or
scientific knowledge, similar inpressions strcugthen themselves.
But an irnprc8sion can lose its force, may-be through opposite
pl'n:cptions, through excitement, sorrow, dru11kcnncss or similar
other things. That such an impression finally releases the recoll-
ection at a particular time, can depend on several causes-, that

a man himself tries to remember and muses with exertion, but,
above all, on different sorts of associations.
With the help of all these different assumptions an attempt
was made to sketch the clearest possible picture of all
psychical occurrences. Thereby the assumption of a psychical
organ turned out to be especially of great importance and fixed, in
a far-reaching manner, the features of this picture. Originally the
psychical organ was a mediating organ which brought about
the connection between the soul and the sense-organs. Now its
activity was extended to all psychical processes and the tempo~
rary appearance of particular psychical phenomena with their
operation was proved. When now this, now that recollection is
awakened, now this, now that desire becomes awake and enters
into consciousness, the psychical organ is its cause. But, as the
function of the p3ychical organ consists in directing and restrict-
ing the activity of the soul to a particular point, it follows
from it that every time only one psychical process, especially
only one knowledge is possible; it may be of a compound or
composite nature. When, occasionally, we have an impression
that several perceptions are simultaneous, it depends on an
illusion and on the rapidity with which they follow one another.
As two knowledge-processes cannot stand beside each other,
every new knowledge crowds out the preceding, in order to
make a place again for the following. Thus all psychical occur- -
rences are reduced to a quick succession of individual know-
ledge-processes and one in conjunction with the Buddhist Schools
went so far as to assert that every knowledge-process has the
duration of a moment. When we believe that we are holding
on to a perception or idea longer, it is a succession of homoge-
neous moments of knowledge fl.owing, as it were, in a stream
( dhiravahinyo buddhayal;) which appear to us as a unity errone-
ously, on account of their similarity.
The doctrine of the psychical organ not only made it possi-
ble to prove how man is able to direct his attention always only
on a single psychical process but it also offered a possibility for
the explanation of the rapid change of the psychical occurrences ..
But beyond that it also proved fruitful and drew into its orbit
the explanation of different phenomena. In the period of the
Upani~ads, sleep and dream were explained76 by the fact that

the soul which has, during working state, entered into the sense-
organs with its subtle parts, withdraws itself out of them and
consequently man goes to sleep. When the soul sees the different
sights in the cavity of the heart or in a self-created (dream-)
world, then this appears as a dream. The soul-doctrine of the
Vaise~ika with its presuppositions did not hold to these ideas;
it gave a new explanation. It was said, that the sleep ensues,
when the psychical organ withdraws from the sense-organs and
its connection with the soul is interrupted. When, however, the
impression of an earlier perception is aw:akened in the soul and
consequently lively memory-pictures appear, then a man
dreams. .
From all this we see that the natural-philosophical schools
and especially the Vai'.ie~ika have created a highly developed
psychology; they have, above all, designed or sketched a picture
of the psychical occurrences, which appears to agree with obser-
ved facts and explains them in an illuminating way. We have,
however, so far considered only one side of the psychical occur-
rences, viz. the soul as the knower and the enjoyer. But according
to the doctrine of the nature-philosophical schools the soul is
also a doer and is as much the cause of total human actions and
behaviour. This part of psychical occurrences was also included
in the sphere of consideration.
A distinction, first of all, was made between the conscious
and unconscious actions of men. The first is dependent on the
will and rests upon the desires (icchti) and aversion (dve,rnb).
Under the second category, were understood mere life-expressi-
ons or life-forces which were also traced to the activity of the
soul. Among these expressions of life were counted, above all,
the breath during sleep, as also the first connection of the
psychical organ with the sense-organ after waking, which ensues
involuntarily and causes the first perception. Consequently it is
also to be marked that during the activity of the soul, an impor-
tant role is, as it is directed, played by the psychical organ. It
was taught that every act of the soul is released through its
connection with the psychical organ. Thus is explained the
spatial and temporal limitation of the momentary activity. The
psychical organ, thus, gained an immensely vast field of activity.
Finally in this way, not only all psychical processes but all the
life-forces of men are conditioned, somehow, in general by its
operation. Finally one went so far as to teach that life itself
depends on the connection of the soul with the psychical organ. 77
This is how the doctrine of the soul is presented which develop-
ed itself in the soil of the old nature-philosophy of the Vaise~ika.
But we must at the same time mention that it did not conclude
with this. On the other hand, later on, the Vaise~ika made
important changes in the soul-doctrine. One of the changes was
that infinite bigness was ascribed to the soul instead of spatial
limitation and restriction. These changes belong, however, to the
later stages of development of the system, in which the total world-
picture of the Vaise~ika gained new characteristic features. We
must describe them, therefore, connectedly. Before we go over
to that, we shall enter into another subject, in all conciseness,
which deserves at least a short presentation, viz, the old nature-
philosophy of the Nyaya.
In our attempt to understand the stages of development
of the Vai\,e~ika, we were dependent on inferring what had been
lost and such an attempt can always lay claim to a greater or
less probability for itself. It is, therefore, all the more valuable
that for us, in one case, a nature-philosophical doctrine is fairly
preserved from out of the circle of the old Vaise~ika. That is
also the case with the Nyaya. As we have already said, the
Nyaya system arose through the mixture of a dialectical doctri-
ne with an old nature-philosophy which approximately stands
on the same stage as the oldest Vai~qika. This nature-philoso-
phy is further joined with a Deliverance-doctrine and is round-
ed into a closed unity. In this way, it represents a good example
of an independent doctrine, as we need presuppose such ones in
greater number, before the great systems gained their supremacy
and we arc still intensely reminded of the doctrines which
are preserved for us in the old Epic. As an example, we wish to
set forth one such doctrine in short. 79
The Deliverance-doctrine of the old nature-philosophy of
the Nyaya depends on a simple basic thought which is confided
to us by the teachings of the Epic. The cause of entanglement
of creatures in the cycle of being is false knowledge (rnitlo·ii-
jfiiinam). That consists in the fact that one cherishes false views
about the most important things. e.g., one believes that there is
no soul or regards something, which is not the soul, as soul.
One regards what is sorrowful, perishable and detestable as
joyful, permanent and worth striving for. One does no· more
believe in the force of good and bad works or such like things.
Through this false knowledge, arise desire and aversion and all
the vices connected with them. Under their influence, the creat-
ures act and do good and evil in thought, word and deed. The
base or good action leads as its consequence to birth in a bad
or joyful existence. There is, thus, produced an entanglement
in the sorrow of existence which endures from birth in endless
succession until finally the right knowledge puts an end to the
whole chain of causes. Then "the Deliverance follows, as of
sorrow, birth, action, vices and false knowledge, through the
repeal of the following one, the previous one disappears. "80
Corresponding to this Deliverance-Doctrine, the subjects
for the knowledge of which one is supposed to endeavour, are
enumerated in the following manner: "soul, body, sense-organs,
objects, knowledge, psychical organ, activity or effort, vices,
continuance after death, retribution, sorrow and deliverance
are the subjects of knowledge." 81 Of these, the soul, the body,
sense-organs, objects, knowledge and psychical organ are the
foundation of existence in the cycle of births. Activity or effort,
vices, life after death, retribution, sorrow and deliverance are
the most important ideas of the D~ liverance-Doctrine.
In particular, the following explanations are given:
"Desire, aversion, toiling, joy, sorrow and knowledge are cha-
racteristic of the soul. " 82 "The body ( Jariram) is the bearer of
the activity of a being, of the sense-organs, and of joy and
sorl'OW as the result of its action." 83 "The sense-organs ( indriyfitzi)
are smell, taste, eyes, skin and ear. They are made out of the
Elements." "These are Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ether."
"The qualities of the Earth etc. viz. smell, taste, forms, touches
and sounds are the sense-objects ( arthiib) "; "Buddhi is the same
as Perception and Knowledge." "The sign of the psychical
organ ( manab) consists in the fact that knowledge cannot origin-
ate at the same time. " 84
All this stands in consonance with what we have heard
about the oldest Vai~e~ika and is understandable without more
ado. Still simpler are the explanations of the ideas of the doctrine
of deliverance. Thus it is said, "application or effort (prayatnal;z)
is the operation through speech, knowledge and body." "The
vices are characterized by the fact that they cause application"
(prayatnal;): "Under continuance oflife after death is to be under-
stood rebirth in the cycle of being." "Retribution is brought
about as the result of application or effort and vices." "The
deliverance (finally) consists in full freedom from sorrow. " 85
After these short explanations, there follow detailed discus-
sions which serve as the clarification clearing up different points
and the refutation of opponents' doctrines. The sequence corres-
ponds to the enumeration of the topics of the doctrine given in
the beginning. At the head stands the problem of the soul and,
doubtless, there is here an attempt to prove the existence of the
soul. The proofs brought forward are similar to those made use of
by the Vai~e~ika. The central place of the soul plays a special role,
the soul being the factor.which unites the knowledges of the diffe-
rent sense-organs with one another. 86 The grounds which support
the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul are new. 87 The
mental impulses of a new-born child, which we deduce from its
movements and gestures, depend, it is said, on the memory of
joy and sorrow which the soul has experienced in earlier births.
Also instinctive actions, like the striving of child towards the
mother's breasts, are explained in the same way. So also, the
inborn talent or aptitude, above all, the inborn passions are
considered as the inheritance of earlier births. From all these
arguments, one concluded the existence of a permanent soul
transmigrating in the cycle of births.
About the body, little was said. One satisfied himself with
only saying that the body was composed of the Element earth
and not of all Elements.88 More detailed is the treatment of the
sense-organs. Above all, the perception through the eye with the
help of the eye-rays is thoroughly described. The presentation
corresponds to the doctrine that we have already described, so
that we need not enter into it again,
Then follows the proof of the number of sense-organs. 89
It turns out in the following manner: As the sense-organs
are found in different places of the body, their multiplicity
could be assumed. On the other hand, an extended unity or
wholeness could be extended to all the places of the body; so

the multiplicity of the organs appears doubtful. As a matter of
fact, we find in the older texts a doctrine repeatedly mentioned
that there is only one sense-organ, viz. the skin which stretches
over the whole body and of which the remaining sense-organs
are merely parts. On the other hand, the following should also
be taken into consideration. If there would have been only one
sense-organ, all sense-objects-: forms, sounds, etc.-, would have
been necessarily perceived at the same time. Besides, if the view
be valid that there is only one sense-organ, then one must assume
that only one and the .same organ perceives a part of the sense-
objects through direct touch, others from a distance. But one is
involved in a contradiction. In the last resort, it was demanded
that five sense-objects should have five sense-organs. One cannot
invoke the innumerableness of sense-objects, as the same are of
five kinds. Again finally the sense-organs must be different from
one another from the point of their seat, shape, manner of
working and the kind of mediate knowledge. Besides, every sense-
organ must consist of one element because it knows the special
quality of this element.
Next follows the description of the sense-objects i.e. the
qualities of the Elements. 90 Here is the question which stands in
the forefront, namely the question regarding the distribution of
the qualities among the elements. With regard to it, the same
views hold good as in the full-fl.edged V ai·.Je~ika and they are
formulated in the following way: "Of the qualities smell, taste,
form, touch and sound, the first four upto touch are ascribed to
earth." "To water, fireand wind are allotted the same qualities,
omitting, however, respectively the preceding; to the Ether is
allotted the last namely, the sound." 91 An opponent, however,
raises an objection: "If it be true that some clements possess
several qualities, it cannot be understood why the sense-organs
which are formed out of the elements, perceive only one of the
qualities and not all." It would be, therefore, better to assume
that every element possesses only one quality. If we believe to
have observed many more qualities in many elements, it depends
on the mixture; during the world-creation, as the holy writings
of the Purai;ias describe, every earlier created element enters
with its quality in the following Element. This assumption is
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL AND THE VAISE~IKA 51
contradicted by the fact which is hinted, namely, that the per-

ception of several qualities in the elements is not explained in
this way. Thus, to take only one example, the taste of the earth
is six-fold; that of water, on the other hand, is exclusively sweet.
The quality of the earth can, therefore, not be explained by the
mixing of water. In the case of the elements, therefore, which
possess more qualities, qualities belong to them naturally. If
in spite of it, the sense-organs formed out of the elements are
at any given time only able to perceive one quality-the special
quality of the element concerned, some other explanation must
be sought for it. It consists in the fact that the special quality of
the element concerned is present in the sense-organ in a parti-
cularly clear-cut, marked form and it is therefore able to know
this same quality alone in the object. The question joined along
with it arises as to why the concerned quality in the sense-organ
itself is not perceived. The answer is that this quality in the
sense-organ is shared together in the perception of the object
and cannot itself be perceived. The ear, however, forms an
exception, but as we know, it represents a special case.u2
Especially comprehensive is the following description of
knowledge ( buddhif:i;). 93 At the beginning, there is the justification
of the doctrine of the evanescence of knowledge as against the
Saq1khya which recognized knowledge (buddhil;t) as a psychical or-
gan and regarded it as enduring for some time. 94 As this discussion,
however, does not play a great role, we can skip over that. The
next is the proof that knowledge is a quality of the soul. 95 The
proof is put forth in such a way that one exhausts all possibilities
so that only the proper assumption remains as the only way.
The knowledge can neither be a quality of the sense-objects nor
of the sense-organs because it also continues to remain, though
others arc destroyed. It cannot also be a quality of the psychi-
cal organ. lfit be, then it would cease to be a mediating or5an
between the sense-organs and knowledge and therefore all per-
.ceptions would be simul lancous. In contrast to that, in the
assumption that knowledge (buddhi~z) is the quality of the soul,
this difficulty falls away, because the psychical organ mediating
between the sense-organs and the soul allows only one percep-
tion. Further objections against this assumption are refuted
and finally it is concluded : "Because only this possibility
remains and cited reasons stand the test of rightness, the

knowledge ( buddhi~) is, therefore, the quality of the soul. " 96
Now it is briefly justified why the knowledge ( buddhil;)
has only the duration of a moment. 97 It must be momentary
because the things, which it may comprehend, stay only for a
moment. Despite the fact that a man is able to distinguish only
indistinctly the forms through the fleeting m{iminations of
lightning, the knowledge, in spite of its being momentary, is
not indistinct because the homogeneous moments of knowledge
can connect themselves with one another and render a
distinct knowledge possible, just as the continually renewing
flame of a lamp shows the illuminated objects distinctly.
Lastly, the special composition of knowledge as the quality
of the soul in contrast to the quality of the body is described. 98
There are three points on which both differ from one another.
The qualities of the body are like the qualities of the Elements
in general, somewhat of an enduring nature and stick to the
body as long as it stays, while knowledge originates only tem-
porarily and again vanishes. Further, the knowledge ( buddhi[l)
penetrates through the whole body because feelings or sensa 9
tions emerge forth in the whole body and in all its parts. Were
it to be a quality of the body and of all its parts, there would
have been produced a plurality of knowledges and conscious-
nesses. Besides, the knowledge distinguishes itself from the
qualities of the body through the fact that the qualities of the
body, so far as they are perceptible, are perceived only through
the external senses, while knowledge is brought into conscious-
ness with the help of the psychical organ.
In conclusion, there is a short description of the psychical
organ. 99 It is proved why there is only one psychical organ in
the bodies of men. The psychical organ had been assumed, as
we have heard, 100 in order to explain how at any given time only
one knowledge can emerge. Along with it, however, it is presup-
posed that it has the unity and smallness. It was therefore,
explained : The psychical organ is one, because knowledges are
not simultaneous. It is tiny and small for the same reason
already given. 101 This also found opposition from the opponents
who asserted that as many activities of a· man are possible at
one and the same time and as the psychical organ mediates in
the working of the soul, there must follow a plurality of psychi-

cal organs. But this objection is refuted by the argument that
the apparent simultaneity of these activities is only an illusion,
which depends on the rapid succession of the same, just as a
rapidly swung or revolved torch appears as a circle of fire.
I
With this, the description of the subjects of old nature-
philosophy are concluded and there follows the discussion of
the doctrine of Deliverance. This is, however, essentially con-
cise and contains little that is remarkable102 so that it can
remain unconsidered. What has been already said is, however,
quite enough in order to give sufficient idea of the old nature-
philosophy and of the old doctrines of the same stream of deve-
lopment. We shall, therefore, allow the matter to rest there and
proceed to describe the further development of the Vaise17ika
itself.
The old nature-philosophy of the Vai5e17ika which we have
already described forms a compact unity and could be easily
rounded, as the last section of nature-philosophy of the Nyaya
has shown, into a self-sufficient system through the connection
with a Deliverance-doctrine. The Vai:lei?ika, however, did not
remain stagnated. It included, in course of time, new important
subjects in its orbit of consideration. Why, it worked out new
valuable points of view which made larger parts of its teaching
appear in quite a new light. We shall now occupy ourselves
with these innovations.
One of the most important doctrines which thus found
entrance into the system is the Atomic Doctrine. What led to
its formulation, escapes our knowledge. Because it falls in a
period for which the sources are denied to us. As firm starting-
points fail, it is idle to make presumptions. In a later period we
find lhc thoughl-process as follows. 103 "When a man divides
something, the division goes on until it reaches the atom. It
is spoken of as an atom (paramlitJult i.e. extremely small),
because the succession of continually smaller and smaller things
during the division has an end, as, at last, there is nothing
smaller. If we divide, for example, a lump of earth into its
parts, the part following in our division becomes continually
smaller. When the succession of continually smaller and smaller
parts has an end, as there is nothing smaller, we name it the
atom. If the division of parts would continue endlessly, it would

follow that the motes or dust-particles in the sun would be un-
measurable as regards their number, extension and weight. It
would be impossible to say: so great is a mote or a particle of
dust in the sunlight, so much is its weight and so many are the
atoms which form a mote in the sun through their union.
Why ! As for instance the Himalaya consists of an accumulation
of numerous atoms and according to the number, extension and
the weight, is unmeasurable, so also is the case of the particles
of dust in the sun, on account of the endlessness of division.''
The proof of the atom rested on the supposition that the divi-
sion of matter must have a limit. Whatever similar or other
thought-processes there might have been, which have led to the
formulation of the Atom-doctrine, the fact at any rate is that the
Vai'.e~ika represented in fairly early times the view that the
elements consist of atoms i.e. the smallest parts which cannot be
further divided, and that out of these atoms, the world of matter
was built. It holds good for the old traditional elements : earth,
fire and wind or air. The ether (iikafa) assumes a special posi-
tion, water, as usual.
This doctrine, as it soon found wide dissemination, met,
however, a lively opposition or contradiction. The attack of the
opponent was based, above all, on the contrast between part-
lessness or indivisibility on which the theoretical idea of the
atom rested and the extension which its practical application
absolutely demanded. It was shown, for example, that it was
impossible for the formation of an aggregate to take place, if
the atoms arepartless or indivisible. It was said, for example, 10' :
"During a simultaneous connection with six atoms from all six
sides, there arises a , six-partness of the atom, because in the
place of one atom, there can be no other. If, on the other hand,
the place of one atom be simultaneously the place of all six,
then all would be in one place and the entire aggregate would
only be of the size of one atom, because one would not extend
beyond the other. No aggregate would then be seen." Or it was
said : "What is organized according to parts of space, cannot
be a unity. One is the eastern space-part of the atom, another
is the western, others the northern, the southerly, the upward,
the downward space-parts. How can the atom which is composed
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAI{El?IKA 5~
of these parts, when an organization according to space-parts

is present, form a unity? If, on the other hand, in the case of
single atoms, there is no organization according to space, how
is it seen that during the entry of the sun's rays, there is on one
side a shadow and on the other, light? Because it has still no
other part into which the light could not come in. How can an
obstruction of one atom by the other take place, if no organiza-
tion according to space-parts is assumed ? Because the atom
has still no other part, the one, when it moves thither, would
knock against the resistance of the other. If the atom knocks
against no resistance, then, as we have already said, all atoms
would assume the same place and every accumulation would
have only the size of one atom."
It was difficult to meet these attacks. An attempt was made
to meet them in a different way but it did not bear any clear
result. For the most difficult task viz., the bridging over of the
gulf between the partless atoms and the gross things composed
out of them during the formation of aggregates, the Vai:",e9ika
later made use of the idea of the 'Schematik' or the scheme of
the Category-Doctrine. We shall come to describe it during the
presentation of the Category-Doctrine. 105 Still, in this way, a
real solution was not available and the artificial sophistry was
scarcely satisfying.
But the significance of the Atom-doctrine in the Vai~el?ika
lies not so much in the theoretical discussion of the atom-idea
as in its practical application in the formulation of the World-
picture. As we have already -said, the atom-doctrine quickly got
a wide circulation. Besides the Vai{;qika and the Nyaya, the
Jaina and the most important Buddhist Schools are familiar
with it and it found acceptance in the S~rpkhya towards the
end of the classical period. It was respectively remodelled
according to the views of the system concerned and was for-
mula tcd in such a way as to suit them. Now it is important
that this formulation in the Vai:'.e~ika ensued in an entirely
definite sense and, no doubt, in such a way that it can scarcely
be a matter of chance; but we need regard it as a definite way of
consideration which expresses itscli' therein. According to the
Vai~e9ika doctrine the atoms are infinitely small and according
to the exact expression used for them, they are globula1 (pari-
mantf,alab). By shape or form they are all alike. They possess

definite qualities-the characteristic qualities of the respective
elements and these qualities are permanent and unchangeable.
There is, no doubt, one exception. Of the earth-atoms, it was
taught that they could change their qualities under the influence
of heat and they named the new qualities as generated through
cooking or heating (pakajab). As the most frequent example,
they cited the change which clay undergoes during the baking
of a pot. But it appears here that a concession was made which
one was compelled to make as he knew no other alternative to
help him. It is, in any case, remarkable that there were two
different views inside the school on this point. According to
one the change is undergone by the qualities of the atoms into
which the pot is dissolved during the temporary baking.
According to the other view, the change ensues in the pot as
a whole. I hold the view which is not unlikely that in the
second view, an attempt is to be seen to remove the change at
least out of the sphere of the atoms, an attempt which was given
up by the orthodox schools because it went against the different
basic tenets of the system. 106 In any case, this deals with a sporadic
exception, as otherwise the basic view of the unchangeability
of the atom was strongly held. Where, otherwise, changes in the
elements appeared to exhibit themselves, e.g. during the heating
of water, they were explained through the mixture of the ele-
ments, as when the fire atoms penetrated in the water.
This doctrine that the atoms are permanent and fixed and
unchangeable in their qualities is of the greatest importance.
Because the Atom-doctrine provided for the VaEe~ika of that
time, who created it, an entirely definite comprehension of the
world-occurrence. According to it, the whole world of appear·
a nee is built out of the permanent and unchangeable cnnsti-.
tuents to which it is again reduced. For the Vaisqika holding
the Atom-doctrine, there is no origin and destruction through
continual change and transformation of a permanent Ur-matter
as in the Sii:rpkhya, no appearance and disappearance of fleeting
and perishable things as in the most important Buddbistic
Schools. In the Vai~c::;ika, on the contrary, the whole world-
occurrence is a play of the imperishable atoms which conglo-
merate and again separate but themselves remain permane11t.
This view is so consistently maintained that there can be no

chance or doubt about it. 107 We may, therefore, assume, although
in the preserved works, it is not more or less clearly expressed,
lhat in the old Vaise~ika, the atom-doctrine served for designing
a world-picture, which traced all origin and end back to the
movement of permanent, unchangeable atoms, which was, there-
fore, dominated by a pure, mechanistic interpretation.
That shows also that we here in the V ai:'.e~ika and for
lhat matter, no doubt, in the whole sphere of Indian Philosophy
find a thorough preoccupation with the problems of a mecha-
nistic view. This view dealt with a whole series of pertinent
questions and it is subsumed and dealt with as a doctrine of
movement (karma). One tried to ascertain what causes a move-
ment (karma), how it runs its course and attempted to explain
the different nature-processes in this way. No doubt, one came
lo the following ideas in their essentials:
The movement is, as a rule, called forth by an impulse
( nodanam) or a stroke ( abhighiitalz) . Such an impulse can be
dii:ectly but also indirectly effective. The propagation of move-
ment was also known. When a body is set in motion by an impulse,
an impetus( vega~) is thereby communicated to it, which keeps it
further in motion. This impetus can gradually relax. Otherwise,
the movement finds its end, when it impinges against a resistance
i.e. when the moving body hits against another. In this case, a
back-movement can ensue, because the swing or the impetus is
given in the opposite direction. As the first cause of a movement
there comes into consideration the heaviness (gurutvam )when the
hindrances working against it fall away. The flowing of water is
traced back to its fluidity (dravatvam). It, therefore, appears
among the causes of movement. In many cases, a movement
also can be caused by the influence of the soul. It is here seen
distinctly how the old nature-philosophy of the souls and their
work is dealt with on the same level with the other factors of
the surrounding world. In consequence, the most different life-
processcs in human bodies arc included in the doctrine of the
movement, above all, in the working of the psychical organ. It is
also to be marked that one, when an occasion arises, reckoned
with the co-operation of many more causes.
One or two examples will explain how things present
themselves under such a view-point to the representatives of

the Vaise~ika; e.g. when an arrow is discharged, first of all the
impulse of the string calls forth a motion, during the flying
(with a jerk) of the arrow from the bow. This movement begets,
on its part, a swing or a flight which either keeps the movement
going until it gradually vanishes and the arrow falls to the earth
through its own heaviness. 108 When a man pounds rice in the
mortar with a pestle, in order to unhusk it, the following pro-
cess occurs : A movement originates in the hand under the
influence of the soul. This movement of the hand communicates
itself to the pestle which it holds and raises it as far as one
wishes. A new influence of the soul causes the falling down of
the hand and of the pestle, by which a swing is called forth in
it. As the pestle now rebounds on the floor-mortar, this impact
together with the swing dwelling in the pestle causes the move-
ment of the pestle in the opposite direction which the hand
also follows. In this, neither the movement in the hand is
caused by the influence of the soul, nor the movement of the
pestle by the hand but both are simply called forth by the
impact. In a similar way, further movement runs its course. 109
In order to gain a survey of the different processes of move-
ment and their causes, an attempt was made to arrange them
according to their bearers-the elements and the psychical
organ. 110 The heaviness as cause falls away in the case of the
fire, the fluidity in the case of the wind, stroke and thrust in
the case of the psychical organ. 111 In this connection, the expla-
nation of different nature-processes was classified, Thus e.g.,
the absorption of water by the sun's rays was explained through
a connection with the wind, the thunder through the knocking
together and separation of water in the clouds. 112 Some may
occur to us as self-intelligible and superfluous when a movement
of thr grass or herbs is traced back to the contact with the
wind. 11 ~ Still we must consider in this case that the wind accor-
ding to the Vai:';qika is not perceptible but is only inferred. An
independent group is formed by the processes in the human
body. We have already dealt with these while describing man
in the presentation of the old Nature-philosophy. It will suffice,
here, to hint that the processes are placed also in this frame.
Besides the doctrine of the movement, the Vaise~ika of
that. time further created a Theory of Causality which is, no

doubt, simple but deserves a short mention in this connection.
Corresponding to the theory which allows all things to originate
through the connection of the atoms, a distinction was made
between two kinds of causes: the atoms were considered as cause •
positive (karm;iam) and everything that contributes to the conne-
cting together of the atoms as an occasional cause (nimittam) ; e.g.,
the clay out of which the pot is formed is the positive cause in
the production of the pot. The potter and his tools are the
occasional causes ( nimittam) • The positive cause corresponds to
the material cause of the Sarµkhya. Thus, one was well conscious
of the fundamental difference of views between the Sarµkhya
and his own doctrine. The causality theory of the Sarµkhya, accor-
ding to which everything originates through the transformation
of permanent Ur-matter, was designated as the doctrine of trans-
formation (pari~ziimavadaf:z), while the Vai·3e~ika doctrine, which
allowed all things to come out of the meeting together of the
atoms, was called the doctrine of composition or synthesis
(arambhavadaf:z ).
Regarding the Causality-Theory, the following should be
marked. Outside theVai;e~ika, one was accustomed to posit the
decisive cause ( Siidhakatama[t) which lets out the effect directly,
in order to distinguish it from other causes. In a similar way the
Vai·ie~ika also distinguished between dependent (sapek~a) and
independent (nirapek5a) causes, that is to say, such causes (sapek~a)
which require the cooperation of other causes for producing forth
the effect, and such others ( nirapek,w) which entail or derive the
effect directly. Finally, it is to be mentioned that space and time
were counted among occasional causes (nimittam), as general
presuppositions of every occurrence. 11 4
If we now sum up all that we have said about the Atom-
doctrine, the doctrine of movement and the theory of causality,
a mighty picture of the world in a uniform view unfolds itself in
its broad features. In our presentation of the Sarµkhya we have
seen115 that it summarized the idea of a world-occurrence in a
compact picture-the picture of the one Ur-matter which, itself
permanent and imperishable, allows the world to arise out of
its elf through continual transformation in a thousand forms, and to
return to itself. Now we meet, in the Vaise~ika, a picture similarly
viewed on a larger scale but a picture of an entirely different sort.

The prime cause of all the phenomenal world is not the Ur-matter
but the permanent, unchangeable atoms. There is no change of
matter, no arising and reverting to its fine, incomprehensible
• Ur-form. Only the law of mechanics is supreme. Every occur-
rence depends upon movement, on impulse and counter-impulse,
which are caused by permanent nature-forces. Also every visible
rise or appearace and disappearance go back to it. It is the
movement which brings the atoms together and allows the
things to originate. It is again the movement which breaks the
holding together of the united atoms and destroys things. Here
is, therefore, developed a uniform, great thought and has been
carried to its conclusion to explain the total phenomenal world.
And this explanation stands equal in rank beside the great
attempt of the Sarµkhya to explain the world.
We, therefore, see that the Indian nature-philosophy did
not restrict itself to giving an explanation of nature sporadically
and to erect a few thought-processes and further formulate them.
On the contrary, it has advanced in the Vai~e~ika towards designing
a uniform grand world-picture by a consistent logical working
out of thoughts. In this world-picture which seeks to explain the
total phenomenal world on the atomistic-mechanistic found-
ations, they have succeeded in bringing forth a creation which
need not shun comparison with the system of Greek Atomism.
With this atomistic-mechanistic world-picture, the Vaise-
~ika reached the peak of its development. But it did not remain
and stop at this point. The change of the times led to new
thoughts which crowded out the old world-picture, so that it is
reflected in the tradition more indistinctly and must be inferred
through research. This change is now conditioned by the gene-
ral development-process. To the Indian mind, the pure natural
scientific attempt at knowledge is not enough in the long run.
The r~~ligious talent or aptitude and the overwhelming drive for
Deliverance penetrated gradually into the circle of the Vage.
~ika and drew it in to the stream of developmcn t. This dcvc lop-
ment led finally to the acceptance of the Deliverance-doctrine
and of a belief in the highest God, in the system. Above all one
idea entered early into the Vaisqika, where it worked like a
foreign body and disturbed the compact edifice of the old
nature-philosophy. The idea was as follows :

In the presentation of the Sarµkhya we have seen118 that
in the course of development, a period was reached in which the
question arose as to what force brought forth the world-occur-
rence, what impels the Ur-mattar to bring forth out of itself the
phenomenal world. As the souls in the Sari:tkhya were held to
be completely inactive, the prime cause could not be sought in
them. The reply which was given on this question was ancient
and unsatisfactory. One did not know to say anything else but
that the Ur-matter worked of itself ( svabhiivatab) and this was
elucidated by analogy instead of by argument. The same ques-
tion must have confronted all other systems which knew no
first cause, when they offered something like a belief in a higher
God and it was quite natural that they did not rest content
with the solution of the Sirµkhya and sought for a better answer.
One such answer was now, in fact, found and that answer agreed
with the predominating inclination or direction of the mind so
much that it found the widest circulation. The answer ran as
follows:
The force which keeps the world-occurrence in process is the
good and bad actions of men. The beliefin the good and bad actions
of men is very old. We have seen that it already emerges in the
Upani~ads. 117 It was taught thatthe actions fixed the fate of crea-
ture in the cycle of being or transmigration. How one thought of
its effect sporadically, we have already been acquainted in the
example of the Yoga system.11 8 This idea of the force of actions
widened itself beyond its original sphere and extended to the whole
world occurrence. It was said that, as the action individually
fixes the fate of the individual, so the works of all creatures
together determine the world-occurrence on a large scale. They
occasion the origin of the world, fix its constituents, and create
as necessary presuppositions the frame in which an individual
accomplishes his works and enjoys their fruit.
A difficulty which had not been thought of, had, indeed,
in the time of the Upani~ads, to be solved with regard to the
doctrine of actions. It had to be explained, how good and bad
works of men could produce effect at a much later time, when
they themselves had long perished. The solution of the difficulty
which was attempted was different. We shall get to know,
before all, one such interesting attempt to resolve this· difficulty

in the Buddhistic systems. In the development-stream to which
the Vai:'.e~ika belonged, the assumption held good to the effect
that the works first of all call forth an invisible force which was
named, in short, 'the invisible' (adr,rfam) and that this latter
produces the effects later. This force embodies itself each time
according to the constituents of the work and merit ( dharmab)
as well as demerit ( adharma!1) and operates favourably or unfav-
ourably accordingly.
The idea to trace the whole world-occurrence to the driving
force of action or work corresponded entirely with the tendency
which ruled Indian philosophy to the greatest extent. We have
repeatedly emphasised that it was determined largely by the
striving after Deliverance. It saw in the fate of men and of all
other creatures a painful wandering through the cycle of births,
directed by the moral power of works and saw the last end of
human endeavour, to which it wasdesired to point out the way,
in the deliverance out of the sorrowful entanglement in births. It
was, therefore, alluring to conceive, with this aim, the whole
surrounding world as one created and called forth by the same
force, a stage on which this occurrence was enacted. And a doc-
trine which represented it and explained the whole world with
a uniform point of view, was bound to be of the greatest success.
This doctrine of works or actions as a cosmic force found
widest circulation and its effect was so enduring that it found
entry where it need not have,-why-and where its entry was
confronted with difficulties. The Jaina system offers the most
striking example. It had already early formulated its doctrine
of the works or actions in an entirely definite form and the view
was presented that through the good and bad works of men, fine
matter streamed into the soul and entailed its further entangle-
ment in the cycle of being. 119 One could not well explain this
matter as the driving force which keeps the entire world-occur-
rence going. On the other hand, one did not wish to renounce
that cosmic force which was of such importance for world-expla-
nation in other systems. And so two independent entities were
assumed under the names of merit (dharma(1), demerit or guilt
(adharmal;) : merit which causes a driving movement and cl en writ
which hinders a movement and brings it to rest. Both these entities
have lost their connection or relevance to the good and base

actions of men and with it also their ethical character as this
place in the system was filled up by another doctrine. They
became pure nature-forces and on;y lheir name reminds us still
of its descent or origin.
Any such remodelling of the doctrine of the cosmical
power of works was not necessary in the Vaise~ika. It was
simply assumed that the good and bad works of men as merit
and guilt bring forth the Invisible ( adNtam) and it was taught
that this not only determines the fate of souls in the cycle of
being but that it also works like a nature-force on the world-
occurrence. It could be added to the system without much ad'.>
and created no further difficulties. The doubtfulness, however,
lay in the fact that with it was introduced, into the system,
something which contradicted its original spirit.
In particular, the doctrine of the working of the Invisible
(adr5tam) looked thus : The Invisible determines the course of
soul's transmigration because it brings to end a life when old
actions are exhausted and bring forth a new life corresponding
to the works done in between. It influences further the course
of every life; it does not abrogate the natural causes but it
influences in a definite way ( niyamaka&) and directs to such
paths as are demanded by the works or deeds of the beings
concerned. When for example, a man's senses are damaged,
if he is blind or deaf~ the Invisible is the cause of it. It also
works in individual processes. When knowledge ( buddhib) fails,
when a man doubts or errs, its cause lies in the Invisible. 120.
Even where there is no question of the retribution of good or
bad works, where no other cause could be stated, it was ulti-
mately seen as the effect of the Invisible. Thus one traced back
all unconscious life-forces-falling asleep, breathing in sleep,
dreaming-to its influence121 -Furthcr as far as the Invisible
is concerned as a cosmic power it causes in the beginning of
every world-period the moyement and gathering together of
atoms which leads to the origin of the world. It is named as the
cause of all these processes in nature, of which explanation was
not known. Thus it concerns the flaming upward of fire, the
sideward movement of the wind, the movement of iron towards
the magnet, etc. 122 It was finally said, "Every other pro-
cess in the great elements for which no c~use can be pointed

out through perception or through inference is caused by the
Invisible." 1 23
Therein lies the rub, the dubiousness. With the doctrine
that the Invisible provides the impulse to the origin of the
world, an intrinsically foreign element was introduced into the
old nature-philosophical system; it was taken out from the
religious-moral sphere and there by broke through the fundam-
ental attempt to explain the phenomenal world from natural
causes. This step had two immediate results : Where no reason
could be discovered for a phenomenon, resort was had to the
convenient explanation through the Invisible ( adNta) which
was no explanation at all and one became accustomed to the
renouncement of a penetrating explanation of things. This
extinction of the natural-scientific spirit was one of the causes
which made the system later grow stiff in the scholastics of the
Categories-Doctrine.
Still that is the item to which we shall again return.
Here we wish to deal with the other effect of the doctrine of
the lnvisible-especially on the sphere of the Soul-doctrine. On
this occasion, we shall give expression to the other important
changes through which the soul-doctrine of the Vai~eJ?ika passed
during this period.
The Transformation of the Doctrine of the Soul : The manner
of the Vaise~ika, with which we shall always continually meet
during our consideration of the system, namely, to think out
every assumption clearly and consistently and to shape it in
consonance with the presuppositions of the system, brought with
it the fact that they attempted to formulate clear ideas about
the nature of the Invisible (adnta) and its effects.124 Thereby,
they came to the following result. To see an independent
entity in it, as the J ainas did, one was confronted with a difficul-
ty that the system did not recognize independent entities which
arc created outofcauses and are again later destroyed. It could
not be permanent, because otherwise it was bound to always
operate. The same difficulty still remained, even though an atom
or a psychical organ would be made its bearer, as the qualities
of the Atom arc permanent. Because one did not desire it to be
considered as a precedent, the exception was conceded unwill-
I
ingly in the case of the Earth-atom changing under the influence

or Fire. The next alternative assumption remained, namely, that
Lhe Invisible clings to the soul. In fact, it was this alternative
which was assumed-namely, to connect it with the personality
by the force of actions-the personality which has done the works
and must bear its consequences. But this assumption led to fur-
ther consequences.
When this Invisible ( adr.rta) was looked upon as a cosmic
force which worked on the total world-occurrence in the most
diverse ways, it meant that its operation can affect any place in
the world. But now, the assumption of influencing from a distance
or from afar went against the strict materialistic-mechanistic
way of thought of the older Vaise~ika. On the contrary, every
influence was explained by direct contact. We have seen how,
for example, in the doctrine of perception, the Vai::e~ika held
stubbornly to the view that the sense-organs .operate through
direct contact (priipyakiiritvam) . In the case of the Invisible, the
same point of view was firmly adhered to. As a result, one was
bound to explain, if not the Invisible itself, at least, its bearer,
as ubiquitous or omnipresent. One was, therefore, compelled to
give up the old doctrine of the restricted size of the soul and
assume it as infinitely great. 125 According to my view, it was
the starting-point for the radical remodelling of the soul-doctrine
in the Vai·ie~ika, which ensued about this time. Thus, in essen-
tials, the conclusions were drawn out of the presupposition of
the system but partly also they might have been determined by
the prototype of the soul-doctrine in the Vedanta and the
Saiµkhya. 126
On account of this, therefore, the following doctrine was
arrived at: The soul possesses infinite dimensions or size (parama-
mahattvam), that is to say, it is unlimited or as it is there expressed,
formless (amii.rtafl). Therefore it is all-penetrating (vibhufl), and
omnipresent ( sarvagataf;,). It also exists there where other things
are; it is, as it is said, in the same place like all things connected
with it (sarvasarriy1gi-samiinadefafl). It follows further from this
that it cannot be impenetrable and offers no resistance to other
things. They, therefore, spoke of the fineness or subtleness
( saukfmyam )of the soul. This expression is, indeed, only occasional-
ly used. It appears to have been used rather unwillingly, as it was
connected in other systems with other ideas. Also otherwise in

the Vaise~ika, one was accustomed to derive the impenetrability
of things from the quality of touchability (sparfa[z). The want
of this quality was enough in the case of the soul, in order to
prove that it offers no resistance to the existence of other things
in the same place. Further, the soul is not composed of isolated
parts. The position is logical and consistent. Because the con-
struction of the elements out of the atoms presupposes their
(-of the atoms-) impenetrability. 127 From the lack of parts one
seems to have inferred the partlessness of the soul. As it
appeared to stand in contradiction with the spatial extension,
the Vaise~ika did not fight shy of asserting that the soul stands
outside the conditions of space. 128
Thus there began to be sketched gradually quite a new
picture of the soul. Hitherto, according to the teaching of the
system, the many wandering and active souls together with the
elements had built or formed the world. They operated on the
same level with them with the exception that the difference of
their nature from the elements preponderated. Now the perma-
nent all-penetrating souls stood out against the elements with the
restless multiplicity of their atoms as something completely hetero-
geneous. The essential difference between the two began to
make itself valid and was expressed, in particular, continually
more and more.
The next obvious inference which arose out of the valid
consideration that the soul was infinitely great concerned the
transmigration of the souls. The souls of infinite size cannot
naturally migrate from one body to another, as they are every-
where. On what, then, depends the embodiment of the soul
and how does transition ensue from one body to another ? For
answering these questions, the Vai~qika held to the prototype
of the $"irp.khya; because the Siirpkhya also in the beginning
regarded soul as of infinite size and had the same question to
answer. Jn the Siirpkhya, the bearer of soul-transmigration was
the psychical organism. 129 It causes the entanglement of the
soul and contributes, through its migration from one body to ano-
ther, to rebirth. These ideas were seized upon by theVai-.'.:e~ika,
because they, on tlH"ir part, made the psychical organ (m1waf1)
as the bearer of ~he migration of the soul. In this context the
Sruµkhya had found it necessary to assume a body of fine stuff as a

1n1pport for the psychical organ in its transmigrations. Of course,
opinions were, no doubt, divided on it. Partly it was held by some
that this fine body endures throughout the whole world-period;
partly it was held by others that it originates after death and
111ediates only the transmission from one body to another. The
Vai~qika followed the prototype of this particular view and
taught that after death, a transmitting body (ativahikafariram)
111akes possible the transition of the psychical organ from one
Ludy to another.
But it was not only this obvious external inference that
was drawn out of the change in the soul-idea. With the consis-
tency of thought peculiar to the Vaise~ika, an advance was
made towards the fundamental general problem and the
11uestion was raised, how under these pre-suppositions, in
general, an activity of the soul is conceivable. As we know, it was
one of the essential features of the soul-doctrine in the old
Nature-philosophy that the soul was regarded as actively ef-
ficient. But how can any such activity be thought of, in the case
of a soul of infinite size? On account of its mechanistic manner
of thought, the Vaise~ika was inclined to understand every
activity as movement, that is, no doubt, as change of place. Any
such thing is not possible in the case of the infinitely gre.at things.
It was, therefore, taught that limitedness ( murtatvam) of a
thing is the presupposition of movement. That was why, as we
have already seen, the transmigration of the soul was no more
allowed to be valid. But not every activity of the soul was
thought as change of place. The activity which a man had
before his eyes, when he spoke of the doership (doing activity)
(kartrtvam) of the soul, was its role as director of the body and
the organs. And this could not be interpreted simply as change
of place. Another sort of movement viz. Atom-movement, was
known as a kind of vibration or swinging (parispanda&). Any
such movement was thinkable in the case of a soul of a limited
size consisting of parts. And thus the activity of the soul could
be thought of~ in so far as it sets the body and organs in move-
ment. This idea, as a matter of fact, has been held to be valid.
We can prove it at least in the case of the Jaina, 1"11 and it may
also be presupposed, in my view, in the older Vaisqika also. But
in the case of an omnipresent, fine, · partless soul, as was just

assumed, this sort of movement was excluded. Under these circu-
mstances, how should one comprehend the activity of the soul?
As an answer to this question, there stand at our disposal
two circles of thought of that time. The first was developed by
the representatives of the science of Grammar, which in India
had attained high blossoming very early and had with their
thoughts begun to penetrate into philosophy, while the
Grammarians on their side seized the philosophical ideas,
employed them in their sense and developed them further.
According to them, the subject of every occurrence is a doer
( kartii). For example, the Mimaiµsa teacher Kumarila could
say1 31 : "Activity for us is not merely the movement of the atoms
as for the adherents of the Vaise~ika. By the doer (kartii) not
only one activity is accomplished-activity which inheres in
them132 • Activity is, on the contrary, what the root of a verb ex-
presses. Doership (kartrtvam) can also consist, when somebody is
the bearer of the activity. In the activities of existence, know-
ledge etc., the soul itself is directly the doer. During the move-
ment of the elements it is also the doer so far as it causes the same
(adhi~thiinata(l)". Such thought-processes lay far from the Vai-
se~ika; they belonged to the thought-complex which had no in-
terest for the Vaisqika. The Vaise~ika found useful suggestions
in the second circle of thoughts which considered doership ( kar-
trtvam) from the moral point of view and sought to fix it in the
sense of responsibility in a moral action. This was, for example,
the case in Buddhist Schools. They saw, in action, the decisive
factor of the will and taught that the moral action of man con-
sists of will and actions depending on it. 133 In a similar way,
the Vaise~ika interpreted the activity of the soul as the will-
impulse which leads to action, as it sets in movement the body
and organs. This will impulse was called by them as effort
(prayatna(z).
Thus was found a form of activity which was different
from movement and which could be ascribed to the soul of in-
finitely great size without much ado. As a matter of fact, it is
quite right when the Mimaiµsa teacher MaQ<;lanami:\ra in consi-
deration of this doctrine says that there arc two sorts of activity:
Atom-movement (parispanda(l} and effort (prayatnaft ). 134 The
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEl[!IKA 69
representatives of the Vaise~ika with regard to the old thought-

habit of the School which joined every kind of activity with the
idea of movement, preferred, indeed, to describe effort (prayatnab)
not as any activity but allowed this expression to occur in general,
when it concerned the soul and therefore explained effort
(prayatna~) as a condition or a quality of the soul. Thus it was
moved back to the same level as that of the remaining conditions
of the soul-knowledge, feelings and desires. Then also these were
consistently looked upon not as processes but as conditions or
qualities. So the old doubleness or duality in the comprehension
of the soul, as knowing and doing, vanished and only a great
uniform unitary group of the qualities of the soul was recognized.
With this we have in no way described all the changes
which the soul-doctrine of the Vaise~ika underwent in the part
of the period we have dealt with. It must yet be mentioned that
the comprehension of the mentioned group of qualities of the
soul in their totality underwent a shift which was as follows:
Until now the view had held good that every soul possesses
qualities. This view confronted no difficulties so long as the
soul was regarded as limited and restricted to the body. When,
on the other hand, the souls were considered as omnipresent,
consistently the question would arise, whether the same would
hold good for the qualities also, whether they also were omni-
present. Nothing remained except answering the question in the
negative. Because all qualities which were known- the know-
ledge-processes as well as feelings were considered only in the
sphere of the body and it is therefore hardly possible to assume
them outside the same. Consequently, it was taught that the
qualities of the soul emerge restricted in a place. 185 (pradefavr-
ttitvam). But this doctrine reacted back on the idea of the
relation of the qualities to the soul. The connection between
4t both was loosened therethrough and they appear no more as
"f absolutely belonging together. This impression was besides
strengthened still by the following circumstances :From antiquity,
the view was helrl. that the qualities or conditions of th<" soul
are not enduring, that they, on the contrary, change rapidly. 18'
This view was further held strongly. Even it was more sharply
worked out and, no doubt, under Buddhist influcnce.1s7 Accord-
ing to the Buddhist teaching the doctrine ha<l been considered
that things, which are perishable by nature, must vanish imme-

diately; they need not wait for an external impulse and it is
therefore not considered why they should not pass away imme-
diately. The Vaise~ika had a8~imilated this interpretation and
had come to assert that the qualities of the soul which are
transitory by nature have only a duration of a moment ( k.>aJJi-
katvam). Thus the qualities of the wul are held to be limited
not only spatially but also temporally limited to the shortest
period. On account of that, they were bound to appear as some-
thing external beside the omnipresent, permanent soul-someth-
ing that does not belong to its nature. And at bottom, they play
no other role than that of the psychical organism in the Sa:rµ-
khya as fully different from the Soul. But that means that they
are not the qualities which determine the nature of the indivi-
dual souls and give them a special character-an interpretation to
which one, in the case of the older soul-doctrine, could be easily
inclined. They have rather nothing to do with the nature of the
soul itself.
With this, the individual soul in the Vaise~ika completely
lost its individuality. Earlier it had been said: The Sarpkhya
doctrine runs as follows: "The souls are not different; difference
lies, on the contrary, in the objects, the body, the sense-organs
and mind and their temporary causes." The Vaise~ika, on the
other hand, taught that the souls are characterized by their
qualities. " 13 8 Therefore, the essential feature of the system had
been regarded as lying in the individual definiteness of the souls
through their qualities. Now it was said : "The nature of the
soul is free from all qualities."t:l9 In this way, the soul-idea of
the Vai~e~ika approximated towards the Atma-idea of the
U pani~ads. This becomes particularly evident, when we consider
the condition of the Released, as it is represented by the doc-
trine of Deliverance taken over later in the system. According
to it, the Deliverance consists in the cancellation of the
embodiment; it follows through the fact that the psychical
organ which is the bearer of the soul's transmigration and which
forms the foundation of all psychical processes, enters into no
new body and suspends its activity for the soul. Therewith also
vanish all the qualities of the permanent, omniprc.~ent soul which
now remains free from all limitations, calm and unchanged,
\.
untouched by all material things. It reminds us involuntarily

of the descriptions of the Brahma as we find it in the Upani-
ads.140 Thereby, in the condition of Deliverance, there is no
consciousness, as with the vanishing of the qualities of the soul,
the knowledge also ceases. That agrees with the doctrine of
Yajiiavalkya in the U pani~ad;;, according to which there remains
no consciousness after death. 1 '1
Thus it was gradually a completely new picture of the
souls that arose. While earlier, the souls were considered beside
the elements as a fundamental homogeneous factor in the construc-
t ion of the world of phenomena, they were now recognized as
something essentially different. In place of the body-sized souls
wandering in the cycle of births, there emerged the idea of their
infinite size and permanent immovability. And through the fact
that the qualities had lost their firm connection with the souls
and had become like something accidental and external, the
picture of the soul gained a feature of undefinedness and incom-
prehensibility which is reminiscent of the soul-doctrine of the
Upani~ads.
In spite of it, however, a fundamental difference continued
to remain and the development in the Vaise~ika leads to no
complete assimilation with the soul-doctrine as depicted in the
other great stream of development of Indian philosophy. After
all, the decisive last step was not taken by the Vaise~ika. The world
of souls did not become the only sphere which, as in the Sarµkhya,
would have been placed in juxtaposition, and of equal value
with the world of matter or would have become a decisive factor
of explaining the world. The similarity with the doctrine of the
soul of the Upani~ads is, finally, only outward. In reality, there
lies a chasm between the attributelessness of the souls in the
Vaisqika inferred from bald logical considerations and of the
Brahma against which all earthly definitions fail. On the one side
there is the rationalistic vacuum ; on the other side there is the
mystic incomprehensibility and inexhausLibility. The Indians
were consciom of this contrast. The oppcmenls of the Vai:ie~ika
had marked the-· contrast with a sharp eye anll had brought to
the forefront the dcathlikestilfocss in the condition of the Delive-
rance as foun:l in the Vaisc.!ika. So the Buddhists flung the
contemptuous verse at the adherents of Vai~qika : "Rather I
.-
f111 t '' • J.to 9
,. _.,...., ..,_ FfJ,_/t_,
72
I
HISTORY OF INDIAN PH;ILOSOPHY
/
would like to be born in the charming Jaitavana as a jackal
than get Deliverance in accordance with the Vaise~ika."142
Space and Time-In conjunction with the described changes
in the Soul-doctrine, we shall deal with still two new ideas which
were taken into the system about the same time-the ideas of
space (Dik) and Time (Kiilal:z). The mere fact that these in and
by themselves were included in the orbit of consideration would
deserve no detailed treatment. But the manner in which it occur-
red is so characteristic that it is worthwhile entering into it
somewhat more closely. Because it is a good example, which
indicates with unusual distinctness, how a philosophically gifted
people like the Indians felt it hard to work through to pure gene-
ral ideas, how tenaciously the once cherished old ideas and
thought-processes asserted themselves and how much trouble and
detour it cost them to reach a uniformly satisfactory result. 143
The idea of space (iikiiJa) is very old in Indian philosophy.
It appears already in the Vedic texts, above all, in the Upani~ads
and is counted as one of the Nature-forces with "Which one conti-
nually reckoned. The doctrine of space has undergone a special
formulation : during the ccnfrcntation of the rracrccosm and the
microcosm, the space in the heart has become the counterpart of
the world-space and we have seen how this idea was employed
in an original way in the doctrine ofdreams. 144 Partly, the space
( iikii!a) was even placed in connection with the Brahma and was
explained as the spring of all things.145 But, in general, this
thought did not turn out to be fruitful. One remained stuck
up in the start which was not further utilized. A new develop-
ment ushered itself when the space was made the bearer of sound
and was enrolled as Ether among the Elements. We have already
spoken about it and need not speak about it again. 146 In this
enrolment, it gained a special place. As it was assumed to be
unlimited and all-penetrating, it appeared as something of quite
a different kind from the remaining limited and impenetrable
fixed Elements. This its special place remained enduring and was
rather strengthened. This was, no doubt, the case during the intro-
duction of the Atom-doctrine. That doctrine remained restricted
to the four remaining clements and was not extended to space. Thus
there was produced a fundamental distinction between the ether
and the remaining Elements. But that did not alter the fact
\
\
that it had, as a bearer of sound, become an Element and could

not play, besides, the entirely different sort of the role of space.
In this way, there was created a lacuna in the system. This
lacuna was especially felt in comparison with other systems like
those of older Buddhism and the J aina where it had retained its
original character as space ( akiisa), and as such was reckoned
not only in the list of factors of existence but it also assumed
its place, otherwise, in the presentation of the systems. There-
fore, one was compelled to fill up this lacuna.
It is characteristic that with this aim in view, the idea of
pure space was not juxtaposed against Ether but an old traditional
idea was seized upon involuntarily, namely the idea of the
quarters or directions ( di.fafz). In the Vedic period, we find Time
and Space and almost more frequently than these we find ideas
closely related to them and graphically employed. Thus in the
speculation of the sacrificial priest, there appear, besides the
Time as a cosmic power, year and seasons, months and days. So
also besides the space there appear the quarters : East, South,
West, North, the intermediate directions : South-East, South-
West, North-West, North-East, the above and the below which
are also reckoned as directions. They are also put as cosmic
powers in relation with others, and are included in ponderings
about macrocosm and microcosm and definite divinities are
brought into connection with them.
The Vaise~ika, therefore, seized back these ideas, as it
turned out to be necessary to create a new idea of space. The
old word for World-quarters (disaM was given a general mean-
ing of space. 147 Thus, however, not merely a new word was given.
All ideas, which originally clung to the idea of quarters, appeared
therewith. Formerly, one had designated space (iika.fab) as that
which allows space. Now space ( dik) was explained as what
determines the spatial layout of a thing. But one did not com-
prehend it in general but referred it to the directions and said :
"The space is the cause of the ideas of East, South, North and
West" .148 Thereby one determined the quarters in the old
traditional way according to the course of the Sun : "The region
in which the Sun rises is the eastern direction. The region, in
which it sets, is the western direction. The region in which the
sun wanders is the southern direction, the region, in which the sun
74 I
HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
does not wander, is the North." 149 Later on, the expressions
were changed. The word rising and setting were avoided. The
world-picture, which the Indian mythology created in course
of time, knows no rising and setting of the Sun, but only a circle
around the divine mountain Meru. The formulation was finally
chosen as follows : "Out of the first connection with the Sun-
it may be past, present, or future,-the easterly direction arises."
"Accordingly the Southern, Western, Northern". 150 The deter-
mination of directions is made dependent on an order of sequence
in which the Sun enters into connection with them, as it may be
now the case with the time when one speaks about it or one may
think of the past or future.
An important change which the new coming of the old idea
of quarters produced on the space-idea was as follows : The quar-
ters are many, a plurality. The space, on the other hand, was
considered a unity. One held fast to this idea and it was said that
one only speaks metaphorically of a plurality of directions, with
respect to the different connections with the Sun ; in reality only
one space is dealt with. Still more important was the following :
One soon came to the knowledge that it is only relative when
one speaks of the layout of things according to directions, that
the same thing which appears out of the east from one stand-
point, can appear out oft be west from another. One adjusted him-
self to this knowledge. Up to this time, space was explained as
the cause of the ideas of the East, South, West and North. Now
it was added that these ideas must refer to particular stand-points;
it was said that the space is the cause when something from a
given stand-point appears as in the East, South, West or North.
Therewith one was accustomed to consider the layout of things
relatively in their relation with one another. This occurred not
only with respect to the direction in which things are, but also
with regard to their distance. The latter also was traced back to
the cause of space. Thus a new definition of space was arrived
at: One said : "The sign of space is that through it one knows
that this is nearer or further than that." 151 This definition
appeared gradually as more important and was finally predomi-
nant so that the cause of the ideas of nearness or distance was
seen, ahovcall, in the space.
One had come so far, when the classical Vaise~ika system
gained its final form, and the development came to a provisional

conclusion. The idea of quarters was thrown in the background
but one stopped with the ideas of nearness and distance. One
had not gained the general idea of spatial layout as the charac-
teristic of space. Thereby we need not think that there lay
tlu.:rein a conscious knowledge of relativity of all spatial relations.
On the other hand, space as something permanent was· fast
adhered to. Only through the accidents of development, one had
stopped with these ideas and did not advance to any further
generalization.
Similarly inconclusive remained the development of the
idea of Time. But it ran its course on an entirely different pi:1.th.
It lies at the basis of every thing. In the mythological and the
religious sphere there is the idea of Time as the world-ruling
power which brings forth everything and again destroys it-
immensely impressive and capable oflastingdevelopment. To the
philosophical thought, on the other hand, the idea of Time
creates great difficulties. One begins, therefore, to discuss it com-
paratively late and the problems connected with it give rise to
protracted and toilsome discussions. Thus it is to be understood
that in the Iranian neighbouring region where the religious
HI reams predominated, the idea of Time gained overwhelming
importance and found its embodiment in the form of the God
Zurvan who was long considered as the highest Godhead. In
India, on the other hand, where in the attempts to explain the
world, philosophy assumed the lead, the things developed diffe,.
rcntly. 152
In the oldest times, we find sporadically the idea of Time
{h"iilab) as the highest principle and Power governing all things.
There is, in the Atharvaveda, a hymn which extols it, as the basis.
ol' all things, in ringing words full of ardour and mystery. It
begins with the following words : 10:i
"Time the steed runs with seven reins (rays), thousand-
cyed, ageless, rich in seed. The seers, thinking holy thought,
mount him, all the Leings (worlds) are his wheels.
"With seven wheels does this Time ride, seven navels has
he; immortality is his axle. He carries hither all these Leings
(worlds). Time, the first God, hastens onwards.
"Time begot yonder heaven, Time also (begot) these worlds.
That which was and that which shall be, urged forth by time,
spreads out.
"Time created the earth, in Time the Sun burns. In Time
are all beings, in Time the eye looks abroad."
This idea of Time has further asserted itself. We hear
continually again and again of a doctrine of time (kalavadal;)
which traces all things back to Time and in the mouth of whose
representatives, for example, the following words are placed :
"The Time brings all creatures to ripeness, the Time again des-
troys all things. The Time keeps awake among the sleepy. It is
hard to transgress Time." 1 54
"Without the time, not at all, not even a bean is cooked,
even when a man has placed the pot in the Fire ; therefore, a
man knows that it has occurred through Time." 155
But in general, this doctrine remains in the background.
Apart from an occasional mention, the leading philosophical
systems take no knowledge of it. On the contrary, they discuss
the question of Time in quite a different way.
First of all we can say that the idea of Time vanishes where
the proper philosophical thought comes in; it emerges only
comparatively later. It was considered by the nature-philosophi-
cal schools; it only emerges, as it appears then, when one
attempts systematically to understand all factors of existence and
was persuaded to discuss the question of Time. It came about
in this way that one was compelled to put the question anew-
what is to be understood by Time. The reply ran as follows :
Time is a permanent, ubiquitous entity which brings forth every-
thing, but which is not itself visible but is only inferred as cause
from its effects. In spite of the bald, matter-of-fact formulation
of thought, here the influence of the doctrine of Time as the
prime ground of all things-the only one on which a man could
lean-is obvious. But is Time really the cause of all things ?
Does it produce everything? The nature-philosophy of the
Vaise~ika in their atomistic-mechanistic world-picture had suffi-
ciently proved the origin of all things so that there was no room
for Time as the World-cause. But still there is a case in which
the influence of Time is palpable. When in spring, the flowers
bloom, when in autumn, the fruits ripen, it is the work of
Time. 15' But is it also right? On more exact consideration, one
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS ANO THE VAISE~IKA 77
must say that it is not the things which Time brings forth. On
the contrary, it only conditions the moment of its origin that
they emerge in appearance earlier or later. So one came to the
doctrine that Time causes the 'earlier' or 'later' of things.
In the formulation of this doctrine we come across a re-
markable thing. This 'earlier' and 'later' is referred only to the
present, not to the past or future; that is to say, of two simulta-
neous things, the older is to be understood as the earlier, the
younger as the later. "The earlier and the later are produced out
of the earlier of the causes and the later of the causes" 157 The
older is therefore, on that account, the earlier because it origina-
ted earlier, the younger, later because it originated later. But
both are present at the same time. With it the questions about
the past and the future and their character which have troubled
the Buddhistic Schools so much158 are shoved away. Has it occur-
red intentionally? Has the cause of itbeen put forth? We are un-
able to say anything about it. According to the aim-conscious
and consistent manner in which the Vai·.ie~ika have otherwise
formulated their doctrine, one could like to believe it. But our
sources are silent. The discussions regarding it must belong,
according to a process of development, to a period which still
lies before the formulation of preserved knowledge. The sources,
which lie before us, know nothing to say about it.
One thing need not be lost sight of. The doctrine of Time
is perceptibly fashioned after the doctrine of Space. Finally, it
was easy or proximate to lean upon the simple prototype of space
while working out the difficult Time-problem. It, therefore, hap-
pens that in India the earlier and the later are expressed by the
same words as the further and the nearer. So it is said: Just as far
(para[z) and near ( apara[i) express the relation of two things which
lie in the same direction, so also earlier (para&) and later ( apa-
rab) express the relation of two things which lie in the same
scale of timc. 109 The 'earlier' and 'later' have also been always
looked upon as the most important signs of time, in agreement
with the doctrine of space. No doubt, in course of time, what
otherwise expressed a time-relation-simultaneity and non-sim-
ultaneity, slowness and speed, was included. It is said: "earlier,
later, simultaneous and non-simultaneous, slow, quick arc the
tiigns oftime." 160 But the idea of 'earlier' and 'later' have always
remained the most important.

A further point in which the doctrine of Time in the Vai-
se~ika agrees with the doctrine of space is as follows: There is
only one, single Time. When one speaks of the parts of Time such
as moments, hours, days and years, it is only a metaphorical
way of expression and serves a practical aim. Again one thing
remains to be mentioned. A question with which Indian philo-
sophy much occupied itself is the origin, duration and the dis-
appearance or passing away as the constituents of things. Especi-
ally the Schools of the Buddhists and theJaina have endeavo-
ured to understand the nature of phenomena and have develop-
ed interesting thought-processes in that connection. On the
other hand, the Vai~e~ika teaches only that the rise, duration
and disappearance of things are an effect of Time. This question
has not been discussed exhaustively but they have chosen to
make short ad hoc small comments in regard to the discussions
of other systems.
This is all what the classical Vaise~ika system has to say on
the question of Time. The essential thing about it is that the
time is considered as a permanent, all-penetrating entity which
is the cause of simultaneous things, of the one appearing earlier
and the other later. We miss here the whole problem which
other systems have developed in all its richness.
In conclusion, if we want to summarize the results of our
considerations so far, we can say thus: We have seen in the ex-
ample of Space as well as of Time, how the development issues
out of simple ancient ideas, how the thought again and again
involuntarily comes round in a once trodden path and only
slowly works itself out forward. In the period in which the
classical system gained its final form, only a certain stage is
attained which is far distant from a satisfactory solution of the
raised question. The result of the development for the classical
system of the Vai:le~ika for philosophical purposes can be summ-
arized thus: Space and Time have become firm ideas of the sys-
tem by the end of the classical period. They, as such, hol<l good
as permanent all-penetrating elements, the importance of which
before all lies in the fact that all relative spatial and temporal
relations arc cou<li tioncd by them.
When the development of the Vaise~ika had advanced so
far, once again new thoughts were of quite a different sort. They
directed the development of the system into fully new paths; on
the strength of these thoughts the system was recast, the recast-
ing finding its expression in the doctrine of categories. Up to
this time, everything new had only contributed to widen the
sphere of considered topics and to deepen the insight gained in
that consideration. Now they dealt with a completely new way of
reflection. Up to this time, one had deemed all objects of the
phenomenal world on the same level as things of the same
sort. Now one learnt to distinguish different forms of their
existence and that, through the distinction of different cate-
gories.
The Emergence of the Doctrine of Categories-How this new
knowledge came about and who was the first to express it, we
cannot say.. Because this development falls in the period in
which our sources cannot be traced back. But, nevertheless, its
course is at least clear in the basic features. The first step lay in
the distinction between substance$ and qualities. It occurred thus:
The thought of the oldest period cared to imagine all things,
with which it occupied itself, as things, objects, objectivcly. 161
We see it especially in the BrahmaJ).a-texts of the Veda. What
the priestly thinker of those times included in the orbit of his
thought-year and seasons, sacrifice and metres, belief and pe-
nance-everything of all these appeared to him in the form of
particular, independent entities. The same held true originally
in the case of the things and their qualities. Not that no distinc-
tion was made between both. They were distinguished in an
intuitive manner, as it was already conveyed by the genius of
the language. But where one attempted to give a more exactly
mathematical account about their constituents, the objective
way of thought automatically appca1'ed forth. We arc already
acquainted with the characteristic examples in this connection
in the history or the S:ur1khya. As one formulated the doctrine
of the three qualities and inquired into their constitution and
into the way of their working, he saw in them involuntarily in-
dependent cntitics. 162 This character showed itself so distinctly
in the tradition that the best knowers or scholars of the
Si"nµkhya doctrine fought shy, during the presentation of the sys-
tem, to speak of the qualities of the Ur-matter but chose the ex-
pression constituents. Another example of the same manner of

thought is offered by the old psychology of the Sarµkhya system
in the doctrine of the fifty ideas. As we have already seen, all
psychical conditions were considered as something material and
were explained by the streaming-in of matter in the psychical
organism. 163 The singularity of these ideas must have, however,
made them doubtful and must have led to a setback. Then fin-
ally one came to the view that things and their qualities need
not be comprehended in the same way as independent entities
but that their sort of existence is something basically different
and that two essentially different forms of existence confront
each other. Thus was gained the knowledge of the first two ca-
tegories substance (dravyam) and quali~y (gu1Jab).
Indeed, one was not able to give a clear definition of the
nature of substances and qualities. What one knew to say was
that substances possess qualities164 and qualities have substances
as their bearer which meant that they themselves possessed no
qualities. 165 Therein was always contained the essential know-
ledge that qualities cannot occur independently but they require
a bearer. Thus there was a break with the old objective manner
of thought. Besides it was recognized that a substance cannot
occur without qualities, that both emerge necessarily connected
with each other. "Qualities without a substance and a
substance without qualities are not possible. Substances and
qualities, therefore, never occur separated." 16 6
Thus was gained a new basic insight and the first step on
a completely new path was taken. Indeed this insight would
never have won such importance, as was really the case, if it
had not been employed with the genuine Indian thoroughness
and a flair for systematic action. It is a case where the Indian
originality shows itself with special distinctness. Whereas in the
philosophy of Aristotle anrl his schools, the categories-doctrine
has only somewhat an episodic character, in India, however,
all the potentialities, latent in it, are exhausted and thought out
to the last conclusions until finally, on this basic foundation,
was created a full system compact and self-sufficient in itself,
which influenced the total later Indian philosophy of India in an
authoritative way, nothing being left out of thought. We shall,
indeed, nevertheless, later on, get acquainted with the disad-
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEi?IKA 81
vantage with which this method was attended.

The Oldest Three Categories-The next step in the develop-
ment of the doctrine of categories consisted of the addition of
a further category. It was in itself evident that one would go
beyond both the categories of substance and quality. We see it
in the J aina who have a beginning of the doctrine of categories
common with the Vaisei?ika. They observed that a thing also
undergoes changes, without the disaµpearance of old qualities
and with the coming in of new ones. So they distinguish besides
the qualities, a third category-the condition of things (paryiiyalz,
P. pajjayo). The Vaise~ika proceeded quite differently and it is
characteristic, viz. the way they chose. Among them at that time
the atomistic-mechanistic way of considering things was predo-
minant and the idea of movement played a decisive role in it.
So it was movement (karma) which was posited as the third
category. 167
In this way a group of three categories was gained, which
formed a close unity and remained as such in the system for a
long time. 168 The 'systematic' or systematization already set in
and an attempt was made to utilize the knowledge gained to the
fullest extent. One sought to delimit and fix the orbit of indivi-
dual categories, everything whatever that falls within the given
frame. One proceeded in such a way that, first of all, he arrang-
ed, in the frame of the categories, the topics dealt with by the
old Nature-philosophy and supplemented it by new ideas as
circumstances demanded it. In this procedure, earlier features
which are characteristic of the Vai . ie1?ika method of thought,
stepped forth and they defined decisively the picture of the
classical system. We must turn to that and enter into it, in
brief.
Among these features, above all, belongs the fundamental
realism of the system. This realism is occupied with understand-
ing thiugs in a way which goes back to an ancient way of view-
ing things and which resulted, as one was compelled in the
course of development, in taking up a fandamcntal attitude or
position towards this manner of viewing things. In the begin-
ning or philosophical thought, a man is inclined to consider all
objects or knowledge as real; that is to say, it is presupposed
involuntarily that to every content of knowledge, there corres-
ponds a real object in the external world. It is a naive realism,

·naive so far that this assumption ensues as a result of what one
· felt sentimental about it, becoming conscious of the problem
lying before him. The further development in such cases follows
as a general rule in such a way that a moment comes when a
man sees himself compelled to take up conscious, intellectual, in-
telligent attitude towards an interpretation which until then was
arrived at emotionally or by way of feeling and to decide for or
against it. The inclination shows itself most in affirming, first of
all, the hitherto existing accepted interpretation. But the decision
which confronts man constrains him to think out through the
things more exactly. Through that, man becomes conscious in
general of the problem before him. With that the requisite
conditions are made available to overcome gradually the old
views which have become untenable in course of time.
In the Vaise~ika, there ai:rived now the moment for taking
up a fundamental attitude towards the old naive realism,
when one proceeded to classify the subjects of the old nature-
philosophy into the frame of the categories. The doctrine of
Categories had taught that the different kinds of existence
should be distinguished and that everything should no more be
considered as material. But one still saw in everything an exis-
tence which was called as something peculiarly real. The
question now forced itself whether such a view was also justi-
fied. Because, among the things which were classified under
various categories, there were also such as were in no way
independently existing, whether they were considered as inde-
pendent entities or not-e.g. Time and Space and the different
qualities. With the classification into categories, one was, how-
ever, bound to decide which view he wished to profess. The
Vaise~ika fundamentally decided in favour of realistic compre-
hension and executed this view with their peculiar consistency
down to the last possibility. According to the doctrine of the
classical Vai~e~ika there exists, corresponding to every content
of knowledge, a real correlate in the external world and this
view was held to firmly as far as it was somehow possible.
Especially clearly it comes, among other things, to be expressed
when one explained this during the definition of different things
with a preference, as the basis, of corresponding ideas and of
words belonging to them. Characteristically the Indian word

for a category (padiirtha!J,) has also its own peculiar meaning-
"object of a word." Through the oversharpened execution of
extreme realism, its critical attitude also became evident and
served as the starting-point for its later being overcome by the
logical-epistemological school of Buddhism.
On this occasion, further, an equally critical feature of the
development, described above, may be mentioned by the way, na-
mely, its favourite inclination towards external systematization.
The attempt to classify all things in the frame ofcategories and to
summarize all and everything under a few ideas, and that too, un-
der the presuppositions created by the extreme realism, brought
with itself the fact that quite heterogeneous things were placed
near each other as homogeneous. With this, its speciality receded
into the background as against the general character of the group.
One forgot the particular and the individual against the general
idea. Thus there opened gradually a chasm between the living
view and the empty world of the ideas of the categories-doubly
dangerous in a school which started with explaining nature and
understanding it. One continually got accustomed more and
more merely to working with the ideas which were offered by
the categories and ended in this way finally with an unnatural
scholasticism in which the system gradually grew rigid and
stiff.
Still, we shall have to return to it later on. We shall now
return back to our proper subject-the further development of
the doctrine of categories through the classification of the
objects of the old nature-philosophy in the frame created by
the Vaise~ika.
In the case of the category of substance ( dravyam ), it was
not difficult. Only one needed to survey the factors out of which
the old nature-philosophy built the world-picture and to gather
them, which were suitable, together. Thus there was no possi-
bility for much doubt. It was self-evident that the Elements
together with the Ether were explained as substances. There
was also no fluctuation or wavering with regard to the souls and
the psychical organs. One could be uncertain only with regard
to Time and Space. But here the realistic attitude of the system
proved decisive so that they were also enrolled as substances.
Thus one arrived at a series of new substances which were

arranged in the classical system in the following way : Earth,
Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Souls and Psychical
Organs. There were hardly differences of opinion with regard to
them-not also among the related schools. Only the J aina
shared the view whether Time should be regarded as substance
or not. 169 In the Mimaiµsa School of Kumarila, as we have
already heard, the sound and darkness were regarded as
substances. 170
Though things with regard to the category of substance
were simple, it was different to get at a clear decision with re-
gard to the category of qu'llities-what were to be regarded as
the qualities and how were they to be arranged. Let us, first of
all, consider the qualities of the elements. The old nature-philoso-
phy had formulated lists of these qualities. But these lists were not
employable or usable without much ado. They were exceedingly
manifold and in spite of many simplifications, which ensued
in between, were composed of the most diverse constituents.171
The formulation of a list of all the qualities which could dwelt
in the substances required, on the other hand, a far stricter selec-
tion, a restriction to the essentials and a well-arranged marshal-
ling together of the same. One had, therefore, to proceed very
systematically-more than hitherto. It resulted in bringing about
decisive changes.
Above all, the old series of the qualities of the elements
fell a victim to this great systematization. While describing the
qualities of the Elements in the old Nature-philosophical doctrin--
es, we have seen that the elements had been first characteriz-
ed by a definite series of qualities such as hardness, moistness or
liquidness, heat and movement and only later on were placed
beside them the lists of qualities which correspond as sense-ob-
jects of sense-perception. 172 The older series was now bound to
fall away. As long as more than one or several lists were tolera-
ted beside one another or as long as the qualities of individual
elements were enumerated in a motley or promiscuous series, it
could easily happen that the same sort of homogeneous qualities
would be repeated in various places. In the formulation, on the
other hand, of single uniform lists, such repetitions were bound to
disappear. Now in the present case, on a more exact cxamina-
71. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 85-
tion, it was seen that hardness, which was taken as the quality
of the earth and the heat, of fire also occurred in the second seri-
es, namely, as sub-varieties of touch and that they were there in a
better place. The movement of the wind was naturally classified
under the category of movement (karma). Thus, of the whole
first series, there remained only the moisture and fluidity of
water, for which a proper place had to be found in the new list
which was formulated.
Regarding the assessment of the qualities of the Elements,
other view-points, besides the greater systematization, also were
taken into consideration. Through the Atom-doctrine one had
learnt to distinguish between atoms and the aggregates formed
out of them. It led to the knowledge that certain qualities occur
to the aggregate but not to the atoms. This knowledge was,
above all, employed by the J aina. 173 In the Vai:~e~ika, the follow-
ing also came up. According to the mechanistic manner of
thought of the Vaise~ika, the atoms and therewith also their qua-
lities were considered as fundamentally unchangeable. 174 So it
was obvious to differentiate the qualities which were firmly bo-
und with the substances from those which were not. Thus fin-
ally one came to the conclusion that there were qualities which
are bound up with definite substances and are characteristic of
them (vaise,rika-gunafl ), as against those which can be common to
different substances (samanya-gw:w?1).
Under the influence of this point of view, the doctrine of
the qualities of the Elements was formed in this way: It was na-
tural that the qualities, which, according to the older doctrine,
form the objects of sense-perception and which had been connec-
ted with the individual elements, namely, form, taste, smell, touch
and sound, should he considered as the characteristic qualities of
these clements. But the accumulation theory, which had been
taken over, went against it, as according to it individual qualities
occur in more and more clements. 175 But one, however, resolved
to lightly pass over these difficulties because he was of the view
that, in spite of the accumulation theory, every quality lends its
special character to every clement. With this assumption, form,
taste, smell, touch and sound were received into the list of qua-
lities to (orm the category of quality and they were explained as
the characteristic qualities of Fire, Water, Earth, Air and
86 HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.'
Ether. 176
Next, in conjunction with it, there arose the necessity to
examine the sub-varieties of these qualities and to fix them fin-
ally. In this respect, taste, smell and sound presented no diffi-
culties. Besides, the things were made more easy; with the for-
mulation of the doctrine of Categories, the proper natural-sci-
entific interest stepped back continually more and more. Of taste
the customary six varieties were formulated: sweet, sour, saltish,
bitter, pungent and acrid. Smell was simply divided into good
and obnoxious smells. As for sound, one was satisfied with
differentiating it as sounds of speeeh (van;i.ab) and unarticulated
sound ( dhvanilz).
In contrast to the above, form and touch served to give
occasion for basic important decisions in the field of the doctrine
of the Categories. The extensive group of the sub-varieties of
Form, after singling out the obvious things not belonging together
such as Light and Shadow, organized itself distinctly into two
sub-groups, of which the first embraced all colours (form in the
strict sense), while the second contained what concerned the
shape (sal]isthanam) of things. Now it was clear that of these two,
clearly only colour could be valid as the characteristic quality of
Fire. The shape according to the Vai~e::;ika played rarely a role in
the fully uniform atoms ; only it played its part in the aggre-
gates. Besides, a view could not be shut out that the shape could
be well attributed to all other substances as well like the fire.
The result was that the shape was separated from the old quality
of Form which was now defined as merely colour.
Similar results accrued on a more exact examination of the
varieties of touch. Heaviness and lightness were also counted
among them. In the meanwhile, however, in the mechanics,
heaviness was known as something different from the other
qualities of the elements. Before all, it could not be reckoned
as a sub-variety of touch among the characteristic qualities of
air to which the old nature-philosophy attributed no heaviness.
It was, therefore, to be excluded. Again, to ascribe hardness
and softness, roughness and smoothness to the atoms went
against the doctrine of the atoms of the Vai·:;e~ika. Rather they
were attributed only to the aggregates and were traced back to
the kind of their compounding. And so finally of all the sub-
varieties of touch, only heat and cold remained.

In this way, by the time of the final doctrine of categories
in the Vaise~ika, the doctrine of the qualities of the elements
and their sub-varieties had the following result : There are five
characteristic qualities of the Elements : form, taste, smell,
touch and sound. Of these, form embraces different colours
white, etc. The taste is six-fold : sweet, salt, bitter, pungent,
sour and acrid. The smell can either be good or bad. The
touch is three-fold-cold, hot and neither hot nor cold. In sound,
finally, sounds of speech and inarticulate sounds are to be dis-
tinguished.
Thus with regard to the first group of qualities which was
enrolled under the category of quality, namely the character-
istic qualities of the elements, there came about clarity. But the
reflective thought bound up with it gave rise to a formulation
of a further group of qualities. As we have seen, one had found
it necessary to separate from 'form' (rapam) what concerns the
shape of things. But how should this shape itself be judged?
The realism of the system demanded that it should be explained
as something real. But then if one comprehended something
real as such, it could only be considered as a quality. Then arose
the question, as to what place among the qualities should be
given to it. As an answer to this question it was decided that
the shape (saT]'lsthiinam) was not to be regarded as the character-.
istic quality of a substance but that which is ascribed to all
substances-to the atoms as well as the aggregates. It was there-
fore explained as a common quality (samiinya-gutza~).
Regarding the precise constituent of this quality, the essen-
tial of shape (saT]'lSthiinam) was seen in the extension. Evidently the
thought conjointly gave the idecl. that the shape was ascribed to
the atoms as well as to the endlessly great substances. This quality
was thercli)rc named extension (parimii~iam ). As sub-varieties, dis-
tinction was made between smallness (ai;zutvam), largeness (mahat-
tvam )and shortness ( hrasvatvam) and length (dirghatvam) • The sub-
varietics which the old nature-philosophy had assumed e.g. quad-
rangularity, rounrlness etc. were rejected, because it was believed
that they only occur to the aggregates and could be traced to
the bigness and to the arrangement of the parts. To the perma-
nent substances which have atom-form, comes infinite smallness,
and to those which are unlimited, comes unending infinite big-

ness ( mahattvam) .Both become summarized as an independent va-
riety of extension under the name of spherical roundness (piiri-
miit;!f,alyam) .177
The perishable aggregate could be small or big, short or
long. 178 It could, indeed, not be overlooked that smallness and
bigness are relative ideas and that their respective knowledge is
directed to the relation to other things. Therefore, it was firm-
ly laid down that only aggregates, which are formed out of two
atoms, are really small and short, while everything else is big
and long. If in spite of it, it is designated as small or short, that
is due to a figurative usage of speech.
Extension (parimiil}am) gave the first common quality of the
substances. While examining the qualities of the Elements, hard
ness, softness, roughness and smoothness were separated from the
sub-varieties of touch because they were traced to the kind of the
composition of things. But what is this composition of things?
The simplest answer was: the connection of its parts. With it
there emerged a new idea, the connection ( Saf!l:Yogab) and the
question arose with regard to its character.
The reply to this question could not be doubtful in the
given situation of things. The fundamental realism of the Vai~e
~ika demanded that it should be understood as a real entity.
Thereby one was confronted with old, already existing ideas.
In the older period, it was a natural thought to see an indepen-
dent entity, when two things were seen connected together, in
those which it binds and which distinguishes it from the un-
bound things. We meet consequently with corresponding views
injinism as well as Buddhism. 179 They, therefore, need be pre.
supposed in the older Vaise~ika. This entity appears to have been
originally imagined as material, as a body which holds to-
gether the connected things. 180
With the emergence of the doctrine of Categories, this
was no more tenable. In it, the connection was bound to be-
come a quality which dwells in the con11ccted things and allows
them to appear as connected. As this quality can indwell in
different substances, it was naturally explained as a common
quality.
It may be remarked here that this quality of connection
( sarriyogab) played a fairly large part in the doctrine of Categories

of the classical Vaise~ika system, as during the incorporation of
the old Nature-doctrine in the scheme of the ideas of the Categor-
ies, different important processes were understood as connection
(sarµyogab). According to the atomism of the old Nature-philoso-
phy, every origin or product ensues through the coming together of
permanent atoms; this coming together was explained as connec-
tion (sa7[1yogab). In the Mechanics it was known that a movement
is called forth through a push (nodanam) or stroke ( abbighiitab }.
In an attempt to define these two in the sense of the doctrine of
Categories, the best solution appeared in understanding these as
a sort of connection. The idea of connection was also worked out
otherwise. The cooperation of the soul and organs was traced
back to their connection. The temporal and spatial layout of
things was derived from their connection with the substances
Time and Space. To it were also finally attributed different in-
dividual cases like the origin of sound which is caused by the
connection of the drum with the :;tick. Thus the quality of con-
nection gained an exceedingly wide sphere of validity. It joined
itself with the issue of living discussion, particularly with the
Buddhistic Schools-to which we shall return still on a later
occasion. 181
As to the nature of the quality of connection, it was defin-
ed as the uniting of two things, which until now were not united
(apraptayob priiptib) . It is possible in the case oflimited ( m urtab)
as well as unlimited (amilrtab) substances, indeed with a limita-
tion. The limited (milrta{l) substances can well be conjoined
among themselves, as well as the limited and the unlimited. But
the conjunction of unlimited substances among themselves is im-
possible. These unlimited substances exist since eternity without
entering into a conjunction. Because, according to the mechanis-
tic manner of thought of the V aise~ika, it can occur only through
a movement, that is, a change of place which is not possible in
infinitely big substances. According to the Vai~c~ika doctrine
there exist~ no connection (sa'!!yoga!t) between Ether, Time and
Space and the infinitely great souls. It remains to be marked that
connection, in contrast to the other qualities described up to now
which always cling only to one suhstance, is a quality which
dwells at the same time in many substances (anekii.frita[1)-i.c.
90 HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY·
the substances which it connects. Further it was taught that it

does not wholly penetrate its bearer but extends itself only on
a part of the same (pradeJavrttil.J,) . As it was seen, an extended
object can enter into a connection only with one of its parts.
Finally, the following should still be considered. The hitherto
described qualities, with the exception of sound to which always
a special place is assigned,1 82 permanently cling to their substan-
ces. On the other hand, connection is a perishable quality which
rises in its bearer and again vanishes. Its cause is, as a rule, a
movement i.e. a movement which leads to the union of the
objects concerned. Its destruction depends finally on movement,
i.e. a movement which drives the connected objects asunder. In
between, comes in or interpolates, according to the Vaise~ika, a
further idea and with that we already come to the next quality,
which we must describe in connection with connection (saJ?lyo-
gaM ,that next quality being separation (vibhii.ga~).
It suited the formulation of the VaiSe~ika to place an in-
dependent quality, separation, in contrast to connection. Be-
cause, during the systematic summing up, ~ne was accustomed to
put togetherthepairs of opposite ideas. The positing of this qua•
lity (separation) occurred after good deliberation and with full
consciousness. Objections were not wanting: it was said that the
mere abrogation of connection is something purely negative
and a positing of a special quality was not justified. Against
that, the adherents of the Vaisei;;ika represented that the idea:
'These things are separated', just like the idea : 'These things
are united', expresses something positive and, in a logical
execution of their fundamental realism, assumed for this idea
also a positive correspondence in the external world. In one
case, at least, they believed to have been able to show distinctly
'separation' as a special, independent real entity.Just as a stroke
-a connection of two things, generates a sound, even so the brea-
king of a stick i.e. a separation, occasions a sound; they therefore,
felt themselves justified in the positing of 'separation' as a sepa-
rate quality. Finally, there was mixed in it an attempt to carry
out as symmetrically as possible the fundamental maxim accord-
ing to which the doctrine of categories was built up. 183 Now, in
general, the rule was considered valid that the qualities are des-
troyed by qualities which are opposed ( virodhi). It appears,
7, THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEtUKA 91
therefore, desirable to infer the abrogation of connection through

one such opposed quality. 'Separation' ( vibhagal;) turned out
to be suitable for that. The process was thought out as follows:
The movement which disturbs the connection (sarµyogaM brings
forth separation (vibhiigafl). This destroys the opposing quality
of connection (sarµyogafl). And the things connected hitherto
loosen themselves from one another.
Concerning the constituent of the quality of separation,
the same held good, in general, as in the case of connection. It
is a common quality which dwells in limited as well as un-limi-
ted substances. It extends itself simultaneously over more subs-·
tances, namely the substances which it separates. And it pene-
trates the things not entirely but only partially. It is further
called forth like the connection through a movement, that is, a
movement which drives asunder the previously joined or connec-
ted substances. Only with its destruction the position becomes
different. In the case of connection, it was clear that it was
destroyed by separation which drives asunder the hitherto con-
nected things. In the case of separation, on the other hand, it
cannot be said, that it is first destroyed when the separated things
again unite with one another. Because it need not so occur in
general. But the idea which considers the things as separated
and on which the assumption of the idea of separation is based
considers the things only in view of their earlier union as sepa-
rated, as soon as the consciousness of their eariier union vani-
shes. It lasts, as a ruk, only for a short time and the same must
hold good for the quality of separation. In order to establish it
the following assumption was made: The movement or action,
which separates the connected things, causes also a change of
place of these things. But a change of place consists in a connection
with another place. Now it is this connection, it was said, which
destroys the separation in the separated things. As a change of
place follows immediately after separation, the quality of separa-
tion is also destroyed immediately and lasts only for a moment.
In this way' the destruction or the quality of separation without
a new connection of separated things is explained. The expla-
nation corresponded simultaneously with the fundamental con-
cepts of the system as it allowed the destruction to follow.
through another opposite quality.
With the formulation of the three qualities-extension (pari-

miit;am), connection (sa'f!lyogab) and separation (vibhiigab) there
emerged, beside the group of the characteristic qualities of the
elements-a second group, and that is the group of common
qualities ( siimiinyagu'!Jii!;). It correponded with the Indian
attempt at systematization-which we have already described in
connection with the old Nature-philosophy-to complete this
group further and seek to make it as consummate as possible.
Towards that end, the following possibility offered itself.
The development of the old Nature-philosophy, of which
we have just spoken, led to the fact that space and time were
included in the sphere of dealt-with subjects and both ideas
had been incorporated into the system. A cause was seen in
them, whereby something appears as further or nearer, earlier
or later. This 'Further' or 'Nearer', 'Earlier' or 'Later' must
now appear, seen from the stand-point of the doctrine of
Categories, as the qualities of things, in consonance with the
consistent realistic attitude of the Vaise~ika, qualities which
are called forth through their connection with Space and Time.
Thereby, in them were necessarily seen the common qualities,
as they occurred in all things which are in Space and Time.
As the ideas of 'distant' and 'earlier', 'nearer' and 'later' were
expressed in India through the same word and fell under a
similar idea, two such qualities (gu7Jalz) were posited viz. the
spatial and temporal distantness (paratvam) and nearness
{ aparatvam) •
But with the positing of these two new ideas, there arose
a new problem. On a more exact reflection, it could not be
-0verlooked that distantness and nearness are something relative
and depend on the stand-point of the observer. Thereby one
was confronted with the question how qualities can dwell in
things, if they are conditioned by the comprehension of the
knowing subject. This was a difficult test for the realism of the
system. Because one wished to assert that something objective
in the present depends on the knowing subject.
Here is seen again the rigorous logical consistency of the
Indian philosophy of the classical time which fought shy of no
inferences where they were valid, to carry through consistent-
ly to the end the: basic views of the system. In the present
7, THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAI~E~IKA 93
case, man held fast to the view, as was demanded by the

·realism of the Vaise~ika, that in distantness and nearness the
objective qualities of things were dealt with but it was also
assumed tbat they originated under the influence of the know-
ledge of the subject. It was taught as follows : When seen
from the point of view of the observer, it was said, two objects
in any direction are found on different distances and when the
observer sees the more distant one, then under the influence
of this observing knowledge (apek~iibuddhib) there originates
the quality of distantness (paratvam) through the connection
(sa1,nyogab) of the object with space and it calls forth on its side
a corresponding knowledge. The weakness and vulnerability
of this theory are obvious. But it is not to be denied that it has
been consistently thought out on the presuppositions of the
system and it well represents the only possibility to rescue its
basic realism in the present case. The origin of the quality of
nearness ( aparatvam) was also similarly explained. The corres-
ponding view also held valid for the temporal distantness
and nearness. For example, when the case of two men is consi-
dered, two men of whom one is older, the other younger, in
the case of the older man in relation to the younger one, there
arises, under the influence of this observing knowledge and
through the connection with Time, a quality of distantness
t (paratvam) in the older one and in the reverse case the quality
of nearness ( aparatvam) in the younger ones.
All these qualities, as also the temporal and spatial dis-
tantness and nearness are naturally, according to this theory,
not enduring. Their emergence rests on the observing know-
ledge (apek,1iibuddhib) of the knowing subject; they vanish also
with the vanishing of this knowledge. Nothing especial remains.
to be said of them.
A further quality which was assumed in the group of com-
mon qualities is the number (SaT(lkhyii). The number plays no·
role in the Indian philosophy of the classical period. The
sacrificial mystique of the Veda has no doubt played with the
number and the philosophical systems of the later time work
with the numerically defined enumerations. 184 llut number itself'
does not belong to the ideas which are employed for explaining
the phenomenal world. It has found access in the V ai:-ie~ika, as,.
according to all appearances, it was sought to comprehend as

completely as possible all categories and their sub-varieties in
the formulation of the Doctrine of Categories.
In the case of number, it is now important that it was
regarded as relative and conditioned by the knowledge of the
observer. One was of the view that number one is ascribed to
single things of nature. When, on the other hand, many things
numerically form a group, it depends on the knowing subject
who understands it as a group. The origin of number was
regarded as similar to that of distantness and nearness e.g.
when two things are understood as belonging together and as
duality, there arises in the things under the influence of the
observing knowledge (apek~iibuddhil;) the number two out of
number one which naturally dwells in things, and the obser-
ver knows them as two. The same holds good for all higher
numbers. Naturally these numbers are fleeting or perishable
and vanish with the observing knowledge. It remains still to be
marked that they belong to the qualities which, like connection
and separation, inhere in many substances.
The last quality (gurzal;) which found acceptance in the
described group of common qualities is the separateness
(prthaktvam). This quality is again an example of the sharp-
ness in distinguishing ideas which distinguished the V aise~ika.
As we have seen, 'Separation' was posited as a counterpart to
connection and was defined as the non-union or disunion of
things which were formerly united. But there are also the
separate things which were not formerly united or connected.
If, therefore, separateness of formerly united things was traced
to a quality called 'separation', separateness of these· things,
which formerly were not united, was also bound to be
derived from a quality dwelling in them. Such a quality was
assumed to be separateness (prthaktvam ).
In itself nothing especial about this quality would have
been said, if the following thoughts had not emerged with
regard to it (prthaktvam). It was said that the separate things
not only appear singly but also could form groups and this
group-formation was also established with the indwelling of
.separateness in them. The thought ran the course similar to
the case of number. In the case of things, separateness as unity
(ekaprthaktvam) and separateness as duality ( dviprthaktvam)

etc. were distinguished. Of these, the first dwells in all separate
things naturally while the other remaining ones are called forth
by the observing knowledge of an observer. The process is
the same as in the case of number. They vanish with the
vanishing of observing knowledge and dwell in more than one
$ubstances just like the corresponding number.
With the separateness (prthaktvam), the qualities which
come to be considered as a group of common qualities, in the
strict sense, are exhausted and the group was closed. This group
embraces the seven qualities which are enumerated in the
classical system in the following order : number, extension,
separateness, connection, separation, distantness and nearness.
Simultaneously ended therewith the new most important
creation which was inaugurated in the sphere of the category
of qualities in the formulation of the Doctrine of Categories.
Everything remaining which remained to be done was, on the
other hand, simple.
First, beside the groups of the qualities of the Elements
and of common qualities, a third group of the qualities of the
soul was formulated. We have heard 185 that the old nature-
philosophy regarded the soul as knowing and active and also
ascribed to it different processes and conditions. We have also
further heard how these different conditions were sifted and
arranged until one arrived finally at a clear and well-arranged
division which differentiated, besides knowledge, pleasure and
sorrow, desire and aversion-to which series later in the course
of further development was added 'effort' which embodied the
activity of the soul. As to the question which arose as to under
which category in the Doctrine of Categories, these conditions
of the soul should be arranged, it appeared best to count and
arrange them under qualities. They could not be considered
as movement, as movement for the Vaise~ika implies exclusively
a change of place and such a change of place is unthinkable in
the case of the infinitely big souls. There was no further possi-
bility of arrangement. It was, therefore, decided to enroll the
named conditions of the soul as the qualities of soul in the
category of qualities.
These new qualities represented an independent group by
itself on different grounds. On the one _hand, they are the charac-
teristic qualities which only occur to the soul and are, therefore,
to be separated from the common qualities. On the other hand,
they are also distinguished from the characteristic qualities of
the Elements in important features. In contrast to the qualities of
the soul, the qualities of the elements are by nature perishable
and extend only on a part of their bearer. And also otherwise,
they assume a special place for themselves according to the way
of thought of the system e.g. they fall out of the usual frame of
the doctrine of causality, as they have nothing to do with the
formation of an aggregate. It was, therefore, justified to group
them as an independent group. Thus there arose the third group
of qualities-the qualities of the soul : knowledge (buddhil.z),
pleasure ( sukham ), sorrow ( duMham), desire ( icchii), aversion
( dvefaM and effort (prayatnal.z).
With these three groups-the qualities of the Elements, the
common qualities and the qualities of the soul, the main mass
of qualities was comprehended. What remained to be added
were mere supplements. Among them first came into conside-
ration the three qualities of the elements which were left out
during the grouping of the characteristic qualities of the Ele-
ments. They were moisture or humidity ( snehal.z ), fluidity ( dravat-
vam) and heaviness (gurutvam).
Of these moisture or stickiness was a remainder of the
old series of the qualities of the Elements. 186 By itself, it was not
considered difficult to arrange it. Because it appeared naturally
as a quality of water and was not different from the remaining
characteristic qualities of the element. But the attempt towards
extreme systematization and symmetry, which played not an
under-estimftble role in Indian philosophy, did not allow its
arrangement in the proper group of the characteristic qualities
of the elements, as it would have disturbed their regular cons-
truction. So it became, in a certain measure, enrolled as an
appendix in a supplement. Just as with humidity, similar was
the case originally with fluidity. But some difficulties arose about
it. Different facts, which made its arrangement into the scheme
difficult, had to be taken into account. First of all, fluidity does
not only occur in the case of water but also in the case of things.
like fat or lac or lacquer which is considered under the
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 97 .
element of Earth, or in the case of different metals which were

considered as the appearances of the element Fire but which
could appear in a fluid, flowing form. Further it was observed,
that water can assume solid form in snow or hail while reversely
fat and lacquer become liquid under the influence of heat. These
observations could have led to kinds of further knowledges. But
the doctrine of categories with its predilection for external
classification was not favourable to such new knowledge. So
instead of recognizing fluidity or stickiness as a condition of the
aggregate, it was, on the contrary, ascribed as the quality to the
atoms of the substance concerned. Only one distinction was
made : in water fluidity was explained as natural (sii'fl.siddhikalz)
and among other elements, on the other hand, as artificial
( naimittika~). Thereby the natural fluidity, because it occurs
only in the case of water, was defined as a special quality, w~ile
the artificial fluidity was defined as a common quality because
it appears in Earth as well as Fire. On account of this, fluidity
fell out of the frame of the characteristic qualities of the Ele-
ments and it had to find a place likewise under the supplementary
qualities.
Things were represented again differently with regard to
the third of the named qualities 'heaviness'. In the old nature-
doctrine, it had been a sub-variety of touch. Now it was to be
differently arranged or classified. First in its case it was of impor-
tance that it belonged to more than one elements, to Earth and
Water, according to the simple observation which were worked
out in those times. But it was still more important that in the
course of development, it got into quite a different circle of ideas
and appeared in a different light. The heaviness, as we know,
played an important role as a chief cause of movement in the
mechanics of the old Vaise~ika and as such was considered from
a different view-point than in the old Nature-doctrine. Accor-
dingly, it was defined as a common quality which is invisible and
is only inferred as a cause of the falling. It has its place in the
play of forces of the mechanics where the resistance of impene-
trable objects, a conscious effort, or the swing ofa moved thing
work against it and neutralize it. It is understandable that in
this entirely different character, heaviness was not placed beside
the characteristic qualities of the Elements but was accommo-
dated in the supplement.

A further quality which arose out of the circle of the ideas
of the mechanics and found its place here is the swing or force
(vega~) which keeps the moved things in motion. It was some-
thing different from the old qualities. It is a common quality
because it occurs to all moving things-to all the four elements
and also to the psychical organs. Therefore, it naturally belongs
to the supplementary qualities. In its arrangement or classifica-
tion, it was mixed with a further idea. We have seen that the
Vaise~ika, with all their externality of systematization, show also
a remarkable sharpness in the formulation of ideas and com-
prehended clearly every idea in its speciality and elaborated it.
It held good in the case of force. It was believed and recognized
that force is essentially different from the remaining hitherto
accepted qualities. I ts decisive feature was seen in the fact that
it displaces its bearer temporarily into a condition which may
cause the release of a particular operation or effect and then
vanish. Something similar was also believed to have been in other
cases ; for instance, Elasticity ( sthitisthiipaka~) which was also
included in the sphere of consideration about this period. Be-
cause when a man stretches a bow, elasticity makes it possible
to assume its earlier form. Finally a similar related phenomenon
was observed in the working ofthe memory-impressions (bhiiva-
nii~) in the soul. Through them, the soul is displaced into a
condition which releases a particular effect and endures until
the effect or working takes place. In order to validate the special
character of these named qualities, it was resolved to do as
follows : They were not posited as three different qualities, but
it was taught that there was a quality called Disposition or
preparedness (saT[lskiira~) which represents an arrangement for
the release of a particular effect or operation. It was said that
force, elasticity and memory-impressions are the three different
sub-varieties of this quality named Disposition (sarr1skiira~)
Thus were comprehended and classified the total qualities
of the Elements which were known to old nature-philosophy and
with the memory-impressions, an important supplement was
added to the qualities of the soul. Still there remained, hitherto
unrnnsidcrcd, merit (dharmal1) and guilt (adlwrma[l) which were
already summed up under the name of the Invisible ( adr,1/am ).
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL AND THE VAISE~IKA 99
We have already spoken during the further development of the

old nature-philosophy about the emergence of the idea of the
Invisible force which is called forth by the actions of men and
leads to retribution. 187 There we have also mentioned the ideas
which were formulated as the constituents of this Invisible Force ;
it was partially comprehended as an independent entity and
partly a bearer was assumed for it. We have also said that the
Vaise~ika decided to set it in connection with the soul. The
result naturally was that in the formulation of the doctrine of
categories, merit and guilt were explained as the qualities of the
soul. They were placed on a par with the remaining qualities
of the soul. They were adjusted in such a way that it was taught
that they as well as the rest of the qualities were called forth
through the connection of the psychical organ with the soul.
With merit and guilt, the summing up of the total qualities
is finally completed and a number of the total twenty-four total
qualities is reached. The classical Vaise~ika represented this num-
ber and the related systems showed no great variations. Kumarila,
who regarded sound of speech (Sabda~) as a substance, enumera-
ted in its place vibrating sound ( dhvanifz) among the qualities. 188
Prabhakara explained the number as a separate category and
went his own independent way on many points. But seen broadly
or by large, the variations are unimportant and the dependence
on the Vaise~ika is palpable.
In conclusion, if we cast a glance on the total category of
-qualities, we must say that its compilation must have involved
fairly great pains. Not only a rich traditional material had to
be sifted and classified but also the transmitted views had to be
changed in many ways. And new thought-processes led to the
formulation of new qualities.
The Category of Movement-Things were quite different with
regard to the category of Movement (karma). The tradition
offered in this respect only little. Because what was taught by
the mechanics of the old nature-philosophy was the idea of
movement but nothing more. A distinction of the sub-varieties
of movement was lacking. But one would not be satisfied with
that. When already different substances and qualities were for-
mulated and enumerated, oue wished also to put against them
a corresponding series of movements. Though tradition <lid not
offer much, one compiled, as well as it could go, one such

series. Thereby raising (utkxepar}am), letting down ( avak.>epai:zam) ,
bending ( iikuncanam), stretching (prasiirai:zam) and going
(gamanam) were distinguished. About the superficiality and
vulnerability of this classification, we need not speak. Simply
different sorts of movements of the human body were compiled.
The differentiation of these kinds of movement gained no further
importance for the system. They were once enumerated and then
there is no more talk about them. But enough was done to fulfill
the necessity to juxtapose a number of the sub-varieties of move-
ments, corresponding to different sub-varieties of substances and
qualities.
There were found opponents who contested this classi-
fication of movement189 and the V aise~ika held fast, with the
tenacity customary to the finished system, to the once formulated
assertions. When the opponent said that the distinction of
different kinds of movement lacked justification, as all move-
ments are a change of place and a going, the representatives
of the Vaise~ika replied that a particular group of activities
called forth an entirely fixed idea different from other ideas and
that corresponding sub-varieties of movement must, therefore,
be accepted. Again the opponent observed that it also proved
true in other cases and that one, therefore, must posit other
special cases of movement like entering and going out as its
sub-varieties. Thereupon, the representatives of the Vaise ~ika
retorted that in such cases no definite sub-varieties could be
had, because it depends on the stand-point of the observer
whether one understands it as going in or going out. But philo-
sophically, these discussions are unimportant. They lead to no
result, as it always happens, when of the two opponents one
is bound by a preconceived opinion and does not wish to be
persuaded or to take advice. It is, therefore, unnecessary to enter
further into such discussions.
With this, we have finished the first stage in the develop-
ment of the doctrine of categories. We have seen how one
filled the given frame through the formulation of the first three·
categories. It was a very important step. With it, one had begun
to build the simple basic ideas of the doctrine of categories further
into a system and the basic lines of the system began already
to stand out. Still it was only the first step. A further way was
to be covered until the full completion of the classical system.
Towards this end the development ran in two directions. On the
one hand, the frame of the doctrine of categories was widened
through the addition of newer categories. On the other hand,
one sought to employ the stuff offered by the doctrine of cate-
gories, because it remodelled the world-picture given by the
old nature-philosophy in the light of the doctrine of categories.
The Category of Commonness-The first, that occurred, was the
formulation of anew category of Commonness (siimiinyam). It falls
before the period to which our sources reach back and we can only
conjecture as to which thought-processes led to it. But we know at
least a doctrine with which the Vaise~ika could come in contact
and with which probably it did. The doctrine is connected with
a problem in the orbit of the philosophy of language-the ques.-
tion of the subject or the object of the word. 190
To the greatest scientific performances of the Indians
belongs, as is well known, what they have attained in the sphere
of the linguistic science. They had already created, in the pre-
Christian period, a Grammar of their classical language Sanskrit
which not only deals with phonetics and accidence with unusual
precision but has also considered word-formation and syntax
and, even beyond that, has summed up the total language-
material in a sort of a dictionary of roots. The whole represents
a performance which, through its deep penetration into the
structure of language and through its systematization and com-
pleteness, has remained unrivalled until in the newest times.
Besides Grammar, they also occupied themselves early with the
problems of linguistic philosophy. They inquired into the
nature of the word and the sentence and into their subjects.
In conjunction with it, the problems of epistemology were also
thoroughly discussed. Their inquiry could go so far that a
famous grammarian Bhartrhari (about 460-520 A.D.) formula-
ted a very well-known doctrine according to which the word is
the 'ur-ground' (the first cause) of things. In the course of our
presentation we shall repeatedly be compelled to come back to
the Indian science of language and its views.
In the present case, what to us is of importance concerns
the views of the Grammarian about the subject of the word. 1111
In the oldest period, when man dealt with the question as to

what was the subject of the word, the natural reply was that
, this subject was seen in something ( dravyam) of the external
world. But soon one became conscious that one and the same
word can denote a large number of individual things; then the
question confronted itself as to how it was possible and to what
subject the word properly clings. The reply given thereto was
that it is the form (akrtifl) which is common to all individual
things and which is, therefore, the cause why the same word is
used for all. Thus there were two opinions of which one assu-
med that the individual thing was the subject of the word while
the other believed to find the subject of the word in the
form (akrti[l) of the thing. 192 Finally, an attempt was made to
unite both these views with one another; it was explained that
both an individual thing and form were expressed by the
word, but then now only the one, now the other stands in the
forefront.
In this doctrine of the Grammarian it is important that
they distinguished between an individual thing and a homoge-
neous constituent which is common to many several things.
The Vaise~ika joined in that view and it depended, above all,
on fathoming the nature of the homogeneous constituent. It is
characteristic of the system, how it goes far deep beyond the
start offered or made by the Grammarian.
The form(akrtifl) assumed by the Grammarian turned out
for the Vaise:;;ika as unusable or inapplicable. Form had been
discussed in the formulation of the category of quality. 193
Thereby, a quality named extension (parima7,1am) had been
accepted. In the remaining, form was known only as an arrange-
ment of parts of which a thing is composed (saT{lsthanam). Of
th~m, extension could not be independently considered as the
subject of the word. One would not decide in favour of the
arrangement of parts. According to the spirit of Realism which
rules the Vai:icsika, they naturally traced the commonness in
the individual things back to an independent entity. In that, it
was still considered that, from the stand-point of the doctrine of
categories, commonness was believed to be recognized not only
in substances but also in qualities and movements. Thus it was
resolved to trace the commonness in all things, in substances,
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEl?IKA 103
qualities and movements back to an independent category which

could also be simultaneously regarded as the subject of the word.
It was, therefore, assumed that there is a category called com-
monness which, as an independent entity, indwells all homoge-
neous things and lends them the homogeneous character. Thus
it was thought, for example, that the commonness 'cowness'
(gotvam) dwells in all cows and operates in such a way that we
know and characterize them as cows.
Thus, a question of commonness in individual things
was, no doubt, answered but there arose a series of new ques-
tions Above all, the followi11g question urgently came forward:
What man usually comprehends as commonness is, in no way,
mere commonness. The cowness, for example, is common to
all cows and allows them to appear as homogeneous or of the
same kind. But at the same time it distinguishes them from the
things of other kinds, for example, from the horses; in this view,
it is not commonness but Peculiarity or Particularity (vife~a~).
Thus one came to the conclusion that the so-called common-
nesses have a double character-partly as commonness, partly as
peculiarity. It was said : 'commonness or peculiarity depends on
comprehension' .194 A second thing came out of it. It was re-
cognized that the sphere of different commonnesses is greatly
different and it was observed that the commonnesses with
larger spheres appear as commonnesses against those with
narrower spheres, while the commonnesses with narrower
spheres present themselves as peculiarities against the common-
nesses with larger spheres. So one was confronted with the
question, how these phenomena are to be assessed.
On a more precise reflection, one came to the following
views : It was said that the entities, which lend the things their
general character and which are predominantly considered as
commonnesses, form a ladder of steps from those with the widest
sphere to those with the narrowest. Of them only the border-
line cases are exclusively constituted by commonness or pecu-
liarity. Existence (bhava~ or satta) has the widest sphere. It
occurs in all substances, qualities and movements and is ex-
clusively a commonness. The entities form the contrasting bor-
der-line cases which occur in individual permanent substances
and distinguish them from all homogeneous or heterogeneous
things. They are exclusively a peculiarity (visefaq). Everything

that lies in between is partly commonness, partly peculiarity;
it appears as peculiarity as against higher commonnesses and as
commonness against the lower. Substanceness ( dravyatvam)
represents itself as peculiarity against existence, as it is a form
of existence which distinguishes the substances from other re-
maining forms, from the qualities and movements. It (substance-
ness) appears, however, as commonness against earthness
(prthvitvam), as it binds together its bearer the earth with
water, fire, etc. as homogeneous. These commonnesses are,
therefore, called with a double name : commonness-peculiarity
(siimiinyavi!efab). In later times, the term genus (Jiitil.z) served
as an expression for it.
With a view to judging all these entities and their organi-
zation in the doctrine of categories, the following formulation
was made regarding them : First of all for the last peculiarity,
which could no more be considered as commonness, a farther
category of peculiarity was posited. For the rest it was clear
that the existence (sattii) as the highest commonness represented
the category of commonness (siimanyam). With regard to the
lower commonnesses, there was vacillation at first. In this res-
pect, partly an independent category of commonness-peculiarity
(siimanyavisefa(z) was posited. 195 Finally, the orthodox system
decided to explain them as commonness, because it was said
that they are basically considered commonnesses and are
designated as peculiarities only in a metaphorical sense.
In this way, a clarity was attained, regarding the positing
of categories and their kinds. The next question concerned the
relation of these new categories to the old. In this respect, the
following view was decided upon : Like all categories except
substances, commonness and peculiarity cannot stand indepen-
dently but require a bearer. But whereas the qualities and
movements and, as man assumed, also the last peculiarities can
only cllng to a substance, the commonness can also dwell in
the qualities and, movements. No further commonness can
dwell in the commonness, just as the qualities and movements
cannot dwell further in qualities and movements.
These arc simple assumptions and are explicable from the
point of their attempt to create the ideas assimpleandas clear
as possible about the relation of categories with one another.

Essentially more difficult was the answer to the question as to
how the working of the commonness in individual cases has
been introduced. Finally, the following rule was formulated for
it. There is, it was said, for every kind of homogeneous things,
one and only one commonness which lends them their homoge-
neous character. This commonness is permanent and exists
everywhere in all its bearers. The one commonness indwells
undivided and entire in its every bearer.
It is a remarkable doctrine which actually challenged
contradiction. It was sought to establish it in all its points in
this or that way. For example, it was said that there is respecti-
vely only one commonness because the characteristic, in which
we recognize it, is the same everywhere and we have no occa-
sion to assume several commonnesses. Or it was said that com-
monnesses are permanent because they are different from their
bearers and do not originate or disappear with them. But
these reasons do not satisfy. As a matter of fact, they are not
the essential ones. In reality, the cited doctrine was formulated
in spite of its difficulties in order to escape still greater diffi-
culties.196 Naturally, under such circumstances this doctrine was
the target for the attacks of the most different opponents. It
was connected with detailed discussions which dragged on
through many centuries in connection with the discussion of the
question of epistemology. On that account we shall have to
return to it in details later on. Here what has been said
may suffice provisionally.
The Category of Inherence-The positing of the categories of
commonness and peculiarity was the most important expansion
which the doctrine of categories underwent beyond the old
three categories. The classical system later added only one
more category-the Inhercnce (samava_ya(1). This category is
again an example of the acuteness and clarity of the building
up of ideas which distinguishes the Vai§e~ika system of the
classical time. As one learnt, through the doctrine of categories,
to see things as a conglomeration of various categories, the
question arose as to what holds these categories together and
connects them into a unity. 197 It was seen that the quality of
connection did not come into consideration in this respect. In
the working out of the Category of this quality it had been

defined as a union of things not formerly united. 198 It had
been recognized that it originates only through a movement of
things which connect themselves with one another and it is
abrogated again through the separation of things. But that does
not hold true in the case of Categories. There is, therefore, no
union of earlier separated things. Because they only occur toge-
ther. Again the things, which are united through a connection,
could stand independently by themselves. It is not the case with
regard to categories. On the contrary, in the case of the two
categories which are connected with one another, there is one
which is always the bearer, while the second always clings to this
bearer and is likewise borne by it. A union of several categories is,
therefore, something quite different from two things being con-
nected by connection. It was taught, therefore, that in this case
there is no connection (sarrzyogab) but an indwelling inherence
( samaviiyaM.
This inherence cannot be a quality. It had been assumed
that the quality of connection indwells the substances which it
unites. The inherence, which connects the different categories
with one another, must accordingly indwell not only substances
but also qualities and all other categories. But that is not'
possible in the case of a quality because qualities can indwell
only the substances. So one was compelled to explain inherence
as an independent category.
It was, therefore, assumed that the connection of different
categories with one another ensues through a further category
of inherence which is defined as the connection of things
occurring not separated ( ayutasiddhalz) which stand in relation
of the bearer and the borne with each other (adhiiryadhiirabh utab).
This definition of inherence stood the test and was, there-
fore, held to firmly in future. Only on one point, it, still re-
quired clarification. It turned out to be necessary to fix more
exactly, what is to be understood under separate occurrences.
On a reflection of all cases coming under consideration it was
seen that there is a case in which no inherencc but a connec·
tion (saT{lyogafz) was present in which, however, the things concer-
ned occur, in spite of everything, not separated. Above all, there
was the case in which the infinitely big substances are concer-
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEl}IKA 107
ned. Between the atoms of the four elements and the space, for
example, there exists no inherence but only a connection. Still,
the atoms and space occur not separated, as the atoms outside
space cannot be thought of. Similar is the case with the psy-
chical organs and the souls, as soon as the souls were regarded,
as was done by the classical Vaise~ika, as infinitely great. (In
order to avoid this difficulty, !the separate occurrences were
defined as the possibility to move, by oneself, separated (prthag-
gatimattvam). This is granted in the case of atoms vis-a-vis space,
as well as in the case of psychical organs vis-a-vis the souls.
Thus the connection between atoms and space, as well as that
between the psychical organs and souls does not fall under the
definition of Inherence but can be regarded as connection with-
out much ado. This solution was helpful where the connection
between infinitely great substances and limited substnces was
dealt with. It failed when one came to define the relation of
infinitely great substances with one another. Because infinitely
great substances, according to the Vai·jel}ika doctrine, cannot
move, movement being a change of place. There was, therefore,
nothing left but to infer that the infinitely great substances could·
not be connected with one another through connection. As no
inherence was considered possible, one was, therefore, constrain-
ed· to assume that between two such substances, there can be
no connection. In fact, this view also was represented and one
did not fight shy of the inference that under these circum-
stances, the souls stand in no relation to space and time.
A second case of things which do not occur separated but·
between which, still, only the connection and no inherence exists
is, for example, that of ;the body and the skin called the sense-
organ of touch. Both occur not separated, still there stands bet·
ween them no inherence. Here one helped himself with the
explanation that there is a separate occurrence also when two
thing> inhere in separate bearers (yukte~v ti.fraye~u samavaya~ ),·
It is the case of the body an<l the skin. Therefore, they are to be
considered as separately occurring and what holds them to
gether is the quality of connection. With this solution, one did
not hit the core of the matter but it helped to explain away the
shocking dillicultics and one rested content therewith.
Regarding what remains regarding the exact constituent
of the Category of Inherence and its operation, the following

doctrine was formulated. There is only one single permanent
Inherence. This stays in all things which inhere in one another
and produces the connection between them. Its own existence
in the things is, on the other hand, not caused by any further
inherence, but is conditioned by its own nature. This doctrine,
just like the corresponding doctrine with regard to the category
of commonness, arose as the necessary inference in the sense of
the system. And one firmly defied all the antagonist's objections.
With the category ofinherence, a number of six categor-
ies was reached and with it the circle of the categories which
found acceptance in the classical Vai~esika system was closed.
Not that there were wanting further attempts to posit further
categories. But these attempts did not prevail. Already there
were not lacking differences of opinion regarding the last descri-
ed categories. It is evinced especially distinctly by the doctrines
of related Schools. All the stronger was, therefore, naturally the
opposition against the recognition of newer categories.
The Controversial Categories-Regarding the already described
categories, e.g, the famous Mimarµsa teacher Kumarila asser-
ted against the Vaise~ika doctrine of the two categories of com-
monness and peculiarity that there is only one category common-
ness, but that this commonness is no separate entity by itself
but is imeparably bound up with the separate nature of indivi-
dual things. There is, on the other hand, no independent cate-
gory of peculiarity nor of inherence. This doctrine, according to
which, there is found united a double nature in things, which
allows itself to partly appear in this, partly in that, was named
as the doctrine ofrelativity (s_yiidviidal;) and is found also in the
Sarµkhya system199 and in the system of the Jaina. 20° Also the
second great Mimarµsa teacher Prabhakara, the opponent of
Kumarila, differed in this regard from the named categories of
the Vai:\e~ika doctrine, though to a small extent. For him, the
category of commonness is a separate entity by itself and he
also holds the category of inherence as valid. But he denied the
category of peculiarity and asserted that the peculiarity of things
is not different from the quality of separateness which dwells in
the individual permanent substances. 201
But in the case of Prabhakara, we also find the attempt to posit
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAlSEt!IKA 109
further categories beyond those of the Vaisesika. Thus we have al-,

ready heard thathe regarded the number not as a quality, like the
Vaisesika, but considered it as a separatecategory. 202 Further, he
assumed, besides the category of commonness, an independent
category of similarity ( sadr§yam) which is the cause that things
appear to us as similar and we compare them with one ano-
ther. 203 Both these did not win any attention among the adhe-
rents of the Vaise~ika and gained no further importance, other-
wise. Important, on the other hand, in his attempt to formulate
an independent category of force or capacity (.Saktib). With that
he touched a problem which was especially ofinterest for the Bud-
dhist Schools. 204 In this he does not also stand alone. Because as
the acceptance of category of force in Candrama ti's text-book of' ten
categories' testifies, the Vaise~ika also occupied themselves with the
problem. Candramati, indeed, in accordance with the succinct-
ness of his work, teaches that there is a category of force or capa-
city which inheres in substances, qualities and movements and it
is a necessary presupposition that they bring forth their effect toge-
ther or in isolation and this category is placed against a second
category ofincapacity. 205 We seek, in vain, in it, a discussion of
the questions connected therewith and of a detailed proof for posi-
ting this category.In the School of Prabhakara, on the other hand,
we find an attempt to establish the assumption of the category
of force or capacity. 206 In general, it was said, we could infer from
every effect a force or capacity in its cause by which it was bro-
ught forth. But the fact that this force or capacity (Saktib) is an
independent one, different from the cause itself, can be deduced
from the following : When a conjuror through his magical word
abrogates the effect of poison or of fire, the poison or fire still
continues to remain afterwards as before. The activity of the
conjuror, therefore, eliminates something which releases the eff-
ects or the working but which is different from the cause itself.
lt can only be a force or capacity which indwells the cause. This
positing of proof, however, is not considered valid by the ortho-
dox school of the Vaisetiika, as it denies this category in general. 201
It was said that when following the activity of the conjuror, the
effect of poison or lire stays away, it depends not on the extinction
of the power or the capacity which otherwise indwells the poison
or fire but on the fact that it depends on the totality of causes
( kiiravasiimagri) which releases the effect and belongs to the poison

or fire, and that then only a change comes in. Thatthis totality
of causes bring~ forth their effect, presupposes that a hindrance
which would hinder their working, does not exist (pratibandhakii-
hhiiva&). When, therefore, a conjuror interferes, this presupposition
is not fulfilled, the totality of the causes is not the same and
consequently, its effect cannot take place.
A further idea with which man occupied himself about the
same period in a lively manner and which also led to the
attempt to formulate a new category is non-existence (abhiivab).
The impulse to it was given by the theory of knowledge and
formed the starting point of the question viz. how it is possible
to know a non-existing thing. The view was put forward that
every knowledge is caused by its object and now it was asked
how non-existence can be operative as a cause. In order to
answer this question, it was taught that every non-existence is
only another aspect of existence. The non-existence of a pot,
for example, consists in the fact that the pot is not available in
that place of the ground, in which one expects to find it. Its
non-existence is, therefore, to a certain extent embodied by this
place of the ground, in so far as the pot is not found in it. In
the same way one cannot find the non-existence of an effect in
a cause, in so far as it does not contain it. In a similar way,
all other cases can be interpreted on the basis of these views.
Candramati, the Vai~e~ika author, made a statement that there
is a category of non-existence. He distinguished five kinds of
non-existence-the earlier or former non-existence (priigabhiiva&),
non-existence through vanishing (pradhvarrzsiibhiiva(1), reciprocal
non-existence (anyonyiibhlivab), non-existence with regard to a
connection ( sarµsargiibhlivab), and the complete non-existence
(atyantiibhiivab) .208 Of these, the earlier or former non-existence
is the non-existence of effect in the cause, the non-existence
throw'.h vanishing is the non-existence of the cause in the effect.
Umlcr reciprocal non-existence is to be understood the non-
existence of a horse in a cow and of a cow in a horse. Non-
existence with regard to a connection is the non·cxistence of
anything in others, so far as they are neither connected with
them nor inhere in them; finally corriplete non-existence deals
with the non-existence of horns on the head of a hare. 209
7. l'HE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEl?IKA 111
Almost the same kinds of non-existence were recognized

by the remaining representatives of the Vaisel?ika and in the
different schools of the Mimarµsa. But in respect of the
assumption of an independent category, Candramati's view did
not prevail at least in the Vaisel?ika. We, therefore, find in
the concluding presentation of the classical Vaise~ika system-in
the Padiirtha-dharmasarµ,grahal; of Prafastapada, the category
of non-existence not cited. But the question was, in no way,
settled. The discussions were continued further and led to a
change of views on certain points. Finally non-existence came to
be enrolled as the seventh category in addition to the six
categories of the classical system. But it is a development which
already exceeds far beyond the period with which we are here
occupied and in which later influences have cooperated. We
shall, therefore, not enter into it further at this place and shall
return to our proper subject viz. the origin and formulation of
the doctrine of categories in the Vaise~ika system of the classi-
cal period.
We have already, hitherto, described how the doctrine of
categories originated, i.e. how one came to distinguish categories
as different forms of existence and how one gradually formulated
different categories, determined their nature and delimited their
spheres. The development, however, did not end therewith for
a long time. As we have already pointed out during the origin
of the doctrine of categories, 210 the doctrine of categories in India
reached suchimportance, because one, with the genuine Indian
profundity, thought out to the last their implications and exhaus-
ted all the possibilities of application implicit in them. It occurred
in the following manner:
With the hitherto existing thoughts, the basic ideas of the
doctrine of categories were already there. But one was not satis-
fied with that. On the other hand, a further step was taken to
employ these basic ideas i.e. an attempt was made to think out
through and through the old nature-philosophy and to clothe it
in the form of the Categories. Thus an effort was made to create
a complete system which rested on the scaffolding of the cate-
gories.
We shall now try to get ac<]uainted with and understand
that system. Because its irnporlance is not small. It represents,
in a certain measure, the test of tl}e doctrine of categories on its

possibility of application and its worth. But above all, its manner
of looking at things has become standard or authoritative for a
wide sphere of Indian philosophy and has remained valid up to
the latest period so that we shall have also to reckon with it in
our later presentation. While we recognize its historical impor-
tance from the beginning, we shall not overlook the serious
disadvantage in which this development resulted. The fault li~s
mainly, in the fact that the Vaise~ika gradually got lost in an
unfruitful scholasticism. We had hitherto many occasions in the
course of presentation to point out this disadvantage. But at this
point of development, however, it stood out prominent in all
its full extent. Here, therefore, it would not be out of place to
speak a few words about it and about the Indian Scholasticism
in general.
The Emergence of Scholasticism-With the name Scholasticism,
I characterize a form of philosophizing in Indian philosophy
which does not start from a living view of things but which rests
on a data, once given, of ideas and develops a system out of
them. This is the essential thing. These ideas need not be given
through revelation and, in their demonstration, need in no
way an appeal to authority in place of logical reasoning, as it
was often emphasized in European Scholasticism. Therefore, it
is possible, as we shall see, for example, in the Vai:je~ika that in
India a nature-philosophy also falls into a Scholasticism.
The way it occurs is, as a rule, as follows : One seeks to
employ the given ideas in a practical way, as he attempts to
explain with their help the things, for the interpretation of which
he is endeavouring. Thereby, different assumptions turn out as
necessary. On the basis of these assumptions, an edifice of
hypothesis is built up. When difficulties come up, new assump-
tions are seized upon. Thus arises an airy, fanciful complicated
edifice of thought which, finally, has scarcely to do anything with
real things. Because one seeks the confirmation of the assumption
made, not through observation and experience, but on the other
hand, is satisfied, if with their help, the erected hypothesis-
edifice suffers no jolts or knocks and exhibits no contradictions.
I will elucidate it from some examples of the Vaise~ika.
According to the old Nature-doctrine of the Vai:~e~ika, things
are formed out of the Elements. These are characterized by

qualities and their movement causes every rise and disappearance.
Thereby, there appear, in abundance, many phenomena which
are homogeneous with each other and also different from the
heterogeneous ones. Everything is translated into the idea of the
doctrine of categories. The things are built out of substances
in which qualities and movements inhere and which are, be~
sides, characterized by different commonnesses. In order to carry
out these ideas lucidly or graphically the following assumptions
, were seized upon. The bearers of different categories, out of which
t things are composed are the substances. Qualities and move-
ments inhere in them. In them no further qualities and move-
ments could inhere. Because the inherence of qualities and
movements is the essential sign of substances. Moreover, other-
wise the inherence of further qualities and movements would
continue endlessly. Similarly, commonnesses inhere in the sub-
stances, qualities and movements. On the other hand, nofurther
commonnesses inhere in the commonnesses. The inherence finally
is the cause by which the rest of the categories inhere in one
another: But they cannot cause their own inherence.
These fundamentals were used in all individual cases and
one did not hesitate from the conclusion where it seemed neces-
sary, with a regardless or ruthless consistency, peculiar to classical
Indian philosophy. We shall take, as an example, the doctrine
of sound. The old nature-doctrine had assumed that the sound.
moves towards the ear from the place of its origin. But now that
confronted difficulties. Because, it was already formulated as a
basic tenet that the qualities cannot inhere in any movement
i.e. they, therefore, cannot move. But according to the doctrine
of the school, sound is a quality, namely, of Ether and cannot,
1'herefore, move. How then does it reach the ear? In order to
remove the difficulty the following assumption was made : The
sound, it was said, disappears immediately after its rise. But
simultaneously, it calls forth a new sound which again calls a
new one and this propagates itself like a wave until it reache~
the e·ar of the hearer. This theory reminds us, at the first glance
of the modern idea of propagation of sound-waves. In reality,
it has naturally the least to do with it. So, as it was originally
meant, this idea of a series of continually originating new quali-;
ties is rather remarkable.

A similarly strange doctrine, which one comes across, is the
theory of movement, though in a different way. When we assume
that a body isputinmotion by an impulse or a stroke and moves
as long as it hits another body and comes to rest, it presents itself
according to the doctrine of categories in the following way :
The impact which brings the movement to a stand-still is a con-
nection ( sarµyoga~). The connection originates in both when the
moving body comes in contact with the body in rest. It is caused
by movement while the movement itself disappears when the
connection arises. It was, therefore, taught that the effect of
the movement i.e. connection abrogates its cause-the movement
itself. But this assumption raised doubts. With the impact, the
moving body moved a certain distance wide through space and
therefore came into connection with different places of space.
As we know, according to the Vaise~ika, every position in space
depends, according to the Vaise~ika doctrine, on a connection
of the object concerned with the substance named space. If one
did not wish to abandon the previous assumption that the con-
nection called forth through movement abrogates the movement
itself, it must be also held good to apply to all these connections
with space. As a matter of fact, one did not fight shy of such a
conclusion. So one arrived at the doctrine that every movement in
space consists of a series of movement-moments of which
every one disappears again immediately, while the spring or force
of the moved body calls forth the next.
This may provisionally suffice as an example in order
to characterize the manner of thought which I name as
Scholasticism and which came to prominence now in the
Vaise~ika. In this way the doctrine of categories was
applied to the old Nature-doctrine and was developed into a
system. Indeed, it never attained to a complete system, although
it gained validity for the whole sphere of old nature-doctrine.
It is due to the fact that its application on a wider sphere did
not bring in anything essentially new in the world-construction
or the construction of the human organism. Therefore, one left,
out of account, an exhaustive treatment of this sphere in the new
way and rather restricted himself to the more exact handling of
isolated important fundamental casea. We shall, therefore, in our
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS ANO THE VAISE~IKA l l5
presentation, reckon with and restrict ourselves to a few cases
which gained an entirely new look in the light of the doctrine
of categories and which are of general basic importance. They
are the Theory of the Aggregates, the Causality-Theory, and the
Theory of Perception.
The Theory of Aggregates-Rf'garding the Theory of the
Aggregates, we shall distinguish between the coming about of
the aggregates and their constituents ; we shall first of all deal
with how the aggregates come into existence.
In the description of the atom-doctrineoftheold Vaise~ika
we have heard that according to this doctrine, the origin and
disappearance of all things depends on the connection and the
separation of Atoms. But that produced a difficulty into which
every atomic theory, created out of theoretical considerations,
gets entangled irretrievably-the difficulty to bridge over the
chasm between the indivisible and endlessly small atom and the
aggregates formed out of them. It must be said that this bridg-
ing over has not succeeded in the atom-doctrine. Here came in
now the doctrine of categories. Because it enabled to let the
problem appear in an entirely different light and to lead to the
solution satisfactory at least from its point of view.
From the stand-point of the doctrine of categories, this
problem was presented as follows : The Atoms and the aggre-
gates, according to their size, distinguish themselves through the
fact th at they are the structures of the elements in which differ-
ent sorts of the quality of extension (parimiii;iam) inhere. As we
have seen during the description of the quality of extension 211 , be-
sides the indivisible infinite smallness or roundness(parimiii;itfa{Yam)
of the atom, they also distinguished smallness ( atlUtvam) and big-
ness (mahattvam). Of them, smallness is designated by the smallest
extension, while everything beyond that is to be considered as
bigness. Smallness (ai;iutvam) was ascribed to the double atoms
( dyatzukiini) consisting of two atoms and bigness (mahattvam) to
all further aggregates. In the formation of the aggregate, it was
considered valid to explain how in the transition from the atom
to the double atoms and greater structures, another sort of
extension steps in, in place of one sort of extension.
Now, indeed, it was not possible to derive the one from
the other without much ado. Because it belongs to the basie
maxim of the system that in the formation of aggregates out of

the qualities of their constituents, only homogeneous qualities
can arise forth. That is to say, in application to our case, when
out of big aggregates still greater ones are formed, the great-
ness of the one can arise from the greatness of the other; but
neither out of roundness (ptirimiirp/,alya) can arise smallness
(m:zutvam) nor out ofsmallness can bigness be derived. In order
to obviate this difficulty, the following way out was chosen. It
was said that it is the number of atoms which bring forth the
extension of the aggregate. When two atoms form together into
double atoms, it is the number two inhering in both the atoms
which brings forth the smallness (atzutvam) of double atoms.
When many atoms form a bigger aggregate, it is their plurality
which causes the bigness (mahattvam). Thereby, originally greater
aggregates are allowed to rise directly out of the atoms. Later on,
it was taught that they areformed out of the double atoms. 2iz
Evidently, one wished to derive their bigness not directly out
of the roundness of the atoms but wished this course of develop-
ment to pass through an intermediate stage of smallness (atzut-
vam ).21s
The formation of the aggregates is carried out in the
following way : When atoms come to a conglomeration, first of
all, two atoms form together double atoms. Thus, the number two
indwelling the two individual atoms calls forth the extension of
smallness (atzutvam) in the double atoms. Three or more of such
double atoms form, then, the greater aggregates whereby the
number three or more inhering in them calls forth in these
aggregates the extension, bigness( mahattvam). When further on,
such aggregates form still greater unities, their bigness arises out
of the bigness of these aggregates.
With this doctrine, there was given a satisfactory explana-
tion of the origin of the aggregate in the sense or light of the
system-indeed, in the sense or light of the system only. To us,
this working with the idea of the doctrine of categories appears
rather arbitrary. Above all, it shows distinctly the dangerous
slipping off of the old Nature-philosophy from the graphic reality
into the construction of a pure thought-world-a slipping off,
which essentially contributed towards cutting off further develop-
ment, as in the place of the living knowledge of nature, there
finally stepped in the empty play of hollow scholasticism.
Not only the origin of the aggregate but also its constitu-
tion allowed or made the doctrine of categories itself to appear
in an entirely new light. According to the doctrine of categories,
all things represent a complex of different categories and, no
doubt, they consist as such, if we restrict ourselves to the essentials
of a substance, which is the bearer of different qualities and in
which their qualities as well as a number of commonnesses inhere.
It holds good naturally in the case of the aggregates as well as in the
case of their constituents. Now it is clear that the qualities and co-
mmonnesses which occur in an aggregate are different from those
which characterize their constituents. To give only a simple exam-
ple, the extension (parimiil'jam) of a cloth is different from that
of the individual threads of which it is woven and the common-
ness-clothness (patatvam)inheres only in thewholecloth butnotin
the threads. Wit.h the force of logic, it follows from it that the
aggregate must be something different from its constituents.
This doctrine was therefore formulated and presented by the
adherents of the Vaise~ika.
But how have we to think of such an aggregate? How i11
it related to its constituents? These questions were answered by
the Vaise~ika in the following way: Through the connection (sa-
1[lyogab) of parts { avayaviif1) of which a thing is composed, there
arises quite a new thing, a uniform whole (avayavi) different
from its parts and which inheres in these parts. Out of the subs-
tance of the parts arises the substance of the whole, out of the
qualities of the parts arise the qualities of the whole Thereby,
as a rule, the qualities of the whole are of the same kind as the
qualities of the parts but many are also different as, for example,
their extension ( parimiir.zam). Also new qualities step in, for
example, connection (sa1[lyogab) which unites the parts to the
whole. But, above all, there arise in the whole, when it originates,
a number of commonnesses which inhere in it and lend it its pe-
culiar character. This whole is, in contrast to the permanent atoms,
perishable. As it originates through the connection of its parts,
it also perishes together with the qualities, when these parts
again separate from one another.
This is the doctrine of the whole, the most characteristic
but also the most controversial doctrine of the Vaise~ika. Because
this idea of a whole, indwelling 'the parts as a separate entity

different from the parts, which might. have been thought out
consistently from the presuppositions of the system is highly re-
markable. It challenged opposition and was the target of
violent attack continually. From the side of the Vaise~ika it
was tenaciously defended. This discussion continued through
centuries, through the whole period of the second or a late flow-
ering of the classical period of Indian philosophy, to which we
shall have to return again in the presentation of that period.
The New Form of the Theory of Causality-With this doctrine
of the whole, the whole world-picture of the VaiSe~ika suffered
an essential change. As we have already seen, for the older
Vaise~ika an atomistic-mechanistic interpretation held good,
according to which all origin and destruction is a play of the
permanent and unchangeable atoms and we have shown how
this grand view of the picture appears as a counterpart to the
likewise sublime conception of the Sarµkhya of the permanent
changing Urmatter. 214 Now came into this world-picture a rift.
It was no more the permanent atoms alone which ruled all
origin and disappearance. Besides them, there emerged now the
different perishable aggregates. And the origin and disappear-
ance no more appeared as mere conglomeration and separation
of atoms but as origination and disappearance of something
quite new which did not exist before. It was an essentially diffe-
rent comprehension which had replaced the old world-picture.
This new comprehension found its expression in a theory which
represents the most characteristic maxim of the classical Vai-(;e1?i-
ka and has been continually regarded as such. With respect to
the great rival Sarµkhya and in contrast to it, this doctrine was
formulated and was given a corresponding form The adherents
of the Sarµkhya, in their doctrine of the incessant modifica-
tion of the one permanent Urmatter, had seen the essential in
the persistence ofUrmatter itself. For them the decisive thing
was that it was enduring in all change, that it was already
present in all origination and disappearance, appearing conti-
nually in newer forms. The Sarµkhya had, for all causal occur-
rences, formulated the doctrine that it is never something new
which arises, but it is already present in this cause-the so-called
SatktiryaviidafJ.BH As against this, now, the representatives of the
Vaise~ika formulated, on the basis of their comprehension of the

whole, the opposite doctrine. For them, every new arising is the·
origination of something completely new and they represented
the theory that the effect is not present in the cause: the
asatkaryavada}J,.
It was not only the general picture of the causal occur-
rence which appeared in a new form. The causality-theory of
the older Vai·3e~ika was also completely remodelled on the basis
of the doctrine of categories. Indeed, with this remodelling, the
system was not very happy and the result was a difficult and
confused theory.
As we have earlier said, 216 the older Vaise~ika distinguished
between the material cause (kiirar.tam in the strict sense) and the.
occasioning cause ( nimittam) and the interest held good, as in
the Sarµkhya, above all, in the case of the material cause.·
According to it, the material cause of all things was seen, accor-
ding to the old Atomic doctrine, in the atoms out of which
•' things are formed. The Atoms are, in consonance with this
theory, according to the matter, of the same nature or essence
with their products. This relation was represented quite differ-
ently on the basis of the doctrine of the whole. Because the
whole is something new, quite different from the atoms. The
causal connection between the Atoms and the whole must be·
established in a different manner from that through material"
identity and in consonance with the views of the doctrine of
categories.
The following point of view was offered for consideration:·
From the point of view of matter, Atoms and the whole are
likewise different from one another, according to the compre-
hension of the doctrine of categories, as the occasioning causes
(nimittakii.rm;iam) and the things which they occasion. Still there
exists an intimate relation between both-a relation which
most closely connects them with one another. As we have heard,1
according to the doctrine of the classical Vai~e~ika, the whole
inheres in its parts. On this inherence was established the new'
definition of the causal relation.
Thereby, it indeed became necessary to consider the
doctrine of categories to the fullest extent. That is to say, cause
and effect required to be considered not simply as matter, but
as substances in which different other categories inhere. It

was, however, still not too difficult. In the classical Vaise~ika,
it was decided that the last three categories-commonness, pecu-
liarity and inherence do not share in the causal occurrence. 217
So one had practically to reckon, besides the substances, only
with the qualities. Therefore, the things represented themselves
now as follows: In the rise of the whole, the substance of the
whole arises out of the substances of the parts, the qualities of the
whole out of those of the parts. A close relation stands between
both through the fact that the whole inheres in the parts. This
relation connects the substances directly; therefore, the substance
of the parts as a cause of the substance of the whole was named
as an inhering cause ( samaviiyikiirmy,am). Somewhat more
difficult is the case with the qualities, because qualities cannot
inhere in one another. The qualities of the whole, therefore,
are not bound with the qualities of the parts through direct
inherence but through the fact that both inhere in the two
inhering substances. In order to express it, the qualities of the
parts as cause of the qualities of the whole were named as non-
inhering causes ( asamaviiyikiiraJJam). This expression is, indeed,
not very happily chosen. Because it is not supposed to be said
that, in general, there is present no inherence. Then it would
apply to the occasioning cause (nimittakiira1J,am). On the con-
trary, it is only meant that there is no direct inherence and
we need never lose sight of it.
So far the new Causality-Theory represents itself very
simply. Only in place of the old material cause, corresponding
to the distinction between substance and qualities, there have
stepped in the substances, the inhering cause and the quality as
the non-inhering one. But this seeming simplicity did not conti-
nue and was soon crowded out by supplementary distinctions. As
soon as the things began to be thought out on more exact lines,
it was discovered that the new definitions did not conform to
the real relation. Above all, the limits between the different
cases of causal occurrences threatened to disappear and there
was the contingency of different phenomena threatening to
coincide as homogeneous. That was sought to be prevented.
The doctrine was formulated that the substance of the
parts, in which the substance of the newly originating \\hole
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEl[HKA 121
inheres, is its inhering cause. But could not one equally well say
of the qualities of the newly originated whole that the substance,
in which they inhere, should be considered as its inhering
cause? Because in a certain sense, every substance renders
possible the origin of the qualities which inhere in it. It was
decided, therefore, to affirm this view. But the qualities originat.e
not only in the origination of the whole. Also the sound in the
Ether and the qualities of the Soul arise and vanish again.
Consistently, therefore, Ether and Soul must be considered valid
as the inhering causes of sound and the soul-qualities. Thus the
idea of the inhering cause extended its validity gradually far
beyond its original sphere.
Similar was the case with the non-inhering cause. During
the arising of the whole, a movement of the parts is the cause,
so that these join themselves with one another, that is to say,
the quality of connection ( sarp,yoga~} arises in them. Thereby
the movement (karma) inheres in the same substance in which
it calls forth the quality of connection without being directly
connected with it through inherence. It is, therefore, clearly
the non-inhering cause. Then the same must hold good for all
mechanical processes which happen during movements (karma).
When a motion makes an object rebound on another and causes
a. connection with it, it is the non-inheri.1g cause of this connec-
tion. In the reverse, an impulse i.e. a connection which sets an
object in motion is the non-inhering cause of this movement
generated in it. The same holds good for the qualities of heavi-
ness and fluidity when they call forth motion. Otherwise the
qualities could be the non-inhering cause of other qualities,
unless the origination of the whole is concerned. When a
quality of the soul calls forth another, it is, according to the
Vai~e11ika, an occasioning cause ( nimittakiirm:iam). But with the
bringing forth of the sound, it is already different. The connec-
tion of a stick with the drum is an occasioning cause for the
origin of sound. Still the simultaneous connection of the drum
with ether is a non-inhering cause. And the sound, which brings
forth the next following sound, is finally the non-inhering
cause.
This widening of the original sphere of validity of the in·
hering and non-inhering causes led to the result that the
phenomena which appeared as completely heterogeneous,

according to the old Nature-philosophy, now fall in the sphere
of the same form of causal occurrences. Thus again there was
an occasion to hit upon new distinctions which better corres-
ponded with real relations. One of these distinctions was as
follows : In the origination of the whole, a new substance arises
and the newly brought forth qualities inhere in it. In all the
rest of the cases, on the other hand, the substances in which
the new qualities are brought forth, are already existent and
as a rule, the cause inheres in the same substance as its effect.
In consequence, one differentiated, among the non-inhering
causes, such as generate an effect which inheres in their proper
bearer (sviifrayasamavetiirambhakaf:i) and such as bring forth their
effect in another substance (paratrarambhakaf:i). This distinction
is, in general, true ; still as an example, the second definition,
in the case of the quality of effort (prayatnaf:i) could be included
as an occasioning cause (nimittakiirariam). According to a second
distinction, there were qualities which produce a homogeneous
effect ( samanajiitiyarambhakab) as against others which produce
unlike effect (asamiina-jatiyiirambhakaf:i). The first proves true in
the case of the qualities (gw;ah) which originate in the formation
of the whole, and the second in all other cases. Indeed there are
also exceptions here. When a sound calls forth a second sound,
it is a homogeneous effect, without having anything to do with
the origination of a whole. A further distinction was, there-
fore, added. The qualities which go back to a quality in a cause
(kiirat;iaguriapilrvakaf:i) are distinguished from those in which that
is not the case ( akara1Jaguriapiirvakaf:i). These definitions are
clearly calculated to distinguish the cases which are connected
with the origination of the wholes from all other cases. Because
under cause (karar:zam), only the parts are meant--theparts which
form the whole. But, thereby, further definitions and classifica-
tions were not superfluous.
All these definitions with their exceptions and special
cases, in which different definitions intersected, produced a
difficult and an exceedingly complicated Causality-Theory which
is to be understood as having been formulated out of the attempt
of the theory of categories at arranging and classifying ; still it
contributed little to the explanation and better understanding
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 123.
of things in the spirit of the old nature-philosophy. So we may

characterize, it on the whole, not as happy.
In this connection, the following, in short, should be mar-
ked. The Causality-Theory of the Vaise~ika not only included
the origination but also the disappearance of things in its orbit
of consideration. Here the doctrine of categories was taken into
consideration. In that, there is, concerning the substances, an
origination and disappearance only in the case of thi.: wholes.
(avayavina~) and in a whole, the destruction follows through a
movement in its parts which abrogates their connection. The
atoms of the elements as well as all the remaining substances
are, on the other hand, permanent. More difficult are the
relations in the case of the qualities. The qualities of the whole
perish naturally with the perishing of the whole, their bearer.
But there are also numerous qualities which are perishable in
themselves. The case is entirely different with them. An im·
portant case may be mentioned that the Vaise~ika knew the
qualities, which are destroyed through their effect. It holds
good, above all, of the characteristic qualities of the soul. But
also a sound which is brought forth by another sound annihi-
lates the previous one during its origination. In the rest of the
cases, to enter into details will be uninteresting. In conclusion,
it may only be remarked that the movement by which the
connection is caused by it is destroyed and that, as we have
heard, 218 has only the duration of the twinkling of an eye.
With this, we have said what was the most important about
the theory of causality of the classical Vaise~ika and can now
go over to the next point which we wish to handle in this place,
namely the remodelling of the doctrine of Perception under the
influen::e of the d J~trine of cJ.teg0r ics. Here we meet with
especially incisive changes. Because through that, as the
categories doctrine has placed, in place of the simple things
with which the old nature-philosophy had reckoned, a com·
plicated picture compounded of different categories, the views
about the objects of Perception as also about the process of
perception itself were bound to change from the very basis.
The Theory of Perception-The Theory of Perception had origi-
nally to do with the qualities of the elements which corresponded
as objects to the different sense-organs. No doubt, it was then
believed that the things were perceived with their qualities because
the sense-organs came into contact (sawogab) with them. Now
one had learnt to distinguish between the qualities and the
substances which are their bearers. I twas, first of all, of impor-
tance for the assessment of connection between the sense-organs
and the objects. Though in this case, the qualities of things
are the object of perception, it was still clear that the connec-
tion of the sense-organs can ensue directly only with the objects.
It was said, one sees, therefore, colour, when the eye enters
into union with the substance in which the colour inheres
(saT{lyuktasamaviiJ'ab). Besides, the old Nature-philosophy had
recognized the large size of the things concerned and the clear-
<:utness of qualities as a pre-supposition for Perception. 219 It
required now a change and the idea of largeness required a
more precise definition. Because, according to the doctrine of
categories, a large size was known as a special quality which
only belongs to the aggregates which are formed out of at least
three atoms. The bearer of the colour with which the eye enters
into conjunction must, therefore, be an aggregate consisting
of more substances. Only in the last definition-the clearcutness
of qualities-the doctrine of categories did not make any change;
one was satisfied to speak merely of a particular or special con-
stitution of colour. Thus one came to the following formulation:
"A colour is perceived, when it inheres in more substances and
when the colour exhibits a special constitntion. " 220 Similarly it
holds good for the qualities which form the objects of the rest
of the sense-organs-i.e. for taste, smell and touch. 221 Only the
sound assumes a special place. Because the sense-organ, which
perceives it, viz. the ear is a part of Ether in which sound in-
heres; so its perception directly follows on the basis of this
inherence.
In this way, the traditional doctrine of Perception attained
an entirely new outlook. But the mentioned changes were unim-
portant in comparison with the new questions which were
raised by the doctrine of categories. If a distinction was made
between the substances and the qualities, the question, above
all, was bound to be raised whether only the qualities are
perceived, or not also the substances. Further, during the formu-
lation of the doctrine of categories, one had, besides the old
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 12!°>
traditional qualities of the Elements which alone were considered

till that time in the Theory of Perception~ known a whole series
of other qualities, especially the common qualities. Now it was
bound to be asked: What happens in the case of the perception
t
of these qualities ? What happens also in the case of other
remaining categories : movements, peculiarity or particularity,
I
inherence and above all the commonnesses ? All these questions.
pressed forth for answers; long effort and discussion were
required until clarity could be created and a definite doctrine
fixed up about them.
Regarding the question of the Perception of substances,_
the Vaise~ika taught that the substances could be perceived.
During the sight of an object, it was believed that not merely
a colour but a colourful substance was also seen, not merely
redness but the red cloth. Thus there was the comprehension
that the substances are perceived. It agreed with the traditional
views. When one, in order to demonstrate the existence of the
soul, had appealed to the fact that things were seen as well as
felt, that it perceives through the two sense-organs and knows or
recognizes still one and the same thing with it, the perception
of things was presupposed besides the perception of qualities.
But now one began to think out through the whole circle of
questions more exactly. In that connection, above all, one ques-
tion thrust itself in the foreground viz. whether the substances
are perceived independent of qualities or whether their percep-
tion is necessarily bound up with the perception of qualities.
These questions were, first of all, answered in the sense'
that the substances are perceived with their qualities and that
their perception presupposes the perception of the qualities.
But one soon saw himself compelled thereby to distinguish bet-'
ween different qualities. One believed to have observed that
only some qualities together with the substances are perceived,
while on the other hand, others are not. Because, one had the
impression that during the feeling of smell and taste merely the·
qualities i.e. the smell and taste concerned are perceived and.
that in the case of the perception of form and touch, besides the
qualities, their bearers-the substances also are known. Therefore,,
it was taught : "The substances are visible and touchable. "222:
With that, one had decided for the view that the perception
of substances ensues though seeing and touching and presupposes

the qualities of colour and touch. But at the same time, percepti-
bility was restricted to a small circle of substances-namely such
as possess the named qualities. Besides, one point had still to be
considered. The colour is not ascribed to air but only touch is
ascribed to it. It was the old doctrine of the school that air was
only felt but is not perceived ; however, it is only inferred from
touch. 22s Therefore, the air stands separate. Therefore, according
to the doctrine of the classical Vaise~ika, only earth, water and
fire remain as perceptible substances.
For the rest, one thought of the perception of substances
as similar to that of the qualities. The touch with the sense-organs
follows in their case through simple connection ( sarrryogafJ). The
presupposition for its Perception is its largeness. They must be
aggregates which are formed out of more substances. Further
they must possess the qualities, colour and touch in a pronounced
form. It was therefore, taught-"a substance is perceived, if it
is large, embraces more substances and exhibits colour in a clear-
.cut form." 224 The quality 'touch' is not named in this connection
because according to the traditional accumulation theory, every-
where where colour is ascribed, touch also must exist. Simulta-
neously air which is not held to be perceptible, is on that account,
shut out. Because it is said, "The air is not perceived because
it is without colour." 225
This doctrine of the perception of substances shows some
isolated deviations in the related schools. The Mimarµsa school
of Prabhakara represents the view that air is perceived. For that
it was invoked that in the perception of touch, the substance
which is the bearer of the quality of touch, is recognized through
the temporary constitution of this touch-because the touch of
fire is hot, of water cold and that of air, on the other hand, is
neither hot nor cold. 228 Further it is to be mentioned that the
question of the perceptibility of substances plays a great role in
the dispute of the schools. The Buddhist Schools for instance
denied the idea of substances and lively discussion developed
itself when especially from the side of the Nyaya, the perceptibi-
lity of the substances is energetically defended. Thereby, one occa-
5ionallywent so far as to assert that the substance can be perceived
without qualities also. For example the Nyaya author Aviddha-
kari;ia says : "Also without the comprehension of colour, a com-

prehension of substance takes place. Because in a quite feeble
light, without the colour etc. being grasped, a substance is
recognized in an undefined form as cow or horse. " 227 But we
shall return to these discussions on a later occasion.
The next question worth while answering was the question
of the perception of common qualities. As we have already seen
during the description of the category of quality, the most im-
portant new creation in the formulation of this category was
that man posited, besides the traditional group of the qualities
of the Elements, a group of common qualities viz. the qualities,
number, separateness, extension, connection, separation, distant-
ness and nearness. In consonance with the fundamental realism
of the system, these qualities were considered as real entities just
like the qualities of the Elements ; one must, therefore, assume
that they also like these are perceived. Now, since old times, the
qualities of the elements held good as the objects of the sense-
organs, whereby to every sense-organ, a quality corresponds as
an object. In the common qualities, on the other hand, there
could be no talk of any such connection with the sense-organ.
So the question was bound to confront itself as to how their per-
ception is to be conceived.
Here the following observation offered the starting-point:
First of all, one believed to find that the common qualities are
never perceived without the things i.e. the objects concerned.
For example, it never occurs that the quality of extension is
perceived by itself without its bearer. Further, the common qua-
lities are not connected like the qualities of the elements with
only a few substances, but they occur to all. Thereby, they are
perceptible only in the visible substances. In the invisible subs-
tances, they are as little perceptible as those substances them-
selves. It, therefore, followed that the common qualities are
perceived in the same way as the substances. The contact with
the sense-organs follows, not through simple connection, but
through the fact that they inhere in the substances which are con-
joined to the senses (sa1'{1yuktasamav4)iab). But they are perceived
like substances through both the sense-organs of sight and touch.
Their perception takes place under the same conditions, namely,
when the substances, which are their bearer, show the necessary
largeness of size and possess the qualities of colour and touch in

a clear-cut form. It was, therefore, taught, as these views were
sought to be expressed in the shortest form-"number, extension,
separateness, connection, separation, distantness and nearness
are visible when they inhere in the substances which possess the
quality of colour". "In such as do not possess colour, they are
not visible. " 228
These views, formulated, during the perception of the common
qualities, allowed themselves to be used in other cases also. First
it occurred in the case of the remaining qualities of the Elements:
moistness, fluidity and swing. These could not be regarded as
objects of particular sense-organs ; it was, therefore, taught that
they also, like the common qualities, are perceived with the eye
and the touch and under the same conditions. An exception was
made in the case of the last quality of the Element-heaviness.
With regard to it, the classical Vaise~ika taught that it is inferred
from its effect, from the falling of a heavy object.
This gained knowledge was found useful not only for qua-
lities but also for the category of movement. The Vaise1?ika
represented the view that movement is perceptible. But its per-
ception is not bound with any particular sense-organ but pre-
supposes the perception of the moved substance. Therefore a
general rule, as in the case of the perception of common qualities,
was formulated. By the way, the Mima:rµsa School of Prabhakara
again differed from the Vaise~ika in this case ; they held that
movement is not perceived but only inferred out of the change
of place of moved substances. But this view did not find a further
dissemination and the Vaise1?ika as well as later on the Nyaya
held fast to their own doctrines. 229
The doctrine of Perception with regard to the remaining
three Categories viz. commonness, particularity and inherence
shaped itself quite differently from that in the case of the first
three categories. Regarding the particularities, they could remain
unconsidered as they indwell only the invisible, permanent subs-
tances and are, therefore, inaccessible to usual perception. The
inherence is considered in the Classical Vaise1?ika as not per-
ceptible on the following grounds : As we have heard, 23 0 it had
been assumed that inherence, which connects all inhering things,
does not itself inhere in these things and so no possibility was
seen as to how a contact of the sense-organs with inherence can

exist. In the case of the qualities, one had assumed that the con-
tact is produced through the fact that they inhere in the substances
with which the sense-organs enter into contact. In the case of
inherence, on the other hand, this possibility of explanation had
been cut off. So it was taught that inherence is not perceivable
but is only inferred from the presence of inhering things in their
bearers. Later it was assumed for inherence as well as for non-exis-
tence (abhava&) that there is a peculiar sort of connection (saT[lyo-
ga~) . It was stated that it stands to its bearer in the relation of the
defining and the defined (vise$a1;tavise$yabhiivab) and it was taught
that it becomes perceivable on the ground of this connection.
But this doctrine did not win great importance.
The more important was the question of the perception of
commonness. Here the things were similar as in the case of com-
mon qualities, because the view was unanimous that the common-
nesses are perceptible and that their perception is conditioned
by the perception of their bearer. Still some differences showed
themselves. First of all, the commonnesses inhere not only in
substances but also in qualities and movements. Out of that is
produced a different sort of contact with the sense-organs. This
depends, in such cases, on the inherence in things which, on their
part, inhere in the substances which are connected with the sense-
organs ( saT[lyuktasamavetasamaviiyab) . But before all, the common-
nesses are perceivable through all senses. Because they 'not only
inhere in the substances and the qualities which are perceived
through the eye and the sense of touch but also in such qualities
as are the objects of smell, taste and sound ; they are also percei-
ved through these senses.
With the perception of commonness was connected still an
important question. When we consider homogeneous things, we
perceive, not so much separated, the homogeneous character
embodied in the commonnesses, but we recognize before all the
things themselves as homogeneous. The knowledge of things is,
therefore, influenced and defined by the knowledge of common-
nesses. That is how the question arises.
The Vaise~ika answered the question as follows : The
knowledge of commonnesses, which defines the character of its
bearer (vise$a1;tam), arises out of the knowledge of the bearer
which is defined by it ( visevam) and influences it. First the

commonness is recognized and then under the influence of the
commonness, one knows the bearer as homogeneous. The same
holds good everywhere where it deals with a similar relation;
it may be that a substance is precisely defined or delimited by
another substance, by a quality or by a movement. For
example, in the case of a white object, it was said-"Through
the inhering whiteness and the knowledge of whiteness, arises
the knowledge of whiteness. These both (knowledges) are
cause and effect." 231 This doctrine was further built and formu-
lated in particulars. That the substances appear as homogeneous
is conditioned by the commonnesses which inhere in them. In the
case of the commonnesses themselves, it is not possible because
no further commonness could inhere in the commonnesses. It
was said therefore, : "Because in the commonnesses there is no
commonness present, the homogeneous knowledge arises through
it alone." "In the case of substances, qualities, movements, on
the other hand, it is conditioned through the commonness." 232
Similar is the case when substances are defined more precisely
through substances, qualities and movements. In this case, the
qualities and movements could well define or particularize the
substances but they themselves can be particularized by no
other qualities or movements. So it was stated : "In a substance,
such a knowledge is conditioned by substances, qualities and
movements." "In the case of qualities and movements, on the
other hand, there is no such knowledge which would be condi-
tioned by qualities and movements, because qualities and
movements are not present in them. " 23 3
All these rules are thought out consistently in the spirit
of the Vaise~ika and could appear clear and intelligible. But
still there were lively discussions with regard to them. The
Buddhistic opponents of the Vai:ie~ika and of their extreme
realism raised the question, namely, as to how many of such per-
ceptions arose as a matter of fact from the external world and
presented, thereby, the origin and constitution of this process of
knowledge in a completely new light. Thus the representatives
of the Vaise~ika were compelled to take a new attitude to this
problem and though they did not intend to abrogate their
doctrine, still they wished to formulate it in accordance, at least,
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEl}IKA 131
with the requirements of the times. The opposing objections

rose predominantly from the logical schools of Buddhism. The
defence of the Vai:iei;iika doctrine was for the most part led by
the representatives of the Nyaya. The discussions took place in
the frame of the general epistemological disputations which
filled the last period of the classical time of Indian Philosophy.
We shall do better, therefore, to break off here in order to return
to them again in our presentation of the Epistemological
Theories on the subject.
Similar is the case with the last problem of the Theory of
Perception with which we have still to occupy ourselves, viz.
with the perception of the Soul and its qualities. The old
Nature-philosophy had scarcely occupied itself with this problem.
Because, in accordance with its interest predominantly directed
towards the external world, it had merely inquired into the
sense-perceptions and their objects. Regarding the soul, one
had merely endeavoured to prove its existence and presented
the view that it is not perceptible but must only be inferred.
One saw himself induced towards an exhaustive preoccupation
with the inquiry into the perceivability of the soul and its quali-
ties when he was compelled to do it by the doctrine of cate-
gories to posit the question of the perceptibility of the objects.
One held fast to the view that as far as the soul is concerned, it
is unperceivable. Regarding its qualities, their perceptibility was
not, indeed, to be doubted. Now the question was, how this per-
ception took place. As an answer to this question, one held now
to the prototype of the remaining perceptions. In them it was
assumed, according to the mechanistic basic views of the system,
that perception follows through contact with the objects and
with the help of the psychical organ. The psychical organ, there-
fore, plays, in this case, the same role as the sense-organs in
external perception. It was placed, from this point of view, on the
same level as the remaining sense-organs and it was expressly
counted occasionally as the sixth organ. Jn the rest, it was assu-
med that the soul knows its own qualities through the contact
of the psychical organ with it. It sounds, indeed, remarkable and
may appear also unsatisfactory. But with the ideas developed by
the doctrine of categories, any other solution was hardly possible.
So one held fast to these views in the Vaise~ika as also in the
related systems.
Though one could not decide, with respect to the qualities
of the soul, to accept change of view in the doctrine of percep-
tion, it was a different case in the case of the soul itself. Not only
that, even some representatives of the Vaise~ika and Nyaya
passed over 234 the teaching of the perception of the soul. Before
all, the adherents of the Mimarµsa represented from old times this
view and showed themselves ready to build the doctrine further
in accordance with the requirements of the times. The :M;ima-
• rµsa was, from old times, closely connected with the Vedanta.
Many teachers wrote works on both the systems. It.can be no
wonder, therefore, that the doctrine of the perception of the soul
which held good in the Vedanta, 235 was also taken over by the
Mimarnsa. It was taught that in every knowledge, the knowing
subject becomes conscious of itself because one thinks 'I know'.
Also the remembrance of earlier knowledge presupposes that one
was conscious as the knowing subject. And through this consci-
ousness, the soul is perceived as the knowing subject. This
doctrine was further formulated in the Mimarµsa School of
Prabhakara as follows: The logical school of the Buddhists had
put forward the formulation that every knowledge follows in
this way : the knowledge (vijniinam) which according to the
Buddhistic views is the proper bearer of psychic occurrence
reflects simultaneously the subject and the object and becomes
conscious of itself. This idea was taken over by the School of
Prabhakara and was carried over to the soul and it was taught
that through becoming conscious of the subject-part of the
knowledge, the soul becomes perceived. 236 fn this way one had
gained a finer and elaborate idea of the nature of the knowledge-
process and at the same time the possibility of the perception of
the soul was derived from it. However, in so doing, one leant
on or took the support of the prototype of the logical school of
Buddhism. With that again, the point is reached where the doc-
trine of knowledge of the Vai~e~ika and related schools, so far as
they attempted to adjust themselves to the process of develop-
ment, fell in with the general stream of development of the
knowledge-theory which filled the last period of the Indian
philosophy of the classical period. We shall reserve the further
treatment of this question until the presentation of that period.
With this we have finished what we had to say about the

transformation of the old nature-philosophy in the sense of the
doctrine of the categories and also ended our description of the
rise and general development of the classical V aise~ika sys tern. We
have got introduced to the old Nature-philosophy and have seen
how there developed in it the doctrine of categories which made
up the chief contents of the classical system. We shall, now, go
over to represent this system in its final form, in which it was
finally confirmed in writing.
The Final Formulation of the Vaife,l'ika- The development of
the Vai~e~ika, as we have described it, embraces a great period.
I ts beginnings fall far back in the pre-Christian times, while the
last described position is supposed to have been reached about
the beginning of the fifth century A.D. The development also
found its literary expression during this period. As it was custo-
mary in the older times, 237 the doctrines of the School were
early put down in a collection of aphorisms which stamped the
memory and were continued orally with explanations and
elucidations from generation to generation. The aphorisms took
part in the changes of the doctrine. As the further formulation
of the doctrine required, they were remodelled and supplemented
by supplements. Thus they gradually gained a very variegated
look. The old stood beside the new and as the arrangement of
the new often created difficulties, its construction became conti·
nually badly arranged. The result of all these changes was finally
unsatisfactory. Through the introduction of the doctrine of
categories, the system had undergone a transformation which
gave it another form basically. In order to justify it, the remo-
delling of old aphorisms was not enough. The new wine could
not be filled in old hoses. Thus finally there came a moment in
which it broke them. That occurred about the turn of the fifth
to the sixth century.
The man who took the decisive step and, as the first one,
carried out the changes, which had become necessary, unhesita-
tingly and consistently was Uandramati (between 450 and 550
A.D.). The doctrine of categories had gradually become the
essential contents of the system. He made it, therefore, the
exclusive subject of his treatise. Already he brought it to expres-
sion in the name of his work, because he named it "a text-book
often categories" ( Dafapadarthasiistram). In particular he placed,

at the head of his work, the enumeration of categories. He, then,
gave a short explanation and joined it with a somewhat detailed
treatment of their constituents and their qualities.
This procedure ofCandramati corresponded to the condi-
tion of development and to the requirements of the period so
that it was bound to have a necessary result. Still many doubts
soon arose. Candramati had been too gruff and had, in a certain
measure, thrown out the baby with the bath. ln order to help
the doctrine of categories towards its rightful position, he had
thrown everything else overboard. He had abandoned the whole
old inheritanceofnature-philosophy. It occurred thus: It is only
natural that a bold innovator who shapes newly the whole struc-
ture of a system from the bottom, does not shrink from changes.
That was the case, in fact, with Candramati. He not only chan-
ged the form but also the content of the system. He received
new categories into the system and added four more to the old
six. That was bound to arouse opposition in orthodox circles of
the School and therefore a setback did not fail to appear. Thus
it transpired that it was not Candramati who gave the final
form to the classical Vai~e~ika system but another, Prafastapada
(presumably second half of the sixth century A.D.).
The Work of Prafastapiida : The performance of Pra:iasta-
pada may be characterized, in its essentials, as follows : He has
taken over the decisive innovation of Candramati because he
had made the doctrine of categories as the basis of his treatise
and he expresses it in the title of his work which is named
as the summarization of the qualities of Categories ( Padartha-
dharmasat!tgrahal;). But as against Candramati, he has reiterated
the orthodox doctrines of the School. He has received in his
work everything which appeared worth preserving from the
old tradition and which could be inserted in the frame of
the doctrine of categories. His treatise restricts itse11~ therefore,
to the old traditional six categories. But in this frame, he has
inserted all csse1i lials from the old nature-philosophy. He, there-
by, continually emphasises the orthodox character of his treatise,
as he demonstrates his agreement with the old tradition, with
continual cross-references to the old aphorisms ( siltra~li).
The work of Pra~astapada is one of the entirely great
\ \
performances of the Indian philosophical systematics. The whole

content of a great philosophical system is summarized in it with
very great clarity and in a very concise form. In spite of it, it docs .
not show the perfection which characterizes, for instance, the
Sarµkhyakarika of hvaraknJ).a. 238 It is partially due to the fact
that the whole stuff is arranged under the ideas of the doctrine of
categories and is executed in the frame of ontology. In this way,
we get, in a certain measure, the building-stone of the system but
not the erected edifice of doctrine erected out of that. The pole-
mic attitude is found in Prafastapada from the beginning as a
reaction against Candramati. It follows from it that some difficult
or controversial points are handled with annoying prolixity. But
the work is mostly damaged by the fact that in it the Scholastics
begin already to degenerate. And as the constitution of the work
and its impression on the reader is determined essentially by
these things, it would be advisable to go into it more closely.
The degeneration of the Scholastics-In a previous section of
our treatise, we have already described how Scholasticism came
into the Vai~e~ika and how that manner of thought gradually
penetrated the whole system. Thereby we have seen its character
in the fact that an edifice of hypothesis was erected under the
presuppositions of definite assumptions and on the basis of given
ideas without living contact with the phenomenal world. A cha-
racteristic feature of the Indian Scholasticism consists( as we have
already seen) in the fact that a test for the rightness of a made
assumption holds good when with it~ help an erected edifice of
hypothesis exhibits no contradiction and if it makes possible the
clarification of any isolated or individual case. With it was the
door opened to degeneration. The opponent tried with all zest
to discover cases in which the formulated hypothesis confronted
difficulties, while one himself got more and more involved in
puzzling out special cases in order to triumphantly show how
his own theory was preserved in spi tc of difliculties. Thus one
lost himself continually more and more in subtle sophistry and
hair-splilling which have hardly anything to do with geuuinc
philosophy an<l an honest attempt for understanding the world
of phenomena. Finally, in the case of unfamiliar objects, this
whole drive lournl entrance in the superficial systematics so
popular in lndia, which concerns itself with purely mechanical
136
/
HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
view-points of classification and distinguishes sub-varieties in

which the nature of the phenomena is not, in the least, touched.
I shall elucidate this kind of Scholasticism as it occurs in
Prafastapada, in short, through some examples. As we have seen
in the course of our presentation, the Vaise~ika, in the process of
development, had come to assume in the case of different things
that they only last for a moment; e.g. the different knowledge-
processes or the category of movement. That was bound to be
considered, when it came to explaining an occurrence in its causal
connections. Now thereby, there arose many difficulties. It turned
out that, in many cases in the assumed momentariness, some
factors of some single cause must have already vanished before
even its effect turned up. It was, therefore, necessary to find a
way out of this difficulty. One of such cases concerns the quality,
'number'. We shall take asanexamplethenumbertwo or twoness
( dvitvam) .239 As we have already heard, 240 when two things are
recognized as duality under the influence of the observing know-
ledge ( apek~abuddhil;) of an observer who observes both things,
the number two, according to the Vaise~ika doctrine, arises out
the number one inhering in them, whereupon he knows them as
two. With the vanishing ofthe observing knowledge, the number
two also vanishes again. But the observing knowledge vanishes
already with the emergence of the knowledge of duality, as accor-
ding to the theory of the school, two knowledges can never stand
beside one another, but every new knowledge crowds out the
earlier one. The duality, therefore, lasts only for quite a short
time.
Now the following is to be further considered. In the doc-
trine of the perception of categories, we have heard 241 that the
knowledge of a substance characterized by a quality requires
that one knows this quality beforehand and as this gains its cha-
racter through the commonness indwelling in it, one must first
know the commonness before the quality. For the described
knowledge of duality, the following is the knowledge-se<1uence.
The observer first knows, in the two objects which he observes,
the commonness number one, then he knows the quality of
number one and finally he knows the objects themselves as each
one. Thereupon arises on the basis of this observing knowledge,
in both the objects, the quality of duality in which naturally the
, I
1.
\
I
THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 137
comiuonness of twoness inheres. And now he again knows first

lhe commonness of twoness, then the quality of duality and finally
he knows both the objects themselves as two. But as every one
of these knowledges destroys the foregoing; naturally in the last
moment, in which one knows both objects as two, the observing
knowledge and with it the qualityofdualityhas alreadyvanished
since long; that is to say, that one knows the objects as two in a
moment in which the duality is no more in them.
I In order to avoid this attack the following theory was for-

mulated. It was said, between two moments of knowledge, there
is an antithesis ( virodhab) on account of which they crowd out
each other. This antithesis, however, is not of that kind that it
cannot stand near each other (sahiinavasthiinavirodhab), so that
one knowledge perishes and another steps in its place. On the
other hand, it consists therein that one knowledge destroys the
other ( vadhyaghiitakavirodhaf:1). That is to say, when a new know•
ledge arises, it does not enter simply in the place of the previous
one but it first steps beside it, whereby destroying it, influences it.
Only in the next moment is the older knowledge destroyed and the
new one steps in its place. Thus in the case of knowledge-proce-
sses and of quickly vanishing things, many moments of existence
were distinguished. They were three: The first is the moment of
origination (utpadyamanata), the second the moment of the origi-
nated or the existent ( utpadab) and the third the moment of
destruction (vinafyatii) on which only the full destruction ( vinafab)
follows. In the knowledges following one another, the moments
follow one another thus: The moment of the origination of one
knowledge comes in during the existence of the previous know-
ledge. The moment of its existence occurs together with the
moment of the disappearance of the previous one and with the
moment of the origin of the following knowledge. In the moment
of its disappearance, finally, the following knowledge is already
existent. and the next following in origination, whereas the pre-
vious one now finally perishes and is destroyed.
This theory makes it possible to solve the above-mentioned
difficulty with regard to thek now ledge of duality thus : On the
origination of duality, there follows the knowledge of common-
ness of dualness. With it the previous observing knowledge enters
into the condition of disappearance, and also the following
138
knowledge of the quality of duality is originated and the khow-

ledge of the commonness oftwoness enters into the condition of
disappearance. In the same moment, the observing knowledge
disappears and the duality called forth through it begins to dis-
therefrom disappear. But simultaneously also the knowledge of
two objects is already in origination. And when, therefore, also
in the next moment, in which this knowledge enters into exis-
tence fully, the duality itself has gone into the past, the processes
are so connected with one another that the causal connection is
preserved.
This Theory shows well enough how artificially Pra·:\asta-
pada erected the edifice of his hypothesis. In the present case, it
can be said that it deals with an important phenomenon in the
succession and causal interlacing of knowledge-processes which
had to be explained and the theory presented offered an artifi-
cial but an intelligible and satisfactory explanation. This manner
of explaining the knowledge-processes is found not only in
Pra~astapada but also was seized upon and employed otherwise
and we shall again meet with it later in the presentation of Epis-
temology and Logic. 242 On the other hand, a pure play with
airy hypothesis occurs in the following case :
For the large number of qualities which dwell in substances,
the general rule holds good that those in eternal substances arc
eternal and those in aggregates are transient and that they vanish
with the disintegration of the aggregate. Besides there are a few
qualities (gutzab) which are themselves transient.
In the more precise thinking out of all possibilities, it was
discovered that these also, when they stick to aggregates, can
become destroyed by the dissolution of the aggregate ancl it is
the case when the dissolution of the aggregate sets in, before the
causes, which usually cause destruction, can become opcrativc.
Naturally these deal with some sporadic special cases which are
practically of no importance. But Pra:'.astapacla goes into them
precisely and discusses every quality corning into consideration
as to how it occurs.
Let us take the example, again, of the case of number. 243
The disintegration of the aggTcgate follows, according to the
doctrine of the categories of the Vai~c~ika, as follows : First a
movement originates in the parts of the aggregate. This move-
ment calls forth the quality of separation. The separation abro-

gates as its opposite the quality of connection which has united the
parts into an aggregate. With the vanishing of connection, the
aggregate falls to pieces. For the case of the destruction of duality
Prafastapada puts forth the following consideration : When in
the moment in which one knows the number one in both the
observed things, a movement sets in their parts, which is suitable
lo call forth the disintegration of things; simultaneously arises,
with the observing knowledge, a quality of separation in them.
Simultaneously with the rise of duality, there follows the abro-
gation of the quality of connection. And in the same moment
in which the knowledge of duality arises, abrogating the obser-
ving knowledge and thus leading, in the usual course of things,
to the disappearance of duality, both the things already dissolve
themselves and with them vanishes the quality of duality dwell-
ing in them. And this occurs, before the destruction of the
observing knowledge can be operative.
Prafastapada puts forth a whole series of possibilities in
the case of the qualities of distantness and nearness. 244 These
originate through the connection of things with the substances-
space and time and through the observing knowledge of an
observer. Their destruction can ensue as well through the dis-
appearance of the observing knowledge as also through the
abrogation of connection, to which as a third factor there also
is the disintegration of things themselves. Pra8astapada reckons
quite exactly in which cases their destruction results, through
one, two, or finally through all the three causes together and
puts forth in all seven cases which he describes in details.
That is enough to give a sufficient picture of the luxuriance
of Scholasticism in Prafastapa<la and we shall let the matter rest
there. But it is now clear that the handling of all these special
cases with the prolixity corresponding to their complicatedness
disturbs the symmetry of the presentation in the work and the
clear, concise recital of the system is disturbingly interrupted.
Through these subtle discussions and the occasionally casually
mentioned polemic, an imbalance is created. Thus it is partly
a clear and concise haudbook of the VaEe~ika and partly a
collection of the discussion of difficult special cases.
In spite of all this, the greatness of the performance need
not be overlooked. The work of Prafastapada is still the conclu-

ding presentation of the classical Vaise~ika which summarizes
all things hitherto contained in it with unusual completeness
and clarity. From the point of content, it adds little new. 245 It
is well ascribed to him that he has given the system, at least out-
wardly, the form of a doctrine of Deliverance. Still it is only an
external addition and does not go deeper. Further, it is charac-
teristic of him to draw in occasionally the god-idea. But it also
restricts itself to unimportant particulars. Both things do not re-
present a special advance of Prafastapiida but they are striking as
features in the course of general development. His importance
depends not on the creation of new path-breaking thoughts but
on his surpassing performance as a systematizer.
The validity of his work in the after-times corresponds to
the greatness of his performance. His Padarthadharmasar(lgraha~
has always remained the authoritative representation of the
classical Vaisqika system and the whole later development is
grounded on it. The old siltras have been besides preserved. That
bestowed the reverence on the texts which were considered as
the revelation of a holy seer. Later, they have been preferred in a
renewed way and commented on. But practically now, as before,
Prafastapada has remained the basis.
Under these circumstances, it is self-evident that the short
summary which we shall present of the classical Vai:ic~ika must
be based on the work of Prafastapiida. I betake myself to this
procedure more closely than in other cases . on account of the
following reasons: His presentation offers, as I have already
said, only the building-stone of the system, not the fully execu-
ted edifice of the system. But it is this form in which it stands
before our eyes in later times. Whenever, in the conrse of our
narration, we have to refer to the classical Vai:ie~ika for the
comprehension of later development, we must presuppose this
form. Therefore we arc entitled-and rightly-to state it in this
form. In particular, I would like to oliscrve th:i.t I only recite
the comprehensive systematic presentation ol' Prafastapiida. For
the special cases, which have licen described above sufficiently
and arc philosophically of no great interest, J satisfy myself with
a short narration.
With this, everything which is necessary has been said
t
~
1
about Prafastapada and his work and we can now pass on to

I he presentation of the classical Vaise~ika system in the form
created by him.246
The Six Categories-The orthodox Vaise~ika system as re-
presented by Prafastapada knows six categories (padiirthab) : sub-
s lance, quality, movement, commonness, particularity and
iuherence. 247 To all these categories three characteristics are
common-the existence (astitvam), knowability (jiieyatvam) and
nameability (abhidheyatvam) . 24 8
The essential thing about the categories lies in the fact
that they do not deal with independent entities but with diffe-
rent forms of existence which are only possible in connection
' with one another and which form in their union the things of
lhe phenomenal world. Thus substances represent the bearer
(a.fraya(t). The remaining categories cling to the substances
(a.fritatvam ). This clinging has the form of Inherence (samaviiyit-
vam), taken as a category of inherence itself which binds the
remaining categories with one another but not itself. For the
rest the following rules hold good for the union of the categories
in the things. Qualities and movements inhere in substances but
neither in themselves i.e. in other qualities and movements, nor
in the remaining categories. In a similar way, commonnesses
inhere in the substances, qualities and movements but neither in
themselves nor in particularities and inherence. Therefore the exis-
tence of these last three categories depends, not as in the case of the
first three categories, on the connection with the commonness of
existence ( sattiisambandhab) but merely on the existence of its
essence ( sviitmasattvam) . So also they are not characterized by an
inhering commonness but only by the knowledge which they
call forth ( buddhilak,rar:iatvam) .
It is further important that every causal occurrence res-
tricts itself to the first three categories-also the moral action
which determines the course of the cycle of births. Thus all the
three with the exception of some qualities (gur:iii(r) are the cause
(kiiratJ,atvam). The substances as aggregate, the large part of the
qualities and movements i:lre, besides, the effect (kiiryatvam) and
as such impermanent (anityatvam). The last three categories are
neither cause nor effect and arc, therefore, permanent.
As regards the individual eategorics 24 u, there are nine sub-
stances : earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and the
psychical organ. They are all characterized by the genus of sub-
stances (dravyatvam) which occurs to them all. For their essence
as substances, the decisive thing is that they are the bearers of
the remaining categories, which inhere in them. There are seen
in individual cases, indeed, many differences due to different
causes. First of all, the entities out of which the old Nature-
philosophy built its world-picture take a special place viz. the
Elements and the Souls; among them again, the elem en ts form a
close group. Then the constitution of the several substances makes
itself valid. It is suggestive of the difference whether a substance
is represented by only one entity like ether, space and time or
by many (a multiplicity). Further it is important whether sub-
stances are limited (milrtab) or unlimited (amftrtal.z). The first
holds good for the four traditional Elements and the psychical
organ which have the atom-form and are infinitely small. The
second holds good for ether, space, time and the souls which are
infinitely great (paramamahattvam). The infinitely great is to be
understood in the sense that they are all-penetrating (sarvagata-
tvam), or as it was more exactly determined by way of supplement
that they assume the same place with all things with which they
come into contact. (sarvasarrzyogisamanade.5itvam) Among the sub-
stances the aggregates take a special place; they are distinguished
from the simple substances by the fact that they inhere in other
substances--their causes and that they are impermanent.
The different classification of the categories which inhere
in the individual substances corresponds to this different cons-
titution. Qualities inhere in all substances. But the substances
which are taken over from the old Nature-philosophy possess
special qualities which only occur in them ( va£.fe~ikagur;a!.z),
while, above all, time and space possess only common qualities.
Jn particular it may be marked that a particular situation in
place and time i.e. the qualities of distantness and nearness are
possible only in limited substances, so also the swing (vegal.z)
which is compulsorily connected with movement. Movements can
also inhere in limited substances only. Because, according to the
Vai~e~ika doctrine, the infinitely great substances are parlless
and offer no resistance to other things. Therefore they are in-
capable of movement. Further, concerning the commonnesses,
7, TUE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 143
il is to be noticed that a genus which determines the entity can

i11hcre only in such substances as are represented by a multipli-
city. Because it is the nature of commonness that it must be
rnmmon to more things. The last particularities finally inhere in
all substances with the exception of the aggregate.
The causality of the substances embraces the bringing forth
nf' substances and of qualities and movements. The first case deals
with the rise of the aggregates out of the atoms of the four tradi-
1ional Elements. The second case deals with the rise of the
'(Halities and movements in any substances. In both cases, the
.~ubstances are the inhering cause and bring forth the effect by
I hcmselves (svatmani arambhakatvam). A further thing is to 1::-e
mentioned. In the causality of qualities and movements, there
is often an opposition between cause and effect so that the effect
al1rogates and annihilates the cause ; sporadically the cause also
abrogates and annihilates the effect. Among the substances there
is no such opposition between cause and effect (karyakarm:zavi-
mdhitvam). An annihilation of the cause through the effect does
not occur in them.
Regarding the individual substances, the earth is charac-
terized by the fact that the genus 'earthness' (Prthivitvam) inheres
in it. 250 It possesses the following qualities: the four qualities of
the old Elements: form, taste, smell and touch. Further, there
arc the seven common qualities : number, extension, separate-
ness, connection, separation, distantness and nearness. Besides,
there are also heaviness, fluidity and preparedness or disposition
( sal!lskarab) under which swing (veg a~) and elasticity are to be
11 nderstood. Of the four old traditional qualities the smell is exclu-
·'ivcly peculiar to the earth. As regards the sub-varieties of these

qualities, as far as the earth is concerned the form embraces
all sorts of colour-white etc. The taste is represented by all six
kinds. The smell appears in both forms : sweet-smelling and
obnoxious. Finally, the touch is, by nature, neither hot nor cold
hut can be changed by heat.
The earth has two phenomenal forms. 251 It is permanent
and impermanent. It is permanent in the form of atoms. It is
impermanent as effect, that is, as an aggregate.
As aggregate, it is divided thrce-fo!J iu the construction of
the world of phenomena : the bodies of creatures, the sense-
organs and the objects. The bodies of creatures are of two sorts :
born out of the mother's womb and not so born. Among the latter
are the bodies of gods and of many holy seers of ancient times
who are born directly out of the Earth-atoms on the ground of
their special merit ( dharmal:t ). Also the bodies of the smallest
living creatures, which expiate their special guilt (adharmab) in
this existence, are also formed directly out of the Earth-atoms.
The bodies which are forme.d from the mother's womb originate
from the union of the father's semen and the mother's menstrual
blood.They can be born out of foetus (jariiyu). Out of foetus
are born men and domestic and wild animals. Out of egg are
born birds and reptiles. In the formation of the sense-organ, the
earth has its share in that the sense of smell is formed out of it.
This organ, which exists in all creatures and renders possible the
perception of smell, preponderatingly consists of the earth-
particles with which in a small measure other elements are also
mixed. As objects, the earth embraces, in three ways, the earth in
its strict sense, the stones and the plant-world. The earth in the
strict sense includes all that is born of clay-walls, tiles, etc.
Among the stones are rocks, precious stones, diamonds, etc. In
the plant-world are counted grass, herbs, trees and creepers,
tendrils, etc.
The water ( iipa/:t) is characterized by the genus 'waterness'
( aptvam) .252 It possesses the following qualities-the old quali-
ties of the elements: form, taste and touch to which fl.uidi ty and
moistness are added. The seven common qualities : number,
extension, separateness, connection, separation, distantness and
nearness ; further there are also heaviness and preparedness er
disposition (sa7]1.skiira/:t ). Regarding the sub-varieties of the quali-
ties of this Element, the colour of water is white, the taste is
sweet and the touch is cold. Moistness and natural( siiT{lsiddhikab)
fluidity are a special peculiarity of the water.
The water has two phenomenal forms, so far as it is perma-
nent and impermanent, permanent in atoms and impermanent
in aggregates. As aggregate, it appears in bodies, sense-organs
and objects. Bodies which are formed of water are in the world
of the water-God Varul).a; these are born not out of the mother's
womb and are strengthened by earth-particles which make it
capable of life. The sense-organ formed out of water is the taste.
It occurs in all living creatures, renders possible the perception

(11' taste and contains parts of the other elements mixed in a small
measure. As object, the water appears in rivers, oceans, snow
hail, etc.
The fire (teja~) 253 is characterized by the genus fireness.
It has the following qualities : the old elementary qualities of
form and touch, also the seven common qualities : number,
nearness; besides there are fluidity and preparedness or disposition
(saTJlskiirab). Its colour is white and bright and the touch is hot.
Also in fire, there are to be distinguished two forms of
appearance; permanent as it appears in atoms and impermanent
as it appears in aggregates. As aggregates it appears in bodies,
sense-organs and objects. The bodies formed out of fire are in
the world of the Sun. They are not produced from the mother's
womb; they are capable of life through the mixing of earth-
particles. The sense-organ formed out of fire is the eye. It
occurs in all creatures and makes possible the perception of form
and contains, in a small measure, a mixture of the remaining
elements. As objects the fire appears in four forms. The earthly
fire, which is contained in the fuel, flames upwards and brings
about cooking, burning, perspiring and the like. As heavenly
fire to which water serves as fuel, it is in the sun and lightening
and similar things. As fire in the abdomen, it digests the eaten
nutrition and changes it in the sap of nutrition. Finally as fire,
which is found in the mines, by which are to be understood
metals such as gold.
The air (viiyub) 204 is characterized by the genus airness.
To it belongs the old elemental quality touch. Further it posses-
ses the seven common qualities : number, extension, separateness,
connection, separation, distantness and nearness and, besides·
them, preparedness( saT[lskiiraft) . The touch of air is neither warm
nor cold and is not changed by fire.
Air appears like the other clements in two forms: parma-
ncnt in atoms and impermanent in aggregates. As aggregates it
appears in sense-organs, objects and, besides, in breath; bodies
in the world of wind (11r?vu(1) are not formed from the mother's
womb. It also holds good in their case I hat they arc 110 t born from
the mother's womb and they are capable of living through the
mixture of earth-particles. The sense-organ made out of air is

the organ of touch, namely skin. It occurs in all living creatures,
makes possible the perception of touch, contains a mixture of
other elements and extends itself over the whole body. As object,
air is the bearer of touch which is perceived. It itself is not
perceptible but is inferred from the touch and from the sounds
which it causes such as the rustling of the leaves and from the
fact that it carries or moves the objects. It moves naturally
horizontally and is able to drive and carry the clouds. The
multiplicity of air, though it is not perceptible, can be inferred
out of the mixture of different air-currents. When two opposite
air-currents, which have the same velocity, meet and hit each
other, they meet and move themselves now upwards, as can be
known from the movement of the blades of grass etc. Finally as
Breath, the Air in the body causes the movement of basic ele-
ments ( dhiitavab) of the food juice and of urine and excreta.
The Breath is according to its nature a unity but is named by
different names on the basis of its different functions.
Out of the four Elements which all consist of atoms, the
world is built; the permanent atoms, during world creation,
bind themselves to form worlds and creatures; during the world-
destructions, on the other hand, they separate. The process
happens thus :255 When the world has continued for a hundred
years of Brahmft and a moment has arrived for the dissoluti,on
of the present Brahma, the highest God (Mahefvara!i) resolves
to destroy the world in order to give a pause of rest to the crea-
tures which are exhausted through the long wandering in
metempsychosis. Therefore, the Invisiblr( adr,rfam) which clings
to the souls and represents the driving power of world-recur-
rence, suspends its work. Now there originates, according to th~
will of the highest God, a movement (karma) in the atom!>
through the connection of th<~ souls with the atoms, which form
the lJ(){ly and the sense-organs; out of the movement arises
separation ( vibhrigafl), and the separation a bro gates the connec-
tion (sar,ryoga{z) between them: Through that the bodies and the
sense-organs disintegrate and dissolve themselves in the atoms.
h1 a sin1ilar way, the Elements also disinlcgrate. First, the earth,
then water, thrn fire and linally the air, until finally the whole
world is dissolved in isolated atoms. This condition lasts for a
7, TIIE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 147
hundred years of Brahma. Then the highest God resolves upon

11 new creation. The 'invisible', which clings to the soul, begins
lo operate anew. Under its influence through the connection of
the souls with the atoms, there, first of all, originates a movement
i11 the atoms of air. They join to form aggregates and create the
nir which, roaring, fills the space. Next originates, in the same
way, water which heaves as a mighty ocean. In it, the earth
conglomerates itself. Last of all, there arises, from the ocean, fire
as a mighty mass of heat. Now again once more the highest God
intervenes. Out of his mere will, the world-egg (brahmiii;u/,am)
forms itself out of the atoms of fire and earth. In it, he creates
the first Father of the whole world-the four-headed God
Brahma, together with all the worlds and charges him with the
creation of beings. This Brahma possesses, in the highest measure,
knowledge, passionlessness and creative power and knows exactly
the merit and guilt of all creatures. He begets, first of all, his
spiritual sons-the Prajapatis-the lords of the created beings.
Then he allows out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet the rise
or four castes or classes and finally creates the rest of the creation
according to their actions.
On the rise of the four elements, follow next the substa-
nces.-Ether, Time and Space. 256 They all occur each as one.
Therefore, there is no genus which inheres in them and would
characterize them. The names, which man gives them, depend
not, as is the general rule, on an inhering commonness but are
purely conventional (piiribhii~·ika(t).
Concerning, first of all, the ether 257 , a substance of this
name is not perceived. ~It is inferred, on the contrary, only
as a bearer of sound, which as quality needs necessarily
a substance as bearer. The sound is perceptible like the quali-
ties of the old elements-like form, taste, smell and touch but is
different from them in other essential features. The qualities of
the old Elements are perceivable only in Aggregates in which
they arise out of the qualities of their parts; they last as long
as ,their bearers and are perceived in their bearers. All this does
not apply to sound. It cannot, therefore, be like any one quality
of the four Elements. It can as little or not be a quality of the
soul, as in contrast to the qualities of the soul, it is perceived
by an external organ ; it is perceived not only by one's own but
also by other souls ; it does not inhere in the soul and is besides
comprehended as different from the 'I' consciousness, as something
different from the soul. Finally it cannot be a quality of Time,
Space or the psychical organ, as it is perceived through the ear,
and is a special quality, that is to say, characteristic of that one
substance (vaife~ikagwJah), whereas, only general qualities
occur in time, space and the psychical organ. Nothing, there-
fore, remains but to assume a peculiar substance of the kind of
ether as its bearer and this substance is the ether.
This proof for the existence of ether shows its peculiar
intermediate place between the four Elements and the remaining
substances. The qualities, which occur in it, show the same.
Besides the sound, the five general qualities are ascribed to it :
number, extension, separateness, connection and separation.
Distantness and nearness are missing, as it is infinitely big and
is permanent; a position in Space and Time is not considered,
Of these qualities, number occurs in the ether as one ( ekatvam)
and correspondingly, as, in contrast to the numberless atoms,
of which the four Elements consist, it is one unity', 258 a separate-
ness, an individual unity (ekaprthaktvam). As regards extension,
it is, as compared to the other elements, infinitely large because
sound can be perceived everywhere. Also connection and separa-
tion in ether are soincwhat different from those in the atoms of
the four Elements. They are ascribed to it only because, according
to the logic of the system, the connection or separation of things
which beget the sound must be accompanied by the connection
with or separation from the ether; because only then a quality
in the ether can be called forth.
In contrast to the four Elements, ether has further only one
form of appearance. It is exclusively permanent. Because, it is
infinitely large and does not consist of atoms, it can form no
aggregate. On the same ground, there arc no bodies formed out
of ether. Only one sense-organ consists ol'cthcr alH1 it is the Ear.
But this is only a part of the inlinite Ether enclosed by tht: ear-
passage. It oct:urs in all living creatures and renders possible the
pert:eption of sound. That a part of Ether enclosed by the ear-
passag<~ is capable of pcrct:ption depends on the inllucnt:e of the
'invisible' ( adnfam) Oil merit and guilt. A denial or the organ in
the condition of deafocss cannot be caused by a damage to the
7. TllE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~JKA 149
MlllllC which is impossible in the case of the permanent ether but

hns its cause in the absence of the influence of the Invisible.
The time (kiilafl) 269 is inferred out of the ideas of temporal
tlista11Lness, nearness, the simultaneousness and the non-simulta-
111·ousness, slowness and quickness. When these ideas arise in
c·.01111ection with objects which were earlier known without them,
there must be a further cause joining with it, which does not lie
in the essence of the object concerned; this cause is time. The
t i111e is further the cause of origination, duration and qestruction
of all causally originated things. It is due to the fact that they
urc brought into connection with time' because one speaks of the
origination, duration and destruction. Besides, on it depends the
assumption of different time-units from a moment to the longest
world-period.
As qualities (gu~iib), five common qualities occur to time:
number, extension, separateness, connection and separation.
The number which inheres in it is the number one--the signs
from which time is inferred are always .the same and, therefore,
the same can be inferred. Accordingly, separateness also occurs
in time as a single thing. It is infinitely great because the signs of
time are perceived everywhere. Connection and separation occur
in it, because through the connection with time in the things,
the qualities of distantness and nearness arise.
The time is permanent, because it has not arisen out of
any cause. In spite of the fact that there is only one time, one
speaks of a time of beginning, of action, of origin, of continuing,
of disappearance, as if cme dealt with a plurality of time. Bµt
this impression is causer! on account of the connection with the
additional particulars just as a crystal, according Lo the things
which lie near it, appears now blue, now red, now green, or as
a man according to his activity is called now as a cook, now as a
reader, as if different persons were dealt with.
The space (dik)~ 110 is similarly explained as Time. It is in-
ferred out or the ideas of Eastern, Western, etc. When in con-
'~ nection with a limite<l object confronting ano Lher limited o~ject,
the ideas arise: "That is, seen from that point, eastern, southern,
western, northern, south-eastern, south-western, north-western,
north-eastern, bdow and <1bove," these ten ideas must have a
special cause because the causes which otherwise cause the ideas
t
of the objects concerned are not sufficient for their clarification.

Thus the special cause is the space.
The space possesses the five common qualities: number,
extension, separateness, connection and separation. The number
is one, the extension is infinite bigness and separateness is the
separateness as a solitary thing. The reasons for these correspond
to those proofs of the qualities in the case of time. Concerning
the connection and separation, these are ascribed to space beca-
use the spatial layout of things, that is to say, the qualities dis-
tantness and nearness. indwelling in them, are conditioned by
the connection with space.
In reality space is a unity or one. Still, the holy seers of
antiquity, when they firmly formulated the usual linguistic usage,
have created from practical grounds the names south, etc. forthe
regions of space with which the sun, in its cyclic round around
the divine mountain Meru, serially enters into conjunction and
which are protected by different godheads as the guardians of
the world. Therefore one speaks metaphorically of ten spaces or
quarters (diJaf1). 261 These quarters according to their guardian
deities are called the quarters of Indra, Vai:Svanara, Yama,
Niqti, Varm:ia, Vayu, Kubera, Isana, Brahma and of the ser-
pent-gods-the Nii.gas.
The soul 262 is characterized by the genus soulness ( iitmat-
vam). According to the Vai~e~ika doctrine, it is not perceivable
on account of its subtleness ( sauk5myam) but must be inferred.
For its existence, numerous proofs are brought forth. Partially
they are the old proofs of the Nature-philosophical schools with
which we have been already acquainted. 263 The soul was inferred
as the cause of various life-forces, as the director of the body, and
as the doer who uses the sense-organs as instruments. But partially
also, the ideas or the doctrine of categoies were also used be-
cause the soul was inferred as the bearer of its qualities. Above
all, one got the support from the spirituality of the soul, that is,
from the quality of knowledge (buddhifl). It was said that this
intelligence or spirituality cannot cliug to the body, because,
like a pot, it is only a product of the unspiritual or unintelligent
clements and because in the dead body, the intelligence or spirit
is missing. It cannot occur in the scnse-orgaus, because they are
mere instruments and because one, during iujury to these organs
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEi,nKA 151
aml during the absence of an object, still observes that remem-

brances occur and therefore, spirituality or intelligence further
continues. To the psychical organ also the spirituality or intelli-
gence cannot be attributed because the psychical organ (mana!i)
is inferred from the fact that it is a mediating organ, that, on
account of it, the knowledge-processes cannot emerge at the
same time. 264 If the psychical organ were to be itself a bearer of
knowledge or spirituality, its mediating role would fall away
and the result would be the simultaneity of knowledge-processes.
Uesides, the psychical organ as organ is only an instrument.
Under the same circumstances, thereisno other go but to assiune
an independent substance as the bearer of knowledge or spiritu-
ality and this substance is the soul. In a similar way, the exis-
tence of the soul was inferred from its remaining qualities, plea-
sure, pain, desire, aversion and effort. These could neither be
the qualities of the body nor of the sense-organs, because they
cannot be referred to the 'I'. Besid!"s, the body and the sense-or-
gans are formed out of the Elements. The qualities of the Elements
extend over their whole bearer, continue as long as the bearer
continues and are perceived through the external sense-organs.
All these do not apply to the qualities of the soul, named above.
They must, therefore, have another substance as the bearer, and
that is the soul.
Regarding the constitution of the soul, it possesses the
following qualities : The qualities, characteristic of it, are know-
ledge, pleasure, pain, <lesire, aversion and effort where-to also
are added merit and guilt and memory-impressions. Further
it also has the general qualities of number, extension, separate-
ness, connection and separation. lts number is a multiplicity.
The corresponding rnul tiplicity holds good for separateness. I ts
extension is infinite greatness. Connection and sepctration occur
to it so far as it C'nters into contact or connection with the
psychical organ during the origination or different psychical
processes.
The last substance is the psychical organ (manab ) 265 which
is characterized bypsychicalorga11ncss (m1111sl11am). Its c'dslc11ce
is inferred on the following grounds: We observe that knowledge
and other psychical processes which did not exist before, in spite
of the preparedness or disposition ( sa!fiskiiralz) of the soul aud the
sense-organs, appear later on and could only be inferred from the ,/

existence of a further organ. Again we observe that recollections
come into existence without the activity of the sense-organs and
we see that there are objects of perception such as pleasure, pain,
etc. which are not perceived by the external sense-organs but
which are still perceivable and that leads likewise to the assump-
tion of a further organ-an inner organ. That is precisely the
psychical organ (mana~).
As qualities, the psychical organ possesses the seven common
- qualities : number, extension, separateness, connection, separa-
tion, distantness, nearness; further it possesses the preparedness
or disposition (sat[lsktira[l) of swing or motion ; and as bearer of
these qualities it is to be naturally considered as a substance.
There are numerous psychical organs ; but there is only one to
each body as only through its existence, the non-simultaneous
emergence of different psychical processes can be explained. As
regards its extension, the psychical organ is tiny and small.
Besides the four elements, it is the only substance which is not
infinitely big but atomic in size. That it still, like the' atoms
of the Elements, does not form aggregates, depends on the fact
th~t the quality of touch i. e. impenetrability is absent in it. On
account of its spatial limitation, the psychical organ may
move further and its movement is either caused by the effort
of the soul or by the Invisible (adr.>/am) and it succeeds with
immense quickness. Finally, the psychical organ is unspiritual,
because otherwise one body would shelter two spiritual
entities and it would lead to a schizophrenia or splitting of the
personality. Thus it is a mere tool or instrument and stands as
such inscrvice to another, namely the soul.
/\f'ter the substances follows the next category, namely quali-
ties. 2u6 The classical Vai~qika system knows twenty-four q ualitics :
form, taste, smell, touch, number, extension, separateness, co11-
ncction, separation, distantness, nearness, knowledge, pleasure,
pain, desire, aversion, elfort; further, heaviness, fluidity, humidity,
preparedness or disposition (sa1[1skiira{1) under which latter are to be
understood swing, elasticity, memory-impressions; mcritandguilt
which are frequently summarized under the name of the Invisible
( 11df.l'f 11111) and linall y the sound .. ,The common q ual it yncss (gu~at
vam} inheres in all these qualities. Besides, they are characteri:.::ed
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAisE::;IKA 153
liy the fact that they inhere in the substances, while in them,
ueither qualities nor movement can inhere.
In general, the qualities (guru'ili) ever cling in one substance
( ekaikadravyavrttitvam) which they completely penetrate ( afraya-
1yapitvam ). 0Hly the sound and the qualities of the soul appear
only in one place of their bearer (pradefavrttitvam). Further con-
nection and separation assume a special place. They cling to more
substances i.e. the substances which they join or separate (anekat-
ritatvam) and penetrate only a part of the same. Finally the num-
ucrs from two onwards and the separateness of several numbers
of things likewise dwell in many substances.
An important classification differentiates special or charac-
teristic qualities (vaife,>ika,.gul!iih) which are peculiar to particular
substances and common qualities (samiinyagul!ah) which can dwell
in the different substances. Among the special qualities are
enumerated the old qualities of the elements-form, taste, smell,
touch and sound, to which humidity and naturally the fluidity
also belong ; further the qualities of the soul-knowledge, plea-
sure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, together with merit, guilt and
the memory-impressions. The common qualities are number,
nearness with which are also joined heaviness and artificially
called forth fluidity and swing or motion. Unimportant and purely
mechanical is, on the other hand, the distinction of qualities
which can indwell the limited substances, the unlimited subs-
tances and both.
As regards the perception of qualities, the qualities of the
Elemcnts--sound, touch, form, taste and smell arc perceived
each through one sense-organ. The common qualities : number,
nearness, as also fluidity, humidity, and swing can be perceived
through two sense-organs- --through the eye and the touch. The
psychical organ serves for the perception or the qualities or the
soul: knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion or effort. U npcr-
ceivable are only heaviness, merit, guilt and memory-impres-
sions.
Diffirul t is the doctrine of the causality of the qualities. 2a1
In general, the qualities can be the cause of the movement or
the cause of other qualities. Causes of movement are heaviness,
154 HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 1:
fluidity, s~ing, and again effort, merit and guilt and the parti-
cular varieties of connection viz. striking and impulse. For the
assessment and arrangement of qualities, as far as they are the
causes of other qualities, the old distinction between the mate-
rial and the occasioning or the inducing cause is important.
According to the Vaise~ika system, we deal with material causes
when a whole arises out the parts. According to the theory of
the categories, in this case, the substance of the whole arises out
of the substances of the parts and the qualities of the whole out
of the qualities of the parts. The substance of the parts, as it is
bound with the substance of the whole through inherence, was
named as an inhering cause (samaviiyikiiratiam) ; the qualities of
the parts as they inhere in the inhering substances stand in no
such relation with the qualities of the whole ; they are the non-
inhering cause ( asamaviiyikiira(lam). According to this view one
distinguished among the qualities: qualities which are the causes
of the other qualities are the non-inhering causes (asamavayikiira-
tziini) and the occasioning causes ( nimittakiira!zani). In these, non-
inhering causes correspond to the old material causes. Later the
idea of non-inhering cause was widened ; it extended itself to
the majority of cases where the causing and caused qualities
inhere in the same substance. Thus one came to the following
formulation : non-inhering causes are form, taste, smell, touch
(which is not hot), number, extension, separateness of isolated
substances, humidity and sound. The occasioning causes are the
qualities of the soul-knowledge, pleasure, pai11, desire, aversion,
effort, merit, guilt and memory-impressions. Besides, some qua-
lities can be the causes of both sorts ; they are connection,
separation, hot touch, heaviness, fluidity and swing. Finally there
are qualities which, in general, cannot be the causes, viz. distant-
ness, nearness and the separateness as duality etc.
Further classifications of the qualities, as far as they repre-
sent the causes of other qualities, are based on the <liflerentiation
of qualities which bring forth the homogeneous things ( samii-
najiitiyiirambhaka[1) , from those which bring forth the heterogeneous
things (asamiinajiitiyiirambhaka[1) and also those in which both
hold good. Again there was the distinction of the qualities-
those whose clfoct or operation inheres in their own bearer
( sviifrayasamavetiirambhakab) from those whose eflect or operation
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAxSE~IKA 155
inheres in other substances (paratrtirambhakab) and those in which

both cases occur. Also here lies ultimately the old distinction bet-
ween the material and occasioning causes. Because the qualities,
which bring forth the homogeneous, are after all the qualities of
the parts which call forth the qualities of the whole and though
the substance of the whole is different from the substance of
the parts, these qualities bring them forth in another substance.
But naturally in both cases, there are other qualities in which
the same definitions prove true and therefore they break through
the original classification.
Regarding the qualities considered as effect, they can be
brought forth through movement or through other qualities. The
connection and separation in mechanical processes are caused
by Movement. In the origination of qualities out of qualities,
there once more recurs the old view-point of distinction
between the material and occasioning causes. One distingish-
ed between qualities-those which originate out of the qua-
lities of the cause (kara1JagU1;iapi1rvakab)and such as do not arise
out of the qualities of the causes (akara1JagutJ,apurvakaM. Out of
the qualities of the causes naturally originate the qualities of the
whole, which are traced back to the qualities of the parts. The
qualities, which do not originate out of the qualities of the cause,
depend in the largest measure on the connection. It holds good
for all the qu;i.lities of the soul, which are brought forth by the
connection of the psychical organ with the soul. But it also holds
good in other cases, as in the case of sound when it is caused by
striking or in the case of distantness and nearness which depend
on a connection with space and time. In some cases, a separation
can also be the cause of a quality when, for instance, a sound is
called forth by the breaking of a stick or when one separation
has another separation as its cause. A special case is finally of
reflective knowledge (apek,1·abuddhi~} which cooperates as cause in
the origination of the qualities : distantness, nearness, numher
and separateness.
We have, thus, said what is the most important about the
causality of the qualities and about the qualities in general and
we can now go over to the description ofthe isolated or indivi-
dual qualities. In advance, it may he said that in every sort of
quality a corresponding commonness inheres, which characte-
rizes it and it is not, therefore, necessary to mention it in every

individual case.
Regarding the qualities of the elements the following
holds good. The Form or Colour ( rupam ) 268 clings to the earth,
water and fire. It exhibits numerous varieties, white etc. Colour is
perceived with the eye, in which case the colour joins in the
sense-organ. Further the colour of the substances makes possible
the perception of the substances themselves, their general qualities,
their movements and commonnesses.
The taste ( rasa(z) 269 occurs to earth and water. It can be
sweet, sour, saltish, bitter, pungent and tart. It is perceived
through the organ of taste, whereby again the same quality coope-
rates in the organ. In the form of nutrition-juice ( rasal;), the
taste is the basis of life, of prosperity, of strength and of health.
The smell (gandhaf1) 270 is finally the quality of the earth.
It is fragrant or obnoxious and is perceived through the organ
of smell whereby the quality of smell cooperates in the organ:
The touch (spar fob) 271 indwells the earth, water, fire and
air. It can be cold, hot and neither cold nor hot. It is perceived
through the sense-organ of skin in which the touch in the
organ supports the perception and is regularly present wher-
ever there is colour. 272
For all these qualities, the rule holds good that they are
permanent in the Atoms and impermanent in the aggregate and
they perish with the aggregate. The only exceptions are the
qualities of the earth, so far as they are changed by heat, as it
occurs in the case of a jar.
In this case, the following process happens. 273 In an unbak-
ed vessel when it is baked, movements originate in the atoms
of which the vessel is composed, under the impact of heat.
These movements cause separations which destroy the connec-
tion inhering in the atoms and through this destruction, the
aggregate -the pot---disappears. As soon as it has disappeared, ,lf:
the hitherto existing qualities like the brown colour in the iso-
lated atoms are destroyed through the connection with the fire,
under the infiucuce or heat, aml there also arise equally through
the connection with the lire the new qualit ics changed through
heat (/ulkaja(1). Dircc tl y t liereupon orig-iuate, under the in Ou-
ence of the Invisible (ad{.l'/am) of the persons concerned through
' 7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 157
t lhe connection of their soul with the atoms, movements in the

atoms whose qualities are now changed. These movements lead
to the connection of the atoms with one another and thus origi-
nates, in that way of process, above the double atoms etc., the
' new aggregate viz. the jar. Just as the substance of the aggre-
gate arises out of the substance of the atoms, the qualities of the
aggregate also arise out of the qualities of the atoms. As the
qualities of the atom are changed through the influence of heat
the qualities of the aggregate are also changed.
This theory is proved as follows: A direct change of the
aggregate under the influence of fire is not possible, because the
lire is not able to penetrate the unitarily extended aggregate
and can only affect its surface. The fire is not also able to enter
into connection with the total atoms, as long as the latter are
connected with each other, because their connection admits no
intervening space in which the fire could penetrate. The assump-
tion is, therefore, unavoidable that the connection of the atoms
is temporarily dissolved. Nevertheless this dissolution and the
new union follow so quickly that the beholder does not notice
them.
After the qualities of the Elements follows next the group
of common qualities-number, extension, separateness, connec-
tion, separation, distantness and nearness.
Of these, number 271 is the cause that one recognizes the
numbers and speaks of them. As number one, it indwells the
individual substances and it is, like the already described qua-
lities of the Elements, permanent in permanent substances and
imperma1H::nt in the aggregates. A~ plurality from the number
two upwards, it inheres in sevPral substances and originates
out of the number one of the individual Sllbstances under the
influence of the re!lective knowledge (apek.riibuddhi~) of an ob·
server. This process happens thus:
When the eye of an observer enters into contact with two
substances, there first arises a knowle(lge of the commonncss-
onencss which inheres in the quality one inhering in these subs-
tances. Then through this commonness, its connection with the
quality and the knowledge of the same originates, a know-
ledge ol' the quality 'one' which is itself a unity l>ut has a plural-
ity to objects and looks upon them so. Under the influence of
this reflective knowledge ( apek~abuddhib), then, originates out of

the number one, in both the substances, the number two. 275 Now
arises again, first of all, a knowledge of the commonness two.
Out of the commonness two, their connection with the quality
two and the knowledge of the same, there arises the knowledge
of the quality two. And out of the quality two, their connection
with the substances and the knowledge of the same, there arises
the knowledge of the two substances as a twoness (duality).
Finally the origination of a memory-impression forms the con-
clusion.
The disappearance of such numbers follows through the
vanishing of the observing or reflecting knowledge which has
called them forth. As two knowledges cannot stand beside each
other, the knowledge of the commonness two which is called
forth by the number two, destroys its previous observing know-
ledge and with the destruction of the observing knowledge dis-
appears also the number two. In particular, the process is as
follows:
As soon as the knowledge of the commonness two arises,
the observing knowledge begins to disappear and the knowledge
of the quality two begins to arise. In the next moment, as soon
as the knowledge of a quality two has arisen, the observing know-
ledge disappears and the number two as well as the knowledge
of the cornmonness two begin to disappear, while the knowledge
of the substances as two (duality) begins to arise. In the third
moment, the number two disappears, the knowledge of the two
substances as two (duality) arises instead, and the knowledge
of the quality two begins to disappear and the memory-impres-
csion, which is the result of this knowledge-process, begins to
arise. Finally with the rise of the memory-impression, the know-
ledge of the two substances also disappears. This theory makes
it possible to trace back the disappearance of number two
to the disappearance of the observing knowledge and still allow
it to participate in the whole knowledge-process which is dis-
solved through it.276
A special case is the disappearance of number through
the destruction of its bearer. When simultaneously with the
knowledge ufthe commonness one, there arises in the parts of
the things under observation, a movement which may contri-
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA }59
!Jute to a dissolution of the aggregate, there arises the quality of

separation, simultaneously with the observing knowledge, through
lhc movement in the parts of the things. Simultaneously with
the rise of number two, the connection is destroyed through
the separation, the connection which makes the aggregates
out of the parts. And with the rise of the knowledge of common-
ness two, the aggregates disintegrate and the number two inher-
ing in them vanishes. Still before the knowledge of the common-
ness, the observing knowledge is destroyed and it can there-
through lead to the disappearance of number two.
The quality of extension (parima1Jam) 277 is the cause of
what one speaks of as mass. It is four-fold-big ( mahat), small
(a:mb ), long (dirgham) and short (hras11am ). These-bigness,
[,mgness, smallness, shortness-are terms of daily use and the
distinction between them needs no clarification.
The bigness occurs to permanent substances: ether, time,
space, souls and further to the aggregates from triads ( tryatzuka)
onwards. In permanent substances, it appears as infinite large-
ness (paramamahattvam) and is permanent. In the aggregate it
is impermanent. The smallness occurs in the substance in the
form of the atom, in the atoms of the Elements and in the
psychical organ : and besides in the dyad (dvyariukam). In the
Atoms, it has the form of infinite smallness or circularity
(piirimiil]rf,alyam) and is permanent. In the dyad it is imperma-
nent. Really small are only atoms and dyads. When one calls
some things as small in comparison with others, it is merely a
metaphorical way of expression. Length and shortness occur
rmly in a~gregates-the shortness in the dyad and length in
the remaining. They are, therefore, exclusively impermanent.
Also the expression shortness is used in comparison with other
things only in a figurative sense.
Concerning the origin of' the impermanent form of the
quality of extension, its cause can be threefold : a number, an
extension and heaping up or an accumulation. A'number is the
cause of the extension when out of atoms, dyads (dvyariukani) and
out of dyads greater aggregates arc formed. Because, as neither
out of the circularity of atoms, the smallness of a dyad can arise,
nor out of the smallness of dyads, the largeness of the rest of the
aggregates can arise, another cause must be sought and that is
number. When under the influence of the observing knowledge

of God, the number two arises in two atoms, it brings forth, as
soon as both atoms have formed into a dyad ( dvya~ukam), a
quality of smallness in the dyad. In a similar way, largeness arises
during the connection of dyads towards further aggregates out of
the number of the dyads or double atoms. As the aggregates, in
which there is already largeness, join themselves to form still
larger aggregates, their largeness arises out of the largeness of
their parts. Then we see that the largeness of the whole depends
on their largeness. As finally numerous big things forms a loose
heap, this largeness is conditioned through the piling up (pracaya[l)
of these things, that is to say, through the fact that they are con-
glomerated loosely or densely. On that depends the largeness of
the heap, also in the case of an equal number and largeness of
its parts. In the same way as smallness and largeness, shortness
and longness arise in the aggregates. What finally concerns the
disappearance of the impermanent forms of the extension in the
aggregates, they disappear with the aggregates.,
The separateness (/1rthaktvam) 278 is the cause of knowledge
which distinguishes the things as separated from one another.
So far as the separateness of individual things emerges, it inheres
in the individual substances and these can be permanent sub-
stances as well as aggregates. In the permanent substances, it is
permanent ; in the aggregates, it is impermanent. As separateness
of several things, it inheres, like the number, on account of the
observing knowledge of the observer and disappears as soon as
it disappears. In these sorts of separateness, as against number,
a difference exists only so far as no corresponding commonness,
which would characterize them, inheres in them. They get, on
the other· hand, their special character through the number
corresponding to them, which indwells the same things together
with them.
The connection (saTflyogab) 279 is the cause of what one
knows the things as joined. It has a specially wider sphere of
operation, as it can be the cause of substances, as well as of qua-
li ti1·s and movements. According to its nature, connection consists
in the union of' hitherto un-unitcd things (apriiptayo[t prii/Jti(t). It
is threefold, acconling as it arises through the movement of one
of the two things or of both things, or through another connection
The last is the case when a part of a whole enters into a

connection and causes therethrough a connection of the whole.
inhering in it. Further sub-varieties of this last form of connection,
according as it arises out of one, two or more connections, as
Prahstapada distinguishes them, are of no importance for the
nature of connection ; so also the special case that out of one
connection, two arise. On the other hand, the definition is impor-
tant that there is no unborn connection (aja}J sarriyogab). Be-
cause, through that a connection between infinitely great
permanent substances is excluded.
This definition is connected with the idea of the occurrence
of separate things (yutasiddhi&) which has been put forth in order
to distinguish connection from inherence. 280 It had been, for
instance, said that connection binds such thing3 as occur separa-
ted from each other, while, on the other hand, inherence binds
such things in which such is not the case. Thereby one had ex-
plained the occurrence of separated things, further, with regard
to the infinitely big substances of which a spatial separation·
cannot take place, as a possibility to move, separated. But this
explanation shows itself utilizable only there where one deals with
a connection of one infinitely big substance with a finite substance.
Where two infinitely great substances are concerned, it is of no
use, as infinitely big substances cannot move. If then the defi-
nition of the occurrence of the separated is to be valid, a con-
nection between infinitely by big substances must be excluded in
general. Because as they are assumed, they must be permanent
and uniform because a movement which can separate them is not
possible in the case of infinitely big substances. So it was taught
that there is no unborn connection. Whether there were also
other reasons for denying unborn connection, besides these con-
siderations, escapes our knowledge. The fact, however, is that
this doctrine was formulated and such inforcnces were drawn.
If infinitely big substances cannot join with each other, there is,
for example, no connection of the soul with space and time. And
one did not hesitate to draw these inferences.
In conclusion, it is to be briefly mentioned how the connec·
tion b abrogated. It is, as a rule, caused by the quality of
separation, which is called forth by a movement in the things
connected and as contrast to connection, it abrogates it. In isolated
i62 HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
cases, it can find its end through the fact that the bearer itself
vanishes. That is the case when aggregates are bound with each
other and these aggregates disintegrate.
The quality of separation (vibhiiga/:l) 281 is the cause of how
one knows things as separated. Its sphere of operation is essen-
tially narrower than that of connection, as it can only come into
consideration as the cause of sound or of another separation.
According to its nature, it is the contrast of connection which it
abrogates. It is, therefore, explained as non-association or non-
union which is preceded by a union (praptipurvikii apriipti/:l ). The
separation is threefold-according as it is called forth by the
movement of one of the two separated things, or by the move-
ment of both by another separation. The last is the case when in
the case of a whole, through the separation of a part from any
object, the separation of the whole from that object ensues, as
for example, through the separation of a hand from an object
which it holds, the whole body separates itself from it. Again
there is a second case puzzled out by the scholiasts of the system.
When, for example, a movement in a part of an aggregate contri-
butes to the disintegration of the aggregate, it as well causes the
separation of this part from the remaining parts of the aggregate
as also its separation from the place in which it had been origi-
nally present. But according to the fundamental maxims of the
system, both cannot be caused by the same movement at the same
time. One, therefore, assumed the following : First the movement
causes the separation of a part from the rest. Through this
separation, the connection on which the aggregate depends is
abrogated and the aggregate disintegrates. Now the part loosen-
ed by the movement separates itself from its original place.
But this separation can no more be caused by the movement
as some time has already elapsed in between. Its cause is, there-
fore, to be sought in something else, that is, in the first separa-
tion which has dissolved the aggregate and which brings forth
the second separation-· namely the change of place.
As regards the disappearance of the quality of separation,
it not only disappears first through a new connection of the separa-
ted tl1ings, but it disappears already the next moment. One knows
it only in quite a short time, as the knowledge or separation
presupposes the consciousness ofa previous connection. lts disap-
7. THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISESIKA 163
pcarance is, therefore, already caused by the connection into

which the separated things enterwith theotherplacesofspace. 28 2
In isolated cases, its disappearance can be caused also by the
destruction of its bearer, when its bearers are namely the aggre-
gates which disintegrate. Indeed, here again, one deals with an
artificially puzzled out special case. Because the separation lasts
only for one moment, the disintegration of the aggregate must
result in this moment before the separation is destroyed through
the connection with the next place in space. But already, the
delineation of this process, the distribution of occurrences on the
single moments and the binding of cause and effect into an
l'l· uninterrupted chain stimulated the scholiasts of the system. The
following course was therefore, assumed. Suppose a case that
two aggregates are joined into a whole and that in one part of
the two aggregates, a movement arises which is fit to contribute
to the dissolution of the aggregate, then this movement calls forth
the quality of separateness, in the part of the aggregate ; this
quality of separation destroys in the next moment the quality of
connection on which the aggregate depends and, therefore, the
aggregate disintegrates. When now in the same moment in which
the quality of separation arises in the part of this aggregate, a
movement is caused in thi:: other aggregate which in a similar
way leads to the dissolution of the whole, there arises, simul-
taneously with the destruction of the quality of connection in the
part of the first aggregate, a quality of separation in the second
aggregate through a movement in that aggregate. But while this
separation in the aggregate destroys the quality of connection
on which the whole depends, the first aggregate already falls
down to pieces and with it also disappears the separation of both
of the aggregates inhering in it, before it can be destroyed
through the falling to pieces of the whole and the change of place
of its parts. This is quite sufficient as an example or the sportive
theories in which scholiasls were involved, in order to explain the
destruction or the quality of separation through the destruction
of its bearer. We shall not consider the objections to it which
are cited by Prafastapiida and his attempt to controvert them.
The qualities of distantness (paratvam) and nearness (aparat-
vam) 2s:i arc the cause by which a man designates and knows an
object as far or near. They are of a double kind according as
they are conditioned by space or time. When they are conditioned

by space, they are known to have a particular position in space;
when they are conditioned by time, a difference of age is known.
When distance and nearness are conditioned by space, they
arise thus : When two objects seen from the point of an observer
in the same direction are on different distances, it is due to the
fact that they are connected with_ the place of the observer by a
greater or less number of space-points, and the observer knows
the distant object in comparison with the near as far (asarrmi-
kuta) and under the influence of this observing knowledge
( apek~iibuddhi[i), the quality of distantness arises in the object
through the connection with the place concerned in space. The
corresponding holds good for the quality of nearness. Distantness
and nearness, which are conditioned by time, arise in a similar
way. When in any place an older and younger man are found
at the same time, what is expressed is that the older one bears the
signs of old age-beard, wrinkles, gray hair, etc. and the observer
knows the older in comparison with the younger one as distant
and under the influence of this observing knowledge, there arises
in the older man the quality of distantness through the connec-
tion with the period concerned. A corresponding thing holds good
for the quality of nearness (in time).
The diappearance of the qualities of distantness and near-
ness ensues as a rule through the disappearance of the observing
knowledge ( apek~iibuddhiM which has called them forth, in the
same way as in the case of number. The process is as follows:
After the rise of the quality of distantness, there first arises the
knowledge of the commonness of distantness and through it the
observing knowledge begins to disappear. Simultaneously the
knowledge of the quality of distantness begins to arise. In the
next moment, the knowledge of the quality of distantness arises
and the knowledge of the distant object as distant begins to
arise. In the meanwhile, however, the observing knowledge has
vanished and the quality of distantness begins to disappear..
And when in the next moment, the knowledge of the distant
object has arisen, the quality of distantness has disappeared.
But as the qualities of distantness and nearness are not
merely caused by the observing knowledge but, before all,
are caused through the connection with space aud time, they
can naturally be destroyed also by the abrogation of this connec-

t ion. Only in that process, the movement, which abrogates the
connection, must set in exactly at the right moment, so that with
it the destruction comes through the abrogation of connection
before the disappearance of the observing knowledge can take
effect. Besides in the case of the aggregate, the destruction of
the qualities of distantness and nearness can succeed through
the destruction of the aggregate. Herein also, the destruction
must come exactly at the right moment, before the destruction
follows through the disappearance of the observing knowledge.
Both are the cases which stimulate Prafastapada to elaborate
them more precisely and he has not neglected to describe the
individual processes thoroughly and to adjust them with one
another. But with him that is not enough. He has also inclu-
ded in his consideration the possibility that two of the named
causes or also all the three together contribute to the destruc-
tion of qualities of distantness and nearness and he has described
also in these cases the course of occurrences exactly. But these
scholastic plays deserve no more than a short mention.
In the group of the common qualities are included also
the special qualities of the soul. They are knowledge, pleasure,
pain, desire, aversion and effort.
The knowledge (buddhib )284 appears in different forms
corresponding to the countlessness of its objects. Still, broadly
considered, two kinds are distinguished : ignorance ( a1iidya)
and knowledge ( viqya). Each of these is divided again into four
varieties. To ignorance belong doubt (sal'(lfayal;t ), error (vipar-
yayal;t), irresolution (anadhyavasiiyal;t), and dream (svapnab).
The knowledge (vidya) includes sense-perception (pratyak$am),
drawing of conclusion ( lair"lgikam), memory (smrtil;t) and super·
natural knowledge (ar~am) as it is ascribed to the holy seers
of antiquity. We will not go into the remaining details regar-
ding the description which Pra:iastapada gives of the individual
sub-varieties of the knowledge-theories of his time and much
that he presents here is his own personal view. In these points,
his teaching cannot therefore be considered valid as a recital of
the doctrine as it prevailed, in general, in the classical Vai~e~ika
but was created out of another stream of development which
later set itself up and flowed in quite a different path viz. that
..stream of development which contributed to the flowering of

Logic and Epistemology towards the end of the classical period
of Indian philosophy. We shall return to it when we deal with
that stream of development in the fourth volume of our work.
Here we shall only give, as an example, the doctrine of dream, 285 ,
because it is better suited to our present context.

According to the Vaise~ika doctrine, sleep comes on when
the body is fatigued through the activity during the day. Then,
in order that the body should rest and the assimilation of the
received nutrition should ensue, there is induced an effort of the
soul under the influence of the 'invisible' (adNtam) so that the
psychical organ moves to the heart and remains there motion-
less without any contact with the sense-organs. Through that
the sense-organs come to rest; only in-and-out-breathings conti-
nue unbroken. In this condition the man sleeps. When now, in
this condition, through the connection of the psychical organ
with the soul and through a memory-impression mediated
through the sense-organ, knowledge of any object, similar to the
sense-perception arises, it is named 'dream'. Especially such a
dream can have three causes. It can be caused by a specially
lively memory-impression. If one has thought, while sleeping, of
an object in a lively manner out of love or anger, he sees that
object in a dream. Further a disturbance in the relation of the
three bodily juices can influence dreams. 286 When the wind
dominates, the man dreams that he flies through the air. When
the bile preponderates, the man dreams of fire, of golden moun-
tains and the like. When phlegm predominates, the man dreams
of rivers, oceans, snow-peaks and many such things. Finally the
happy and unhappy dreams are called forth by the 'invisible'
(adr~tam), the happy ones by merit and the unhappy ones by
guilt.
Of the remaining qualities of the soul, pleasure (sukham) 287 is,
according to its nature, satisfying. It arises, when a desired ob-
ject like a wreath etc. is found nearby on account of the contact
of the sense-organ with the objects under the influence or merit
through the connection of the psychical organ with the soul and
it produces joy, affection, brightness in the eyes,etc. In the case
or past objects, it depends on memory; in the case of future
objects, it depends on plans about the future (saT{lkalpab). In
the case of the wise, the feeling of pleasure which arises

without any object, recollection or wish-dreams, depends on
knowledge, self-mastery, satisfaction and merit.
The pain (dul;kham )2°8 by its nature is oppressive. It arises
when an undesirable object like poison, etc. is found nearby, on
account of the contact of the sense-organs with the objects under
the influence of guilt (adharmal;), through the connection of the
psychical organ with the soul and it begets ill-humour, oppres-
siveness and dejectedness. In the case of the past objects,
serpents, tigers, robbers, etc., it depends on memory; in the case
of the future, on future thoughts.
Desire (icchii) 289 is the desire for a thing, which one does
not possess; it may be for oneself or for others. It arises through
the connection of the psychical organ with the soul under the
influence of the feeling of pleasure or memory. It is the cause
of effort, memory, merit and guilt. The sub-varieties of desire are
love, longing, passion, wish, sympathy, passionlessness, etc.
The aversion{dve,rnl;) 290 or hate is, by its nature, a flaming
up. It arises through the connection of the psychical organ with
the soul under the influence of pain or memories. It is the cause
of efforts, memories, merit and guilt. The sub-varieties of aver-
sion are anger, hostility, rage, ill-will and ill-humour.
The effort(prayatnal.t) 291 is two-fold-(i) a mere result of life
or induced through desire and aversion. In the first case, it main-
tains in process, during sleep, in-and-out-breathing and causes,
on waking, the first connection of the psychical organ with the
sense-organs. In this case, it originates through a connection of
the psychical organ with the soul under the in[\uence of merit and
guilt. In the second case, the cause is the human action which
strives to gain the wished-for thing and to avoid the unwished·
for one anri besides keeps the body in maintenance. In this caset
it arises through the connection of the psychical organ with tho
soul under the influence of desire and aversion.
With the characteristic qualities of the soul, the great
groups of qualities are described. The remaining qualities follow,
loosely enrolled, first the three qualities of the Elements, namely
heavines>, fluidity and humidity.
Of these heaviness (gurutuam) 292 is the common quality of
water and earth. It is the cause of falling and is inferred from fall•
ing, as it is not perceivable by the senses. It can be abrogated

by connection, effort, or in a moved thing, by a swing. Like the
characteristic qualities of the Elements, heaviness is permanent
in permanent atoms and impermanent in aggregates.
The fluidity ( dravatvam) 293 is the cause of flowing. It
occurs to these elements : water, earthandfire. Thereby a distin-
ction is made as natural (siirµsiddhikam) and artificial (naimitti-
kam). The natural fluidity is the characteristic quality of water.
The artificial fluidity is a common quality of earth and fire. The
natural fluidity is like the remaining characteristic qualities of
the Elements permanent in atoms, and impermanent in aggre-
gates. If in many appearances or forms of water like snow and
hail, the natural fluidity appears to be abrogated, it depends on
the fact that in these cases, under the influence of heavenly fire 294
( divyarrz tejaft) heaps of water-atoms arise, in which the natural
fluidity of the atoms is hindered. The artificial fluidity is produc-
ed in different forms of earth like fat, lac, etc. and in the metals
which represent the appearance or form of fire, under the influe-
nce of fire. The process is the same as that during the change of
the qualities of the Earth under the influence of heat. 295 First,
under the impact of the Fire-atoms, the aggregate dissolves itself
into its atoms. Thereupon, the atoms take on the quality of
fluidity under the influence of heat. Then arise out of the
changed atoms again the aggrrgates which also exhibit now the
quality of fluidity.
The humidity or stickiness (snehab ) 296 is a characteristic
quality of water. It makes possible that moist things stick to one
another, that one can wash himself and some more things of
like nature. Like the other characteristic qualities of the Ele-
ments, it is permanent in the atoms and impermanent in aggre-
gates.
The next quality-the disposition or preparedness ( sa111skii-
ra{1) embraces three-the swing (vegalz), the memory-impressions
and the elasticity.
The swing ( vegatz)207 emerges among the five limited sub-
stances-the four clements and the psychical organ, that is, among
all substances which arc capable of movement. It is generat-
ed by a movement on account of a special cause-an impube or
stroke, and causc8 a continued movement in a particular ciirec-
7, THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISEl[IIKA 169
tion. The swing is abrogated through the connection with a

substance to which the quality of touch occurs, that is, through
rebounding on an impenetrable object. In some cases, the swing
can arise when the parts, in which it dwells, unite into a whole
to which then it also occurs.
A memory-impression (bhiivanii) 298 is a quality of the soul
which occasions a memory (smrti~) or a recognition (pratyabhijfiii-
nam) of a formerly perceived object. It is abrogated through a
knowledge of another sort-through intoxication or frenzy, sorrow
and such like feelings. Memory-impressions arise through the
connections of the psychial organ with the soul and above all in
the case of specially lively perceptions, through practice and
attentiveness. When a man, for example, sees something wonder-
ful, this perception calls forth a specially lively memory-impres-
sion. In the learning of a knowledge of a handicraft or skill by
practice, the already existing memory-impressions are strengthe·
ned on account of the continuously renewed perceptions. And
finally when man looks forward to any sight with special interest,
the memory-impressions called forth therethrough make an
especially lasting impression.
The elasticity (sthitisthiipakab) 299 occurs in impenetrable
things which consist of a union of solid or firm parts and endure
for a longer time and its bearer, if it is displaced to another
position, may return to its original one. I ts influence is to be
observed in living and non-living things as in the case of a bow,
a branch and more things like them, when these are bent or
rolled together. Like most of the qualities of the elements, it is
permanent in permanent substances and impermanent in im-
permanent ones.
Both the qualities merit (dharma{t) and guilt ( adharma~) soo
which are often comprehended under the name of the Invisible
(adnfam) are unpcrceivable q ualitics of the soul. The merit arises
through the connection of the psychical organ with the soul on
account of the good willing when one accomplishes duties ascribed
to different castes and the stages of life. It has agreeable and
profitable results and can lead to Deliverance. It is extinguished
with the last f'ccli11g of happiness brought about by it. The guilt
arises through the connection of the psychical organ with the soul
on account of the bad willing when a man does the opposite of
what the merit leads to as consequence, when he neglects the

prescribed duties and allows himself to be guilty of errors out of
frivolity. It has disagreeable and unprofitable consequences and
is extinguished with the last sorrowful experience brought about
through it.
In connection with the qualities, merit and guilt, Prafas-
tapada presents briefly his doctrine of Deliverance. 301 The last
cause of entanglement in the cycle of being is ignorance. On it
depend the passions, desires and hate. When a being, caught in
ignorance and ruled by desire and hate, gains merit with which
only slight guilt is mixed, he is reborn in the world of gods or
in the human world and attains a body, sense-organs and objects
which prepare happiness for him. If on the other hand, he sad-
dles himself with guilt with which only slight merit is mixed, he
is reborn in the animal-world or in one of the hells and gets a
body, sense-organs and objects, which prepare sorrow for him.
Thus merit and guilt lead to new rebirths in a beginningless cycle
of being. A deliverance out of it is possible only in the following
way : He, who is born in a pious family through knowledge and
selfless acts, seeks after a way out of the sorrow of existence, and
on that account goes to a teacher and receives from him the true
knowledge about the six categories by which the ignorance goes
out and with the ignorance also vanish desires and hate. Conse-
quently merit and guilt which are caused by desire and hate can
no more arise and what existed from former times is cancelled
through retribution. Only a pure form of merit still arises, which
brings forth the feeling of joy begot by the view of the highest
truth and then goes out. When it is extinguished and finally the
body also disintegrates with death, there is no new rebirth and
man attains the Deliverance, because he comes to rest and calm-
ness like a fire, the fuel of which is consumed.
The last quality, the sound (Sabda[1) 302 is a quality of the
Ether and is perceived through the ear. It is limited in place
and has the <lura ti on of on! y a moment. The sound can be called
forth by connection, separation or through another sound. Every
sound is destroyed b5' the following, with the exception of the last
sound of a series of sounds, which is destroyed by the previous
sound.aoa This is a forced and a very questionable theory which
has been formulated, because no other way out was known.
The sound is two-fold-syllabiC sound (varr;,a&) and sound

( dhvani& ). Under syllabic sounds are to be understood the speech-
sounds. The sound is brought forth through an instrument. The
origination of the speech-sounds ensues as follows : Through the
connection of the speech-organ with the soul and under the in-
fluence of memory there is awakened a wish to utter the syllabic
sound. Thereupon, arises in the soul an effort and under the
influence ofthi~ effort there arises a movement in the speech-air,
through the connection of the soul with the speech-air. This moves
upwards and hits the throat and the remaining instruments of
speech. And under the influence of the connection of the air with
the instruments of speech there arise the speech-sounds through
the connection of speech instruments with the Ether. 304 The
sound ( dhvani&) arises, for example, under the influence of the
connection of the drum and the stick, through the connection
of the drum with the ether, or when a man breaks a stick, under
the influence of the separation of the parts of the stick from one
another through the separation of the stick from the ether.
The propagation of sound follows in this way : evey sound
while vanishing generates another sound in its direct neighbour-
hood, so that there arises a chain of sounds which reaches the
ear of the hearer like a wave. Because neither the ether of the
ear nor the sound lasting for only a moment can move itself, a
perception is not possible if the sound does not reach the ear ;
there remains no other possibility than the assumption of such
propagation of sound. 3 05
The third category the movement (karma ) 306 is divided
into five sub-varieties: raising, lowering, bending, stretching and
going. Commonness of movementness (karmatvam) occurs in all
these sub-varieties. Besides, each is characterized through its
special genus.
The place of movement inside the categories is due to the
fact that, like the quality, it necessarily presupposes a substance
as bearer, while it itself can neither be the bearer of a movement
nor of a quality. Every movement, therefore, inheres only in one
su\Jstance. This substance must be limited as movement denotes
a change of place, which is only possible in the case of limited
things. Again, it is important that every movement has only the
duration of a moment.307
Regarding the causality of movement, it is called forth by

heaviness, fluidity, effort or a connection. It, itself, without the
assistance of a further ca use, brings forth a connection, separation.
Thereby, the connection brought forth by it makes an end of
action itself. According to the scheme of ideas of the Vaise~ika,
the movement is a non-inhering cause (asamavayikiirat;am). It
shares also with others in the origination of the aggregates but
thereby, it brings forth neither the substance of the whole, be-
cause that is the result of the connection called forth by it, nor
does it bring forth a homogeneous result, that is to say, another
movement. It causes, on the contrary, only during the rise of the
aggregate, the connection and, in its destruction, causes also the
separation of its parts ; it therefore brings forth a quality which
inheres partly in its bearer and partly in another substance.
Of the sub-varieties of movement, raising ( utMepar;,am) is a
movement which ensues in such a way that the parts of the body
and things connected with them join themselves with places, in
space situated upward and separate themselves from those placed
downward. The lowering ( apak~epa1J,am) is the opposite thereof. The
bending is a movement through which the end of a straight thing
separates itself from its place in space and joins with the place
in the beginning so that the whole becomes curved. Stretching
(prasiirar;,am) is the opposite of that. The going (gamanam) finally
causes the connection with the places not fixed in the space and
also the separation from them. ltis, therefore, an indefinite move-
ment.
A further classification of movement is as follows : move-
ment can happen in the parts of the body and in objects which
are in connection with it i.e. in things which stand under the
influence of the soul and movements can happen in things which
do not stand under the influence of the soul. In the first case
they can be conscious (satpra~yayab) or unconscious (asatj!raty-
aya!t ). In the second case, they follow without any connection
with consciousness (apratyayalt). Jn this frame, Prafastapada
describes all the cases of movement which had been dealt with
by the old nature-philosophy.
In order to begin with a movement which stands under the
influence or the soul, it-for example, the raising of the hand-
ensues thus : When a man wishes to raise the hand, there arises
effort on the part of the soul connected with the hand. Under the
influence of this effort, a movement arises in the hand through
the connection of the soul with the hand. And this movement
moves the hand upwards. Things are more difficult when man,
for example, pounds in a mortar with a pestle. 308 Also in this case,
there first arises the wish to raise the pestle. Out of that arises
an effort and under the influence of this effort, there arises a
movement in the hand, through the connection of the soul with·
the hand, which raises it upwards. But at the same time, there
also arises, under the influence of effort, similar movement in the
pestle through the connection of the pestle with the hand. Now
it proceeds further. If the pestle is raised high enough, the wish
to raise it ceases and in its place steps in a wish to lower it. There-
upon arises again in the way mentioned already the movement
of lowering in the hand and the pestle though effort and through
the connection of the soul with the pestle. The last moment of this
movement leads to the impulse named connection between the·
pestle and the mortar. This impulse sets up again a stimulus under
the influence of a swing (vegafl) indwelling the pestle, to generate
an unconscious movement in the pestle which makes it fly up-
wards. This movement brings forth a swing in the pestle under
the influence of an impulse of the pestle. And under the influence
of the swing, there arises an unconscious movement upwards in
the hand through the connection of the pestle and the hand,
until by and by, after wish and effort, again the conscious move-
ment sets in.
This example may be enough to show how Pra:iastapada
treats his material. In a similar way, he speaks of the movement
of the objects, which are thrown with the hand or with some
device e.g. the movement of an arrow which is shot from a bow.
Then he goes on from the movements which stand under the in-
fluence of the soul to those which do not stand under the influence
of the soul.
Such movements take place in the four elements. As causes,
there come into consideration a thrust (nodan am), a stroke (abhi-
ghiital;l), the connection with something already joined(sa11!)1ukta-
sarriyogal;l ), that is to say, the connection with an object, which
is hit by a thrust or a stroke-where we speak of a propagation
of a thrust or impulse; heaviness, fluidity which cause the falling
and flowing named as movements and finally the swing of a

moved object. Here also Prafastapada speaks of different exam-
ples, according to his manner, in details, in the light of the
doctrine of categories. In connection with the movement of the
four Elements, he mentions, as a special case, the movement of the
breath-air. In a waking state, it is caused by a connection with
the soul, in which an effort also cooperates, which, on its side,
goes back to a desire or aversion, why, even the course of
breathing can be consciously regulated. In sleep, the connection
with the soul is also the cause of breathing ; still in that case
the effort depends on the life (jivanam) called the connection of
the psychical organ with the soul. 309
After the movement in the four Elements, Prafastapada
describes the relation of movement to the remaining substances.
Of these ether, time, space and soul fall away, as they are not
limited, a change of place being impossible in their case. On the
other hand, the movement in the case of the psychical organ is
important as its whole work depends on it. As long as life lasts,
the movement of the psychical organ makes possible, above all,
the connection of the soul with the different sense-organs ; its
movement is caused by the union with the soul and follows
under the influence of effort. This depends, during the waking
state, on the will of a man as the perception occurs voluntarily
through the sense-organs. Only the first perception, after waking
out of sleep, is involuntary and in this case, therefore, the effort
is occasioned through the life named as the connection of the
psychical organ with the soul. At the end of life, the movement
of the psychical organ causes the departure from here and
rebirth in a new embodiment. As the infinitely big soul cannot
wander, it is the psychical organ which binds the soul to the
temporary body, and thus leades to rebirth. It happens thus in
the following way : When merit and guilt, which condition a
particular existence ancl thus cooperate with the life (jivanam),
are exhausted through retrilrntio11, the effort, which keeps brea-
thing-in-process called forth by life, ceases, its operation is
suspended and breath stops. But now a man has again gained
in this existence new merit and new guilt. These now come into
activity and contribute, together with the connection which binds
the psychical organ with the soul, to the fact that the psychical
organ departs from the body and with it death ensues. There-
upon there again originates, through merit and guilt, a fine trans-
mitting body (ativahikafariram ) 310 which receives the psychical
organ and makes wandering to the place of next birth possible.
There it enters into a new body which is commensurate with the
merit and guilt of man and then begins the new existence.
These are the most important functions of the psychical or-
ganism which are rendered possible by movement. It is still to
be mentioned that a Yogi, through the wonderful power of the
psychical organ, can also wander to any place outside the body
and can again enable it come back. Finally Prafastapada notes
that during world-creation the movement, which leads to the
connection of the psychical organ with the newly born body, is
conditioned by the 'Invisible'. It gives him the occasion to point
out that in general all movements for which no other reason
can be definitely fixed are to be traced back to the 'Invisible'.
With this, there has ended what Prafastapada has to say about
the category of movement and he goes on next to the description
of the next category of commonness.
The commonness ( siimanyam ) 311 which remains undivided 312
and uninterrupted in its bearer, is the cause why man recognizes
the agreement ( anuvrttib) with one another; when a man, for ins-
tance, observes an object in which a definite commonness dwells,
there originates, on account of a 111emory-impression which
has been called forth by the earlier preception of similar objects,
a knowledge on the basis of the memory of the earlier perceptions
that here lies something of a like sort. And it is what lies at the
bottom as cause of this knowledge-the commonness.
As the commonness, according to this definition is di llercnt
from substances, qualities and movements, it is an independent
category. There are numerous commonnesses, because every
commonness clings to a particular group of things and calls forth
a special idea. Thereby the commonnesses arc permanent. As
they arc different from their bearers they do not perish even
though these bearers perish. But o!' every kind, there is only
one unicp1e commonness because its characteristic is the same in
all its bearers and a distinctive mark is absent. This one com-
monness indwells undi viclccl in every bearer. It, no doubt, exists
everywhere in all its bearers but particularly also only in its
bearer. Though the commonnesses are not restricted spatially,

the conditions for their existence are only given in their
bearers. In other places in between they cannot exist and are,
therefore, ungraspable there (avyapadefya(t).
There are two sub-varieties of the category of commonness,
the highest one and the lower one. The highest commonness is
the existence (sattii). It is, exclusively, commonness and the cause
by which a man knows all things as agreeing with one another.
Just as leather, woollen and linen clothes, dipped in blue colour,
can be recognized, according to universal agreement, as blue in
spite of their difference otherwise, even so substances, qualities
and movements in spite of their difference otherwise, are re-
cognized and there is a universal agreement that they exist.
This knowledge of universal agreement must depend on another
cause different from substances, qualities and movements them-
selves. This cause is commonness-existence.
Among lower commonnesses are counted substances (dravya-
tvam), qualityness ( gw;zatvam) and movemen tness (karmatvam).
It is the cause that things partly agree with one another, and
partly deviate from one another and is, therefore, commonness
(siimiinyam) as well as particularity ( vife~aM. Thus substanceness
is the cause that earth, water, fire etc., in spite of their diffe-
rences otherwise, agree with one another as substances and it is
therefore the commonness. But it is also the cause that things
distinguish themselves from qualities and movements and is in
this sense a particularity ; a corresponding state holds for qua-
lityness, movementness and all further lower commonnesses. They
are all, because of their wide spheres, at bottom (priidhiinyena)
assumed as commonnesses. Because they distinguish their bearer
from the heterogeneous one, they are designated in a metaphori-
cal sense (bhaktyii) as particularities (vi.fe~ab).
The category of particularity (vi.fe~ab) 813 embraces the last
particularities (antiyii vife~ii(t). These indwell the permanent sub-
stances-the atoms of the four Elements-ether, time, space, the
soul, and the psychical organ. 314 One such particularity indwells
every individual substance and differentiates it from all other
homogeneous and heterogeneous things. These particularities are
not perceivable by ordinary men and are only seen by Yogis in
their condition of contemplation. As, for instance, ordinary men
distinguish a cow on the ground of the commonness, qualities

and movements indwelling it, as something different from a horse,
so also the Yogis are able to distinguish from one another the
atoms, the released souls and the psychical organs, in spite of
the fact that they are like one another according to the common·
nesses qualities and movements indwelling them and they are
also able later to recognize them again. But as other causes are
not proved, it can only depend on the fact that a characteristic
entity indwells every one of these substances and distinguishes
them from all homogeneous and heterogeneous things. This entity
is the particularity (vifefa~ ).
In this case, no other explanation is thinkable. Because, in
spite of their supernatural powers, the Yogis are able only to-
distinguish these substances, when something which renders the
distinction possible ind wells them. It cannot also be asserted that
these substances are different from one another, of themselves,
as no further particularities which can distinguish them from
others can indwell the particularities ( vifefa&). Because, in the
case of particularities, this difference constitutes their nature. In
the case of other things, however, in which this is not the case,
they must depend on the influence of other en ti ties. Thus a lamp,
which is, by its nature, illuminating, illuminates itself. Other
things, on the other hand, must be illuminated by it. Or to use
another example, according to the Hindu prescriptions regarding
purity, cow's flesh or horse's flesh is, by nature, impure, while other
eatables become impure through contact with it. In the present
case, the relation of permanent substances and the last parti-
cularities is to be thought of in a similar way.
The last category of inherence (samavayab) 31 5 is a connec-
tion which calls forth the idea of 'here' in the things occurring
not separated, which stand in the relation of the bearer and the
Lorne (adha,ryiidharabhuta). As among things occurring separated,
for example a jar and milk, an idea arises, on the ground of their
connection: 'Here in the jar there is milk'. So also a similar idea
on the basis of inherenee arises among things occurring not sepa-
rated. Thus a man knows, for example, when he deals with a
whole and its parts: "Here in the threads is the cloth contained".
Among the substances, and their q1ialitics and movements, one
rccogni:.:es : "Here in the substances, there exist qualities and
movements." In the case of substances, qualities, movements and

commonnesses inhering in them one knows : "Here in the sub-
stances, qualities, movements, existence is present ; here in the
substance there is substanceness, in the quality, qualityness ; in
movement, movementness". In the case of the substances and the
last particularities one knows : "Here in these permanent sub-
stances are the last particularities existent".
From connection ( sarµ;·ogaf:z), the inherence is distinguished
by the fact that the things which it joins can never occur sepa-
rated. Therefore, it cannot be called forth like connection through
movement. It cannot be also destroyed by separation. Besides,
the things, which it joins, occur exclusively as the bearer and the
borne.
That inherence (samaviiyaf:z) is a separate category, arises
out of the speciality of the characteristic in which man recognizes
it. As one knows different things as of a like sort on the ground
of commonness and out of that infers \he existence of a further
entity namely, the commonness, so also, one is led to recognize
among the five categories the idea of 'here'-the existence of a
further category-namely, inherence.
In contrast to the quality of connection, which emerges as
plurality, there is only one single lnherence. Because the characte-
ristic, out of which we infer it, is everywhere one and the same
and a starting-point is absent out of which one could infer or
conclude plurality. Also inherence in contrast to connection
is permanent, because it is not caused, as no cause can be proved.
As far as the existence of inherence in the remaining categories
is concerned, there is no need of a further connection or inherence,
as the inhering forms its own nature. Finally the inherence is not
perceivable by the sense because it inheres in no sensuously per-
ceivable things and is not reflected in knowledge; on the contrary
it is inferred out of the idea of 'here'.
With the description of the category ofinherence, the work
of Pra~astapftda concludes. Simultaneously ends with it the his-
tory of the Vailie~ika of the classical time which has found in
this work its concluding presentation. Since then, something
really new was created in the sphere of the theory of knowledge
and logic and here the lead was soon assumed by the Nyfiya,
while the Vaise~ika moved into the background. Inside the Vai-
7· THE NATURE-PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS AND THE VAISE~IKA 179
se~ika itself, one restricted oneself to working through the doc-

trine transmitted in the commentaries and to shapir.g out
further the individual things. Really new features do not come
lorth. Only first, about the turn of the millennium (the first
thousand years A.D.) the new School of the Nyaya-the Navya
Nyiiya-strikes a new path ; still it works back to the Vaise~ika
and leads to the stronger changes of the old doctrine.
With this, we have provisionally reached the conclusion
and it is therefore time to direct back our gaze. It is a long and
rich development which we have known, a development which
extended itself over eight centuries. Its importance lies above all
in the fact that here we get acquainted with a kind of philoso-
phising which is something rare in the Indian soil and which one,
according to the usual ideas of Indian philosophy, would not
expect. Here is the view directed not on the beyond and no striv-
ing after Deliverance is the motive of this philosophy. The inte-
rest, on the contrary, is on this existence and its root
is the pure striving for knowledge-the striving to understand
and explain the world of phenomena. The doctrines, which were
thereby arrived at, may appear to us today primitive and laugh-
able. But in order to be just to them, we need not start from the
views of modern science. We must, on the other hand, include
in our comparison what was created under similar presuppositions
and conditions and these are the doctrines of Greek Philosophy.
Then we can say that the nature-philosophy of the Vaise~ika, so
far as its traditionally handed down material allows us to gain
its distinct picture--its Atom Theory, its doctrine of Perception,
its Psychology, as well as its Theory of Categories, can be well
compared with the corresponding doctrines of the old Greek
thinkers. And we have had repeated occasions to point out the
unusual sharpness aud consistency of thought by which the
Vai{;e~ika is distinguished. Thus seen, the philosophy of the
classical Vaise~ika represents a most highly considerable
phenomenon. Now the question raises itself~ why it did not
attain more and more growth but soon grew stiff and numb,
and why it, in the form in which it is shown handed down to
us, produces, in spite of everything, an unsatisfactory, why,
in many view-points, an unpleasant elfect.
During the second great philosophy of the classical time-
i.e.-the Sarµkhya, we have said316 that its ancient doctrines

must have appeared obsolete and out-distanced in later times
and were therefore rejected. That does not hold good for the
Vai~e~ika. Its theories were as well rejected by the opponents
and passionately contested but they were never felt to be obsolete.
Here the reasons which led to the arresting of development and
to its torpidity are to be sought elsewhere. To the classical Vai-
sel?ika, the fresh sources of observation, which gives life to
scientific knowledge, were lacking. Its nature-philosophy, there-
fore, dried up and died. A similar case happened to the doctrine
of categories. It worked with a few ideas once gained and lost
itself in an unfruitful scholastics. But that passed a sentence on
the system. In spite of shining beginnings, the living stimulus,
which always produces an impregnating effect, was missing in
it. Therefore, it is intelligible that it gradually grew stiff and
numb and was bound to step in the background against other-
schools.
In spite of that, the historical significance of the Vaise~ika
is immensely great and the influence, which it has exercised, can
be hardly over-estimated. The manner to think-which it has
created in the doctrine of the categories, has shone out far and
wide and has influenced the new school of the Nyaya until the
present times. The opponents of the Vai:\el?ika also could not
escape its influence. They have developed and formed a large
part of their doctrines in the discussions with the Vaisel?ika.
So in spite of its weaknesses or foibles, this system represents a.
significant limb of Indian philosophy which assumes an im-
portant place inside the whole and without which the remain-
ing would never be fully intelligible.
8. THE SYSTEM OF THE JAINA
In the last section we have dealt, in connection with the

origin of the Vaise~ika system, with the development of the old
Indian Nature-philosophy in general, so that it is not necessary
to describe, besides, the individual doctrines. Only in one case
we must make an exception-in the case of the Jaina ; that is
the fully developed philosophical system which developed, in
the course of the period with which we have dealt, out of the
simple ancient doctrines of the Jina. This stands apart from the
general development and exhibits so many original features
that we must deal with it separately. Still it is not necessary,
to deal with it as much exhaustively as we did with the Vai-
se~ika. Because, the system of the Jaina cannot be compared
with the Vaisei?ika in point of philosophical importance and
effect. Besides, its detailed historical representation through
periods is not possible. This is due to the constitution of the tra-
dition as also to the present position of research. Before we
speak of the condition of the tradition (or the material handed
down), we must speak a few words about the external history
of Jinism, so far as it concerns the development of the doctrine
and is, therefore, important for us here. ·
In the case of the representation of Buddhism, we shall
see that a large number of schools were formed early on its soil
from which different important systems were created which
differed from one another in essential features. Anything com-
parable to it is absent in Jinism. We hear, no doubt, in the old
period, of different schisms. 317 Interesting opinions about the
doctrine are also mentioned. Thus, the founder of the sixth
schism is supposed to have represented a doctrine of categories
similar to that of the Vai~qika. But apart from the uncertainty
of information, these schisms have not led to the foundation of
lasting schools and to any formulation or development of im-
portam doctrines. For us, the historical fact which is of praC•
tical importance is only the great split of the .Jaina Church in
two branches-theDigambara and Svetambara. What is repor-
ted by legend about this split is worthless and is of no interest
for us. The fact is that we must reckon with this split in the
first post-Christian Centuries. As the names Digambara ('sky-
clad') and Svetambara ('white-clad') show, they deal originally
with a difference in the ways about the life of the monks. Diffe-
rences in the opinion about the doctrine seem to have been form-
ed gradually and were never very great. Still the following thing
is important. Through the fact that both the branches of the
Church led their own lives, its result was that the changes, to
which the holy tradition was naturally subjected in course of
time, followed in the two branches in different ways so that
gradually traceable differences were developed. Only the
Svetambara have maintained the old canon, while it was given
up by the Digambara and was replaced by the later dogmatic
works. Also from the point of contents, differences of all sorts
appeared forth. 318 Further the separation resulted in the Svetam-
bara and the Digambara developing their own literature and
many times going their own manifold, different ways. These
differences, however, played a great role only in later times and
we shall have to deal, in the representation of the Knowledge
Theory, with the Digambara and Svetambara separately. In the
period with which we have to do here, the differences are with-
out any great importance and we can, therefore, leave them
out of consideration.
Now, regarding the constitution of the handed-down tradition:
When we try to describe how out of the simple doctrine of the
Jina, the doctrinal system of the J aina developed, as it is re-
presented to us at the end of the classical period of Indian philo-
sophy, there stand before us, for our disposal, several masses of
tradition. AmJng them in the first place, the writings of the
Jaina C.ino1.1s are to be named. As we have already said during
the dl~>:;ri ptio n. of the doctrine of Jina, 319 the oldest tradition of
th~.Jain.1 is containd in the canon of holy writings, of which we
have already spoken briclly. On that occasion we have already
pointed out that this canon consists of very heterogeneous consti-
tuents, that, beside very old texts, there stand such as arc youn-
ger or later by many centuries and that it is difficult to peel away
and get at the oldest kernel which forms a certain foundation
for Lhe presentation of the teaching of Jina. Already this com-
position of the Canon out of the layers of different times could
8. THE SYSTEM OF THE JAINA 183
give precious starting points for the development of the doctrine

and could h:rnd down precious m:iterial for a presentation such
as we attempt here. But with thi > ai n, the com position of the
canon itself must be clearly presented; its different constituents
must be separated and arranged from the point of time. But
hardly the first steps have been taken towards it.
One does not fare better with the next mass of tradition
viz. the commentaries on the canonical writings. On the J aina-
canon, we possess a rich commentary-literature, the production
of which belongs to the period here dealt with. The oldest among
these works are called 'nijjutti'. They are composed in verses
and give, in the shortest form, the keywords for the orally hand-
ed down explanation of the holy texts. Later these works were
supplemented with interpolated verses, and were finally en-
larged into extensive metrical commentaries which were named
'Bh!isa'. Connected therewith are further prose commentaries
called 'Cu1.11.1i'. All these works are composed in Prakrit and
form the foundation for the later exhaustive commentaries in
Sanskrit. Rich material may be necessarily found in these works
for the history of the Jaina doctrine. But they are printed only
in small parts and their evaluation has yet hardly begun. 32 0
There remains, therefore, only the third mass of tradition-
the group of independent doctrinal writings. Such writings were
already composed in the period with which we are dealing. Of
all, there are the works of two authors, which are to be conside·
red here. They are the works of Um'isvati and Kundakunda.
Of these, Umasvati was the pupil of Gho~anandi and MUia, was
active in Pataliputra and is supposed to have lived in the first
post-Christian centuries. Of his works the most important arc the
'Tattniirthiidhigamasutrii1Ji' ('aphorisms about the knowledge of
the meaning of truth') on which he himself composed a com-
mcntary.321 The Sutras were recognized as authoritative by the
Svetiimbara as well as the Digambara ; the commentary, on the
other hand, only by the Svetiimbara. The second author Kunda-
kunda is counted as the Digambara. About his person, reliable
information is missing. Still he is supposed to have been a.
native of the Deccan and must have belonged to a time not much
later than Urnasvati (about 300 to 400 A.D. ). Numerous works
are ascribed to him, of which 'Pavaya1.1asaro' ('the kernel of
proclamation or preaching') 322, the 'Pamcatthiyasamgaho' ('sum-

mary of the five masses of existence) 323 and the 'Samayasiiro'
I
('the kernel of the doctrine' ) 324 are the most important.
The works of both these authors give us a sufficient picture of
the doctrinal system of the Jaina upto their time. The difficulty
lies in the fact that in the present state of our knowledge regarding
that time, their works appear not as parts of a connected Ii terary
development but stand by themselves alone. They do not allow
the Jaina doctrine to appear in its development but recite only
the condition upto their particular period. In spite of that, our
knowledge of the general developmentrenders possible the essen-
tially true assessment and arrangement of information offered by
them. We, therefore, hope to give, at least in the ground features,
a correct picture of the J aina doctrine of the classical period. In
doing so, I proceed thus: The work of U masvati gives, in the
most concise form, the dogmatics of Jainism. It embraces the
entire range of the doctrine. But it presents only the dry, short
maxims. The philosophical thought comes in them very briefly.
Besides, it enters incomparably at great length into things which
are philosophically of only little interest-such as the construction
of the world, which theJainas delineate in all particulars in a phan-
tastic way, or the directions of conduct for the monks. Reverse is
the case of Kundakunda whose work is dominantly characteri-
zed by philosophical interest. He deals especially with the the-
oretically important fundamental questions. He handles them at
length and in a well-thought-out way. Consequently, he neglects
the external particulars. Under these circumstances, I choose
for my presentation the following way : I accept, as the hasic
foundation, the aphorisms of Umasvati but touch only very
concisely what is philosophically unimportant. For that, I seek
the explanation of Kundakunda to illumine the philosophically
important problems in hand. Besides, I give this stuff or material
the arrangement which corresponds to our hitherto offered pre-
sentation of the Nature-philosophical doctrines.
In this way, the doctrinal system of the Jaina in the classi-
cal period of Indian Philosophy represents itself like something
as follows :
There are five masses of existence ( astikti)•iill}, space
(iikiifam), impulse ( dharmab), hindrance (adharma{1), souls(jiviib),
matter(pudgalii~). They are permanent and firmly fixed in num-

ber. Out of them is composed the world ( lokab) which is only
one and limited according to the Jaina doctrine. The first three
masses of existence : space, impulse and hindrance are only exist-
ing as one each. They are incorporeal (arilpi or amilrtab) and
immovable (ni,skriyafl). The space is infinitely great; it stretches
not only over this whole world but also far beyond it over the
non-world (alokab). It consists of endlessly innumerable points
of space. Impulse and hindrance are restricted to the world, as
they can be effective only in this world, but they fill it entirely. 325
They consist of innumerable space-points. The existence and
operation of space consists in the fact that it preserves space for
things and receives them in itself. The efficacy of impulse and
hindrance consists in the fact that through them are rendered
possible the movement and rest in things.
Beside these three masses of existence, there is also named,
in general, the time (kiilab)). It was not received into the list of
masses of existence. But one soon saw himself compelled to ex-
plain, when difficulties presented themselves. 326 First, one defined
Time ( k!ila~), just as he described three masses of existence,
according to its efficacy, as it was stated that Time is that which
renders possible the mutation ( vartanii) of things. 327 Then it was
naturally clear that the Time is incorporeal. But now already
begin the difficulties. While the remaining masses of existence
were defined according to their relation to space and it was
declared how many space-points they take, one was, on the other
hand, compelled to say in regard to time that it has no space-
points. But with it the question arose, in which form it then
existed. In order to answer this question, it was explained that
the Time stood leaning upon (pratitya) the variable masses of
existence : souls and matter. Slowness and speed in the mutation
-0fthings, it was said, are not possible without a mass (mtitrii).
The mass again cannot be independent of variable or mutable
things. It stands only in dependence on them. But can one, under
these circumstances, characterize time as material or object as
substance? Views wavered on this point. Kundakunda and the
DiE;ambara in general decided in its favour. Umasvati allows the
question open. The following was also to be further considered :
What depends on the variable or mutable things is naturally not
the time in general but only the present, the moment ( samayab).
This moment is transitory and originates and vanishes in the
same moment. It is the time which an atom requires in order to
cross one space-point. Only that, which earlier and later is con-
nected with it, is, as one taught, the time ( kiilab) in general.
Umasvati and Kundakunda explained this question somewhat
like this.
Now remain still the two most important masses of existence:
souls and matter. Both are different from the hitherto described
ones through the fact that they are a plurality and are mobile,
For, the souls are incorporeal and alone spiritual (cetana) among
all the masses of existence. The particles of matter are unspiri-
tual or insentient but they alone are corporeal (rap; or murtab)
among all the masses of existence.
The characteristic of the souls is, according to Umasvati,
that they influence one another (parasparopagrahab) 328 • Far more
important and characteristic of their nature is, however, their acti-
vity (upayogab), which depends on their spirituality or sentience
and consists of knowledge and sight or view. 329 Further the soul
is not only a sentient or spiritual knower, it is also a doer, enjoyer
and master (prabhub). It is the doer (kartii )so far as it accomplishes
actions which determine its fate in metempsychosis. It is the
enjoyer (bhoktii) because it enjoys the fruit of its works. It is the
master (prabhu!i) because its fate in metempsychosis as well as its
Deliverance lie in its hands and depend on itself only. In these de-
finitions, the comprehension of the soul as a doer created some
difficul ties. 330 The J aina designate, as we have already said in
the description of the doctrine of Jina, 331 action or karma as a
material stuff which streams in the soul through the activity of the
soul, fixes itself firmly and binds it. Now naturally one cannot
say that the soul brings forth this material stuff, this action. Only
the condition of the soul (bhiiva~) which brings forth the in-
streaming stuff, is caused through its action. Besides, one can,
in a certain sense, assert that it is the material stuff which is
brought forth by the work or action and the condition concerned.
But in another sense, the soul itself is the cause of this condition.
Thus its activity properly consists in doerness. All the named
qualities of the soul, it may be remarked here, occur to it in full
measure but only in the state of Deliverance. In the case of the
wandering souls, they (qualities) arerestricted by the in-stream-

ing Karma-stuff in different ways and come into validity only
when this Karma is destroyed ( k~ayaM or- is brought to rest
( upafoma{l,.)
Concerning the extension of the soul, it embraces as many
points of space as also the World-space. It can, therefore, fill
the entire world. But it can also, on account of its subtleness or
fineness and because it is not impenetrable, draw itself together
to any small space as it likes. The embodied soul has the size as
large as that of a body in which it is embodied and to which it
adjusts itself. This adjustment is elucidated by the example of
light which in a similar way fills space, may it be great or
small.
The matter (pudgala{l,) is, as we have said, insentient and
corporeal in contrast to the souls. 332 Its operation consists there-
in that the body, the speech, the psychical organ and the breath
are formed out of it and further that it causes pleasure, pain,
life and death. 333 As regards its extension, it is to be distinguished
as atoms (atzavafl) and aggregates (skandhii{l,). Of these, the atom
takes one point of space, the aggregates as many as they like,
according to the number of their atoms. But they have a parti-
cular size only in the form of gross m:itter. In the form of fine
or subtle matter, as many atoms as one likes are crowded to-
gether in any small place.
The origin of aggregates (skandhii{l,) ensues through the
conglomeration of atoms and small aggregates or through the
disintegration of the big ones. Atoms arise only through the
disintegration of aggregates. The amalgamation of the atoms in
the formation of an aggregate depends on the quality of touch
which occurs to the atoms. 33' Thus touch is either rough
(ruk,rnb) or smooth or sticky (snigdha{i ).aa 5 Besides, both
sorts of touch occur in different degrees from the least rough-
ness or stickiness or smoothness to the highest one. When the
atoms which possess the quality of touch in different dt::grees
occur together, though they may bt:: homogeneous or heteroge-
neous, they join themselves with one another. This theory was
supplemented with some definitions which remain provisionally
uniutclligible to us regarding their origin and proof. For exam-
ple, it was asserted that atoms, which possess these qualities in
the smallest degree, generally enter into no connection. In the

.case of those which enter into connection, there must be a dif-
ference of two degrees in the strength of their qualities upon
which after the entry of the connection an equalization follows.
The doctrine of qualities is formulated in an original way.
Here also atoms and aggregates are distinguished. The old
qualities of the elements occur in the atoms : touch ( sparfab),
taste ( rasab), smell (gandhab) and colour (var!lab ). The quali-
ties of the aggregate are, besides, sound (Sabdab ), connection
( bandhab), subtleness or smallness ( sauk~myam), grossness or
bigness ( sthaulyam), form or shape (sal'(lsthanam ), separation
(bhedab ), darkness (tamab), shadow ( chiiyii), radiation of warmth
(iitapab) and illumination (uddyota[z). In these, for example,
with sound, they held fast, in the ancient manner, to the
material character of this quality. In the qualities of the ele-
ments, further sub-varieties are distinguished. The touch i3
eight-fold: hard, soft, heavy, light, cold, warm, sleek, rough. The
taste is five-fold : bitter, pungent, acrid, sour and sweet. The
smell is two-fold : fragrant and obnoxious; and the colour is
five-fold : dark, blue, red, yellow and white.
It is now remarkable that according to the Jaina doctrine,
these qualities are not distributed according to the elements on
the atoms but that they occur to all the atoms equally symme-
trically. Every atom possesses a taste, a smell, a colour, and
two kinds of touch. In the atoms, therefore, there is no diffe-
rence of Elements. Only in the formation of the aggregate,
through the change (/iari!liima!1) to which all material things
(pudgaliib) are continually subject, the particular qualities
arise forth, others step back and there arises the difference of
Elements. It is this basic difference which distinguishes the
atom-doctrine of the Jaina from that of the Vai~e~ika and
which, perhaps, is conditioned by the Jinistic doctrine of re-
lativily of which we shall come to speak.
To the doctrine of masses of existence, Umasviiti joined
the doctrine of categories : As we have already mentioned, the
Jaina know only three categories : substance (draryam), quality
(gu!lab) and condition (parytlya!i). They have not formulated
the theory of categories in the way of the Vaise~ika. We, there-
fore, find no enumeration and full description of all substances,
qualities and conditions from the stand-point of the doctrine of

categories. Umasvati, on the contrary, satisfies himself with a
short mention and definition of a few individual categories. 3 3&
He says : "A substance is that to which cling qualities and
states". "Qualities have substances for their bearer and are
themselves without qualities". "The constitution of the subs-
tances and qualities" finally "is its change (pari1;uimafl )" or its
condition.
Though in thejaina doctrine one renounced the formulation
of the category-doctrine after the manner of the Vai~e~ika into a
frame in which the whole traditional Nature-philosophy was in-
cluded, it was sought to makeit fruitful in another way. Through
the attempt to define more exactly the nature of the categories
and their relation with one another, one reached a comprehension
of the nature of things which created the philosophical founda-
tion or groundwork for the Jinistic theory of relativity according
to which the constitution of things admitted a plurality of com-
prehensions and assertions or expressions. We see this already
in Kundakunda. 337 He first inquires into the nature of substance
and finds it in existence (sattii). Thereby he considers as existing
that which according to its nature is a given fact (sahiivasid-
dham or avatthital'fl, sahiive). The existence consists now in origina-
tion, disappearance and preservation or persistence. This triad
appears bound with each other ever and indissolubly. There is.
no origination without destruction, no destruction without origina-
tion and both not without persistence. The substance whose na-
ture consists of existence is, therefore, continually adhered to by
origin, destruction and persistence and with all together. Conse-
quently it is subjected to continual change in which it still per-
sists imperishable. This apparent contradiction is explained
through the relation of the substance to the qualities and condi-
tions. According to the Jaina doctrine, the substance is not
only their bearer but it is, by its nature, inseparably bound with
them. There is no substance without qualities and conditions
and no qualities an<l conditions without substance. It is not
to be understood in the sense of the Vai~e~ika that substances,
qualities and conditions cannot occur separated from one ano-
ther. But therewith a unity of its nature is supposed to be
asserted by it ( do1J.ham at;ai1i7J.abhutarri bhiivarri). This explains
the union of change and persistence in the nature of a substance.

What originates and disappears is not the substance itself but
its qualities and conditions. Its existence, on the other hand,
'
persists. In the case of the origination and disappearance of
things, one need not speak, after the fashion of the V ai~e~ika,
of the origination of the non-existent but the things, according
to their qualities and conditions, are subjected to origination and
disappearance.
Kundakunda explains this doctrine in the example of the
soul. 338 The soul possesses different qualities like sentiency and
activity. And it appears in different forms of existence in diffe-
rent conditions as god, man, denizen of hell or animal. When
a man dies and is reborn as god, or in any other form of exis-
tence, it is not the soul that dies and is reborn but it is only
the condition as man and god that dies and is reborn. One
can, therefore, speak of no disappearance of the existent and
the origination of the non-existent but only of a change of the
condition of the soul.
With this we have said, in the sense of the Nature-philo-
sophy as well as from the stand-point of doctrine of categories,
what is most necessary about the factors out of which the doc-
trinal system of the Jaina forms its world-picture and can now
go on to consider the world-picture itself. In that we meet with
many remarkable ancient features beside the unbridled phan-
tasy-building in the delineation of individual things.
Regarding the construction of the world, 339 the J aina
know only one world which floats in empty space. It is, below,
the broadest, narrows itself towards the middle, then again gets
broader, until finally to become narrow again. Occasionally
its shape is compared to a human being who stands with spread-
out legs and it is perhaps a very old idea. In the lower parts
of the body of this world-man, the hells are found, in the
middle is the human world and in the upper part and the head
the heaven and finally the place or spot of the emancipated.
This whole world is surrounded by many covers or veils :
first of all, by empty space, then by thin air, then by thick air
and finally by thick water.
The hells which occupy the lowest part of the world are
seven in number and are situated like storeys over one another.
In them, the creatures, which are born therein, on account of

their bad deeds, suffer terrible torment which is partly inflicted
by them mutually but partly also inflicted by hellish demons.
Above the hells, the human world is situated. In its middle
is found the continent of J ambudvipa like a mighty disk, around
which there are, in continually larger rings, the alternating
ocec.ns and other continents. It is divided in seven zones through
six chains of mountains which go through it from the west to the
east. The southern-most is India-the Bharatavar~a-which is sep-
arated in the north from other remaining continents by Himavan
or Himalaya the first of the named mountain-chains. In the mid-
dle of the whole Jambudvipa, Meru, the mountain of the gods,
raises itself as a gigantic cone. It is remarkable that only the
Jambudvipa, the first of the continents. surrounding it and the
inner half of the second are inhabited by men. And only a part
of this sphere is the place of works (karmabhilmib), that is, only in
it, the good and bad works could be accomplished and eliminated
and only in it is Deliverance possible.
Above the human world are the heavenly worlds. The gods,
of whom there are four classes, in no way, inhabit only the
heavenly worlds. Both the lowest classes, among whom theJaina
include the half-gods and demoniac creatures of popular super-
stition, live in the human world or the underworld or partly
in heaven. Also the third class-the stargods who circle around
the divine mountain and create the division of time, belong to
the human world. Only the fourth class represents the proper
denizens of heaven. Their numerous worlds are again situated
one above another storey-like and fill the above or upper part of
the entire world. Above them, there is only a thin space-the spot
of the Delivered. All gods live in happiness and magnificence.
Thus the higher are superior to the lower in liLe-duration, power
and bliss. N evcrtheless, their sphere of influence, their size of
the body, their possession or property, their pride are smaller,
as their earthly bondages arc smaller.
The whole world holds good as permanent for the Jaina.
As distinguished from other systems, the Jaina know no continua-
l! y recurring world-originations and world-destructions. Evidently
their doctrine had early assumed so firm a shape that this idea
.could no more penetrate them. On the other hand, they know
the old idea of the alternation of world-ages, though in a pecu-

liarly recast form. According to them a very good (su~amasu)amii}
world-ageis followed by a goodone(su,wma); after that there fol-
low a good-bad( su)amarj,u}.t)ama) age, a bad-good (du}.t)amasu,rnma)
age and finally a bad (dub)ama)age. Then begins again an ascent.
The world-ages recur again in a reverse sequence. Thus up
and down they join themselves wit.11 one another in perma-
nent alternation.
The most important events in these world-periods recur
permanently and the Jaina believe that they can specify it to a
detail. In every cycle of six world-ages, according to their opi-
nion, 63 great men appear-24 Prophets ( tirtharrzkariib), 12
Kings ruling over the world (cakravartinab) and ')7 great heroes.
The last consist of 9 groups, of 3 each, which are characterized
by the names Baladeva, Vasudeva and Pra tivasudeva borrowed
from the Kql).a legend. The history of these 63 great men forms
the world-history of the Jaina. Towards their compilation the
whole legend-and-fairy-tale-world of India has been requisi-
tioned. Thus the history of the 8 hero-triads corresponds to the
Rama-legend. Then the 8th Baladeva is Rama or as the Jaina
call him Padma from whom his consort Sita was carried away
by Prativasudeva, the demon-prince Ravana and she is won back
in an adventurous struggle. The 9th Vasudeva is Knl).a who kills
the bad King Karµsa and vanquishes the Prativasudeva Jarasa-
ndha, the father-in-law of Karµsa, who was interested in his ven-
geance. With the Knl).a-saga is connected the main story of the
great heroic epic Mahabharata--of the internecine strife of the
two princely houses of the Kaurava and Pal).<;l.ava. And the most
famous fairy-romance of ancient India-the Brhatkatha of
Gul).adhya, was also, along with them, pressed into service. In
such a way the Jaina have sketched a comprehensive picture of
the whole world-occurrence. For them it had this advantage
that they produced, before their followers, the total 1egend-tradi-
tion remodelled in their spirit or sense and could make them
therethrough serve the religious aim. Indeed we need not con-
ceal the fact that the J aina-works which describe the world-
history show more a well-meant edifying tendency than poet-
ical power. But thr world-history is a remarkable and character-
istic constituent of the Jaina-doctrine and as such it deserves a
short mention at least in a work about Indian philosophy.

Regarding the beings which people the described world,
they were classified from different points of view. 340 At bottom
are all the beings of the Souls of whom the largest part is invol-
ved in metempsychosis. That gives rise to the division of the
released and the wandering souls. The wandering souls were
divided, according to the number of the sense-organs, according
as it was connected with the sort of their entanglement (in birth).
Of the sense-organs, the usual number of five was known: the
senses of touch, taste, smell, eye and ear to which the objects of
touch, taste, smell, colour and sound were juxtaposed. The plants
have only one sense-organ and also element-beings have one
sense-organ. According to the J aina doctrine, souls are connec-
ted not only with the plants but also with all elements. Of
them, the souls connected with parts of Earth and Water as well as
the plants are motionless, while those in the parts of Fire and Air
are mobile. To them all occurs as sense-organ the sense of touch
or contact. Of the animals, the lowest ones possess the two sense-
organs of touch and taste. Among the ants, there occurs already
the sense of smell. In the bees and other higher insects, there
occur the eye. Among all further animals, among the beings of
hell, men and gods, there is also the ear. They possess, therefore,
all the five sense-organs. Besides the sense-organs, the souls are
also connected with the psychical organ (manafz). It is the case,
in respect of beings in hell and gods and in respect of men when
they have left the mother's womb and in respect of a part of the
animals.
Another classification of living creatures is the otherwise
wide-spread division according to their origin. 3<11 Of them the
J aina know three sorts : a sudden appearance into view ( upapii-
taM, begetting (garbhafz), and coagulation i.e. the self-active con-
glomeration of element-parts (sammilrchanam). A sudden appea-
rance into view is found among gods and beings of Hell. The
begetting leads to three sorts of birth, according as the creature
is born in an egg ( aw/aja(l), from the embryo in the womb
(Jarli_yuja{1) or as a living young one (potaja{1). ~ 42 Those born
from the egg are birds, reptiles and fish. From the embryo in
the womb are born mostly higher quadrupeds and human beings.
As living young ones are horn into the world not only som~
higher quadrupeds like elephants but also hares, ichneumons,

mice and bats. Through coagulation or conglomeration
( sammilrchanam) originate finally the remaining living creatures.
What Umasvati has to say about the constitution of liv-
ing creatures in the different worlds, about their duration of life
and such other things, is a pure web of phantasy and is philo-
sophically of no interest. I restrict myself, therefore, in the
following, in essentials to the thF:ory or doctrine of men. The
man, as a soul entangled in the cycle of birth, consists of soul
and body, according to the Jaina doctrine. Thus, however,
many bodies are to be distinguished. 343 As we already know, the
Indian philosophy knows, since old times, not only the usual gross
body. We have, for example, in the presentation of the Sarµ-
khya, known of the fine body (silk;marrz .foriram) which is the
bearer of the transmigration of the soul. 344 We have also
heard, during the description of the Yoga, of a mental body
(manomayab kayab) which the Yogi separates from his gross body
and which serves him for the practice of wonder-powers. 34 5
Artificial bodies ( nirma1)akayab) are also mentioned, which are
created by ascetics through their super-natural power, for diffe-
rent aims. The Jaina have seized all these suggestions and sys-
tematically built out of them. Accordingly, they distinguish, in
all, five bodies : a gross body (audarikatr1 .foriram), a transfor-
mation-body (vaikriyarrz .foriram), a transference-body (aharikarrz
.foriram), a fiery body ( taijasarrz .foriram) and a karma body
( kiirmm:ia'TJ'l Sariram).
The gross body is the usual body among men and animals
who originate through begetting or through coagulation. Among
gods and creatures of hell who appear forth directly, the trans·
formation-bodies emerge into their place. These bodies can also
he acquired by ascetics as a result of perfection ( labdhib) and
serve the practice of miraculous powers.a16 The transference-
body is also the result of perfection. It consists of good and
pure stull~ encounters no resistance on account of its fineness
or subtleness an<l is created in order to bring information about
important questions from a teacher who is in another place.
According to Umiisvati, the ability to create such a tra11skrence-
body was restricted to the old ecclesiastical teachers who were
still in possession of foll holy knowledge. The assumption of a
fiery body is based on the old idea of a magical lustre which an

ascetic acquires through his self-mortification and through which
he may be able even to burn his enemy. According to the Jaina
doctrine, it is an independent body which causes the shining out
of lustre and splendour. Partially, this body is considered as a
result of Perfection which is acquired by an ascetic. Partially,
one was of the view that it occurs to all creatures from the
beginning and one sporadically assumes that it influences diges-
tion. The Karma-body finally is a result of the Karma-stuff
clinging to the soul. This Karma brings forth the Karma-body
as well as other bodies just as the sun lights itself up as also
other things. As an instrument of entanglement in the cycle of
birth, the Karma-body accompanies all beings from eternity
until the moment when they attain Deliverance.
Of the bodies enumerated, the following is always finer
than the preceding one and consists of a conspicuously large
number of points (pradefal,z). The last two bodies, the fiery and
karma bodies are so fine that they can reach any limit of the
world without encountering resistance. Of these bodies, every
creature pos~esses several, but four at the most. It holds good
also for men. A man possesses in every case the gross-and-Karma-
bodies. The fiery body can further occur in addition to them.
Besides he can also gain the transformation-body or the trans-
ference-body but only one at a time, because these both exclude
each other.
Among men, the four life-forces (pratJaf.z) are bound up
with the bodies. a41 These are the life-force of the senses ( i11dri-
yapra1Ja(1), the life-force of strength (balaprar;tal,z ), the life-force of
life (iiyu~tprii~tab) and the life-force of in-and-out-breathing
(aniipiinapriittah ). The life-force of the senses embraces the five
sense-organs. Under the life-force of strength are to be under-
stood the body (kaya{l), speech ( vak), the thinking (manal,z ). The
life-force of life is the cause which preserves the existence.
About in-and-out-breathing, nothing is further to be remarked.
All these lilc-forces are of a material nature. Among them only
the group of the sense- organs has a great importance and about
this something is more to be said.
Regarding the working of the sense-organs, Umiisvati does
not go so much into it deeply. We have already mentioned the
I
most important considerations in the general presentation of old

~ature-philosophy. We can, therefore, exclude them. Remark-
able and worth mentioning are still the different forms of
phenomena which the Jaina distinguish under every sense-
organ.348 Here also lie at the bottom, as in the doctrine of
different bodies, old ideas which have been seized upon, supple-
mented and finally brought into a regular system by the Jaina.
Old and generally widespread is the distinction between the
proper sense-organs and the parts of the body which represent
their bearers. The J aina include, under consideration, further, the
part of the soul which operates in the sense-organs. Besides, they
distinguish, corresponding to their categories, between subs-
tance and condition. They arranged these ideas systematically
and came to the following doctrine :
Among the sense-organs, there is a two-fold distinction : the
sense-organs as substance (dravyendriyam), the sense-organs as con-
dition (bhiivendriyam). The sense-organ as substance is divided into
talent or tendency (nirvrttib) and an instrument of doing (upakara-
tzam), of which again each one can be inner (abhyantaral1) and outer
( biihyafi). The inner tendency consists of the points of the soul.
which, arranged in a definite form, are active as sense-organs.
The outer tendency ( biihyanirvrttil;) consists in the particles of
matter which join themselves together under the influence of
Karma in conjunction with these points of the soul in the same
form. Under instrument ofactivity (upakara7Jam), the bodily organ
is to be understood ; in the sense of sight, for example, the eye-
ball is as the inner instrument, while the eyelid, the eyelashes
are as external instruments. In the case of the sense-organs as
condition, ability or capacity (labdhib) and activity ( upayogab)
are distinguished. The capacity is produced through the destruc-
tion (k,raya(1) or the coming to rest ( upafamab) of Karma which
stands in the way of the corresponding activity of the soul. The
activity ( upayoga(z) is the change (parirJ,iimal;) of' the soul which
eventually appears forth.
The psychical organ ( mana(l) is twofold : as substance
(dravyamanal;) and as condition ( bhiivamana(t) .349 In the first case,
it consists of the matter which has conglomerated together into a
psychical organ under the influence of Karma. In the second
case, is to be understood, thereunder, the adaptation of the con-
cerned parts of the soul which appear forth on account of the

destruction of the hindering Karma. About the activity of the
psychical organ, Umasvati has little to say. It is the bearer of
the reason or judgement and examines what is useful and
harmful in order to strive after it or avoid it. He also observes
that it is operative in the usual form of knowledge and in the
sense-perception besides the sense-organs and as a single organ
·in knowledge through communication.
This small survey of the mind has its good reason or motive.
In the doctrine of theJaina, the soul has preserved its old consti-
tution. One, as before, held fast to the view that it is of a restric-
ted size and denies the doctrine of the infinity of the soul assumed
by the Vaise11ika. One also participated as little in the other
changes which this doctrine in the Vaise~ika underwent in future
-above all, concerning the qualities of the soul. For the Jaina,
the qualities of the soul are, in the first place, knowledge which,
by no means, something external, is joined to the activity of the
organ, especially of the psychical organ and vanishes as soon as
the soul stands alone by itself. The qualities belong, on the con-
trary, firmly to its nature and occur to it also after Deliverance.
Consequently Deliverance does not represent, as in the Vaisqika,
a state of absence of consciousness. The Released one possesses,
on.the contrary, all the qualities of the soul to an unlimited and
in the highest degree and he is, above all, omniscient. But out of
this it follows that the psychical organ is not an indispensable
presupposition of all knowledge-processes. It, on the contrary,
appears as by far unnecessary or a thing to be dispensed with.
Therefore, it is conceivable that it played only a modest role in
the epistemology of the J aina.
With these considerations about the psychical organ and
its working, we have already reached what forms the kernel of
human nature, according to the J aina doctrine, in respect of the
soul and its qualities. As already described before, the Jaina con-
sider the soul as the bearer of difTerent qualities. Among them,
knowledge is the most important and therefore Umasvati deals
with it more doscly. 350 He distinguishes between five souls of
knowledge : experience (matijfiiinam), communication (frutajfla-
nam), supernatural perception~ (avadhi:}fi iinam) , knowledge of other
men's thoughts ( manaJ;-paryiiyajfiiinam) and omniscience (kevala-
jfianam) .351 Of these, the first two are natural forms of knowledge.
They ensue with the help of the sense-organs and of the psychi-
cal organ and are therefore indirect (parok~al.z). The remaining
three deal with the supernatural forms of knowledge. They
depend exclusively on the knowledge-faculty of the soul and are
therefore, direct (pratyak~iil.z). This division shows the one-sided
interest which governs the epistemology of the classical Jaina
system. All usual knowledge-processes-sensuous perception, con:
ceptual thought and memory are summarized in a word simply
as experience (matiji'iiinam). The communication (frutafzanam)
is only conceded on account of its special position, as the know-
ledge of the Jaina doctrine depends on communication. The
next two forms of knowledge are important for the ascetic who
has trodden the way of Deliverance. The omniscience ( kevala-
jiianam) which forms the conclusion is for the J aina an essential
characteristic of the Released.
With regard to the different kinds of knowledge, in parti-
cular, the following is to be observed :
The experience (matiji'iiinam) passes through four stages.
It begins with a first fleeting notice ( avagraha/.z) . It is followed by a
wish ( iha) to know the noticed object more exactly. That leads
to the clarifying of the real state of things ( apiiyal.z) and finally
to the final ascertainment of the object concerned ( dharm;,a). In
the case of the first notice ( avagrahal.z), there is only an unparti-
cularizcd impression. The remaining steps, on the other hand,
comprehend already the object concerned. Perception through
sight and thought forms an exception. They are never entirely
unparticularized or indefinite. In them, on the contrary, the
first notice ( avagrahal.z) comprehends the object.
The communication (Srutajiianam) is based on experience
(matijr1iinam). It can be of two sorts, according as it is, accord-
ing to its contents, contained in the holy writings of the Jaina
canon or not. In the first case, it is twelve-fold according to the
number of holy writings. In the second case, it can be of the most
different kinds.
The supernatural perception can be innate but it can also
be caused by the destruction or coming to rest of the opposing
Karma. The first case is of the Gods and creatures in Hell, the
second ofthe remaining beings. Umfisviiti distinguishes, besides,
\
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8. THE ~YSTEM OF THE JAINA 199

\
\
six varieties of supernatural knowledge accordingly as it vanishes
on change of place or not, whether its sphere of operation de-
creases or increases, and whether it is changeable or not.
In the case of knowledge of others' thoughts (mana~paryii
yajniinam), Umasvati distinguishes between simple and all-com-
prehensive forms, the second being characterized by greater
clarity and permanence. In the case of omniscience (kevalajnanam),
no varieties are distinguished.
Objects of experience ( mativijnanam) and communication
(Srutajfianam) are all substances but not in all conditions (paryii-
ya~). Objects of supernatural knowledge and of the knowledge
of others' thoughts are only the material object (substances) and
these also not in all conditions. Only the omniscience has as its
objects all substances in all conditions.
As conclusion, it may be mentioned that Umasvati, besides
the mentioned forms of right knowledge, considers also false
knowledge. This appears in three forms which are the counter-
parts of right experience, communication and supernatural
perception and consists in the fact that a man like a lunatic knows
without any distinction the true or the right and the untrue or
the wrong, as the chance may be.
The Theory of Knowledge of the Jaina: Umasvati tries to put
the described sorts of knowledge in relation to the means of right
knowledge which the other philosophical schools taught and
strives to connect them with the epistemological doctrines of
these schools. But his attempt is mechanical and inadequate. The
J aina created a real Theory of Knowledge and Logic only late,
when the Theories of Knowledge of other schools also reached
their highest flowering. We ;hall return to it, during the pre-
sentation of that period. Besides the means of right knowledge,
the Jaina have also continually dealt with the doctrine of the
various ways of consideration (nayii!z) and in this there sticks an
old kernel which perhaps goes back to the first beginning of
Jinism. Into this doctrine we must go at this place at least
slightly.
Already in the oldest parts of the J aina canon, it is reported
that the Jina had the habit to answer the questions which were
put to him, not simply, in short, in a definite sense but he pointed
out that one could see things differently from different sides
200 H>'TORY OF >NmAN PmLtHY
(
and that, accordingly, different answers may be possibl¢. Jinism
held fast to this view and built it gradually systematically. For
instance, a number of view-points were posited, according to
which one considered the things and four view-points were dis-
tinguished according as man directed his attention to the name
(niima), presentation ( sthiipanii), the substance ( dravyam) or the
condition (bhiiva!;) of a thing. 352 More important is the already
mentioned doctrine of the different ways of consideration
( nayiil;) to which a thing can be subjected. It was especially
carefully elaborated and gained, in the later theory of know-
ledge of the J aina, a firm place beside the doctrine of the means
of right knowledge (pramii[liini ). But philosophically it is most
important that through this manner, one came to consider the
things and attribute to them a manifold composite nature which
made them appear now this way, now that way, according
as a man looked at it from this or that side of its nature. This
comprehension of things which was designated as the doctrine
of relativity ( syiidviida(z), we already meet with in the Sarp.khya
and the Mimarp.sa. 353 But nowhere did it get so much impor-
tance and nowhere it was so systematically worked out as in the
Jaina. All the mentioned thoughts developed slowly in course
of time. They attained their full shape, however, only in the
last period of the classical period of Indian philosophy when ~
the theory of knowledge stood in the forefront of interest. There ~·
we shall occupy ourselves with it more exactly. Only the doc-
trine of the ways of consideration ( nayiil;) with which Uma-
vati deals more closely, will be here, in short, recited in the
form in which Umasvati puts it forth.354
According to Umasvati, there are five ways of consi-
deration : the one in current use (naigama!;), one in which
things are summed up (sa~ngrahab), one which is customary
(vyavahiira!1), one which is rectilineal or straightforward (!}usiJ.-
tral;), and one in linguistic use ( fobdab). Of these, the first is
divided into two and the last into three sub-varieties.
The way of consideration as in current use (naigamab}
concerns itself with the objects of the words used in usual life
and with the knowledge of these objects. The two sub-varieties
are : first, when a man has a special object before his eyes,
the second when he has the object of a like sort. Still one
\
\
8. THE\SYSTEM OF THE JAINA 201
makes ~o
difference in them in particular. The way of consi-
deration which is a summing up ( SaJ'[!graha!;) considers one or
many objects which are characterized according to the above-
mentioned four view-points in a general comprehensive way,
whether they be present, past or future. The customary way of
consideration ( vyavahiirab) takes in the things by large as they
are comprehended in the same way by the ordinary men and
by the experts and as they come in use in daily life. The
straightforward way of consideration (rJusutrab) knows the
things according to their naming, in so far as they are at hand
and present. The linguistic way of consideration (fobda~) can
be as concerning the present ( saJ'[!pratab), when the objects are
present and are known through words which comprehend one
of the above-mentioned four view-points and are known from
previous or earlier time. It can be bound ( samabhirfujhah) when
it holds itself to an object at hand in particular and goes over
to none else. It is named finally as thus constituted(evambhutab)
when it directs itself to the mutual connection of expression and
the object.
We have now described a large part of the classical sys-
tem of the Jaina. We have dealt with the factors out of which
the world is built, the world-edifice and the beings which
people it. With it fs the stage set, on which the world-event
happens. This itself consists, as for Indian doctrines of Deliver•
ance, as well as for the Jaina, in the course of cycle of births
which endures permanently as long as one does not succeed in
e~caping from it through Deliverance. The law of metempsy·
chosis and the way of Deliverance are yet to be described.
The Jaina doctrine of Deliverance : The doctrine of Deliver-
ance belongs to the oldest constituents of the J aina system, be-
cause what the Jina proclaimed was, in the first place, the doc-
trine of Deliverance. What we have already said during our
presentation of the teachings of Jina holds good, therefore, in
its basic foatures. 355 The later period has, above all, added what
I name as the scholastics of Deliverance. That is to ~ay, one
inquired what is useful for Deliverance and what stands in its
way, enumerated virtues and vices, gave directions and prohibi-
tions and was absorbed in externalities and secondary things
but knew to give to the whole an outlook of a stately and well-
202 HrnTORY OF rnmAN PmL/.HY
I
organized doctrinal edifice. Umasvati has summarized in his
aphorisms the whole Deliverance-scholastics and it forms a large
part of his work. It is philosophically utterly unimportant and
produces a dry effect with the arid systematics of the aphorisms.
I give it only roughly in broad features. It exhibits something
like the following picture :
From the standpoint of the doctrine of Deliverance, U mas-
vati distinguishes seven basic truths-souls (jivab ), non-souls
( ajivaf.i), instreaming ( iisraval;) , bondage ( bandhal;) warding off
(sa1J1varaf.i ), cancelling (nirJarii) and deliverance ( mokfaf.i ). We
have already spoken about the souls and the non-souls and need
now speak only about the remaining basic truths which directly
concern Deliverance.
The entanglement of souls in the cycle of births depends
on different causes-on false belief ( mit~yiidarfonam), non-obser-
vance of moral commands (aviratil;), negligence (pramiidal.i),
passions ( ka~ii_yaf.i) and activity (yo gal;) .356 Of these U masvati
deals in details with the non-observance of moral commands. 357
These are the five basic moral commands ( vratiini): Cessation
from injuring the living (hirrisii), from falsehood (anrtam), theft
(steyam), unchastity ( abrahma), and from striving after possession
(parigrahal;). According as they are practised in a restricted or
full measure, they are designated as small or great. Their obser-
vance is facilitated through the practices of the following kind:
One considers that the injury to living creatures, etc. brings
here and in the next world harm and disgrace and that it is
exclusively sorrowful. One, therefore, applies himself to the well-
wishing towards all beings, rejoices in the advantages or benefits
of another, shows compassion for the unhappy and equanimity
towards the incorrigible. One considers the constitution of the
world and of his own body in their aspect of futility in order to
promote the pious ardour and passionlessness. The monk or the
houseless one is obliged to observe the great moral commands
or vows. The small ones hold good for the laymen or the house-
holders. Further, the laymen can also take up additional vows. 358
Umasv~iti elucidates all these commands more exactly. Injury to
a living creature is said as robbing a being of ils life by deluded
action. One offends against this vow of non-injury to a living
creature not only when he kills another creature, but also when
8. THE SYSTEM OF THE JAINA 20~
he binds, strikes, injures, heavily belabours another creature or

deprives him of food and drink. Falsehood is uttering something
that does not exist. As untruth are enumerated also false infor-
mation, secret rumours, falsification of record, appropriation of
confided goods and betrayal of secrets. Thus and in a similar
way, all the vows are described by Umasvati.
The non-observance of vows represents only one cause of
the entanglement in metempsychosis. By far more important is.
that every activity of the body, speech and the psychical organ
leads to entanglement as its consequence. Because, through acti-
vity, there stream into the soul the suitable relevant particles
of matter and fix themselves as Karma in it and bind it, as.
merit when it is instreaming through good activity and as guilt
when it streams in through bad acts. This instreaming ( iisrava!J)
of the Karma stuff is the third basic truth and is accordingly
described at length by Umasvati who distinguishes in it nume-
rous sub-varieties. 359
First of all, it should be distinguished whether the activity,
which entails instreaming, is conditioned by passions (ka,>iiya(l)
or not. Only in the first case, the instreaming matter clings to
the soul in an enduring manner, while in the second case, it is
immediately separated and has no further consequence. In the
first case, the instreaming can be caused through the five-fold
non-observance of moral commands on account of the four pass-
ions: anger ( krodhaM , pride ( mana(l) , deceit (mayii) and greed
(lobhafl), through the five-fold negligence of the senses, and
through the twentyfivc kinds of actions. Further, different sorts
ot instreaming are distinguished, according to the make-up or
constitution of activity, which entails it, whether it is strong or
weak, conscious or unconscious, whether carried out with energy
or its object is living or lifeless. Therewith are joined again
numerous distinctions of further sub-varieties. Finally, the in-
strearning can be divided according to eight kinds of Karma
which it has for its result. It is as follows: 3 60
The instreaming Karma matter sticks, as we have said, to
the soul an<l binds it. This bondage ( bandha(t) is the fourth basic
truth. It is formed or organized according to the constitution of
Karma which has entered the soul and it is divided into eight
kinds. They are namely the Karma causing the veiling of know-
ledge (j fiiiniivaraiyam), Karma which envelops insight (darfaniivara-

1;1am), emotional (vedaniyam) Karma, bewildering (mohaniyam)
Karma, Karma of life-prolongation (iiyu~kam), Karma of the name
the individuality ( niima), Karma of the social position (gotram)
and the hindering l(arma ( antariiyam).
The knowledge-veiling Karma is five-fold according to the
five sorts of knowledge which it hinders. The insight-enveloping
Karma is nine-fold. The insight, which it hinders, can be
through the eye or not through the eye, or through supernatu-
ral sight or the sight of the all-knowing. Further the insight-
enveloping Karma can call forth the unconsciousness of sleep
which can be absorbed in by stages, such as going and standing
or acting in sleep. The emotional Karma is two-fold, according
as it leads to happiness or unhappiness. Of the bewildering
Karma, there are 28 kinds. They can perplex the belief or the
conduct. In the first case, it is threefold, according as the belief
is right, erroneous or partly right and partly erroneous. In the
second case, it is to be distinguished whether it depends on
passion or not. If it depends on passion, it gives rise to sixteen
sorts, as there are four passions of which each can emerge in
four degrees. In that which does not depend on passion, the
causes are laughing, pleasure, displeasure, fright, application,
horror and consciousness of sex as man or woman or being with-
out any sex-distinction-which comes to nine kinds. In the Karma
of life-prolongation there are four kinds which are to be distin-
guished, each according as it respectively deals with beings in
hell, animals, men or gods. The Karma of individuality exhibits
the most numerous kinds viz. 42 kinds. They condition the
individuality of a being in the most diverse respects, above all,
according to the stage of being, class, formation of the body and
bodily functions. The Karma of the social position can be high
or low, of which again there are numerous ·varieties. The hinder-
ing Karma finally is of a five-fold kind: it hinders the activity of
giving, taking, eating, using and willing.
Besides the kinds of Karma, Umasvati also describes its
duration, its operation or ripening (maturity) and its multitudi-
nousness. Thus he gives, how long each sort of Karma endures
at its highest or lowest. He mentions how far a change in the
operation is possible. And he discusses the relation of the points
8. THE SYSTEM OF THE JAINA 205-
of Karma to the points of the soul.

All sorts of Karma bind the soul in the most diverse forms.
and fix its fate in the cycle of births. Besides, they influence the
constitution of the soul itself in an incisive way. The Jaina have
distinguished and described, according to this influence, different
conditions ( bhavafz) of the soul. 361 Accordingly there are five such
conditions: the condition of the coming to rest of Karma ( aupa-
samikab), the condition of the destruction of the same ( ksayikab),,
the mixed condition (kfayopafamikab or mifrab), the condition
of the operation of Karma ( audayikab) and the conditioning of
the quality of Karma (pariQamikal.t). In the condition of the
coming to rest, the Karma is no doubt present but it has come.
to rest and does not operate. As a result, there is the emergence
of right belief and right conduct. In the condition of destruc-
tion, the Karma has completely vanished. The soul rejoices in
the full knowledge and view and in the unhindered activity of
giving, taking, enjoying, using and willing. In the mixed condi-
tion, where Karma is partly brought to rest or partly destroyed,
there stand, beside knowledge, also ignorance, further, restricted
view, giving, taking, enjoying, using and willing, right belief and
right conduct and partly self-discipline, all to a limited extent.
In the condition of the operation of Karma there emerges mem-
bership of or participation in the four forms of existence, as deni-
zens of hell, animals, men or gods; further the four passions-
anger, pride, deceit and greed-the three sexes, false belief,
ignorance, deficient self-discipline, impiousness and the six
colours of the soul (lefya(1) yet to be spoken of: The condition
of the quality of Karma finally implies the condition or consti-
tution which occurs to the soul by nature without regard to
Karma, namely, sentiency (Jivatvam), potentiality of deliverance
(bha1!)1atvam) or the absence of potentiality of deliverance ( abha-
vyatvam) and others.
At this stage, it is the proper place to mention, in short,
the doctrine of the colours of the soul, which U masvati touches
many times. According to the old Jaina doctrine, the Karma
lends the soul a defi.ni te character which shows itself in taste,
smell, touch but above all in colour. There are six such colours
of the soul: dark (kmialefya), dusky or blue ( nflale.~ya), grey
(kapotalefya), yellow (tejolefy4), rosy (padmalelya), and white
'206 HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
(fuklaleS_yii). These colours of the soul change continually, each

according to the actions of beings and according to their fate in
the cycle of existence. The souls of the denizens of hell, and of
lower animals have only dark, dusky or blue and grey colours.
The gods can also possess the bright colours, the highest gods
·exclusively those only. Among men and animals, having five
·senses, all colours of the soul are possible. This doctrine of the
.colours of the soul is only loosely connected with the rest of the
doctrine of the Jaina and makes the impression of being a
foreign body. And it is possible that the Jina has taken it from
the chief of the school of the Ajivika, Maskari GoUiliputra. 362
With this we have described the third and the fourth
basic truths-the instreaming of Karma in the soul and the
bondage of the soul conditioned by it. But how is freedom from
this bondage possible? The two following basic truths, warding
off ( sal[lvarab) and cancelling (nirJarii) point it out. 363 Of these
(sal[lvaraM 'warding off' implies the hindering of new Karma
streaming in the soul, and cancelling ( nirjarii) implies the des-
truction of the already penetrated Karma. In the description of
both these basic truths, we can understand that Umasvati has
recited in a large part the same which we described in the pre- ~·
sentation of the doctrine of Jina. Only he inserts some things i
more and carries forth the doctrine further, in some parti-
.culars
As the warding off of new Karma, first of all, different
forms of moral behaviour and spiritual practices serve as means .
.Such are three kinds of discipline : discipline (guptib) of the
body, of the speech, and of thought ; further the fivefold
.cautiousness or wariness (samitib), the ten duties ( dharmiib), the
twelve considerations ( anuprek,l'ii(l) and the enduring of 22 miser·
ies (pari,1iihrlb) .ae4 Besides, there is the five-fold conduct (caritram):
the plain pious conduct, the conduct of a monk a!'tcr receiving
the const.:cration, the conduct of a monk who has cxpiatt.:d for
a fault, the conduct in which only a quite little remissness
occurs, and finally the faultless conduct as it corresponds to
the ideal picture already sketched.
As the next, follows the penance (tapa(l). This serves as
not only the warding off of new /1 'arma but also of the cancelling
of the old. lt is two-fold : external and inner penance. The ex-
ternal penance consists in the omission of meals, diminishing of

nutrition, restriction to a particular diet, renunciation of dainty
food, choice of a lonely resting-place and mortification of the
body. The inner penance consists in confession and penitence,
reverential behaviour, intentness on serving, study, renuncia-
tion and mediation. U masvati again distinguishes a large num-
ber of sub-varieties. By far the most important among them is
the mediation (dhyiinam). It consists in the collection and sup-
pression of thought and can last up to nearly an hour. The
meditation can be of four kinds : ( i) mournful, (ii) malignant,
{iii) pious and (iv) pure. The mournful meditation consists in
lively thinking on the disagreeable which one has suffered, in
order to be free from it, and on the agreeable, in order to at-
tain it. Among beings, it occurs to those who are not abstem-
ious, partially abstemious, or are negligent in self-discipline.
The malignant meditation aims at murder, falsehood, theft and
the preservation of earthly goods and is practised by creatures
who are unabstemious or partially abstemious. The pious medi-
tation helps towards the understanding of the holy doctrine, of
the aberrations of beings, of the results of actions and of the
world-construction. It can be reached by those who are not re•
miss in self-discipline, and by such whose passions have come to
rest or are destroyed. For the beings of this kind there are
accessible the first two steps of the highest form of meditation
with which we have been already, in particular, familiar in the
doctrine of Jina. 365 The last two steps of pure meditation are,
however, reserved for the omniscient one.
All the named forms of penance help towards the cancel-
lation of Karma. Still their working is different, according to
the beings who practise it. They operate much more energeti-
cally in the case of monks than in the case of laymen. ln the
case of the monks also, the success is determined by the moral
stage which they have reached.
With the destruction of Karma, there ensues the deliver·
.ance. 36° First disappear the bewildering (mohaniya), knowledge·
veiling au<l insight-enveloping ( jiliiniivarar;.a and darfa11iivara~1a)
and the hindering ( antariiya) lt-armas. Through their disappear·
ance is unfolded the true nature of the soul unhindered and the
omniscience (kevalam) appears, which consists of full knowledge
and insight. The emotional Karma, the life-prolonging Karma and

the Karma of individuality (nama) and the Karma of the social
position (gotra) still continue and therethrough the existence con.
tinues. Finally disappear also these forms of Karma, then the
existence comes to an end and the final Liberation emerges. The
soul, an account of its natural lightness, ascends up to the high-
est part of the world, where it remains in permanent blessedness.
Umasvati represents the Deliverance-doctrine thus. His
presentation is a typical example of Jainistic Deliverance-Scho-
lastics and produces not a very satisfactory impression. But hap-
pily that is not the only way in which the subject-matter has
been dealt with by the Jaina. The second author, whom we
have chosen for our presentation i.e. Kundakunda, offers an
example of an entirely new way of consideration. Kundakunda
cares little for everything which is external or mechanical. He
is not occupied with the classifications and enumerations. He
knows them but they remain in the background. He seizes the
essentials and pursues the philosophical thought to its depth,
entirely in contrast to U m1svati who clings to the superficial.
We could observe it up to now many times. But nowhere it is
seen so strongly as in the doctrine of Deliverance. We shall give,.
therefore, a short sample of that at least. 337
In the attempt to reshape the handed-down form of the
Deliverance Doctrine according to a uniform broad basic view.
many old maxims present difficulties. In order to circumvent
them, Kundakunda chose the following way.:ios He says that
two ways of consideration must be distinguished, in considering
things-the pure ( faddha-naya(1) or the final (nifcaya-naya[1) consi-
deration and the common-place (1yavahiira-nayab) consideration ..
The common-place consideration (vyauahara-nayafi) is necessary in
order to make the doctrine intelligible to ordinary men. One can
only come to an understanding with a foreigner when one uses
his spcech. 369 But one must be clear about the fact that it has
validity only in a certain sense. It should necessarily supplement
the pure way of thought which alone brings full truth. As he
interprets, therefore, these maxims in this sense, he understands
them in such a way as to bring them in unison with his com-
prehension.
Concerning the Deliverance, Kundakunda employs the
traditional views with a few changes as the basic structure of his

presentation. The last cause of entanglement in the cycle of be-
ing is the three stains or pollutions (iisrava~i) : 370 desire, hate and
delusion. On them depend the four causes of action : wrong
belief (mithyiitvam) ,371 ignorance (ajfiiinam), indiscipline (aviratilz)
and activity (yogalz). These call forth the material Karma
(pudgalakarma) which clings to the soul. The decisive cause is,
however, the delusion or the ignorance (ajniinam) of the true
nature of the soul. This consists in the fact that one regards
foreign things as the 'I', because he thinks, "I am it; It is my
I. I belong to it; it is mine." But only a fool makes these wrong
ideas of the 'I' and designates the material things as mine. Be-
cause, how can the soul, as the omniscient have viewed it, be
a material thing, so that one could designate it as mine ?371
The soul, on the contrary, is mere activity ( upayoga~) ,373 pure
view (darfanam), knowledge (jfiiinam) and morality (caritram).
Neither the base quality like delusion, nor the good quality like
the piety can occur to it. 374 In general, the material qualities
have nothing to do with the soul, beginning from the qualities
of the Elements to the psychical conditions which are brought
forth through the instreaming Karma. When such qualities are
ascribed to the soul, it depends only on the above-mentioned
common-place or habitual way of consideration( vyavahiiranayalz).
From the standpoint of the final way of consideration (niscaya-
naya~) it is not justified. The connection of the qualities with
the soul resembles a mixing of water and milk. 375 But they be-
long, on that account, not to the soul. Its single quality is, on
the other hand, the activity. 376
Now how does Deliverance ensue? When man knows the
fateful mistake which confounds the soul and matter together, as
one knows of property not belonging to him: "it is not mine,"
and gives it up, so also one knows of the matter and its qualities:
"It is not my I, it is not mine", and separates himself from
them. Simultaneously, one is supposed to observe the soul
according to its true ·nature as view ( darfanam), knowledge
(jrlii.nam) and morality ( caritram). Then an ascetic who practises
this contemplation of the soul in continuous endeavour, reaches
in a short. time the freedom from all sorrow. Just as a man,
who has known the king, confides in him and joins in his com-
210 HISTORY OF INDI;\N PHILOSOPHY
pany with full vigour or fervour in order to attain the fulfil-

ment of his desires, so also a man knows the soul-the King
among things, confides in him and joins in his company in
order to attain Liberation. 377
These are a few thought-processes in which the doctrine of
Deliverance of Kundakunda moves. As already said, they avoid,
in contrast to Umasvati's, all externalities and go to the essen-
tials. Indeed, it cannot be denied that they bring in nothing
new but repeat the old widespread views. The idea that the
ignorance is the cause of entanglement in the cycle of existence
and that, thereby, the error about the true nature of the 'I' plays
a decisive role, is already known to us from the ancient period
of Indian philosophy since the doctrine of the Buddha and it
again meets us in the classical Sarµkhya where it stands in the
central place of the doctrine of Deliverance. 378 Still we must say
that Kundakunda has cleverly adapted it to the .Jaina system
and has given it an original form. He has, thereby, also not over-
looked the difficulties with which the traditionally handed-down
Jaina doctrine of the nature of the soul confronts him and has
tried to remove them.
In the Sarµkhya, there stands a sharp separation between
the I-the soul, and the non-I-the matter and this relation
between the soul and matter renders possible the proving of the j
doctrine of Deliverance which is given by the system. According J,
to the Sa111khya system, the soul is pure knowledge and com-
pletely inactive. Every psychical occurrence takes place in the
psychical organism which belongs to the sphere of matter. Only
to all appearances, therefore, it is involved in the occurrences of
the phenomenal world. The knowledge of this error, therefore,
is enough to liberate it. The case is different in the system of the
J aina. Here the soul is considered as active and as the bearer of
the psychical processes and it was, consequently, not possible,
without much further ado, to prove the Deliverance in the same
way. Kundakunda tried the following way out. The psychical
condition depends, according to the J aina doctrine, by far, on the
Karma-stuff which has penetrated into the soul and exercises
various influences on it. He, therefore, taught that there are
different kinds of Karma whose difference from the soul one
must know in order to attain Deliverance. The Deliverance de-
pends, accordingly, according to this interpretation, again on a

distinction between the soul different from all material things
and matter which dominates the psychical processes. Indeed,
the activity of the soul, itself, allows itself not to be completely
explained away, and so one could easily be tempted to ascribe
to it an interlocking in the occurrence of the phenomenal world
which again had made impossible the tracing of the deliverance
back to the removal of a mere error. Kundakunda tried to meet
the difficulty as follows: He distinguished between two sorts of
psychical conditions-the material condition generated by the
Karma and the condition of the soul itself called forth there-
through. It is the material conditions which one must distinguish,
like everything material in general, from the soul. Thereby, the
working of these both does not encroach on each other. The
soul brings forth only its own condition, though under the influ-
ence of Karma. The Karma brings forth its condition, though
under the influence of the soul. When it is said that the soul
brings forth the material condition and knows it also at the same
time, it is to be understood as a common-place way of looking
at things ( vyavahiiranaJ1a&) . According to the final way of looking
at things (niscayanayafl), it produces and knows only its own
condition. 379
This sample may be enough in order to show how Kunda·
kunda deals with the theory of Deliverance. With it we have
also ended our short sketch of the Jaina system in the period of
the classical Indian philosophy. Still it remains our task to
define, on the basis of our presentation, what place and impor·
tance belong to it in the circle of other remaining systems.
The importance of the System of the Jainca: If we review, with
this aim, the doctrines already described, so far as they fall in the
sphere of Nature-philosophy, a certain old-fashionedness or
antiqueness in them is striking. The J aina have held fast to the
old doctrine of the four elements. The space ( iikiifom) has prc~er
ved its character and has not become the fifth element. Conse-
quently, the sound (Sabda&) is an independent entity and not a
quality of any element. The list of the qualities of the elements
shows very antique features. Further it is remarkable that the
system of the Jaina assumes only a single world and that it
knows different world-periods, but that it has not accepted the
doctrine of the periodically recurring world-creation and world-

destruction. Besides, it is to be especially emphasised that one,
with respect to the soul, in contrast to the ruling development,
held firmly to the idea of its restricted size and its mobility and
efficiency.
Besides these pronounced old antique features, later ideas also
found acceptance whereby the doctrine was remodelled often in
an original way, many times its original significance also being
lost. One occupied himself with the problem of Time. One took
over the doctrine of merit (dharmal; )and guilt( adharmal;) as world-
moving forces, and made them, as the independent Karma doc-
trine was already fully developed, the bearers of movemeet and
rest. It is very important that the Atom-Theory also found
access in it; still, the entirely peculiar comprehension of the
Jaina regarding the constitution of matter shows that here there
is not the proper soil on which it has grown. According to the
Jaina doctrine, the matter can be gross as well as fine or subtle.
It is, therefore, not impenetrable but can contract and extend.
With that the most important presupposition for the creation
of the Atom-doctrine is missing. And the mechanical world-
picture which has been sketched by the Vaise~ika is foreign to
theJaina .. Characteristically missing also therein is the theory of
movement and its laws. Besides the Atom-doctrine, the J aina
have also accepted the doctrine of categories-but of only the
beginning ones. They differentiate between substances and
qualities. They know the category of movement as little as the
mechanics. They have not also shared in the further develop-
ment of the doctrine of categories. In the place of all other cate-
gories they have posited only the category of condition (parya-
ya!t) which is best adapted to their comprehension of the mani-
fold and changing nature of things.
~ Besides such doctrines which it shares with other systems,
the doctrine of the J aina exhibits also characteristic features
and ideas which are peculiar to it. In the sphere of anthropo-
logy, for example, there is worked out the doctrine of the
different bodies, of the two forms of sense-organs or of the diff-
erent kinds of knowledge, may-be schematically but also origi-
nally arranged. Only to the Jaina, the manner is peculiar, to
distribute all things in points of space (pradefafi) and to consider
them accordingly. But philosophically the most important are

the different ways of consideration ( nayal;) and the doctrine of
relativity ( syiidviidal;) based thereon, which sees united in the
nature of all things an alternating manifoldness.
Finally, besides the philosophical constituent parts of the 1
system, there is also conspicuous the luxuriant growth of a sport~,
ive or playful phantasy which appears here, more strongly than
in other systems. Thus for example, in the sphere of Nature-phi·;
losophy, during the consideration of the animal and the plant· ,
world, the phantasy takes a far more share than scientific
observation. But this luxuriance of phantasy shows itself strong-
est in the case of the world-picture delineated down to all
particulars, above all, in the detailed description of the world-
occurrence which happens permanently recurring, in the world- ·
history peculiar in this form only to the J aina.
When we summarize all this, there appears a quite varie-.
gated picture. The system appears as a motley mixture of
antique and young or late doctrines and philosophical thoughts ,
which are mostly not fully worked out and appear to be the ,
creation of boundless phantasy.
If we ask the reason of this remarkable state of things the
answer is already given in what we have already said in the
presentation of the doctrine of the Jina. 380 The Jaina cherish-
ed the conviction that their doctrine depended on what was
proclaimed by the omniscient one. On account of that, every
development was subjected to firm restrictions from the begi-
ning. Because, the proclamation of the omniscient one cannot be
changed and bettered. Doctrines, which are once uttered forth,
stood firm and could not therefore be displaced. They can be
interpreted and supplemented but not quashed. That explains
the many antique features which the system has preserved. It
also explains the half-measured and imperfect execution of
philosophical thought. The thinkers of the Jaina were at every
step subjected to limits which they were not to transcend. For
the consistent carrying out of new great thought, for the erection
of a uniformly compact doctrinal edifice, there was no room.
Under these circumstances, it is also understandable, as one
was cribbed and confined on all sides in the pursuit of original
thoughts, that one sought for it a substitute and consequently,
where the traditionally handed-down dogmatics showed a lac-

una, the phantasy was allowed to have free reins without check.
The comparison with Buddhism is very instructive. While
the Jaina system makes, in a great measure, an impression of
backwardness and stuntedness, the Buddhists have created, on
the other hand, grand doctrinal edifices which were of greatest
significance for the development of the total Indian philosophy.
One asks oneself involuntarily how the two doctrines, which
originated at the same time and under the same conditions,
could develop so differently. But a satisfactory explanation is
also found at the same time. The simple doctrine of Deliverance
of the Buddha had allowed a free path or course to the great
philosophers of later Buddhism. They could lay hold of its thou-
ghts unhindered and carry them through. The agreement with
the few teachings handed down from old times was easy to be
created. The position in which the Jaina found themselves was
entirely different. Numerous aphoristic teachings were handed
down to them which they were not to change. They were
compelled to fill their wine in old hoses and to take great care
that the latter do not burst. This could only produce a paraly-
sing effect on philosophic thought. In spite of these things, we
need not think little of the system of the J aina. It is not only
that it has enriched the general picture of Indian philosophy
with independent features; it is not merely a storehouse of odd,
antique ideas. The teachers of J aina have, on the contrary,
despite all difficulties, seen the things independently and com-
prehended them originally. And we find, among them, many
earnest and deep thinkers, like Kundakunda, for example, who
deserve more consideration than they have found hitherto.
9. THE MATERIALISM
It is advantageous to join the nature-philosophical schools
with the description of Materialism, as the latter stands nearer
to them than all other schools. By the way the Indians them-
selves, as a rule, speak not of Materialism but they characterize
its adherents usually as deniers or negativists (niistikal;). And it
has its good ground. For the Indian Materialism the essential
thing is not the denial of the soul and the exclusive restriction
t0 matter as the cause for the explanation of the world. The
decisive thing, on the contrary, is its purely negative interest.
Its aim is to dispute and deny the continuance of life after
death, the retribution of good and bad work and the moral
claims derived out of them. It is interested in philosophical
questions only so far as they serve this aim. Concerning
the rest, it is indifferent to them. That distinguishes it from
all others and also from Nature-philosophical schools. Naturally
Materialism could reach its aim most quickly, if it denied the
existence of the soul. But so far as the assumption of a soul
served only the explanation of the phenomenal world, as was
the case in the old Nature-philosophy, before it was connected
up with belief in God and with the doctrine of Deliverance,
it was also acceptable to the Materialism. As a matter of fact,
there are also found given materialistic directions which recog-
nize a soul in this sense and which have established a connec-
tion, therethrough, with the Nature-philosophical schools. But
while these nature-philosophical schools were governed by the
striving towards the understanding of the phenomenal world
and their attempts at explanation gradually formed into the
full-fledged philosophical system, the materialists satisfied them-
selves all the while with their positing of a purely negative aim.
Therefore the Indian characterization of them as 'deniers or
negativists' is appropriate. But in my presentation I will follow
the usual practice for the sake of simplicity and speak of Mate-
rialism by which a man should not lose sight of the right under-
standing of what has been said.
Materialistic directions of the above-mentioned kind are
already found in India since early times. The old maxim, that
materialism is as old as philosophy, holds good also here. And
just as we hear, in the recorded oldest Vedic monuments,
of believers in god, also of god-deniers, there is also information
about materialistic directions standing side by side with the
oldest recorded monuments of philosophical doctrine. In India;
there early emerges a characteristic feature which also holds
good for the later period-a close connection of materialism
with political theory. The Indians had early developed a syste-
matic doctrine of state-craft which made light of all moral
scruples in the positing of its aim and of the choice of means,
which, therefore, corresponds to what for us is associated with
the name of Machiavelli. The embodiment of this statecraft is
the legendary Minister of the King Candragupta of the Maurya
family, who founded for the first time an indigenous empire on
the Indian soil at the end of the fourth century B.C. The Indian
tradition ascribes the merit for the success of Candragupta to
this Briihmai:ia named Ciii:iakya or Kautilya and has always
seen in him an unsurpassed master of the art of statecraft. The
most famous Indian literary work about the science of state-
craft is handed down under his name. This Ciii:iakya, as is shown
by tradition, is the prototype of the unscrupulous Real-politiker
who avoids no means, if it only leads him to his goal. And his
ideal as well as his theory have been much esteemed in the
circles of practical Politikers or politicians.
It is now easy to understand that such a Politiker from
the point of world-view supported himself on a doctrine which
put out of the way or removed all moral scruples that were hin•
drances to his action. One such doctrine was Materialism. Its
positing of the aim, as we have described above, corresponds
entirely with its purpose. It was created for this circle, whether
it may acknowledge it openly or secretly. It is, therefore,
certainly no accident that the first materialist, whom tradition
has handed down to us in living vivid colours, is a King.
King Paesi: We find, in the canon of the Jaina, as also of
the Buddhists, the account of a conversation which one of their
teachers had with a King who adhered to a gross materialism.
The conversation ends, as it is to be expected according to the
origin of the report, with the conversion of the King. But the
9. THE MATERIALISM 217
narration is carried out in such a lively way and gives such a

graphic picture of the materialistic views in the period of the
Jaina and the Buddha that I cite a few pieces out ofthem. 381
In the City of Seyaviya, there rules a bad King Paesi (the
Buddhists call him Pay5si) who believes in no God and no be-
yond. One day, the holy man Kesi arrives in this city. Now the
King has a charioteer named Citta who was won over earlier
by Kesi as an adherent and who longingly wishes that the King
also should be converted. He knows how to arrange it skilfully
so that the King, during his morning drive, alights down in the
park in which Kesi is staying and it comes to a conversation
between the King and the holy man. The King has heard that
Kesi believes in a soul which is different from the body and
reproaches him as follows:
"If you have the conviction that the soul is different from
the body and not the same, I have, on the other hand, to cite
the following. I had a godless, wicked grandfather who did not
administer his Kingdom well and who, after his death, must
have reached hell on account of his bad actions. If now he
would come to me who am ever his beloved grandson-his
joy and care-and warn me against living as godlessly as he
did, in order that I should not go to hell, then I would believe
that the soul is different from the body. But as he has not come
to warn me, I am convinced that the soul and the body are the
same."
Thereupon Kesi replied: "If you notice, oh King, that
your wife has given herself up to another man, what punishment
would you inflict on this man ?"
"I would get him executed in any way."
"If the man were to request you that he should be given
some time before his execution in order to warn his relatives
and acquaintances against a similar offence, would you grant
him also at least only one moment?"
"No, why should I?"
"Entirely in the same way, thy godless grandfather, who
according to our doctrine, is in hell, has not come; he has, no
doubt, the wish to come to thee his beloved grandson-his joy
and care-in order to warn thee. But he cannot. Because there
are the most diverse grounds that a being tarrying in the hell,
however much he would like to come to men, cannot come.

Therefore, believe, Paesi, that the soul is different from the
body."
And again the King says: "What you say is merely a com-
parison and does not apply to the following. I had a very pious
grandmother, who according to your doctrine, must have got,
after her death, into a world of the gods, for her pious acts. If
she would come to me who was her most beloved grandson-her
joy and care-and admonish me to live piously like her in order
that I should attain the world of the gods, then I would believe
that the soul is different from the body. But she has not come
to admonish me and I am convinced that the soul and the body
are the same."
Upon this, Kesi knew how to reply. But Paesi has also
made an experiment. He reports for example: "I was once in
my reception-hall surrounded by the distinguished elite of
my kingdom. There the city watchman brought a thief,
whom they had caught. I got him thrown alive into a brazen
pot, with a brass lid strongly soldered laid over it, with the
coppersmith watching over him. After some time, I got the lid
opened and found the man dead, though there was no opening
in the pot, through which the soul could have escaped. Had
there been an opening in the jar through which the soul could
have escaped I would believe that the soul is different from
the body. But it was not the case. So I am convinced that the
soul and the body are not the same."
And another experiment: Paesi had first executed one
offender and then got him locked up in a jar and when it was
opened after some time, the corpse was full of worms. The jar,
however, had no opening through which the souls of these
worms could have reached the inside. Another offender was got
weighed by Paesi. Then he was killed, except that his skin only
was injured and he was again weighed. But the weight was the
same. Therefore, no soul could have escaped. Another oflcnder
he got hacked to pieces in order to search the soul but it was
not to be found. Such other like experiments were made by
Paesi. Kesi knew appropriate answers to all these arguments
and finally Paesi gives himself over as beaten and converted.,·j ,
This account gives a lively picture of an old Indian
1
Materialist on the King's throne. And Paesi was certainly not

the only one of his kind. But however interesting and character-
istic such accounts are, they can rarely claim a place of the
same kind in a history of Indian philosophy. The Materialism
gains for it an importance from the moment only when it
emerged in the form of a regular doctrine and took up arms
against the remaining philosophical schools. That occurred also
very early. The old writings of the Buddhistic canons report
that, in the time of the Buddha, a large number of teachers
stalked the land and gathered students around themselves.
Among them are found such as represent the materialistic
doctrines. 382
The oldest Materialistic doctrines: We hear of a certain Piira-
i:ia Kasyapa who taught the following; "Anybody may do or
allow to do anything, mutilate or allow somebody to be muti-
lated, roast or allow somebody to be roasted, persecute, plague,
harass or get somebody persecuted, plagued or harassed, may
rob life, steal, break into a house, drag away the loot, plunder
a sequestered house, carry on highwaymanship or brigandage,
commit adultery or lie; but he, with all this, does nothing bad.
If any one, with a razor-sharp quoit, reduces a living creature
on the earth to a heap of flesh, transforms him into a single
lump of flesh, he would thereby prove himself as nothing bad;
it would not appear as anything bad. If any body would go to
the southern bank of the Ganga, 383 murdering and allowing
somebody to murder, mutilating and allowing somebody to
mutilate, roasting and allowing somebody to roast, he would
prove himself as nothing bad; it would not appear bad. And if
he would go to the northern bank of the Ganga, 383 giving gifts
and causing them to be given, sacrificing and causing sacrifices
to be offered, it would thereupon prove in no way meritorious;
it would not appear as merit. Through presents, self-discipline,
self-mastery and veracity, there arises or appears no merit."
A second teacher Ajita Kefakambala represented the
following view: "There is no gift in charity, there is no sacri-
fice, there are no offerings. There is no fruit and ripening of
good and bad actions. There is not this world or that. There
is no mother nor father. There are no suddenly born beings. 3M
In the world, there are no ascetics and Brahmai:ias who have
gone along the right path of conduct and follow the right con-
duct, who have seen this world and that world out of indepen-
dent knowledge and proclaimed it. A man consists of four
Elements. When he dies, earth goes into the mass of earth
(Prthivikaya[1), the water into the mass of water, the fire into the
mass of fire, the breath into the mass of air, and the sense-organs
enter into the space (iikiifal;). Four men with the bier as the
fifth carry forth the dead person, and they carry on their talk
until they come into the place of cremation. Then there remain.
only white bones and all the sacrifices end in ashes. The gift of
charity is, therefore, the doctrine of a buffoon; it is an empty
and false talk when anybody asserts that there is something.
Fools and wise men are destroyed and disappear when the body
falls to pieces. They are no more after death."
A third teacher finally Kakuda Katyayana teaches the
following :
"There are seven masses (kiiyal;) which are neither crea-
ted nor brought forth. They are unfruitful, unchangeable, and
are firm like a pillar. They move not, nor do they change, they
do not disturb each other, nor are they able to procure joy, grief
or joy and grief. Which are these seven masses? The earth-mass,
the water-mass, the fire-mass, the air-mass, pleasure, pain and
the souls (jivii}J) as the seventh. These seven masses are neither
created nor produced, they are unfruitful, unchangeable, and
firm like a pillar. They do not move nor do they change, they
do not disturb one another and they are not able to procure
pleasure, pain or pleasure and pain. There is no murderer, nor
one who allows to murder, nor any one who hears or allows to
hear, no knower or one who allows to know. When anybody
with a sharp sword strikes off a head, nobody robs nobody of
life. The sword passes, on the contrary, through the empty
space, between the seven masses."
Of these three doctrines, the first exhausts itself in mere
denial of all moral obligations. The second seeks to prove it
with a gross materialism. The third finally represents an ancient
Nature-philosophy which explains all occurrences through the
inter-play of a number of permanent factors. The souls also
occur among these factors. But this doctrine also denies every-
thing transcendent. And all the three are unanimous in the fact
that they deny continuance after death and the moral conse-
quences arising therefrom, and are, in this sense, genuine
materialistic doctrines.
The old writings of the Jaina also describe similar mate-
rialistic doctrines. We, therefore, see that Materialism arose
early in the form of a regular theory. But the development)
thereby, does not remain stationary. It led to the creation of a
fully formed materialistic system which was handed down like
all other systems, in the form of a School-that of the Lokii.yata.
The Lokayata System: The Lokayata, i.e. the doctrine which
concerns this world, arose in the pre-Christian period. As a
founder is regarded one Carvii.ka about whom nothing further
is known. 38 5 It is characteristic for this system that it is clothed
in the same form like the remaining systems. Like these, its doc-
trines are written down in aphorisms which were orally handed
down. 386 Further one took care to refer his doctrines to a holy
seer of antiquity in the Brahmanical circles. In a similar way,
the Loki ya ta derived its doctrine from a higher authority. As.
we have already heard, the Materialism was connected most
closely with the circles which taught the art of Statecraft. But
as the highest teacher of the art of Statecraft and as its legen-
dary proclaimer was co.lSidered Brhaspati, the teacher of the
gods and besides him, there was Ufanas, the teachers of the
A5ura5, the demon>. Accordingly, th:! Loka ya ta traced back
their aphorisms to Brhaspati. Besides we also hear of a school
which refers itself to Ufanas.
Like the aphorisms of the Vai~e~ika and other systems, 38 7'
- the aphorisms of the Lokii.yata also begin with the words : "Now
we shall explain the truth." Now the chief maxims of the system
follow sharply and trenchantly. 388 "Earth, water, fire, air :
these are the entities." "One designates their connection or com-
bination as body, sense-organs and objects." "Out of them
develops the mind or spirit itself." "The knowledge arises like
a force of fermenting intoxicant out of a yeast, etc." "The ex-
pressions of life (jiva~) resemble bubbles in water." "And be-
cause there is nothing that continues in the world beyond, there-
is, therefore, no wodd beyond."
With this has been said what is essential of the Lokayata.
The man consists only of four elements ; there is no soul. There-
fore, there is no beyond and no retribution of good and bad

actions.
These short maxims or aphorisms were explained and
further set forth, first in oral and, later on, in written elucida-
tions. For example, the question was raised by the opponents'
side, why, when as a matter of fact, everything consists of the
elements, the sentiency emerges only in the human body and
not in inanimate things like a pot or a vessel. Thereupon, the
reply was: "The sentiency does not .emerge into appearance in
vessels etc., because the remaining causes are missing, just as
in sand, the force of intoxication or intoxicant does not appear
forth." 389 Again, the force of intoxication, when it is to appear
forth, presupposes not only the presence of necessary things-
flour, water and molasses and the remaining ingredients but also
the fact that these must be in a particular condition of mixture.
So also the elements only may produce the sentiency when they
appear in a particular state i.e. in the form of the body as skin,
bones, flesh and blood. In the corpse already, this condition is
not preserved unchanged and therefore sentiency has vanished
from it." In order to derive all the psychical processes out of
the Elements, one took hold of the doctrine of the three juices
in the body--phlegm, bile and wind. 390 I twas taught that through
phlegm, there arises desire, through bile, hatred and through
wind, delusion. The manifoldness of life-forces, that one ex-
periences in incalculable alternation-now joy, now grief-was
traced by the opponents of the Lokayata to the power of good
and bad actions which, according to the rigorous law of retri-
bution, lead to joy and grief. This law was denied by the re-
presentatives of the Lokayata and they appealed to the incal-
culable accidental rise of bubbles in water for explaining the ac-
ddentality of joy and grief. They also asserted that natural
foelings or experiences ascribe all these life-forces to no soul.
Because, for example, when a man says : "I know" or when a
man also says, "I am lean; I am fat", he speaks of no soul but
only of a body. llccause there is no soul.
The Buddhist teachings demanded a special comment, as
they assumed no soul but only a stream of consciousness i.e. a
connected series of knowledge-moments. 301 What was concerned
here was not the contesting of the belief in a soul-which was
also denied by the opponent-but of the proof that the series
of knowledge-moments does not endure uninterrupted and does
not continue from one existence to another. Because that was
the proof of these schools in asserting in support of a continu-
ance after death and of a retribution of good and bad actions.
Accordingly, the representatives of the Lokayata emphasised that
the coming into existence of knowledge was bound up with a
body and with entirely definite prerequisites. Therefore no know-
ledge comes into existence in the embryo, because the sense-organs
are not still developed and there is no object (for them). So also
knowledge is suspended in a state like that of swoon. The know-
ledge in an alleged rebirth depends, however, on an entirely
another body and is exactly different, like the body, from an
earlier knowledge. There is, therefore, as little connection as
that in the knowledge of two different beings who live simulta-
neously near each other. It is not also right to trace back, as
one does, the expression of passions and instinctive behaviour
of small children to experiences in earlier births. For, then, a
man must be able to remember earlier (former) births, not
only in isolated cases asserted by the opponent, but in general,
just as all people who were together in one village would re-
member about it in a similar way.
There is, therefore, no soul, no survival after death and
no retribution of good and bad deeds. When one speaks of
such things, it is only a misuse of words, which originally
implied something quite different. 392 The 'other world' (para-
lokaf.t), which word in India denotes a peculiar meaning, is
nothing else than another place, another time and another
condition. 39 :i Hell is nothing else than grief full of agony.
Deliverance is the destruction of the body. The highest god is
an almighty King.
The adherents of the Lokiiyata developed and proved
their doctrines like this. But there were not only systematic
explanations or proofs with which they met their opponents.
They also knew to use especially cfTcctually the weapon of
derision and knew how to make the opponent a laughing stock.
Their derision, in the first place, was directed against the sacri-
ficial cultoftheBrahrnal)as. They said, for example, 3114 "lfa man
after leaving the body enters into a world beyond, why does
he not again come back, driven by the impulse of love or

affection to his relatives ?" But the belief in the other world is
meaningless. Because, if "a sacrificer would reap the reward of
heaven, after the sacrificer himself, the sacrificial act and the
implements of sacrifice are long gone (into the limbo of the
past), the trees which were consumed by a forest conflagration
would as well bear fruit." Equally meaningless it is to offer an
ancestral sacrifice to the dead. "If the ancestral offering of
worship would be the source of gratification to the dead, then
one could as well feed the flame of a lamp which is extinguished."
"Fine, indeed, would be any such effect on the things which
are distant. Then a man need not provide provisions (of
food etc.) to the people who go on a journey. Because, then,
nothing would prevent one from satisfying him (his hunger and
thirst) by an ancestral offering of worship performed at home. !
But it is all a swindle ! The ceremonies for the dead which the
BrahmaI.J.as performed, have been performed to provide them-
selves with means of maintenance. There is nothing else in
that." Generally, "the fire-sacrifice, the three Vedas, the
bundle of three sticks which the Brahmal,las carry, and the
besmearing with ashes serves only as a means of livelihood for
men who lack intelligence and energy for any other occu-
pation." "The mortifications, the different self-torments, the
self-discipline, the deceits for the sense-satisfaction and the
sacrificial acts like the fire-sacrifice are regarded as childish
play" by reasonable men. If really that would have been true,
"if", really as the Brahmal).aS assert, "the animal slaughtered
in the sacrifice would go to heaven, why does not, then, the
sacrificer kill his father in order to despatch him to heaven ?"
B'ut "the authors of the Vedas are none else than the_ three
categories of the crackers of jests, rogues, and night-sneakers,
when they utter their unintelligible gossip, their 'Jarbhari'
and 'turbhari' " 395 passing it for the words of wise men. That
is why one should not believe in anything of this kind but
should live happily, so long as life lasts. There is nothing
which does not expire after death. Once the body becomes
ashes, then there is no recurrence".
Thus represents itself in broad features the doctrine of the
Lokayata in the older period. Its thought-processes are simple and
have rarely interfered in the philosophical development. But
they have continually found adherents and their school has
maintained its ground through the whole centuries. Its situation
becomes more difficult at the end of the classical period oflndian
philosophy, when logical and epistemological questions moved to
the forefront of interest and when every system was compelled
to take them into consideration, on which their systems were
founded. The adherents of the Lokayata also could not escape
this demand. Originally they made light of the fact. In the siltras
of Brhaspati 396 it is said : "The inference is not the means of
right knowledge." One, therefore, appealed only to sense-
experience and simply dismissed the further assertions of the
opponent. One could do it so long as inferences which were arri-
ved at by the antagonistic schools were simple inferences by
analogy. It was enough to show the faultiness of every conclusion,
in order to decline every inference as unreliable. Things, how-
ever, were different, as the opponent developed the firmly grounded
scientific doctrines forming conclusions. One had to discuss these,
nay, one was compelled to establish his own doctrine differently
as from what he had done hitherto and to defend it. Partly one
tried to hold fast to the old line, as, for instance, when one
explained :397 "The aphorisms of Brhaspati have only this aim,
viz. to refute the opponent". iut in the majority of cases one
decided to discuss the doctrine of inference and to take it over
at least in parts. This desertion of the original attitude led, in no
way, to the consequence of the decline of the system. The tak·
ing up of foreign thoughts and occupation with them led, on
the contrary, to a regular activity and to a blossoming up of a
literature richer than hitherto. We have, however, reached with
it a turning point, in the development, at which we must provi-
sionally halt.
Also among the other systems with which we have dealt,
we have seen that at the end of the classical period of Indian
philosophy about the middle of the first post-Christian millen·
nium, the system-building in essentials had come to a close and
had been at a stand-still. In its place there stepped in the fore-
front the theory of knowledge and there developed a lively and
fruitful activity in this sphere for several more centuries. The
presentation of this development. which appears to a certain extent
as a second blossoming of the classical period, we have hitherto

put in the background, in order to handle it separately as an
independent section of Indian philosophy. Now we see that the
Lokayata also came round to the same path about the same
time. But before we can go over to the presentation of these
sections of development, there remains for us a group of systems
to handle, which later sprang forth and to which we have referred
up to this time, but which developed themselves to so great
importance and scrambled for the lead through several centu-
ries-namely the systems of the Buddhists.
SUPPLEMENT
Bibliography (select) au.d Notest
General Literature (new Publications}
Ruben, W. : Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Berlin

1954.
Zimmer, H. : Philosophiesoflndia,ed. by T. Campbell, New
York 1951.
7. The Nature-philosophical schools and the Vai-
se~ika-system
Bibliography
Faddegon, B. : The Vaise~ika system described with the help
of the oldest Texts-Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie
van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Afdeeling Letterkunde,
Nieuwe Reeks. Deel XVIII-No. 2 Amsterdam 1918.
Keith A. B. : Indian Logic and Atomism, an exposition of
the Nyaya and Vaise~ika systems. Oxford 1921.
Chatterji, J. : Hindu Realism. Allahabad 1912.
Handt, W. : Die Atomistische Grundlage der Vai~e~ika
Philosophie, Rostock 1900.
Ruben, W. : Zur indischen Erkenntnistheorie. Die Lehre
von der Wahrnehnung nach den Nyayasiitras III 1, Leipzig.
1926.
Umesha Mishra : The conception of Matter according to
Nyaya-Vai~e~ika. Allahabad 1936.
Sadanand Bhaduri: Studies in Nyaya-Vaille,ikaMetaphysics,
Poona 1947.
Jacobi, H. : Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den
lndern und deren Beweise fur das Dasein Gottes ( Geistesstr<)-
rimngen des Ostens, edited by W. Kirfel, Band I), Bonn &
Leipzig 1923.
Bulcke, C : The Theism ofNyaya-Vaise,ika. Its origin and
early development. Calcutta 1947.
Translations
Nandlal Sinha : The Vai~e~ikasi1tras of KaQada with the
commentary of Sa1i1kara Misra (The Sacred Books of the Hindus)
Allahabad, 1910-11.
1. When in the Notes I point out to my own presentation, It occurs
merely as the statement of the volume and the page-number,
230 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES
The abovementioned work of Faddegon contains also the

translation of the Sutras.
Ganganathjha: Padarthadharma-sarµgraha of Prafastapada
with the Nyaya-Kandali of Sridhara, translated into English.
(The Pandit, New Series Vo. XXV--XXXVII) Benares 1916.
Ruben, W. : DieNyayasutras, Text, translation, Explanation
und Glossary. Abhandlungen flir die Kunde des Morgenlandes,
XVIII Band, No. 2 Leipzig 1928.
Ganganath Jha : The Nyayasutras of Gautama with the
Bha~ya of Vatsyayana and the Varttika of Udyotakara, with
notes from the Nyaya-Varttikatatparyatika of Vacaspati Misra
and the Tatparyaparifoddhi of Udayanacarya (Indian
Thought Vol. IV-X) Allahabad 1912-20.
A presentation of the Vaise~ika system of the classical
period confronts the following task : It has to deal with a
system which has gone through a long development and has been
counted for centuries as the leading philosophical system of
India. Still there are no direct sources at our disposal for the
history of the system, its origin and development. What lies be-
fore us as a source stems out of the last period of the system,
when its development had, in the main, already concluded. The
works of Candramati and Prafastapada give short summary
representations of the system in its concluding form. The VaiSe-
::;ika Sutras also, in the form which is available to us, belong to the
last period of the classical system. They contain, no doubt, old
constituents but what can be gained out of it for the history of
the system, is scanty. 1 When we, therefore, wish to write a history
of the classical Vaisc~ika system, we are thrown, for the older
stages of development, on what can be inferred from the analysis
of the system in its preserved form and out of it we must try to
reconstruct the course of development.
The following fact forms the starting-point. The character-
istic sign of the Vaise5ika system, as it lies before us, is its doct-
rine of categories. He, who studies exhaustively the work of the
classical system, is forced to the observation that there is here a
highly developed Nature-philosophy clothed in the form of a
1• I do not go deeper into this as I am working on a critical treatment

ofthe VaiSe~ikaaiitras.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES 231
doctrine of categories. 1 But then the question arises of what

kind was this Nature-philosophy which lies at the basis of the
doctrine of categories ? Does it deal with the views widespread
in general and known also otherwise or have we to do here with
a doctrine which was different from the doctrines of the remain-
ing Nature-philosophical schools ? Now, it appears that the
second is the case. It deals with an original doctrine characteri-
zed by entirely special features. For this I refer, for example, to
the peculiar form of the Atomism represented by them and its
shaping into a large scale atomistic-mechanistic world-picture.
With that we come to the first important conclusion: The classi-
cal Vaise~ika is built or erected on an entirely definite original
Nature-philosophy which it pursues and which it recasts in the
sense of the doctrine of categories. An attempt to represent the
Vaise~ika in its development has, therefore, as its first task to
regain this Nature-philosophy as the pre-stage of the classical
Vai~e~ika. Whether we wish to name it as the Vai~e~ika or
whether we reserve this name only for the system of the doctrine
of categories is an external and fully secondary question.
In the reconstruction of the old Nature-philosophy, it is
seen further that it contains older and younger or later doctrines
beside one another. Now, on the basis of what we know of the
remaining doctrines and the systems of the ancient times, we can
judge pretty exactly, how the Nature-philosophical doctrines of
the ancient period look. Turning to the old Nature-philosophy
of the Vaise~ika, we are able to docide with great probability,
what constituents arc old and what development is late. With
that we get two stages of development of the old Vaise~ika-the
oldest Nature-philosophy which forms the starting point of the
entire later development and which by far resembles other
Nature-philosophical doctrines and a later stage of development
which is characterized by new thoughts showing an entirely
original stamp.
In these two stages of development joins in the third-
1. li, Faddegon as well as H. Ui have seen it. I quote only the words
with which H. Ui concludes his presentation, ("The Vaisc~ika philosophy,
according to the Desapadarthasastra, London(917 p. 2124) "The consequence
Illay lead to the conclusion that the VaiSe~ika system intends principally to
explain things and phenomena in nature as they arc. The whole system was
a kind of natural philosophy in ancient India."
232 . BIBLIOGRAPSY -f.
the ,shaping of the doctrine ofcategories. How it came about/ and
how it ran its course in particulars, is, to a certain extent, re-
cognizable to us through traces in the preserved system and
through comparison with related systems. Thus, through the in-
clusion, for consideration, of old Nature-philosophy, which forms
the starting point, the method and performance of its creator
allow themselves to be much better assessed than hitherto. On
the creation of the doctrine of categories there follows, as the
next stage, its application to the old Nature-philosophy, whereby
the old doctrines became clothed in the ideas of the doctrine of
categories in a way characteristic for the Vaise~ika. Here also
helps the genetic consideration towards an essentially better un-
derstanding of the doctrines in the preserved form.
With these four stages, the development of the classical
Vaifo~ika is completed in its basic features. The final fixing of
the system in its concluding form by Candramati and Prafasta-
pada forms the conclusion.
In this way, I have tried, in my presentation, to describe
the origin and development of the Vaise~ika system. NaturaUy
any such attempt to infer or to conclude the whole history of
the system out of the last stages of its development, is bound to
work largely upon conjectures. But the attempt must once be
made. Because, only in this way, much that gives an impression
of being odd in the preserved system, becomes understandable
and intelligible. Besides, I hope that at least the groundlines
of development are drawn by me rightly and that my attempt
would stimulate further labours in this direction.
Nol~s
I) The Vaise(lika-Siitras with the later commentary of

Sai1.karamisra are edited by Jayanarayai:ia Tarkapa1icanana,
Bibliotheca lndica No.34, Calcutta 1860-61; by Dhui:ic;liraj
Sastri, Kashi Sanskrit Series No.3, Benares 1923. I quote the
Siitras more often in the wording testified to as the oldest.
More exact wording about them is given by the treatment of
$utras, prepared by me.
2) Edited by H. Ui, the Vaise~ika Philosophy according to
the Dafapadartha:iistra, Chinese Text with Introduction, Tram·
\
BI~LIOGRAPHY AND NOTES 233
lat ion and Notes (Royal Asiatic Society, Oriental Translation

Fund, N.S. Vol. XXIV.) London 1917. The text is also
contained in the Taisho edition of the Chinese Tripitaka
(T 2138, Cheng tsong che kiiu yi louen). I quote according to
this edition as it is more well-arranged than the edition of
Ui.
3) The text was printed repeatedly. It is also contained
in the quoted editions of the commentary. I quote according
to the edition of the Nyaya-Kandali.
4) The Prafastapadabha~yam by Prafastadevacarya with
the commentaries : Siikti by ] agadifa J:'arkalarikara, Setu by
Padmanabha MiSra and Vyomavati Vyomasivacarya ed.
Gopinath Kaviraj and Dhm:1.c;liraj Shastri, Chowkhamba Sans-
krit Series No. 61, Benares 1930.
5) Vaise~ikadarfanam, the Aphorisms of the Vaisel?ika
Philosophy by Kal).ada, with the commentary of Prafastapada
and the Gloss of Uyadanacarya, ed. Vindhyesvari Prasada
Dvivedi and Dhu1,1c;lhiraj Shastri, Benares Sanskrit Series
No. 9, Benares 1919.
6) Kandali is originally the name ofa plant with white
flowers which appear in great plenty suddenly at the beginning
of the rainy season.
7) The Bha~ya of Prafastapada together with the
Nyayakandali of Sridhara, ed. Vindhye:ivari Prasada Dvivedin,
Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, Vol. 4, Benares 1895.
8) The Text of the Nyayasiitras is contained in the
edition of the commentary. For the rest, compare, above all,
vV. Ruben, Die Nyaya-Sutras, Text, Translation, Explanation
and Glossary. Abhandlungen fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes,
18. Band, No. 2, Leipzig 1928.
9) Edited by Jayanarayal).a Tarkapa1kanana, Biblio-
theca Indica No. 50, Calcutta 1864-65; by Gangadhara Sii.stri
Tailariga, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series Vol. 9, Bcnares, 1896; by
Lak~ma1,1a Sastri and Srirarna Sastri, Kashi Sanskrit Series, No.
43, Benares 1920; by Nagefa S:istri .Joshi, Ananda~rama Sans-
krit Series No. 91, Poona 1922. I quote according to the edition
of the Kashi Sanskrit Series.
l 0) Edited by Vindhydvari Prasada Dvivedin, Bibliotheca
Indica No. 113, Calcutta 18B7-1914; by Vindhyesvari Prasada
234
Dvivedi and Lak~ma.I).a Sastri, Kashi Sanskrit Series No: 33,

Benares 1916-I quote according to the edition of the Kashi
Sanskrit Series.
11) Edited by Garigadhara Sastri Tailariga, Vizianagaram
Sanskrit Series Vol. 15, Benares 1898; by Rajeshwara Sastri
Dravid, Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 24, Benares 1925-26. I quote
again according to the edition of the Kashi Sanskrit Series.
12) Edited by Garigadhara Sastri Tailariga, Vizianagaram
Sanskrit Series, Vol. 8, Benares 1895; by Surya Narayai:ia Sukla,
Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 106, Benares 1934-36. I quote accord-
ing to the edition of the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.
13) Nyayasaral;t of Acarya Bhasarvajfia, together with
the commentary called Nyayatatparyadipika by Jayasirpha Suri,
Bibliotheca Indica No. 188, Calcutta 1910.
14) Nyayavarttikatatparyaparifaddhi by Udayanacarya
with a gloss called Nyayanibandhaprakafa by Vardhamanopa-
dhyaya, ed. by Vindhydvari Prasada Dvivcdin and Lak~mar.ia
Sastri Dravic;la, Bibliotheca Indica No.205, Calcutta 1911 ff
(incomplete) .
15) The Text of the Siitras is contained in the edition of
the Mimarpsabhiir?yam. For the rest, compare, above all,
Mimftrpsadarfanam, J aiminimimarpsasiitrapatha, ed. by Keva-
lanandasarasvati, Wai 1948.
16) edited by Mahdcandra Nyayaratna, Bibliotheca
Indica No.451, Calcutta 1863-87; by Ratna Gopal Bhatta,
Kashi Sanskrit Series No.42, Benares 1910. I quote according
to the edition of the Kashi Sanskrit Series.
17) Contained in the edition of the commentary cited
below.
18) Brhati of Prabhakara Misra with the l~juvimala
pa1icikfi of Salikanfttha, edited by S. K. Ramanatha Sastri,
Madras University Sanskrit Series No.3, Madras 1934.
19) Slokavarttikavyakhyf1 (Tatparyatika) of Bhattombeka,
ed. by S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, Madras University Sanskrit
Series No.13, Madras 1940.
20) The Mima1psaslokavarttika with the commentary
Kasika of Sucaritami~ra, ed. by K. Sambasiva Sastri, Trivan-
drum Sanskrit Series No.90, 99, 150, Trivandrum 1926 ft
(incomplete).
21) Mimarpsii.slokavarttika by Kumarila Bhatta with

the commentary called Nyayaratnii.kara by Parthasii.rathi Misra,
ed. by Rama Sastri Tailai1ga, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series
No.17, Benares 1898.
22) PrakaraI).apaficikii. by Sii.likanatha, ed. by Mukunda
Sastri, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No.17, Benares 1904.
23) Vol. Ip. (247)
24) Vol. Ip. (161)
25) Thereby one thought, as also the word Vayul}. shows,
originally of the moved air, the wind.
26) Vol. I p. ( 151 )
27) Vol. Ip. (p. 86f.)
28) Compare below p. (79f.)
29) Compare below (p. 188)
30) Compare the presentation· of the Buddhistic systems
in Vol. III.
31) Vol. I (p. 97 ff.)
32) V aisei?ikasiitraI).i II, 1, 1-4
33) Vaise~ikasiitraI).i II, 1, 5
34) Vol. I (p. 281 f.)
35) Vol. I ( p. 98 f.)
36) Nyayakandali p. 9, 6 f; compare also Slokavarttikam
22 (SabdanityatadhikaraI).am), v. 434 f[
37) For the doctrine of the shadow and the darkness,
compare, above all, Nyayabha~yam p. 82, 7-14; Tii.tparyatlka
p. 345, 4-16; Vyomavati p. 46, 32-47, IO; Nyayakandali p. 9,
1-10, 8; KiraI).avali, p. 15, 16-20, 14; PrakaraI).apa1'icikii p.
143, 14-145, 9; Nyayaratnii.karal;i. p. 740, 12-741, 15
38) Nyayakandali p. 179, 9-13.
39) About the rays of the eyes, compare below p. 52 ff.
40) The account of creation by Prafastapii.da p. 48 f. is
remodelled in the sense of the Atomic doctrine and points, other-
wise also, to late features.
41) If one holds the view that the body is formed only
out of the four elements, one could not then consider the digestive
fire as a part of the body.
42) Vol. I. p. (284) f.
43) The bodies of divine beings in the other world could
also be formed out of the other clements.
236 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOUS
44) Vol. I (p. 99 f.)

45) According to the doctrine of Indian medicine, three
steps of the development of the embryo following one another
arc not dealt with, but the first preliminary steps of the three
generations.
46) What the name kalalam in this context implies is not
clear to me{compareNyayabha~yam p. 352, 10). Hair and nails
are mere attachments and are not counted in the body (Nyaya-
b~yam, p. 342, 9-12).
47) Thejuice or sap of nutrition is not counted in the
Vaise~ika among the dhiitava~z. (compare Padarthadharma-
sarµgrahal.1 p. 44, 17 ; Kirai:iavali p. 88, 13 and 273, 19.)
48) An exact rendering of the word 'd()faft' would be
'basic evil'. (compare Vagbhata's AHangahrdayasayµhita, trans-
lated from Sanskrit into German by L. Hilgenberg and W.
Kirfel, Leiden, 1941 p. 2, Note I.)
49) Vol. I (p. 86 f.)
50) Vol. I (p. 236)
51) Vol. I (p. 84f.)
52) On the question of the duality of the visual organ,
compare Nyayabha~yam p. 236, 11-239, 6. Compare also W.
Ruben, Die Nyayasii.tras, Leipzig 1928, p. 198, note 183.
53) Compare Vaise~ikasii.tral,'li VIII, 2, 5-6 ; Padartha-
dharma-sarµgrahal;i p. 28, 6 f; 36, 5-7 ; 39, 4-6 ; 44, 8-10 and
N ya yasii.tral,'li II I, 1, 71 together with the commentaries belong-
ing thereto. The commentaries interpret their view on the com-
mented text partially. Both views are mentioned by Vyomoma-
siva, Vyomavati p. 233, 19-234, 23; 246, 3-247, 3.
54) Nyayabha~yam p. 291, 9-:292, 3.
55) Compare above all, Nyayabha~yam p. 277, 11-17 ;
Nyayavarttikam p. 33, 15-36, 21 ; Kiral,'lavali p. 74, 3-76, 6;
Padmanabha, Vaixe~ikasetul:i p. 250; 28-253, 1 (gives important
supplements). Prakaral).apaficika p. 44, 9-45, 20 etc. Compare
further W. Ruben, Die Nyayaii.tras, Leipzig 1928, p. 199, note
188 ; p. 200, note 190 ; p. 201, note 194.
56) Compare Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakofal:i I, v. 43
cd (translation by L. de La Vallee-Poussin p. 8 7 ff) ; Dignaga,
Pramai;iasamuccaya~1, I. v. 20[, Vrttil:ifollowing 17 b 6-18 a 4.
57) For the doctrine of the rays of the eyes, compare,
above all, Nyayasutrai:i.i III, I, 33-53, and Nyayabha~yam p.

258, 14 up to 274, 2, together with the later commentaries.
These texts are dealt with in detail by W. Ruben in his 'Zur in-
dischen Erkenntnistheorie, Die Lehre von der Wahrnehmung
nach den Nyayasutras' III, I, Leipzig 1926.
58) Nyayasutrai:i.i III, I, 52 ; Nyayabha~yam p. 272, 8-
17 ; Nyayavarttikam p. 384, 3-15; Tatparyatika p. 526, 12-28;
Slokavarttikam 22 ( Sabdanityadhikarai:i.am) ,;. 183-191 ab
(Another view appears in v. 180 cd-183).
59) Nyayabha~yam p. 266, 3-267, 8.
60) Nyayabha.~yam p. 267, 1-8
61) Nyayabhil?yam p. 262, 5-11 and 263, 3-14.
62) Nyayabha~yam p. 263, 7 f; Nyayavarttikam p. 378,
9-21.
63) Exactly these have been held by the representatives of
the Vedic auxiliary science of Phonetics (Sik~akaral).), to which
this doctrine is traced.
64) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal). p. 287, 21-288, 2.
65) Mimarpsabha~yam I, p. 20, 5 ff; Slokavarttikam 22
( $abdanityatadhikarl}.am), v. 122-125 and 42-45 ; Prakarai:i.a-
paficika p. 164, 25-165, 6; 166 ; 7-11 ; Nyayamafijari p. 216,
19-217, 4.
66) Slokavarttikam 22, v. 170-176 ; Prakarai:i.apaficika p.
166, 22-167, 19.
67) Slokavarttikam 22, v. 129-130; 210 cd-213 ab; 217
cd-221 ab ; Prakaral}.apaficika p. 165, 6-13; 166, 15-21 ; 167,
20-168, IO; Nyayamafijari p. 208, 17-20; 209, 1-11; (but also
the difference of the speaker 208, 13-16 and the neighbouring
sounds 208, 25-27) ; 213, 22 ff; 214, 2-4.
68) Such forced explanations are found in Jayanta Bhatta,
Nyayamanjari, p. 228, 24-229, 5.
69) Kathaka Upani~ad IV, v. 12 f; Mahabharata HI,
v. 16763 (Savitri episode). Compare H. Oldenberg, Die Reli-
gion des Veda, Stuttgart and Berlin, 374 1923, p. 525.
70) Kathaka Upani~ad III, v. 3 ff. Mahabharata XIV, 51,
v. 1 ff.
71) Vol I. (p. 52 ff.)
72) Compare above (p. 17-18 f,)
73) There are also found the doctrines that the psychical
organ moves in the arteries ( nadya!z)-( Kirai:iavali, p. 135,

4-12).
74) Compare the presentation of the classical Yoga System
in Vol. I. (p. 328).
75) Sal'[lskaraf:z is the older designation (compare Vaise-
1?ika-sutral).i IX, 2, 6) . Bhavana appeared to have stepped in
its place, when 'vegal/ and 'sthitisthapakaf:z' were included under
the name Sal'[lskaral.z.
76) Vol I. (p. 48 f.) and (51 f.)
77) Nyayabhii.1?yam p. 215, 5 f. 'Sadehasya Otmano manasa
sal'[lyogo vipacyamanakarmafayasaltito jivanam ivate' ; compare also
Nyayamafijari p. 499, 1-4 ; Nyayakandali p. 263, 2 f.; Kiral).a-
vali p. 134, 5 f.
78) Compare above page (18.) In respect of the assessment
of the composition of the text I agree by far with W. Ruben (Die
Nyayasiitras, Leipzig 1928, p XV f; and above all also p. 218,
note 291). According to my view, of the Chapters II-IV, only
II belongs closely to the dialectical hand-book I and V, while
III-IV originally form an independent unity with the sections
belonging to it from Chapter I. On the other hand, I share his
view also in respect of the tearing asunder of the original con-
nection of I and V through the putting in of II and IV, as above
all also, in respect of the endeavour concerned to make up or
balance the length of the isolated Ahnika through an explanation
put in between them. I, therefore, also, do not regard the intro-
duced matter as an explanation in the following presentation of
the Chapters III- IV, as its place in it, from the point of time
and its position in the frame of the whole doctrine, is to be
assessed differently from the remaining sections.
79) The old Nature-philosophy of the Nyaya knows neither
the further formulation of the Nature-philosophy of the Vai~e
~ika (compare p. 81 ff), nor the doctrine of categories. In the
presentation that is preserved, there have no doubt penetrated
later things and, above all, the Nyayabha~yam always again
reckons involuntarily with the progressive Vaise~ika system and
the doctrine of categories. But the basic features of the old
Nature-philosophy are, in spite of that, rarely changed.
UO) Nyayasiitra~1i I, l, 2.
81) ,, I, I, 9.
82) Nyayasiitral}.i I, 1, 10. They are the same qualities

which the full-fledged Vai::ietiika system ascribes to the soul and
infers the soul as their bearer.
83) Compare Nyayasiitral}.i I, l, 11.
84) Nyayasiitral}.i I, 1, 12-16.
85) ,, I, 1, 17-22.
86) Compare above p. (39-40 f.); further Nyayabhli~yam
p. 29, 17-18.
87) Nyayasiitral}.i, III, 1, 19-27.
88) Compare above p. (24 f.)
89) Nyayasittrlil}.i III, 1, 54-63. I recite in the following, as
proof, a few thought-processes of the text more exactly.
90) Nyayasiitral}.i III, 1, 64-75
91) ,, III, 1, 64-65
92) Compare above p. (31 f.)
93) Nyayasiitra:r:ii III, 2, p. 1-56.
94) ,, III, 2, 1-17.
95) ,, III, 2, 18-42.
96) ,, III, 2, 40.
97) ,, III, 2, 43-46.
98) ,, III, 2, 47-56.
99) ,, III, 2, 5 7-60·:
100) Compare above page ( 43-44 f.)
101) Nyayasiitral}.i III, 2, 57 and 60.
102) As already remarked, I leave out of account the
interpolated excursus.
103) Nyayavarttikam p. 510, 3-15
104) Vasubandhu, Virpa:iatikavijfiaptimatratasiddhil). p. 7,
3-8 1 (by way of summary).
105) Compare below page ( 114 ff.)
1
106) The qualities of a whole are, namely, according to

the orthodox doctrines of the school, basically conditioned by the
qualities of its constituents. Of the two mentioned views, the
first was ascribed, in later period, to the Vai§e~ika and was named
as Pilupakal;l (the burning of the atoms) and the second was
ascribed to the Nyaya and was named as the Pitharapakal;i (the
burning of the saucepan) . Against the second view, an objec-
tion was raised that the fire does not penetrate the saucepan
as a whole and, therefore, it would not be able to change it in

all its parts.
107) In contrast to the Vaise~ika, the doctrine of the atoms
in the J aina shows entirely different features. According to them,
the matter is capable of extension and contraction and the quali-
ties of the atoms are changeable. The basic thought about the
doctrine of the atoms is, therefore, not comprehended by them.
But out of that it can be deduced that it cannot be original
here.
108) Vaise~ikasiitra1_1i V, I. 16-18.
109) ,, V, 1, 1-6.
110) " v, 2, 1-18.
l l l) Da:lapadarthasastram, T 2138, P. 1265 c 23 f. (in
the translation by H. Ui, P. 116).
112) Vaise~ikasiitra1_1i, V, 2, 5 and J l
113) ,, V, 1, 14.
114) Padarthadharmasarpgraha.I). p. 25, IO f.
115) Vol. I, p. (304 f.)
116) Vol. I, p. (318f.)
117) Vol. I, p. (49 f.)
118) Vol. I, p. (330 f.)
119) Vol. I, p. ( 199 f.)
120) Padarthadharmasarpgraha.I). p. l 75, 2; 177, 12 f.
121) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal;i p. 183, 16 f; 263, 7;
184, 8 ff.
122) Vaise~ikasutrai:ii V, 2, 13; Padarthadharmasarpgra-
hal:i p. 309, 10-15.
123) Padarthadharmasai:pgrahal;i p. 309, 10-12. Prasasta-
pada's supplement 'Upakiiriipakiirasa111artham' ('so far as it can
be of advantage or disadvantage') seeks to rescue the moral
character in the working of the Adu/am, hut it can deceive
nobody about the fact that, as the cited examples show, it was
stretched in the cases in which there can be no talk of the re-
ward or retribution of good or bad actions in the case of the
men of best wills.
124) Compare, for the following, above all Vyomavati p.
639, 3 upto 40, 2 and Nyiiyasiitra1_1i III, 2, 61-73 with the com·
mcntaries.
125) Compare in this respect Nyayamai'ijari p. 479, ,1-2;
Vyomavati p 411, 7-12 and Nyayakandali p. 88, 11-16.

126) According to my view, with the change of the idea
about the soul is connected the fact that in the VaiSe~ika the
old designation jivab is replaced by the term iitmii.
127) The different sort of the doctrine of the Jaina
depends on syncretism. Compare note 107.
128) Compare Nyayavarttikamp. 336, 17-337, 5.
129) Vol. I,p. (287)ff.
130) It is said, for example, in Piijyapiida's Sarviirthasid·
dhiJ:.i on the Tattvarthiidhigamasiitrii.1~i VI, 1 'iitmapradeia-
parispando yogab.'
131) Slokavarttikam 21 (Atrnavadal.i) v. 74 cd-76.
132) So far as every activity is understood as movement,
the doer can only be the bearer of the movement.
133) Vasubandhu, Abhidharmako5aJ:.i IV, v. 1 'Cetanii
tatkrtam ca tat (=Karma) ; compare in this respect the de-
tailed presentation in vol. III .
134) Mar.1c;l.ana Misra, Bhiivaniivivekal;l (ed. Ganganiith
Jha) p. 91, 8-94, 2.
135) PadarthadharmasarpgrahaJ:.i p. 102, 16 f.; they work,
as Udayana has exactly expressed it, only in the sphere of the
body (Kirai:iiivali p. 40, 8 'Sariravacchedena vrttilabhab'). An
interesting deviation in this respect of the memory-impressions
is shown by the refuted doctrine in the Nyayasiitrai:ii III, 2, 25.
136) Compare above page (45) f.
137) The opposing schools also placed, therefore, the rep-
resentatives of the Vaise~ika in this respect as 'ardhavainiifikiib
beside the Buddhists.
138) Nyayabhii~yam p. 52, 8-12 on Nyayasiitrii.Qi I, I, 29
niratifayafretaniib, dehendriyamanabsu vi~aye~u tattatkiiratJe,fU
ca viJe,rn iti Siirrzkhyaniim .... svaguT}avi!i,f(ri.f cetaniib iti Yoganiim.'
The name Yauga or Yoga is used for the adherents ofNyaya and
Vaise~ika not only in the later Jaina works. It is also found in
the older period and can be demonstrated occasionally also in
non-Jinistic works (e.g. Salikanatha l,ljuvimala, p. 209, 25 ).
139) NyayamanjarI p. 473, 10 'sakalaguT}apoefham eva
a.rya r ilpam. •
140) It is characteristic, how the Buddhistic author Adva~
yavajra in his Tattvaratnavali (edition of the Gaekwad's Orien-
tal Series p. 16, I 1 ff) compares the state of the released man
according to the Vaise~ika doctrine with deep sleep and places
him beside the released one according to the Vedanta idea.
141) Vol. I, p. (61 f.)
142) Advayavajra, Tattvaratnavali ( Gaekwad's Oriental
Series) p. 16, 22 f. My rendering is free, as the text is uncertain.
The verse was used by the Brahmanical side in which J etavana
was replaced by Vrndavana (Anandagiri, Brhadarai;iakyopani-
~adbhasyatika) (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series) p. 307, 23; so
also Prabhacandra. Nyayakumudacandra ( Manik Chandra Dig-
ambara Jaina Granthamala) p. 828, 8 f. etc. Compare also: M.
Winternitz, Geschichte der indischen Literatur, 3. Band, Leipzig
1922, p. 463, (note 2),
143) The following sketch of development is an attempt.
Certainty cannot be reached in particulars, as the mat~rial for
the old period is too scanty. Only for the idea of space, some
other old information can be had from the Sutras.
144) Vol. I. p. ( 48 ff.).
145) Compare, for example, Chandogya-Upanii.;ad I, 8-9.
To this also properly belongs the idea of the Brhadarai;iyaka-
Upani~ad III, 2, 13 that the Atma enters into space during
death.
146) Compare above p. ( 14) ff.
147) Among the Jainas, according to whom space has
remained as iikiisal;, the world-quarters have also suffered no
shifting of their importance.
148) Dafapadartha~astram T 2138, p. 1262 c. 22 f. (in
the translation by H. Ui, p. 94).
149) Quoted in the Mahaprajnaparamitopade~al:i, T
1509, p. 133 b 21 f. (in the translation by Et. Lamotte, p. 596).
150) Vaise~ikasutrai;ii II, 2, 14-15; compare with itVasu's
commentary on Aryadeva's Sata~astram, T 1569, p. 180 a 28-6
b 1 (in the translation by G. Tucci, p. 78).
151) Vai~e~ikasutrar.i.i II, 2, 10.
l '.i2) I do not enter into details for the oldest period.
Especially the speculations of the sacrificial priests in the Brah-
mai;ias, which, according to my view, represent a separate deve-
lopment, arc laid aside by me. For the doctrine of Time,
compare for the older period, F. O. Schrader, 'iiber den Stand
der indischen Philosophie Zur Zeit Mahaviras and Buddhas',

Strassburg 1902, p. 17-30; for the further development, St.
Schayer, Contribution to the Problem of Time in Indian Philo-
sophy, Polska Akademia Umiejetno~ci. Prace Komisji Orienta-
listycznej Nr. 31, Krakow 1938, which but, above all, describes
the Buddhistic theories.
153) Atharvavedasaiphita XIX, 53, v.l, 2, 5, and 6(Trans-
lation according to M. Winternitz, Geschichte der indischen
Literatur, 1, Band, Leipzig, 1908, p. 132).
154) Compare Mahaprajfiaparamitopadefah, T 1509,
p. 65b 12 f (in the translation by Et. Lamotte, p. 76) ; the
commentary on the Saipkhyakarika, v. 61; Candrakirti, Prasa-
nnapada, p. 386, 6 f; Haribhadra, Sastravartta-samuccay aQ., v.
166; etc.
155) Haribhadra, SastravarttasamuccayaQ. v, 167; etc.
156) Compare Vasu's commentary on Aryadeva's Satasa-
stram, T. 1569, p. 180 a 1-3 (in the translation by G. Tucci p.
76); MahaprajiiaparamitopadefaQ., T 1509, p. 65 b 17 f. (in
the translation by Et. Lamotte, p. 76) .
157) Vaise~ikasiitral).i VII, 2, 22.
158) Compare my presentation in Vol. III
159) Compare Vaise~ikasiitral).i VII, 2, 21.
160) Vaise~ikasli.tral).i II, 2, 6; I read 'param aparam'
etc., with Kamalaiila, Tattvasaipgrahapanjika p. 206, 20 f.
Compare also Vasu's commentary on Aryadeva's Sata:iastram,
T 1569, p. 180 a 3 f. (in the translation by G. Tucci, p. 76);
Mahapra:jfiaparamitopadefaQ., T 1509, p 65 b 18-20 (in the
translation by Et. Lamotte, p. 76) ; Dafapadarthasastram, T
2138 p 1262 c 21 f. (in the translation by H. Ui, p. 93 ). For the
kind of reading 'aparasmin aparam' in the Sutra compare B.
Faddegon, The Vaise~ika system, Amsterdam 1918, p. 212, who
holds this kind of reading as late.
161) About this see for great details H. v. Glasenapp,
Entwicklungsstufen des indischen Denkens, Schriften der Koni-
gsberger Gclehrtcn Gessellschaft 15./ 16, Jahr, Heft 5, Halle
1940, p. 273 (""' 1) ff.
162) Vol. l p. (241)
163) Vol. 1 p. (258)f.
164) Compare Umasvati, Tattvarthadhigamasiitra:Q.i V,
37; Vaise~ikasiitral).i I. 1, 15.

165) Umiisvliti, Tattvarthiidhigamasiitrlil).i V, 40; Com-
pare Vaise~ikasii triil).i 11 I, 16.
166) Kundakunda, Paiµcattiyasarpgaho v. 13.
167) On the contrary, it is characteristic that the Jaina,
apart from the heretical schools, do not know these categories.
168) It shows the summary treatment of these three cate-
gories in the beginning of the Vaise~ikasiitras in the first Ahni-
kam of the first Adhyaya]:i, while, commonness and particularity
are separated from them and are dealt with in an entirely
different way in the second Ahnikam. Besides, the summarizing
of these three categories as artha!; is characteristic ( Vaise~ikasu
trftl).i VIII, 2, 3).
169) Umiisviiti, Tattviirthiidhigamsiitra9i V, 38.
170) Compare above p. ( 17) f and p. (20) f.
171) Compare above p. (19) f.
172) Compare above p. ( 14)
173) Umiisvati, Tattvlirthadhigamasiitriil).i V, 24.
174) Compare p. (55) f.
175) Compare p. (17 ).
176) I again emphasize on this occasion explicitly that I
cannot go here into all the details of development, how, for
example, they were conditioned by the special position of
sound.
177) Compare Vaise~ikasiitriil).i VII, 1, 20, and Dafapa-
dartha~iistram, T 2138, p. 1263 a 18-22 (in the translation by
H. Ui, p. 95).
178) Shortness and longness occur, therefore, only in the
aggregates and are missing in the permanent substances. Indeed
there were differences of opinion on this point. Compare, for
example, Vyomavati p. 474, 3 ff.
179) Compare in the Jinism the 'bandhnb' (Umiisviiti,
Tattvlirthiidhigamasiitrfo,ii V, 24 ff), and in the Buddhism the
'j1riipti(t' Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakofal.1 II, v. 36 ff.)
lBO) Compare the 'siT,1ehakiiye' in the older Jinism.
181) Compare the treatment of this question in Vol. IV.
182) Otherwise, only the qualities which change under
the influence of heat form an exception. On the question of the
aggregate, we shall still speak later.
BIBLIOGRAPHY ANO NOTES 245
183) Compare on this question p. ( 111) ff.
184) Compare the Sarµkhyaikantavadal;i, Nyayasiitral).i
IV, 1, 41-43.
185,i Comparep (40.)ffandp. (67) f.
186) Compare p. (84-85)
187) p. (61) ff.
188) Compare p. ( 36) ff.
189) Padarthadharmasa1pgraha}.i p. 292, 10 ff.
190) I believe, that the doctrine of commonness is united
herein because it was most closely connected with the question
regarding the object of the word and also because the old doc-
trine of the grammarians was later interpreted in the sense of
the theory of categories. It is also noteworthy that Prafastapada
occasionally uses in the place of the commonness (siimiinyam)
the word foreign to the system, namely, akrti~ (p. 321, 16 and
,19) which is at home or indigenous in the doctrine of the gra-
mmarian from whom it has been taken over also by the older
Nyaya.
191) Compare Patafijali, Mahribha~yam (ed. F. Kielhorn),
Vol I, p. 6, 8-11 and 242, 10-247, 16; translated by 0. Straus,
Altindische Spekulationen iiber die Sprache und ihre Problem,
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellshaft,
Band 81/1927, pp. 99-151.
192) The expressions 'thing' ( dravyam) and 'form'
( iikrti(1) were first used in the popular sense and philosophically
interpreted first by Patafijali, as W. Ruben has rightly seen
(W. Ruben, die NyayasiHras, Leipzig 1928, p. 195, note 168).
193) p. (B7) f.
194) Vai{;qikasutral).i I, 2, 3; That this Sutra is not to
be so understood, that commonness and particularity represent
different ways or views in the idealistic sense, has been rightly
emphasised, by H. Ui. (The Vai:;qika Philosophy according to
the Da~apadartha~i.istra, Royal Asiatic Society, Oriental Trans-
lation Fund, N.S. Vol XXIV, London 1917, p. 173 f.)
195) This view is represented by Candramati in his
Dafapa<lrirthasastram. In this connection, the information
about the Sixth Schism of the J aina is interesting.
l!JG) Taken basically, they arc the same difliculties with
which the Platonic doctrine of ideas saw itself confronted.
246 13I13LIOGRAPltY ANU NOTES
197) Exactly considered, the relation of the whole

(avayavi) to its parts appears to have been the starting-point
in the formulation of the category of inherence. Still there are
details into which we shall not be able to enter here.
I 98) Compare p. (81-82). ·
199) Vol. Ip. (314)f.
200) Compare p. ( 200) f.
201) Compare Salikanatha, Prakarai:i.apaftcika p. 110,
18-23.
202) Compare p. (98-99) .
203) Compare Salikanatha, PrakaraQapaftcika p. 110,
8-111,3.
204) The question about this and about the position of
the Srupkhya and the school of Kumarila on it is to be handled
in Vol. IV.
205) Da8apadarthasastram, T 2138, p. 1263 c. 19-22 (in
206) Salikanatha, Prakarat:iapancika p. 81, 10-82, 11.
207) Compare VyomavatI p. 194, 6-16; Nyayakandali
p. 144, 24 upto 146, 4; Nyayamaftjari 42. 2-13.
208) Dafapadarthasastram, T 2138, p. 1264 a 2-10 (in
209) I recite here the most widespread elucidations, not
the wording of the elucidation of Candramati. ·
210) p. (80) f.
211) p. (88)
212) Compare Anubhutisvarupa's Prakatarthavivarai:i.am
on the Brahmasutrar.ii II, 2, 11 (Madras University Sanskrit
Series, No. 9, p. 490, 15-17).
213) Characteristically, the J aina, from whom such
thought-processes were far off, do not know this detour about
the double-atom.
214) Compare p. (59-60)f.
215) Compare Vol. I, p. (385).
216) p. (58-59).
217) They were known only as occasioning causes, as far
as they are able to call forth an understanding knowledge from
themselves.
218) p. (113-114).
\
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTKS 247
219) p. ( 34) f.
220) Vaise~ikasiitral).i IV, 1, 8.
221) Vaise~ikasiitral).i IV, 1, 9.
222) 'darsanal'fl Jparsanarri ca dravyam' This Siitra is missing
in the handed-down text but is repeatedly quoted in the old
period.
223) Compare p. (16).
224) Vaise~ikasiitral)..i IV, 1, 6. I translate according to
the form of the Siitra handed down by Vyomasiva, as it is clear-
er.
225) Vaise~ikasiitral).i, IV, 1, 7.
226) Compare Salikanatha, Prakaral).apaficika p. 46,
6-14.
227) Compare Santirak~ita, Vipaficitartha p. 35, 12 ff.
228) Vaise~ikasiitrii.Q.i IV, 1, 11 and 12.
229) Compare Salikanatha, Prakaral).apaficika p, 46. 14-
17, and 78, 14-81, 9 ; Kira9avali p. 281, 7-282, H; Nyaya-
kandali p. 194, 13-195, 7.
230) p. (107-108).
231) VaiCe~ikasiitral).i VIII, 1, 9.
232) Vaise~ikasiitral).i VIII, 1, 5 and 6.
In this Siitra, the expression commonness-particularity ( siimii-
nyavife,rn~) is used for the commonness. (compare p. 148).
233) Vai~e~ikasiitra9i VIII, 1, 7 and 8.
234) The perceptibility of the soul is represented, for ex·
ample, by Vyomasiva, Vyomavati, p. 391, 12-392, 22 ; compare
besides, Jayanta, Nyayamar'ijarI p. 429, 20 ff.
235) From the older period, U pavarJ?a, above all, is named
as the representative of this doctrine. Further particulars will
be given in my presentation of the Vedanta. Further, on this
question, compare P. Hacker, Untcrsuchungen uber Textc des
friihen Advaitavada, 1. Die Schuler Sati.karas ( Akademie der
Wisscnschafren und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungcn der
geistes-und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrgang 1950, Nr
26), p. 2037 ( = 131).
236) Compare Sii.likanatha, Prakaral).apancika, p. 151, 12-
153, 25.
237) Vol I, p. (217) ff.
238) Vol. I, p. (225).
248
I
BIBLIOGRAPHY AN.l> NO'I'ES
239) Padarthadharmasarp.graha}.i, p. 111, 8 ff.

240) p. ( 93-94) f.
241) p. ( 129) ff.
242) Compare the presentation of the theory ofNyaya in
Vol. IV.
243) Padarthadharmasarp.grahal.i p. 112, 4 ff.
244) Padarthadharmasarp.grahal.1 p. 164, 21 ff.
245) The Theory of knowledge of Prafastapada is to be
dealt with in Vol. IV.
246) Prafastapada organizes his work in such a way that
he first deals with the categories in general and then in parti-
cular and also in the case of particular categories, he describes
first their general and then their special qualities. On account of
this, the description of common qualities contains a dry com-
pilation in the most concise form, as it is customary in India,
when some matter is to be committed to memory. A~ such enume-
rations are naturally not fit for reproduction, what lies in the clue
words must be, on the contrary, elucidated. I have attempted it
in my presentation and no doubt, so far as it deals with the
general characterization of the Categories. In doing so, I have
not considered the qualities which are merely named in this
Section, because they occur in the case of several categories
and they appear again in the description of particular ones and
have a better place there.
247) For the following, compare Padarthadharmasaql-
grahal.i p. 16, l ff.
248) Behind these definitions stand problems which have
been developed, above all, outside the Vaise~ika .• in the course of
epistemological discussions. We shall, therefore, come to speak
of them on another occasion.
249) Padiirthadharmasarp.grahal). p. 20, 14 ff.
250) Padiirthadharmasarp.grahaJ.i p. 27, 9 ff.
251) I cite these sections fairly exactly as they stand in
the work of Prafastapiida, because the superficiality and back•
wardness, in dealing with things pertaining to natural science,
beside the over-sharpened Scholasticism of the doctrine of
categories, are characteristic of it. The commentaries awaken a
favourable impression occasionally.
252) Padartha<lharmasarµgrahal.i p. 35, 22 ff,
253) Padarthadharmasarp.grahaQ. p. 38, 24 ff.

254) Padarthadharmasarp.grahaQ. p. 44, l, ff.
255) Padarthadharmasarp.grahal) p. 48, 7, ff.
This doctrine shows different elements in a variegated
mixture. At the basis, there lies an old myth of creation. It is
remodelled in the sense of the atom-doctrine, because in place
of the rising forth of the elements out of one another, their origin
takes place out of the permanent elements. Further, the ideas
of the doctrine of categories are employed. A later and an adven-
titious supplement is the intervention of God. Finally, it is to
be marked that the eight conditions of knowledge (bhaviif:i) also
emerge out of the Sarp.khya ( p. 49, 12 and 16 f.)
256) Padii.rthadharmasarp.grahal) p. 58, 5 ff.
257) Padarthadharmasarp.grahal) p. 58, 7 ff.
258) It is produced out of the homogeneousness of the
quality of sound from which it is inferred. (Vaise~ikasiitral}.i II,
1, 30 ; Padii.rthadharmasarp.grahal) p. 58, 14 f.)
259) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal) p. 63, 15 ff.
260) Padarthadharmasa1µgrahal) p. 66, 20 ff.
261) As we have already said while describing the origi-
nation of the idea of space, the same word is used among Indians,
for space and quarters.
262) Padarthadharmasarp.grahal;l p. 69, 6 ff.
263) p. (39-40) f.
264) p. (43-44) f.
265) Padarthadharmasa1µgrahal) p. 89, 8 ff.
266) Padii.rthadharmasarpgrahal) p. 94, 6 ff.
267) I restrict myself here to the essentials and do not
quote all the details and special cases.
268) Padfirthadharmasarp.grahal) p. l 04, l ff.
269) Padarthadharmasarp.grahal) p. 105, 8 ff.
270) Padii.rthadharmasa1µgrahal:i p. l 05, 23 ff.
271) Padii.rthadharmasarp.grahal,i p. 106, 8 ff.
272) This definition is connected with the perception of
the substances etc. through colour and touch.
273) Padarthadharmasarp.grahal.1 p. 106, 19 ff.
274) Padarthadharmasarp.grahal,i p. 111, 3 ff.
27'.i) That is to say, there originates the quality two, which
inheres, from the moment of its origination, in the commonness
two.
/
250 BIBLIOGRAPHY
/
AJlm NOTES
276) Compare about this theory above, page ( 190) ff.

Pra8astapada gives, at the conclusion of the section about the
number, a defence of the 'Vadhyaghatakavadal;i' as against the
'Sahiinavasthanaviidal:J..' But we cannot enter into it, in the
(defined) frame of our work.
277) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal;i p. 130, 20 ff.
279) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal:J. p. 139, 13 ff.
280) Compare p. (106) ff.
281 ) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal;i p. 106, 4 ff.
282) Compare p. ( 192) f.
283) Padiirthadharmasarpgrahal;i p. 164, 3 ff.
284) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal). p. 171, 16 ff.
285) Padiirthadharmasarpgrahal:i p. 183, 13 ff.
286) Compare above p. (26-27)£
288) Padarthadharmasarµgrahal;i p. 260, 19 ff.
291 ) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal.1 p. 263, 3 ff.
292) Padiirthadharmasarpgrahal:i p. 263, 25 ff.
293) Padarthadharmasarpgrahab. p. 264, 23 ff.
294) This noteworthy comprehension is proved on the
basis of the fact that another cause is not ascertainable and
that, for example, fluid salt is seen to be becoming solid under
the influence of fire.
295) Compare p. (156)
296) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal;i p. 266, 16 f.
297) Padarthadharmasarp.grahal;i p. 266, 24 ff.
298) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal:i p. 267, 2 ff.
299) Padarthadharmasarpgrahal). p. 267, l 3 ff.
301 ) Padarthadharmasarpgraha];i p. 280, 20 ff.
302) Padiirthadharmasarpgrahal;i p. 287, 17 If.
303) It is a forced and very questionable theory which
was formulated, because no other way out was known.
304) About this theory, compare p. (35) ff.
305) Compare page (l 13) f.
306) Padarthadharmasa1rigrahal1 p. 290, I ff.
l31BLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES 251
307) Compare about this, p. (113-114).

308) In this connection, one compared the description of
the process above on p. (87) and considered, how Pra8astapada
during the description of the same process introduced, step by
step, the idea of the doctrine of categories, the qualities of the
soul, wish (icchii) and effort (prayatnab), the common qualities
connection (salflyoga[i) and swing ( vegafi,) etc.
309) Compare page (232).
310) Compare the corresponding Sarpkhya doctrine, Vol.
I, p. (287-288).
311) Padarthadharmasa:rµgrahal:i p. 311, 13 ff.
312) This interpretation of the word Svarupiibhedena
( =abhinniitmakam) appears to me the most probable.
313) Padarthadharmasa:rµgrahal;i p. 321, 11 ff.
314) Candramati restricts its occurrence to the substances
which exist only in number one.
315) Padarthadharmasarµgrahal;i p. 324, 18 ff.
316) Vol. I, p. (315) f.
8 THE SYSTEM OF THE jAINA
Bibliography
Glasenapp, H. v. : Der Jainismus, eine indischen Erlos-

ungs-religion, Berlin 1925.
Schubring, W. : Die Lehre der Jaina, Grundriss der in-
doarischen Philologie und Altertum-Skunde III 7. Berlin &
Leipzig 1935. (It should be mentioned of this work that Schu-
bring brings in Umasvati again and again to supplement the
lacunae in the canonical information.)
TRANSLATIONS
Jacobi, H. : Eine Jaina Dogmatik, Umasvati's Tattvar-

thadhigamasiitra (translated and explained), Zeitschrift der
Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, Band 60, Leipzig
1906. p. 287-325 and 512-551.
Faddegon, B. : The Pravacansara of Kunda-kunda A.carya,
together with the commentary Tattvadipikii. by Amrtacandrasuri,
English translation, edited with an Introduction by F. W.
Thomas (] ain Literary Society Series, Vol. I), Cambridge 1935.
With the older Jinism, the position with respect to the

tradition as well as the state of research is more unfavourable
than in Buddhism. The available information about the original
canon, its handing down (tradition) and the loss of holy writ-
ings appear to me untrustworthy. In every case, however, the
canon in its handed-down form is composed of constituents from
different times. A comparison with the canonical writings of the
Buddhsits is instructive. A work like the Thai:iat"1gam corresponds
somewhat with the SarµgHiparyayaJ.i which forms the transition
to the Abhidharma literature. The Jinacariyam of the Kalpa-
sutra stands about on the level of the LalitavistaraJ:i. The cosrno-
graphical texts Siirapai:ii:iatti andJ ambuddivapat;it;iatti correspond
to the Lokaprajfiaptil_i of the Abhidharmapitakam. Especially
important appears to me the proof of L. Alsdorf that the
cosmography of this text depends on the Brhatkatha. 1 The
fiction Brhatkatha, although it is placed in pre-Christian times,
requires to be put still much later with regard to its estimate of
time. The works 2 of W. Kirfel and J. Fr. Kohl have enabled
us to know the stages of development of the cosmographical
texts-which again remind us of the LokaprajfiaptiJ.i whose
recasting and further development can be pursued by us in his-
torical times. But apart from such younger or later texts, there
stand also, in the oldest layers of the canon, the late beside the
old.:i Under these circumstances, in the position today of rese-
arch in the fields of the Jaina canons there is no appropriate or
proper basic foundation to build a historical presentation on it.
Further, completely unsatisfactory-at least for the ancient
period-are the preliminary works in the sphere of commentarial
literature and independent doctrinal writings. Unreliable defi-
nitions of chronology on the basis of questionable evidence and
superficial statement of contents arc of no use. Hut only in rarest
1. Alsdorf : Zur Geschichte der Jaina-Ko11mographie und-Mythologie,
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, Band 92/1938 p.
464-493.
2. W. Kirfel : Studien zu Texten des Jaina-Kanons Zeitschrift fur
lndologie und lranistik, Band 3/1924 p. c,0-80, J. Fr. Kohl : Die Suryapraj-
ilaptil;l, Versuch einer Tcxt-geschichte, Bonner Orientalische Studien, Heft
20, Stuttgart 1!l37.
3. This is strongly emphasised by Schubring, 'Die Lehre de Jainas' p, 55,
cases, more of that period will be found at present.

Under these circumstances I have decided in favour of
getting out of a necessity or an emergency and build my presenta-
tion on a few isolated sources. How I think of the historical
position of the cited doctrines, is hintedin the presentation itself.
I have, however, absolutely held fast to one thing. I have
endeavoured to reproduce in pure form the doctrines from the
chosen sources. I intended to avoid, in every case, the popular
joining together or collection· of information from various sources
and times. Because thereby, one only dims or blurs the picture
and blocks the way of further knowledge.
NOTES
317) Compare E. Leumann, Die altern Berichte von den

Schismen der Jaina, Indische Studien, 17, Band, Leipzig, 1885,
p. 91-135.
318) Compare on this, above all, the works of L. Alsdorf :
Harivaqifapurar.ia, Alt-und Neu-Indische Studien, Band 5, Ham-
burg 1936; Zur Geschichteder Jaina-Kosmographie und-Mytho-
logie, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft,
Band 92/938, p. 464-493 ; Further contributions to the History
of Jain Cosmography and Mythology, New Indian Antiquary,
Vol. IX, Bombay 1947, p. 105-128.
319) Vol. I, p. ( 195) f.
320) Above all, E. Leumann makes a beginning in his
'0bersicht iiber die Avasyaka-Literatur, Alt-und Neu-Indische
Studicn, vol. 4, Hamburg 1934.
321) Tattvarthadhigamasiitra, with a bha~ya by the author,
ed. M. K. Premchand, Bibliotheca Indica, No. 159, Calcutta
1903-05. Further, numerous editions with different comment-
aries.
322) Sri Kundakundacarya's Pravacanasara, a Pro-Can-
onical Text oftheJainas, ed. by A. N. Upadhye, SriRayacandra
Jaina Sristramala, Bombay2 1935.
323) Srimatkundakundasvamiviracital:i PancastikayaQ. ed.
by ManoharLal, RayacandraJaina Sastramala, Bombay2 1914,
and other editions.
324) Srimadbhagavatkundakundacaryaviracitaqi Samaya-
prabhrtam, ed. by Gajadhar Lal Jain, Sanatana Jaina Gran-

thamala 3, Benares 1914, and other editions.
325) The contrast to the infinitely great substances of the
Vaise~ika is characteristic because therein it is shown especially
clearly that for Jinism the philosophical thought does not stand
in the forefront but that it starts from the world-picture.
326) Compare TattvarthadhigamasutraI).i V, 22 and 38-39,
and above all PavayaI).asaro II, v. 43-52 and Paq;catthiyasarpgaho
v. 23-26 and 100-10.2. I stick here only to Kundakunda ; I do
not take later views into consideration. It appears to me also
doubtful whether the distinction between 'vyavahiirakiilal;,' and
'nifcayakiilal;' can or need be already traced back to Kundakunda.
327) This must have been originally the only definition
Par&Jiimafi kri,ya paratvaparatve ca' are considered by me as a later
enlargement.
328) Tattvarthii.dhigamasiitraI).i V. 21.
329) The following is according to Kundakunda, Parp-
ca tthiyasarpgaho v. 27 ff.
330) Kundakunda, in the work quoted above, v. 56-68.
331) Vol. I, p. (199) f.
332) The corporeality or limitedness (milrtatvam) was,
according to the Vaise~ika, conditioned by impenetrability
which depends on the quality of touch. For the Jaina, this inter-
pretation was impossible, as according to them, the matter, at
least in the condition of fine material particles, is not impenetr-
able. They were, therefore, compelled to seek another definition
for the corporeality and found it, for example, in the sensuous
perception ( Parµcattiyasarpgaho v. 99).
333) Tattvarthadhigamasutra:i:ii V, 19-20.
334) TattvarthadhigamasiitraI).i V, 32-36; Pavaya:i:iasaro
IT, v. 71-74.
335) The word 'snigdhab' in Sanskrit implies both glossy
as well as sticky.
336) Tattvarthadhigamsutra:i:ii V, 37, 40 and 41.
337) Pargcatthiyasarpgaho v. 8-21 ; Pavayal).asaro II,
v. 3-19.
338) Parpcatthiyasarpgaho v. 16-21 ; compare Pavaya·
I).asaro II, v. 20. ff.
339) Tattvarthadhigamasutrai;i.i III and IV.
340) Tattviirthadhigamasutriii:ii II, 10-25. Paqicatthiya-

saqigaho v. 109-117.
341) Tattviirthiidhigamasiitrai:ii II, 32-36.
342) A natural-scientific explanation, worth consideration
of the expression 'potajafz' is given by J. Fr. Kohl, 'Zur Deu-
tung des Begriffs 'potaja' in der Zoologie der J ainas, Zeitschrift
der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gasellschaft, Band 103/1953,
p. 151-155.
343) Compre Tattvarthadhigamasiitriii:ii II, 37-49
344) Vol. I, p. (287) ff.
345) Vol. I, p. (113) and (142)
346) The description which Umasvati gives of these
wonder-powers, resembles strikingly the wonder-powers (rddhi-
prabhedaJz) which are enumerated by older Buddhism. Com-
pare Vol. I, p. ( 143).
347) Pavayai:iasiiro II, v. 53-55 ; Parµcatthiyasaq1gaho v.
30 ; according to other treatises, these life-forces are reckoned
under Karma.
348) Tattviirthadhigamasutrai:ii II, 16-19. I follow in my
presentation the Digambara commentators Devanandi (Pujya-
piida) and Akalanka, by whom the subject is better thought out
than by Umasvati.
349) Devanandi and Akalankaonthe Tattviirthadhigama-
sii.tra1.1i II, 11 ; Compare also the commentary of Siddhasena.
350) Tattviirthadhigamasiitriii:ii I, 9-33.
351) The self-willed and, many times, not a very happy
terminology of the Jaina is especially difficult to render. I rely,
during the rendering, on the usual translations, so far as they,
otherwise, do not contradict the terminology used by me.
352) Tattvarthiidhigamasutra:t;J.i I, 5.
353) Vol. I, p. (315).
354) Tattviirthiidhigamasutrii:t;J.i I, 34-35. I cite the doc-
trine ofUmasvati intentionally, in its obscure form, without sup-
plementing it. The different later interpretations will be given
in their proper place.
35'.i) Vol. I, ( 199) ff.
356) Tattviirthadhigamaslitrii!].i VIII, 1.
3'.i7) Tattvarthiidhigamasii.trai:ii VII.
358) Vol. I, p. (201) f.
359) Tattvarthadhigamasii.triiQ.i VI.

360) Tattvarthiidhigamasii. triiQi VIII.
361) TattviirthadhigamasiltraQi II, 1-7.
362) Compare W. Schubring, Die Lehre der Jainas, Berlin
and Leipzig 1935, p. 28 and 127. About Maskari Gosaliputra,
see Vol. I. p. (2 70) ff.
363) TattvarthiidhigamasiitriiQi IX.
364) Vol. I, p. (202) f.
365) Vol. I, p. (203) f.
366) Tattviirthadhigamasii.triiQi X.
367) The Samayasiiro which is considered as the best work
of Kundakunda contains the detailed presentation of the doc-
t~ine of Deliverance. Therefore, I have taken it as the basis in
the following treatment.
368) I believe that here, as also in the following, the
influence of a Buddhistic prototype is at work.
369) Samayasaro v. 8.
370) Kundakunda employs the expression 'iisrava~' for
the three passions. He is, therefore, in contact, in this respect,
with the linguistic usage of the Buddhistic Dogmatik.
3 71 ) These are in contrast to the triad of right belief,
right knowledge, and right conduct, together with the idea of
activity in general.
372) Samayasaro v. 25-29.
373) Compare p. (186)
374) Compare Samayasaro v. 41-43.
375) A mixture of water and milk is well quoted as an
example of a special inner connection.
'.176) Compare Samayasaro v. 55-62.
377) Compare Samayasaro v. 11 ff.
378) Vol. I, p. (152) ff. and (298) ff.
379) Samayasaro v. 80 ff.
380) Vol. I, p. ( 195) f.
g THE MATERIALISM
llIBLIOORAPIIY
Hillebrandt, A. : Zur Kenntnis der in<lischen Materialis-

ten. Aufsatze zur Kultur und Sprachagcschichte vornehmlich
des Orients, Ernst Kuhn gewidmet, Munchen 1916, p. 24-26.

Tucci, G. : Linee di una Storia del materialismo Indiana.
Memorie della R. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Serie V,
Vol. 17 Fasc. 7/1923 and Serie VI. Vol. 2, Fasc. 10/1929.
Ruben, W. : Materialismus im Leben des alten Indien,
Acta Orientalia XIII, Leiden 1935, p. 128-162 and 177-225.
Dakshina Ranjan Shastri : Short History of Indian
Materialism, Calcutta 1930.
Translations are not mentioned; apart from a few concise

works recently found, in later times, the literature of the system
is lost. Nothing much is to be remarked about my presentation.
Jn a history of Indian Philosophy, the systematic materialism of
the Lokayata must naturally stand at the middle point or centre.
A grouping of scattered utterance> of materialistic views has no
value, because therethrough no es>entially new features come
forth. For the systematic Lokayata, the most important thing is
the assembling and making use of the available fragments. It is
still, upto this time, not performed in a satisfactory form but is
not difficult for the older times. Difficulties present themselves
only in the post-classical times, where the thought-processes be-
come complicated and isolated authors and works become avail-
able for consideration. But it falls already out of the limits of
the present volume.
NOTES
381) This deals with the second Uvarigarµ of the Jaina,

the RayapaseQ.aijjarµ, to which from the Buddhistic side Digha-
nikaya XXIII (Payasisuttantarp) =Dirghagamal.1 7 corresponds.
Of both the versions, the Jinistic one is, according to all
appearances, the original one. Compare E. Leumann, Beziehun-
gcn der Jaina-Literatur zu andern Literaturkrcisen Indiens.
Actes du sixieme Congres International, des Oricntalistcs tenu
en 1883 a Leide, Troisicmc Partie, Section 2, Leiden 1885, p.
467-564. I closely follow, in the following, the translation by E.
Leumann, though in doing so, I have made it more smooth and
short.
382) Compare Dighanikaya II ( Samal'll'laphalasuttarµ) -
Dirghagamal:i 27
383) The northern bank of the Ganga was considered at

that time as an old Brahmanical holy land in contrast to the
southern bank.
384) The beings in the hell and the world of the gods are
not produced but they originate suddenly and directly [com-
pare p. ( 41) f and(267)]. The belief in such suddenly originated
beings is, therefore, of importance for the doctrine of the re-
birth and of the retribution of good and bad actions in the
world beyond.
385) The word Carvaka holds good partly as the name of
the founder of the system but is also explained in a different
way.
386) The aphorisms of Brhaspati are not preserved to us
but are only known from quotations. And as the remaining
literature of the system is lost and besides, the works and the
authors, about whom we hear, belong to a later time, I have
not further gone in this place into the literature of the Lokayata.
387) The beginning of the Vaise~ika-Siitras runs origi-
nally: Tad iha bhiivarupaqi tat sarvam abhidhiisyami (compare
Vyomasiva, Vyomavati p. 47, 13 f. and 492, 25 ).
388) The quoted Siitras are often quoted in an isolated
manner. In the cited order, they appear in Prabhacandra,
Nyayakumudacandra, Mai:i.ikacandra Digambara Jaina Gran-
thamala vols. 38-39, Bombay 1938-41, p. 341, 17 ff. I follow
it here.
389) Prahhacandra, Nyayakumudacandra p. 343, 9 f.
390) Compare p. (27) f.
391) For the following, compare Santirak(lita, Tattvasarp-
grahaQ, Gackwad's Oriental Series No. 30-31, Baroda 1926, v.
1857 ff.
392) Compare Sayar.iama<lhava, Sarvadar:ianasaq1grahal,1,
Anandaframa Sanskrit St~ries No. 51, Poona 2 1928, p. 2, 23 f.
and 3, 1-4-.
393) Santirak~ita, Tattvasarpgrahal:i v. 1874.
394) The verses employed for the following are found in
their largest number in Saya1.1amadhava's Sarvadarsanasarpgra·
hal.1, p. 5, I ff.
39;,) jarhl/(/ri and lurpharf are antiquated obsolete Vedic
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES ' 259
words which become unintelligible in later times and appear
to the sceptics as a senseless Abrakadabra.
396) Pratyakfam eva pramii1)am anumanam apramiitiam.
Compare Abhayadevasuri, Tattvabodhavidhayini on Sid-
dhasenadivakara's Sarµmatitarkaprakara9am, Puratattvamandi-
ra Granthavali No. 10, 16, 18, 19 and 21, Ahmedabad 1923-30,
p. 70, 18 f and 73, 14· ff.
397) Sarvatra paryanuyogapariiTJi eva siitriiTJi Brha~pate~.
Compare Abhayadevasuri, in his above referred-to work,
p. 69, 39.
I. INDEX OF NAMES
Ajita Kdakambala 12, 219 Nyayaviirttika-tiitparya-(ikii 9 ff

Ak~apada 8 (Tiitparya-tika)
Atreya, Atreyabha~yam, Atreyatan-
tram 4 Padiirthadharmasarpgrahal;t (Pra-
Aviddhakan;ia 8, 1 ~6 sastapiidabhii~yam) 4, 111, 134 ff
Paesi (Payasi) 216 ff.
Bhartrhari IO 1 Pak~iiasviimi (Vatsyiiyana) 8
Bhasa~vajna (Bhiivasarvajiia) 9 Parpcatthiyasarpgaho (Pancastikayal;t)
Bhavivikta ll 184 ff.
Bhrgu, dialogue between Bhrgu and Paiicasikhi 3
Bharadvaja q Piirthasarathi MiSra 1 1
Brhaspati 221, the aphorisms of B. Pavayai:iasaro (Pravacanasiiral;t) 183
221ff. Prabhiikara 10, 99, 108 ff, 126 ff,
Brhati (Nibandhanam) 10 128, 132 ff.
Prakara9apaiicika 1 1
Candramati (Maticandra) 4, 109 ff Prafastapiida (Prafastadeva, Pra8a-
133 ff. stakiira ) 4 ff, 1 11, 134 ff
Carvaka 2~1 Prafastapiidabhii~yam, see Padiirtha-
dharmasarpgrahal;t
Da5apadarthasastram 4, 13.f Puriii:ia Kasyapa 219
Digambara 182
Riivana, Riiva1~abhii~yam 4
Jaimini 9
Jayanta Bhatta 9 Sabarasvami 9 ff.
Salikaniitha 11.
Kakuda Katyayana 12, 220 Samayasiiro 183
Ka9ada 4 Sankarasvami 8
Kasika 11 Slokaviirttikam 1 o ff
Ke5i 217 ff. Sridhara 5
Kira9avali ;, Sucarita Misra 11
Kumarila 10ff, 21, 68, 84, 99, mil Svetambara 11J:z
Kundakunda 11J3 ff
Tiitparyatika see Nyiiyavarttikata-
Laghvi (Vivara1;iam)- 10 tparya\ ikii
Lokiiyata '..!21 ff. Tattviirthiidhigamasutrai:ii 18:1
Trilocana 8
l\1andana Misra 10, Clll
Maticandra see Candramati Udayana "" !J
Mimaq1sabhii~yam !l Uddyotakara 9
Mimiirpsa-Stitras !J Uluka :J
Umasvati (Umasvami) 18:1
Nyayabhft~yam ll U1pveka 11
Nyi:"1yabhu~a1_iam !J U8anas 2!.!1
Nyayakandali :,
Nyayamaiijari 9 V11caspati Miilra !' ff.
Nyayaratnakaral;t 11 Vaisc.~ika-s.-1 t ras .J, 1:;3 ff, qr>, :.121
Ny1iyasftral_1 9 Vf1tsy;"1yana, see Pak~ilasviimi
Nyiiya-s.itras H Vrttikiiral 1 IO
Nyayavf1rttikam !I Vyomasi~a 4
Nyiiyaviirtti ka-lii tparya-paris11cldhil.i ~J Vyomavatl 4
II. SUBJECT INDEX
Accumulation Theory 16, 25, 85 Commonness (siimiitryam) 101, 108,

Action (karma) 61 ff., 222 cf. also 175-176.
Invisible (ada;am) Perception of Commonness 129.
Activity (upqyogaf!) 186, 209 Comrnonness-particularity ( Siimiif!Ya-
Aggregate (in the Vaise~ika, cf. also viseia{1) 1 o.1-
the whole) 54 ff, 85, 86, ll5-1I9; Conditions of the soul (bhiiviib) 186,
(in the Jaina Skandhii~) 187 ff. 2I0-2ll
Air (ViiyuQ,) 145 ff.; nonperceptibility Conditions of things (pa~yii.yiib- also
of air 16, 126 ff., 14:; ff. j1ari(1iimiib) 81, 189, 199
Atma (world-soul) 3, l l, 41 ff. Con<luct, fivefold (caritram) 206
Atom-doctrine 53-~1 7, 115 ff, 187-188, Connection (Samyoga{I) 88, rn5, 160;
212; atoms (a(lavaf1, j1aramiii;uwaQ,) connection according to Jaina
:J:i, lj!-J, 187; double atoms(dvya- (bandha(1) 188
~1ukiini) 1I5, 159. Considerations twelve (anuprekfii{I)
Aversion (dve1aVi 42, 96, 167 206.
Corporeal winds (pra11ab) 2G-27
Basic Truths (tattvani), seven 2oa. Cm:u;ii 183.
Bhasa 183
Body of man 2·l· +8; body that accom- Darkness (tomaf! or andhakiira{I) 19,
p,anies beyond (iitiviihikam), the 188.
transmigratory body 67, 175; Deliverance ( Alokfa[•) '.W 1, 207;
five bodies according to the Jaina Deliverance-doctrine of the Jaina
194 201, '.207-210; of the Ny5.ya 47,
Bondage of Karma (bandhab) 202, 52; of the Vaise~ika 140, 170.
203, 20!j Desire (icchii) 42, q6, i G7.
Brightness (see Light) Discipline, three kinds e1f (gupti{z) 206,
Buddhism 7, q., 16, IC), 28, 32, 35, Disposition or pr~paredness (.1mi1-
:39, .42, 73, BB, 1·i6, 181, 214; skiira{1) <JB, 168.
Logical schools 83, 131, 132 Distance, distantness (paratvam) 92,
139, 164.
Cancellation of Karma (nizjara) Duties, ten (dharmiib-) 206
202, 20{)
Categories (/lluliirt!iiili) 141 Ear (frotram) 31, 36.
Categorics-doctrin_e-of the Jaina Earth (prtlwi) 14:1.
189-1')<>, 212; of the Vaise~ika, its Eflort (Jmp•al1111{1) 68, ()6, 167.
origin 79; its formulation 1111; Elasticity (sthitistltiij1ak11{1) !)8,. 169.
its final form 1:n Elements 14, 17, '..!'..!, H4.
Causality-doctrine of the Vaisqika Ether (iikiiia{<) 1:,, :JI. ::l'i· fLl. 147.
5!1· 119-122, q~. q3; arambha- Existence (.rntl<i or hhava{I) 103, 176,
viidah '.>'J; a.rntkii1ym1iidah l 1 q. 1Bq.
Causes-material or positive (kiira- Extension (J1arima1iam) 87, 102, 115,
iwm) 59, 119; occasioning (nimi- I :>9·
ttam) 59, l l!Ji inhering (.1ama-
1•iiyikiirat)am) 120; noniohering Firr. (tf:ia{z) 11~5.
(11s11ma1•ii_yikiiraizam) 120 Fluidity (dravatvam) 14, 57, ll4, !J6,
Causes of action, four (11rafY(lYiil1) ion.
'209 Forcr or capacity (.foktifi) IO:J.
Change or trans format ion (jl(lri(1iimr1{1) Form or shap<' (<ikrti(I) 1m1,
<loctrine of change (J111rit1iim11-viidab) Form (r1ij1a111) 19, ll5, 1:j6.
~,~1 cf. 11B, 1BB
Colour or form (var11a(t rrij1mn) !36. (;.,nus (i<ili?t) 104,
1:1(i, 1HB God-i<ll'a qo.
Colours of Souls (ldyii/1) 1103 Grammarians 36, 68, 101,
262 SUBJECT INDEX
Grossness or largeness (sthaulyam) 19, Nearness (aparatvam) 92, i39, 163-

188. 164.
Guilt, demerit (adharma[i) 62, 98, 169. Nijjutti i83.
Non-existence (abhiiva(z) I 10.
Heat (of the Sun) radiation of warmth Number (.wl]lk~ya) 93, 109, 116.
(iitapab) 20, 133. 136, 138, 157.
Heaviness (~urutvam) 57, 97, 167. Nutrional juice or sap (rasab) 2G,
Hindrance (adharma{i) 62, 184, 212. 156.
Nyiiya 5, 12, 180; the Naturf"-philo-
Ignorance (aj1ianam) 209. sophy of N. 47-53.
Impressions, psychical (samskariib),
bhiivanii{t) 44, 98, 168. Organ, psychical (mana~) 43, 43,
Impulse, movement (dharmab) 62, 46, .'j'!, 66, 83, 1,:,1, 174, 196.
184, 212. Origination, new composition or
Inherence (Smnavii)'a(i) 105, io8, synthesis (iiramhhariida(1), the doc-
177, nonperceptability of I. 128, trine of 0. (iiramhhatiirla {1) 59 ,
178. cf. 118.
lnstreaming of Karma-matter (iilTa-
vab) 202, 203. Passions (ka$ii)'ii.!1) 20'.{.
Invisible, the ,adr$fam) 62, 98, 169, Peculiarity or particularity (vise,rn(z)
175. 10~. 101!, 176; ultimate peculia-
rities (a11!rii!1 z:i{t$ii{•) 103, 176.
Jinism 3, 13, 16, 19, 67, 73, 81, 84, .Penance (tajJ11(1) ~w6.
88, 108. Pleasure (.111kha111) 42, 96, 166.
Juices or saps, the doctrine of the Points of space (fnnrldiil;) 212.
three saps 27, 166, 222. Points of vi<"w, four 200.
Pr<"paredness, see Disposition.
Karma, according to the Jaina i86,
203-205, 20~~- Quality, category of, (guna{!) 8<', H4-
Knowledge (jfliinam), five sorts of, ~9, 152-171, 183; characteristic
197. qualities (1'a;;,,,ikagu11ii{l) n:,. 87,
Knowledge, instrumrnt of (buddhift) qfi, i42, 1y:i; Common qualiti<"s
4'~• :;1, <JG. 1G-,; observing know- (<ii111a 1o·ai1111iib) B:;. 117, r.p. 1 _·,:i;
lcagc (aj1.-kfii-lmddi(1) !H· 1:n, changeable quality thro11gh heat
i:,7, 160, 1G4. means of right (J1iikr~ja(1) ;-,fi, 1:iG; Causality of
knowledge (prm11iiuiini) 199, 225. quantities I !'i'.{-1 c,f); J>erception of
qualifies 12;~, I'-'/, 1:1 :~.
Life (jfrnuam) 47, lU. Q11;ilities of the Elements 11·21, 5ri,
Life-forces (Jniina(i) l!J,~· :\.1, 1llB; old series 14, 17, 24, B.1;
Lighl (ii/oka{! or· 11ddyota(1) 20, 11l!l. later sr·rics 14, 17, 2.~·
Linguistic Philosophy IOI. Q.uarters (rliiab) 73.
Living objects or crratures 23, 193.
Relativity, doctrine of ( '.J'tid1iida{1)
Man, the <foctrine of, 2.4-4 7. 108, 189, 200.
l\~ass<'~ <~I' existence (astik<(Yii(1) 184.
~ iatrnaltsrn J ~, 2 15. Sfupkhya 15, :.!13, .41, j~>, 61, 66, 70,
Maller (jnlff~ai<ib) 18.;, 187-108. 7'J. 10!!, 111l, 1Bo, 2rn.
l\ 1"chanics :;7-~,ll. Sdinlastics, nature of Indian 112;
l\ l<"ditation (d/1yii1111m) 206. Its deterioration in Prafastapiida
l\l<'l'it (dlwr11111/!) C?o6, 1:11 .
.l\krit (dlwm1a{1) G2, 98, 16~1. Sense-organs (indririi11i) 27-311, t•J,
l\1ima1psa B, 17, 21, :17, 114, 126, 1q6.
1:):.?, '.,lPO. Sens;·-pcrcrption ::11-38, 49, 111:1-1·;:.?,
Moistness. humidity, stickiness (me- 111(i,
lw{!) q, B~. 96, dill. Scparaten!'ss (jlrthakll'tlrn) 10!1, 13:,.
]\[oral cm1u11a11ds or vows five (vra· rf )11.
liit1i I ct oz. Separation (1•ihl1<i,~11{i) !)ll, 1fi'..1-11i:;;
l\low1n'i:nt (karma) ;,7, 111, 'l!I· 1q, S<"paration arconling to Jaina
171-17;,; causality of movement (hltc<lal.1) 11\ll.
17ct; Perception of movement 128. Sharlow (chii)•ti) 20, 1118.
INDEX OF INDIAN TERMS 263
Shape or form (samsthanam) 86, 102, 168.

188.
Similaritv ( 1iidrf)>am) mg. Taste (rasa.~) 19, 8:-,, 156, 188.
Sleep 46·, 166. Time (kiila{l) 75-78, 84, 147, 149,
Smell (~andhrz~) 19, 85, 156, 188. 185.
Sorrow, pain (dubkham) 42, 96, 167. Touch or contact (sf>ariab) 19, 85, ·
Soul (jiz•al; or iitmii) 'j, !I-12, 24, 1:;6, 187
38-47, .48, 64-71, 84, l:)CI, 184-187,
198, 202, 213; proofa for the
existence of the soul 40, 49, 150;
Its size 38, 39, 65, 187; perception Vai,Se~ika
1, 12; the nature-philosophy
of the soul 13 l ; denial of the soul of the V. 14.; I ts further formu-
215, 217, 222; the qualities of lation 53; the categories-doctrine
the soul 'lfl• 68-6:),'J.1, 209; momen- of the V. 79; the world-picture
tariness of the soul (Kfar1ikatvam) of the V. 59, II8; Its realism 81;
70; the activity of the soul 42, the importance of the V. 179.
.n, 6j'. Vedanta 1:12 •
Sound (.~ahdab) I!), 19-20; 31, 3_5,
86, II'), 170, 18R, 211. Wardin~ olfofnew Karma (samvarab)
Space (iikasa{z) 16, 72, 18.1:, 211. 202, 206.
Space (rlik) 72-74, 84, 14;, 1 -,o. Wariness, fivefold (samiti{l) 206.
Speech 36. Water (iitia{z) 'H·
Stains, three (iisraciib) 208. Ways of consideration (llf!J'iih) IC)!J•
Stickin<'ss, see m0istness. 201, '208.
Substance (dra,:i•am) 3.>, H:1, q1-1:;2, Whole (a1•11y1wi) 1 1 7.
1Bc), JC)g; causality of substance World-ages and' world p<"riods 192.
1 ~3; perception of substance World-constructiou 22, I')"·
123-1 26 \Vorld-cr<'ation '..! 1, 14 7.
Subtleness, fineness or smallness World-history 1!)2.
(Saukpf!.Yt1'11) 19, 188. World-so11l; see Atma.
S11iT<"ring or r.ndudng of miseries
(/•arifiiha{l) ·206.
Swing, impetus (vti;a{l) 57, 98, 114,
III. INDEX OF INDIAN TERMS

ajliiinam ignorance
m;avab atoms
adrstam invisible
11dit~nna{1 hindrance and guilt
111wjntk,fii{l considerations
andhakiirab darkness
aj>arat1,ari nearness
aj>ek,fiihurldhi{l observing knowledge
abhiivab nonexistrncc
a11ayal i
1
a whok
11 ,·,imaviiyikarar.zatn non-inhcriog ca11se
1nt;kiiyah mass of existence
tik1IJ1ib . ether and spacr' ·
iikrtib shap<". form
iitaj){l(I radial ion of heat
atma soul
iiramhhah composition, origination
iir. zmh!w ;.Iida b composition. the cloctrin<' of the com-
position or origination.
iiloka/;I lif{ht .
a1rava{l in~trcaming of karma-matter.
264 INDEX OF INDIAN TERMS
ii>ravii/;t stains or taints.

icrhii desire
indriyii1Ji sense-organs
udrlyotal;i light
upayogaf;t activity
karma movement and action
ka~iiyii{t passions
kiiratiam material cause
kiila/;t time
uandhah smell
~uralz · quality
guj>tift discipline
!!Urulvam heaviness
ciiritram conduct
chiiyli shadow
jiiti/;t genus
jivanam life
jiva/;t soul
jnlinam knowledge
tattvllni basic truths
tapa/;t penance
tama/;t darkness
teja/;t lire
rlik space
di5a(1 quarters
du/;tkham sorrow
drauatvllm liquidness
dravyam substance
dve,al;t aversion
dharma/;t motion and merit
dharrnii/;t duties
dhyiinam meditation
na_)•ii(z ways of consideration
nimittam occasioning cause
nirjarii cancellation of karma
j>adlirthli/;t categories
paraturmz distance
paramiitzm·a!;i at01ns
pari11iinwb chang<: and condition
f>arii1iima11iida• doctrine of change
j/(/rimiitiam extension
jwri$iiha/;t suffering miseries
jw 1.1·iiya /;t condition
j1111!~alii{1 matter
Jnthaktva scparat!"ness
jnatyayii(1 causes of actions
I muIf.Iiilz points of spacr. ·
jnamii11am mrans of right knowledge
jJTayatna/;t effort
jJTii(liih corporeal winds anci lifi'forccs
hamllw/;t co111wction and bondage of karma
bwldhi{1 knowk<lgc
hllii11a11il. psychic impressions
bhiil'llh existence
bhiiuii[1 conditions of the soul
hlur/11/1 :-wparatioll
111111111{1 psychical organ
mokfaf1 deliverance
1a.1ali taste and sap of nutrition
1fij•~m form and colour
ERRATA 265
le5yii(1 colours of the souls

11ari1a{l colour
vii_yufl air
vibhiigal,t separation
vis'esah particularity or peculiarity
veg~fl · swing or impulse
ziratiini moral commands.
iakti!1 force
.fobda{l sound
.frotram ear
sarpyo:;a!,t connection
SQ'Jll'(ITQ(I defence against or war<ling off of new
karma.
sarpskiira!z disposition
sm{lskiiriilz psychical impressions
sam.1thiinam form
sa;,ikhyii number
sattii existence
samaviiyaft inherence
samaviiy i kiiran am inhering cause
samitih wariness
siidrJy~m similarity
samiinyam commonness
simtinya-DiJe$a/J, commonness-particularity
Sllkham pleasure
sauksmvam tineness, subtleness
ska11dhii[1 aggregate
stlzitisthiipaka{l elasticity
sthaulyarp grossness
snehal) humidity or stickiness
sparsa{l touch
syiidvada{l doctrine of relativity.
ERRATA
p. :.I -fourth line from bottom : read' Paiicaiikhi' for 'Paiicalikha'

p. 197-fourth line from bottom : read 'sort/ for 'sou/,'

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ERICH FRAUWALLNER

t History of Indian Philosophy

THE l\ATURE-PHILOSOPHlCAL SCHOOLS

Translated from original German ittto English

By arrangement with Otto Muller Verlag Salzburg

of perception in the light of the doctrine of catego-.

The present second volume of my History of Indian Philo-

' available for the consideration of the natural philosophy of the

dependent on it. They would be as little understo;d without the

Nlon, I would like to remark byway of principle that my treatise

In the history of Indian Philosophy, as we have seen in

in the early post-Christian centuries, Vaise~ika was one of the

A.I>.).' The second is that of the famous Nyaya teacher Udayana

another the plethora of directions in the old Vedic text and to

describe the origin and the development of the Vaise~ika up

v.-1caspatimisra a bulky commentary on the N;·aya-viirttikam of

cal. But Sabarasvami, where he comes to speak of the Theory

only mention here a few. The oldest exponent of Kumarila is

the souls is in no way connected the necessity of ethical inferences

( dhiitavab) which we find mentioned in oldest Buddhism 24 , clearly

thr Vaise~ika system externally, without any inner connection

as in the dialogue between Bhrgu and B~aradvaja (See Vol. I).

wl\y: 27 Form, Taste, Smell and Touch could, without further

duced to decline the acceptance of the fifth element as the bearer

built out of it. Thereby, this development took a course in a way

. 1C1u11 pie, in the philosophy of the Epic in the dialogue between

and rubbing (gharfafJ), each according to the constitution of

• 11pl1Li11ed. A non-existence cannot naturally be the bearer of a

much in the background.

the old series of the qualities of the elements, a second row

lopment. And no doubt it is already a completely definite and

which it perceives. It was also the doctrine of the Vai{;qika.

To the doctrine of seeing and of sense-perception in gene-

q11ality of the Element. 62 Still in future, markedness (to become

the spatial limits of the ear-perceptions. From the side of the

general, inaudible sound is temporarily brought into manifestation

difficulties. If the permanent sound (.fabda fl) is a quality of

and ideas. In place of the shadowy nature of the soul, it was

about somebody who handles it. Now this idea is executed

which had their origin in the teachings of the Upani~ads. But

which the psychical organism claimed to win in the Sa:rpkhya

Regarding this arrangement of groups it should be marked

mption of such an organ. As soon as a doctrine was formulated

ection at a particular time, can depend on several causes-, that

Upani~ads, sleep and dream were explained76 by the fact that

wholeness could be extended to all the places of the body; so

contradicted by the fact which is hinted, namely, that the per-

remains and cited reasons stand the test of rightness, the

the working of the soul, there must follow a plurality of psychi-

atom. If the division of parts would continue endlessly, it would

of these parts, when an organization according to space-parts

mantf,alab). By shape or form they are all alike. They possess

This view is so consistently maintained that there can be no

themselves under such a view-point to the representatives of

that. time further created a Theory of Causality which is, no

viewed on a larger scale but a picture of an entirely different sort.

nature-philosophy. The idea was as follows :

before all, one such interesting attempt to resolve this· difficulty

have lost their connection or relevance to the good and base