A History of Indian Philosophy - 2 - Dasgupta PDF

A HISTORY
OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
BY
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D.
PRINCIPAL, SANSKRIT COLLEGE, CALCUTTA
VOLUME II
CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY
TilE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
London Office: Bentley House, N.W. I
American Branch: New York
.-\gents for Canada, India, and Pakistan: Macmillan
First printed 1932

Reprinted 1952
First printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge

Reprinted by offset-litho by Percy Lund Humphries fS Co. Ltd
PREFACE
INE years have passed away since the first volume of this work
N was published, and the present volume has been in the press for
more than two years. During the last seven years bad health has been
responsible for many interruptions. In the first volume manu-
scripts were sparingly used, but in the present work numerous
unpublished and almost unknown manuscripts have been referred
to. Thesecouldnotbecollected easily, and it took time to read them;
many of them were old and moth-eaten and it was not often easy to
decipher the handwriting. It has not always been possible, how-
ever, to give an elaborate account of the content of all these manu-
scripts, for in many cases they contained no new matter and had
therefore only been mentioned by name, a fact which could be ascer-
tained only after long and patient study, since records of them
were previously unknown. A considerable delay was also caused
in the writing of this volume by the fact that large portions of
what will appear in the third volume had to be compiled before
the manuscripts had left the author's hands. In any event, the
author offers his sincere apologies for the delay.
The manuscript of the third volume has made good progress
and, barring illness and other accidents, will soon be sent to
press. This volume will contain a fairly elaborate account of the
principal dualistic and pluralistic systems, such as the philosophy
of the Paiica-riitra, Bhaskara, Yamuna, Ramanuja and his followers,
l\1adhva and his followers, the Bhiigavata-purli1Ja and the Gaudiya
school of Vai~I).avism. The fourth and the fifth volumes will
deal with the philosophy of Vallabha and some other lesser known
schools of Vai~Q.avism, the philosophy of the Pural).as, Tantras, the
different schools of Saivas, Saktas, Indian Aesthetics, the philo-
sophy of right and law and the religious systems that have found
their expression in some of the leading vernaculars of India.
A new impression of the first volume is now in the press. The
present volume contains four chapters on Sankara Vedanta, the
1\Iedi~al Speculations of the Ancient Hindus, and the Philosophy
of the Yoga-viisi~tha and the Bhagavad-gitii. A good deal of the
Sankara Vedanta, especially in regard to its controversy with
vi Preface
Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Madhva and their followers, still remains to
be treated in the third volume.
A word of explanation may be needed with regard to the inclusion
in a work on Indian philosophy of the speculations of the Indian
medical schools. Biology has recently played a great part in liberating
philosophy from its old-world ideas. In ancient India, Biology had
not grown into a separate science; whatever biological ideas were
current in India were mixed up with medical, osteological and
physiological speculations, the only branches of study in ancient
India which may be regarded as constituting an experimental
science. It was therefore thought that a comprehensive work on
the history of Indian philosophy would be sadly defective without
a chapter on these speculations, which introduce also some dis-
tinctly new ethical and eschatological concepts and a view of life
which is wholly original. The biological notions of growth, de-
velopment and heredity of these schools are no less interesting, and
their relations to the logical categories ofNyaya are very instructive.
No attempt has been made to draw any comparisons or contrasts
with Western philosophy, since in a work of this type it would
most likely have been misleading and would have obscured the
real philosophical issues. The study here presented is strictly
faithful to the original Sanskrit texts within the limits of the
present writer's capacities. Often the ground covered has been
wholly new and the materials have been obtained by a direct and
first-hand study of all available texts and manuscripts. Nevertheless
some sources, containing, possibly, valuable materials, inevitably
remain unconsulted, for many new manuscripts will be discovered
in future, and our knowledge of Indian philosophy must advance
but slowly. In spite of the greatest care, errors of interpretation,
exposition and expression may have crept in and for these the
author craves the indulgence of sympathetic readers.
Since the publication of the first volume of the present work,
many treatises on Indian philosophy have appeared in India and
elsewhere. But it has not been possible to refer to many of these.
The present attempt is mainly intended to give an exposition of
Indian thought strictly on the basis of the original texts and
commentaries, and not to eradicate false views by indulging in
controversy; and, since the author takes upon himself the responsi-
bility of all the interpretations of the texts that he has used, and since
Preface Vll
he has drawn his materials mostly from them, it has seldom been
possible to refer to the efforts of his fellow-workers in the field.
Occasionally, however, he has had to discuss and sometimes to bor-
row the views of other writers in the assessment of chronological
facts, and he also expresses his indebtedness to such other writers
who have worked upon some of the special problems of Indian
thought. It has been suggested to him that it would have been better
if the views of other writers had been fully criticized, but however
that may be, such criticism has been considered as beyond the
scope of this work, which, as at present planned, will cover some
JOOO pages when completed.
The chronological views regarding the antiquity of the Gita may
appear heretical, but it is hoped that they may be deemed ex-
cusable, for this is an age of toleration, and they are not more
heretical than the views of many distinguished writers on Indian
chronology. In the chapter on the Gita, some repetition of the
same views in different contexts was inevitable on account of the
looseness of the structure of the Gita, which is an ethico-religious
treatise and not a system of philosophy. This, however, has been
studiously avoided in the other chapters. Neither the Yoga-viisiftha
nor the Gitii are systematic works on philosophy, and yet no
treatment of Indian philosophy can legitimately ignore their
claims. For in a country where philosophy and religion have
been inseparably associated, the value of such writings as breathe
the spirit of philosophy cannot be over-estimated, and no history
of Indian philosophy worth the name can do without them.
I have no words sufficient to express my gratitude to my
esteemed friend, Dr F. W. Thomas, Boden Professor of Sanskrit,
Oxford, who went through the proofs in two of their stages
and thus co-operated with me in the trouble of correcting
them. I fear that in spite of our joint efforts many errors have
escaped our eyes, but had it not been for his kind help the
imperfections of the book would have been greater. I must similarly
thank my friend, Mr Douglas Ainstie, for help with the proofs.
l\tly thanks are also due to my pupils, Dr M. Eleade (Bucharest),
Mr Janakiballabh Bhattacharyya, 1\I.A., and my other friends,
Messrs Satkari 1\tlookerjee, NI.A., Durgacharan Chatterjee, JVI.A.,
Srish Chandra Das Gupta, lVI.A., and my daughter, Miss Maitreyi
Devi, for the assistance they rendered me in getting the manuscript
Vlll Preface
ready for the press, inserting diacritical marks, comparing the
references and the like, and also in arranging the index cards. But
as none of them had the whole charge of any of these tasks, and
as their help was only of an occasional nature, the responsibility
for imperfections belongs to the author and not to them.
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA
Calcutta, 1931
CONTENTS
CHAPTER XI
THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA (continued)
PAGE
I The World-Appearance I
2 Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta IJ
3 Sailkara's Defence of Vedanta; Philosophy of Badarayat;ta and
Bhartrprapaiica 36
4 Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta 46
s Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist Doctrine of Soullessness 58
6 Vedantic Cosmology 73
7 Sailkara and his School 77
8 Mat;t<;lana, Suresvara and VisvarUpa 82
9 Mal).<;lana (A.D. 8oo) . 87
IO Suresvara (A.D. 8oo) 98
II Padmapada (A.D. 82o) I02
I2 Vacaspati Misra (A.D. 84o) Io6
I3 Sarvajiiatma Muni (A.D. 900) III
I4 Anandabodha Yati (eleventh or twelfth century A.D.) u6
IS jV/ahii-vidyii and the Development of Logical Formalism • u8
I6 Vedanta Dialectic of Srihar~a (A.D. I ISO) . I2S
I7 Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts I33
I8 Citsukha's Interpretations of the Concepts of Sailkara Vedanta (A.D.
I220) I47
I9 The Dialectic of Nagarjuna and the Vedanta Dialectic I63
20 Dialectical Criticisms of Santarak~ita and Kamalasila (A.D. 76o) as
forerunners of Vedanta Dialectics I7I
(a) Criticisms of Sarpkhya Pari1)iima Doctrine I7 I
(b) Criticism of Isvara I76
(c) Refutation of the Soul Theory I78
(d) Refutation of the Mimarpsa Theory of the Self I79
(e) Refutation of the Sarpkhya View of the Self I8I
(f) Refutation of the Upani~ad View of the Self I8I
(g) Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities . I 82
(h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities I8S
(i) Refutation of the Nyaya Vaise~ika Categories I87
2I Dialectic of Sailkara and Anandajiiana I89
22 Philosophy of the Prakatiirtha-vivara1)a (A.D. I200) I96
23 Vimuktatman (A.D. I2oo) • I98
24 Ramadvaya (A.D. I3oo) 204
2S Vidyarat;tya (A.D. I3SO) 2I4
26 Nrsirphasrama Muni (A.D. ISOO) 2I6
27 Appaya Dik~ita (A.D. ISSO) 2I8
28 Prakasananda (A.D. ISSO-I6oo) . 220
29 Madhusiidana Sarasvati (A.D. Isoo) 22S
X Contents
CHAPTER XII
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGA- V ASI$THA

PAGE
I Yoga-viisi1tha 228
2 The Ultimate Entity • 232
3 Origination 235
4 Karma, Manas and the Categories • 237
5 The World-Appearance 240
6 Nature of Agency Kartrtva) and the Illusion of World Creation • 242
7 The Stage of the Saint (Jivan-mukta) • 245
8 Energy of Free-will (Pauru1a) 252
9 Prii1J.a and its Control • 256
IO Stages of Progress 264
I I Methods of Right Conduct 267
I2 Yoga-viisi1tha, Sailkara Vedanta and Buddhist Vijfianavada • 268
CHAPTER XIII
SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS
I Ayur-veda and the Atharva- Veda 273

2 Bones in the Atlzarva- Veda and Ayur-veda • 284
3 Organs in the Atharva- Veda and Ayur-veda 288
4 Practice of Medicine in the Atharva- Veda 293
5 The Foetus and the Subtle Body 302
6 Foetal Development • 3I2
7 Growth and Disease • 3I9
8 Viiyu, Pitta and Kapha 325
9 Head and Heart 340
IO The Circulatory and the Nervous System • 344
1I The Nervous System of the Tantras 352
I2 The Theory of Rosas and their Chemistry 357
I3 The Psychological Views and other Ontological Categories 366
I4 Logical Speculations and Terms relating to Academic Dispute 373
15 Did Logic Originate in the Discussions of Ayur-veda Physicians? 392
I6 Ayur-veda Ethics • 402
I7 Springs of Action in the Caraka-sa'tflhitii 4Il
I 8 Good Life in Caraka . 4I8
I9 Ayur-veda Literature • 423
Contents xi
CHAPTER XIV
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA
PAGE
I The Gftii Literature • 437
2 Gitii and Yoga . • 443
3 Sarpkhya and Yoga in the Gitii- • 455
4 Sarpkhya Philosophy in the Gitii • 461
5 A vyakta and Brahman • 470
6 Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gltii • 479
7 Sense-control in the Gitii . 488
8 The Ethics of the Gitii and the Buddhist Ethics • 493
9 Analysis of Action • SIS
IO Eschatology SI7
II God and Man • • 523
I2 Vi~~u, Vasudeva and Kn~a • 535
I3 Bhagavata and the Bhagavad-gltii • 545
INDEX • 553
CHAPTER XI
THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA (continued)
THE treatment of the school of Sankara Vedanta in the preceding

chapter may be considered fairly sufficient for all ordinary pur-
poses. But the reputation of this school of thought stands so high,
and so many people are interested in it, that it was pointed out to
me that it would be desirable to go into a little more detailed study
of it. An additional justification for such a suggestion is to be
found in the regrettable fact that, though numerous elementary
and half-informed treatises have been published both in this
country and in Europe, I do not know of any systematic study of
the system in any of the modern languages of Europe or Asia
which has been based on a first-hand study of the works of the
great thinkers of this school who followed Sankara and developed
his system in a remarkably recondite manner. The comparatively
small compass of this chapter in a History of Indian Philosophy
cannot be expected to fulfil adequately such a demand; but still it
may be expected that an attempt to bring out some of these
materials by some amount of detailed study will be excusable,
though it may seem slightly to disturb the general plan of this work.
The World-Appearance.
The U pani~ads, called also the Vedanta, contain passages which
indicate very different lines of thought, theistic, pantheistic, of
self as the only ultimate reality, creationism, etc. The works of
those commentators who wrote commentaries on the Upani~ads
before Sankara and tried to interpret them on the supposition that
there was one uniform, systematic, dogmatic philosophy in them
are now practically all lost, and all that we can know of them is
contained in the meagre references that are found in Sankara's
commentario.!s or the works of other, later, commentators. As an
example I may refer to Bhartrprapafica, who tried to give a realistic
interpretation of the Brhad-iira7Jyaka Upan#ad by treating the
world and souls as real emanations from God or Brahman 1 •
1
Fragments of Bhartrprapaiica from the writings of Sankara and his com-
mentator Anandajiiana and from Suresvara's Viirttika have been collected by
Prof. Hiriyanna, Mysore, in a short paper read at the Third Oriental Conference
in Madras in 1924, published in Madras in 1925.
2 The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [cH.
Sankara inherited from his predecessors the opinion that the
Upani!?ads teach us one consistent systematic philosophy, but,
being under the influence of Gau9apada, differed from them
on the nature of this philosophy, which he propounded so elabo-
rately in all his commentaries on the Upani~:;ads and the Brahma-
siitras.
The main thesis of Sankara, as has already been pointed out
in the preceding chapter, consists of the view that Brahman alone
is the ultimate reality, while everything else is false. He was
interested in proving that this philosophy was preached in the
Upani~ads; but in the Upani!?ads there are many passages which
are clearly of a theistic and dualistic purport, and no amount of
linguistic trickery could convincingly show that these could yield
a meaning which would support Sankara's thesis. Sankara there-
fore introduces the distinction of a common-sense view (vyiiva-
hiirika) and a philosophic view (piiramiirthika), and explains the
Upani!?ads on the supposition that, while there are some passages
in them which describe things from a purely philosophic point of
view, there are many others which speak of thing~ only from a
common-sense dualistic view of a real world, real souls and a real
God as creator. Sankara has applied this method of interpretation
not only in his commentary on the Upani~ads, but also in his
commentary on the Brahma-stitra. Judging by the siltras alone,
it does not seem to me that the Brahma-siltra supports the
philosophical doctrine of Sankara, and there are some siltras which
Sankara himself interpreted in a dualistic manner. He was never
afraid of indulging in realistic interpretations; for he could easily get
out of the difficulty by asserting that all the realistic conceptions
found in the sutras or in the U pani~ad passages were merely an
estimate of things from the common-sense point of view. Though
on the basis of Sailkara's own statements, as well as those of his
later commentators and other adherents of his school, there is
hardly any room for doubt regarding the meaning and force of
Sankara's philosophy, yet at least one Indian scholar has sought
to prove that Sankara's philosophy was realistic 1 . That there was
some amount of realism in Sankara is proved by his own con-
fession, when he criticizes the uncompromising Buddhistic idealists
(vzjiiiina-viidins) or the so-called Buddhistic nihilists (silnya-viidins).
1
Advaita Philosophy by K. Vidyaratna, published by the Calcutta Univer-
sity Press, 1924.
XI] Jrhe Tflorld-i1ppearance 3
I have already discussed in a general way in what sense according
to the Vedanta, from the point of view of the Sankara school of
Vedanta as interpreted by his later adherents, the world is an
illusion. But in the present section I propose to discuss Sankara's
own statements, as well as the statements of some of his important
followers, on the subject of the nature of world-illusion. This is
one of the most important points of the Sankara school of
philosophy and needs a discussion in some detail.
But before I take it up, I am naturally reminded of the views
of Buddhist idealism and the so-called Buddhistic nihilism, and it
seems desirable that Sankara's doctrine of illusion should be treated
in connection with the doctrines of illusion in those systems of
Buddhistic thought which preceded Sankara. Taking the Sunya-
viida theory of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti, we see that they also
introduced the distinction between limited truth and absolute
truth. Thus Nagarjuna says in his Madhyamika-sutras that the
Buddhas preach their philosophy on the basis of two kinds of truth,
truth as veiled by ignorance and depending on common-sense pre-
suppositions and judgments (sa1{lvrti-satya) and truth as unqualified
and ultimate (paramiirtha-satya )1. The word sal!lvrti literally means
"closed." Candrakirti explains smpvrti as meaning "closing on
all sides" and says that it is ignorance (ajiiiina) which is denoted
by the term sal!lvrti here, because it covers the truth of all things 2 •
In this sense the whole of the world of our experience of causes
and effects, which we perceive and of which we speak, presents an
appearance which is hidden by ignorance. This world is not con-
tradicted in our world-experience; but, as each and every entity
of this world is produced by other things or entities, and they
again by others, and as we cannot specify the nature of each one
of them without referring to others which produced them or from
which they originated, and tracing those again to other causes and
dve satye samupiisritya buddhiiniirrz dharma-desanii

loka-sa1Jlvrti-satya1Jl ca satya1Jl ca paramiirthatal;..
Miidhyamilw-sutra, XXIV. 8, p. 492, B.B. edition.
2
Ajiiiinm.n hi samantiit sarva-padiirtha-tattviivacchiidaniit S01JW!lir ity ucyate.
Ibid. Candrakirti however gives two other meanings of the word sartzvrti, which
do not seem to be so closely connected with the etymology. In the first of the
two meanings sat_nvrti means interdependent origination or pratUya-samutpiida,
and in the second it means the conventional world of common-sense, which can
be expressed or indicated by speech and language and which we are supposed
to know and refer to in all our experiences involving the knower and the known-
sa1Jlvrtil;. sa1Jlketo lolw-vyavahiiral;., sa ca abhidhiiniiblzidheya-jiiiina-jiieyiidilak-
~a1Ja/:z.
4 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
so on, it is not possible to assert anything as to the nature or
characteristic (svabhiiva) of anything as it is. Things are known to
us only as being the result of the combination of many entities or as
product complexes. Nothing is produced of itself, and so the pro-
ducts are never by themselves self-existent, but exist only through
the coming together of different entities. That which has any namre
of its own cannot owe its origination to other complexes, and so there
is nothing in our world-experience which has a nature of its own.
The apparent reality of the world has therefore the mysterious veil
of ignorance over it, and it is this veil of ignorance which is referred
to by the term loka-sa1J1vrta. This is spoken of also as tathya-Sa1J1vrti
(real ignorance), as distinguished from mithyii-sa1J1vrti (false ignor-
ance), properly used of the ordinary illusions and hallucinations
of magic, mirage reflections, etc. 1 Those appearances which are
due to sense-defects or other causes and are therefore contradicted
in experience are called mithya-Sa1J1vrta, because their falsehood is
discovered in experience. The falsehood of the world-appearances,
however, can be realized only when their real nature (paramiirtha-
rupa) as a succession of essenceless products of causal complexes
is properly understood. The world holds good and remains un-
contradicted and has all the appearance of reality in all our practical
experiences, and it is only when it is understood that these pheno-
mena have no nature of their own that they are considered false.
All teachings in philosophy take for granted the world-appearances,
subjective and objective, and try to give a rational analysis and
estimate of them; and it is only through an experience of these
world-phenomena and a rational understanding of them that one
realizes their truth as being a mere flow of causes and effects devoid
of essence. The appearance of the world as reality is therefore true
only in a limited manner during the period when the veil of ignor-
ance is not removed from our eyes; and this is signified by
designating the truth (satya) of the world as only loka-sa1J1'D!la.
This world-appearance is however relatively true when compared
with the ordinary illusions of perception (when, e.g., a piece of
rope is perceived as a snake, or when one sees a mirage in a desert).
But a question arises-if the world-appearance has no essence
of its own, how is it that it appears to have one, or how is it
that the world-phenomena appear at all? To such a question
Nagarjuna's answer is that the appearance of the world is like the
1
Bodhi-caryiivatiira-pafijikii, p. 353, Biblotheca Indica Series, 1902.
XI) Jrhe H!orld-~ppearance 5
appearance of mirages or dreams, which have no reality of their
own, but still present an objective appearance of reality 1 . The
world is not a mere nothing, like a lotus of the sky or the hare's
horn, which are simply non-existent (avidyamiina). Thus there is
not only the ultimate truth (paramiirtha); there is also the relative
truth of the phenomenal world (loka-smpvrti-satya); there are,
further, the sense-illusions, hallucinations and the like which are.
contradicted in ordinary experience (aloka-sa'!lvrta or mithyii-
sa'!lvrta), and also that which is merely non-existent, like the hare's
horn. The error (viparyiisa) of world-appearance is considered as
being of four kinds, viz. the consideration of the momentary as
eternal, the consideration of the painful as being pleasurable, the
consideration of the unholy as holy, and of that which has no soul
as having a soul 2 • And this error is due to ignorance (avidyii).
Candrakirti quotes a passage from the Arya-drt}hiisaya-pariprcchii,
in which it is said that, just as a man may see in a dream that he
is spending the night with the wife of the king, and, suddenly
realizing that he is discovered, tries to fly for fear of his life
(thus perceiving the presence of a woman, where there is none), so
we are always falling into the error of asserting that we have per-
ceived the manifold world-appearance where there is none 3 •
Such analogies of error naturally suggest the supposition that
there must be some reality which is mistaken as some other thing;
but, as has already been explained, the Buddhists emphasized the
fact that, in dreams, the illusory appearances were no doubt objec-
tively known as objective presentations of which we had previously
become aware--experiences through which we pass, though there
is no reality on which these appearances rest or are imposed. It
was here that Sankara differed. Thus, in his introduction to the
commentary on the Brahma-sutra he says that the essence of all
illusory perception is that one thing is mistaken for another, that
the qualities, characteristics or attributes of one thing are taken
for the qualities, characteristics or attributes of another. Illusion
IS defined as the false appearance in some object of something
1
.lvliidhyamika-sutra, xxm. 8.
2
Iha catviiro viparyiisii ucyante: tadyathii pratik~atJa-vinliiini skandha-
paiicake yo nityam iti griihal; sa viparyiisal; . .. dul.zkhiitmake skandha-paiicake yab
sukham iti f.,iparzto griihal; so 'paro viparyiisal.z, ... iariram aiuci-svabhii'l.:attz tatra
yo iucitvena griihal; sa viparyiisal;, ... paiica-skandhattz niriitmakattz tasmin ya
iitma-griihab aniitmani iitmiibhzniveial; sa viparyiisal;. Candrakirti's commentary
on ibid. XXIII. 13. Compare it with the Yoga-sutra, II. 5, Anandasrama Series.
3
Candrakirti's commentary on the Miidhyamika-sutra, XXIII. 13.
6 The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
experienced before, resembling a memory image. It is explained by
some as being the false affirmation of the characteristics of one thing
in regard to another; others explain it as an error due to the non-
apprehension of the difference between that which is wrongly
apprehended and the misapprehended object which the former is
wrongly supposed to be; others think that, when one thing is
misapprehended as another, the illusion consists in the fancying of
the former entity as being endowed with strange characteristics
(viparita-dharmatva); but in all these different ways of analysis
illusion fundamentally is nothing but the false appearance of
one thing with the characteristics of another. So also it may be
that a conch-shell appears as silver or that one moon appears as
two moons 1 • Sankara then suggests that, since the universal self
(pratyag-iitman) is felt through our feeling of "I" and since it is
immediate in all experience (aparok~a), it is not absolutely un-
related and unindicated (avi~aya) in experience, and consequently
it is quite possible that the non-self (aniitman) and its character-
istics may be illusorily imposed upon the universal self. This
illusory imposition of the non-self and its characteristics on the
universal self is called nescience (avidyii).
In his commentary on Gau9apada's Karikii, 1. 17, Sankara says
that, when a piece of rope falsely appears as a snake, this is merely
false imposition or appearance, not existence. The illusory appear-
ance of the snake did not really bring into existence a snake,
which later on became non-existent when right knowledge super-
vened. It was a mere illusion, and the rope-snake had no existence
at alJ2. Sankara in commenting on Gau9apada's Kiirikii explains
with approval Gau9apada's view that the world of common ex-
perience is as illusory as a dream. Dreams are false; for in a dream
a man may have the experience of going to distant places, and yet,
when he wakes up, he finds that he has been asleep for a few
seconds only, and has not moved a foot from his bed. The dream
experiences are therefore false, because they are contradicted by
the waking experiences. But the waking experiences, being similar
to dream experiences, are equally false. For both sets of ex-
periences involve the duality of subject and object, and are therefore
1
Sankara's Adhyiisa-bhii~ya on the Brahma-<ifitra, Nirl)aya-Sagara Press,
Bombay, 1904.
2
Ra_jjviirrz sarpa iva kalpitatviit na tu sa T-·idyate . .. na hi rajjviirrz bhriinti-
buddhyii kalpita!z sarpo vid_vamiina!z san vivekato niv•rtta!z; tathedarrz prapmi-
ciikhya'!l miiyii-miitram. Gau<;lapada's Kiirikii, 1. 17, Anandasrama Series.
XI) The World-Appearance 7
fundamentally more or less the same: so that, if one of them is
false, the other also is false. The world-experience is like other
well-known instances of illusion-the mirage, for example. Since
it had no existence in the beginning, and will not have any existence
in the end, neither can it have existence in the intervening period
of appearance. The objection that our waking experiences fulfil
practical purposes and have thus associated with them the prag-
matic test of truth, which is absent in the case of dream experiences,
is invalid; for the pragmatic tests of the waking experiences may
well be contradicted by dream experiences ; a man who goes
to sleep after a sumptuous feast may well dream that he has been
starving for days together. Both our inner world of mind and its
experiences and the outer objective world are thus false creations 1 •
But GauQapada and Sankara differ from the Siinyavadin Buddhists
in this-that they think that even false creations must have some
basis in truth. If a rope appears as a snake, the false creation of
the snake has some basis in the truth of the rope: there could
not be false creations and false appearances without any firm basis
of truth (iispada) underlying them 2 • Nagarjuna, it will be re-
membered, tried to prove the falsity of all appearances on the
ground of their being interdependent and not having anything
which could be pointed out as their own nature. The dialectic
being applicable to all appearances, there was nothing left which
was not relative and interdependent, nothing which was self-
evident by nature and which was intelligible by itself without
reference to anything else. It is this interdependence and relativity
of all appearances that was called "nothingness, or sunyatii by
Nagarjuna. There was nothing which could be affirmed of anything
independently by itself without reference to something else; nothing
therefore could be conceived as having any essence by itself.
All appearances were therefore only interdependent phantom crea-
tions; and it was precisely this interdependence that proved the
essencelessness of their natures. There was no basis of truth any-
where. There was nothing which had any essence. But neither
Sankara nor GauQapada appears to have tried to show why the
inner world of thoughts, ideas, emotions, volitions and the outer
world of objects should be considered as being illusory appearances.
1
Sankara's commentary on Gaw;lapih.la's Kiirikii, 11. 1-12.
2
Na hi niriispadii raJju-sarpa-mrgatn7Jikiidaya!z kvacit upalabhya11te. Ibid.
I. 6.
Their main point seems to consist in a dogmatic statement that
all appearances or experiences are false just as dream experi-
ences are false. The imperfect analogy of waking experiences
is made into an argument, and the entire manifold of appearances
is declared to be false. But it is urged at the same time that these
false creations must have some basis of truth; the changing ap-
pearances must have some unchanging basis on which they are
imposed-and this basis is the self (iitman), or Brahman, which is
the only thing that is permanent, unchanging and real. This self
is the being of pure intelligence, which is one identical unit,
negating all differences and duality (visuddha-vijiiapti-miitra-sattii-
dvaya-rupe1Ja )1. Just as the false creation of " snake " appears in the
case of the" rope," so all such judgments as" I am happy,"" I am
unhappy," "I am ignorant," "I am born," "I am old," "I am
with a body," "I perceive," etc., are all merely false predications
associated with the self; they are all false, changing and illusory
predications, and it is only the self which remains permanent
through all such judgments. The self is entirely different from all
such predications; it is self-luminous and self-manifesting, shining
independently by itself.
By applying the dialectic of mutual interdependence, pratitya-
samutpiida, Nagarjuna tried to prove that there was nothing which
could be pointed out as the essence of anything as it is; but he
did not explain how the appearances which were nothing more
than phantom creations came to be what they were. How did
the world-appearance of essenceless interdependent phenomena
show itself? Sankara did not try to prove with a keen logical
dialectic that the world-appearance was false: he simply took it
for granted, since the Upani!?ads proclaimed Brahman as the
ultimate reality. But how did the world-appearance manifest itself?
Sankara does not seem to go deeply into this question and simply
passes it over in asserting that this world-appearance is all due
to ignorance (avidyii); it could not be spoken of as either existing
or non-existing; it was merely illusory, like the conch-shell silver.
But Padmapada, who wrote the commentary known as Paiica-piidikii
on the first four sutras of Sankara's commentary on the Brahma-
sutras, says that the precise meaning of the term "false conception "
(mithyii-jFiiina) in Sankara's introduction to his commentary on the
Brahma-sutras is that there is a force or power or potency (saktz) of
1 Gaudapada's Kiirikii, II. 17.
XI] The World-Appearance 9
nescience which constitutes materiality (jatjiitmikii avidyii-saktil;),
and that it is this potency which transforms itself into the stuff
(upiidiina) of the world-appearance 1 • It is well to remember in
this connection that, according to Sankara's philosophy, it is not
only the objective world that constitutes the world of appearance,
but also the subjective world of all experiences and predicates that
may be associated with the self. Thus, when one says "1," this
ego-hood is analysed as involving two parts-the one, pure in-
telligence or pure consciousness; and the other, the concept of
subjectivity, which is illuminated, expressed or manifested by the
underlying pure intelligence with which it is falsely associated.
The concept of subjectivity stands here as materiality, or objec-
tivity, which is made to float up by the power of pure intelligence,
thus causing the judgment "I am" or "I am a man 2 ." This
avidyii-sakti, or power of avidyii, subsists in the pure self and, on
the one hand, arrests the revelation of its true nature as Brahman,
and, on the other hand, transforms itself into the various
concepts associated with the psychological self of our ordinary
experience 3 • The illusion consists in the association of the psycho-
logical qualities of thinking, feeling, willing, etc. with the trans-
cendent or universal self (pratyak-citi). These psychological deter-
minations are all mutually connected with one another. Thus, to
be able to enjoy pleasures, one must first act; one can only act
when one has attachments, antipathies and desires, and one can
have attachments and desires only when one has experienced joys
and sorrows-so these psychological determinations in a beginning-
less cycle are always naturally associated with the transcendent
self-luminous self4 •
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that, as
Padmapada or Prakasatman explains, ajiiiina or nescience is
some kind of indefinable stuff out of the transformations of which
subjective psychological experiences and the world of objects have
come into being. This ajiiiina is not the ajiiiina of the Buddhists,
i.e. a wrong notion or misconception, and this adhyiisa, or illusion,
1
Paiica-piidikii, p. 4, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1891.
2
asmat-pratyaye yo 'nidam-a1Jlsas cid-eka-rasal;. tasmi7J1S tad-bala-nirbhiisita-
tayii lak~a~zato yu~mad-arthasya manu~yiiblzimiinasya sambhedaiviivabhiisal;. sa
eva adhyiisal;.. Ibid. p. 3·
3
atal;. sii pratyak-citi brahma-svarupiivabhiismJl pratibadhniiti aha7J1kiiriid-
y-atad-rupa-pratibhiisa-nimitta7J1 ca bhavati. Ibid. p. 5.
4
Prakasatman's Paiica-piidikii-vi·varm;a, p. ro, the Vizianagram Sanskrit
Series, 1 892.
is not the v£paryaya of Nagarjuna; for here it is a positive power
or stuff. Thus Prakasatman argues that all effects have at their
back some cause, which forms their stuff or material; the world-
appearance, being also an effect, must have some stuff out of which
it has evolved or was made up; and ajiiiina, lying in the trans-
cendent self as a separate power, is such a material cause 1 • This
av£dya-potency in the transcendent self is positive in its nature.
This positive ajiiiina is directly perceived in such immediate per-
ceptions as "I do not know myself or others," and can also be
inferred or comprehended by implication 2 • The fact that ajfliina
or av£dyii is spoken of as a power inherent in the transcendent self
shows that it is dependent thereon ; avidyii is not, however, a power,
but a substance or entity which has certain powers by which it
transforms itself into the cosmic appearances, subjective and ob-
jective; yet it is called a power, or sakti' because of its dependence
(para-tantratii} on the transcendent self, and it is in consideration
of the entire dependence of avidyii and its transformations on the
self that the self is regarded as the material cause of all effects-
the cosmic appearances of the world and the mind 3 • The self thus
not only holds the ajfiiina within it as a dependent function,
but in spite of its self-luminosity it can be reacted upon by the
ajfliina with its manifold powers in such a way that it can be
veiled by this ajfliina and made the underlying basis of all world-
appearances of ajiiiina-transformations 4 •
Appaya Dik~ita, referring in his Siddhiinta-le$a to the view of
the writer of the Padiirtha-tattva, summarizes the matter thus:
Brahman and Maya form together the material cause ( ubhayam
upiidiinam), and hence it is that in the world-appearance there are
two distinct characteristics, "being" (salta} from Brahman and
materiality (jaljya) from 1\rlaya. Brahman is the cause, as the
unchanging basis of the Iviaya, which is the cause as being the
1
sarva1Jl ca l?aryam sopiidiina1Jl bhiiva-kiiryatviit ghatiidivad ity anumiiniit
... tasman mithyiirtha-taj-jnaniitmaka1Jl mithyii-bhi"itam adhyasam upiidiina-
kiira1}12-siipek~am ... mithyii-jnanam eva adhyiisopiidiinam. Panca-piidikii-vivara1Ja,
pp. I 1-12.
2
Ibid. p. 13.
3
saktir ity iitma-para-tmztratayii iitmana!z sarva-kiiryopiidiinasya nirvor;lh-
rtvam. Ibid. p. 13. Atma-kara7Jatva-nir•vor;lhrt·vad iitma-para-tantratvii ca sakti-
matyam api sakti-sabda upaciirital;. Akhar:H;lananda Muni's Tattva-dipana,
p. 65, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1902.
4
atalz svaprakiise 'pi iitmani vicitra-sakti-bhiiva-riipiividyii-prayuktam iiva-
ra1Ja'f!Z durapah1}avam. Ramananda Sarasvati's Vivara1Jopanyiisa, p. 16, Chow-
khamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.
XI] The fVorld-Appearance II
stuff that actually undergoes transformation 1 . Vacaspati lVIisra

also conceives Brahman, jointly with its avidya, to be the material
cause of the world (av£dya-sahita-brahmopadanam) 2 • In his adora-
tion hymn at the beginning of his Bhamati he describes Brahman
as being in association with its companion, the indefinable a·vidya,
the unchanging cause of the entire objective universe 3 • Sarva-
jfiatma Muni, however, does not wish to give maya the same degree
of co-operation in the production of the world-appearance as
Brahman, and considers the latter to be the real material cause of
the world through the instrumentality of Maya; for Brahman,
being absolutely changeless, cannot by itself be considered as cause,
so that, when Brahman is spoken of as cause, this can only be in a
remote and modified sense (upalak~a1Ja), through the instrumen-
tality of maya 4 • The author of the Siddhanta-muktavali is referred
to by Appaya Dik~ita as holding that it is the maya and maya alone
that forms the stuff of the world-appearance; and that Brahman
is not in any way the material cause of the universe, but that it is
only the basis of the subsistence of maya and is only from that
point of view spoken of as being the material cause 5 •
It is clear that the above differences of view regarding the
nature of the relation between maya and the self or Brahman in
the production of the world-appearance are mere scholastic dis-
putes over words or modes of expression, and have but little
philosophical significance. As has already been said, these ques-
tions do not seem to have arisen in Sankara's mind. He did not
think it worth while to explain anything definitely regarding the
nature of av£dya and its relation with Brahman, and the part that
it played in supplying the material stuff of the universe. The world
was an illusion, and Brahman was the basis of truth on which these
illusions appeared; for even illusions required something on which
they could appear. He never faced squarely the difficulties that
are naturally connected with the theory, and was not therefore
concerned to explain the definite relation of maya to Brahman
in connection with the production of the phantom show of the
universe. The natural objection against such views is that the term
1
Siddhiinta-leia, p. 12, V.S. Series, 1890.
2
Bhiimafl on Sankara's Bhii~ya, 1. 1. 2, Nirt:Jaya-Sagara Press, 1904.
? Anirvii.cyiividyii-ddtaya-sacivasya prabhm:ato ·vivartii yasyaite •ciyad-anila-
tejnb-a·vanaya!z. ibid. p. 1.
~ Sa'f!lk~epa-iiiriraka, 1. 333, 334, Bhaii Sastri's edition.
5
Siddhiinta-le§a, p. 13, V.S. Series, 1890.
avidyii (formed by compounding the negative particle a and
vidyii "knowledge") may mean either absence of knowledge ( vidyii-
bhiival;) or false knowledge (mithya-jiiiinam); and in neither of these
meanings can it be supposed to behave as the material cause or
substance-stuff of anything; for a false knowledge cannot be a
substance out of which other things are made 1 • The answer given
by Anandabodha Bhattaraka to such an objection is that this avidyii
is not a psychological ignorance, but a special technical category,
which is beginningless and indefinable (aniidy-anirviicyiividyii.Sra-
ya~ziit). The acceptance of such a category is a hypothesis which
one is justified in holding as valid, since it explains the facts.
Effects must have some cause behind them, and a mere instru-
mental cause cannot explain the origination of the substratum of
the effect; again, effects which are not true cannot have for their
material cause (upadiina-kiira1Ja) that which is true, nor can they
have for their material cause that which is absolutely non-existent.
So, since the material cause of the world can neither be true nor
be anything which is absolutely non-existent, the hypothesis is
naturally forced upon the Vedantists that the material cause of
this false world-appearance is an entity which is neither existent
nor non-existent 2 • Anandabodha in his Pramii1}a-miilii quotes ap-
provingly from the Brahma-tattva-samlk~ii ofVacaspati to show that
avidyii is called avidyii or nescience because it is a hypothetic
category which is neither "is" nor "is not," and is therefore
unintelligible; avidyii signifies particularly the unintelligibility of
this category 3 • Anandabodha points out that the acceptance of
avidyii is merely the logical consequence of indicating some
possible cause of the world-appearance-considering the nature
of the world-appearance as it is, its cause can only be something
which neither is nor is not; but what we understand by such
a category, we cannot say; it is plainly unintelligible; the logical
requirements of such a category merely indicate that that which is
the material cause of this false world-appearance cannot be re-
garded either as existing or as non-existing; but this does not
1
avidyii hi vidyabhavo mithya-jiiiiiWl!l vii na cobhaya1Jl lwsya cit samavayi-
kiirm.zam adravyatviit. Anandabodha's ~Vyiiya-makaranda, p. 122, Chowkhamba
Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.
2
Ibid. pp. 122-124.
3 sad-asad-ublzayiinubhayiidi-prakiirai?z anirvacanfyatvam eva hy avidyiiniim
avidyiitvam. Brahma-tattva-samfk~ii as quoted in Pramii'l}a-miilii, p. 10, Chow-

khamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, I9C7.
x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 13
make this concept either intelligible or consistent1 • The concept
of avidyii is thus plainly unintelligible and inconsistent.
Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta.
The Vedanta takes a twofold view of things; the first view refers
to ultimate reality and the second to appearance. This ultimate
reality is pure intelligence, as identical with pure bliss and pure
being. This is called ultimately real in the sense that it is regarded
as changeless. By pure intelligence the Vedanta does not mean the
ordinary cognitional states; for these have a subjective and an
objective content which are extraneous to them. This pure in-
telligence is pure immediacy, identical with the fact of revelation
found in all our conscious states. Our apprehensions of objects
are in some sense events involving both a subjective and an ob-
jective content ; but their special feature in every case is a revelatory
inwardness or immediacy which is non-temporal and changeless.
The fact that we see, hear, feel, touch, think, remember is equi-
valent to saying that there are various kinds of cognizings. But
what is the nature of this cognizing? Is it an act or a fact? When
I see a blue colour, there is a blue object, there is a peculiar
revelation of an appearance as blue and a revelation of the "I"
as perceiver. The revelation is such that it is both a revelation of
a certain character as blue and of a certain thing called the blue
object. When a revelation occurs in perception, it is one and
it reveals both the object and its appearance in a certain
character as blue. The revelation is not the product of a certain
relation which happens to subsist at any time between the
character-appearance and the object; for both the character-
appearance as blue and the object are given in revelation. The
revelation is self-evident and stands unique by itself. Whether I see,
or hear, or feel, or change, the fact remains that there is some sort
of an awareness which does not change. Awareness is ever present
by itself and does not undergo the changes that its contents undergo.
I may remember that I had seen a blue object five minutes pre-
viously; but, when I do this, what I perceive is the image of a blue
object, with certain temporal and spatial relations, which arises or
1
V ailak~m:zya-viico-yuktir hi pratiyogi-nirupm;iid yauktikatva-prakatana-
phalii na tv evarrz-rilpatiiyiil; siimaiijasya-sampiidaniiya ity avociima. Pramii1}a-
miilii, p. 10.
The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
becomes revealed; but the revelation itself cannot be revealed
again. I may be conscious, but I cannot be conscious of con-
sciousness. For consciousness as such, though ever present in its
immediacy, cannot become an object of any other consciousness.
There cannot be any such thing as the awareness of an awareness
or the awareness of the awareness of an awareness, though we may
multiply such phrases in language at our pleasure. When I re-
member that I have been to Trinity College this morning, that
only means that I have an image of the way across the commons,
through Church Street and Trinity Street; my movements through
them are temporally pushed backward, but all this is a revelation
as image at the present moment and not a revelation of a past
revelation. I cannot say that this present image in any way reveals
that particular image as the object of the present revelation. But
the former revelation could not be held to be distinct from the
present one; for distinction is always based on content and not on
revelation. Revelation as such is identical and, since this is so, one
revelation cannot be the object of another. It is incorrect to say
that "A is A" means that one A becomes itself over again. It is
owing to the limitations of grammatical terminology that identity
is thus described. Identity thus understood is different from what
we understand by identity as a relation. Identity understood as a
relation presupposes some difference or otherness and thus is not
self-contained. And it is because it is not self-contained that it
can be called a relation. When it is said that A is identical with A,
it means that on all the various occasions or contents in which
A appeared it always signified the same thing, or that it had the
same shape or that it was the same first letter of the English
alphabet. Identity in this sense is a function of thought not
existing by itself, but in relation to a sense of opponency or other-
ness. But revelation has no otherness in it; it is absolutely ubi-
quitous and homogeneous. But the identity of revelation of which
we are speaking does not mean that the revelation signifies the
same thing amidst a diversity of contents: it is simply the one
essence identical in itself and devoid of any numerical or other
kinds of difference. It is absolutely free from" now" and" then,"
"here" and "there," "such " or" not such" and "this" or" that."
Consciousness of the self-shining self taken in this way cannot be
regarded as the relation of an appearance to an object, but it is
the fact of the revelation or the entity of the self. If we conceive
xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 15
of revelation in this way, it is an error to make any distinction in
revelation as the revelation of the past or the revelation of the
present moment. For moments are revealed as objects are re-
vealed; they do not constitute revelation or form any part of it.
This revelation is identical with the self-shining self to which
everything else has to be related in order to be known.
"Is cognizing an act or a fact?" Before this can be answered
the point to be made clear is what is meant by cognizing. If we
ignore the aspect of revelation and speak of mental states which
can be looked at from the point of view of temporal or qualitative
change of character, we must speak of them as acts or events. If
we look at any mental state as possessing certain characters and
relations to its objects, we have to speak of these aspects. But, if
we look at cognizing from the point of view of its ultimate truth
and reality as revelation, we cannot call it either an act or a fact;
for, as revelation, it is unique and unchangeable in itself. All
relations and characters are revealed in it, it is self-evident and
is at once in and beyond them all. Whether we dream or w?ke,
whether we experience an. illusion or a truth, revelation is always
there. When we look at our mental states, we find that they are
always changing, but this is so only with reference to the contents.
Apart from this there is a continuity in our conscious life. By
this continuity the Vedanta apprehends not any sort of coherence
in our ideas, but the fact of the permanence of revelation. It
may be asked what remains of revelation, if the mental states are
taken away. This question is not admissible; for the mental states
do not form part of revelation; they are rendered conscious by
coming into relation with revelation. This category is the ultimate
reality. It is not self or subject in the sense in which self or ego
is ordinarily understood. For what is ordinarily understood as the
ego or the '' I" is as much a content of the perception of the
moment as any other objective content. It is not impossible that
any particular objective content may be revealed at any time
without the corresponding "I perceive" being explicitly revealed
at the same time. The notion of ego or " I " does not refer to an
everlasting abiding independent self or person; for this notion is
as changing as any other objective content. The " I" has no definite
real content as referring to an existing entity, but is only
a particular mode of mind which is often associated, as a
relatively abiding content, with other changing contents of the
mind. As such, it is as changeable as is any other object. "I know
this" only means that there is a revelation which at one sweep
reveals both the " this" and the " I." So far as the revelation
appears as revealing the "this" and the "1," it is manifested in
a subjective mental state having a particular conscious centre
different from other similar centres. But, since revelation cannot
in reality be individuated, all that we may say about "I" or
"mine,"" thou" or" thine," falls outside it. They are all contents,
having some indefinite existence of their own and revealed by this
principle of revelation under certain conditions. This principle of
revelation thus has a reality in quite a different sense from that
which is used to designate the existence of any other object. All
other objects are dependent upon this principle of revelation for
their manifestation, and their nature or essence, out of connection
with it, cannot be defined or described. They are not self-evident,
but are only expressed by coming into some sort of relation
with this principle. We have already seen that this principle
cannot be either subjective or objective. For all considera-
tions of subject or object fall outside it and do not in any
way qualify it, but are only revealed by it. There are thus two
principles, the principle of revelation and all that which is re-
vealed by it. The principle of revelation is one; for there is nothing
else like it; it alone is real in the highest and truest sense. It is
absolute in the sense that there is no growth, decay, evolution or
change in it, and it is perfectly complete in itself. It is infinite in
the sense that no finitude can form part of it, though through it all
finitude is being constantly revealed. It is all-pervading in the
sense that no spatial or temporal limits can be said to affect it in
any way, though all these are being constantly revealed by it. It is
neither in my head nor in my body nor in the space before me;
but yet there is nowhere that it is not. It has sometimes been
designated as the" Self" or iitman, but only in the sense of denoting
its nature as the supreme essence and transcendent reality of all-
the Brahman.
Apart from this principle of revelation, all else is constituted
of a substanceless indefinable stuff called maya. In some schools
of Sati.kara Vedanta it is said that all is pure and simple illusion,
that things exist only when they are perceived and dissolve into
nothingness as soon as we cease to perceive them ; this school has
been designated the Drfti-snti school, a doctrine which has been
briefly explained in the tenth chapter of the present work 1 • One of
the most important texts of this school is the Siddhiinta-muktiivalz by
Prakasananda 2 • Prakasananda seems to have taken his inspiration
from the Yoga-vasi~tha, and he denied the existence of things when
they are not perceived (ajfiiita-sattviinabhyupagama). He tried to
show that there were no grounds for holding that external objects
existed even when they were not perceived or that external objects
had a reality independent of their perceptions. Examining the
capacity of perception as a proof to establish this difference be-
tween perception and its object, he argued that, since the difference
between the awareness and its object was a quality of the awareness,
the awareness itself was not competent to grasp this quality in the
object, as it was one of the constituents of the complex quality
involving a difference of the awareness and its object; to assert
the contrary would be ·a fallacy of self-dependence (iitmiisrayatva).
If the apprehended difference is a complex, such as "difference-
between-awareness-and-its-object," and if this complex is a quality
which is apprehended as existing in the object, it has to be assumed
that, in order that the nature of awareness may be realized, vindi-
cated or established, it must depend upon itself involved as a con-
stituent in the complex "difference-between-awareness-and-its-
object" directly and immediately-which comes to the same thing
as saying that awareness becomes aware of itself by being aware
of itself; this is impossible and is called the logical fallacy of self-
1
A History of Indian Philosophy, vel. 1. pp. 477-478, by S. N. Dasgupta,
published by the Cambridge University Press, 1922.
2
Prakasananda refers to the arguments of Prakasatman's (A.D. 1200) Paiica-
piidikii-vivarm;aand Sarvajfiatma Muni's (A.D. 900) Sa'f!lk~epa-siirlraka and refers
approvingly to Sure8vara, the author of the Nai~karmya-siddhi. Appaya Dik!?ita
(A.D.162o) refers to PrakasanandainhisSiddhiinta-leia (pp. 13, 72). Nana Dik~ita,
a follower of the school ofPrakasananda and author of the Siddhiinta-mpikii, in a
commentary on the Siddhiinta-muktiivall, gives a list of Vedanta teachers. In this
list he mentions the names of Prakasanuhhavananda, Nrsirpha and Raghavendra
Yati. Venis thinks (see The Pandit, 1890, pp.487-490) that Prakasanubhavais the
same as Prakasatman and Nrsirpha the same as Nrsirphasrama Muni, who is
said to have converted Appaya Dik!?ita to Sankara Vedanta, and thinks that
Prakasananda lived in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, being wedged
in between Nrsirpha and Appaya. Though it would be difficult to settle his
time so precisely and definitely, yet it would not be wrong to suppose that he
lived sometime towards the latter half of the sixteenth centurv. Prakasananda's
doctrine of DH!i-sn# is apparently unknown to the earlier V~dantic works and
even the Vediinta-pan"bhii~ii, a work of the early sixteenth century, ~oes not
seem to be aware of him, and it appears that the earliest mention of his name can
be traced only to Appaya, who lived in the sixteenth and the seventeenth
centuries. Prakasananda mav thus be believed to have lived in the latter half of
the sixteenth century. ·
DII 2
dependence 1 • If it is held that the complex quality ("difference-
of-awareness-from-the-object") is directly perceived in the ob-
ject through the senses, then it has to be assumed that the
said complex quality existed in the object even before the pro-
duction of the awareness, and this would involve the impossible
supposition that the complex quality of which the awareness was
a constituent was already present even before such an awareness
had already come into being. If perception or direct awareness
cannot be said to prove the difference between the awareness and
its object, there can be no inference which may be supposed to
do it. For such an inference has to take form thus-" the object is
different from its own awareness, because it is associated with
entirely different kinds of qualities or characteristics 2 . , But ho,v
could it be known that the object has qualities of an entirely
different character from its awareness, since a difference between
an awareness and its object was contested and could not be proved
by perception or any other means? Prakasananda further says that
the argument by implication (arthiipatti), that awareness involves
the acceptance of something different from the awareness of
which the awareness is affirmed, because there cannot be any know-
ledge without a corresponding object, is invalid. In proving the
invalidity of the supposition that knowledge necessarily implies an
object, Prakasananda raises the question whether such an impli-
cation of an object as conditioning knowledge refers to the pro-
duction (utpatti) of know ledge, its persistence (sthiti) or its secondary
cognition. As regards the first alternative Prakasananda says that
according to the Vedanta consciousness is ever-existent and is
never a product; and, even if it is regarded as a product, the
process of cognition can itself be regarded as a sufficient cause
for its production. It can by no means be urged that the
presence of an external object is in all cases necessary for the
production of knowledge; for, though it is arguable that in
perception an object is necessary, no one will suggest that an
external object is to be considered necessary in the production of
inferential knowledge-a fact which shows that the presence of
an external object is not indispensable for the production of know-
ledge as such. As regards the persistence of knowledge it is said
1
Siddhiinta-muktiivall, as printed in the Pandit, 1889, pp. 247-249.
2
vimato vi~ayalz sva-vi~aya-jiiiiniid bhidyate tad-viruddha-dharmiiirayatviit.
Ibid. p. 252.
that awareness has not the object that it knows for its locus or sub-
stance (iiSraya), in such a way that the absence of the object, as apart
from the awareness, would make it impossible for the awareness to
persist; and, if knowledge is supposed to be persisting in anything,
that something would not be a cognized object, but the cognizer
itself-as in the Nyaya view, where knowledge is regarded as an
attribute of the self and the self is then regarded as the substance
or locus (iiSraya) of knowledge. Since again cognition and its
object do not exist in the same space or in the same time (this is
proved by the possibility of our knowing a past or a future object),
there cannot be any such concomitance between the two that it
would be right for any one to infer the external presence of an
object because of there being a subjective cognition or awareness.
So he argues that there is no proof that cognition and cognized
objects are different.
In the above account of Prakasananda's views it is clear that
he does not attempt to give any positive proof in support of his
thesis that the world-appearance and all objects contained in it
have no existence while they are not perceived or that the being
of all objects cognized is their percipi. He only tries to show that
it cannot be logically established that awareness of blue and blue
are two different objects; or, in other words, that it cannot be
proved that the cognized object is different from its cognition.
It could not legitimately be held that awareness (p1·atitz) was
different from its object (pratyetavya). The whole universe, as we
perceive it, is nothing but cognition without there being any object
corresponding to it. As dreams are nothing but mere awareness,
without there being any real objects behind them which manifest
themselves in different ways of awareness and their objects, so
also is the world of awaking consciousness 1 • The world has thus
no independent substratum, but is mere cognition or mere aware-
ness (vijfiiina-miitra or bhiiva-miitra).
This scheme of Vedanta philosophy is surprisingly similar
to the idealism of Vasubandhu (A.D. z8o-36o), as taught in his
Vi1Jlsatikii with a short commentary of his own and in his Tri1Jlsikii
with a commentary by Sthiramati 2 • According to this idealism
pratyetavya-pratltyoi ca bhedal;. priimiivikal;. kutab
pratzti-miitram evaitad blziiti viiva1Jl cariicaram
jiiiina-jiieya-prabhedena yathii sviipna1Jl pratfyate
vijiiiina-miitram evaitat tatlzii jiigrac cariicaram.
Siddhiinta-muktiivali, p.258.
2
Vijiiapti-miitratii-siddlzi, containing two treatises, Vi1Jlsatikii and Tri1Jliikii,
2-2
(vi_j1Iiina-'Viida) ofVasubandhu all appearances are but transforma-

tions of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement,
and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects
which to us seem to be existing outside. of us and generating our
ideas. Just as in dreams one experiences different objects at
different places and countries without there being any objective
existence of them, or as in dreams many people may come together
and perform various actions, so what seems to be a real world of
facts and external objects may well be explained as a mere creation
of the principle of intelligence without any objective basis at all.
All that we know as subjective or objective is mere ideation
(vijnapti) and there is no substantive reality, or entity corre-
sponding to it; but that does not mean that pure non-conceptual
(anabhilapyeniitmanii) thought, which the saints realize, is also
false 1 . It is possible that the awareness of anything may become
the object of a further awareness, and that of another; but in all
such cases where the awarenesses are significant ( arthavail) there
is no entity or reality represented by them; this, however,
should not be interpreted as a denial of the principle of intelligence
or pure knowledge as such. Vasubandhu then undertakes to show
that the perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world
cannot be trusted. He says that, taking visual perception as an
example, \ve may ask ourselves if the objects of the visual perception
are one as a whole or many as atoms. They cannot be mere wholes,
since wholes would imply parts; they cannot be of the nature of
atoms, since such atoms are not separately perceived; they cannot
be of the nature of combinations of atoms, since the existence of
atoms cannot be proved 2 • For, if six atoms combine from six sides,
that implies that the atoms have parts; if however six atoms
combine with one another at one identical point, that would mean
that the combined group would not have a size larger than that
of one atom and would therefore be invisible. Again, if the objects
of awareness and perception were only wholes, then succession
and sequence would be inexplicable, and our perception of separate
and distinct things would remain unaccountable. So they have
Paris, 1925. It seems probable that V asubandhu flourished in A.D. 280-360 rather
than in A.D. 420-500 as held by me in the first volume of the present work. See
B. Bhattacharya's foreword to the Tattva-smJlgraha.
1
yo biilair dhiirmii1Jii1Jl svabhiivo griihya-griihakiidil; parikalpital; lena kalpiten-
iitmanii te~ii1Jl nairiitmya7Jz na tv anabhiliipyeniitmanii yo buddhiiniiTJZ vi~aya iti.
Commentary on ViTJiiatikii, p. 6.
2
Napi te sa7J1hatii vi~ayz-bhavanti, yasmiit paramii1Jur eka'IJl dravya1Jl na
sidhyati. Ibid. p. 7·
xr] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 2!
no real objective existence, though perception leads us to believe

that they have. People are dreaming of the world of objects in the
sleep of the sub-conscious habit of false imaginative construction
(vitatha-vikalpiibhylisa-vlisanli-nidrayli), and in their dreams they
construct the objective world; it is only when they become
awake with the transcendent indeterminate knowledge (lolwttara-
nirvikalpa-jiilina-liibhiit prabuddho bhavati) that they find the
world-construction to be as false as the dream-construction
of diverse appearances. In such a view there is no objective
material world, and our cognitions are not influenced by external
objects; how then are our minds influenced by good instructions
and associations? and, since none of us have any real physical
bodies, how can one kill another? Vasubandhu explains this by
the theory that the thought-currents of one person can sometimes
determine the thought-currents of another. Thus the idea of
killing of a certain type may produce such a disturbance of the
vital powers of another as to produce a cessation of the continuity
of the thought-processes, which is called death 1 • So also the good
ideas of one may influence the ideas of another for good.
In the Tri'f!Zsikli of Vasubandhu and its commentary by Sthir-
amati this idealism is more clearly explained. It is said that both the
soul (or the knower) and all that it knows as subjective ideas ot as ex-
ternal objects existing outside of us are but transformations of pure
intelligence (vijiilina-parir.zlima). The transformation (parir.zlima)
of pure intelligence means the production of an effect different
from that of the causal moment simultaneously with the cessation
of the causal moment 2 • There is neither externality nor subjectivity
in pure intelligence, but these are imposed upon it (vijiilina-s'l.-'arflpe
parikalpita eva iitmii dharmlis ca). All erroneous impositions imply
that there must be some entity which is mistaken for something
else; there cannot be erroneous impositions on mere vacuity; so
it has to be admitted that these erroneous impositions of various
kinds of external characteristics, self, etc. have been made upon
the transformations of pure intelligence 3 • Both Vasubandhu and
Sthiramati repudiate the suggestion of those extreme idealists who
1
para-vijnapti-viie~iidhipatytit pare~ii'!l fi·vitendr~va-t:irodhitzl kiicit 'l'ihiyii
utpadyate yayii sablzaga-satztati-vicchedakhya1{l mara~am bhavati. Commentary
on Vi'!liatikii, p. 1 o.
2
kiiratza-ksatza-nirodha-sama-kalah kiirana-ksana-·vilaksana-kan:asva iitma-
liibha!z pari~a1;Ul~. Sthiramati's com~entary on. Tri'!liika: p: 16. - -
3 upacarasya ca niriidhiirasyiisambhaviid avasya'Jl vijniina-pari~ltimo ·castuto
'sty upaf?antm.yo yatra iitma-dharmopactira!z pravartate. Ibid. Compare Sai1kara's

commentary on Gau9apada's Karikii, "na hi nirii.rpadii mrgatn~lihiidayal;.."
deny also the reality of pure intelligence on grounds of inter-
dependence or relativity (sa'!lvrti)l. Vasubandhu holds that pure
consciousness (vijiiapti-miitratii) is the ultimate reality. This ulti-
mate consciousness is a permanent entity, which by its inherent
power (saktz) undergoes threefold transformations as the inherent
indeterminate inner change (vipiika), which again produces the
two other kinds of transformations as the inner psychoses of mental
operations (manana) and as the perception of the so-called external
sensibles (vi~aya-vijiiapti). The apprehension of all appearances or
characterized entities (dharma) as cognized objects and that of
selves as cognizers, the duality of perceivers and the perceived,
are due to the threefold transformations of vipiika, manana and
v#aya-vi.fiiapti. The ultimate consciousness (vijiiapti-miitra) which
suffers all these modifications is called iilaya-vijiiiina in its modified
transformations, because it is the repository of all experiences.
The ultimate principle of consciousness is regarded as absolutely
permanent in itself and is consequently also of the nature of pure
happiness (sukha); for what is not eternal is painful, and this, being
eternal, is happy 2 • When a saint's mind becomes fixed (prati~thita)
in this pure consciousness (vijiiapti-mlitra), the tendency to dual
thought of the subjective and the objective (grlihya-grlihaklinufaya)
ceases and there dawns the pure indeterminate (nir-~·ikalpa) and
transcendent (lokottara) consciousness. It is a state in which the
ultimate pure consciousness returns from its transformations and
rests in itself. It is divested of all afflictions (klesa) or touch of vicious
tendencies and is therefore called aniisrava. It is unthinkable and
undemonstrable,because it is, on the one hand, pure self-conscious-
ness (pratylitma-vedya) and omniscience (sarvajiiatii), as it is divested
of all limitations (ii~·aratza), and, on the other hand, it is unique
in itself 3 • This pure consciousness is called the container of the
seed of all (sarva-blja), and, when its first indeterminate and inde-
finable transformations rouse the psychosis-transformations and
1
Thus Laizkiivatiira, one of the most important works on Buddhistic
idealism, denies the real transformation of the pure intelligence or iilaya-vijfiiina.
See Laizkiivatiira, p. 46, published by the Otani University Press, Kyoto, 1923.
2
dhruvo nityatviid ak~ayatayii; sukho nityatviid eva yad anitya1{l tad dubkham
ayartz ca nitya iti asmiit sukhab. Sthiramati's commentary on Trirtdikii, p. 44·
3
Jllaya-vijiiiina in this ultimate state of pure consciousness ( vijfiapti-miitratii)
is called the cause (dhiitu) of all virtues, and, being the ultimate state in which
the dharmas or characterized appearances have lost alJ their limitations it is
called the dharma-kiiya of the Buddha (mahii-munib bhumi-piiramitiidi-bhiiva-
nayii klefa-jfieyiivarm;a-prahii1}iit . .. sarva-dharma-vibhutva-liibhatas ca dlzarma-
kiiya ity ucyate). Ibid.
also the transformations as sense-perceptions, these mutually act
and react against one another, and thus the different series rise
again and again and mutually determine one another. These trans-
formations are like waves and ripples on the ocean, where each is
as much the product of others as well as the generator of others 1 •
In this view thought (vijfiiina) is regarded as a real substance,
and its transformations are also regarded as real; and it is these
transformations that are manifested as the selves and the charac-
terized appearances 2 • The first type of transformations, called
vipiika, is in a way the ground of the other two transformations,
which contain the indeterminate materials out of which the mani-
festations of the other two transformations appear. But, as has
already been pointed out, these three different types of trans-
formations again mutually determine one another. The vipiika
transformations contain within them the seeds of the constructive
instincts ( vikalpa-viisanii) of the selves as cognizers, the constructive
instincts of colours, sounds, etc., the substantive basis (iisraya) of
the attribution of these twofold constructive instincts, as well as
the sense-faculties and the localization of space-determinations
(sthiina-vijiiapti or bhajana-loka-sannivesa-vijiiaptz). They are also
associated in another mode with sense-modifications involving the
triune of the sense (indriya), sense-object (vi~aya) and cognition
(and each of these triunes is again associated with a characteristic
affective tone corresponding to the effective tones of the other
two members of the triune in a one-to-one relation), attention
(manaskiira), discrimination (sa'!ljiiii), volition (cetanii) and feeling
( vedanii) 3 • The vipiika transformations have no determinate or
limited forms (aparicchinniilambaniikiira), and there are here no
1
tac ca varttate srotasaughavat. Ibid. p. 21.
avasya'f!l vijiiiina-pari~ziirno vastuto 'sty upagantavy oyatratmadharmopaciirab
2
pravarttate. Ibid. p. 16.

3 Feeling(vedana) is distinguished here as painful,pleasurable and as the basic
entity which is neither painful nor pleasurable, which is feeling per se (vedana
anubhava-svablzavii sa punar vi$ayasya ahladaka-paritiipaka-tadubhaya-kara-
vivil~ta-s·variipa-siik$iitkarm:za-bhedtit). This feeling per se must be distinguished
again from the non-pleasurable-painful feeling existing along with the two other
varieties, the painful and the pleasurable. Here the vipiika transformations are
regarded as evolving the basic entity of feeling, and it is therefore undifferentiated
in it as pleasure or pain and is hence called "feeling as indifference (upek$ii)"
and undifferentiated (avyiikrta). The differentiation of feeling as pleasurable or
as painful takes place only as a further determination of the basic entity of feeling
evolved in the v:ipiika transformations of good and bad deeds (Subhiisubha-
karma-vipaka). Good and bad (Subhasubha) are to be distinguished from moral
and immoral as potential and actual determinations of virtuous and vicious
actions.
The Sankara School of Vedanta [en.
actualized emotional states of attachment, antipathy or the like,
which are associated with the actual pleasurable or painful feelings.
The vi'piika transformations thus give us the basic concept of mind
and its principal functions with all the potentialities of determinate
subject-object consciousness and its processes. There are here the
constructive tendencies of selves as perceivers, the objective con-
structive tendencies of colours, sounds, etc., the sense-faculties,
etc., attention, feeling, discrimination, volition and sense-func-
tioning. But none of these have any determinate and actualized
forms. The second grade of transformations, called manana,
represents the actual evolution of mora1 and immoral emotions;
it is here that the mind is set in motion by the ignorant references
to the mental elements as the self, and from this ignorance about
the self is engendered self-love (iitma-sneha) and egoism (iitma-
miina). These references are again associated with the fivefold
universal categories of sense-functioning, feeling, attention, voli-
tion and discrimination. Then comes the third grade of trans-
formations, which is associated with the fiv~fold universal cate-
gories together with the special manifestations of concrete sense-
perceptions and the various kinds of intellectual states and moral
and immoral mental states, such as desire (chandal.z) for different
kinds of sense-experiences, decisions (adhimok~a) in conclusions
firmly established by perceptions, reasoning, etc., memory, attentive
reflection (samiidhz), wisdom (prajiiii), faith and firm will for the
good (sraddhii}, shamefulness (hri) for the bad, etc. The term
iilaya-vi.fiiiina is given to all these three types of transformations,
hut there is underneath it, as the permanent passive ground, the
eternal and unchangeable pure thought ('1.-'ijiiapti-miitratii).
It may be pointed out here that in this system of philosophy
the eternal and unchangeable thought-substance undergoes by
virtue of its inner dynamic three different orders of superficial
changes, which are compared to constantly changing streams and
waves. The first of these represents the basic change which later
determines all subjective and objective possibilities; the second
starts the process of the psychosis by the original ignorance and
false attribution of self-hood to non-self elements, self-love and
egoism; and in the third grade we have all the concrete mental
and extra-mental facts. The fundamental categories which make
the possibility of mind, mental processes and the extra-mental
relations, are evolved in the first stage of transformations; and these
abide through the other two stages of transformations and become
more and more complex and concrete in course of their association
with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the
knowledge situation Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness
of blue is only a modification of the "awareness," but he thinks
that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the
subject or the knower (griihaka-graha) and a relation with the object
which is known (griihya-graha). Blue as an object is essential for
making an awareness of blue possible; for the awareness is not
blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu
argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of
objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought, and it
does not at all follow that this implies that there are real external
objects existing outside of it and generating the aw;1reness as
external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply onto-
logical objectivity. It is argued that, if the agency of objective
entities in the production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there
could not be any case where sense-knowledge could be admitted to
be produced without the operation of the objective entities; but,
since in dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge is universally
regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such
objective entities, no causal operation can be conceded to the
objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge.
Sankara, in attempting to refute the Buddhist idealism in his
commentary on the Brahma-siltra, 11. ii. 28, seems to refer to a
school of idealism which is the same as that described by
Santarak~ita in his Tattva-sa1{lgraha (commented upon by Kama-
la8ila), but largely different from that described in Vasubandhu's
Tri1{lsikii. The positive arguments against the impossibility of an
external world constituted by partless atoms are the same 1 • But
1 Vacaspati, however, in his Bhamati commentary, 11. ii. 28, introduces some
new points. He says that spatial extension, as perceived in visual perception,

cannot be due to the perception of partless atoms. Nor can it be said that the
colour particles produced in uninterrupted succession generate the notion of
spatial extension, though there is no spatial extension in the individual atom;
for it is not possible that the groups of colour particles are not interrupted by
taste, smell and the tactual particles. So it has to be admitted that the colour
particles are at some distance from one another and are interrupted by other
particles, and that the continuous appearance of colour in spatial distribution
is a false appearance, like the appearance of continuous trees from a distance con-
stituting a forest (gandha-rasa-sparsa-paramti7JV-antarita hi te rupa-paramii~ravo
na nirantarii/.z; tasmiid iiriit siintare~u vrk~e~u eka-ghana-pratyayavad e~a sthala-
pratyayal.z paramii7Ju~u siintare~u bhriinta eva).
z6 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
it is further argued on behalf of the Buddhist idealists that the
awareness of a pillar, the awareness of a wall or of a jug or of a
piece of cloth, implies that these individual awarenesses are mutually
different in nature among themselves; and that consequently
the apparent differences among objects are but differences among
the ideas; and that therefore the objects are of the same nature
as the particular ideas by which we are supposed to know them;
and, if that be so, the hypothesis of an external world of objects
becomes unnecessary. Moreover the fact that both the idea of the
object and the object are taken at one and the same moment proves
that both the object and the idea are identical, just as the illusory
second moon perceived simultaneously with the moon is identical
with it 1 . When one of them is not perceived the other also is not
perceived. If they were by nature separate and different, there
would be no reason why there should be such a uniform and
invariable relation between them. The reason for the diversity of
our ideas is to be sought not in the diversity of external objects
which are ordinarily supposed to produce them, but in the be-
ginningless diversity of the instinctive sub-conscious roots (viis ana)
which produce all our ideas in the waking state, just as they produce
dreams during sleep ; as dreams are admitted by all to be produced
without any external objects, so are all ideas produced without
any external real objects; for as ideas the dream ideas are just the
same as the waking ideas. But in both cases there are the in-
stinctive sub-conscious roots (·viisanii), without which no ideas,
·whether in the dream state or in the waking state, can be produced;
so these, being invariably present in all cases of production of ideas,
are the cause of all ideas 2 •
1 This simile is adduced by Vacaspati probably from a quotation from
Diimaga-sahopalambha-niyamiid abhedo nlla-tad-dhiyo(l bhedai ca bhrtinti-

'l-'ijiiiiuair drsyetendiiv iviidvaye.
Since both the blue and the idea of the blue are taken at the same moment,
they are one and the same; for any two things which are taken simultaneously
are identical. As one moon appears as two in an illusory manner, so the dif-
ference benvecn the idea and the object is also perceived only illusorily. This
argument of sahopalambha-niyama is absent in Vasubandhu's Vitrtiatikii and
TritJziikli.
2
Vacaspati summarizes in this connection the inference of the Sautrantikas
for the existence of an external world of objects as the causes of the corre-
sponding ideas. The argument of the Sautrantikas runs thus: When, the old
causes remaining the same, there is a new effect, that new effect must be due
to a new cause. Now, though it should be admitted that in the passing series of
inner consciousness each particular moment generates the succeeding one, and
that this power of productivity is called vasana (tat-pravrtti-vijiiana-janana-iak-
Sankara in refuting the above position says that such a view
is untenable because it contradicts our experienc~, which always
distinguishes the subject and the object from the awareness.
vVe are directly aware of our sense-contact with external objects
which we perceive, and the object of awareness and the awareness
are not one and the same. Our awareness itself shows that it is
different from its object. The awareness of a pillar is not the same
as a pillar, but a pillar is only an object of the awareness of a
pillar. Even in denying external objects, the Buddhist idealists
have to say that what is knowable only within appears as if it was
existing outside 1 • Sankara argues thus: if externality is absolutely
non-existent, how can any sense-cognition appear as external?
Vi~Q.umitra cannot appear as the son of a barren woman. Again,
the fact that an idea has the same form as its object does not imply
that there are no objects; on the other hand, if there were no
objects, how could any idea have the same form as its corresponding
object? Again, the maxim that any two things which are taken
simultaneously are identical is false; for, if the object and its
awareness are comprehended at the same moment, the very fact
that one is taken along with the other shows that they cannot be
identical. Moreover, we find that in all our awarenesses of blue
or yellow, a jug or a wall, it is the qualifying or predicative factors
of objects of knowledge that differ; awareness as such remains
just the same. The objects of knowledge are like so many ex-
traneous qualities attributed to knowledge, just as whiteness or
blackness may be attributed to a cow; so whether one perceives
blue or red or yellow, that signifies that the difference of
perception involves a difference in objects and not in the
awareness itself. So the awareness, being one, is naturally different
from the objects, which are many; and, since the objects are many,
tir viisanii), and that its tendency to effectuate itself is called its power of fruition
(paripiika), even then it would be difficult to understand how each particular
moment should have a power altogether different from other moments; for, since
there is nothing else to change the character of the moments, each moment is
just as much a moment as any other. So it has to be admitted that there are
other things which make one moment different in its power of effectuation from
any other; and these are the external objects.
1
Sankara says yad antar-jiieya-rupa1Jz tad bahirvad avabhiisate. This seems
to be a quotation from Diimaga. Dinnaga's verse, as quoted by Kamalasila in
his commentary on the Tattva-sa1Jlgraha, verses 2082-2084, runs as follows:
yad antar-jiieya-rr1pa1Jl tu bahirvad avabhiisate
so 'rtho vijiiiina-rilpatviit tat-praiyayatayiipi ca.
This shows that Sankara had Dinnaga in his mind when he attempted to
refute the Buddhist idealists.
they are different from the one, the awareness. The awareness is
one and it is different from the objects, which are many 1 • l\1oreover,
the argument that the appearance of world objects may be ex-
plained on the analogy of dreams is also invalid; for there is a
great difference between our knowledge of dreams and of worldly
objects-dreams are contradicted by the waking experience, but
the waking experiences are never found contradicted.
It is curious to note here the contradictions in Sankara 's own
statements. It has been already pointed out that he himself in his
commentary on Gau4apada's Kiirikii built a powerful argument for
the non-existence of all objects of waking experience on the analogy
of the non-existence of the objects of dream experience. Santarak-
~ita (A.D. 705) and Kamalasila (A.D. 728) in refuting a position
similar to that of the view of Sankara-that consciousness is one
and unchangeable and that all objects are changing, but that the
change of objects does not imply any change of the consciousness
itself-argue that, had this been so, then that would imply that all
sensibles of different kinds of colours, sounds, etc. were known at
one and the same time, since the consciousness that would reveal
those objects is constant and unchangeable 2 • Kamalasila there-
fore holds that consciousness is not unchangeable and one, but
that there are only the changeable ideas of the sensibles and each
idea is different from the other which follows it in time. Sankara's
view that consciousness is only one and that it is only the objects
that are many seems to be based on a separation due to an
arbitrary abstraction. If the commentary on Gau4apada's Kiirikii
be admitted to be a work of Sankara, then it 'may be urged that
Sankara's views had undergone a change when he was writing the
commentary on the Brahma-siltra; for in the commentary on
Gau4apada 's Kiirikii he seems again and again to emphasize the
view that the objects perceived in waking experience are as false
and as non-existent as objects of dream experience. His only
realism there consisted in the assertion that the world was but the
result of a false illusory imposition on the real Brahman, since
1
d?.•tibhyti'!l ca bheda ekasya siddho bhavati ekasmac ca dvayo!z; tasmtid
artha-jiianayor bhedafz. Sankara's Bha~ya, n. ii. 28, NirQaya-Sagara Press.
Bombay, 1904.
2
tad yadi nityaika-jiiana-pratibhasatmaka ami iabdadaya!z syus tada "licitras-
taratJa-pratibhasavat sakrd eva pratibhaseran; tat-pratibhastitmakasya jiianasya
sarvada vasthitatvat. Kamalasila's commentary on the Tatt'va-sa1Jlgraha,
sl. 331. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 1926.
Neither Santarak~ita nor Kamalasila seems to be familiar with Sankara.
illusions such as mirage, etc. must have some underlying basis
upon ,vhich they are imposed. But in the commentary on the
Bralzma-siltra the world of objects and sensibles is seen to have
an existence of some sort outside individual thought. Vacaspati in
his Bhiimatl commentary distinguishes the position of Sankara
from that of Buddhist idealism by saying that the Vedanta holds
that the" blue" is not an idea of the form of blue, but" the blue" is
merely the inexplicable and indefinable object 1 .
In discussing the views of Vasubandhu in the Vi1J1satikii and
Tri1J1Sikii it has been pointed out that Vasubandhu did not try to
repudiate the objectivity of the objects of awareness, but he re-
pudiated the idea that objects of awareness existed outside of
thought and produced the different kinds of awareness. His idea
seems to have been that the sensibles are made up of thought-
stuff and, though they are the psychological objects of awareness,
they do not exist outside of thought and determine the different
ideas that we have of them. But both the sensibles and their ideas
are determined by some inner lav; of thought, which determines
the nature and methods of the whole process of the growth and
development of the psychosis, and which determines not only its
cognitional character, but also its moral and emotional character. All
the arguments of Sankara in which he emphasizes the psychological
duality of awareness and its object would have no force against
Vasubandhu, as Vasubandhu admits it himself and holds that
"blue" (nzla) is different from the idea of blue; the blue is an
object (iilambana) and the idea of the blue is an awareness. Ac-
cording to him thought splits itself into subject and object; the
idea therefore expresses itself as a subject-object awareness. The
subject and the object are as much products of thought as the idea
itself; the fact that he considers the blue to be thought does not
mean that he denies the objectivity of the blue or that the only
existence of the blue is the blue-idea. The blue is objectively
present before the idea of blue as a presentation, just as there is the
subject to perceive it, but this objectivity does not imply that the
blue is somewhere outside thought in the space outside; for even
space-locations are thought-products, and so there is no sense in
attributing the sensibles of presentation to the outside world. The
sensibles are objects of awareness, but they are not the excitants
1 na hi brahma-viidino nlliidyiikiirii1Jl vittim abhyupagacchmzti, kintu anir-
vacanlya1Jl nlliiditi. Bhiimati, 11. ii. 28.

of the corresponding awareness. It does not seem that Sankara
says anything to refute such a view. Sankara's position in the
commentary on Gauc;iapada's Kiirikii seems to have been the same
sort of view as that of Dinnaga, which he takes so much pains to
refute in the Brahma-siitra-bhii~ya, and as such it was opp<lsed
to the view of Nagarjuna that there must be some essence or reality
on which the illusory impositions are made. But in the Brahma-
sutra-bhii~ya he maintains the view that the objective world, as it
appears to our consciousness, is present before it objectively and
independently-only its ultimate nature is inexplicable. The
difference of the objects from the awareness and their inde-
pendent existence and activity have been accepted by most of
the later Vedanta teachers of the Sankara school; and it is well
known that in sense-perception the need of the mind-contact with
the object of perception through the specific sense is considered
indispensable 1 .
Prakasatman (A.D. 1200) in his Paiica-piidikii-vivarm:za raises this
point and says that the great difference between the Mahayanists
and the Vedantins consists in the fact that the former hold that
the objects (vi~aya) have neither any separat~ existence nor any
independent purpose or action to fulfil as distinguished from the
momentary ideas, while the latter hold that, though the objects are
in essence identical with the one pure consciousness, yet they can
fulfil independent purposes or functions and have separate, abiding
and uncontradicted existences 2 • Both Padmapada and Prakasatman
argue that, since the awareness remains the same while there is
a constant variation of its objects, and therefore that which
remains constant (anuvrtta) and that which changes (vyiivrtta)
cannot be considered identical, the object cannot be regarded
as being only a modification of the idea 3 • It is suggested that the
Buddhist idealist urges that, if the object (e.g. blue) is different
from the awareness, it cannot be revealed in it, and, if the blue
can be revealed in the awareness, at that moment all the other
things of the world might as well be revealed; for there is no such
1
See Vediinta-paribhii~ii, ch. 1, Srivenkatesvar Press, Bombay, 191 I.
2 tattva-darsinas tu advitzyiit Sa'f!lvedaniit abhede 'pi vi~ayasya bhedeniipi artha-
kriyii-siimarthya-sattva'f!l sthiiyitva'f!l ciibiidhitam astiti vadanti. Paiica-piidikii-vi-
vara~a. p. 73. In addition to this work Prakasatman also wrote two inde-
pendent commentaries on Brahma-sutra called Siirzraka-mzmli'f!lSii-nyiiya-sa'f!l-
graha and Laukika-nyiiya-muktiivalz.
3
anuvrttasya vyiivrttiin na bhedo 'nuvrttatviid iikiisa-ghatiidivat. Paiica-
piidikii-vivara~a. p. 73·
specific relation with the blue that the blue alone should appear
in consciousness at that moment. If it is urged that the blue
produces the awareness of the blue, then what would be the
function of the visual organ? It is better, therefore, the Buddhist
suggests, to admit a natural and unique relation of identity of the
idea and the object 1 • The Vedantist objects to this and says that
such a supposition cannot be true, since we perceive that the subject,
object and the idea are not one and the same. To such an objection
the Buddhist is supposed to reply that these three do not form a
complex unity, but arise at three successive moments of time, and
then by virtue of their potency or root-impression a complex of
the three appears; and this complex should not therefore be inter-
preted as being due to a relationing of three distinct entities 2 •
Thus the fact that " I perceive blue" is not to be interpreted as a
conscious relationing of" I," "the blue" and the awareness, but
as an ideation arising at one particular point of time, involving all
the three constituents in it. Such a supposition is necessary, be-
cause all appearances are momentary, and because the relationing
of the three as three independent entities would necessarily be
impossible without the lapse of some time for their operation of
relationing. The theory of momentariness naturally leads us to the
above supposition, that what appears as relationing is nothing but
one momentary flash, which has the above three as its constituent
elements; so the Buddhist is supposed to admit that, psychologic-
1
tasmiit sviibhiivikiisiidhara1Jiibhedasambandhiid eva vijfiiine nilam avabhiisate.
Pa1}ca-piidil~ii-vivara1Ja, p. 74·
Arguing from a similar point of view, Santarak!?ita and Kamalasila urge that,
if the object was not identical with the awareness, there must be some im-
mutable law why they should appear simultaneously. This law according to the
Buddhists could only be either of identity (tiidiitmya) or of causality as invariability
of production (tad-utpatti). The first alternative is what the Buddhists here are
contending for as against the Vedantists. There cannot be the law of causality
here; for there cannot be any operation of the law of causality as production
between two entities which are simultaneous. Tatt'm-sal!lgraha and Pafijikii,
20JO, 20JI.
2
tad viisanii-sameta-samanantl'ra-pratyaya-samutthal!l sankalaniitmakal!l pra-
tyayiintaram etan neha sambandhiigamafz. Padmapada's (A.D. 820) Pafica-piidikii,
p. 25. This work exerted the greatest influence on the development of Vedantic
thought for about six or seven centuries, and several commentaries were written
on it. Most important of these are Prakasatman's Pa1icapiidikii-vivara1Ja, Pafi-
ca-piidikiidhyiisa-bhii~ya-vyiikhyii, Pafica-piidikii-siistra-darpa1J.a by Amrt:ananda,
Tattva-dipana by Amrtanandanatha, and also a commentary by Anandaptin;ta
Yati. Prakasatman's commentary on it, called Paiicapiidikii-vivara1Ja, was com-
mented upon by Akhaf)gananda Muni in his Tattva-dipana, by Ramananda
Sarasvati in his Vivara1Jopanyiisa, and by N rsirp.hasrama in his Pafica-piidikii-
vivara1Ja-bhiiva-prakiisikii.
ally, the awareness and its object seem to be different, but such
a psychological appearance can at best be considered as a mental
illusion or fiction; for logically the Buddhist cannot admit that a
momentary appearance could subsist long enough to have the
possibility of being relationed to the self and the awareness, as
in " I know the blue " ; and, if the blue was not considered to be
identical with awareness, there would remain no way to explain
the possibility of the appearance of the blue in the awareness 1 •
Padmapada points out that the main point with the Buddhists is
the doctrine of causal efficiency (artha-kriyii-kiiritva), or the maxim
that that alone exists which can prove its existence by effecting
some purpose or action. They hold further that this criterion of
existence can be satisfied only if all existents are momentary and
if all things are momentary; the only epistemological view that
can consistently be accepted is the identity of the awareness and
the object. The main reason why only momentary existents can
satisfy the criterion of causal efficiency is that, if the existents were
not assumed to be momentary, they could not effect any purpose
or action 2 • Padmapada urges in refutation of this that, if causal
efficiency means the productivity of its own awareness (sva-vifaya-
jiiiina-jananam), then an awareness or idea has no existence; for it
doesnotproduceanyotherknowledgeofitself(sa1Jlvidii1Jlsva-vifaya-
jiiiinii-jananiid asallak~m.zatvam}, and the awareness of one cannot be
known by others except by inference, which again would not be
direct cognition 3 • If causal efficiency means the production of
another moment, then the last moment, having no other moment
to produce, would itself be non-existent; and, if the last moment
is proved to be non-existent, then by turns all the other moments
would be non-existent. Existence is a nature of things; and even
when a thing remains silent after an operation it does not on that
account cease to exist4 • On such a basis Prakasatman points out
1 niinubhavam iisritya smrzvedaniid abhinna1,.n nllarrz bruma/:z kintu vi}niinena
nllasya pratibhiisiinyathiinupapattyii; k~m;ikasya tv iigantuka-sambandhiibhiive . ..

pratibhiisa eva na syiit. Paiica-piidikii-vivarm;a, p. 74·
2 See the first volume of this work, pp. I63-164, where the reasons in
justification of the doctrine are briefly stated.

3 Padmapada derives the possibility of one's being aware of an awareness,
which however hardly appears to be convincing. He thinks that an awareness,

being of the nature of light, does not stand in need of any other light to illuminate
it. na ca sat.nvit sarrzvido vifaya/:z samvid-iitmanii bhediibhiiviit pradipasyeva
pradipiintaram. Paiica-piidikii, p. 27.
' niirtha-kriyii-kiiritva-lak~a7Ja1.n sattvarrz kintu sviibhiivikam iti sakrt kiiryya1{l
krtvii tu~7Jlmbhutasycipi sthiiyina/:z sattvarrz na vimdhyate. Paiica-piidikii-•civara7Ja,
p. 8o.
that the supposed three notions of "I," "awareness" and the
object are really not three distinct notions appearing as one on
account of their similarity, but all the three are joined together in
one identical subject-object-awareness which does not involve the
three successive stages which the Buddhists suppose. This identity
is proved by the fact that they are recognized (pratyabhijiiii) to be
so. We are, again, all conscious of our own identity, that we persist
in all our changing states of consciousness, and that, though our
ideas are continually changing with the changing objects, we remain
unchanged all the same; and this shows that in knowing ourselves
as pure awareness we are successively connected with the changing
objects. But the question arises who is to be convinced of this
identity, a notion of which can be produced only by a relationing
of the previous existence (through sub-conscious impressions of
memory) to the existence of the present moment; and this
cannot be done by the Vedantic self, which is pure self-revealing
consciousness that cannot further be made an object of any
other conscious state; for it is unchangeable, indestructible, and
there cannot be in it a consciousness of relationing between a past
state and a present state through the sub-conscious impressions of
memory 1 • The mere persistence of the same consciousness is not
the recognition of identity; for the recognition of identity would
be a relation uniting the past as past with the present as present;
and, since there is no one to perceive the relation of identity, the
appearance of identity is false. The Vedantic answer to such an
objection is that, though the pure consciousness cannot behave as
an individual, yet the same consciousness associated with mind
(antal;karm.za-viS~ta) may behave as an individual who can
recognize his own identity as well as that of others. The mind
is associated with the sub-conscious impressions of a felt ego
(aharrzvrtti-sa1J1skiira-sahitam), due to the experience of the self as
associated with a past time; being responsible for the experience of
the self as associated with the present time, it produces the notion
of the identity of the self as persisting both in the past and in the
present. A natural objection against such an explanation is that,
since the Vedanta does not admit that one awareness can be the
object of another awareness, the revival of a past awareness is
1
purviinubhava-sm.nskiira-sahitiid idiini1Jltana-vastu-pramiti-kiira~ziij jiitam
ekasya kiila-dvaya-sa1Jlbandha-vi~ayaka1Jl pratyak$a-jiiiina1Jl pratyabhijiiii iti cet,
na tarhi iitmani sii sambhavati . .. vijiiiina-svabhii'vasya hy iitmanalz . . .jiiiiniinta-
riigamyatviit. . • Paiica-piidika-vivara1Ja, p. 7 5.
DII 3
impossible, without which recognition of identity would be im-
possible. The answer of the Vedantist is that, just as an idea is
remembered through its sub-conscious impressions, so, though
recognition of identity was absent in the preceding moment, yet
it could arise through the operation of the sub-conscious im-
pressions at a later moment 1 . According to the Vedanta the pure
consciousness is the only unchanging substance underlying; it is
this consciousness associated with mind (antal;zkara7Ja) that behaves
as the knower or the subject, and it is the same consciousness
associated with the previous and later time that appears as the
objective self with which the identity is felt and which is known
to be identical with the knower-the mind-associated conscious-
ness. Vv' e all have notions of self-identity and we feel it as "I am
the sarne"; and the only way in which this can be explained is on
the basis of the fact that consciousness, though one and universal,
can yet be supposed to perform diverse functions by virtue of the
diverse nature of its associations, by which it seems to transform
itself as the knower and the thousand varieties of relations and
objects which it knows. The main point which is to be noted in
connection with this realization of the identity of the self is that
the previous experience and its memory prove that the self existed
in the past; but how are we to prove that what existed is also existing
at the present moment? Knowledge of identity of the self is some-
thing different from the experience of self in the past and in the
present. But the process consists in this, that the two experiences
manifest the self as one identical entity which persisted through
both the experiences, and this new experience makes the self known
in the aforesaid relation of identity. Again, when I remember a
past experience, it is the self as associated with that experience that
is remembered; so it is the self as associated with the different
time relations that is apprehended in an experience of the identity
of self.
From all these discussions one thing that comes out clearly is
that according to the Sankara Vedanta, as explained by the Vivara7Ja
school of Padmapada and his followers, the sense-data and the
objects have an existence independent of their being perceived;
and there is also the mind called antal;zkara7Ja, which operates in
its own way for the apprehension of this or that object. Are objects
already there and presented to the pure consciousness through the
1
Paiica-piidika-vivara~za, p. 76.
xr] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 35
mind? But what then are the objects? and the Sankarite's answer
is that they in themselves are unspeakable and indescribable. It
is easy to notice the difference of such a view from that of the
Buddhistic idealism of Dinnaga or the Laizkavatiira on the one hand
and that of Vasubandhu in his Tri7Jlsika on the other. For in the
case of the former there were no objects independent of their being
perceived, and in the case of the latter the objects are trans-
formations of a thought-principle and are as such objective to
the subject which apprehends them. Both the subject and the
object are grounded in the higher and superior principle, the
principle of thought. This grounding implies that this principle
of thought and its transformations are responsible for both the
subject and the object, as regards material and also as regards form.
According to the Sankara Vedanta, however, the stuff of world-
objects, mind, the senses and all their activities, functionings and
the like are but modifications of miiyii, which is indescribable
(anirviicya) in itself, but which is always related to pure con-
sciousness as its underlying principle, and which in its forms as
material objects hides from the view and is made self-conscious
by the illuminating flash of the underlying principle of pure con-
sciousness in its forms as intellectual states or ideas. As already
described, the Siinyavadins also admitted the objective existence
of all things and appearances; but, as these did not stand the test
of criticism, considered them as being essenceless (ni/:zsvabhiiva).
The only difference that one can make out between this doctrine
of essencelessness and the doctrine of indescribableness of the
Sankara school is that this "indescribable" is yet regarded as an
indescribable something, as some stuff which undergoes changes and
which has transformed itself into all the objects of the world. The
idealism of the Sankara Vedanta does not believe in the sahopalam-
bha-niyama of the Buddhist idealists, that to exist is to be perceived.
The world is there even if it be not perceived by the individual;
it has an objective existence quite independent of my ideas and
sensations; but, though independent of my sensations or ideas, it
is not independent of consciousness, with which it is associated
and on which it is dependent. This consciousness is not ordinary
psy.:;hological thought, but it is the principle that underlies all
conscious thought. This pure thought is independent and self-
revealing, because in all conscious thought the consciousness
shines by itself; all else is manifested by this consciousness and
when considered apart from it, is inconceivable and unmeaning.
This independent and uncontradicted self-shiningness constitutes
being (abiidhita-svaya1{l-prakiisataiva asya sattii) 1 • All being is
pure consciousness, and all appearance hangs on it as something
which is expressed by a reference to it and apart from which
it has no conceivable status or meaning. This is so not only
epistemologically or logically, but also ontologically. The object-
forms of the world are there as transformations of the indescribable
stuff of miiyii, which is not" being," but dependent on" being";
but they can only be expressed when they are reflected in mental
states and presented as ideas. Analogies of wor1d objects with
dream objects or illusions can therefore be taken only as popular
examples to n1ake the conception of miiyii popularly intelligible;
and this gives the Vedantic idealism its unique position.
Sailkara's Defence of Vedanta; Philosophy of BadarayaQa

and Bhartrprapafica.
Sankara 's defensive arguments consisted in the refutation of
the objections that may be made against the Vedantic conception
of the world. The first objection anticipated is that from the
followers of Sarpkhya philosophy. Thus it is urged that the effect
must be largely of the same nature as the cause. Brahman, which
is believed to be intelligent (cetana) and pure (suddha), could not
be the cause of a world which is unintelligent (jatja and acetana)
and impure (asuddha). And it is only because the world is so
different in nature from the intelligent spirits that it can be useful
to them. Two things which are identical in their nature can hardly
be of any use to each other-two lamps cannot be illuminating to
each other. So it is only by being different from the intelligent
spirits that the world can best serve them and exist for them.
Sankara's answer to this objection is that it is not true that the
effect should in every way be similar to the cause-there are
instances of inanimate hair and nails growing from living beings,
and of living insects growing out of inanimate objects like cow-
dung. Nor can it be denied that there is at least some similarity
between Brahman and the world in this, that both have being.
It cannot be urged that, because Brahman is intelligent, the
world also should be intelligent; for there is no reason for such
1
Vacaspati Misra's Bhiimau, p. 13, Nin,1aya-Sagara edition, 1904.
XI] Sankara's Defence of Vedanta 37
an expectation. The converse of it also has not been found to be
true-it has not been found that what is unintelligent has been
known to have been derived from a source other than Brahman 1 •
The whole point of this argument seems to lie in the fact that,
since the Upani!?ads assert that Brahman is the cause of the world,
the apparent incompatibility of the production of an impure and
unintelligent world from the intelligent and pure Brahman has to
be explained away; for such ultimate truths can be discovered not
by reason, but by the testimony of the U pani!?ads. Another objec-
tion supposed to be raised by Sarp.khya against Vedanta is that at
the time of dissolution (pralaya), when the world of effects will
dissolve back into Brahman the cause, the impurities of the worldly
state might also make the causal state of Brahmahood impure.
Sankara refutes it by pointing out two sets of instances in which
the effects do not affect the causal state when they return to it.
Of these, one set of instances is to be found in those cases where
articles of gold, silver, etc. are melted back into their original
material states as unformed gold and silver, and are not seen to
affect them with their specific peculiarities as formed articles. The
other instance is to be found in the manifestation of magic by a
magician. The magical creations of a magician are controlled by
him and, when they vanish in this way, they cannot in any way
affect the magician himself; for the magical creations have no
reality. So also a dreamer is not affected by his dreams when he
is awake. So the reality is one which remains altogether un-
touched by the changing states. The appearance of this reality
as all the changing states is mere false show (miiyii-miitram), like
the appearance of a rope as a snake. Again, as a man may in
deep sleep pass into a state where there is no trace of his mundane
experiences and may yet, when he becomes awake, resume his
normal vocation in life, so after the dissolution of the world into
its causal state there may again be the same kind of creation as
there was before the dissolution. So there can be no objection
that the world of impure effects will affect the pure state of
Brahman at the time of dissolution or that there could be no
creation after dissolution.
These arguments of Sankara in answer to a supposed objection
1
kirrz hi yac caitanyeniinan'Litatp tad abrahma-prakrtika7fz dr~tmn iti brahma-
viidinarrz praty udiihriyeta samastasya vastujiitasya bralzma-prakrtikatviibhyu-
pagamiit. Sankara's Bhiirya, n. i. 6.
The Saizkara School of Vedanta (cH.
that the world of effects, impure and unintelligent as it is, could
not have been the product of pure and intelligent Brahman are
not only weak but rather uncalled for. If the world of effects
is mere miiyii and magic and has no essence (vastutva), the best
course for him was to rush straight to his own view of effects as
having no substantiality or essence and not to adopt the pari1Jiima
view of real transformations of causes into effects to show that
the effects could be largely dissimilar from their causes. Had
he started with the reply that the effects had no real existence
and that they were merely magical creations and a false show,
the objection that the impure world could not come out of pure
Brahman would have at once fallen to the ground; for such an
objection would have validity only with those who believed in the
real transformations of effects from causes, and not with a philo-
sopher like Sankara, who did not believe in the reality of effects
at all. Instead of doing that he proceeded to give examples of the
realistic return of golden articles into gold in order to show that
the peculiar defects or other characteristics of the effect cannot
affect the purity of the cause. Side by side with this he gives another
instance, how magical creations may vanish without affecting the
nature of the magician. This example, however, does not at all
fit in with the context, and it is surprising how Sankara failed
to see that, if his examples of realistic transformations were to hold
good, his example of the magic and the magician would be quite
out of place. If the pari1Jiima view of causation is to be adopted,
the vivaria view is to be given up. It seems however that Sankara
here was obliged to take refuge in such a confusion of issues by
introducing stealthily an example of the vivarta view of unreality
of effects in the commentary on sutras which could only yield a
realistic interpretation. The sutras here seem to be so convincingly
realistic that the ultimate reply to the suggested incompatibility of
the production of effects dissimilar from their causes is found in
the fact that the U pani~ads hold that this impure and unintelligent
world had come out of Brahman; and that, since the Upani~ads
assert it, no objection can be raised against it on grounds of reason.
In the next section the theory of realistic transformation of
causes is further supported by the sutra which asserts that in spite
of the identity of effects with their cause their plurality or diversity
may also be explained on the analogy of many popular illustrations.
Thus, though the waves are identical with the sea, yet they have
XI] Sankara' s Defence of Vedanta 39
an existence in their plurality and diversity as well. Here also
Sankara has to follow the implication of the siltra in his interpre-
tation. He, however, in concluding his commentary on this siltra,
says that the world is not a result of any real transformation of
Brahman as effect; Brahman alone exists, but yet, when Brahman
is under the conditioning phenomena of a world-creation, there is
room for apparent diversity and plurality. It may be pointed out,
however, that such a supplementary explanation is wholly incom-
patible with the general meaning of the rule, which is decidedly
in favour of a realistic transformation. It is unfortunate that here
also Sankara does not give any reason for his supplementary
remark, which is not in keeping with the general spirit of the
siltra and the interpretation which he himself gave of it.
In the next section the siltras seem plainly to assert the identity
of cause and effect, "because of the possibility of the effect, because
the cause exists, because the effect exists in the cause and is due
to an elaboration of the cause and also for other reasons and the
testimony of the Upani!?ads." Such a meaning is quite in keeping
with the general meaning of the previous sections. Sankara, however,
interprets the siitra as meaning that it is Brahman, the cause, which
alone is true. There cannot therefore be any real transformation
of causes into effects. The omniscience of Brahman and His heing
the creator of the world have thus only a limited validity; for they
depend upon the relative reality of the world. From the absolute
point of view therefore there is no Isvara who is the omniscient
creator of the world 1 . Sankara supports this generally on the ground
of the testimony of some Upani!?ad texts (e.g. mrttiketyeva satyam,
etc.). He however introduces an argument in support of the
sat-kiirya-viida theory, or the theory that the effect is already
existent in the cause. This theory is indeed common both to the
pari1Jiima view of real transformation and the vh·arta view, in
t\vo different ways. It is curious however that he should support
the sat-kiirya-'l·iida theory on parhziima lines, as against the genera-
tive view of a-sat-kiirya-'l'tl.da of the Nyaya, but not on vivaria
lines, "\vhere effects are treated as non-existent and false. Thus he
1 kfita-stlw-bwhmiitma-viidinah ekaf1.laihiintviit l.~itrlsitavvabluiv:alz ·l.~vmr'l
luirm;a-pratiJilii-virodha iti at; 1u;; avidyiitmak~-niillw-rfipa-hija-vyiik;lrtl~liipek

~mnit sar'i'ajiiat'l'fi.S}'a. Sankara's Bhtin•a on Rraltma-siltra. II. i. 14.
na hittvikam ais1·aryym!l sarvajiial'l!Wfi ca brahmm;ab ldntv avidyoptidhilwm
iti tadiiirayam pratiji-.ui-siltram, tattvtisraya1!l tu tad mwnyatva-sfitram. Bhlimatl
on the above Blui,~ya.
The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [cH.
says that the fact that curd is produced from milk and not from
mud shows that there is some such intimate relation of curd with
milk which it has not with anything else. This intimate relation con-
sists in the special power or capacity (Saktz) in the cause (e.g. the
milk), which can produce the special effect (e.g. the curd). This
power is the very essence of the cause, and the very essence of this
power is the effect itself. If a power determines the nature of the
effect, it must be already existent in the cause as the essence of the
effect. Arguing against the Nyaya view that the cause is different
from the effect~ though they are mutually connected in an insepar-
able relation of inherence (sama·ciiya), he says that, if such a
samaviiya is deemed necessary to connect the cause with the effect,
then this also may require a further something to connect the
samaviiya with the cause or the effect and that another and that
another ad infinitum. If it is urged that samaviiya, being a rela-
tion, does not require any further relation to connect it with anything
else, it may well be asked in reply how "conjunction" (smpyoga),
which is also regarded as a relation, should require the relation
of inherence (samm:iiya) to connect it with the objects which are in
conjunction (sa1Jlyogin). The conception of samaviiya connecting
substances with their qualities is unnecessary; for the latter always
appear identified with the former (tiidiitmya-pratUi). If the effect,
say a whole, is supposed to be existing in the cause, the parts, it
must exist in them all taken together or in each of the separate parts.
If the whole exist only in the totality of the parts, then, since all the
parts cannot be assembled together, the whole as such would be in-
visible. If the whole exist in the parts in parts, then one has to
conceive other parts of the whole different from its constituent
parts; and, if the same questions be again repeated, these parts
should have other parts and these others; and thus there would
be a vicious infinite. If the whole exists wholly in each of the
parts at the same time, then tl;lere would be many wholes. If it
exists successively in each of the parts, then the whole would at
one time be existent only in one part, and so at that time the
functions of the whole would be absent in the other parts. If it
is said that, just as a class-concept (e.g. cow) exists wholly in each
of the individuals and yet is not many, so a whole may also be
wholly existent in each of the parts, it may well be replied that
the experience of wholes is not like the experience of class-concepts.
The class-concept of cow is realized in each and every cow; but
XI] Sankara' s Defence of Vedanta
a whole is not realized in each and every part. Again, if the effect
is non-existent before its production, then, production being an
action, such an action would have nothing as its agent, which is
impossible-for, since the effect is non-existent before its pro-
duction, it could not be the agent of its production; and, since
being non-existent, it cannot be the agent of its production, such a
production would be either itself non-existent or would be without
any agent. If, however, production is not defined as an action, but as
a relationing of an effect with its cause (svakiira~a-sattii-samaviiya),
then also it may be objected that a relation is only possible when
there are two terms which are related, and, since the effect is as yet
non-existent, it cannot be related to its cause.
But, if the effect is already existent, what then is the necessity
of the causal operation (kiiraka-vyiipiira)? The answer to such a
question is to be found in the view that the effect is but an elabora-
tion of the cause into its effect. Just as a man may sit with
his limbs collected together or stretched out and yet would be
considered the same man, so an effect also is to be regarded as an
expansion of the cause and as such identical with it. The effect is
thus only a transformed state of the cause; and hence the causal
operation is necessary for bringing about this transformation; but
in spite of such a transformation the effect is not already existing
in the cause as its potency or power.
There are seven other smaller sections. In the first of these
the objection that, if the world is a direct product of the intelligent
Brahman, there is no reason why such an intelligent being should
create a world which is full of misery and is a prison-house to
himself, is easily answered by pointing out that the transcendent
creator is far above the mundane spirits that suffer misery in the
prison-house of the world. Here also Sankara adds as a supple-
mentary note the remark that, since there is no real creation and
the whole world is but a magical appearance, no such objection
that the creator should not have created an undesirable world for
its own suffering is valid. But the sz1tras gave him no occasion
for such a remark; so that indeed, as was the case with the
previous sections, here also his miiyii theory is not in keeping even
with his general interpretation of the siltras, and his remarks have
to be appended as a note which hangs loosely and which does not
appear to have any relevancy to the general meaning and purport
of the siltras.
In the next section an objection is raised that Brahman cannot
without the help of any other accessory agents create the world;
the reply to such an objection is found in the fact that Brahman
has all powers in Himself and can as such create the world out of
Himself without the help of anything else.
In the next section an objection is raised that, if the world is a
transformation of Brahman, then, since Brahman is partless, the
transformation must apply to the whole of Brahman; for a partial
transformation is possible only when the substance which is under-
going the transformation has parts. A reply to such an objection
is to be found in the analogy of the human self, which is in itself
formless and, though transforming itself into various kinds of
dream experiences, yet remains unchanged and unaffected as a
whole by such transformations. Moreover, such objections may
be levelled against the objectors themselves ; for Sa:rp.khya also
admits the transformation of the formless prakrti.
In another section it is urged that, since Brahman is complete
in Himself, there is no reason why He should create this great
world, when He has nothing to gain by it. The reply is based on
the analogy of play, where one has nothing to gain and yet one is
pleased to indulge in it. So Brahman also creates the world by His
ltlii or play. Sankara, however, never forgets to sing his old song
of the miiyii theory, however irrelevant it may be, with regard to
the purpose of the sutras, which he himself could not avoid
following. Thus in this section, after interpreting the siltra as
attributing the world-creation to God's playful activity, he remarks
that it ought not to be forgotten that all the world-creation is but
a fanciful appearance due to nescience and that the ultimate reality
is the identity of the self and Brahman.
The above discussion seems to prove convincingly that
Radarayal).a's philosophy was some kind of bhediibheda-viida or a
theory of transcendence and immanence of God (Brahman)-even
in the light of Sankara 's own commentary. He believed that the
world was the product of a real transformation of Brahman, or
rather of His powers and energies (saktz). God Himself was not
exhausted by such a transformation and always remained as the
master creator who by His play created the world and who could
by His own powers create the world without any extraneous
assistance. The world was thus a real transformation of God's
powers, while He Himself, though remaining immanent in the
XI) Philosophy of Biidariiyar;a and Bhartrprapaiica 43
world through His powers, transcended it at the same time, and
remained as its controller, and punished or rewarded the created
mundane souls in accordance with their bad and good deeds.
The doctrine of bhediibheda-·ciida is certainly prior to Sankara,
as it is the dominant view of most of the purii7Jas. It seems
probable also that Bhartrprapafica refers to Bodhayana. who is
referred to as vrttikiira by Ramanuja, and as 'L'rttikiira and Upa'L'ar~a
by Sankara, and to Drami<;lacarya, referred to by Sankara and
Ramanuja; all held some form of bhediibheda doctrine 1 • Bhartrpra-
pafica has been referred to by Sankara in his commentary on the
Brhadiira7Jyaka Upan#ad; and Anandajfiana, in his commentary
on Sankara's commentary, gives a number of extracts from
Bhartrprapafica's Bhii~ya on the Brhadiira7Jyaka Upan#ad. Prof.
l\1. Hiriyanna collected these fragments in a paper read before the
Third Oriental Congress in l\Iadras, 1924, and there he describes
Bhartrprapafica's philosophy as follows. The doctrine of Bhartr-
prapafica is monism, and it is of the bhediibheda type. The relation
between Brahman and the fiva, as that between Brahman and the
world, is one of identity in difference. An implication of this view
is that both the jlva and the physical world evolve out of Brahman,
so that the doctrine may be described as Brahma-pari7Jiima-viida.
On the spiritual side Brahman is transformed into the antaryiimin
and the fiva; on the physical side into a<L-yakta, sutra, viriij and
devatii, which are all cosmic; and jati and pi1J¢a, which are not
1 Prof. S. Kuppusvami Sastri, in an article read before the Third Oriental
Conference, quotes a passage from Venkata's Tattva-tikO. on Ram~nuja's com-

mentary on the Brahma-srl.tras, in which he says that Upavar~a is a name of
Bodhayana-vrttikarasya Bodhiiyanasyai·l:a hi Upavar~a iti syan nama-Pro-
ceedings of the Third Oriental Conference, lV1adras, 1924. The commentators on
Sankara's Bha~ya say that, when he refers to Vrttikara in 1. i. 9, 1. i. 23, 1. ii. 23
and III. iii. 53, he refers to Upa,·ar~a by name. From the views of Upavar!?a
referred to in these siitras it appears that UpaYar~a believed in the theory of
jiiO.na-karma-samuccaya, held also by Bhaskara (an adherent of the bhediibheda
theory), Ramanuja and others, but vehemently opposed by Sankara, who wanted
to repudiate the idea of his opponents that the performance of sacrificial and
Vedic duties could be conceived as a preliminary preparation for making oneself
fit for Brahma-knowledge.
References to Drami9.acarya's commentary on the Chiindogya Upani~adare
made by Anandagiri in his commentary on Sankara's commentary on the Chan-
dogya Upani~ad. In the commentary of San·ajfilitma Muni's Sm,zk~epa-siirzraka,
m. 217-227, by Nrsirphasrama, the Vakyakara referred to bySan·aji'iatma 1\1 uni as
Atreya has been identified with Brahmanandin or Tanka and the bha~yakara
(a quotation from ·whose BhiiD·a appears in Smph~epa-siirlraka, 111. 2.21. "antar-
gu~zii bhaga•vatl paradevateti," is referred to as a quotation from Dramic,lacarya
in Ramanuja's Vediirtha-sa'f!zgraha, p. 138, Pandit edition) is identified with
Dramidaclina, who wrote a commentary on Brahmanandin's Clu"iudogyo-
pani~ad-viirttilw.
cosmic. These are the avasthas or modes of Brahman, and re-

present the eight classes into which the variety of the universe
may be divided. They are again classified into three rasis, para-
miitma-riiSi, jiva-riiSi and milrttiimilrtta-riiSi, which correspond to
the triple subject-matter of Religion and Philosophy, viz. God,
soul and matter. Bhartrprapaiica recognized what is known as
pramii!la-samuccaya, by which it follows that the testimony of
common experience is quite as valid as that of the Veda. The
former vouches for the reality of variety and the latter for that of
unity (as taught in the Upani!?ads). Hence the ultimate truth is
dvaitiidvaita. Mo~a, or life's end, is conceived as being achieved
in two stages-the first leading to apavarga, where sarrzsiira is
overcome through the overcoming of asaizga; and the second
leading to Brahmahood through the dispelling of avidyii. This
means of reaching either stage is jiiiina-karma-samuccaya, which
is a corollary on the practical side to pramii!la-samuccaya on the
theoretical side.
It is indeed difficult to say what were the exact characteristics
of Badarayal).a 's bhediibheda doctrine of Vcdanta; but there is very
little doubt that it was some special type of bhediibheda doctrine,
and, as has already been repeatedly pointed out, even Sankara's
own commentary (if we exclude only his parenthetic remarks, which
are often inconsistent with the general drift of his own commentary
and the context of the siltras, as well as with their purpose and
meaning, so far as it can be made out from such a context) shows
that it was so. If, however, it is contended that this view of real
transformation is only from a relative point of view (vyavahiirika),
then there must at least be one siltra where the absolute (piira-
miirthika) point of view is given; but no such siltra has been dis-
covered even by Sankara himself. If experience always shows the
causal transformation to be real, then how is one to know that in
the ultimate point of view all effects are false and unreal? If,
however, it is contended that there is a real transformation
(pari!liima) of the miiyii stuff, whereas Brahman remains always
unchanged, and if miiyii is regarded as the power(sakti) of Brahman,
how then can the sakti of Brahman as well as its transformations
be regarded as unreal and false, while the possessor of the sakti (or
the saktimat, Brahman) is regarded as real and absolute? There
is a great diversity of opinion on this point among the Vedantic
writers of the Sankara school. Thus Appaya Dik!?ita in his Sid-
dhiinta-lesa refers to the author of Padiirtha-nir!laya as saying that
XI) Vivaria and Paril;iima in Vedanta 45
Brahman and miiyii are both material causes of the world-appear-
ance-Brahman the vivaria cause, and miiyii the pari7Jii.ma cause.
Others are said to find a definition of causation intermediate
between vivaria and pari7Jii.ma by defining material cause as that
which can produce effects which are not different from itself (svii-
bhinna-kiirya janakaivam upiidiinatvam). The world is identical with
Brahman inasmuch as it has being, and it is identical with nescience
inasmuch as it has its characteristics of materiality and change. So
from two different points of view both Brahman and miiyii are the
cause of the world. Vacaspati Misra holds that miiyii is only an acces-
sory cause (sahakiiri), whereas Brahman is the real vivaria cause 1 •
The author of the Siddhiinia-mukiiivali, Prakasananda, however,
thinks that it is the miiyii energy (miiyii-sakii) which is the material
cause of the world and not Brahman. Brahman is unchangeable
and is the support of miiyii; and is thus the cause of the world in
a remote sense. Sarvajiiatma Muni, however, believes Brahman
alone to be the vivaria cause, and miiyii to be only an instrument
for the purpose 2 • The difficulty that many of the siliras of
BadarayaQa give us a pari7Jii.ma view of causation was realized by
Sarvajiiatma .:\Iuni, who tried to explain it away by suggesting that
the pari7Jiima theory was discussed approvingly in the sfitras only
because this theory was nearest to the vivaria, and by initiating
people to the pari7Jiima theory it would be easier to lead them to
the vivaria theory, as hinted in sut1·a 11. i. 143 • This explanation
could have some probability, if the arrangement of the siltras was
1 Vacaspati Mjsra flourished in about A.D. 840. In addition to his Bluimatz
commentary on the Brahma-sutra he wrote many other works and commentaries

on other systems of philosophy. His important \Vorks are: Tattva-bindu, Tattva-
vaiiaradl (yoga), Tattva-samik~ii Brahma-siddhi-{ikii, Nyiiya-lw1Jikii on Vidhi-
viveka, N yiiya-tattviiloka, N yiiya-ratna-tlkii, Nyciya-viir ttika- tiitparya-tlkii,
Brahma-tattva-sa1{lhitoddipanl, Yukti-dipikii (Siil!lkhya), Sii1{lklzya-tattva-
kaumudi, Vediinta-tattva-kaumudi.
2 He lived about A.D. 900 during the reign of King Manukuladitya and was
a pupil of Devesvara.
3 vivarta-viidasya hi pilrva-bhumir
vediinta-viide pari~ziima-viidaft
vyavasthite 'smin pari1Jiima-viide
svaya1{l samiiyiiti vh·arta-viidaft.
Sa1{lk~epa-siirlraka, n. 61.
upiiyam iitisthati pi"irvam uccair
upeyam iiPIU1fl janatii yathaiva
irutir munindroi ca vivarta-siddhyai
vikiira-viida1{l vadatas tathaiva. Ibid. II. 62.
vikiira-viida1{l Kapiliidi-pak~am
upetya viidena tu siitra-kiiraft
irutis ca sa1{ljalpati piirvabhumau
stlzitvii vivarta-pratipiidaniiya. Ibid. 11. 64.
The Sankara School of J..7 edanta [cH.
such as to support the view that the pari1Jlima view was intro-
duced only to prepare the reader's mind for the vivarta view,
which was ultimately definitely approved as the true view; but it
has been shown that the content of almost all the siltras of n. i.
consistently support the pari1Jiima view, and that even the siltra
n. i. 14 cannot be explained as holding the vivarta view of
causation as the right one, since the other siltras of the same
section have been explained by Sailkara himself on the pari1Jiima
view; and, if the content be taken into consideration, this sutra also
has to be explained on the pari1_liima view of bhediibheda type.
Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta.

The central emphasis of Sailkara's philosophy of the Upani~ads
and the Brahma-siltra is on Brahman, the self-revealed identity of
pure consciousness, bliss and being, which does not await the
performance of any of the obligatory Vedic duties for its realiza-
tion. A right realization of such U pani!?ad texts as "That art
thou," instilled by the right teacher, is by itself sufficient to dispel
all the false illusions of world-appearance. This, however, was
directly against the MimaiJlsa view of the obligatoriness of certain
duties, and Sankara and his followers had to fight hard on this
point with the MimaiJlsakas. Different l\1imaiJlSa writers empha-
sized in different ways the necessity of the association of duties with
Brahma-wisdom; and a brief reference to some of these has been
made in the section on Suresvara. Another question arose re-
garding the nature of the obligation of listening to the unity texts
(e.g. "that art thou") of the Vedanta; and later Vedanta writers
have understood it differently. Thus the author of the Prakatlirtha,
who probably flourished in the twelfth century, holds that it is
only by virtue of the mandate of the Upani~ads (such as "thou
shouldst listen to these texts, understand the meaning and medi-
tate") that one learns for the first time that one ought to listen
to the Vedanta texts-a view which is technically called apilrva-
vidhi. Others, however, think that people might themselves
engage in reading all kinds of texts in their attempts to attain
salvation and that they might go on the wrong track; and it is just
to draw them on to the right path, viz. that of listening to the
unity texts of the U pani!?ads, that the U pani!?ads direct men to
listen to the unity texts--this view is technically called niyama-vidhi.
XI] Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta 47
The followers of Sarvajfiatma Muni, however, maintain that there
can in no sense be a duty in regard to the attainment of wisdom of
Brahma-knowledge, and the force of the duty lies in enjoining the
holding of discussions for the clarification of one's understanding;
and the meaning of the obligatory sentence "thou shouldst listen
to" means that one should hold proper discussions for the clarifi-
cation of his intellect. Other followers of Suresvara, however, think
that the force of the obligation lies in directing the student of
Vedanta steadily to realize the truth of the Vedanta textswithoutany
interruption; and this view is technically called parisa'flkhyii-vidhi.
Vacaspati l\1isra and his followers, however, think that no obliga-
tion of duties is implied in these commands; they are simply put
in the form of commands in order to show the great in1portance
of listening to Vedanta texts and holding discussions on them, as
a means of advancement in the Vedantic course of progress.
But the central philosophical problem of the Vedanta is the
conception of Brahman-the nature of its causality, its relation
with miiyii and the phenomenal world of world-appearance, and
with individual persons. Satikara's own writings do not always
manifest the same uniform and clear answer; and many passages
in different parts of his work show tendencies which could be
more or less diversely interpreted, though of course the general
scheme was always more or less well-defined. Appaya Dik~ita
notes in the beginning of his Siddhiinta-lesa that the ancients were
more concerned with the fundamental problem of the identity
of the self and the Brahman, and neglected to explain clearly
the order of phenomenal appearance; and that therefore many
divergent views have sprung up on the subject. Thus shortly after
Sankara's death we have four important teachers, Suresvara and
his pupil Sarvajfiatma Muni, Padmapada and Vacaspati Misra,
who represent three distinct tendencies in the monistic interpre-
tation of the Vedanta. Suresvara and his pupil Sarvajiiatma lVIuni
held that miiyii was only an instrument (dviira), through which
the one Brahman appeared as many, and had its real nature hidden
from the gaze of its individual appearances as individual persons.
In this view miiyii was hardly recognized as a substance, though it
was regarded as positive; and it was held that miiyii had, both for
its object and its support, the Brahman. It is the pure Brahman
that is the real cause underlying all appearances, and the miiyii
only hangs on it like a veil of illusion which makes this one thing
The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH.
appear as many unreal appearances. It is easy to see that this
view ignores altogether the importance of giving philosophical
explanations of phenomenal appearance, and is only concerned to
emphasize the reality of Brahman as the only truth. Vacaspati's
view gives a little more substantiality to miiyii in the sense that
he holds that miiyii is coexistent with Brahman, as an accessory
through the operation of which the creation of world-appearance
is possible; miiyii hides the Brahman as its object, but it rests on
individual persons, who are again dependent on mayii, and miiyii on
them, in a beginningless cycle. The world-appearance is not mere
subjective ideas or sensations, but it has an objective existence,
though the nature of its existence is inexplicable and inde-
scribable; and at the time of dissolution of the world (or pralaya)
its constitutive stuff, psychical and physical, will remain hidden
in av£dyii, to be revived again at the time of the next world-
appearance, otherwise called creation. But the third view, namely
that of Padmapada, gives miiyii a little more substantiality, re-
garding it as the stuff which contains the double activity or power
of cognitive activity and vibratory activity, one determining the
psychical process and the other the physical process, and regarding
Brahman in association with miiyii, with these two powers as
lsvara, as the root cause of the world. But the roots of a very
thoroughgoing subjective idealism also may be traced even in the
writings of Sankara himself. Thus in the Brhadara7Jyaka-bhii~ya he
says that, leaving aside theories of limitation (avaccheda) or reflec-
tion (pratibimba), it may be pointed out that, as the son of Kunti
is the same as Radheya, so it is the Brahman that appears as
individual persons through beginningless avidyii; the individual
persons so formed again delusively create the world-appearance
through their own avidya. It will be pointed out in a later section
that MaQ.9ana also elaborated the same tendency shortly after
Sankara in the ninth century. Thus in the same century we
have four distinct lines of Vedantic development, which began to
expand through the later centuries in the writers that followed one
or the other of these schools; and some additional tendencies also
developed. The tenth century seems to have been very barren in
the field of the Vedanta, and, excepting probably Jiianottama IV1isra,
who wrote a commentary on Suresvara's Varttika, no writer of great
reputation is known to us to have lived in this period. In other
fields of philosophical development also this century was more or
XI) Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta 49
less barren, and, excepting Udayana and Sridhara in Nyaya-
Vaise~ika, Utpala in Astronomy and Abhinavagupta in Saivism,
probably no other persons of great reputation ~an be mentioned.
There were, however, a few Buddhistic writers of repute in this
period, such as Candragomin (junior) of Rajshahi, the author of
Nyiiya-loka-siddhi, Prajiiakara Gupta of Vikramasila, author of
Pramii1Ja-viirtikiilmikiira and Salzopalambha-niScaya, Acarya J etari
of Rajshahi, the author of Hetu-tattvopade~a, Dharma-dharmi-
viniscaya and Balavatiira-tarka, Jina, the author of Prama7Ja-
vartikiilaizkara-fikii, Ratnakirti, the author of the Apoha-siddhi,
K~a7Ja-bhaizga-siddhi and Sthira-siddhi-du~a1Ja, and Ratna Vajra,
the author of the Yukti-prayoga. The eleventh century also does
not seem to have been very fruitful for Vedanta philosophy. The
only author of great reputation seems to have been Anandabodha
Bhattarakacarya, who appears to have lived probably in the latter
half of the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth century.
The mahavidyii syllogisms of Kularka PaQ.<;\ita, however, probably
began from some time in the eleventh century, and these were often
referred to for refutation by Vedantic writers till the fourteenth
century, as will be pointed out in a later section. But it is certain
that quite a large number of Vedantic writers must have worked on
the Vedanta before Anandabodha, although we cannot properly
trace them now. Anandabodha says in his Nyaya-makaranda that
his work was a compilation (sa1[lgraha) from a large number of
Vedantic monographs (nibandha-pu~piiiijalz). Citsukha in his com-
mentary on the Nyaya-makaranda points out (p. 346) that Ananda-
bodha was refuting a view of the author of the Brahma-prakiisika.
According to Govindananda's statement in his Ratna-prabhii,
p. 3 I I, Amalananda of the thirteenth century refuted a view of
the author of the Prakatartha. The author of the Prakatartha may
thus be believed to have lived either in the eleventh or in the
twelfth century. It was a commentary on Sankara's Bha~ya, and
its full name was Sarlraka-bhii~ya-prakatiirtha; and Anandajfiana
(called also Janardana) wrote his Tattviiloka on the linesofVedantic
interpretation of this work. l\h Tripathi says in his introduction
to the Tarka-sartzgraha that a copy of this work is available in
Tekka l\latha; hut the present writer had the good fortune of
goir.g through it from a manuscript in the Adyar Library, and
a short account of its philosophical views is given below in a
separate section. In the Siddhanta-lesa of Appaya Dik!?ita we
DII 4
so The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
hear of a commentary on it called Prakatiirtha-vivara'!la. But,
though Anandajfiana wrote his Tattviiloka on the lines of the
Prakatiirtha, yet the general views of Anandajfiana were not
the same as those of the author thereof; Anandajfiana's position
was very much like that of Sarvajfiatma lVIuni, and he did not
admit many ajfiiinas, nor did he admit any difference between
miiyii and avidyii. But the author of the Prakatiirtha,so far as can be
judged from references to him in the Siddhiinta-lda,gave a separate
place to the antal.zkara'!las of individual persons and thought that,
just as the jzvas could be cognizers through the reflection of pure
intelligence in the anta/.zkara'!la states, so Isvara is omniscient by
knowing everything through miiyii modifications. The views of
the au thor of the Prakatiirtha regarding the nature of vidhi have
already been noted. But the way in which Anandajfiana refers to
the Prakafii;tha in J\!lu'!ll]aka, p. 32, and Kena, p. 23, shows that
he was either the author of the Prakatiirtha or had written
some commentary to it. But he could not have been the author of
this work, since he refers to it as the model on which his Tattviiloka
was written; so it seems very probable that he had written a
commentary to it. But it is surprising that Anandajfiana, who
wrote commentaries on most of the important commentaries of
Sankara, should also trouble himself to write another commentary
on the Prakatiirtha, which is itself a commentary on Sankara's
commentary. It may be surmised, therefore, that he had some
special reasons for respecting it, and it may have been the work of
some eminent teacher of his or of someone in his parental line.
However it may be, it is quite unlikely that the work should have
been written later than the middle of the twelfth century 1 •
It is probable that Gangapur1 Bhattaraka also lived earlier than
Anandabodha, as Citsukha points out. Gangapur1 must then have
lived either towards the latter part of the tenth century or the first
half of the eleventh century. It is not improbable that he may
have been a senior contemporary of Anandabodha. His work,
Padiirtha-tattva-niT1:zaya, was commented on by Anandajfiana. Ac-
cording to him both miiyii and Brahman are to be regarded as the
cause of the world. All kinds of world-phenomena exist, and being
may therefore be attributed to them; and being is the same what-
ever may be the nature of things that exist. Brahman is thus the
changeless cause in the world or the vivarta-kiira'!la; but all the
1
See Tripathi's introduction to the Tarlw-saf!Zgraha.
XI] Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta
changing contents or individual existents must also be regarded
as products of the transfonnation of some substance, and in this
sense miiyii is to be regarded as the pari1Jiimi-kiira1Ja of the world.
Thus the world has Brahman as its vivarta-kiira1Ja and miiyii as its
pari1Jiimi-kiira1Ja. The world manifests both aspects, the aspect of
changeless being and that of changing materiality; so both miiyii
and Brahman form the material cause of the world in two different
ways ( Brahma miiyii ca ity ubhayopiidiinam; sattva-jiitjya-rupobhaya-
dharmiinugaty-upapattis ca). Tarka-viveka and Siddhiinta-viveka
are the names of two chapters of this book, giving a summary
of Vaise~ika and Vedanta philosophy respectively. The view of
Gangapuri in the Padiirtha-tattva-nin_zaya just referred to seems
to have been definitely rejected by Anandabodha in his Pramii1Ja-
miilii, p. 16.
When Kularka had started the mahii-vidyii syllogisms, and great
Nyaya authors such as Jayanta and Udayana in the ninth and tenth
centuries had been vigorously introducing logical methods in philo-
sophy and were trying to define all that is knowable, the Vedantic
doctrine that all that is knowable is indefinable was probably
losing its hold; and it is probable that works like Anandabodha's
Pramii1Ja-miilii and Nyiiya-dtpiivalt in the eleventh century or in the
early part of the twelfth century were weakly attempting to hold
fast to the Vedantic position on logical grounds. It was Sriha~a
who in the third quarter of the twelfth century for the first time
attempted to refute the entire logical apparatus of the Naiyayikas.
Srihar!?a's work was carried on in Citsukha's Tattva-pradzpikii in
the early part of the thirteenth century, by Anandajiiana in the
latter part of the same century in his Tarka-SaYflg1·aha and by
Nrsirrhasrama l\!Iuni in hisBheda-dhikkiira in the sixteenth century.
On the last-named a pupil, NarayaQ-asrama, wrote his Bheda-
dhikkiira-satkriyii, and this had a sub-commentary, called Bheda-
dhikkiira-satkriyojjvalii. The beginnings of the dialectical argu-
ments can be traced to Sankara and further back to the great
Buddhist writers, Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Candrakirti, etc. Interest
in these dialectical arguments was continuously kept up by com-
mentaries written on these works all through the later centuries.
The names of these commentators have been mentioned in the
sections on Srihar~a, Citsukha and Anandajiiana.
Moreover, the lines of Vedanta interpretation which started
with Suresvara, Padmapada and Vacaspati were vigorously
4-2
The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
continued in commentaries and in independent works through-
out the later centuries. Thus in the middle of the thirteenth
century Vacaspati 's Bhiimatf was commented on by Amalananda
in his Kalpa-taru; and this Kalpa-taru was again commented on by
Appaya Dik!?ita in the latter part of the sixteenth century and the
first quarter of the seventeenth century, and by Lak!?minrsirpha
in his Abhoga towards the end of the seventeenth century or the
beginning of the eighteenth 1 •
Padmapada's Paiica-piidikii was commented on by Prakasatman
in the thirteenth century in his Paiica-piidikii-vivara7Ja, by AkhaQ-
c.lananda in the fourteenth century in his Tattva-dipana, by Vidya-
raQya in the same century in his Vivara1}a-prameya-sa1Jlgraha, by
AnandapiirQa and Nrsirpha in the sixteenth century and by
Rama Tirtha in the seventeenth century 2 • The line of Suresvara
also continued in the summary of his great Viirttika (called Viirt-
tika-siira) by VidyaraQya and its commentaries, and also in the
commentaries on the Sa1Jl~epa-siiriraka from the sixteenth cen-
tury onwards. Many independent works were also written by
persons holding more or less the same kinds of views as Sarvaj-
iiatma Muni 3 • The philosophy of dHti-snfi-viida Vedanta, which
was probably started by MaQc.lana, had doubtless some adherents
too; but we do not meet with any notable writer on this line,
except Prakasananda in the sixteenth century and his pupil Nana
Dik~ita. The Vediinta-kaumudi is an important work which is
1 Allala Suri, son of Trivikramacarya, wrote a commentary on the Bhiimatl,
called the Bhiimatl-tilaka.

2
Samyagbodhendra Sarpyamin, pupil of GirviiQ.endra (A.D. 1450), wrote a
summary of the main contents of the Paiica-piidikii-vivaratza in six chapters (var-
tzaka), and this work is called by two names, Advaita-bhi4atza and Vivaratza-
prameya-sa1fl!Iraha. There are again two other commentaries on Prakasatman's
Paiica-piidika-vit.:aratza: the Riju-vivaratza by Vi~Q.ubhana, son of Janardana
Sarvajiia and pupil of SvamindrapiJ.rQ.a, and the Tfkii-ratna by AnandapiJ.rQ.a.
The Riiu-vit-·aratza had again another commentary on it, called the Trayyanta-
bhiiva-pradzpikii, by Ramananda, pupil of Bharati Tirtha.
There are, however, two other commentaries on the Pafica-piidikii called
Paiica-piidikii-vyiikhyii (by an _author whose name is not definitely known) and
the Prabandha-pariiodhini by Atmasvarupa, pupil of Nrsirphasvarupa. Dharma-
rayadhvarindra also wrote a commentary on Pafica-piidikii, called the Paiica-
piidikii-tlkii.
3
Apart from the two published commentaries on the Smpktepa-siirfraka, there
is another work called the Sa1flktepa-siirlraka-sambandhokti by V edananda,
pupil of Vedadhyak~a-bhagavat-pujyapada, in which the author tries to show the
mutual relation of the verses of it as yielding a consistent meaning. Nrsirpha-
srama also wrote a commentary on the Sa1flk~epa-siirlraka, called the Tattva-
bodhinl. One Sarvajnatma Bhagavat wrote a small Vedantic work, called Paiica-
praluiyii; but it is not probable that he is the same as Sarvajiiatma Muni.
XI) Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta 53
referred to by Appaya Dik!?ita in his Siddhiinta-lesa. In this work
the omniscience of Brahman consists in the fact that the pure con-
sciousness as Brahman manifests all that exists either as actually
transformed or as potentially transformed, as future, or as latently
transformed, as the past in the miiyii; and it is the Paramesvara
who manifests Himself as the underlying consciousness (siilqin) in
individual persons, manifesting the ajiiiina transformations in them,
and also their potential ajiiiina in dreamless sleep. Many other
important Vedanta views of an original character are expressed in
this book. This work of Ramadvaya has been found by the present
writer in the Govt. Oriental MSS. Library, Madras, and a separate
section has been devoted to its philosophy. From references in
it to followers of Madhva it may be assumed that the Vediinta-
kaumudz was written probably in the fourteenth century.
From the fourteenth century, however, we have a large number
of Vedanta writers in all the succeeding centuries; but with the
notable exception of Prakasananda, Madhusudana Sarasvati in his
Advaita-siddhi (in which he tried to refute the objections of Vyasa
Tirtha against the monistic Vedanta in the sixteenth century) and
probably Vidyara:gya's Vivara7Ja-prameya-Sa1Jlgraha and Dhar-
marajadhvarindra's Paribhii~ii, and its Sikhiima!Ji commentary by
Ramakr!?:ga, there are few writers who can be said to reveal any
great originality in Vedantic interpretations. Most of the writers of
this later period were good compilers, who revered all sorts of past
Vedantic ideas and collected them in well-arranged forms in their
works. The influence of the Pmica-piidikii-vi'l'ara7Ja, however, is very
strong in most of these writers, and the Vivara7Ja school of thought
probably played the most important part in Vedantic thought
throughout all this period.
These Vedantic writers grew up in particular circles inspired
by particular teachers, whose works were carried on either in their
own families or among their pupils; a few examples may make this
clear. Thus Jagannathasrama was a great teacher of south India in
the latter half of the fifteenth century; he had a pupil in N rsirph-
asrama, one of the most reputed teachers of Vedanta in the early
half of the sixteenth century. He was generally inspired on the one
hand by the Vivara7Ja and on the other by Srihar!?a and Citsukha
and SarvajfHitma Muni: ht: wrote a number of Vedanta works,
such as Advaita-dzpikii (his pupil, Naraya:gasrama, wrote a com-
mentary called Advaita-dipikii-vivara7Ja on it}, Advaita-pafica-
ratna, Advaita-bodha-dlpikii, Advaita-ratna-ko~a, Tattva-bodhini, a
commentary on the Saf!Z}qepa-siiriraka, Tattva-viveka (which had
two commentaries, Tattva-viveka-dipana of Narayat:lasrama and
Tattva-·civecana of Agnihotra, pupil of Jiianendra Sarasvati), Paii-
ca-piidikii-'l)ivara7Ja-prakaSikii, Bheda-dhikkiira, Adv.mita-ratna-vyii-
khyiina (a commentary on l\fallanarodiya's Advaita-ratna), and
Vediinta-tattva-vi'l:eka. The fact that he could write commentaries
both on Sarvajfiatma lVIuni's work and also on the Vivara7Ja, and
also write a Bheda-dhikkiira (a work on dialectic Vedanta on the
lines of Sriha~a's dialectical work) shows the syncretistic ten-
dencies of the age, in which the individual differences within the
school were all accepted as different views of one Vedanta, and in
which people were more interested in Vedanta as a whole and felt
no hesitation in accepting all the Vedantic ideas in their works.
Nrsiqlhasrama had a pupil Dharmarajadhvarindra, who wrote a
Vediinta-paribhii~ii, a commentary called Tarka-cut;liima7Ji on the
Tatt'l:a-cintiima7Ji of Gangesa, and also on the Nyaya-siddhiinta-
dipa of Sasadhara Acarya, and a commentary on the Paiica-piidikii
of Padmapada. His son and pupil Ramakn;:ga Dik~ita wrote a com-
mentary on the first, called Vediinta-Sikhiima7Ji; and Amaradasa,
the pupil of Brahmavijfiana, wrote another commentary on this
Sikhiima7Ji of Ramakr~Qa1 . Ramak~t:la had also written a com-
mentary on Rucidatta's Tattva-cintiimm;i-prakiisa, called Nyiiya-
Sikhiimm:zi, and a commentary on the Vediinta-siira. Other authors,
such as Kasinatha Sastrin and Brahmendra Sarasvati, had also
written separate works bearing the name Vediinta-pm·ibhii~ii after
the Vediinta-paribhii~ii of Dharmaraja in the seventeenth century.
Under the sphere of Nrsirpha's influence, but in the Saiva and
lVIImarpsaka familyofRangarajaAdhvarin,was hom Appaya Dik~ita,
who became one of the most reputed teachers of the sixteenth and
the seventeenth centuries. His works have all been noted in the
section devoted to him. He again was a teacher of Bhattoji Dik~ita,
who in addition to many works on grammar, law and ritual (st{lrtz)
wrote two important works on Vedanta, called Tattva-kaustubha
and Vediinta-tattva-dipana-vyiikhyii, the latter a commentary on
the commentary, Tattva-viveka-dlpana, of Narayat:lasrama (a pupil
of Nrsi111hasrama) on the latter's work, Vediinta-tnttva-vi·z:eka.
This Narayal)asrama had also written another commentary on
1
Petta Dik~ita, son of Narayal)a Dik~ita, also wrote a commentary on
the Vedanta-paribht1~ii, called Vediinta-paribha~ii-prakiiSikii.
XI] Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta 55
N rsi~phasrama's Bheda-dhikkiira, called Bheda-dhikkiira-satkriyii;
and later on in the eighteenth century another commentary was
written on Nrsi~pha's Bheda-dhikkara, called Advaita-candrikii, by
Narasi~pha Bhatta, pupil of Ramabhadrasrama and Nagesvara in
the eighteenth century. Bhattoji Dilq;ita's son Bhanuji Dik~ita was
a commentator on the Amara-ko~a (Vyiikhyii-sudhii or Subodhinl).
Bhattoji was, however, a pupil not only of Appaya, but also of
Nrsi~phasrama Muni. Bhattoji's younger brother and pupil, Rail-
goji Bhana, wrote two works, the Advaita-cintiima1}i and the Ad-
vaita-siistra-siiroddhiira, more or less on the same lines, containing
a refutation of Vaise~ika categories, a determination of the nature
of the self, a determination of the nature of ajiiiina and the nature of
the doctrine of reflection, proofs of the falsity of world-appearance
and an exposition of the nature of Brahman and how Brahmahood
is to be attained. His son Kol).<;la Rhana was mainly a grammarian,
who wrote also on Vaise~ika. Again Madhusiidana Sarasvati, who
,was a pupil of Visvesvara Sarasvati (pupil of Sarvajfia Visvesa
and pupil's pupil of Govinda Sarasvati), lived in the early half
of the sixteenth century and was probably under the influence of
N rsi~phasrama, who is reputed to have defeated Madhusiidana
Sarasvati's teacher, l\1adhava Sarasvati. Madhusiidana had at
least three pupils, Puru~ottama, who wrote on IVIadhusiidana's
commentary the Siddhiinta-tattva-bindu a commentary called
Siddhiinta-tattva-bindu-tzkii 1 ; the others were Balabhadra and
Se~agovinda (the latter of whom wrote a commentary on Sati.kara's
Sarva-darsana-siddhiinta-saf!Zgraha, called Sarva-siddhiinta-raha-
sya-tikii). Again Sadananda, the author of the Vediinta-siira, one
of the most popular and well-read syncretistic works on Vedanta,
was a contemporary of N rsi~phasrama; N rsi~pha Sarasvati wrote
in I 588 a commentary thereon, called Subodhinl. Devendra,
the author of the SviinubhUti-prakiisa, was also a contemporary of
N rsi~phasrama. It has already been pointed out that Prakasananda
was probably a contemporary of Nrsi~phasrama, though he
does not seem to have been under his influence. This shows how
some of the foremost Vedanta writers of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries grew up together in a Vedantic circle, many of
whom were directly or indirectly under the influence of N rsi~p
hasrama and Appaya Dik!?ita.
1
Brahmananda wrote on the Siddhiinta-bindu another commentary, called
Siddhlinta-bindu-Jlkii.
Passing to another circle of writers, we see that Bhaskara
Dik~ita, who lived in tPe latter half of the seventeenth century,
wrote a commentary, Ratna-tillikii, on the Siddhiinta-siddhiifijana of
his teacher Kr~Q.ananda. The Siddhiinta-siddhiifijana is an excellent
syncretistic work on Vedanta, which contains most of the im-
portant Vedanta doctrines regarding the difference of dharma-viciira
and brahma-viciira, the relation of Mimarp.sa theories of commands,
and the need of Brahma-knowledge; it introduces many Mimarp.sa
subjects and treats of their relations to many relevant Vedanta
topics. It also introduces elaborate discussions on the nature of
knowledge and ignorance. It seems, however, to be largely free from
the influence of the Vivara7Ja, and it does not enter into theories
of perception or the nature of the antal:zkara1Ja and its vrtti.
It is thus very different from most of the works produced in the
sixteenth century in the circles of Nrsirp.ha or Appaya. Kr~Q.ananda
lived probably in the middle of the seventeenth century. He had
for teacher Ramabhadrananda; and Ramabhadrananda was taught
by Svayarp.prakasananda, the author of the Vediinta-naya-bhu~a1Ja,
a commentary on the Brahma-siltra on the lines of Vacaspati Misra's
Bhiimatt. This Svayarp.prakasa must be distinguished from the
other Svayarp.prakasa, probably of the same century, who was a
pupil of Kaivalyananda Yogindra and the author of the Rasiibhi-
vyafijikii, a commentary of Ad~·aita-makaranda of Lak~midhara
Kavi. Ramabhadrananda had as his teacher Ramananda Sarasvati,
the author of the Vediinta-siddhiinta-candrikii, on which a commen-
tary was written by Gangadharendra Sarasvati (A.D. 1826), pupil of
Ramacandra Sarasvati and pupil's pupil of Sarvajiia Sarasvati, and
author of the Sii1Jlriijya-siddhi with its commentary, the Kaivalya-
kalpadruma. Prakasananda was a pupil of Advaitananda, author of
the Brahma-vidyiibhara1Ja, a commentary on Sankara's Siiriraka-
bhii~ya-Advaitananda was a disciple of Ramatirtha, author of the
Anvaya-prakii!ikii (a commentary on the Sa1!llqepa-siiriraka of
Sarvajiiatma l\1uni) and a disciple of Kr~I).atirtha, a contemporary
of Jagannathasrama, the teacher of Nrsiip.hasrama. Ramatirtha's
Anvaya-prakiisikii shows an acquaintance with Madhusiidana's
Advaita-siddhi; and he may thus be considered to have lived in the
middle of the seventeenth century. Svayarp.prakasananda, again, had
for pupil Mahadevananda, or V edantin Mahadeva, the author of
the Advaita-dntii-kaustubha or Tattviinusandhiina. It seems very
clear that these writers of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth
XII Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta 57
centuries flourished in a different circle of Vedantic ideas, where
the views of Vacaspati, Suresvara and Sarvajfiatma 1.V1uni had
greater influence than the authors of the Vivara'!la school of
Vedanta. Another important syncretistic Vedanta writer is Sada-
nanda Kasmiraka, author of the Advaita-brahma-siddhi, who lived in
the early part of the eighteenth century. The Advaita-brahma-siddhi
is an excellent summary of all the most important Vedanta doc-
trines, written in an easy style and explaining the chief features of
the Vedantic doctrines in the different schools of Advaita teachers.
Narahari's Bodha-siira may be mentioned as one of the important
products of the late eighteenth century 1 .
The sort of relationship of teachers and students in particular
circles that has been pointed out holds good of the earlier authors
also, though it is difficult to trace them as well as can be done in
the later years, since many of the earlier books are now missing
and the footprints of older traditions are becoming more and more
faint. Thus it may be pointed out that Vidyara:t:lya was a con-
temporary of Amalananda in the fourteenth century, as both of them
1
A number of other important Vedanta works, written mostly during the
seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, may also be mentioned. Thus Lokanatha,
son of Sarvajii.anarayarya and grandson of Nrsiq1hasrama, wrote a metrical work
in three chapters refuting the views of the dualists, called Advaita-muktii-
siira with a commentary on it called Kiinti; Brahmananda Sarasvati wrote
the Advaita-siddhiinta-vidyotana; Gopalananda Sarasvati, pupil of Yo_gananda,
wrote the Akhm:uJiitma-prakiiSikii; Harihara Param~haq1sa, pupil of Sivarama,
pupil of Visvdvarasrama, wrote the Anubha·va-·ciliisa, and early in the nineteenth
century Samin, a pupil of Brahmananda, wrote a big work in twelve chapters,
called Brahmiinanda-viliisa. In this connection it may not be out of place to
mention the names of some important works of Vedanta dialectics in refutation
of oth~r systems of philosophical views more or less on the lines of those dialec-
tical writings which have been noticed in the present volume. Thus Ananda-
pu ·rya (A.D. 16oo), who commented on Srihar~a's Kha~uJana-khm:uJa-khiidya, wrote
the Nyiiya-candrikii in four chapters, refuting the views of the Nyaya, Mimliq1sa
and Vaise~ika; Anandanubhava, pupil of Narayarya Jyotisha, who lived probably
in the same century, wrote a similar work, called Padiirtha-t{1ttva-nirtzaya;
}fianaghana, who probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote an elaborate
dialectical work in thirty-three chapters (pralzara1Ja), called Tattva-suddhi;
Srinivasa Yajvan, who probably lived in the sixte:>nth century, wrote the Vtidii-
vall in twenty-six chapters in refutation of Visi~ta<.lvaita and Dvaita views;
Bhavanisari.kara also wrote a similar dialectical work, called Siddhiinta-dipikii.
As examples of semi-popular Vedanta works of a syncretistic type, such works
as the Tattva-bodha of Vasude\'endra, the Gu1Ja-traya-vi·veka of Svayaq1prakasa
Yogindra, the Jagan-mithyiitva-dtpikii of Ramendra Yogin, the Ananda-dlpa of
Si\'anandaYati(whichhadacommentarycalledAnanda-dlpa-flkiirbyRamanatha),
the Sviitma-yoga-pradipa by Yogisvara (which had a commentary by Amarananda)
and the Ved£1nta-hrdaya (on the lines of the Yoga-vr1si~tha and Gau~la
p;ida) by Varada Pary<;!ita may be mentioned. This latter work was probably later
than Prakasananda's Vedii.nta-siddhiinta-muktiivali, which followed the same line
of thought.
ss The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
were pupils of Sailkarananda and Anubhavananda respectively;
these in turn were both pupils of Anandatman. Sailkarananda
was the author of the Gitii-tiitparya-bodhini and of a number of
comm.entaries on the various Upani~ads, and alsu of a summary
of the Upani~ads, called Upanifad-ratna. Amalananda, however,
had as teacher not only Anubhavananda, but also Sukhaprakasa
1\Iuni, who again was a disciple of Citsukha, himself a disciple of
Gau9e8vara Acarya (called also }fianottama).
Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist

Doctrine of Soullessness.
One of the most important points of Sailkara's criticism of
Buddhism is directed against its denial of a permanent soul which
could unite the different psychological constituents or could behave
as the enjoyer of experiences and the controller of all thoughts
and actions.
The Buddhists argue that for the production of sense-cognition,
as the awareness of a colour or sound, what is required in addition
to the sense-data of colours, etc. is the corresponding sense-
faculties, while the existence of a soul cannot be deemed indispens-
ahle for the purpose 1 • Vasubandhu argues that what is experienced
is the sense-data and the psychological elements in groups called
skandhas. \Vhat one calls self (iitman) cannot be anything more
than a n1ere apparent cognitional existence (prajiiapti-sat) of what
in reality is but a conglomeration of psychological elements. Had
the apparent self been something as different from the psycho-
logical elements as colours are from sounds, it would then be
regarded as an individual (pudgala); but, if its difference from these
psychological elements be of the same nature as the difference of
the constituents of milk from the appearance of milk, then the self
could be admitted only to have a cognitional existence (prajiiapti-
sat)2. The self has, in fact, only a cognitional appearance of
separateness from the psychological elements; just as, though
1 The arguments here followed are those of Vasubandhu, as found in his
A.blzidharma-koia, and are based on Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of the ap-

pendix to ch. viii of that work, called the Pudgala-viniicaya, and Ya8omitra's
commentary in manuscript from Nepal, borrowed from Visvabhaniti, Santini-
ketan, Bengal.
2 yadi yathii rupiidi/:l iabdiider bhiiviintaram abhipreyate pudgala iti abhyu-
pagato blzavati blzinna-/ak~a7JOf!& lzi rfipaf!& sabdiid ityiidi k~lriidivat samudii.yas cet
prajfiaptita/:l. Abhidharma-kosa-vyiikh:va, Visvabharati MS. p. 337.
XI) Soul in T7 ediinta and Buddhism 59
milk appears to have a separate existence from the proper com-
bination of its constituent elements, yet it is in reality nothing
more than a definite kind of combination of its constituent
elements, so the self is nothing more than a certain conglomeration
of the psychological elements (skandha), though it may appear to
have a separate and independent existence. The Vatsiputriyas,
however, think that the individual is something different from the
skandhas or psychological entities, as its nature is different from
the nature of them. The Vatsiputriyas deny the existence of a
permanent soul, but believe in momentary individuals (pudgala)
as a category separate and distinct from the skandhas. Just as fire
is something different from the fuel that conditioned it, so the
name "individual" (pudgala) is given to something conditioned
by the skandhas at a given moment in a personallife 1 • Vasuban-
dhu, however, argues against the acceptance of such an individual
and says that there is no meaning in accepting such an individual.
Rain and sun have no effects on rriere vacuous space, they are of
use only to the skin; if the individual is, like the skin, a deter-
miner of the value of experiences, then it must be accepted as
external; if it is like vacuous space, then no purpose is fulfilled
by accepting it 2 • The Vatsiputriyas, however, thought that, just as
the fuel conditioned the fire, so the personal elements conditioned
the individual. By this conditioning the Vatsiputriyas meant that
the personal elements were some sort of a coexisting support 3 •
'Vhat is meant by saying that the pudgala is conditioned by the
personal elements is that, when the skandhas or psychological
elements are present, the pudgala is also present there 4 • But
Vasubandhu urges that a mere conditioning of this kind is not
sufficient to establish the cognitional existence of an individual;
for even colour is conditioned by the visual sense, light and
attention in such a way that, these being present, there is the
perception of light; but can anybody on that ground consider the
1 Stcherbatsky's translation of the Pudgala-uiniicaya, Bulletin de l'Academie
des Sciences de Russie, p. 830.

The exacttextofVasubandhu,as translated from Tibetan in a note, runs thus:
grhua-pratyutpanniibhyantara-skandham upiidiiya pudgala-prajiiaptib. Ibid. p. 953.
2 ViitsiputriyiitJii1Jl tirthika-dntib prasajyate nifprayojanatva1Jl ca
varfiita-piibhyii1Jl kirrz vyomnai carmat}y-asti tayob phalam

carmopamai cet sa nityab khatulyas ced asatphala!z.
MS. of Yasomitra's commentary, p. 338.
3 iisraya-bhutab saha-bhutas ca. Ibid.
4 rilpasyiipi prajiiaptir vakta•vyii cakfur-iidifu satsu tasyopalambhiit, tiini cak-
fUr-iidfny upiidiiya riipam prajiiiipyate. Ibid.

6o The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
existence of colour to be a cognitional one? And would cognitional

entities deserve to be enumerated as separate categories? Again it
may be asked, if such an individual exists, how is it experienced?
For, if it be experienced by any of the senses, it must be a sense-
datum: for the senses can grasp only their appropriate sense-data,
and the individual is no sense-datum. Therefore, just as milk is
nothing but the colJected sense-data of colour, taste, etc., so also
the so-called individual is nothing more than the conglomerated
psychological elements 1 • The Vatsiputriyas argue that, since the
psychological elements, the sense-data, etc., are the causes of our
experience of the individual, the individual cannot be regarded as
being identical with these causal elements which are responsible
for their experience; if it were so, then even light, eye, attention,
etc., which are causes of the experience of the sense-data, would
have to be regarded as being identical in nature with the indi-
vidual2. But it is not so maintained; the sense-datum of sounds and
colours is always regarded as being different from the individual,
and one always distinguishes an individual from a sense-datum and
says "this is sound," "this is colour" and "this is individual 3 ." But
the individual is not felt to be as distinct from the psychological
elements as colour is from sound. The principle of ditierence or
distinctness consists in nothing but a difference of moments; a
colour is- different from a sound because it is experienced at a
different moment, while the psychological elements and the indi-
vidual are not experienced at different moments 4 • But it is argued
in reply that, as the sense-data and the individual are neither
different nor identical (ratio essendi), so their cognition also is
neither different nor identical in experience (ratio cognoscendz) 5 •
But Vasubandhu says that, if such a view is taken in this case, then
it might as well be taken in all cases wherever there is any con-
glomeration6. Moreover, the separate senses are all limited to their
special fields, and the mind which acts with them is also limited
1
yathii rilpiidiny e•l.'a samastiini samuditiini k~lram iti udakam iti vii prajfiiipyate,
tathii skandhiii ca samastii pudgala iti praji1iipyate, iti siddham. MS. of Yaso-
mitra's commentary, p. 339 A.
2
yathii rilpam pudgalopalabdheb kiira7Ja't!l bhavati sa ca tebhyo 'nyo na
vaktavyafz iiloka-cak~ur-manaskiirii api rilpopalabdhe}:z kiira7Ja1!1 bhavati tad api
tad-abhinna-svabhiiva}:z pudgala}:z priipnoti. Ibid. 3 Ibid. p. 339 B.
4
svalak$a1Jiid api kfa1Jiintaram anyad ity udiihiiryam. Ibid.
5
yathii rilpa-pudgalayor anyiinanyatvam avaktavyam e'VO"f!l tadupalabdhyor
api anyiinanyatvam avaktavyam. Ibid.
6
yo 'ya'f!l siddhiintab pudgala eva vaktavya}:z so 'yam bhidyate sa'f!ZSkrtam
api avaktavyam iti krtvii. Ibid.
XI] Soul in Vedanta and Buddhism 61
to the data supplied by them; there is, therefore, no way in which
the so-called individual can be experienced. In the Ajita sermon
Buddha is supposed to say: "A visual consciousness depends upon
the organ of sight and a visible object. When these three (object,
sense organ and consciousness) combine, a sensation is produced.
It is accompanied by a feeling, a representation and a volition.
Only so much is meant, when we are speaking of a human being.
To these (five sets of elements) different names are given, such
as a sentient being, a man, Manu's progeny, a son of Manu, a
child, an individual, a life, a soul. If with respect to them the
expression is used 'he sees the object with his own eyes,' it is false
imputation (there being in reality nobody possessing eyes of his
own). In common life such expressions with respect to them are
current as 'that is the name of this venerable man, he belongs to
such a caste and such a family, he eats such food, this pleases him,
he has reached such an age, he has lived so many years, he has
died at such an age.' These 0 brethren ! accordingly are mere
words, mere conventional designations.
'Expressions are they, (but not truth)!
Real elements have no duration :
Vitality makes them combine
In mutually dependent apparitions 1 . ' "
The Vatsiputriyas however refer to the Bhiira-hiira-siltra, in
which Buddha is supposed to say: "0 brethren, I shall explain unto
you the burden (of iife ), and moreover I shall explain the taking up
of the burden, the laying aside of it and who the carrier is .... What
is the burden? All the five aggregates of elements-the substrates
of personal life. What is meant by the taking up of the burden?
The force of craving for a continuous life, accompanied by pas-
sionate desires, the rejoicing at many an object. What is the laying
aside of the burden? It is the wholesale rejection of this craving
for a continuation of life, accompanied as it is by passionate desires
and rejoicings at many an object, the getting rid of it in every
circumstance, its extinction, its end, its suppression, an aversion
to if, its restraint, its disappearance. Who is the carrier? We must
answer: it is the individual, i.e. 'this venerable man having this
name, of such a caste, of such a family, eating such food, finding
pleasure or displeasure at such things, of such an age, who after a
1 Stcherbatsky's translation in Bulletin de l' Acadbnie des Sciences de Russie.
6z The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
life of such length will pass away having reached such an age 1 . ' "
But V asubandhu points out that the carrier of the burden is not
to be supposed to be some eternal soul or real individual. It is
the momentary group of elements of the preceding moment that
is designated as the burden, and the immediately succeeding one
tb.e carrier of the burden (bhiira-hara) 2 •
The Vatsiputriyas again argue that activity implies an active
agent, and, since knowing is an action, it also implies the knower
who knows,just as the walking of Devadatta implies a Devadatta
who walks. But Vasubandhu's reply to such a contention is that
there is nowhere such a unity. There is no individual like Devadatta:
what we call Devadatta is but a conglomeration of elements. "The
light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an un-
interrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this
production changes its place, we say that the light has moved.
Similarly consciousness is a conventional name for a chain of
conscious moments. When it changes its place (i.e. appears in
co-ordination with another objective element), we say that it ap-
prehends that object. And in the same way we speak about the
existence of material elements. \Ve say matter 'is produced,' 'it
exists'; but there is no difference between existence and the
element which does exist. The same applies to consciousness
(there is nothing that cognizes) apart from the evanescent flashing
of consciousness itself) 3 ."
It is easy to see that the analysis of consciousness offered by the
Vedanta philosophy of the Sankara school is entirely different from
this. The Vedanta holds that the fact of consciousness is entirely
different from everything else. So long as the assemblage of the
physical or physiological conditions antecedent to the rise of any
cognition, as for instance, the presence of illumination, sense-
object contact, etc., is being prepared, there is no knowledge, and
it is only at a particular n1oment that the cognition of an object
arises. This cognition is in its nature so much different from each
and all the elements constituting the so-called assemblage of con-
ditions, that it cannot in any sense be regarded as the product of
1
Stcherbatsky's translation.
2
Y asomitra points out that there is no carrier of the burden different from
the collection of the skandhas-bharadanavan na skandhebhyo 'rthantara-bhutal.z
pudgala ity arthal.z. Abhidharma-kosa-vyakhya, Visvabharati MS.
3 Stcherbatsky's translation in Bulletin de l'Academie des Sciences de Russie,
pp. 938-939·
XI) Soul in Vedanta and Buddhism
any collocation of conditions. Consciousness thus, not being a
product of anything and not being further analysable into any
constituents, cannot also be regarded as a momentary flashing.
Uncaused and unproduced, it is eternal, infinite and unlimited.
The main point in which consciousness differs from everything
else is the fact of its self-revelation. There is no complexity in
consciousness. It is extremely simple, and its only essence or
characteristic is pure self-revelation. The so-called momentary
flashing of consciousness is not due to the fact that it is
momentary, that it rises into being and is then destroyed the
next moment, but to the fact that the objects that are revealed
by it are reflected through it from time to time. But the conscious-
ness is always steady and unchangeable in itself. The immediacy
(aparok~atva) of this consciousness is proved by the fact that, though
everything else is manifested by coming in touch with it, it itself
is never expressed, indicated or manifested by inference or by
any other process, but is always self-manifested and self-revealed.
All objects become directly revealed to us as soon as they come in
touch with it. Consciousness (sa'l(lvid) is one. It is neither identical
with its objects nor on the same plane with them as a constituent
element in a collocation of them and consciousness. The objects
of consciousness or all that is manifested in consciousness come
in touch with consciousness and themselves appear as conscious-
ness. This appearance is such that, when they come in touch
with consciousness, they themselves flash forth as consciousness,
though that operation is nothing but a false appearance of the non-
conscious objects and mental states in the light of consciousness,
as being identical with it. But the intrinsic difference between
consciousness and its objects is that the former is universal (pratyak)
and constant (anuvrtta), while the latter are particular (ap1·atyak)
and alternating (vyiivrtta). The awarenesses of a book, a table, etc.
appear to be different not because these are different flashings of
knowledge, but because of the changing association of conscious-
ness with these objects. The objects do not come into being with
the flashings of their awareness, but they have their separate
existence and spheres of operation 1 • Consciousness is one and
unchanging; it is only when the objects get associated with it that
1 tattva-daril tu nityam advitzyarrz v~iiiiinarrz vi~ayiis ca tatriidhyastiib Prthag-
artha-kriyii-samarthiis te~iiTfl ciibiidhitarrz sthiiyitvam astui vadati. Vivara7Ja-

prameya-sa'f!ZI!Taha, p. 74, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1893.
they appear in consciousness and as identical with it in such a way
that the flashing of an object in consciousness appears as the
flashing of the consciousness itself. It is through an illusion that
the object of consciousness and consciousness appear to be welded
together into such an integrated whole, that their mutual difference
escapes our notice, and that the object of consciousness, which is
only like an extraneous colour applied to consciousness, does not
appear different or extraneous to it, but as a specific mode of the
consciousness itself. Thus what appear as but different aware-
nesses, as book-cognition, table-cognition, are not in reality
different awarenesses, but one unchangeable consciousness suc-
cessively associated with ever-changing objects which falsely appear
to be integrated with it and give rise to the appearance that quali-
tatively different kinds of consciousness are flashing forth from
moment to moment. Consciousness cannot be regarded as momen-
tary. For, had it been so, it would have appeared different at every
different moment. If it is urged that, though different conscious-
nesses are arising at each different moment, yet on account of
extreme similarity this is not noticed; then it may be replied that,
if there is difference between the two consciousnesses of two
successive moments, then such difference must be grasped either
by a different consciousness or by the same consciousness. In the
first alternative the third awareness, which grasps the first two
awarenesses and their difference, must either be identical with
them, and in that case the difference between the three awarenesses
would vanish; or it may be different from them, and in that case,
if another awareness be required to comprehend their difference
and that requires another and so on, there would be a vicious
infinite. If the difference be itself said to be identical with the
nature of the consciousness (sartzvit-svarupa-bhuto bhedal;), and if
there is nothing to apprehend this difference, then the non-
appearance of the difference implies the non-appearance of the
consciousness itself; for by hypothesis the difference has been held
to be identical with the consciousness itself. The non-appearance of
difference, implying the non-appearance of consciousness, would
mean utter blindness. The difference between the awareness of
one moment and another cannot thus either be logically proved,
or realized in experience, which always testifies to the unity of
awareness through all moments of its appearance. It may be held
that the appearance of unity is erroneous, and that, as such, it
XI] Recognition in Vedanta and Buddhism
presumes that the awarenesses are similar; for without such a
similarity there could not have been the erroneous appearance of
unity. But, unless the difference of the awarenesses and their
similarity be previously proved, there is nothing which can even
suggest that the appearance of unity is erroneous 1 • It cannot be
urged that, if the existence of difference and similarity between the
awarenesses of two different moments can be proved to be false,
then only can the appearance of unity be proved to be true; for the
appearance of unity is primary and directly proved by experience.
Its evidence can be challenged only jf the existence of difference
between the awarenesses and their similarity be otherwise proved.
The unity of awareness is a recognition of the identity of the
awarenesses (pratyabhijiiii), which is self-evident.
It has also been pointed out that the Buddhists give a different
analysis of the fact of recognition. They hold that perception
reveals the existence of things at the moment of perception,
whereas recognition involves the supposition of their existence
through a period of past time, and this cannot be apprehended
by perception, which is limited to the present moment only. If it
is suggested that recognition is due to present perception as asso-
ciated with the impressions (sa1(lskiira) of previous experience,
then such a recognition of identity would not prove the identity
of the self as" I am he "-for in the self-luminous self there cannot
be any impressions. The mere consciousness as the flash cannot
prove any identity; for that is limited to the present moment and
cannot refer to past experience and unite it with the experience
of the present moment. The Buddhists on their side deny the
existence of recognition as the perception of identity, and think
that it is in reality not one but two concepts-" I" and "that"-
and not a separate experience of the identity of the self as per-
sisting through time. To this the Vedantic reply is that, though
there cannot be any impressions in the self as pure consciousness,
yet the self as associated with the mind (antal:zkarar.za) can well
have impressions (sa1(lskiira), and so recognition is possible 2 • But
it may be objected that the complex of the self and mind would
then be playing the double role of knower and the known; for it
is the mind containing the impressions and the self that together
1
Vivaratza-prameya-sa1'[lgraha, p. 76.
2
kevale cidiitmani janya-jfiiina-tat-sa'!zskiirayor asambhave 'py antabkarmJa-
visine tat-sambhaviid ukta-pratyabhijfiii ki'!l na syiit. Ibid. p. 76.
DII 5
66 The Saiikara School of Vedanta [cH.
play the part of the recognizer, and it is exactly those impressions
together with the self that form the content of recognition also-
and hence in this view the agent and the object have to be regarded
as one. But in reply to this VidyaraJ).ya Muni urges that all systems
of philosophy infer the existence of soul as different from the
body; and, as such an inference is made by the self, the self is thus
both the agent and the object of such inferences. VidyaraJ).ya says
that it may further be urged that the recognizer is constituted of
the self in association with the mind, whereas the recognized entity
is constituted of the self as qualified by past and present time 1 •
Thus the recognition of self-identity does not strictly involve the
fact of the oneness of the agent and its object. If it is urged that,
since recognition of identity of self involves two concepts, it also
involves two moments, then the assertion that all knowledge is
momentary also involves two concepts, for momentariness cannot
be regarded as being identical with knowledge. The complexity
of a concept does not mean that it is not one but two different
concepts occurring at two different moments. If such a maxim is
accepted, then the theory that all knowledge is momentary cannot
be admitted as one concept, but two concepts occurring at two
moments; and hence momentariness cannot be ascribed to know-
ledge, as is done by the Buddhists. Nor can it be supposed, in
accordance 'vith the Prabhakara view, that the existence of the
permanent "this self" is admitted merely on the strength of the
recognizing notion of "self-identity"; for the self which abides
through the past and exists in the present cannot be said to depend
on a momentary concept of recognition of self-identity. The notion
of self-identity is only a momentary notion, which lasts only at the
present time; and hence the real and abiding self cannot owe its
reality or existence merely to a psychological notion of the moment.
Again, if it is argued that memory, such as "I had an
awareness of a book," shows that the self was existing at the past
time when the book was perceived, it may be replied that such
memory and previous experience may prove the past existence of
the self, but it cannot prove that the self that was existing in the
past is identical with the self that is now experiencing. The mere
existence of self at two moments of time does not prove that the
self had persisted through the intervening times. Two notions of
1
antabkara~a-viiinatayaiviitmanab pratyabhijiiiitrtvaiJl purviipara-kiila-vi-
si~!atayii ca pratyabhijiieyatvam. Vivara~a-prameya-sa'!lgraha, p. 77.
XI] Recognition in Vedanta and Buddhism
two different times cannot serve to explain the idea of recognition,
which presupposes the notion of persistence. If it were held that
the two notions produce the notion of self-persistence through the
notion of recognition, then that would mean that the Buddhist
admits that one can recognize himself as "I am he." It cannot
be said that, since the self itself cannot be perceived, there is no
possibility of the perception of the identity of the self through
recognition; for, when one remembers " I had an experience," that
very remembrance proves that the self was perceived. Though at
the time when one remembers it the self at the time of such memory
is felt as the perceiver and not as the object of that self-perception,
yet at the time of the previous experience which is now being
remembered the self must have been itself the object of the per-
ception. If it is argued that it is only the past awareness that is
the object of memory and this awareness, when remef!lbered, ex-
presses the self as its cognizer, then to this it may be replied that
since at the time of remembering there is no longer the past
awareness, the cognizer on whom this awareness had to rest itself
is also absent. It is only when an awareness reveals itself that ·it
also reveals the cognizer on whom it rests; but, if an awareness is
remembered, then the awareness which is remembered is only
made an object of present awareness which is self-revealed. But
the past awareness which is supposed to be remembered is past
and lost and, as such, it neither requires a cognizer on which it
has to rest nor actually reveals such a cognizer. It is only the
self-revealed cognition that also immediately reveals the cognizer
with its own revelation. But, when a cognition is mediated through
memory, its cognizer is not manifested with its remembrance 1
So the self which experienced an awareness in the past can be
referred to only through the mediation of memory. So, when the
Prabhakaras hold that the existence of the self is realized through
such a complex notion as "I am he," it has to be admitted that
it is only through the process of recognition (pratyabhifiiii) that
the persistence of the self is established. The main point that
VidyaraQ.ya Muni urges in his Vivarm:za-prameya-sa'!lgraha is that
the fact of recognition or the experience of self-identity cannot be
explained by any assumption of two separate concepts, such as the
memory of a past cognition or cognizer and the present awareness.
1
svayarrzprakiisamiinarrz hi sal!lvedanam iisrayarrz siidhayati na tu smrti-
vitayatayii para-prakiisyam. Vivarat.za-prameya-sarrzgraha, p. 78.
5•2
68 The Saizkara School of Vedanta (CH.
We all feel that our selves are persisting through time and that I
who experienced pleasure yesterday and I who am experiencing new
pleasures to-day are identical; and the only theory by which this
notion of self-persistence or self-identity can be explained is by
supposing that the self exists ·and persists through time. The
Buddhist attempts at explaining this notion of self-identity by the
supposition of the operation of two separate concepts are wholly
inadequate, as has already been shown. The perception of self-
identity can therefore be explained only on the basis of a per-
manently existing self.
Again, the existence of self i3 not to be argued merely through
the inference that cognition, will and feeling presuppose some entity
to which they belong and that it is this entity that is called self; for,
if that were the case, then no one would be able to distinguish his
own self from that of others. For, if the self is only an entity
which has to be presupposed as the possessor of cognition, will,
etc., then how does one recognize one's own cognition of things as
differing from that of others? What is it that distinguishes my
experience from that of others? l\Iy self must be immediately
perceived by me in order that I may relate any experience to myself.
So the self must be admitted as being self-manifested in all ex-
perience; without admitting the self to be self-luminous in all
experience the difference between an experience as being my
own and as belonging to others could not be explained. It may
be objected by some that the self is not self-luminous by itself,
but only because, in self-consciousness, the self is an object of
the cognizing operation (sarrzvit-karma). But this is hardly valid;
for the self is not only cognized as an object of self-consciousness,
but also in itself in all cognitional operations. The self cannot be
also regarded as being manifested by ideas or percepts. It is not
true that the cognition of the self occurs after the cognition of the
book or at any different time from it. For it is true that the
cognition of the self and that of the book take place at the same
point of time; for the same awareness cannot comprehend two
different kinds of objects at the same time. If this was done at
different points of time, then that would not explain our ex-
perience-" I have known this." For such a notion implies a
relation between the knower and the known; and, if the knower
and the known were grasped in knowledge at two different points
of time, there is nothing which could unite them together in the
xr] Self-luminosity of the Self
same act of knowledge. It is also wrong to maintain that the self
is manifested only as the upholder of ideas; for the self is mani-
fested in the knowing operation itself. So, since the self cannot be
regarded as being either the upholder or cognizer of ideas or their
object, there is but one way in which it can be considered as self-
manifesting or self-revealing (sva-prakiisa). The immediacy of the
self is thus its self-revealing and self-manifesting nature. The
existence of self is thus proved by the self-luminous nature of the
self. The self is the cognizer of the objects only in the sense that
under certain conditions of the operation of the mind there is the
mind-object contact through a particular sense, and, as the result
thereof, these objects appear in consciousness by a strange illusion;
so also ideas of the mind, concepts, volitions and emotions appear
in consciousness and themselves appear as conscious states, as if
consciousness was their natural and normal character, though in
reality they are only illusorily imposed upon the consciousness-
the self-luminous self.
Anandabodha Bhattarakadirya, from whom VidyaraQya often
borrows his arguments, says that the self-luminosity of the self has
to be admitted, because it cannot be determined as being mani-
fested by anything else. The self cannot be regarded as being
perceived by a mental perception (miinasa pratyak~a); for that
would involve the supposition that the self is the object of its
own operation; for cognition is at any rate a function of the self.
The functions of cognition belonging to the self cannot affect the
self itself 1 • The Vedanta has also to fight against the Prabhakara
view which regards cognition as manifesting the object and the
self along with itself, as against its own view that it is the self
which is identical with knowledge and which is self-manifesting.
Anandabodha thus objects to the Prabhakara view, that it is the
object-cognition which expresses both the self and the not-self,
and holds that the self cannot be regarded as an object of awareness.
Anandabodha points out that it may be enunciated as a universal
proposition that what is manifested by cognition must necessarily
be an object of cognition, and that therefore, if the self is not an
object of cognition, it is not manifested by cognition 2 • Therefore
the self or the cognizer is not manifested by cognition; for, like
1
tatlzii sati sviidhiira-vijiiii:na-vrtti-vyiipyat·viid iitmanal.z karmatve sviitmani
vrtti-virodhiid iti briinwl.z. Nyiiya-makaranda, p. 13 I.
2
Ibid. pp. 134-135·
70 The Saizkara School of Vedanta (CH.
cognition, it is self-manifested and immediate without being an
object of cognition 1 •
The self-luminosity of cognition is argued by Anandabodha.
He says that, if it is held that cognition does not manifest itself,
though it manifests its objects, it may be replied that, if it were so,
then at the time when an object is cognized the cognizer would have
doubted if he had any cognition at the time or not. If anyone is
asked whether he has seen a certain person or not, he is sure about
his own knowledge that he has seen him and never doubts it. It is
therefore certain that, when an object is revealed by any cognition,
the cognition is itself revealed as well. If it is argued that such a
cognition is revealed by some other cognition, then it might require
some other cognition and that another and so on ad infinitum;
and thus there is a vicious infinite. Nor can it be held that there
is some other mental cognition (occurring either simultaneously
with the awareness of the object or at a later moment) by which
the awareness of the awareness of the object is further cognized.
For from the same mind-contact there cannot be two different
awarenesses of the type discussed. If at a later moment, then, there
is mind-activity, cessation of one mind-contact, and again another
mind-activity and the rise of another mind-contact, that would
imply many intervening moments, and thus the cognition which is
supposed to cognize an awareness of an object would take place at
a much later moment, when the awareness which it has to reveal is
already passed. It has therefore to be admitted that cognition is itself
self-luminous and that, while manifesting other objects, it manifests
itself also. The objection raised is thatthe self or the cognition cannot
affect itself by its own functioning (vrttz); the reply is that cognition
is like light and has no intervening operation by which it affects
itself or its objects. Just as light removes darkness, helps the
operation of the eye and illuminates the object and manifests itself
all in one moment without any intervening operation of any other
light, so cognition also in one flash manifests itself and its objects,
and there is no functioning of it by which it has to affect itself.
This cognition cannot be described as being mere momentary
flashes, on the ground that, when there is the blue awareness, there
is not the yellow awareness; for apart from the blue awareness, the
1
Sa'f!lveditii na Sa'f!lvid-adhlna-prakiisatz Sa'f!lvit-karmatiim antaret:za aparok-
~atviitSa'f!lvedanavat. Nyiiya-makaranda, p. 135· This argument is borrowed
verbatim by VidyiiraQya in his Vivarat:za-prameya-smpgraha, p. 85.
Self as pure Consciousness 71
yellow awareness or the white awareness there is also the natural
basic awareness or consciousness, which cannot be denied. It
would be wrong to say that there are only the particular aware-
nesses which appear and vanish from moment to moment; for, had
there been only a series of particular awarenesses, then there would
be nothing by which their differences could be realized. Each
awareness in the series would be of a particular and definite char-
acter, and, as it passed away, would give place to another, and that
again to another, so that there would be no way of distinguishing
one awareness from another; for according to the theory under
discussion there is no consciousness except the passing awarenesses,
and thus there would be no \vay by which their differences
could be noticed; for, even though the object of awareness,
such as blue and yellow, differed amongst themselves, that would
fail to explain how the difference of a blue awareness and a yellow
awareness could be apprehended. So the best would be to admit
the self to be of the nature of pure consciousness.
It will appear from the above discussion that the Vedanta had
to refute three opponents in establishing its doctrine that the self
is of the nature of pure consciousness and that it is permanent
and not momentary. The first opponent \vas the Buddhist, who
believed neither in the existence of the self nor in the nature of any
pure permanent consciousness. The Buddhist objection that there
was no permanent self could be well warded off by the Vedanta
by appealing to the verdict of our notion of self-identity-which
could not be explained on the Buddhist method by the supposition
of two separate notions of a past "that self" and the present
"I am." Nor can consciousness be regarded as being nothing
more than a series of passing ideas or particular awarenesses; for
on such a theory it would be impossible to explain how we can
react upon our mental states and note their differences. Conscious-
ness has thus to be admitted as permanent. Against the second
opponent, the Naiyayika, the Vedanta urges that the self is not
the inferred object to which awarenesses, volitions or feelings
belong, but is directly and immediately intuited. For, had it
not been so, how could one distinguish his own experiences as his
own and as different from those of others? The internalness of
my own experiences shows that they are directly intuited as my
own, and not merely supposed as belonging to some self who was
the possessor of his experiences. For inference cannot reveal the
The Sankara School of Vedanta (cH.
internalness of any cognition or feeling. Against the third opponent,

the Mima111saka, the Vedanta urges that the self-revealing character
belongs to the self which is identical with thought-as against
the Mima111sa view, that thought as a self-revealing entity revealed
the self and the objects as different from it. The identity of
the self and thought and the self-revealing character of it are also
urged; and it is shown by a variety of dialectical reasoning that
such a supposition is the only reasonable alternative that is left
to us.
This self as pure consciousness is absolutely impersonal, un-
limited and infinite. In order to make it possible that this one self
should appear as many individuals and as God, it is supposed that
it manifests itself differently through the veil of miiyii. Thus,
according to the Siddlziinta-lesa, it is said in the Prakatiirtha-
vivarar;a that, when this pure consciousness is reflected through the
beginningless, indescribable miiyii, it is called Isvara or God. But,
when it is reflected through the limited parts of miiyii containing
powers of veiling and of diverse creation (called avidyii), there
are the manifestations of individual souls or jzvas. It is again said
in the Tattva-viveka of Nrsi111hasrama that, when this pure con-
sciousness is reflected through the pure sattva qualities, as domi-
nating over other impure parts of prakrti, there is the manifestation
of God. Whereas, when the pure consciousness is reflected through
the impure parts of rajas and tamas, as dominating over the sattva
part of prakrti (called also avidyii), there are the manifestations
of the individual selves or jz1-·as. The same prakrti in its two aspects,
as predominating in sattva and as predominating in rajas and
tamas, goes by the name of miiyii and avidyii and forms the con-
ditioning factors (upiidhz) of the pure consciousness, which on
account of the different characters of the conditioning factors of
miiyii and avidyii appear as the omniscient God and the ignorant
individual souls. Sarvajiiatma :.\1uni thinks that, when the pure
consciousness is reflected through m:idyii, it is called Isvara, and,
when it is reflected through mind (anta~zkarar;a), it is calledjzva.
These various methods of accounting for the origin of indi-
vidual selves and God have but little philosophical significance.
But they go to show that the principal interest of the Vedanta lies
in establishing the supreme reality of a transcendental principle of
pure consciousness, which, though always untouched and un-
attached in its own nature, is yet the underlying principle which
XI] Vediintic Cosmology 73
can explain all the facts of the enlivening and enlightening of all
our conscious experiences. All that is limited, be it an individual
self or an individual object of awareness, is in some sense or other
an illusory imposition of the modification of a non-conscious
principle on the principle of consciousness. The Vedanta is both
unwilling and incapable of explaining the nature of the world-
process in all its details, in which philosophy and science are
equally interested. Its only interest is to prove that the world-
process presupposes the existence of a principle of pure conscious-
ness which is absolutely and ultimately real, as it is immediate
and intuitive. Reality means what is not determined by anything
else; and in this sense pure consciousness is the only reality-and
all else is indescribable-neither real nor unreal; and the Vedanta
is not interested to discover what may be its nature.
Vedantic Cosmology.
From what has been said above it is evident that maya
(also called avidyii or ajiiiina) is in itself an indefinable
mysterious stuff, which has not merely a psychological existence,
but also an ontological existence as well. It is this ajfiiina which
on the one hand forms on the subjective plane the mind and the
senses (the self alone being Brahman and ultimately real), and on
the other hand, on the objective plane, the whole of the objective
universe. This ajiiiina has two powers, the power of veiling or
covering (iivara~a) and the power of creation (vik§epa). The power
of veiling, though small, like a little cloud veiling the sun with a
diameter of millions of miles, may, in spite of its limited nature,
cover up the infinite, unchangeable self byveilingitsself-luminosity
as cognizer. The veiling of the self means veiling the shining
unchangeable self-perception of the self, as infinite, eternal and
limitless, pure consciousness, which as an effect of such veiling
appears as limited, bound to sense-cognitions and sense-enjoy-
ments and functioning as individual selves 1 . It is through this
covering power of ajiiiina that the self appears as an agent and an
enjoyer of pleasures and pains and subject to ignorant fears of
rebirth, like the illusory perception of a piece of rope in darkness as
a snake. Just as through the creative power of ignorance a piece of
1
vastuto 'jiiiinasyiitmiichiidakatviibhiive 'pi pramiitr-buddhimiitriichiidakatvena
ajiiiinasyiitmiichiidakatvam upaciiriid ucyate. Subodhinl on Vediinta-siira, p. 13,
Nirl)aya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1916.
rope, the real nature of which is hidden from view, appears as a
snake, so does ignorance by its creative power create on the hidden
self the manifold world-appearance. As the ajtiiina is supposed to
veil by its veiling power (iivara~za-saktz) only the self-cognizing
and self-revealing aspect of the self, the other aspect of the self as
pure being is left open as the basis on which the entire world-
appearance is created by the creative power thereof. The pure
consciousness, veiled as it is by ajiiiina with its two powers, can
be regarded as an important causal agent (nimitta), when its nature
as pure consciousness forming the basis of the creation of the world-
appearance is emphasized; it can be regarded as the material cause,
when the emphasis is put on its covering part, the afiiiina. It is
like a spider, which, so far as it weaves its web, can be regarded as
a causal agent, and, so far as it supplies from its own body the
materials of the web, can be regarded as the material cause of the
web, when its body aspect is emphasized. The creative powers
(vik~epa-saklz) of ajfiiina are characterized as being threefold, after
the manner of Sarp.khya prakrli, as sattva, rajas and lamas. With
the pure consciousness as the basis and with the associated creative
power of ajfiiina predominating in lamas, space (iikiiSa) is first
produced; from iikiisa comes air, from air fire, from fire water, from
water earth. It is these elements in their fine and uncompounded
state that in the Sarp.khya and the Pural}as are called lan-miilras.
It is out of these that the grosser materials are evolved as also the
subtle bodies 1 • The subtle bodies are made up of seventeen parts,
1
As to how the suhtle elements are combined for the production of grosser
elements there are two different theories, viz. the tnvrt-lwra~za and the paiicl-
kara1Ja. The trivrt-karm;a means that fire, water and earth (as subtle elements)
are each divided into two halves, thus producing two equal parts of each; then
the three half parts of the three subtle elements are again each divided into two
hah-es, thus producing two quarter parts of each. Then the original first half of
each element is combined with the two quarters of other two elements. Thus
each element has half of itself with two quarter parts of other two elements.
Vacaspati and Amalananda prefer tri·crt-karu1Ja to paiici-lwral}Q; for they think
that there is no point in admitting that air and iikiisa have also parts of other
clements integrated in them, and the Vedic texts speak of tri'l·rt-kara1)a and not of
paiic1-kara1Ja. The paiki-kara1Ja theory holds that the five subtle elements are
divided firstly into two halves, and then one of the two halves of these five
elements is divided again into four parts, and then the first half of each subtle
element is combined with the one-f<,urth of each half of all the other elements
excepting the element of which there is the full half as a constituent. Thus each
element is made up of one-half of itself, and the other half of it is constituted of
the one-fourth of each of the other elements (i.e. one-eighth of each of the
other four elements), and thus each element has at least some part of other
elements integrated into it. This view is supported by the Vediinta-paribhiifii
and its Sillhiima1)i commentary, p. 363.
XI] Vediintic Cosmology 75
excluding the subtle elements, and are called suk~ma-sartra or
liftga-sarira. This subtle body is composed of the five cognitive
senses, the five conative senses, the five viiyus or biomotor activities,
buddhi (intellect) and manas, together with the five subtle elements
in tanmatric forms. The five cognitive senses, the auditory, tactile,
visual, gustatory and olfactory senses, are derived from the sativa
parts of the five elements, iikiisa, viiyu, agni, ap and prthivt
respectively. Buddhi, or intellect, means the mental state of
determination or affirmation (niJcayiitmikii antal:zkarm:za-vrttz).
ll.fanas means the two mental functions of vikalpa and saftkalpa
or of saftkalpa alone resulting in doubt 1 • The function of mind
(citta) and the function of egoism (ahattzkiira) are included in
buddhi and manas 2 • They are all produced from the sattva
parts of the five elements and are therefore elemental. Though
they are elemental, yet, since they are produced from the
compounded sattva parts of all the elements, they have the re-
vealing function displayed in their cognitive operations. Buddhi
with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of knowledge
(vijfiiinamaya-ko~a). Manas with the cognitive senses is called the
sheath of manas (manomaya-ko~a). It is the self as associated with
the vijfiiinamaya-ko~a that feels itself as the agent, enjoyer, happy
or unhappy, the individual self (jtva) that passes through worldly
experience and rebirth. The conative senses are produced from
the rajas parts of the five elements. The five viiyus or biomotor
activities are called Prii7Ja or the breathing activity, Udiina or the
upward activity and Samiina or the digestive activity. There are
some who add another five viiyus such as the Naga, the vomiting
Apiina troyiines activity, Kiirma, the reflex activity of opening the
eyelids, Krkala, the activity of coughing, Devadatta, the activity of
yawning, and Dhanaiijaya, the nourishing activity. These prii1Jas
1 The Vediinta-silra speaks of sankalpa and vikalpa, and this is explained
by the Subodhinl as meaning doubt. See Vediinta-siira and Subodhinl, p. 17. The
Vediinta-paribhii~ii and its commentators speak of safzlwlpa as being the only
unction of manas, but it means "doubt." See pp. 88-89 and 358.
2
smara1)iikiira-vrttimad untal;kara1)a1Jz cittam (Vediinta-paribhii~ii-1\Ia~zi
prabhii, p. 89). anayor eva cittiihat!lkiirayor antarbhiivalz (Vediinta-siira, p. 17).
But the Vediinta-paribhii~ii says that manas, buddhi, aha1flkiira and citta, all four,
constitute the inner organ {anta{lkara1)a). See Vediinta-paribhii,~ii, p. 88. The
Vediinta-siira however does not count four functions buddhi, manas, citta,
aha'f!lkiira; citta and aha1Jzkiira are regarded as the same as buddhi and manas.
Thus according to the Vediinta-siira there are only two categories. But since
the Vediinta-paribhii~ii only mentions buddhi and manas as constituents of the
subtle body, one need not think that there is ultimately any difference between
it and the Vediinta-siira.
together with the cognitive senses form the active sheath of prii1_Za
(prii1_Zamaya-ko~a). Of these three sheaths, the vijiiiinamaya, mano-
maya and prii1_Zamaya, the v~fiiiinamaya sheath plays the part of the
active agent (kartr-rupal;); the manomaya is the source of all desires
and volition, and is therefore regarded as having an instrum~ntal
function; the prii1_Zamaya sheath represents the motor functions.
These three sheaths make up together the subtle body or the
su~ma-sarira. HiraQ.yagarbha (also called Sutriitmii or prii1Ja) is
the god who presides over the combined subtle bodies of all living
beings. Individually each subtle body is supposed to belong to
every being. These three sheaths, involving as they do all the sub-
conscious impressions from which our conscious experience is de-
rived, are therefore called a dream (jitgrad-viisaniimayatviit svapna).
The process of the formation of the gross elements from the
subtle parts of the elements is technically called paiiclkara1_la. It
consists in a compounding of the elements in which one half of
each rudimentary element is mixed with the eighth part of each
other rudimentary element. It is through such a process of com-
pounding that each element possesses some of the properties of
the other elements. The entire universe consists of seven upper
worlds (Bhul;, Bhuval:z, Svar, Alahar, Janal;, Tapa~z and Satyam ),
seven lower worlds (Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasiitala, Taliitala,
Mahiitala and Piitiila) and all the gross bodies of all living beings.
There is a cosmic deity who presides over the combined
physical bodies of all beings, and this deity is called Virat. There
is also the person, the individual who presides over each one of
the bodies, and, in this aspect, the individual is called Visva.
The ajniina as constituting antal;kara1_la or mind, involving the
operative functions of buddhi and manas, is always associated
with the self; it is by the difference of these anta~zkara1_las that one
self appears as many individual selves, and it is through the states
of these antal;kara1_las that the veil over the self and the objects
are removed, and as a result of this there is the cognition of objects.
The anta!:zkara1_la is situated within the body, which it thoroughly
pervades. It is made up of the saft:va parts of the five rudimentary
elements, and, being extremely transparent, comes into touch with
the sense objects through the specific senses and assumes their
forms. It being a material stuff, there is one part inside the body,
another part in touch with the sense-objects, and a third part
between the two and connected with them both as one whole.
XI] Sankara and his School 77
The interior part of the antal:zkara1Ja is the ego or the agent. The
intervening part has the action of knowledge, called also vrtti-jiiiina.
The third part, which at the time of cognition is transformed into
the form of the sense-objects, has the function of making them
manifested in knowledge as its objects. The antal:zkara1}a of three
parts being transparent, pure consciousness can well be manifested
in it. Though pure consciousness is one, yet it manifests the three
different parts of the anta!:zkarar.za in three different ways, as the
cognizer (pramiitr), cognitive operation (pramiir.za) and the cogni-
tion, or the percept (pramitt). In each of the three cases the
reality is the part of the pure consciousness, as it expresses itself
through the three different modifications of the antal:zkarar.za. The
sense-objects in themselves are but the veiled pure consciousness,
brahman, as forming their substance. The difference between the
individual consciousness (jzva-caitanya) and the brahman-con-
sciousness (brahma-caitanya) is that the former represents pure
consciousness, as conditioned by or as reflected through the antal:z-
kara1Ja, while the latter is the unentangled infinite consciousness, on
the basis of which all the cosmic creations of miiyii are made. The
covering of avidyii, for the breaking of which the operation of the
antal:zkara1Ja is deemed necessary, is of two kinds, viz. subjective
ignorance and objective ignorance. When I say that I do not know
a book, that implies subjective ignorance as signified by" I do not
know," and objective ignorance as referring to the book. The
removal of the first is a precondition of all kinds of knowledge,
perceptual or inferential, while the second is removed only in
perceptual knowledge. It is diverse in kind according to the form
and content of the sense-objects; and each perceptual cognition
removes only one specific ignorance, through which the particular
cognition arise31.
Sarikara and his School.

It is difficult to say exactly how many books were written by
Sankara himself. There is little doubt that quite a number of
books attributed to Sailkara were not written by him. I give
here a list of those books that seem to me to be his genuine
works, though it is extremely difficult to be absolutely certain.
1
See Madhusiidana Sarasvati's Siddhiinta-bindu, I?P· 132-150; and Brah-
mananda Sarasvati's Nyiiya-ratniivalz, pp. 132-150, Srividya Press, Kumba-
konam, 1893.
I have chosen only those works which have been commented on
by other writers, since this shows that these have the strength
of tradition behind them to support their authenticity. The most
important works of Sankara are his commentaries on the ten
Upani~ads, lsii, Kena, Katha, Praina, Mwpjaka, Mii1;ll}iikya,
Aitareya, Taittiriya, Chiindogya and Brhad-iira7Jyaka and the
Siirlraka-mlmiil[lSii-bhii~ya. The main reasons why a number of
works which probably were not written by him were attributed
to him seem to be twofold; first, because there was another writer
of the same name, i.e. Sankaracarya, and second, the tendency of
Indian writers to increase the dignity of later works by attributing
them to great writers of the past. The attribution of all the
PuraQas to Vyasa illustrates this very clearly. Sankara's lsopani~ad
bh~ya has one commentary by Anandajfiana and another, Dzpikii,
by the other Sankara Acarya. His Kenopani~ad-bh~ya has two
commentaries, Kenopani~ad-bh~ya-vivara7Ja and a commentary by
Anandajiiana. The Kiithakopani~ad-bh~ya has two commentaries,
by Anand.ajiiana and by Balagopala Yogindra. The Prasnopani~ad
bh~ya has two commentaries, by Anandajiiana and NarayaQendra
Sarasvati. The Mu7Jl}akopani~ad-bh~ya has two commentaries,
by Anandajfiana and AbhinavanarayaQendra Sarasvati. The
Mii1Jrjz7kyopani~ad-bhii~ya has two commentaries, by Anandajfiana
and ;\1athuranatha Sukla, and a summary, called Mii1;ll}ilkyopan#ad-
bhii~yiirtha-sa1J1graha, by Raghavananda. The Aitareyopani~ad
bhii~ya has six commentaries, by Anandajfiana, AbhinavanarayaQa,
N rsimha Acarya, Balakp?Qadasa, Jiianamrta Yati, and Visvesvara
Tirtha. The Taittirlyopanifad-bhii~ya seems to have only one
commentary on it, by Anandajiiana. The Chiindogyopani~adhas two
commentaries, called Bhii~ya-fippana, and a commentary by Anan-
dajiiana. The Brhad-iira7Jyakopanifad-bh~ya has a commentary
by Anandajiiana and a big independent work on it by Suresvara,
called Brhad-iira1}yakopani~ad-bhii~ya-viirttika, or simpJy Viirttika,
which has also a number of commentaries; these have been noticed
in the section on Suresvara. His Aparok~iinubhava has four commen-
taries, by Sailkara Acarya, by Balagopala, by CaQ<).e8vara Varman
(Anubhava-dlpikii), and by VidyaraQya. His commentary on Gau<Ja-
pada's l\Jii7;Zl}ilkya-kiirikii, called Gauljapiidlya-bhii~ya or Agama-
siistra-'l_,·ivara7Ja, has two commentaries, one by Suddhananda and
one by Anandajfiana. HisAtma-jfiiinopadesa has two commentaries,
by Anandajfiana and by PiirQananda Tirtha; the Eka-sloka has a
Xlj Sa1ikara and his School 79
commentary called Tattva-dzpana, by Svayarpprakasa Yati; no com-
mentary however is attributed to the Viveka-cudiima"!li, which seems
to be genuinely attributed to Sankara; the Atma-bodha has at least
five commentaries, by Advayananda, Bhasurananda, Bodhendra
(Bhii'l)a-prakiiSika), l\tiadhusudana Sarasvati and RamanandaTirtha;
The Atmiiniitma-viveka has at least four commentaries, by Padma-
pada, Pun~ananda Tirtha, SayaQa and Svayarpprakasa Y ati. The
Atmopadesa-vidhi is said to have a commentary by Ananda-
jfiana; the Ananda-laharz has about twenty-four commentaries, by
Appaya Dik~ita, Kaviraja, Kr~Qa Acarya (Maii}u-bhii~i"!li), Kesava-
bhana, Kaivalyasrama (Saubhiigya-vardhinz), Gangahari (Tattva-
dzpikii), Gangadhara, Gopirama, Gopikanta Sarvabhauma(Ananda-
laharz-tarz), Jagadisa?, Jagannatha Paficanana, Narasirpha,Brahma-
nanda (Bhiiviirtha-dzpikii), Malia Bhatta, Mahadeva Vidyavagisa,
lVIahadeva Vaidya, Ramacandra, Ramabhadra, Ramananda Tirtha,
Lak~midhara Desika and Visvambhara and SrikaQtha Bhana and
another called Vidvan-manoramii. The Upadesa-siihasrz has at
least four commentaries, by Anandajfiana, by Rama Tirtha (Pada-
yojanikii), Bodha-vidhi by a pupil of Vidyadhaman, and by Sankara-
carya. His Cid-iinanda-stava-riija, called also Cid-iinanda-dasaSlokz
or simply Dasa-slokz, has also a number of commentaries and sub-
commentaries, such as the Siddhiinta-tattva-bindu by Madhusii-
dana Sarasvati; Madhusudana's commentary was commented on
by a number of persons, such as Narayal)a Yati (Laghu-flkii),
Puru!?ottama Sarasvati ( Siddhiinta-bindu-sandzpana), PiirQananda
Sarasvati (Tattva-viveka), Gau<;la Brahmananda Sarasvati (Sid-
dhiinta-bindu-nyiiya-ratniivalz), by Saccidananda and Sivalala Bar-
man. Gau<;la Brahmananda's commentary, Siddhiinta-bindu-nyiiya-
ratniivali, was further commented on by Kr~Qakanta (Siddhiinta-
nyiiya-ratna-pradipikii). Sali.kara's Drg-drsya-prakara"!la was com-
mented on by Ramacandra Tirtha; his Paiidkara"!la-prakriyii has
again a number of commentaries-that by Suresvara is Paiid-
kara"!la-viirttika, and this has a further commentary, called Paiicl-
kara"!la-vii.rttikiibhara"!la, by AbhinavanarayaJ)endra Sarasvati, pupil
of J fianendra Sarasvati. Other commentaries on the Paiidkara"!la-
prakriyii are Paiidkara"!la-bhiiva-prakiiSikii, Paiidkara1}a-fikii-
tattva-candrikii, Paiidkara"!la-tiitparya-candrikii and Paiicikarm;a-
vivara"!la by Anandajfiana, Paiidkara"!la-vivarm;a by Svayal[l-
prakasa Yati and by Prajfianananda, and a sub-commentary called
Tattva-candrikii. Sankara also commented on the Bhagavad-
8o The Sankara School of Vedanta (CH.
gitii; this commentary has been examined in the chapter on the
Bhagavad-gitii in the present volume. His Laghu-viikya-vrtti
has a commentary called Pu~piiiijali, and another, called Laghu-
viikya-vrtti-prakiisikii, by Ramananda Sarasvati; his Viikya-vrtti
has a commentary by Anandajfiana, and another commentary,
called Viikya-vrtti-prakiiSikii, by Visvesvara Pal)gita. He start5 his
Viikya-vrtti in the same manner as isvarakr~l)a starts his Siif!Zkhya-
kiirikii, namely by stating that, suffering from the threefold sorrows
of life, the pupil approaches a good teacher for instruction regarding
the ways in which he may be liberated from them. Suresvara in his
1Vai~karmya-siddhi also starts in the same manner and thus gives
a practical turn to the study of philosophy, a procedure which one
does not find in his Brahma-sutra-bhii~ya. The answer, of course, is
the same as that given in so many other places, that one is liberated
only by the proper realization of the U pani!?ad texts that declare
the unity of the self with Brahman. He then goes on to show that
all external things and all that is called mind or mental or psychical
is extraneous to self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness;
he also declares here that the effects of one's deeds are disposed
by God (lsvara), the superior illusory form of Brahman, and not
by the mysterious power of apurva admitted by the l\1ima:rrsists.
He concludes this short work of fifty-three verses by insisting on the
fact that, though the unity texts (advaita-sruti) of the U pani!?ads,
such as" that (Brahman) art thou," may have a verbal construction
that implies some kind of duality, yet their main force is in the direct
and immediate apperception of the pure self without any intel-
lectual process as implied by relations of identity. The Viikya-vrtti
is thus conceived differently from the Aparok~iinubhuti, where yoga
processes of posture and breath-regulations are described, as being
helpful for the realization of the true nature of self. This may, of
course, give rise to some doubts regarding the true authorship of
the Aparok~iinubhuti, though it may be explained as being due to
the different stages of the development of Sailkara's own mind;
divergences of attitude are also noticeable in his thoroughgoing
idealism in his commentary on Gau<Japada's Kiirikii, where the
waking life is regarded as being exactly the same as dream life, and
external objects are deemed to have no existence whatsoever,
being absolutely like dream-perceptions-as contrasted with his
Siirzraka-mzmii1JlSii-bhii~ya, where external objects are considered
to have an indescribable existence, very different from dream-
XI] Sankara and his School
creations. The Upadesa-siihasrt, which in its nineteen chapters
contains only six hundred and seventy-five stanzas, is more in a line
with the Vakya-vrtti, and, though the well-known Vedanta topics
are all slightly touched upon, greater emphasis is laid on the proper
realization of the Vedantic unity texts, such as" that art thou," as
means to the attainment of Brahmahood. There are also a number
of short poems and hymns attributed to Sankaracarya, such as the
Advaitiinubhuti, Atma-bodha, Tattvopadesa, Prautjhanubhuti, etc.,
some of which are undoubtedly his, while there are many others
which may not be so; but in the absence of further evidence
it is difficult to come to any decisive conclusion 1 • These hymns
do not contain any additional philosophical materials, but are
intended to stir up a religious fervour and emotion in favour
of the monistic faith. In some cases, however, the commentators
have found an excuse for extracting from them Vedantic doctrines
which cannot be said to follow directly from them. As an illustra-
tion of this, it may be pointed out that out of the ten slvkas of
Sankara Madhusudana made a big commentary, and Brahmananda
Sarasvati wrote another big commentary on that of Madhusudana
and elaborated many of the complex doctrines of the Vedanta
which have but little direct bearing upon the verses themselves.
But Sankara's most important work is the Brahma-sutra-bhiijya,.
which was commented on by Vacaspati Misra in the ninth century,.
Anandajfiana in the thirteenth, and Govindananda in the four-
teenth century. Commentaries on Vacaspati's commentary will be
noticed in the section on Vacaspati l\1.isra. SubrahmaJ)ya wrote a
verse summary of Sankara's commentary which he callsBhiijyiirtha-
nyaya-miilii; and Bharati Tirtha wrote also the V aiyasika-nyaya-
miilii, in which he tried to deal with the general arguments of
the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Sankara 's commentary. Many
other persons, such as Vaidyanatha Dik~ita, Devarama Bhatta, etc.,
also wrote topical summaries of the main lines of the general
arguments of the Brahma-siUra on the lines of Sankara's com-
mentary, called 1Vyaya-miilii or Adhikara~Ja-miilii. But many other
persons were inspired by Sankara's commentary (or by the com-
nlentaries of Vacaspati Misra and other great writers of the Sankara
school) and under the name of independent commentaries on the
Brahma-!;iltra merely repeated what was contained in these. Thus
1
The Atrna-bodha was commented upon by Padmapada in his commentary
Atma-bodha-vyiikhyiina, called also Vediinta-siira.
Dll 6
Amalananda wrote his Sastra-darpa1J.a imitating the main lines of
Vacaspati's commentary on Sankara's commentary; and Svayarp.-
prakasa also wrote his Vediinta-naya-bhu~a1J.a, in which for the most
part he summarized the views of Vacaspati 's Bhiimati commentary.
Hari Dik~ita wrote his Brahma-siltra-vrtti, Sankadinanda his
Brahma-siltra-dzpikii and Brahmananda his Vediinta-siltra-muktii-
valt as independent interpretations of the Brahma-siltra, but these
were all written mainly on the lines of Sankara's own commentary,
supplementing it with additional Vedantic ideas that had been
developed after Sankara by the philosophers of his school of
thought or explaining Sankara's Bh~ya 1 •
MaQqana, Suresvara and Visvariipa.

General tradition has always identified lVlai).Q.ana \vith Suresvara
and Visvariipa; and Col. G. A. Jacob in his introduction to the
second edition of the ]\lai~karmya-siddhi seems willing to believe
this tradition. The tradition probably started from Vidyaral).ya's
Sankara-dig-vijaya, where lVlai).Q.ana is spoken of as being named
not only Umbeka, but also Visvariipa (vnr. 63). He further says
in x. 4 of the same work that, when lVlai).Q.ana became a follower
of Sankara, he received from him the name Suresvara. But the
Sankara-dig-vijaya is a mythical biography, and it is certainly very
risky to believe any of its statements, unless corroborated by
other reliable evidences. There is little doubt that Suresvara was
1
Some of these commentaries are: Bralzma-sfitra-bhii~yiirtha-sa'1{lgralza by
Brahmananda Yati, pupil of Visvesvarananda, Brahma-satriirtha-dlpikii by
Venkata, son of Gauri and Siva, Brahma-sfitra-vrtti (called also 1\llitak~arii)
by Annam BhaHa, and Brahma-sfitra-bhii~ya-vyiikhyii (called also Vidyii-srl) by
J i'ianottama Bhattaraka, pupil of J iianaghana. The peculiarity of this last work
is that it is the only commentary on the eka-jlva-viida line that the present writer
could trace. In addition to these some more commentaries may be mentioned,
such as Brahma-siltra-vrtti by Dharma Bhaga, pupil of Ramacandrarya and
pupil's pupil of Mukundasrama, Sfitra-bhii~ya-vyiikhyiina (called also Brahma-
vidyii-bharaQ.a) by Advaitananda, pupil of Ramananda and pupil's pupil of
Brahmananda, Brahma-siltra-bhii~ya-vyiikhyii (called also Nyiiya-rak~ii-matzi) by
Appaya Dik!;>ita, Brahma-tattva-prakiiSikii (which is different from an earlier
treatise called Brahma-prakiisikii) by Sadasivendra Sarasvati, Brahma-siltro-
panyiisa by Ramesvara Bharati, by a pupil of Ramananda, Sarlraka-mlmii'1{lsii-
siltra-siddhiinta-kaumudl by Subrahmat;1ya Agnicin Makhindra, Vediinta-kaustu-
bha by Sitarama; none of which seem to be earlier than the sixteenth century.
But Ananyanubhava, the teacher of Prakasatman (A.D. 1200), seems to have
written another commentary, called Siirlraka-nyiiya-matzimiilii. Prakasatman
himself also wrote a metrical summary of the main contents of Sankara 's Bhii~ya
called Siirzraka-mlmii1[lSii-nyiiya-sarpgraha, and Kfl]t;liinubhuti, in much later
times, wrote a similar metrical summary, called Siirzraka-mimii1[lSii-sa'1{lgraha.
xr] 1Vfa1Jt}ana, Suresvara and Visvarupa
the author of a Viirttika, or commentary in verse, on Sankara's
Brhad-iira'l}yaka Upani~ad (which was also summarized by Vidya-
raQ.ya in a work called Viirttilw-siira, which latter was further
commented on by Mahe5vara Tirtha in his commentary, called the
Laghu-sa1{lgraha). The Viirttika of Suresvara was commented on
by at least two commentators, Anandagiri in his Siistra-prakiisikii
and Anandapiirl).a in his 1Vyiiya-kalpa-latil~ii. In a commentary
on the PariiSara-smrti published in the Bib. Ind. series (p. 51) a
quotation from this Viirttika is attributed to Visvarilpa; but this
commentary is a late work, and in all probability it relied on
Vidyaral).ya's testimony that Visvariipa and Suresvara were identi-
cally the same person. VidyaraQ.ya also, in his Vivara1}a-prameya-
sa1J1graha, p. 92, quotes a passage from Suresvara's Viirttika (Iv. 8),
attributing it to Visvariipa. But in another passage of the Vivara1}a-
prameya-sa1{lgraha (p. 224) he refers to a Vedanta doctrine, attri-
buting it to the author of the Brahma-siddhi. But the work has not
yet been published, and its n1anuscripts are very scarce: the pre-
sent writer had the good fortune to obtain one. A fairly detailed
examination of the philosophy of this work will be given in
a separate section. The Brahma-siddhi is an important work, and
it· was commented on by Vacaspati in his Tattva-samik~ii, by
AnandapiirQ.a in his Brahma-siddhi-vyiikhyii-ratna, by Sankhap5Q.i
in his Brahma-siddhi-tikii, and by Citsukha in his Abhipraya-
prakiiSikii. But only the latter two works are available in manu-
scripts. Many important works however refer to the Brahma-siddhi
and its views generally as coming from the author of Brahma-siddhi
(Brahma-siddhi-kiira). But in none of these references, so far as
it is known to the present writer, has the author of Brahma-siddhi
been referred to as Suresvara. The Brahma-siddlzi was written in
verse and prose, since two quotations from it in Citsukha's Tattva-
pradzpikii (p. 38r, NirQ.aya-Sagara Press) and Nyiiya-km;zikii (p. 8o)
are in verse, while there are other references, such as Tattva-
pradipikii (p. 140) and elsewhere, which are in prose. There is,
however, little doubt that the Brahma-siddhi was written by
MaQ.9ana or MaQ.9ana l\1isra; for both Sridhara in his 1Vyiiya-
kandalt (p. 218) and Citsukha in his Tattva-pradzpikii (p. 140) refer
to Mal).~ana as the author of the Brahma-siddhi. Of these the evi-
dence of Sridhara, who belonged to the middle of the tenth century,
ought to be considered very reliable, as he lived within a hundred
years of the death of MaQ.9ana; whoever MaQ.9ana may have been,
6-2
The Sankara School of Vedanta [cu.
since he lived after Saiikara (A.D. 820), he could not have flourished
very much earlier than the middle of the ninth century. It is,
therefore, definitely known that the Nai~karmya-siddhi and the
Varttika were written by Suresvara, and the Brahma-siddhi by
Mal).Q.ana. The question regarding the idtrntity of these two persons
may be settled, if the views or opinions of the Brahma-siddhi can
be compared or contrasted with the views of the Nai{karmya-
siddhi or the Varttika. From the few quotations that can be
traced in the writings of the various writers who refer to it it is
possible to come to some fairly decisive conclusions 1 .
Of all passages the most important is that quoted from the
Brahma-siddhi in the Vivara'l}a-prameya-sa'l{lgraha (p. 224). It is said
there that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi it is the
individual persons (jiva/:z, in the plural) who by their own individual
ignorance (svavidyaya) create for themselves on the changeless
Brahman the false world-appearance. Neither in itself, nor with
the maya, or as reflection in maya, is Brahman the cause of
the world (Brahma na jagat-kara1Jam). The appearances then are
but creations of individual ignorance, anci individual false ex-
periences of the world have therefore no objective basis. The
agreement of individual experiences is due to similarity of illu-
sions in different persons who are suffering under the delusive
effects of the same kinds of ignorance; this may thus be compared
with the delusive experience of two moons by a number of persons.
Not all persons experience the same world; their delusive ex-
periences are similar, but the objective basis of their experience
is not the same (sa'l{l·vadas tu bahu-pur~avagata-dvitiya-candravat
sadrsyad upapadyate). If this account is correct, as may well be
supposed, then 1\Ial).Q.ana Misra may be regarded as the originator
of the V edantic doctrine of d!fti-snti-vada, which was in later times
so forcefully formulated by Prakasananda. Again, in Prakasatman's
Pafica-padika-vivara1Ja (p. 32), it is held that according to the author
of the Brahma-siddhi both maya and avidya are nothing but false
experiences (avidya maya mithya-pratyaya iti). About the function
1
A copy of the manuscript of the Brahma-siddhi and its commentary was
consulted by me in the Adyar and the Govt. Sanskrit MSS. Libraries after the
above section had been written, and a thorough examination of its contents,
I am happy to say, corroborates the above surmises. The Brahma-siddhi is
expected to be shortly published by Prof. Kuppusvami Sastri, and I con-
sulted the tarka-pada of it in proof by the kind courtesy of Prof. Sastri in
l\lladras in December 1928. A separate section has been devoted to the
philosophy of Ma~9ana's Brahma-siddhi.
XI] Ma1Jtfana, Suresvara and Visvarupa ss
of knowledge as removing doubts he is said to hold the view (as
reported in the Nyiiya-kandali, p. 218) that doubt regarding the
validity of what is known is removed by knowledge itself. In the
Nyiiya-km;:ikii (p. 8o) it is said that l\IaQ.<;lana held that reality mani-
fests itself in unlimited conceptions of unity or universality, whereas
differences appear only as a result of limited experience. Again,
in the Laghu-candrikii (p. 112, Kumbakonam edition) l\1aQ.<;lana
is introduced in the course of a discussion regarding the nature of
the dispersion of ignorance and its relation to Brahma-knowledge
or Brahmahood. According to Sankara, as interpreted by many of
his followers, including Suresvara, the dissolution of ignorance
(avidyii-nivrtti) is not a negation, since negation as a separate cate-
gory has no existence. So dissolution of ignorance means only Brah-
man. But according to lVlal).<;lana there is no harm in admitting the
existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance; for the
monism of Brahman means that there is only one positive entity.
It has no reference to negations, i.e. the negation of duality only
means the negation of all positive entities other than Brahman
(bhiiviidvaita). The existence of such a negation as the cessation
of ignorance does not hurt the monistic creed. Again, Sarvajiiatma
Muni in his Sa1J1k~epa-siiriraka(n. 174) says that ignorance ( avidyii)
is supported (iisraya) in pure consciousness (cin-miitriisrita-vi~ayam
ajiiiinam),and that, even wherefrom the context of Sankara's Bhii~ya
it may appear as if he was speaking of the individual person (jiva)
as being the support of ajiiiina, it has to be interpreted in this sense.
Objections of l\1al)<;lana, therefore, to such a view, viz. that ignorance
rests with the individuals, are not to be given any consideration;
for Mal)<;lana's Yiews lead to quite different conclusions (parihrtya
1l1arpjana-viical; tad dhy anyathii prasthitam) 1 . The commentator of
the Sa1J1k~epa-siiriraka, Ramatirtha Svamin, also, in commenting on
the passage referred to, contrasts the above view of MaQ.<;lana with
that of Suresvara, who according to him is referred to by an adjective
bahu-sruta in the Sa1J1k~epa-siiriraka text, and who is reported to
have been in agreement with the views of Sarvajiiatma Muni, as
against the views of Mal). <;lana. Now many of these views which have
been attributed to Mal)<;lana are not shared by Suresvara, as will
appear from what will be said below concerning him. It does not
therefore appear that l\1al)<;lana Misra and Suresvara were the same
1 l\'lr Hiriyanna, in ].R.A.S. 1923, mentions this point as well as the point
concerning avidyii-nivrtti in l\lar;J9ana's view as admission of negation.

person. But, if VidyaraJ).ya, who knows so much about the views
of MaJ).(_lana, had identified them in the Sankara-dig-vijaya, that
might lead one to pause. Now Mr Hiriyanna seems to have removed
this difficulty for us by his short note in J.R.A.S. 1924, where he
pojnts out that Vidyaral).ya in his Vlirttika-slira refers to the author
of the Brahma-siddhi as a different authority from the author of
the Viirttika, viz. Suresvara. Now, if VidyaraJ).ya, the author of the
Vlirttika-slira, knew that l\lal).(_fana, the author of the Brahma-siddhi,
was not the same person as Suresvara, he could not have identified
them in his Sankara-dig-vijaya. This naturally leads one to suspect
that the Vidyaral).ya who was the author of the Vivarm:za-prameya-
Sa1Jlgraha and the Viirttika-slira was not the same Vidyaral).ya
as the author of Sankara-dig-vijaya. Another consideration also
leads one to think that VidyaraJ).ya (the author of the Vivaratza-
prameya-Sa1Jlgraha) could not have written the Sankara-dig-vijaya.
Anandatman had t\vo disciples, Anubhavananda and Saii.kara-
nanda. Anuhhavananda had as his disciple Amalananda, and
Saii.karananda had Vidyaral).ya as his disciple. So Amalananda
may be taken as a contemporary of Vidyaral).ya. Now Amalananda
had another teacher in Sukhaprakasa, who had Citsukha as his
teacher. Thus Citsukha may be taken to be a contemporary of the
grand teacher ( parama-guru), Anandatman, of Vidyaral).ya. If this
was the case, he could not have written in his Sankara-dig-vijaya
(xnr. 5) that Citsukha, who lived several centuries after Padmapada,
was a disciple of Padmapada. It may therefore be safely asserted
that the author of the Sankara-dig-vijaya was not the author of
the Vivarm:za-prameya-sat{lgraha. Now, if this is so, our reliance on
the author of the Vivarm:za-prameya-sat{lgraha cannot be considered
to be risky and unsafe. But on p. 92 of the Vivara'!la-prameya-
sat{lgraha a passage from the Viirttika of Suresvara (1v. 8) is
attributed to Visvariipa Acarya. It may therefore be concluded that
Mal). (_lana, the author of the Brahma-siddhi, was not the same person
as Sure8vara, unless we suppose that l\1al).(_lana was not only a
Mima:rpsa writer, but also a Vedanta writer of great repute and
that his conversion by Saii.kara meant only that he changed some
of his Vedantic views and accepted those of Saii.kara, and it was
at this stage that he was called Suresvara. On this theory his
Brahma-siddhi was probably written before his conversion to
Saii.kara's views. It seems likely that this theory may be correct,
and that the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the
XI] .lVIar;4ana
Brahma-siddhi; for the passage of the Brahma-siddhi quoted by
Vacaspati in his 1\yiiya-ka~zikii is quoted in a manner which
suggests that in all probability the author of the Vidhi-viveka was
also the author of the Brahma-siddhi. It may also be concluded
that in all probability Visvarupa was the same person as Suresvara,
though on this subject no references of value are known to the
present writer other than by the author of the Vivara~a-prameya
sat[lgraha.
Mal)4ana (A.D. Boo).

MaJ).Q.ana l\lisra's Brahma-siddlzi with the commentary of San-
khapal,li is available in manuscript, and 1\!Iahamahopadhyaya Kup-
pusvami Sastri of .:\Iadras is expected soon to bring out a critical
edition of this important work. Through the courtesy of Mahama-
hopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastri the present writer had an oppor-
tunity of going through the proofs of the Brahma-siddhi and through
the courtesy of Mr C. Kunhan Raja, the Honorary Director
of the Adyar Library, he was able also to utilize the manuscript
of Sankhapal,li's commentary1 • The Brahma-siddhi is in four
chapters, Brahma-kii~uja, Tarka-kii~uja, Niyoga-kii~ga, and Siddhi-
kii~z¢a, in the form of verses (kiirikii) and long annotations (vrtti).
That Mai).Q.ana must have been a contemporary of Sankara is
evident from the fact that, though he quotes some writers who
flourished before Sankara, such as Sahara, Kumarila or Vyasa, the
author of the Yoga-sutra-bh~ya, and makes profuse references to
the Upani~ad texts, he never refers to any writer who flourished
after Sankara 2 • Vacaspati also wrote a commentary, called Tattva-
samtk~ii, on ~lai).Q.ana's Brahma-siddhi; but unfortunately this
text, so far as is known to the present writer, has not yet been
1 Citsukha, the pupil of Jnanottama, also wrote a commentary on it, called
Abh£priiya-pmkiis£kii, almost the whole of which, except some portions at the

beginning, is available in the Government Oriental 1\Ianuscript Library, R.
No. 3853. Anandapilrrya also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sz"ddhi, called
Bhiiva-suddhi.
2 1\Iar:H;lana's other works are Bhiivanii-viveka, Vidhi-viveka, Vihhrama-viveka
and Sphota-siddhi. Of these the Vz"dhi-viveka was commented upon by Vacaspati

Misra in his Nyiiya-km::tikii, and the Sphota-sz"ddh£ was commented upon by the
son of Bhavadasa, who had also written a commentary, called Tattva-vibhii'l'anii,
on Vacaspati Misra's Tattva-bindu. The commentary on the Splwta-siddhi is
called Gopiilika. MaQ~ana's Viblzrmna-viveka is a small work devoted to the dis-
cussion of the four theories of i!lusion (khyiiti), iitma-khyiiti, asat-khyiiti, an_vathii-
khyiit£ and akhyiiti. Up till now only his Bhiivanii-"Z-'iveka and Vidhi-·vi·veka have
been published.
discovered. In the Brahma-kiit;u)a chapter Mal). <;lana discusses the

nature of Brahman; in the Tarka-kiil}r)a he tries to prove that
we cannot perceive "difference" through perception and that
therefore one should not think of interpreting the Upani~ad texts
on dualistic lines on the ground that perception reveals difference.
In the third chapter, the Niyoga-kiil}r)a, he tries to refute the
l\Iimaq1sa view that the Upani~ad texts are to be interpreted in
accordance with the Mimaq1sa principle of interpretation, that
all Vedic texts command us to engage in some kind of action
or to restrain ourselves from certain other kinds of action. This
is by far the longest chapter of the book. The fourth chapter,
the Siddhi-kiil}r)a, is the shortest: Mal). <;lana says here that the
V pani~ad texts show that the manifold world of appearance does
not exist at all and that its apparent existence is due to the
a·vidyii of jiva.
In the Brahma-kiil}(la the most important Vedantic concepts
are explained by l\1al).<;iana according to his own view. He first
introduces the problem of the subject (dra~tr) and the object
(drsya) and says that it is only by abolishing the apparent duality
of subject and object that the fact of experience can be explained.
For, if there was any real duality of subject and object, that duality
could not be bridged over and no relation between the two could
be established; if, on the other hand, there is only the subject,
then all things that are perceived can best be explained as being
illusory creations imposed on self, the only reality1 • Proceeding
further with the same argument, he says that attempts have been
made to bring about this subject-object relation through the theory
of the operation of an intermediary mind (antal;kara1J.a); but
whatever may be the nature of this intermediary, the pure un-
changeable intelligence, the self or the subject, could not change
with its varying changes in accordance with its connection with
different objects; if it is held that the self does not undergo any
transformation or change, but there is only the appearance of a
transformation through its reflection in the antal;karm;za, then it is
plainly admitted that objects are not in reality perceived and that
there is only an appearance of perception. If objects are not
perceived in reality, it is wrong to think that they have a separate
1
ekatva eviiya'!l dra~!r-drsya-bhiivo 'vakalpate, dra~tur eva cid-iitmanal; tathii
tathii vipari~iimiid vivartaniid vii; niiniitve tu vivikta-svabhiivayor asmhsnta-
paraspara-svarfipayor asambaddhayol; kidrso dra~tr-dr$ya-bhiivab. Kuppusvami
Sastri's edition of Brahma-siddhi, p. 7· (In the press.)
XI] Ma1J4ana
and independent existence from the selfl. Just as the very same
man sees his own image in the mirror to be different from him and
to exist outside of him as an object, so the same self appears as
all the diverse objects outside of it. It is difficult to conceive how
one could admit the existence of external objects outside the pure
intelligence (cit); for in that case it would be impossible to relate
the two 2 •
According to lVIaJ).(_lana avidyii is called miiyii, or false appearance,
because it is neither a characteristic (sva-bhiiva) of Brahman nor
different from it, neither existent nor non-existent. If it was the
characteristic of anything, then, whether one with that or different
from it, it would be real and could not therefore be called avidyii;
if it was absolutely non-existent, it would be like the lotus of
the sky and would have no practical bearing in experience (na
vyavahiira-bzjam) such as avidyii has; it has thus to be admitted
that avidyii is indescribable or unspeakable (anirvacanlyii) 3 •
According to MaQ.(_lana avidyii belongs to the individual souls
(ji·va). He admits that there is an inconsistency in such a view;
but he thinks that, avidyii being itself an inconsistent category,
there is no wonder that its relation with jlva should also be in con-
1
ekiintal,zkara?Za-sa'!lkriintiiv asty eva sambandha iti cet, na, cite!; suddhatviid
apari?Ziimiid aprati-sa'!lkramiic ca; drsyii buddhil; citi-sannidhes chiiyaya ·vivartata iti
ced atha keya7J1. tac chiiyatii? a-tad-iitmanal.z tad-avabhiisal,z; na tarhi paramiirthatu
drsya7J1. drsyate, paramiirthatas ca drsyamiina7JI. dra~tr-vyatiriktam asti iti dur-
bha'l}am. Ibid. gankhapal)i in commenting on this discards the view that objects
pass through the sense-channels and become superimposed on the anta~zkara1)a or
durbha')am and thereby become related to the pure intelligence of the self and
objectified : na tll spha{ikopame cetasi indriya-pra?Ziili-sa'!lllriintiiniim arthiiniirJl
tatraiva sarJlkriintena iitma-caitanyena sambaddhiinarJl tad-driyatvarJl gha{i~yate.
Adyar MS. p. 75·
It may not be out of place to point out in this connection that the theory of
Padmapada, Prakasatman, as developed later on by Dharmarajadhvarindra,
which held that the mind (antal;kara1J.a) becomes superimposed on external objects
in perception, was in all probability borrowed from the Sarnkhya doctrine of
cic-chii.yiipatti in pe1·ception, which was somehow forced into Sankara's loose
epistemological doctrines and worked out as a systematic epistemological theory.
The fact that MaQ.Qana discards this epistemological doctrine shows, on the
one hand, that he did not admit it to be a right interpretation of Sankara and
may, on the other hand, he regarded as a criticism of the contemporary inter-
pretation of Padmapada. But probably the reply of that school would be that,
though they admitted extra-individual reality of objects, they did not admit the
reality of objects outside of pure intelligence (cit).
2 tathii hi darpat;~a-tala-stham iitmlina1!l ·vibhalaam iviitmanal.z pratyeti; cites tu
vibhaktam asa'!lsnfa1Jl tayii cetyata iti dur-avagamyam. Ibid. _

8 Ibid. p. 9· It may not be out of place here to point out that Anandabodha's
argument in his Nyiiya-makaranda regarding the unspeakable nature of avidyii,

which has been treated in a later section of thi-; chapter, is based on this argument
of Mai)Qana.
The Sankara School of Vedanta [cu.
sistent and unexplainable. The inconsistency of the relationship of
avidyii with the jivas arises as follows : the jivas are essentially
identical with Brahman, and the diversity of jtvas is due to
imagination (kalpanii); but this imagination cannot be of Brahman,
since Brahman is devoid of all imagination ( tasyii vidyiitmanalj, kal-
panii-sunyatviit) ; it cannot be the imagination of the jtvas, since the
jivas themselves are regarded as being the product of imagination 1 •
Two solutions may be proposed regarding this difficulty, firstly,
that the word miiyii implies what is inconsistent; had it been a
consistent and explainable concept, it would be reality and not
miiyii 2 • Secondly, it may be said that from avidyii come the jivas
and from the jivas comes the avidyii, and that this cycle is begin-
ningless and therefore there is no ultimate beginning either of the
jivas or of the avidyii 3 • This view is held by those who think that
avidyii is not the material cause of the world : these are technically
called avidyopiidiina-bheda-viidins. It is through this avidyii that the
jivas suffer the cycle of births and rebirths, and this avidyii is
natural to the jivas, since the jivas themselves are the products of
avidyii 4 • And it is through listening to the Vedantic texts, right
thinking, meditation, etc. that true knowledge dawns and the
avidyii is destroyed; it was through this avidyii that the jivas were
separated from Brahman ; with its destruction they attain Brahma-
hood5.
In defining the nature of Brahman as pure bliss Sailkhapal).i the
commentator raises some very interesting discussions. He starts
by criticizing the negative definition of happiness as cessation of
pain or as a positive mental state qualified by such a negative
condition 6 • He says that there are indeed negative pleasures which
are enjoyed as negation of pain (e.g. a plunge into cold water
is an escape from the painful heat); but he holds that there are
cases where pleasures and pains are experienced simultaneously
itaretariisraya prasaitgiit kalpaniidhino hi
jzt•a vibhiiga/:1, jlt:iisrayii kalpanii. Ibid. p. 10.
2 anupapadymniiniirthaiva hi miiyii; upapadyamiiniirthatve yathiirtha-bhiiviin
na m(/yii sytlt. Ibid.

3
anaditvan netaretariisrayattJa-do~ah. Ibid.
4
na hi jzve~u nisarga-jii vidyiisti, avidyaiva hi naisargiki, iigantukyii vidyiiyiih
pravilaya/:1. Ibid. pp. 11-12.
5
avidyayaiva tu brahmm:w jzvo vibhakta/:1, tan-nivrttau brahma-svarilpam eva
bhavati, yathii gha!iidi-bhede tad-iikiisam pariiuddham paramiikaiam eva bhavati.
Ibid. .
6
dubkha nivrttir 'Cii tad-visi~!iitmopalabdhir vii sukham astu, sarvathii sukha?Jl
nama na dharmiintaram asti. Adyar .MS. of the Sankhapal)i commentary, p. 18.
XI] Ma1pjana
and not as negation of each other. A man may feel painful heat in
the upper part of his body and yet feel the lower part of his body
delightfully cool and thus experience pleasure and pain simul-
taneously (sukha-dul;khe yugapaj janyete). Again, according to the
scriptures there is unmixed pain in Hell, and this shows that pain
need not necessarily be relative. Again, there are many cases (e.g.
in the smelling of a delightful odour of camphor) where it cannot
be denied that we have an experience of positive pleasure 1 •
Sankhapal).i then refutes the theory of pain as unsatisfied desire
and happiness as satisfaction or annulment of desires (vi~aya
priipli1Jl vinii klima eva dul;kham atal; tan-nivrttir eva sukham
bhavz~yati) by holding that positive experiences of happiness are
possible even when one has not desired them 2 • An objection
to this is that experience of pleasures satisfies the natural,
but temporarily inactive, desires in a sub-conscious or potential
condition 3 • Again, certain experiences produce more pleasures in
some than in others, and this is obviously due to the fact that one
had more latent desires to be fulfilled than the other. In reply to
these objections Sankhapal).i points out that, even if a thing is
much desired, yet, if it is secured after much trouble, it does not
satisfy one so much as a pleasure which comes easily. If pleasure
is defined as removal of desires, then one should feel happy before
the pleasurable experience or after the pleasurable experience, when
all traces of the desires are wiped out, but not at the time of
enjoying the pleasurable experience; for the desires are not wholly
extinct at that time. Even at the time of enjoying the satisfaction
of most earnest desires one may feel pain. So it is to be admitted
that pleasure is not a relative concept which owes its origin to the
sublation of desires, but that it is a positive concept which has its
existence even before the desires are sublated 4 • If negation of
desires be defined as happiness, then even disinclination to food
through bilious attacks is to be called happiness 5 • So it is to be
admitted that positive pleasures are in the first instance experienced
and then are desired. The theory that pains and pleasures are
relative and that without pain there can be no experience of
pleasure and that there can be no experience of pain without an
1 Ibid. pp. 20, 21. 2 Ibid. p. 22.
3
sahajo hi riigal.z sarva-pmrzsiim asti sa tu 'L'i~aya-'L'ise~e7Ja iivir-bhavati. Ibid.
p. 2J.
' atal.z kiima-nivrttel; prag-bhii'L'i sukhu-vastu-bhutam enavyam. Ibid. p. 27.
5
Ibid. p. 25.
experience of pleasure is false and consequently the Vedantic view
is that the state of emancipation as Brahmahood may well be
described as an experience of positive pure bliss 1 .
Sankara in his commentary on the Brahma-siitra and in his
commentaries on some of the Upani~ads and the Miil}t].ukya-
kiirikii had employed some elements of dialectical criticism, the
principles of which had long been introduced in well-developed
forms by the Buddhists. The names of the three great dialecticians,
Srihar~a, Anandajfiana and Citsukha, of the Sankara school, are
well known, and proper notice has been taken of them in this
chapter. But among the disciples of Sankara the man who really
started the dialectical forms of argument, who was second to none
in his dialectical powers and who influenced all other dialecticians of
the Sankaraschool,Anandabodha, Srihar~a,Anandajiiana, Citsukha,
Nrsirphasrama and others, was l.Vla"Q.<;lana. MaQ.<;lana's great dia-
lectical achievement is found in his refutation of the perception of
difference (bheda) in the Tarka-kiil}t].a chapter of his Brahma-siddhi.
The argument arose as follows: the category of difference
(bheda) is revealed in perception, and, if this is so, the reality of
difference cannot be denied, and therefore the Upani~ad texts
should not be interpreted in such a way as to annul the reality
of "difference." Against such a view-point lVIaQ.c;lana undertakes
to prove that "difference," whether as a quality or character-
istic of things or as an independent entity, is never experienced
by perception (pratyak~a) 2 • He starts by saying that perception
yields three possible alternatives, viz. ( 1) that it manifests a
positive object, (2) that it presents differences from other objects,
(3) that it both manifests a positive object and distinguishes it
from other objects 3 • In the third alternative there may again be
three other alternatives, viz. (i) simultaneous presentation of the
positive object and its distinction from others, (ii) first the pre-
sentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the
difference, (iii) first the presentation of the difference and then
the presentation of the positive object 4 • If by perception difference5
1
yadi dul.zkhii-bhiitml.z sukha1Jl syiit tatal.z syiid evam bhiiviintare tu sukhe
dul.zkhiibhiive ca tathii syiid eva. Ibid. p. 161.
2
This discussion runs from page 44 of the Brahma-siddhi (in the press) to
the end of the second chapter.
8 tatra pratyak~e trayal.z kalpii}.z, vastu-svariipa-siddhil.z vast·v-antarasya vya-
vacchedal.z ubhayarrt vii. Brahma-siddhi, II.

6
ubhayasminn api traividhyam, yaugapadyam, vyavaccheda-piirvako vidhi}.z,
vidhi-purvako vyavacchedal.z. Ibid.
XIj Ma1Jljana 93
from other objects are experienced, or if it manifests both the object
and its differences, then it has to be admitted that "difference" is
presented in perception; but, if it can be proved that only positive
objects are presented in perception, unassociated with any pre-
sentation of difference, then it has to be admitted that the notion
of difference is not conveyed to us by perception, and in that case
the verdict of the Upani~ads that reality is one and that no diversity
can be real is not contradicted by perceptual experience. Now
follows the argument.
Perception does not reveal merely the difference, nor does it
first reveal the difference and then the positive object, nor both
of them simultaneously; for the positive object must first be
revealed, before any difference can be manifested. Difference
must concern itself in a relation between two positive objects,
e.g. the cow is different from the horse, or there is no jug here.
The negation involved in the notion of difference can have no
bearing without that which is negated or that of which it is
negated, and both these are positive in their notion. The negation
of a chimerical entity (e.g. the lotus of the sky) is to be inter-
preted as negation of a false relation of its constituents, which
are positive in themselves (e.g. both the lotus and the sky are
existents, the incompatibility is due to their relationing, and it is
such a relation between these two positive entities that is denied),
or as denying the objective existence of such entities, which can
be imagined only as a mental idea1 • If the category of difference
distinguishes two objects from one another, the objects between
which the difference is manifested must first be known. Again, it
cannot be held that perception, after revealing the positive object,
reveals also its difference from other objects; for perception is
one unique process of cognition, and there are no two moments
in it such that it should first reveal the object with which there is
present sense-contact and then reveal other objects which are not
at that moment in contact with sense, as also the difference between
the two 2 • In the case of the discovery of one's own illusion, such
as "this is not silver, but conch-shell," only the latter knowledge
is perceptual, and this knowledge refers to and negates after the
previous knowledge of the object as silver has been negated. It was
1 kutasdn nimittad buddhau labdha-rupa1Jam bahir n#edha!z kriyate.
Brahma-siddhi, II.
kramal.z samgacchate yuktya naika-viji'iana-karma1Jol.z
na sannihita-ja1Jl tac ra tadanyiimarsi jayate. Ibid. n. Kiirika 3·
only when the presented object was perceived as "this before"

that it was denied as being the silver for which it was taken, and
when it was thus negated there was the perception of the conch-
shell. There is no negative concept without there first being a
positive concept; but it does not therefore follow that a positive
concept cannot be preceded by a negative concept 1 • This is
therefore not a case where there are two moments in one unique
perception, but there are here different cognitive experiences 2 •
Again, there is a view (Buddhist) that it is by the power or
potency of the indeterminate cognition of an object that both the
positive determinate cognition and its difference from others are
produced. Though the positive and the negative are two cognitions,
ye.t, since they are both derived from the indeterminate cognition,
it can well be said that by one positive experience we may also
have its difference from others also manifested (eka-vidhir eva anya-
vyavacchedal} )3 • Against such a view 1\1al).9ana urges that one
positive experience cannot also reveal its differences from all other
kinds of possible and impossible objects. A colour perceived at
a particular time and particular place may negate another colour
at that particular place and time, but it cannot negate the presence
of taste properties at that particular place and time ; but, if the very
perception of a colour should negate everything else which is not
that colour, then these taste properties would also be negated, and,
since this is not possible, it has to be admitted that perception of
a positive entity does not necessarily involve as a result of that
very process the negation of all other entities.
There is again a view that things are by their very nature different
from one another (prakrtyai'l)a bhinnii bhiiviil}), and thus, when by
perception an object is experienced, its difference from other
objects is also grasped by that very act. In reply to this objection
Mal).9ana says that things cannot be of the nature of differences ;
firstly, in that case all objects would be of the nature of difference,
and hence there would be no difference among them; secondly, as
1 pfirva-vijiiiina-vihite rajatiidau "idam" iti ca sannihitiirtha-siimiinye ni~edlw
vidhi-piirva eva, iuktikii-siddhis tu virodhi-ni~edha-purva ucyate; vidhi-pll.rvatii

ca niyamena ni~edhasyocyate, na vidher ni~edha-purvakatii ni#dhyate. Brahma-
siddhi, II. Kiirikii 3·
2 na ca tatra eka-jiiiinasya kramavad-vyiipiirata ubhaya-rilpasya utpattelz. Ibid.
3 nzlasya nirvikalpaka-darianasya yat siimarthya'!l niyataika-kiirm;atva'!l tena
aniidi-viisanii-vasiit pratibhiisita'!l janitam ida'!l nedam iti vika!po bhiivabhii-

va-vyavahiiram pravartayati... satya'!l jilii.na-dvayam ida1Jl savikalpaka1Jl tu
nirvikalpaka'!l tayor mula-bhilta'!l tat pratyak~a,. tatra ca eka-vidhir eva anya-
vyavaccheda iti brilma iti. Sankhapal)i's commentary, ibid.
XI] Ma~u!ana 95
"difference" has no form, the objects themselves would be
formless; thirdly, difference being essentially of the nature of
negation, the objects themselves would be of the nature of negation;
fourthly, since difference involves duality or plurality in its concept,
no object could be regarded as one; a thing cannot be regarded as
both one and many 1 . In reply to this the objector says that a thing
is of the nature of difference only in relation to others (pariipeh~al!l
vastuno bheda-s·vablziival; niitmiipek~am ), but not in relation to
itself. In reply to this objection 1.\lal)<;iana says that things which
have been produced by their own causes cannot stand in need of
a relation to other entities for their existence; all relationing is
mental and as such depends on persons who conceive the things,
and so relationing cannot be a constituent of objective things 2 •
If relationing with other things constituted their essence, then
each thing would depend on others-they would depend on one
another for their existence (itaretariiJraya-prasaizgiit). In reply to
this it may be urged that differences are different, corresponding
to each and every oppositional term, and that each object has a
different specific nature in accordance with the different other
objects with which it may be in a relation of opposition; but, if
this is so, then objects are not produced solely by their own causes;
for, if differences are regarded as their constituent essences, these
essences should vary in accordance with every object with which
a thing may be opposed. In reply to this it is urged by the objector
that, though an object is produced by its own causes, yet its nature
as differences appears in relation to other objects with which
it is held in opposition. 1\lal)Qana rejoins that on such a view
it would be difficult to understand the meaning and function
of this oppositional relation (apek~ii); for it does not produce the
object, which is produced by its own causes, and it has no causal
efficiency and it is also not experienced, except as associated
with the other objects (niiniipe~a-pratiyoginii~n bhedalj, pratiyate).
Difference also cannot be regarded as being of the essence of
oppositional relation ; it is only when there is an oppositional re-
lation between objects already experienced that difference manifests
na bhedo vastuno rilpatp tad-abha·va-prasailgata[l

ariip~a ca bhinnatva1{l vastzmo niivakalpate.
Brahma-siddhi, II. 5·
2 niipek~ii nama kascid 'l.JaStu-dharmo yena vastuni vyavasthiipyeran, na khalu
sva-hetu-priipitodaye~u sva-bhii·va-vyavasthite~u vastu~u sva-bhiiva-sthitaye vastv-

antariipeklii yujyate. Ibid. n. 6, vrtti.
itself. Relations are internal and are experienced in the minds
of those who perceive and conceive 1 • But it is further objected
to this that concepts like father and son are both relational and
obviously externally constitutive. To this Mal)<;lana's reply is that
these two concepts are not based on relation, but on the notion
of production ; that which produces is the father and that which is
produced is the son. Similarly also the notions of long and short
depend upon the one occupying greater or less space at the time
of measurement and not on relations as constituting their essence.
In reply to this the objector says that, if relations are not regarded
as ultimate, and if they are derived from different kinds of actions,
then on the same ground the existence of differences may also be
admitted. If there were no different kinds of things, it would not
be possible to explain different kinds of actions. But MaJ)Q.ana's
reply is that the so-called differences may be but differences in
name; the burning activity of the same fire is described sometimes
as burning and sometimes as cooking. In the Vedanta view it is held
that all the so-called varied kinds of actions appear in one object,
the Brahman, and so the objection that varied kinds of actions
necessarily imply the existence of difference in the agents which
produce them is not valid. Again, the difficulty in the case of the
Buddhist is in its own way none the less; for according to him all
appearances are momentary, and, if this be so, how does he explain
the similarities of effects that we notice? It can be according
to them only on the basis of an illusory notion of the sameness
of causes; so, if the Buddhist can explain our experience of similarity
on the false appearance of sameness of causes, the Vedantist may
also in his tum explain all appearances of diversity through
illusory notions of difference, and there is thus no necessity of
admitting the reality of differences in order to explain our notions of
difference in experience 2 • Others again argue that the world must
be a world of diversity, as the various objects of our experience
serve our various purposes, and it is impossible that one and the
same thing should serve different purposes. But this objection is
not valid, because even the self-same thing can serve diverse
purposes; the same fire can burn, illuminate and cook. There is no
objection to there being a number of limited (avacchinna) qualities
1
pauru~eyfmapek$iim na vastv anuvartate, ato na vastu-svabhiiva!z. Ibid.
2
atha nir-anvaya-vinasiiniim api kalpanii-vi~ayiid abhediit kiiryasJla tulyatii
hama tarhi bhedad eva kalpanii-vi~ayiit kiiryiibheda-siddher muljhii kii.Ta'I,.Ul-
bheda-kalpanii. Ibid.
XI] Ma1J4ana 97
or characters in the self-same thing. It is sometimes urged that
things are different from one another because of their divergent
powers (e.g. milk is different from sesamum because curd is
produced from milk and not from sesamum); but divergence of
powers is like divergence of qualities, and, just as the same fire
may have two different kinds of powers or qualities, namely, that
of burning and cooking, so the same entity may at different
moments both possess and not possess a power, and this does
not in the least imply a divergence or difference of entity. It is
a great mystery that the one self-same thing should have such
a special efficiency (siimarthyiitisaya) that it can be the basis of
innumerable divergent appearances. As one entity is supposed
to possess many divergent powers, so one self-same entity may
on the same principle be regarded as the cause of divergent
appearances.
Again; it is held by some that "difference" consists in the
negation of one entity in another. Such negations, it may be
replied, cannot be indefinite in their nature; for then negations of
all things in all places would make them empty. If, however,
specific negations are implied with reference to determinate
entities, then, since the character of these entities, as different from
one another, depends on these implied negations, and since these
implied negations can operate only when there are these different
entities, they depend mutually upon one another (itaretariisraya)
and cannot therefore hold their own. Again, it cannot be said that
the notion of" difference" arises out of the operation of perceptual
processes like determinate perception (occurring as the culmination
of the perceptual process); for there is no proof whatsoever that
"difference," as apart from· ~utual negation, can be definitely
experienced. Again, if unity of all things as "existents" (sat) was
not realized in experience, it would be difficult to explain how one
could recognize the sameness of things. This sameness or unity of
things is by far the most fundamental of experiences, and it is first
manifested as indeterminate experience, which later on transforms
itself into various notions of difference 1 • In this connection
MaJ).c.lana also takes great pains in refuting the view that things
are twofold in their nature, both unity and difference, and also
1 pratyekam anubiddhatviid abhedena mr~a matafl

bhedo yathii tarangii1]iim bhediid bhedal; kaliivatal;.
Brahma-siddhi, II. Karikii 3 1.
DII 7
the Jaina view that unity and difference are both true in their own
respective ways. But it is not necessary to enter into these details.
The main point in his refutation of the category of difference
consists in this, that he shows that it is inconceivable and dia-
lectically monstrous to suppose that the category of difference can
be experienced through perception and that it is philosophically
more convenient to suppose that there is but one thing which
through ignorance yields the various notions of difference than to
suppose that there are in reality the infinite agreements of unity
and difference just as they are experienced in perception 1 •
In the third chapter of the Brahma-siddhi, called the Niyoga-
kii1J¢a, l\lal)9ana refutes the l\'limarpsa view that the Vedantic texts
are to be interpreted in accordance with the :;\limarpsa canon of
interpretation, viz. that Vedic texts imply either a command or a
prohibition. But, as this discussion is not of much philosophical
importance, it is not desirable to enter into it. In the fourth
chapter, called the Siddhi-l~ii1;¢a, :\lal).9ana reiterates the view that
the chief import of the U pani~ad texts consists in showing that the
manifold world of appearance does not exist and that its mani-
festation is due to the ignorance (a~·idyii) of the individual souls
(fi~·a). The sort of ultimate reality that is described in the Upani~ad
texts is entirely different from all that we see around us, and it
is as propounding this great truth, which cannot be known by
ordinary experience, that the Upani~ads are regarded as the only
source from which knowledge of Brahman can be obtained.
Suresvara (A.n. 8oo).

Suresvara's chief works are the ]\la4karmya-siddhi and Brhad-
iira1Jyakopani~ad-bhii~ya-viirttika. The N a#karmya-siddlzi has at
least five commentaries, such as the Bhiiva-tattva-prakiisikii by
Citsukha, which is based on Jiianottama's Candrikii. This Candrikii
is thus the earliest commentary on the 1\~ai~karmya-siddhi. It is
difficult to determine Jiianottama's date. In the concluding verses of
this commentary the two names Satyabodha and J iianottama occur;
and Mr Hiriyanna points out in his introduction to theNai~karmya
siddhi that these two names also occur in the Sarvajiia-pitha of Con-
jeeveram, to which he claims to have belonged as teacher and pupil,
ekasyaiviistu mahimii yan niineva prakiisate
liighaviin na tu bhimziiniim yac cakiisaty abhinnavat.
Brahma-siddhi, 11. Kiirilul. 32.
XI] Suresvara 99
and according to the list of teachers of that lVIatha J fianottama was
the fourth from Sankara. This would place J fianottama at a very
early date; if, however, the concluding verses are not his, but in-
serted by someone else, then of course they give no clue to his date
except the fact that he must have lived before Citsukha, since
Citsukha's commentary was based on Jfianottama's commentary
Candrikii. Another commentary is the Vidyii-surabhi of }t1anamrta,
the pupil of Uttamamrta; another is the 1\rai~karmya-siddhi
vivarat}a of Akhilatman, pupil of Dasarathapriya; and there is also
another commentary, called Siiriirtha, by Ramadatta, which is of
comparatively recent date.
Suresvara's Nai~karmya-siddhi is divided into four chapters.
The first chapter deals with discussions regarding the relation of
Vedic duties to the attainment of Yedantic wisdom. Avidyii is
here defined as the non-perception in one's experience of the
ultimate oneness of the self: through this rebirths take place, and
it is the destruction of this ignorance which is emancipation (tan-
niiso mul?.tir iitmana~z). The l\limarp.sists think that, if one ceases
to perform actions due to desire (kiimya-lwrma) and prohibited
actions, then the actions which have already accumulated will
naturally exhaust themselves in time by yielding fruits, and so, since
the obligatory duties do not produce any new karma, and since no
other new karmas accumulate, the person will naturally be emanci-
pated from kaTma. There is, however, in the Vedas no injunction
in favour of the attainment of right knowledge. So one should
attain emancipation through the performance of the Vedic duties
alone. As against this l\Hmarp.sa view Suresvara maintains that
emancipation has nothing to do with the performance of actions.
Performance of Vedic duties may have an indirect and remote
bearing, in the way of purifying one's mind, but it has certainly
no direct bearing on the attainment of salvation. Sures,·ara states
a view attributed to Brahmadatta in the ridyii-~urabhi commentary,
that ignorance is not removed merely by the knowledge of the
identity of oneself with Brahman, as propounded in Vedanta texts,
but through long and continuous meditation on the same. So the
right apprehension of the U pani~adic passages on the identity of
the Brahman and the individual does not immediately produce
salvation; one has to continue to meditate for a long time on
such ideas of identity; and all the time one has to perform all
one's obligatory duties, since, if one ceased to perfonn them, this
7·Z
would be a transgression of one's duties and would naturally produce
sins, and hence one would not be able to obtain emancipation.
So knowledge must be combined with the performance of duties
(jiiiina-karma-samuccaya), which is vehemently opposed by Sailkara.
Another view which occurs also in the Viirttika, and is there referred
to by the commentator Anandajfiana as being that of MaJ).gana,
is that, as the knowledge derived from the Vedantic texts is verbal
and conceptual, it cannot of itself lead to Brahma-knowledge,
but, when these texts are continually repeated, they produce
a knowledge of Brahman as a mysterious effect by just the same
kind of process as gives rise to the mysterious effects of sacrificial
or other Vedic duties. The Viirttika refers to various schools
among the adherents of the joint operation of knowledge and
of duties (jiiiina-karma-samuccaya), some regarding jiiiina as
being the more important, others regarding karma as more im-
portant, and still others regarding them both as being equally
important, thus giving rise to three different schools of jiiiina-
karma-samuccaya. Suresvara tries to refute all these views by
saying that true knowledge and emancipation are one and the
same thing, and that it does not in the least require the per-
formance of any kind of Vedic duties. Suresvara also refutes
the doctrine of the joint necessity of karma and jiiiina on the view
of those modified dualists, like Bhartrprapafica, who thought that
reality was a unity in differences, so that the doctrine of differences
was as true as that of unity, anc that, therefore, duties have to be
performed even in the emancipated state, because, the differences
being also real, the necessity of duties cannot be ignored at any
stage of progress, even in the emancipated state, though true
knowledge is also necessary for the realization of truth as unity.
Suresvara's refutation of this view is based upon two considera-
tions, viz. that the conception of reality as being both unity and
difference is self-contradictory, and that, when the oneness is
realized through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and
differences is removed, it is not possible that any duties can be
performed at that stage; for the performance of duties implies
experience of duality and difference 1 •
The second chapter of the N a#karmya-siddhi is devoted to the
exposition of the- nature of self-realization, as won through the
proper interpretation of the unity texts of the Upanh:;ads by a
1
See also Prof. Hiriyanna's introduction to his edition of the Nai1karmya-siddhi.
XI] Suresvara 101
proper teacher. The experience of the ego and all its associated
experiences of attachment, antipathy, etc., vanish with the dawn
of true self-knowledge of unity. The notion of ego is a changeful
and extraneous element, and hence outside the element of pure
consciousness. All manifestations of duality are due to the dis-
tracting effects of the antal;karm:za. When true knowledge dawns,
the self together with all that is objectivity in knowledge vanishes.
All the illusory appearances are due to the imposition of ajiiiina on
the pure self, which, however, cannot thereby disturb the unper-
turbed unity of this pure self. It is the antal;karm:za, or the intellect,
that suffers all modifications in the cognitive operations; the
underlying pure consciousness remains undisturbed all the same.
Yet this non-self which appears as mind, intellect, and its objects
is not a substantive entity like the prakrti of the Sarpkhya; for its
appearance is due merely to ignorance and delusion. This world-
appearance is only a product of nescience (ajiiiina) or false and
indescribable illusion on the self, and is no real product of any real
substance as the Sarpkhya holds. Thus it is that the whole of the
world-appearance vanishes like the illusory silver in the conch-shell
as soon as truth is realized.
In the third chapter Suresvara discusses the nature of ajiiiina, its
relation with the self, and the manner of its dissolution. There are
two entities, the self and the non-self; now the non-self, being itself
a product of ajiiiina (nescience or ignorance), cannot be regarded
as its support or object; so the ajiiiina has for its support and object
the pure self or Brahman; the ignorance of the self is also in regard
to itself, since there is no other object regarding which ignorance is
possible-the entire field of objective appearance being regarded
as the product of ignorance itself. It is the ignorance of the real
nature of the self that transforms itself into all that is subjective
and objective, the intellect and its objects. It is thus clear that
according to Suresvara, unlike Vacaspati Misra and lVfal)<;iana, the
avidyii is based not upon individual persons(jtva), but upon the pure
intelligence itself. It is this ignorance which, being connected and
based upon the pure self, produces the appearances of individual
persons and their subjective and objective experiences. This ajiiiina,
as mere ignorance, is experienced in deep dreamless sleep, when all
its modifications and appearances shrink within it and it is ex-
perienced in itself as pure ignorance, which again in the waking
state manifests itself in the whole series of experiences. It is easy to
see that this view of the relation of ajiiiina to pure intelligence is
different from the idealism preached by lV1aQ<;lana, as noticed in the
previous section. An objection is raised that, if the ego were as much
an extraneous product of ajiiiina as the so-called external objects,
then the ego should have appeared not as a subject, but as an object
like other external or internal objects (e.g. pleasure, pain, etc.). To
this Suresvara replies that, when the antal;kara1Ja or mind is trans-
formed into the form of the external objects, then, in order to give
subjectivity to it, the category of the ego (aharrzkiira) is produced
to associate objective experiences with particular subjective centres,
and then through the reflection of the pure intelligence by way of
this category of the ego the objective experience, as associated with
this category of the ego, appears as subjective experience. The
category of the ego, being immediately and intimatsly related to
the pure intelligence, itself appears as the knower, and the objec-
tivity of the ego is not apparent, just as in burning wood the fire
and that which it burns cannot be separated. It is only when the
pure intelligence is reflected through the ajiiiina product of the
category of the ego that the notion of subjectivity applies to it,
and all that is associated 'vith it is experienced as the "this," the
object, though in reality the ego is itself as much an object as the
objects themselves. All this false experience, however, is destroyed
in the realization of Brahman, when Vedantic texts of unity are
realized. In the third chapter of the Nai~karmya-siddhi the central
ideas of the other three chapters are recapitulated. In the Viirttika
Suresvara discusses the very same problems in a much more
elaborate manner, but it is not useful for our present purposes to
enter into these details.
Padmapada (A.D. 82o).

Padmapada is universally reputed to be a direct disciple of
Sankaracarya, and, since the manner of his own salutation to
Sankaracarya confirms this tradition, and since no facts are known
that can contradict such a view, it may safely be assumed that he
was a younger contemporary of Sankaracarya. There are many tradi-
tional stories about him and his relations with Sankaracarya; but,
since their truth cannot be attested by reliable evidence, it is not
possible to pronounce any judgment on them. Only two works are
attributed to him, viz. the Paiica-piidikli, which is a commentary on
XI] Padmaptida 103
Sankara's commentary on the first four sutras of the Brahma-sutra
and Sankara's introduction to his commentary known as theadhyiisa
and the sambhiivanii-bhii~ya, and the Atma-bodlza-'l'Yiikhyiina, called
also Vediinta-siira. This Paiica-piidikii is one of the most important
of the Vedanta works known to us. It was commented on by
Prakasa tman (A.D. 1 zoo) in his Pai1ca-piidikii-vivara1Ja 1 . The Paiica-
piidikii-'l.:ivara1Ja was further commented on by Akhal)<;iananda
(A.D. 1350), a pupil of Anandagiri, in his Tattva-dzpana. 4t\..nanda-
piirl)a (A.D. 16oo), who wrote his Vidyii-siigarl commentary on
Srihar!?a's Kha1J¢ana-kha~uja-khiidya and also a commentary on the
Mahii-'l·idyii-vi¢ambana, wrote a commentary on the Paiica-piidikiP.
N rsirp.hasrama also wrote a commentary on the Paiica-piidikii-
vivara1Ja, called thePaFica-piidikii-vivara1Ja-prakiiSikii, and Srikf~l)a
also wrote one on the Paiica-piidikii-vivara1Ja. Aufrecht refers to
another commentary by Amalananda as Paiica-piidikii-siistra-dar-
pa1Ja; but this is undoubtedly a mistake for his Siistra-darpa1Ja,
which is noticed below. Amalananda was a follower of the
Vacaspati line and not of the line of Padmapada and Prakasatman.
Ramananda Sarasvati, a pupil of Govindananda, the author of the
Ratna-prabhii commentary on the Siitikara-bhii~ya, wrote his
Vivara1Jopanyiisa (a summary of the main theses of the Vivara1Ja)
as a commentary on Sankara 's Blzii~ya; but this was strictly on
the lines of the Paiica -piidikii-'l:i'l·ara~w, though it was not a direct
commentary thereon. Vidyaral)ya also wrote a separate monograph,
called Vi'l·ara1Ja-prameya-sm!zgraha, in which he interpreted the
Vedantic doctrines on the lines of the Paiica-piidikii-vi'L•ara1Ja. Of
all these the Vi'L·m·a1Jopanyiisa of Ramananda Sarasvati was probably
the last important work on the Vi'l.Jara~za line; for Ramananda's
teacher Govindananda, the pupil of Gopala Sarasvati and the
pupil's pupil of Sivarama, refers in his Ratna-prabhii commentary
to Jagannathasrama's commentary on the Siitikara-bhii~ya, called
the Bhii~ya-dlpikii, and also to Anandagiri's commentary as
"vrddhiih," p. 5 (Nirl)aya-Sagara Press, 1904). Jagannatha was the
teacher of N rsirp.hasrama; Govindananda must therefore have
lived towards the end of the sixteenth century. Ramananda may
1 Prakasatman also wrote a metrical summary of Sal)kara's Bha~ya and a work
called Sabda-nin.zaya, in which he tried to prove the claims of scriptural testi-

mony as valid cognition.
2 As Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahii-'l.:idyii-vitf.ambana,
it seems that AnandapGrl)a lived after Sankara Misra (A.D. 1529), as is seen
from his criticism of his reading of a passage of the Kha1Jtf.ana-kha1)t/.a-khiidya,
p. s86 {Chowkhamba).
therefore be placed in the early part of the seventeenth century.
Govindananda himself also in his Ratna-prabhii commentary
followed the Vivara7Ja line of interpretation, and he refers to
Prakasatman with great respect as PrakiiSiitma-fri-cara7Jaib (Ratna-
prabhii, p. 3).
Padmapada's method of treatment, as interpreted by Prakas-
atman, has been taken in the first and the second volumes of the
present work as the guide to the exposition of the Vedanta. It is not
therefore necessary that much should be said in separate sections re-
garding the Vedantic doctrines of these two great teachers. But still
a few words on Padmapada's philosophy may with advantage be
read separately. Padrnapada says that miiyii, avyiikrta, prakrti,
agraha7Ja, avyakta, tamab, kiira7Ja, laya, sakti, mahiisupti, nidrii,
kfara and iikiisa are the terms which are used in older literature as
synonymous with avidyii. It is this entity that obstructs the
pure and independently self-revealing nature of Brahman, and
thus, standing as the painted canvas (citra-bhitti) of ignorance
(avidyii), deeds (karma) and past impressions of knowledge (piirva-
prajiiii-Sa1Jlskiira) produce the individual persons (jivatviipiidika).
Undergoing its peculiar transformations with God as its support,
it manifests itself as the two powers of knowledge and activity
(vijiiiina-kri'yii-sakti-dvaylifraya) and functions as the doer of all
actions and the enjoyer of all experiences (kartrtva-bhoktrtvaikii-
dhiirai.J). In association with the pure unchangeable light of Brah-
man it is the complex of these transformations which appears
as the immediate ego (aha'f!lkiira). It is through the association
with this ego that the pure self is falsely regarded as the enjoyer
of experiences. This transformation is called antai.Jkara7Ja, manas,
buddhi and the ego or the ego-feeler (aha1Jl-pratyayin) on the side
of its cognitive activity, while on the vibratory side of its activity
(spanda-saktyii), it is called prii1Ja or biomotor functions. The asso-
ciation of the ego with the pure litman, like the association of the
redness of a japii flower with a crystal, is a complex (granthi) which
manifests the dual characteristics of activity of the avidyii stuff
and the consciousness of the pure self (sa1Jlbhinnobhaya-riipatviit).
On the question as to whether avidyii has for both support
(lisraya) and object (vi~aya) Brahman Padmapada's own attitude
does not seem to be very clear. He only says that avidyii mani-
fests itself in the individual person (jiva) by obstructing the
real nature of the Brahman as pure self-luminosity and that the
XI] Padmapiida 105
Brahman by its limitation (avaccheda) through beginningless avidyii

is the cause of the appearance of infinite individual persons. But
Prakasatman introduces a long discussion, trying to prove that
Brahman is both the support and the object of avidyii as against
the view of Vacaspati Misra that avidyii has the Brahman as its
object and the jzva as its support (iisraya). This is thus one of the
fundamental points of difference between the Vivaratta line of
interpretation and the interpretation of the Vacaspati line. In this
Prakasatman agrees with the view of Suresvara and his pupil
Sarvajfiatman, though, as will be noticed, Sarvajfiatman draws
some nice distinctions which are not noticed by Suresvara.
Padmapada draws a distinction between two meanings of false-
hood (mithyii), viz. falsehood as simple negation (apahnava-vacana)
and falsehood as the unspeakable and indescribable (anirvacani-
yatii-vacana). It is probably he who of all the interpreters first
described ajfiiina or avidyii as being of a material nature (jatfiitmikii)
and of the nature of a power (jatfiitmikii avidyii-saktz), and inter-
preted Sankara's phrase "mithyii-jniina-nimittal:z" as meaning that
it is this material power of ajfiiina that is the constitutive or the
material cause of the world-appearance. Prakasatman, however,
el~borates the conception further in his attempts to give proofs in
support of the view that avidyii is something positive (bhiiva-rilpa).
These proofs have been repeatedly given by many other later
writers, and have already been dealt with in the first volume of the
present work. Padmapada is also probably the first to attempt an
explanation of the process of Vedantic perception which was later
on elaborated by Prakasatman and later writers, and his views were
all collected and systematized in the exposition of the Vediinta-
paribh~ii of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra in the sixteenth century.
Describing this process, Padmapada says that, as a result of the
cognitive activity of the ego, the objects with which that is con-
cerned become connected with it, and, as a result of that, certain
changes are produced in it, and it is these changes that constitute
the subject-object relation of knowledge (jniitur jfieya-sambandhal:z).
The antal:zkaratta, or psychical frame of mind, can lead to the limited
expression of the pure consciousness only so far as it is associated
with its object. The perceptual experience of immediacy (aparok~a)
of objects means nothing more than the expression of the pure
consciousness through the changing states of the antal:zkara1Ja. The
ego thus becomes a perceiver (pramiitr) through its connection
with the underlying consciousness. Prakasatrnan, however, elab-
orates it by supposing that the antal.zkarm.za goes out to the
objective spatial positions, and assumes the spatial form of the
objects perceived. Hence what Padmapada conceived merely as
the change of the antal.zkarm.za states through the varying relation
of the anta}.zkarm:za with its objects, is interpreted in the definite
meaning of this relation as being nothing more than spatial super-
position of the anta}.zkarm.za on its objects. In inference, however,
there is no immediate knowledge, as this is mediated through
relations with the reason (linga). Knowledge however would mean
both mediate and immediate knowledge; for it is defined as being
the manifestation of the object (artha-prakiisa).
On the subject of the causality of Brahman Padmapada says
that that on which the world-appearance is manifested, the
Brahman, is the cause of the world. On this point Prakasatman
offers three alternative views, viz. ( 1) that, like two twisted threads
in a rope, miiyii and Brahman are together the joint cause of the
world, (z) that that which has miiyii as its power is the cause,
and (3) that the Brahman which has miiyii supported on it is the
cause of the world, but in all these the ultimate causality rests with
Brahman, since miiyii is dependent thereon. Brahman is sanw-jiia
(omniscient) in the sense that it manifests all that is associated with
it, and it is the Brahman that thr.;mgh its miiyii appears as the world
of experience. The doctrines of avaccheda-viida and pratibimba-
viida explained in the first volume of the present work are also
at least as old as Padmapada 's Paiica-piidikii, and both Padmapada
and Prakasatman seem to support the reflection theory (prati-
bimba-viida), the theory that the jzva is but a reflected image of
Brahman 1 •
Vacaspati Niisra (A.D. 84o).

Vacaspati 1\Iisra, the celebrated author of a commentary called
Bhiimatlon Sankara's commentary ,is the author of a Tattva-samik~ii,
a commentary on l\.Jat:l<;iana's Brahma-siddhi; he also commented
on the Sii1J1l~hya-kiirikii, Vidhi-viveka, Nyiiya-viirttika, and he was
1
See volume 1, pp. 475, 476. These two doctrines were probably present
in germinal forms as early as the ninth century. But gradually more and more
attention seems to have been paid to them. Appaya Dik~ita gives a fairly good
summary of these two doctrines in the Parimala, pp. 335-343, Sri Val)i
Vila sa Press, Srirangam, without committing either himself or Vacaspati to any
one of these views.
XI] V iicaspati Misra 107
the author of a number of other works. In his Nyiiya-sucini-

bandhahe gives his date as 898(vasv-mika-vasu-vatsare), which in all
probability has to be understood as of the Vikrama-sarpvat, and con-
sequently he can safely be placed in A.D. 842. In his commentary
called Bhiimati he offers salutation to l\Iartal).<;la-tilaka-svamin,
which has been understood to refer to his teacher. But Amala-
nanda in commenting thereon rightly points out that this word is a
compound of the two names l\1artal).<;la and Tilakasvamin, belong-
ing to gods adored with a view to the fruition of one's actions.
Tilakasvamin is referred to in Yiijiiavalkya, I. 294 as a god, and the
Jl:Iitiik~arii explains it as being the name of the god Karttikeya or
Skanda. U dayana, however, in his Nyiiya-viirttika-tiitparya-pari-
suddhi (p. 9), a commentary on Vacaspati's Tiitparya-tzkii, refers
to one Trilocana as being the teacher of Vacaspati, and Vardhamana
in his commentary on it, called Nyiiya-nibandha-prakiiSa, con-
firms this: Vacaspati himself also refers to Trilocanaguru, whom he
followed in interpreting the word vyavasiiya (Nyiiya-sutra, 1. i. 4)
as determinate knowledge (savikalpa) 1 • It is however interesting
to note that in the Nyiiya-km:zikii (verse 3) he refers to the author of
the Nyiiya-maiijari (in all probability Jayanta) as his teacher (vidyii-
taru)2. Vacaspati says at the end of his Bhiimati commentary that
he wrote that work when the great king Nrga was reigning. This
king, so far as the present writer is aware, has not yet been histori-
cally traced. Bhiimati was Vacaspati's last great work; for in the
colophon at the end of the Bhiimatl he says that he had already
written his Nyiiya-km:zikii, Tatl'i.,'a-samzk~ii, Tauva-bindu and other
works on Nyaya, Sarpkhya and Yoga.
Vacaspati's Vedantic works are Bhiimatl and Tatt·va-samik~ii
(on Brahma-siddhi). The last work has not yet been published.
Aufrecht, referring to his work, Tattva-bindu, says that it is a
Vedanta work. This is however a mistake, as the work deals with
the sphota doctrines of sound, and has nothing to do with Vedanta.
In the absence of Vacaspati's Tattva-samik~ii, which has not been
published, and manuscripts of which have become extremely
scarce, it is difficult to give an entirely satisfactory account of the
special features of Vacaspati's view of Vedanta. But his Bhiimati
trilocana-gurfinnlta-miirgiinugamanonmukhai!z
yathiimiinai'Jl yathii-vastu vyiikhyiitam idam rdriam.
Nyiiya-viirttika-tiitparya-tlkii, p. 87. Benares, 1898.
ajiiiina-timira-iamanli'Jl nyiiya-maiijaTli'Jl ruciriim
prasavitre prabhavitre vidyii-tarave namo gurave.
Nyiiya-ka1Jikii, introductory verse.
commentary is a great work, and it is possible to collect from it
some of the main features of his views. As to the method of
Vacaspati 's commentary, he always tries to explain the text as
faithfully as he can, keeping himself in the background and direct-
ing his great knowledge of the subject to the elucidation of the
problems which directly arise from the texts and to explaining
the allusions and contexts of thoughts, objections and ideas of
other schools of thought referred to in the text. The Bhiimati
commentary on Sankara's Bhiifya is a very important one, and
it had a number of important sub-commentaries. The most
important and earliest of these is the Vediinta-kalpa-taru of
Amalananda (A.D. 1247-126o), on which Appaya Dik!?ita (about
A.D. r6oo) wrote another commentary called V:ediinta-kalpa
taru-parimala 1 • The Vedanta-kalpa-taru was also commented on
by Lak~minrsirpha, author of the Tarka-dipika, son of KoQ<;ia-
bhatta and grandson of Railgoji Bhana, towards the end of
the seventeenth century, and this commentary is called Abhoga.
The Abhoga commentary is largely inspired by the Vedanta-
kalpa-taru-parimala, though in many cases it differs from and
criticizes it. In addition to these there are also other commentaries
on the Bhamati, such as the Bhiimati-tilaka, the Bhamati-vilasa,
the Bhiimati-vyakhyii by Sriranganatha and another commentary
on the Vediinta-kalpa-taru, by Vaidyanatha PayaguQQ.a, called the
Vediinta-kalpa- taru-maiijari.
Vacaspati defines truth and reality as immediate self-revelation
(sva-prakasata) which is never contradicted (abadhita). Only the
pure self can be said to be in this sense ultimately real. He thus
definitely rejects the definition of reality as the participation of the
class-concept of being, as the Naiyayikas hold, or capacity of doing
work (artha-kriyii-kiiritva), as the Buddhists hold. He admits two
kinds of ajfiiina, as psychological and as forming the material cause
of the mind and the inner psychical nature of man or as the material
world outside. Thus he says in his commentary on the Saizkara-
1 Amalananda also wrote another work, called Sastra-darpm;a, in which,
taking the different topics (adhikarm;zas) of the Brahma-sfltras, he tried to give a

plain and simple general explanation of the whole topic without entering into
much discussion on the interpretations of the different sfitras on the topic. These
general lectures on the adhikararzas of the Brahma-siltras did not, however, reveal
any originality of views on the part of Amalananda, but were based on Vacas-
pati's interpretation, and were but reflections of his views, as Amalananda
himself admits in the second verse of the Sastra-darparza (Vilcaspati-mati-vimbi-
tam adarsam prtirabhe vimalam)-Sri Val)i Vilasa Press, I 9 I 3, Srirangam, Madras.
XI] Viicaspati Misra
bhii~ya, I. iii. 30, that at the time of the great dissolution (mahii-
pralaya) all products of avidyii, such as the psychical frame
(antal)karm.za), cease to have any functions of their own, but
are not on account of that destroyed; they are at that time merged
in the indescribable avidyii, their root cause, and abide there
as potential capacities (suk~meya sakti-rupe1_la) together with the
wrong impressions and psychological tendencies of illusion. When
the state of mahii-pralaya is at an end, moved by the will of God,
they come out like the limbs of a tortoise or like the rejuvenation
during rains of the bodies of frogs which have remained inert and
lifeless all the year round, and then, being associated with their
proper tendencies and impressions, they assume their particular
names and forms as of old before the mahii-pralaya. Though
all creation takes place through God's will, yet God's will is also
determined by the conditions of karma and the impressions pro-
duced by it. This statement proves that he believed in avidyii
as an objective entity of an indescribable nature (anirviicyii
avidyii), into which all world-products disappear during the
mahii-pralaya and out of which they reappear in the end and
become associated with psychological ignorance and wrong im-
pressions which had also disappeared into it at the time of the
mahii-pralaya. Avidyii thus described resembles very much the
prakrti of Yoga, into which all the world-products disappear
during a mahii-pralaya together with the fivefold avidyii and their
impressions, which at the time of creation become associated with
their own proper buddhis. In the very adoration hymn of the
Bhiimati Vacaspati speaks of avidyii being twofold (avidyii-
dvitaya), and says that all appearances originate from Brahman
in association with or with the accessory cause (sahakiiri-kiira1_la)
of the two avidyiis (avidyii-dvitaya-sacivasya). In explaining this
passage Amalananda points out that this refers to two avidyiis, one
as a beginningless positive entity and the other as the preceding
series of beginningless false impressions (anyii purviipurva-bhrama-
sa'f!lskiirab). There is thus one aspect of avidyii which forms the
material stuff of the appearances; but the appearances could not
have been appearances if they were not illusorily identified with
the immediate and pure self-revelation (sva-prakiisii cit). Each
individual person (jiva) confuses and misapprehends his psychical
frame and mental experiences as intelligent in themselves, and
it is by such an illusory confusion that these psychical states
attain any meaning as appearances; for otherwise these appearances
could not have been expressed at all. But how does the person
come in, since the concept of a person itself presupposes the very
confusion which it is supposed to make? To this Vacaspati's reply
is that the appearance of the personality is due to a previous false
confusion, and that to another previous false confusion (cf. Mal}-
<Jana). So each false confusion has for its cause a previous false
confusion, and that another false confusion and so on in a beginning-
less series. It is only through such a beginningless series of confusions
that all the later states of confusion are to be explained. Thus
on the one hand the avidyii operates in the individual person, the
jlva, as its locus or support (asraya), and on the other hand it
has the Brahman or pure self-revealing intelligence as its object
(v~aya), which it obscures and through which it makes its false
appearances to be expressed, thereby giving them a false semblance
of reality, whereby all the world-appearances seem to be manifes-
tations of reality1 • It is easy to see how this view differs from the view
of the Satflk~epa-siirlraka of Sarvajfiatma Muni; for in the opinion
of the latter, the Brahman is both the support (iisraya) and the
object (vi~aya) of ajiiiina, which means that the illusion does not
belong to the individual person, but is of a transcendental character.
It is not the individual person as such (fiva), but the pure intelli-
gence that shines through each individual person (pratyak-cit),
that is both obscured and diversified into a manifold of appearances
in a transcendental manner. In Vacaspati's view, however, the
illusion is a psychological one for which the individual person is
responsible, and it is caused through a beginningless chain of
illusions or confusions, where each succeeding illusory experience
is explained by a previous illusory mode of experience, and that by
another and so on. The content of the illusory experiences is also
derived from the indescribable avidyii, which is made to appear as
real by their association with Brahman, the ultimately real and
self-revealing Being. The illusory appearances, as they are, cannot
be described as being existent or non-existent; for, though they
seem to have their individual existences, they are always negated
by other existences, and none of them have that kind of reality
which can be said to defy all negation and contradiction; and it
is only such uncontradicted self-revelation that can be said to be
1 It is in the latter view that Vacaspati differs from MaJ)c;lana, on whose
Brahma-siddhi he wrote his Tattva-samzk~ii..

XI] Sarvajiiiitma Muni III
ultimately real. The unreality of world-appearances consists in the

fact that they are negated and contradicted; and yet they are not
absolutely non-existent like a hare's horn, since, had they been so,
they could not have been experienced at all. So in spite of the fact
that the appearances are made out of avidyii, they have so far
as any modified existence can be ascribed to them, the Brahman
as their underlying ground, and it is for this reason that Brahman
is to be regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. As soon as
this Brahman is realized, the appearances vanish; for the root of
all appearances is their illusory confusion with reality, the Brahman.
In the Bhiimati commentary on Sailkara's commentary, n. ii. 28,
Vacaspati points out that according to the Sailkara Vedanta the
objects of knowledge are themselves indescribable in their nature
(anirvacaniya1Jl niliidi) and not mere mental ideas (na hi brahma-
viidino niliidy-iikiirii1Jl vittim abhyupagacchanti kintu anirvacaniya1Jl
niliidi). The external objects therefore are already existent
outside of the perceiver, only their nature and stuff are inde-
scribable and irrational (anirviicya). Our perceptions therefore
refer always to such objects as their excitants or producers, and
they are not of the nature of pure sensations or ideas generated
from within, without the aid of such external objects.
Sarvajnatma Muni (A.D. goo).

Sarvajfiatma lVIuni was a disciple of Suresvaracarya, the direct
disciple of Sankara, to whom at the beginning of his work Sa'f!lk-
~epa-siiriraka he offers salutation by the name Devesvara, the word
being a synonym of the word sura in Suresvara. The identification of
Devesvara with Suresvara is made by Rama Tirtha, the commentator
on the Sa'f!lk~epa-siirzraka, and this identification does not come
into conflict with anything else that is known about Sarvajfiatma
l\luni either from the text of his work or from other references to
him in general. It is said that his other name was Nityabodhacarya.
The exact date of neither Suresvara n3r · Sarvajfiatma can be
definitely determined. l\Ir Pandit in his introduction to the Gautja-
vaho expresses the view that, since Bhavabhuti was a pupil of
Kumarila, Kumarila must have lived in the middle of the seventh
century, and, since Sankara was a contemporary of Kumarila (on the
testimony of the Sankara-dig-viJaya), he must have lived either in
the seventh century or in the first half of the eighth century. In the
112 The Satikara School of Vedanta [cH.
first volume of the present work Sailkara was placed between A.D.
78o-82o. The arguments of Mr Pandit do not raise any new point
for consideration. His theory that Bhavabhuti was a pupil of Kuma-
rila is based on the evidence of two manuscripts, where, at the end of
an act of the Miilatl-Miidhava, it is said that the work was written
by a pupil of Kumarila. This evidence, as I have noticed elsewhere,
is very slender. The tradition that Sankara was a contemporary of
Kumarila, based as it is only on the testimony of the Sankara-dig-
vijaya, cannot be seriously believed. All that can be said is that
Kumarila probably lived not long before Sailkara, if one can infer
this from the fact that Sailkara does not make any reference to
Kumarila. Hence there seems to be no reason why the traditionally
accepted view that Sankara was born in Sarp.vat 844, or A.D. 788,
or Kali age 3889, should be given up 1 • Taking the approximate
date of Sankara's death to be about A.D. 820 and taking into con-
sideration that Suresvara, the teacher of Sarvajfiatman, occupied
his high pontifical position for a long time, the supposition that
Sarvajfiatman lived in A.D. 900 may not be very far wrong. More-
over, this does not come into conflict with the fact that Vacaspati,
who probably wrote his earlier work the Nyiiya-silc't-nibandha in
A.D. 842, also wrote his commentary on l\.1aQc)ana's Brahma-siddhi
when Suresvara was occupying the pontifical position.
Sarvajfiatma lVIuni was thus probably a younger contemporary
of Vacaspati lVIisra. In his Sarrz~epa-siirzraka he tries to describe
the fundamental problems of the Vedanta philosophy, as explained
by Sankara. This work, which is probably the only work of his
that is known to us, is divided into four chapters, written in verses
of different metres. It contains. in the first chapter 563 verses,
in the second 248, in the third 365 and in the fourth 63. In the
first chapter of the work he maintains that pure Brahman is the
ultimate cause of everything through the instrumentality (dviira)
of ajiiiina. The ajiiiina, which rests on (iiSraya) the pure self and
operates on it as its object (vi~aya), covers its real nature (iicchiidya)
and creates delusory appearances (vi~ipatz), thereby producing
the threefold appearances of God (lsvara), soul (jiva) and the
world. This ajiiiina has no independent existence, and its effects
are seen only through the pure self (cid-iitman) as its ground and
object, and its creations are all false. The pure self is directly
perceived in the state of dreamless sleep as being· of the nature
1
See Jlrya-vidyii-sudhii-kara, pp. 226, 227.
XI] Sarvajiiiilma J.1luni 113
of pure bliss and happiness without the slightest touch of sorrow;

and pure bliss can only be defined as that which is the ultimate
end and not under any circumstances a means to anything else;
such is also the pure self, which cannot be regarded as being a
means to anything else; moreover, there is the fact that everyone
always desires his self as the ultimate object of attainment which
he loves above anything else. Such an infinite love and such an
ultimate end cannot be this limited self, which is referred to as the
agent of our ordinary actions and the sufferer in the daily concerns
of life. The intuitive perception of the seers of the Upani!?ads also
confirms the truth of the self as pure bliss and the infinite. The
illusory impositions on the otht·r hand are limited appearances
of the subject and the object which merely contribute to the
possibility of false attribution and cannot therefore be real (na
viistava'f!l tat). 'Vhen the Brahman is associated with ajiiiina there
are two false entities, viz. the ajiliina and the Brahman as asso-
ciated with the ajiiiina; but this does not imply that the pure
Brahman, which underlies all these false associations, is itself also
false, since this might lead to the criticism that, everything being
false, there is no reality at all, as some of the Buddhists contend.
A distinction is drawn here between iidlziira and adhi#hiina. The
pure Brahman that underlies all appearances is the true adlzi-
~thiina (ground), while the Brahman as modified by the false ajiziina
is a false iidlziira or a false object to which the false appearances
directly refer. All illusory appearances are similarly experienced.
Thus in ·the experience "I perceive this piece of silver" (in the
case of the false appearance of a piece of conch-shell as silver) the
silvery character or the false appearance of the silver is associated
with the "this" element before the perceiver, and the "this"
element in its turn, as the false object, becomes associated with
the false silver as the" this silver." But, though the objectivity
of the false silver as the "this" before the perceiver is false, the
"this" of the true object of the conch-shell is not false. It is the
above kind of double imposition of the false appearance on the
object and of the false object on the false appearance that is known
as paraspariidhyiisa. It is only the false object that appears in the
illusory appearance and the real object lies untouched. The inner
psychical frame (anta/:zkarm;a) to a certain extent on account of
its translucent character resembles pure Brahman, and on account
of this similarity it is often mistaken for the pure self and the pure
Dll 8
self is mistaken for the antal:zkarm:za. It may be contended that there
could be no antal:zkarar.za without the illusory imposition, and so it
could not itself explain the nature of illusion. The reply given to
such an objection is that the illusory imposition and its conse-
quences are beginningless and there is no point of time to
which one could assign its beginning. Hence, though the present
illusion may be said to have taken its start with the antal:zkarar_za, the
antal;karar.za is itself the product of a previous imposition, and that
of a previous antal:zkarar_za, and so on without a beginning. Just as
in the illusion of the silver in the conch-shell, though there is the
piece of conch-shell actually existing, yet it is not separately seen,
and all that is seen to exist is the unreal silver, so the real Brahman
exists as the ground, though the world during the time of its ap-
pearance is felt to be the only existing thing and the Brahman is
not felt to be existent separately from it. Yet this ajfliina has no
real existence and exists only for the ignorant. It can only be
removed when the true knowledge of Brahman dawns, and it is
only through the testimony of the Upani!?ads that this knowledge
can dawn; for there is no other means of insight into the nature of
Brahman. Truth again is defined not as that which is amenable
to proof, but as that which can be independently and directly felt.
The aj1iiina, again, is defined as being positive in its nature (bhiiva-
rupam) and, though it rests on the pure Brahman, yet, like butter
in contact with fire, it also at its touch under certain circumstances
melts away. The positive character of ajiiiina is felt in the world
in its materiality and in ourselves as our ignorance. The real ground
cause, however, according to the testimony of the Upani!?ads, is
the pure Brahman, and the ajiiiina is only the instrument or the
means by which it can become the cause of all appearances; but,
ajiiiina not being itself in any way the material cause of the world,
SarvajfHitman strongly holds that Brahman in association and
jointly with ajtiiina cannot be regarded as the material cause of
the world. The ajiiiina is only a secondary means, without which
the transformation of appearances is indeed not possible, but which
has no share in the ultimate cause that underlies them. He definitely
denies that Brahman could be proved by any inference to the effect
that that which is the cause of the production, existence and dis-
solution of the world is Brahman, since the nature of Brahman
can be understood only by the testimony of the scriptures. He
indulges in long discussions in order to show how the Upanif?ads
XI] Sarvajiiiitma Muni 115
can lead to a direct and immediate apprehension of reality as

Brahman.
The second chapter of the book is devoted mainly to the further
elucidation of these doctrines. In that chapter Sarvajiiatma l\'luni
tries to show the difference of the Vedanta view from the Buddhist,
which difference lies mainly in the fact that, in spite of the doctrine
of illusion, the Vedanta admits the ultimate reality to be Brahman,
which is not admitted by the Buddhists. He also shows how the
experiences of waking life may be compared with those of dreams.
He then tries to show that neither perception nor other means of
proof can prove the reality of the world-appearance and criticizes
the philosophic views of the Sarp.khya, Nyaya and other systems.
He further clarifies his doctrine of the relation of Brahman to ajiiiina
and points out that the association of ajiiiina is not with the one
pure Brahman, nor with individual souls, but with the pure light of
Brahman, which shines as the basis and ground of individual souls
(pratyaktva); for it is only in connection with this that the ajiiiina
appears and is perceived. When with the dawn of right knowledge
pure Brahman as one is realized, the ajiiiina is not felt. It is only
in the light of Brahman as underlying the individual souls that the
ajiiiina is perceived, as when one says," I do not know what you
say" ; so it is neither the individual soul nor the pure one which is
Brahman, but the pure light as it reveals itself through each and
every individual soul 1 • The true light of Brahman is always
there, and emancipation means nothing more than the destruction
of the ajiiiina. In the third chapter Sarvajiiatman describes the
ways (siidhana) by which one should try to destroy this ajiiiina and
prepare oneself for this result and for the final Brahma knowledge.
In the last chapter he describes the nature of emancipation and
the attainment of Brahmahood.
The Sarrzk~epa-siiriraka was commented upon by a number of
distinguished writers, none of whom seem to be very old. Thus
Nrsirp.hasrama wrote a commentary called Tattva-bodhinl, Puru-
~ottama Dikf?ita wrote another called Subodhini, Raghavananda
another called Vidyamrta-var#1Jl, Visvadeva another called Sid-
dhiinta-dtpa, on which Rama Tirtha, pupil of Kr~J)a Tirtha,
1 niijiiiinam advayasamiiirayam i~tam eva1JZ
niidvaita-vastu-v#aya1Jl niiitek~a1Jiiniim
niinanda-nitya-vi~ayiisrayam i~tam etat
pratyaktva-miitra-vi~ayiiirayatiinubhutel;.
Sa1Jlk~epa-iiirlraka, 11. 2 I I.
8-2
based his commentary Anvayiirtha-prakiiSikii. Madhusiidana Sara-
svati also wrote another commentary, called Sa~nk~epa-siiriraka
siira-smpgraha.
Anandabodha Yati.
Anandabodha is a great name in the school of Sankara Vedanta.
He lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century 1 • He
refers to Vacaspati's Tattva-samik~ii and criticizes, but without
mentioning his name, Sarvajiiatman's vie\\ of the interpretation of
the nature of self as pure bliss. He wrote at least three works on
Sankara Vedanta, viz. 1Vyaya-makaranda, Nyiiya-dipiivali and
Pramiir_za-miilii. Of these the Nyaya-makaranda was commented
upon hy Citsukha and his pupil Sukhaprakasa in works called
1\'yiiya-makaranda-flkii and !vyiiya-makaranda-vivecanf. Sukha-
prakasa also wrote a commentary on the Nyiiya-dipiivall, called
.Yyiiya-dipci'l·ali-tiitparya-flkii. Anubhutisvariipa Acarya (late thir-
teenth century), the teacher of Anandajfiana, also wrote commen-
taries on all the three works of Anandabodha. Anandabodha does
not pretend to have made any original contribution and says that
he collected his materials from other works which existed in his
time 2 • He starts his 1Vyaya-makaranda with the thesis that the
apparent difference of different selves is false, since not only do
the· Upani:::;ads hold this doctrine, but it is also intelligible on
grounds of reason that the apparent multiplicity of selves can
be t:xplained on an imaginary supposition of diversity (kiilpanika-
puru~a-bheda), even though in reality there is but one soul.
Arguing on the fact that even the illusory supposition of an
imaginary diversity may explain all appearances of diversity,
Anandabodha tries to refute the argument of the Sii:qzkhya-kiirikii
that the diversity of souls is proved by the fact that with the birth
and death of some there is not birth or death of others. Having
refuted the plurality of subjects in his own way, he turns to the
refutation of plurality of objects. He holds that difference (bheda)
cannot be perceived by sense-perception, since difference cannot
be perceived without perceiving both the object and all else
from which it differs. It cannot be said that first the object is
perceived and then the difference; for perception will naturally
1
_ Mr Tripathi in his introduction to AnandajfHina's Tarka-saT{lgraha gives
Anandabodha's date as A.D. 1200.
2
N iinii-nibandha-kusuma-prabhaviivadata-
nyiiyiipadeia-makaranda-kadamba e~a.
Nyiiya-makaranda, p. 359·
XI] Anandabodha lrati
cease with awareness of its object, and there is no way in which
it can operate for the comprehension of difference; neither can it
be held that the comprehension of difference can in any way be
regarded as simultaneous with the perception of the sensibles.
Nor is it possible that, when two sensibles are perceived at two
different points of time, there could be any way in which their
difference could be perceived; for the two sensibles cannot be
perceived at one and the same time. It cannot, again, be said that
the perception of any sensible, say blue, involves with it the per-
ception of all that is not blue, the yellow, the white, the red, etc.;
for in that case the perception of any sensible would involve the
perception of all other objects of the world. The negation of the
difference of an entity does not mean anything more than the
actual position of it. It is not, however, right to hold that all positive
entities are of the nature of differences; for this is directly against
all experience. If differences are perceived as positive entities,
then to comprehend their differences further differences would be
required, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. l\!Ioreover,
differences, being negative in their nature, cannot be regarded as
capable of being perceived as positive sensibles. Whether differ-
ence is taken as a subject or a predicate in the form "the
difference of the jug from the pillar," or "the jug is different from
the pillar," in either case there is comprehension of an earlier and
more primitive difference between the two objects, on the basis of
which the category of difference is realized.
Anandabodha then discusses the different theories of error held
by the Nyaya, l\1imarpsa, Buddhism, etc. and supports the anirva-
canlya theory of error 1 • In this connection he records his view as to
why nescience (avidyii) has to be admitted as the cause of world-
appearanc.e. He points out that the variety and multiplicity of
world-appearance cannot be explained without the assumption of
a cause which forms its substance. Since this world-appearance
is unreal, it cannot come out of a substance that is real, nor can it
come out of something absolutely non-existent and unreal, since
such a thing evidently could not be the cause of anything; hence,
since the cause of world-appearance cannot be either real or unreal,
it must have for its cause something which is neither real nor
unreal, and the neither-real-nor-unreal entity is avidyii 2 •
1 See the first volume of the present work, ch. x, p. 485.
2 Nyiiya-makaranda, pp. 122, 123.
He next proceeds to prove the doctrine that the self is of the
nature of pure consciousness (iitmana~ samvid-rupatva). This he
does, firstly, by stating the view that awareness in revealing itself
reveals also immediately its objects, and secondly, by arguing that
even though objects of awareness may be varying, there is still
the unvarying consciousness which continues the same even when
there is no object. If there were only the series of awarenesses
arising and ceasing and if there were constant and persistent
awarenesses abiding all the time, how could one note the difference
between one awareness and another, between blue and yellow?
Referring to avidyii, he justifies the view of its being supported
on Brahman, because avidyii, being indefinable in its nature, i.e.
being neither negative nor positive, there can be no objection to its
being regarded as supported on Brahman. Moreover, Brahman can
only be regarded as omniscient in its association with avidyii,sinceall
relations are of the nature of avidyii and there cannot be any omni-
science without a knowledge of the relations. In his Nyiiya-dtpavali
he tries by inference to prove the falsity of the world-appearance
on the analogy of the falsity of the illusory silver. His method of
treatment is more or less the same as the treatment in the Advaita-
siddhi of Madhusiidana Sarasvati at a much later period. There
is practically nothing new in his Pramii7Ja-miilii. It is a small work
of about twenty-five pages, and one can recognize here the argu-
ments of the Nyaya-makaranda in a somewhat different form and
with a different emphasis. Most of Anandabodha's arguments were
borrowed by the later writers of the Vedanta school. Vyasatirtha
of the Madhva school of Vedanta collected most of the standard
Vedanta arguments from Anandabodha and Prakasatman for re-
futation in his Nyiiyiimrta, and these were again refuted by
Madhusiidana's great work, the Advaita-siddhi, and these refuted in
their turn in Rama Tirtha's Nyiiyamrta-tarailgi1Ji. The history
of this controversy will be dealt with in the third volume of the
present work.
Maha-vidya and the Development of Logical Formalism.

The Buddhists had taken to the use of the dialectic method
of logical discussions even from the time of Nagarjuna. But this
was by no means limited to the Buddhists. The Naiyayikas had
also adopted these methods, as is well illustrated by the writings
x1] Mahii-vidyii and Development of Logical Formalism 119
of Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vacaspati, Udayana and others.
Sankara himself had utilized this method in the refutation of
Buddhistic, Jaina, Vaise~ika and other systems of Indian philo-
sophy. But, though these writers largely adopted the dialectic
methods of Nagarjuna's arguments, there seems to be little attempt
on their part to develop the purely formal side of Nagarjuna's
logical arguments, viz. the attempt to formulate definitions with
the strictest formal rigour and to offer criticisms with that over-
emphasis of formalism and scholasticism which attained their cul-
mination in the writings of later Nyaya writers such as Raghunatha
Siromal).i, Jagadisa Bhattacarya, Mathuranatha Bhanacarya and
Gadadhara Bhattacarya. It is generally believed that such methods
of overstrained logical formalism were first started by Gangesa
Upadhyaya of l\1ithila early in the thirteenth century. But the
truth seems to be that this method of logical formalism was
steadily growing among certain writers from as early as the tenth
and eleventh centuries. One notable instance of it is the formu-
lation of the mahii-vidyii modes of syllogism by Kularka Pal).~ita
in the eleventh century. There is practically no reference to this
mahii-vidyii syllogism earlier than Srihar~a (A.D. 1187)1. References
to this syllogism are found in the writings of Citsukha Acarya
(A.D. 1220), Amalananda, called also Vyasasrama (A.D. 1247),
Anandajfiana (A.D. 1260), Veilkata (A.D. 1369), Se!?a San'lgadhara
(A.D. 1450) and others 2. The mahii-vidyii syllogisms were started
probably some time in the eleventh century, and they continued
to be referred to or refuted by writers till the fifteenth century,
though it is curious to notice that they were not mentioned by
Gangesa or any of his followers, such as Raghunatha, Jagadisa
and others, in their discussions on the nature of kevaliinvayi types
of inference.
1 gandhe gandhiintara-prasaiijikii na ca yuktir asti; tadastitve vii kii no hiinil.z;
tasyii apy asmiibhil_z khm:uJanlyatviit. Srihar!?a 's Khm:uf.ana-kha~uja-khiidya, p. 1181,

Chowkhamba edition.
2 athavii ayam glzatal_z etadgha!iinyatve sati vedyatviinadhikarm;iinya-padiir-
hatviit pafavad ity-iidimahiividyii-prayogair api vedyatva-siddlzir apy ahaniyii.-

CitsukhaAcarya's Tattva-pradipikii,p. 13,also p. 304. Thecommentator Pratyag-
rupa-bhagavan mentions Kularka Par:u;lita by name. eva'f!l. sarvii ma/zavidyiis tac-
chiiyii viinye prayogiil_z khmpjanlyii iti.-Amalanan_9a's Vediinta-kalpa-taru, p. 304
(Benar~s, 1895). sarviisv eva mahiividyiisu, etc.-Anandaji'Hina's Tarka-SO'f!l.graha,
p. 22. Also Venkata's Nyiiya-parisuddhi, pp. 125, 126, 273-276, etc., and
Tattva-muktii-kaliipa with Sarviirtha-siddhi, pp. 478, 485, 486-491. Mr M. R.
Telang has collected all the above references to mahii-vidyii in his introduction
to the ll!ahii-vidyii-vifjambana, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1920.
In all probability mahii-·cidyii syllogisms were first started by
Kularka PaQ.<;iita in his Dasa-slokz-mahii-vidyii-sutra containing
sixteen different types of definitions for sixteen different types
of mahii-vidyii syllogisms. Assuming that Kularka PaQ<;iita, the
founder of mahii-vidyii syllogisms, flourished in the eleventh
century, it may well be suggested that many other writers had
written on this subject before Vadindra refuted them in the first
quarter of the thirteenth century. Not only does Vadindra refer
to the arguments of previous writers in support of mahii-vidyii and
in refutation of it in his A1ahii-vidyii-•virjambana, but Bhuvana-
sundara Siiri also in his commentary on the Mahii-vidyii-virjambana
refers to other critics of mahii-vidyii. Recently two different com-
mentaries have been discovered on mahii-vidyii, by Puru~ottama
vana and PiirQ.aprajfia. Veilkata in his Nyiiya-parisuddhi refers to
the Mahii-vidyii, the Miina-manohara and the Pramiir.za-mafijari,
and Srinivasa in his commentary Nyaya-siira on the Nyiiya-pari-
suddhi describes them as works which deal with roundabout
syllogisms (vakriinumiina)l. This shows that for four or five
centuries mahii-vidyii syllogisms were in certain quarters supported
and refuted from the eleventh century to the sixteenth century.
It is well known that the great l\1ima:rpsa writers, such as
Kumarila Bhatta and his followers, believed in the doctrine of the
eternity of sounds, while the followers of the Nyaya and Vaise~ika,
called also Yaugacaryas, regarded sound as non-eternal (anitya).
"A1ahii-vidyii modes were special modes of syllogism, invented prob-
ably by Kularka PaQ<;lita for refuting the 1\Iimarp.sa arguments of
the eternity of sounds and proving the non-eternity of sounds. If
these modes of syllogism could be regarded as valid, they would
also have other kinds of application for the proving or disproving
of other theories and doctrines. The special feature of the mahii-
vidyii syllogisms consisted in their attempt to prove a thesis by
the kevaliinvayi method. Ordinarily concomitance (vyiiptz) con-
sists in the existence of the reason (hetu) in association with the
probandum and its non-existence in all places where the pro-
bandum is absent (siidlzyiibhiivavad-avrttitvam). But the kevaliin-
vayi form of inference which is admitted by the Naiyayikas applies
to those cases where the probandum is so universal that there is
no case where it is absent, and consequently it cannot have a
reason (hetu) whose concomitance with it can be determined by
1
See M. R. Telang's introduction to the Mahii-vidyii-vitjambana.
xi] J.lfaht1-vidyii and Development of Log1cal Formalism I2I
its non-existence in all cases where the probandum is absent and

its existence in all cases where the probandum is present. Thus in
the proposition, "This is describable or nameable (idam abhi-
dheyam) because it is knowable (prameyatviit)," both the pro-
bandum and the reason are so universal that there is no case where
their concomitance can be tested bynegative instances. Mahii-vidyii
syllogisms were forms of kevaliinvayi inference of this type, and
there were sixteen different varieties of it which had this advantage
associated with them, that, they being kez·aliinvayi fonns of
syllogism, it was not easy to criticize them by pointing out defects
or lapses of concomitance of the reason and the probandum, as no
negative instances are available in their case. In order to make it
possible that a kevaliinvayi form of syllogism should be applicable
for affirming the non-eternity of sound, Kularka tried to formulate
propositions in sixteen different ways so that on kevaliin·vayi lines
such an affirmation might be made about a subject that by virtue
of it the non-eternity of sound should follow necessarily as
the only consequence, other possible alternatives being ruled
out. It is this indirect approach of inference that has been by
the critics of mahii-vidyii styled roundabout syllogism. Thus
mahii-vidyii has been defined as that method of syllogism by which
a specific probandum which it is desired to prove by the joint
method of agreement and difference (3, anvaya-vyatireki-siidhya-
viSe~al!l viidy-abhimatam siidhayati)is proved by the necessary impli-
cation of the existence of a particular probandum in a particular
subject (2, pa~e vyapaka-pratltya-paryavasiina-baliit), affirmed by
the existence of hetu in the subject on kevaliinvayi lines (I, kevaliin-
vayini vyiipake pravartamiino hetul;z ). In other words, a reason which
exists in a probandum inseparably ·abiding in a subject (pak~a)
without failure (proposition I) proves (siidhayati), by virtue of the
fact, that such an unfailing existence of that probandum in that
subject in that way is only possible under one supposition (pro-
position 2), namely, the affirmation of another probandum in
another subject (e.g. the affirmation of the probandum "non-
eternity" to the.subject "sound"), which is generally sought to be
proved by the direct method of agreement and difference (pro-
position 3). This may be understood by following a typical mahii-
vidyii syllogism. Thus it is said that by reason of knowability
(meyat·va) as such the self, dissociated from the relations of all
eternal and non-eternal qualities of all other objects excepting
sound, is related to a non-eternal entity (iitmii sabdetariinitya-nitya-

yavrttitviinadlzikara1Jiinitya-vrtti-dharmaviin meyatviid ghatavat).
Now by the qualifying adjunct of" self" the self is dissociated from
all qualities that it shares with all other eternal and non-eternal
objects excepting sound, and the consequence is that it is left only
with some kind of non-eternal quality in relation with sound, as
this was left out of consideration in the qualifying adjunct, which
did not take sound within its purview. Since many relations are
also on the Nyaya view treated as qualities, such a non-eternal
relation of the self to sound may be their mutual difference or
their mutual negation (anyonyabhiiva). Now, if the self, which is
incontestably admitted to be eternal, has such a non-eternal quality
or relation to sound, then this can only be under one supposition,
viz. that sound is non-eternal. But, since all other non-eternal
relations that the self may have to other non-eternal objects,
and all other eternal relations that it may have to other eternal
objects, and all other such relations that it may have to all
eternal and non-eternal objects jointly, except sound, have already
been taken out of consideration by the qualifying phrase, the in-
separable and unfailing non-eternal quality that the self may have,
in the absence of any negative instances, is in relation to sound;
but, if it has a non-eternal quality in relation to sound, then this
can be so only under one supposition, viz. that sound is itself
non-eternal; for the self is incontestably known as eternal. This
indirect and roundabout method of syllogism is known as mahii-
vidyii. It is needless to multiply examples to illustrate all the
sixteen types of propositions of maha-vidyii syllogism, as they are
all formed on the same principle with slight variations.
Vadindra in his Mahii-vidyii-vi¢ambana refuted these types of
syllogism as false, and it is not known that any one else tried to
revive them by refuting Vadindra's criticisms. Vadindra styles
himself in the colophon at the end of the first chapter of
his M ahii-vidyii-vi¢ambana ''IIara-kinkara-nyiiyiiciirya-parama-
pa1J¢ita-bhatta-viidindra," and in the concluding verse of his work
refers to Yogisvara as his preceptor. The above epithets of Hara-
kiilkara, nyiiyiiclirya, etc. do not show however what his real name
was. l\1r Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahii-vidyii-
vi¢ambana that his pupil Bhana Raghava in his commentary on
Bhasarvajfia's Nyiiya-siira, called Nyiiya-siira-viciira, refers to him
by the name l\1ahadeva. Vadindra's real name, then, was Mahadeva,
xi] Mahii-vidyii and Development of Logical Formalism 123
and the rest of the epithets were his titles. Bhatta Raghava says that
the name of Vadindra's father was Saranga. Bhatta Raghava gives
his own date in the Saka era. The sentence however is liable to two dif-
ferent constructions, giving us two different dates, viz.A.D. 1252 and
13 52. But, judging from the fact that Vadindra was a religious coun-
sellor of King Srisirrha (also called Sin ghana), who reigned in Deva-
giri A.D. I2I0-1247, and that in all probability he lived before
Venkata (A.D. 1267-1369), who refers to his Mahii-vidyii-virjambana,
lVIr Telang suggests that we should take A.D. 1252 to be the date of
Bhatta Raghava; and, since he was a pupil of Vadindra, one may
deduct about 27 years from his date and fix Vadindra's date as
A.D. 1225. l\Ir Telang points out that such a date would agree with
the view that he was a religious counsellor of King Srisirrha.
Vadindra refers to Udayana (A.D. 984) and Sivaditya l\1isra
(A.D. 975-1025). l\ir Telang also refers to two other works of
Vadindra, viz. Rasa-sara and Km:ziida-sutra-nibandha, and argues
from allusions contained in Vadindra's J\;fahii-vidyii-virjambana
that he must have written other works in refutation of mahii-vidyii.
Vadindra 's M ahii-vidyii-virjambana consists of three chapters. In the
first chapter he gives an exposition of the mahii-'l:idyii syllogisms; the
second and third chapters are devoted to the refutation of these syllo-
gisms. Vadindra's Mahii-vidyii-virjambana has two commentaries,
one called M ahii-vidyii-virjambana-?-yiikhyiina, by Anandaplirl)a
(A.D. 16oo), and the other, called Vyiikhyiina-dipikii, by Bhuvana-
sundara Suri (A.D. 1400). In addition to these Bhuvanasundara
Suri also wrote a small work called the Laghu-mahii-vidyii-virjam-
bana and a commentary, M ahii-vidya-vivarm:za-#ppana, on a
Mahii-vidyii-dasaSlokt-vivarm:za by an unknown author.
The main points of Vadindra's criticisms may briefly be stated
as follows: He says that it is not possible that there should be a
proper reason (hetu) which has no negative instances (kevaliinvayi-
hetor eva nirvaktum asakyatviit). It is difficult to prove that any
particular quality should exist everywhere and that there should
not be any instance or case where it does not occur. In the third
chapter he shows that not only is it not possible to have kevaliinvayi
hetus, but that even in arguments on the basis of such ke1-·aliinvayi
hetu there would be great scope for fallacies of self-contradiction
(sva-vyiighiita) and fallacies of illicit distribution of the middle term
(anaikiintikatva) and the like. He also shows how all these fallacies
apply to all the mahii-vidyii syllogisms invented by Kularka Pal)<;lita.
124 The Saizkara School oj Vedanta [cH.
It is needless for our present purposes to enter into any elaborate

logical discussion of Vadindra; for the present digression on
mahli-vidyii syllogisms is introduced here only to show that
scholastic logicisms were not first introduced by Snha~a, but
had already come into fashion a few centuries before him,
though Snha~a was undoubtedly the most prominent of those
who sought to apply these scholastic methods in philosophy.
It will thus be seen that the fashion of emphasizing the em-
ployment of logical formalism as a method in philosophy was
inherited by the N aiyayikas and V edantists alike from Buddhists
like Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and others in the third and the fourth
centuries and their later successors in the fifth, sixth and seventh
centuries. But during the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries one
notices a steady development on this side in the works of prominent
Nyaya writers such as Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vacaspati lVIisra
and Udayana and Vedantic authors such as the great master
Sankaracarya, Vacaspati Misra and Anandabodha Yati. But the
school of abstract and dry formalism may be said to have properly
begun with Kularka Pat:!<;lita, or the authors of the Mlina-manohara
and Pramii'l}a-mafijar'i in the latter part of the eleventh century, and
to have been carried on in the works of a number of other writers,
until we come to Gangesa of the early thirteenth century, \vho
enlivened it with the subtleties of his acute mind by the introduction
of the new concepts of avacclzedakatli, which may be regarded as a
new turning point after vylipti. This work was further carried
on extremely elaborately by his later successors, the great writers
of this new school of logic (navya-nyliya), Raghunatha Siromal)i,
Jagadisa Bhattacarya, Gadadhara Bhattacarya and others. On the
Vedanta side this formalism was carried on by Snhar!?a (A.D. I 187),
Citsukha of about A.D. 1220 (of whom Vadindra was a contem-
porary), Anandajiiana or Anandagiri of about A.D. 1260 and through
a number of minor writers until we come to N rsirrhasrama
and Madhusiidana Sarasvati of the seventeenth century. It may
be surmised that formal criticisms of Srihar!?a were probably
largely responsible for a new awakening in the N aiyayikas, who
began to direct their entire attention to a perfecting of their
definitions and discussions on strict lines of formal accuracy and
preciseness to the utter neglect of the collection of new data, new
experiences or the investigation of new problems or new lines of
enquiry, which is so essential for the development of true philo-
XI] Vedanta Dialectic of Srzlzar~a 125
sophy. But, when once they started perfecting the purely logical
appliances and began to employ them successfully in debates, it
became essential for all Vedantists also to master the ways of this
new formalism for the defence of their old views, with utter
neglect of new creations in philosophy. Thus in the growth of
the history of the dialectic of logical formalism in the Vedanta
system of thought it is found that during the eighth, ninth,
tenth and eleventh centuries the element of formalism was
at its lowest and the controversies of the Vedanta with the
Buddhists, l\limarpsists and Naiyayikas were based largely on the
analysis of experience from the Vedantic standpoint and its general
approach to philosophy. But in the twelfth and the thirteenth
centuries the controversy was largely v;ith the Nyaya and Vaise!}ika
and dominated by considerations of logical formalism above every-
thing else. Criticisms became for the most part nothing more than
criticisms of Nyaya and Vaise~ika definitions. Parallel to this a
new force was gradually growing during these centuries in the
writings of Ramanuja and his followers, and in the succeeding
centuries the followers of l\ladhva, the great Vai~J)ava writer, began
to criticize the V edantists (of the Sankara school) very strongly.
It is found therefore that from the thirteenth or fourteenth century
the Vedantic attack was largely directed against the followers of
Ramanuja and 1\lladhva. A history of this controversy will be given
in the third and fourth volumes of the present work. But the
method of logical formalism had attained such an importance by
this time that, though the Vai!?J)avas brought in many new con-
siderations and points of view in philosophy, the method of logical
formalism never lost its high place in dialectic discussions.
Vedanta Dialectic of Srihar~a (A.D. nso).

Srihar!?a flourished probably during the middle of the twelfth
century A.D. Udayana, the great Nyaya writer, lived towards the
end of the tenth century, as is evident from the colophon of his
Lak~a1}iivali 1 • Srihar~a often refutes the definitions of U dayana,
and therefore must have flourished after him. Again, the great
logician Gangesa of 1\:lithila refers to Srihar!?a and refutes his
tarkiimbarii:izka( 906 )pramite~v atUe~u sakiintata?z

var~esudayanas cakre subodhii'!llak~at;ziivalim.
Lak~at;ziivali, p. 72, Surendralal Gosvamin's edition, Benares, 1900.
views, and, since Gati.gesa lived in A.D. 1200, Srihar!?a must have
lived before that date. Accordingly Srihar!?a was after Udayana
and before Gati.gesa, i.e. between the tenth and twelfth centuries
A.D. At the end of his book he refers to himself as honoured by
the King of Kanauj (Kiinyalwbjesvara). It is probable that this
king may be Jayacandra of Kanauj, who was dethroned about
A.D. 1195 1 • In his poetical work .lvai§adha-carita he mentions at
the end of the several chapters many works of his, such as Ar~ava
var~ana, Gau{iorviSa-kula-prasasti, Nava-siihasiiizka-carita, Vijaya-
prasasti, Siva-sakti-siddhi, Sthairya-viciira~a, Chandal:z-prasasti,
and also lsvariibhisandhi and Paficanalzya kiivyat.. The fact that
he wrote a work eulogizing the race of the kings of Gau<;ia leads
one to suspect that he may have been one of the five Brahmans
invited by Adisura of Bengal from Kanauj in the early part of
the eleventh century, in which case Srihar!?a would have to be
placed at that time, and cannot be associated with J ayacandra,
who was dethroned in A.D. 1195. Srihar~a's most important philo-
sophical contribution was the Kha'(l{iana-kha'(l{ia-khiidya (lit. "the
sweets of refutation"), in which he attempts to refute all defini-
tions of the Nyaya system intended to justify the reality of the
categories of experience and tries to show that the world and
all world-experiences are purely phenomenal and have no reality
behind them. The only reality is the self-luminous Brahman of pure
consciousness 3 • His polemic is against the Nyaya, which holds that
1 Anandapun:ta in his commentary on the Khm;ufana-khm;ufa-J:hiidya, called
Khm.ujana-phakkikii, explains Kanyakubjdvara as Kasiraja, i.e. King of Kasi or

Ben ares.
2 None of these however are available.
3 Srihar~a at the end of this work speaks of having purposely made it ex-
tremely knotty here and there, so that no one could understand its difficulties
easily except when explained by the teacher. Thus he says:
grantha-granthir iha kvacit kvacid api nyiisi prayatniin maya
priijiiammanya-manii hatlzena pafhitlmiismin khala!z khelatu,
sraddhiiriiddha-gurul;z slathzkrta-drl}ha-granthil;z samiisiidayat
tv etat-tarkarasormmi-majjana sukhe~v iisaiijana'!l sajjanal;z.
Klzm;ufana-khm;rtja-klziidya, p. 1341. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot,
Benares, 1914.
Several commentaries have been written on this celebrated work by various
people, e.g. Khm;tjana-mm;rfjana by Paramananda, Khm;rfjana-ma1Jljana by
Bhavanatha, Dzdlziti by Raghunatha SiromaQi, Prakiisa by Vardhamana, Vidyii-
bhara1Jl by VidyabharaQa, Vidyii-siigarl by Vidyasagara, Kha1Jfjana-flkii by
Padmanabha PaQ<;iita, Jinanda-vardhana by Sankara Misra, Srt-darpa1Ja by
Subhankara, Kha1J4ana-mahii-tarka by Caritrasirpha, Kha1Jf/ana-kha1Jljana by
Pragalbha Misra, Si~ya-lzitai#1Jf by Padmanabha, Kha1Jtfana-kufhiira by Goku-
lanatha Upadhyaya. At least one refutation of it was attempted by the Naiya-
yikas, as is evidenced by the work of a later Vacaspati (A.D. 1350) from Bengal,
called Klza1Jljanoddlziira.
XI) Vedanta Dialectic of Srlhar~a 127
whatever is known has a well-defined real existence, and Srihar!?a's

main point is to prove that all that is known is indefinable and
unreal, being only of a phenomenal nature and having only a relative
existence based on practical modes of acceptance, customs and
conventions. But, though his chief polemic is against the Nyaya, yet,
since his criticisms are almost wholly of a destructive nature like
those of Nagarjuna, they could be used, with modifications, no less
effectively against any other system. Those who criticize with the
object of establishing positive definitions would object only to
certain definitions or views of other schools; but both Srihafl?a
and the nihilists are interested in the refutation of all definitions
as such, and therefore his dialectic would be valid against all views
and definitions of other systems 1 •
He starts with the proposition that none of our awarenesses
ever stand in need of being further known or are capable of being
the objects of any further act of knowledge. The difference of
the Vedanta from the idealistic Buddhists consists in this, that
the latter hold that everything is unreal and indefinable, not even
excepting cognitions (vij"fiiina); while the Vedanta makes an excep-
tion of cognitions and holds that all the world, excepting knowledge
or awareness, is indefinable either as existent or non-existent
(sad-asadbhyii1Jl vilak~m;am) and is unreal 2 • This indefinableness is
in the nature of all things in the world and all experiences (meya-
svabhiiviinugiiminyiim anirvacanlyatii), and no amount of in-
genuity or scholarship can succeed in defining the nature of that
which has no definable nature or existence. Srihar!?a undertakes to
show that all definitions of things or categories put forward by the
Nyaya writers are absolutely hollow and faulty even according to
the canons of logical discussions and definitions accepted by the
Naiyayika; and, if no definition can stand or be supported, it
necessarily follows that there can be no definitions, or, in other
words, that ho definitions of the phenomenal world are possible
and that the world of phenomena and all our so-called experiences
1
Srihar~a himself admits the similarity of his criticisms to those of Nagarjuna
and says: " tatlzii hi yadi darsane~U Silnya-viidtinirvacanzya-pak~ayor asrayatJG'f!Z
tada tiivad ama~ii'f!Z nir-biidhaiva siirva-pathinatii," etc. KhatJif.ana-khatJtfa-
khiidya, pp. 229-230, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914.
2
By the idealistic Buddhists Sriha~~ here means the idealism of the
Lankiivatiira, from which he quotes the following verse:
buddhyii ·vivicyamiiniinii'tJl svabhiivo niivadhiiryate
ato nirabhilapyiis te nissvabhiiviis ca deSitii/.z.
Lankiivatiira-satra, p. 287, Otani University Press, 1923.
The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [cH.
of it are indefinable. So the Vedantist can say that the unreality
of the world is proved. It is useless for any one to attempt to find
out what is true hy resorting to arguments; for the arguments can
be proved to be false even by the canons on \Vhich they are based.
If anyone, however, says that the arguments of Srihar~a are open
to the same objection and are not true, then that would only
establish his own contention. For Srihar~a does not believe in
the reality of his arguments and enters into them without any
assumption of their reality or unreality. It can be contended
that it is not possible to argue without first admitting the reality
of the arguments. But such reality cannot be established without
first employing the pramiiiJaS or valid means of proof; and the
employment of the pramii~zas would require further arguments,
and theSt further employment of the pramii~ws and so on until
we have vicious infinite regress. If, however, the very arguments
employed in accordance with the canons of the opponents to
destroy their dd1nitions he regarded as false, this would mean that
the opponents reject their own canons, so that the Vedantic argu-
ments in refuting their position would be effective. The Vedanta
is here interested only in destroying the definitions and positions
of the opponents; and so, unless the opponents are successful in
defending their own positions against the attacks of the Vedanta,
the Vedanta point of view is not refuted. So the manifold world
of our experience is indefinable, and the one Brahman is absolutely
and ultimately real.
Regarding the proof that may be demanded of the ultimate
oneness Srihar~a says that the very demand proves that the idea of
ultimate oneness already exists, since, if the idea were not realized,
no one could think of asking fora proof of it. Now, if it is admitted
that the idea of absolute oneness is realized (pratUa), then the
question arises whether such realization is right knowledge (pramii)
or error (apramii). If it is a right idea, then, whatever may have
produced it, this right idea is to be regarded as valid proof. If such
an idea is false, one cannot legitimately ask the Vedantist to adduce
any proofs to demonstrate what is false. It may be urged that,
though the Naiyayika considers it false, it is regarded by the
Vedantist as true and hence the Vedantist may be called upon to
prove that the way in which or the means of proof through which he
came to have his idea was true. This, however, the Vedantistwould
readily deny; for, even though the idea of the absolute onenes3 may
XI) Vedanta Dialectic of Srzhar~a 129
be right, yet the way in which one happened to come by this idea
may be wrong. There may be a fire on a hill; but yet, if one infers
the existence of such a fire from fog appearing as smoke, then such
an inference is false, even though the idea of the fire may itself
be right. Leaving aside the discussion of the propriety of such
demands on the part of the opponents, the Vedantist says that
the Upani~adic texts demonstrate the truth of the ultimate oneness
of reality.
The ultimate oneness of all things, taught in the Upani~ad texts,
cannot be said to be negatived by our perceptual experience of
"many." For our perception deals with individual-things of the
moment and therefore cannot apply to all things of the past,
present, and future and establish the fact of their all being different
from one another. Perception applies to the experience of the
immediate present and is therefore not competent to contradict the
universal proposition of the oneness of all things, as taught by the
Upani~ads. Again, as Snhar~a says, in our perception of the things
of experience we do not realize the differences of the perceptual
objects from ourselves, but the differences among the objects
themselves. The self-revelation of knowledge also fails to show its
difference from all objects of the world. The difference, again, of the
perceived objects from all other things is not revealed in the nature
of the perceived objects themselves as svarupa-bheda, or difference
as being of the nature of the objects which are differenced-if that
were the case, then the false and erroneous perception of silver
would also at once manifest its difference from the object (the
conch-shell) on which the false silver is imposed. In this way
Srihar~a tried to prove that the purport of non-duality, as asserted
in the Vedic texts, is not contradicted by any other, stronger,
proof. Most of these arguments, being of a verbal nature, may
better here be dropped. The main stress seems to rest on the
idea that the immediate differences between the things perceived
do not in the least suggest or imply that they, in their essence
or in their totality, could not ultimately, as a result of our pro-
gressive and better knowledge of things, be considered as one
identical reality (as is asserted in the Upani~ads). If perception
cannot prove anything, inferences by themselves cannot stand
alone or contradict the non-duality taught in the Upani~ads. In
our world of phenomenal experience our minds are always im-
pressed with the concept of difference; but Srihar~a says that the
DII 9
mere existence of an idea does not prove its reality. Words
can give rise to ideas relating even to absolutely non-existing
things.
Again, the concept of" difference" can hardly be defined. If it
lies involved within the essential nature of all things that differ,
then difference would be identical with the nature of the things
that differ. If difference were different from the things that differ,
then it would be necessary to find out some way of establishing a
relation between "difference" and the things that differ, and this
might require another connection, and that another, and so we
should have a vicious endless series. He says that "difference"
may be looked upon from a number of possible points of view.
Firstly, "difference" is supposed to be of the nature of things.
But a "difference" which is of the nature of the things which
differ must involve them all in one; for there cannot be any
difference without referring to the things from which there is
difference. If by" book" we mean its difference from table, then
the table has to enter into the nature of the book, and that would
mean the identity of the table and the book. There is no meaning
in speaking of" difference" as being the thing, when such differ-
ences can only be determined by a reference to other things. If
"difference" be the nature of a thing, such a nature cannot be in
need of being determined by other things. One thing, say a book,
is realized as being different from a table-the nature of the
difference may here be described as being "the quality of being
distinguished from a table"; but "the quality of being distin-
guished" would have no meaning or locus standi, unless "the table"
were also taken with it. If anyone says that a book is identical with
"the quality of being distinguished from," then this will in-
variably include "the table" also within the essence of the book,
as "the table " is a constituent of the complex quality "to be dis-
tinguished from," which necessarily means " to be distinguished
from a table." So on this view also" the table" and all other things
which could be distinguished from the book are involved in the
very essence of all things-a conclusion which contradicts the very
concept of difference. It may also be pointed out that the concept
of difference is entirely extraneous to the concept of things as they
are understood or perceived. The notion of "difference" is itself
different from the notion of the book and the table, whether jointly
or separately. The joint notion of the book and the table is different
XI] Vedanta Dialectic of Srlhar$a 131
from the notion that" the book differs from the table." For under-
standing the nature of a book it is not necessary that one should
understand previously its difference from a table. l\Ioreover, even
though the notion of difference may in some sense be said to lead
to our apprehension of individual things, the apprehension of such
individual things does not carry with it the idea that it is on account
of such difference that the individual things are perceived. It is
through similarity or resemblance between two things-say be-
tween a wild cow (gavaya) and the domestic cow (go)-that a man
can recognize an animal as a wild cow; but yet, when he so con-
siders an animal as a wild cow, he does not invariably because
of such a resemblance to a cow think the animal to be a wild
cow. The mental decision regarding an animal as a cow or a wild
cow takes place immediately without any direct participation of
the cause which produced it. So, even though the notion of differ-
ence may be admitted to be responsible for our apprehension of
the different individual things, an apprehension of an individual
thing does not involve as a constituent any notion of difference.
It is therefore wrong to think that things are of the nature of
difference.
In another view, wherein difference is interpreted as "mental
negation" or "otherness" (anyonyiibhiiva), this "otherness" (say
of the book from the table) is explained as being the negation of
the identity of one with the other. When one says that the book is
other than the table, what is meant is that identity of the book with
the table is denied. Srihar~a here raises the objection that, if the
identity of the book with the table was absolutely chimerical, like the
hare's horn, such a denial of identity would be absolutely meaning-
less. It cannot, again, be suggested that this mental negation, or
negation as otherness, means the denial of one class-concept in
respect of another (e.g. that of book on the table); for there is in
these class-concepts no such special characteristic (dharma) by
virtue of which one could be denied of the other or they could be
distinguished from each other, since the Naiyayika, against whom
Srihar~a's arguments are directed, does not admit that class-con-
cepts possess any distinguishing qualities. In the absence of such
distinguishing qualities they may be regarded as identical: but in
that case the denial of one class-concept (say of the table) would
involve the denial of the class-concept of the thing itself (e.g. the
book), since the class-concepts of the book and the table, not having
IJ2 The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
any distinguishing qualities, are identical; and, further, through
mental denial both the book and the table would be devoid of the
class-concepts of book and table, and so there would be no way of
distinguishing one thing from another, book from table. It is easy
to see therefore that there is no way of making a special case re-
garding negation as otherness (anyonyiibhiiva). Again, if difference
is regarded as the possession of opposite characters (vaidharmya),
then also it may be asked whether the opposite characters have
further opposite characters to distinguish them from one another,
and these again others, and so there is a vicious infinite; if these
are supposed to stop anywhere, then the final characters at that
stage, not having any further opposite characters to distinguish
them, would be identical, and hence all opposite characters in the
backward series would be meaningless and all things would be
identical. If on the contrary it is admitted at the very first stage
that opposite or differing characters have no differing characters to
distinguish them from one another, then the characters will be
identical. Again, it may be asked whether these distinguishing
characters are themselves different fron1 the objects which possess
them or not. If they are different, one may again ask concerning
the opposing characters which lead to this difference and then again
about other opposing characters of these, and so on. If these
infinite differences were to hold good, they could not arrive in less
than infinite time, whereas the object is finite and limited in time.
If, again, they came all at once, there would be such a disorderly
medley of these infinite differences that there would be no way of
determining their respective substrates and their orderly successive
dependence on one another. And, since in the series the earlier
terms of difference can only be established by the establishment
of the later terms of difference, the forward movement in search
of the later terms of difference, in support of the earlier terms
of difference, makes these earlier terms of difference un-
necessary1.
It cannot, therefore, be said that our perception of differences
has any such intrinsic validity that it can contradict the ultimate
unity taught in the Upani~ad texts. Sriha~a does not deny that
we perceive seeming differences in all things, but he denies their
1 prathama-bhediisvlkiira-prayojanasya bheda-vyavahiiriider dvitfya-bhediid
eva siddhefz prathama-bhedo vyarthafz syiid eva, dvitfya-bhediidi-prayojanasya

trtzya-bhediidinaiva siddhefz so pi vyarthafz syiit. Vidyii-siigan on Kha1J4ana-
khm;uj.a-khiidya, p. 206. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914.
XI) Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 133
ultimate validity, since he considers them to be due to avidyii or
nescience alone 1 .
The chief method of Srihar~a's dialectic depends upon the
assumption that the reality of the things that one defines depends
upon the unimpeachable character of the definitions; but all
definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy of argument in a
circle (cakraka), and hence there is no way in which the real nature
of things can be demonstrated or defined. Our world of experience
consists of knower, known and knowledge; if a knower is defined
as the possessor of knowledge, knowledge can only be understood
by a reference to the knower; the known, again, can be understood
only by a reference to knowledge and the knower, and so there is
a circle of relativity which defies all attempts at giving an inde-
pendent definition of any of these things. It is mainly this rela-
tivity that in specific forms baffles all attempts at definition of
all categories.
Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories

and Concepts.
Srihar~a first takes for his criticism the definitions of right
cognition. Assuming the definition of right cognition to be the
direct apprehension of the real nature of things, he first urges that
such a definition is faulty, since, if one accidentally guesses rightly
certain things hidden under a cover and not perceived, or makes
a right inference from faulty data or by fallacious methods, though
the awareness may be right, it cannot be called right cognition 2 •
It is urged that cognition, in order to be valid, must be produced
through unerring instruments; here, however, is a case of chance
guesses which may sometimes be right without being produced by
unerring instruments of senses. Nor can correspondence of the
cognition with its object (yathiirthiinubhava~z pramii) be regarded
as a proper definition of right cognition. Such correspondence can
be defined as meaning either that which represents the reality of
the object itself or similarity to the object. The real nature of
1
na vayaf!l bhedasya san.:athaivasattvam abhyupagacchiima!z, kit!l nama na
paramiirthikat!l sattvaf!l; avidya-vidyamiinatVaf!l tu tadlyam #yata eva. Khatz-
4ana-khatz(la-khiidya, p. 214.
2
E.g. when a man rightly guesses the number of shells closed in another
man's hand, or when one makes a false inference of fire on a hill from a fog
looking like smoke from a distance and there is fire on the hill by chance-his
judgment may be right though his inference may be false.
1 34 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
an object is indeterminable, and so correspondence of awareness

with the object may rather be defined as similarity of the former
to the latter. If this similarity means that the awareness must
have such a character as is possessed by the object (jiiana-
vi~ayikrtena rupe7Ja sadrsyam), then this is clearly impossible; for
qualities that belong to the object cannot belong to the awareness
-there may be an awareness of two white hard marbles, but the
awareness is neither two, nor white, nor hard 1 • It may be urged
that the correspondence consists in this, that the whiteness etc.
belong to the object as qualities possessed by it, whereas they
belong to awareness as being qualities which it reveals 2 • But that
would not hold good in the case of illusory perception of silver
in a conch-shell; the awareness of" before me" in the perception
of "before me the silver" has to be admitted as being a right
cognition. If this is admitted to be a right cognition, then it
was meaningless to define right cognition as true correspondence;
it might as well have been defined as mere cognition, since all
cognition would have some object to which it referred and so far as
that only was concerned all cognitions would be valid. If, however,
entire correspondence of thought and object be urged, then partial
correspondence like the above can hardly be considered satisfactory.
But, if entire correspondence is considered indispensable, then the
correctness of the partial correspondence has to be ignored, whereas
it is admitted by the Naiyayika that, so far as reference to an object
is concerned, all cognitions are valid; only the nature of cognition
may be disputed as to right or wrong, when we are considering the
correspondence of the nature of the object and the nature charac-
terized by the awareness of the object. If entire correspondence
with the object is not assured, then cognition of an object with
imperfect or partial correspondence, due to obstructive circum-
stances, has also to be rejected as false. Again, since the
correspondence always refers to the character, form or appearance
of the thing, all our affirmations regarding the objects to which the
characters are supposed to belong would be false.
Referring to Udayana's definition of right cognition as samyak
paricchitti, or proper discernment, Srihar~a says that the word
1 dvau ghatau suklav ityatra riipa-sa,khyiidi-samaviiyitva, na jiiiinasya
gut}atviid atal; prakiisamiina-ruper;a artha-siidriya'tfl jiiiinasya niisti-asti ca tasya

jiiiinasya tatra gha{ayol:z pramiitvam. Vidyii-siigarz on KhatJtf.ana, p. 398.
2
arthasya hi yathii samaviiyiid riipa1fl vise~at}lbhavati tathii vi~ayabhiiviij
jiiiinasyiipi tad-vise~atJam bhavaty eva. Khat}t/.ana, p. 399·
xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 135
"samyak" (proper) is meaningless; for, if samyak means "entire,"
then the definition is useless, since it is impossible to see all the
visible and invisible constituent parts of a thing, and no one but
an omniscient being could perceive a thing with all its characters,
properties or qualities. If right discernment means the discern-
ment of an object with its special distinguishing features, this again
is unintelligible; for even in wrong cognition, say of conch-shell
as silver, the perceiver seems to perceive the distinguishing marks
of silver in the conch-shell. The whole point lies in the difficulty
of judging whether the distinguishing marks observed are real or
not, and there is no way of determining this. If, again, the dis-
tinguishing features be described as being those characteristics
without the perception of which there can be no certain knowledge
and the perception of which ensures right cognition, then it may
well be pointed out that it is impossible to discover any feature of
any cognition of which one can be positively certain that it is not
wrong. A dreamer confuses all sorts of characters and appearances
and conceives them all to be right. It may be urged that in the
case of right perception the object is perceived with its special
distinguishing features, as in the case of the true perception of
silver, whereas in the case of the false perception of silver in the
conch-shell no such distinguishing features are observed. But
even in this case it would be difficult to define the essential nature
of the distinguishing features; for, if any kind of distinguishing
feature would do, then in the case of the false perception of silver
in the conch-shell the distinguishing feature of being before the
eyes is also possessed by the conch-shell. If all the particular
distinguishing features are insisted on, then there will be endless
distinguishing features, and it would be impossible to make any
definition which would include them all. The certitude of a cogni-
tion which contradicts a previous wrong cognition would often be
liable to the same objection as the wrong cognition itself, since
the nature of the special distinguishing features which would
establish its validity cannot be established by any definition of
right knowledge.
Arguing against the definition of right cognition as "appre-
hension which is not incorrect or not defective" (avyabhiciiri
anubhava/:t), Srihar~a says that "not incorrect" or "not defective"
cannot mean that the cognition must exist only at the time when
the object exists; for then inferential cognition, which often refers
to past and future things, would be false. Neither can it mean
that the cognition coexists in space with its objects; nor can it
mean that the right cognition is similar to its object in all respects,
since cognition is so different in nature from the object that it is
not possible that there should be any case in which it would be
similar thereto in all respects. And, if the view that an awareness
and its object are one and the same be accepted, then this would
apply even to those cases where one object is wrongly perceived
as another; and hence the word "avyabhiciiri" is not sufficient to
distinguish right knowledge from wrong cognition.
Arguing against the Buddhist definition of right cognition as
''an apprehension which is not incompatible (avisa'l{lviidi) with the
object known," Srihar~a tries to refute the definition in all the
possible senses of incompatibility of cognition with object which
determines wrong knowledge. If the definition is supposed to
restrict right cognition to cognition which is cognized by another
cognition as being in agreement with its object, then a wrong
cognition, repeated successively through a number of moments
and found to be in agreement with its object through all the
successive moments until it is contradicted, would also have to
be admitted as right, because in this case the previous cognition
is certified by the cognition of the succeeding moments. If, again,
right cognition is defined as a cognition the incompatibility of
which with its object is not realized by any other cognition, then
also there are difficulties in the way. For even a wrong cognition
may for some time be not contradicted by any other cognition.
l\1oreover, the vision of the conch-shell by the normal eye as
white may be contradicted by the later vision by the jaundiced
eye as yellow. If it is urged that the contradiction must be by
a faultless later cognition, then it may be pointed out that,
if there had been any way of defining faultless cognition, the
definition of right cognition would have been very easy. On
the other hand, unless right cognition is properly defined,
there is no meaning in speaking of faulty or wrong cognition. If
right cognition is defined as a cognition which has causal efficiency,
that in fact is not a proper definition; for even the wrong
cognition of a snake might cause fear and even death. If it is urged
that the causal efficiency must be exercised by the object in the
same form in which it is perceived, then it is very difficult to
ascertain this; and there may be a false cognition of causal effi-
XI] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 137
ciency also; hence it would be very difficult to ascertain the nature
of right cognition on the basis of causal efficiency. Srihar~a points
out again that in a similar way Dharmakirti's definition of right
cognition as enabling one to attain the object (artha-priipakat'l-'a) is
also unintelligible, since it is difficult to determine which object can
be actually attained and which not, and the notion that the thing
may be attained as it is perceived may be present even in the case
of the wrong perception of silver in the conch-shell. If right
cognition is defined as cognition which is not contradicted, then
it may be asked whether the absence of contradiction is at the
time of perception only, in which case even the wrong perception
of silver in the conch-shell would be a right cognition, since it is
uncontradicted at least at the time when the illusion is produced.
If it is urged that a right cognition is that which is not contradicted
at any time, then we are not in a position to assert the rightness
of any cognition; for it is impossible to be certain that any par-
ticular cognition will never at any time be contradicted.
After showing that it is impossible to define right cognition
(pramii) Srihar!?a tries to show that it is impossible to define the
idea of instruments (kara7Ja) or their operative action ('~-yiipiira)
as involved in the idea of instruments of cognition (pramii7Ja).
Srihar~a attempts to show that instrumentality as an agent cannot
be separately conceived as having an independent existence, since it
is difficult to determine its separate existence. It would be a long
tale to go into all the details of this discussion as set forth by
Srihar~a, and for our present purposes it is enough to know that
Srihar~a refuted the concept of "instrumentality" as a separate
agent, both as popularly conceived or as conceived in Sanskrit
grammar. He also discusses a number of alternative meanings
which could be attributed to the concept of" kara7Ja," or instru-
ment, and shows that none of these meanings can be satisfactorily
justified 1 •
In refuting the definition of perception he introduces a long
discussion showing the uselessness of defining perception as an
instrument of right knowledge. Perception is defined in the Nyaya
as cognition which arises through the contact of a particular sense
with its object; but it is impossible to know whether any cognition
has originated from sense-contact, since the fact of the production
1
Among many other definitions Srihar!;>a also refutes the definition of kara7Ja
as given by Uddyotakara-" yadvan eva karoti tat karm;am." Khm:uj.ana, p. so6.
of knowledge from sense-contact cannot itself be directly perceived
or known by any other means. Since in perception the senses
are in contact on the one hand with the self and on the other
hand with the external objects, Srihar~a urges by a series of argu-
ments that, unless the specific object with which the sense is in
contact is mentioned in each case, it would be difficult to formulate
a definition of perception in such a way that it would imply only
the revelation of the external object and not the self, which is as
much in contact with the sense as is the object. Again, the specifi-
cation of the object in the case of each perception would make it
particular, and this would defeat the purposes of definition, which
can only apply to universal concepts. Arguing against a possible
definition of perception as immediateness, Srihar~a supposes that,
if perception reveals some specific quality of the object as its per-
manent attribute, then, in order that this quality may be cognized,
there ought to be another attribute, and this would presuppose
another attribute, and so there would be an infinite regress; and,
if at any stage of the infinite regress it is supposed that no further
attribute is necessary, then this involves the omission of the preced-
ing determining attributes, until the possibility of the perception
is also negatived. If this immediateness be explained as a cognition
produced by the instrumentality of the sense-organs, this again is
unintelligible; for the instrumentality of sense-organs is incom-
prehensible. Srihar~a takes a number of alternative definitions of
perceptions and tries to refute them all more or less in the same
way, mostly by pointing out verbal faults in the formulation of the
definitions.
Citsukha Acarya, a commentator on Srihar~a's Khar.z{fana-
khar.z¢a-khiidya, offers a refutation of the definition of perception
in a much more condensed form. He points out that the definition
of perception by Ak~apada as an uncontradicted cognition arising
out of sense-contact with the object is unintelligible. How can we
know that a cognition would not be contradicted? It cannot be
known from a knowledge of the faultlessness of the collocating cir-
cumstances, since the faultlessness can be known only if there is no
contradiction, and hence faultlessness cannot be known previously
and independently, and the collocating circumstances would con-
tain many elements which are unperceivable. It is also impossible
to say whether any experience will for ever remain uncontradicted.
Nor can it again be urged that right cognition is that which can
xr] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 139
produce an effort on the part of the perceiver (pravrtti-siimarthya);
for even an illusory knowledge can produce an effort on the part
of the perceiver who is deceived by it. Mere achievement of the
result is no test for the rightness of the cognition; for a man may
see the lustre of a gem and think it to be a gem and really get the
gem, yet it cannot be doubted that his apprehension of the ray of
the gem as the gem was erroneous 1 • In the case of the perception
of stars and planets there is no chance of any actual attainment of
those objects, and yet there is no reason to deny the validity of
the cognitions.
Passing over the more or less verbal arguments of Srihar~a in
refutation of the definitions of inference (anumiina) as liizga-parii-
marsa or the realization of the presence in the minor term (pak~a,
e.g. the mountain) of a reason or probans (liizga, e.g. smoke) which
is always concomitant with the major term (siidhya, e.g. fire), or as
invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum or the
major term (siidhya, e.g. fire), and its other slightly modified
varieties, I pass on to his criticism of the nature of concomitance
(vyiipti), which is at the root of the notion of inference. It is urged
that the universal relationship of invariable concomitance required
in vyiipti cannot be established unless the invariable concomitance
of all the individuals involved in a class be known, which is
impossible. The Naiyayika holds that the mind by a sort of
mental contact with class-concepts or universals, called siimiinya-
pratyiisatti, may affirm of all individuals of a class without actually
experiencing all the individuals. It is in this way that, perceiving
the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire in a large number of
cases, one understands the invariable concomitance of smoke with
fire by experiencing a sort of mental contact with the class-concept
"smoke" when perceiving smoke on a distant hill. Srihar~a argues
in refutation of such an interpretation that, if all individual smoke
may be known in such a way by a mental contact with class-con-
cepts, then by a mental contact with the class-concept "knowable"
we might know all individual knowables and thus be omniscient as
well. A thing is knowable only as an individual with its specific
qualities as such, and therefore to know a thing as a knowable
would involve the knowledge of all such specific qualities; for the
1 drsyate hi mm;i-prabhiiyiirJz ma1Ji-buddhyii pravartamiinasya ma1Ji-priiptel:z
pravrtti-siimarthyarJZ na ciivyabhiciiritvam. Tattva-pradipikii, p. 218. NirQaya-

Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915.
class-concept" knowable" would involve all individuals which have
a specific knowable character. It may be urged that knowability is
one single character, and that things may be otherwise completely
different and may yet be one so far as knowability is concerned, and
hence the things may remain wholly unknown in their diversity of
characters and may yet be known so far as they are merely know-
able. To this Srihar~a answers that the class-concept "knowable"
would involve all knowables and so even the diversity of characters
would be involved within the meaning of the tenn "knowable."
Again, assuming for the sake of argument that it is possible
to have a mental contact with class-concepts through individuals,
how can the invariable concomitance itself be observed? If our
senses could by themselves observe such relations of concomitance,
then there would be no possibility of mistakes in the observation
of such concomitance. But such mistakes are committed and
corrected by later experience, and there is no way in which one
can account for the mistake in the sense-judgment. Again, if this
invariable concomitance be defined as aviniibhiiva, which means
that when one is absent the other is also absent, such a definition
is faulty; for it may apply to those cases where there is no real
invariable concomitance. Thus there is no real concomitance be-
tween "earth" and "possibility of being cut"; yet in iikiisa there
is absence of earth and also the absence of "possibility of being
cut." If it is urged that concomitance cannot be determined by a
single instance of the absence of one tallying with the absence of
the other, it must be proved that universally in all instances of the
absence of the one, e.g. the fire, there is also the ab!,'ence of the
other, e.g. the smoke. But it is as difficult to ascertain such uni-
versal absence as it is to ascertain universal concomitance. Again,
if this concomitance be defined as the impossibility of the presence
of the middle term, the reason or the probans, where the major
term or the probandum is also absent, then also it may be said that
it is not possible to determine such an impossibility either by sense-
knowledge or by any other means.
Now tarka or eliminatory consideration in judging of possi-
bilities cannot be considered as establishing invariable concomi-
tance; for all arguments are based on invariable concomitance, and
such an assumption would lead to a vicious mutual interdepend-
ence. The great logician Udayana objects to this and says that, if
invariable concomitance between smoke and fire be denied, then
XI] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 141
there are strong arguments (tarka) against such a denial (badhakas

tarkal:z ), namely, that, if smoke is not regarded as concomitant
with fire, then smoke would either exist without any cause or not
exist at all, which is impossible. But Srihar~a says that there is
room for an alternative proposition which Udayana misses, namely,
that smoke is due to some cause other than fire. It may be that
there are smokes which are not caused by fire. How can one be
sure that all smokes are caused by fire? There may be differences
in these two classes of fire which remain unnoticed by us, and so
there is always room for the supposition that any particular smoke
may not be caused by fire, and such doubts would make inference
impossible. Udayana had however contended that, if you entertain
the doubt, with regard to a future case, that it is possible that there
may be a case in which the concomitance may be found wrong,
then the possibility of such a doubt (sankii) must be supported by
inference, and the admission of this would involve the admission of
inference. If such an exaggerated doubt be considered illegitimate,
there is no obstruction in the way of inference. Doubts can be enter-
tained only so long as such entertainment of doubts is compatible
with practical life. Doubts which make our daily life impossible are
illegitimate. Every day one finds that food appeases hunger, and,
if in spite of that one begins to doubt whether on any particular day
when he is hungry he should take food or not, then life would
be impossible 1 . Srihar~a, however, replies to this contention by
twis~ing the words of Udayana's own karikii, in which he says that,
so long as there is doubt, inference is invalid; if there is no doubt,
this can only be when the invalidity of the inference has been
made manifest, and until such invalidity is found there will always
be doubts. Hence the argument of possibilities (tarka) can never
remove doubts 2 •
Srihar~a also objects to the definition of "invariable concomi-
tance" as a natural relation (sviibhavikal:z sambandha/:z). He rejects
the term "natural relation" and says that invariable concomitance
saizkii ced anumiisty eva
na cec chaizkii tatastariim
vyiighiitiivadhir iisaizkii
tarkah saizkiivadhir matah.
Kusumiiiijali, III, 7· Chowkhamba Sanskrit Bo~k Depot, Benares, 1912.
2 vyiighiito yadi sankiisti
na cec chaizkii tatastariim
vyiighiitiivadhir iisaizkii
tarkab saizkiivadhib kutab.
Khm.uj.ana-khat:uJa-khiidya, p. 693.
The Sankara School of Vedanta (CH.
would not be justifiable in any of its possible meanings, such as
(i) depending on the nature of the related (sambandhi-svabhiiva-
srita), (ii) produced by the nature of the related (sambandhi-sva-
bhiiva-janya), (iii) not different from the nature constituting there-
latedness, since, as these would be too wide and would apply even
to those things which are not invariable concomitants, e.g. all that
is earthen can be scratched with an iron needle. Though in some
cases earthen objects may be scratched with an iron needle, not all
earthen objects can be so scratched. He further refutes the defini-
tion of invariable concomitance as a relation not depending upon
conditional circumstances (upiidhz). Without entering into the
details of Sriharf_)a's argument it may be pointed out that it rests
very largely on his contention that conditionality of relations can-
not be determined without knowledge of the nature of invariable
concomitance and also that invariable concomitance cannot be
determined without a previous determination of the conditionality
of relations.
Sriharf_)a's brief refutation of analogy, implication and testimony,
as also his refutation of the definitions of the different fallacies of
inference, are not of much importance from a philosophical point
of view, and need not be detailed here.
Turning now to Srihar~a's refutation of the Nyaya categories,
we note that he begins with the refutation of "being" or positivity
(bhiivatva). He says that being cannot be defined as being existent
in itself, since non-being is also existent in itself; we can with as
much right speak of being as existing as of non-being as existing;
both non-being and being may stand as grammatical nominatives
of the verb "exists." Again, each existing thing being unique in
itself, there is no common quality, such as" existence" or" being,"
which is possessed by them all. Again, "being" is as much a
negation of "non-being" as "non-being" of "being"; hence
"being" cannot be defined as that which is not a negation of
anything. Negation is a mere form of speech, and both being and
non-being may be expressed in a negative form.
Turning to the category of non-being (abhiiva), Sriharf}a says
that it cannot be defined as negation of anything; for being may
as well be interpreted as a negation of non-being as non-being of
being (bhiiviibhiivayor dvayor api paraspara-pratihfepiitmakatviit).
Nor again can non-being be defined as that which opposes being;
for not all non-being is opposed to atl being (e.g. in" there is no jug
on the ground" the absence of jug does not oppose the ground in
respect of which the jug is denied); if non-being opposes some
existent things, then that does not differentiate negation; for there
are many existent things which are opposed to one another (e.g.
the horse and the bull).
In refuting the Nyaya definition of substance (dravya) as that
which is the support of qualities, Srihar~a says that even qualities
appear to have numeral and other qualities (e.g. we speak of two
or three colours, of a colour being deep or Jight, mixed or primary
-and colour is regarded as quality). If it is urged that this is a
mistake, then the appearance of the so-called substances as being
endowed with qualities may also be regarded as equally erroneous.
Again, what is meant by defining substance as the support (asraya)
of qualities? Since qualities may subsist in the class-concept of
quality (gu~Jalva), the class-concept of quality ought to be regarded
as substance according to the definition. It may be urged that a
substance is that in which the qualities inhere. But what would
be the meaning here of the particle "in"? How would one dis-
tinguish the false appearance, to a jaundiced eye, of yellowness in
a white conch-shell and the real appearance of whiteness in the
conch-shell? Unless the falsity of the appearance of yellow in the
conch-shell is realized, there can be no difference between the one
case and the other. Again, substance cannot be defined as th~
inhering or the material cause (samavayi-kiira7Ja), since it is not
possible to know which is the inhering cause and which is not; for
number is counted as a quality, and colour also is counted as a
quality, and yet one specifies colours by numbers, as one, two, or
many colours.
Furthermore, the Nyaya definition of quality as that which has
a genus and is devoid of qualities is unintelligible; for the defini-
tion involves the concept of quality, which is sought to be defined.
Moreover, as pointed out above, even qualities, such as colours,
have numeral qualities; for we speak of one, two or many colours.
It is only by holding to this appearance of qualities endowed with
numeral qualities that the definition of quality can be made to stand,
and it is again on the strength of the definition of quality that such
appearances are to be rejected as false. If colours are known as
qualities in consideration of other reasons, then these, being en-
dowed with numeral qualities, could not for that very reason be
called qualities; for qualities belong according to definition only to
substances. Even the numerals themselves are endowed with the
quality of separateness. So there would not be a single instance
that the Naiyayika could point to as an example of quality.
Speaking of relations, Srihar~a points out that, if relation is to
be conceived as something subsisting in a thing, then its meaning
is unintelligible. The meaning of relation as "in" or" herein" is
not at all clear; for the notion of something being a container
(iidhiira) is dependent on the notion of the concept of "in" or
"herein," and that concept again depends on the notion of a
container, and there is no other notion which can explain either of
the concepts independently. The container cannot be supposed to
be an inhering cause; for in that case such examples as "there is
a grape in this vessel " or "the absence of horns in a hare" would
be unexplainable. He then takes a number of possible meanings
which can be given to the notion of a container; but these, not
being philosophically important, are omitted here. He also deals
with the impossibility of defining the nature of the subject-object
relation (v#aya-vi~ayi-bhiiva) of knowledge.
In refuting the definition of cause Srihar~a says that cause
cannot be defined as immediate antecedence; for immediate antece-
dence can be ascribed only to the causal operation, which is always
an intervening factor between the cause and the effect. If, on
the theory that what (e.g. the causal operation) belongs to a thing
(e.g. the cause) cannot be considered as a factor which stands
between it (cause) and that which follows it (effect), the causal
operation be not regarded as a separate and independent factor, then
even the cause of the cause would have to be regarded as one with
the cause and therefore cause. But, if it is urged that, since the
cause of the cause is not an operation, it cannot be regarded as
being one with the cause, one may well ask the opponent to define
the meaning of operation. If the opponent should define it as that
factor without which the cause cannot produce the effect, then the
accessory circumstances and common and abiding conditions, such
as the natural laws, space, and so forth, without which an effect
cannot be produced, are also to be regarded as operation, which
is impossible. Further, "operation" cannot be qualified as being
itself produced by the cause; for it is the meaning of the concept
of cause that has still to be explained and defined. If, again, cause
is defined as the antecedence of that which is other than the not-
cause, then this again would be faulty; for one cannot understand
the "not-cause" of the definition without understanding what is
the nature of cause, and vice-versa. l\1oreover, space, being a per-
manent substance, is always present as a not-cause of anything,
and is yet regarded as the cause of sound. If, again, cause is defined
as that which is present when the effect is present and absent when
the effect is absent, this would not explain the causality of space,
which is never known to be absent. If, again, cause is defined as
invariable antecedence, then permanent substances such as space
are to be regarded as the sole causes of effects. If, however, in-
variable antecedence be understood to mean unconditional ante-
cedence, then two coexistent entities such as the taste and the
colour of an earthen pot which is being burnt must mutually be
the cause of the colour and the taste of the burnt earthen pot; for
neither does the colour condition taste, nor does the taste condition
colour. l\1oreover, if mere invariable antecedents be regarded as
cause, then the invariably preceding symptoms of a disease are to
be regarded as the cause of the disease on account of their in-
variable antecedence. Again, causality cannot be regarded as a
specific character or quality belonging to certain things, which
quality can be directly perceived by us as existing in things. Thus
we may perceive the stick of the potter's wheel to be the cause
of the particular jugs produced by it, but it is not possible to
perceive causality as a general quality of a stick or of any other
thing. If causality existed only with reference to things in general,
then it would be impossible to conceive of the production of
individual things, and it would not be possible for anyone to know
which particular cause would produce a particular effect. On the
other hand, it is not possible to perceive by the senses that an
individual thing is the cause of a number of individual effects; for
until these individual effects are actually produced it is not possible
to perceive them, since perception involves sense-contact as its
necessary condition. It is not necessary for our present purposes
to enter into all the different possible concepts of cause which
Sr1haJ1?a seeks to refute : the above examination is expected to
give a fairly comprehensive idea of the methods of Srlhar~a's
refutation of the category of cause.
Nor is it possible within the limited range of the present work
to give a full account of all the different alternative defences of the
vanous categories accepted in Nyaya philosophy, or of all the
vanous ways in which Srlhar~a sought to refute them in his
DII 10
Kha1Jt}.ana-kha1Jf!a-khiidya. I have therefore attempted to give here
only some specimens of the more important parts of his dialectical
argument. The chief defect of Srihar~a's criticisms is that they
often tend to grow into verbal sophisms, and lay greater stress on
the faults of expression of the opponent's definitions and do not do
him the justice of liberally dealing with his general ideas. It is easy
to see how these refutations of the verbal definitions of the Nyaya
roused the defensive spirit of the Naiyayikas into re-stating their
definitions with proper qualificatory phrases and adjuncts, by which
they avoided the loopholes left in their former definitions for the
attack of Srihar~a and other critics. In one sense, therefore, the
criticisms of Sriha~a and some of his followers had done a great
disservice to the development of later Nyaya thought; for, unlike
the older Nyaya thinkers, later Nyaya writers, like Gangesa,
Raghunatha and others, were mainly occupied in inventing suitable
qualificatory adjuncts and phrases by which they could define their
categories in such a way that the undesirable applications and
issues of their definitions, as pointed out by the criticisms of their
opponents, could be avoided. If these criticisms had mainly been
directed towards the defects of Nyaya thought, later writers would
not have been forced to take the course of developing verbal ex-
pressions at the expense of philosophical profundity and acuteness.
Srihar~a may therefore be said to be the first great writer who is
responsible indirectly for the growth of verbalism in later Nyaya
thought.
Another defect of Srihar~a's criticisms is that he mainly limits
himself to criticizing the definitions of Nyaya categories and does
not deal so fully with the general ideas involved in such categories
of thought. It ought, however, in all fairness to Srihar!?a to be said
that, though he took the Nyaya definitions as the main objective
of his criticisms, yet in dealing with the various alternative varia-
tions and points of view of such definitions he often gives an
exhaustive treatment of the problems involved in the discussion.
But in many cases his omissions become very glaring. Thus, for
example, in his treatment of relations he only tries to refute the
definitions of relation as container and contained, as inherence, and
as subject-object relation of cognitions, and leaves out many other
varieties of relation which might well have been dealt with. Another
characteristic feature of his refutation is, as has already been
pointed out, that he has only a destructive point of view and is
xi] Citsukha's Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 147
not prepared to undertake the responsibility of defining any

position from his own point of view. He delights in showing that
none of the world-appearances can be defined in any way, and that
thus, being indescribable, they are all false. But incapacity to define
or describe anything in some particular way cannot mean that the
thing is false. Srihar!?a did not and could not show that the ways
of definition which he attempted to refute were the only ways of
defining the different categories. They could probably be defined in
other and better ways, and even those definitions which he refuted
could be bettered and improved by using suitable qualificatory
phrases. He did not attempt to show that the concepts involved
in the categories were fraught with such contradictions that, in
whatever way one might try to define, one could not escape from
those inner contradictions, which were inherent in the very nature
of the concepts themselves. Instead of that he turned his attention
to the actual formal definitions which had been put forward by the
Nyaya and sometimes by Prabhakara and tried to show that these
definitions were faulty. To show that particular definitions are
wrong is not to show that the things defined are wrong. It is, no
doubt, true that the refutation of certain definitions involves the
refutation of the concepts involved in those definitions; but the
refutation of the particular way of presentation of the concept does
not mean that the concept itself is impossible. In order to show
the latter, a particular concept has to be analysed on the basis of
its own occurrences, and the inconsistencies involved in such an
analysis have to be shown.
Citsukha's Interpretations of the Concepts of

Sankara Vedanta.
Citsukha (about A.D. 1220), a commentator on Srihar!?a, had all
Srihar!?a's powers of acute dialectical thought, but he not only
furnishes, like Srihar~a, a concise refutation of the Nyaya categories,
but also, in his Tattva-pradipika, commented on by Pratyagbha-
gavan (A.D. 1400) in his Nayana-prasadini 1 , gives us a very acute
1
Citsukha, a pupil of Gau<;ldvara Acarya, called also Jnanottama, wrote
a commentary on ..\nandabodha Bhattarakacarya's Nyiiya-makaranda and also
on Srihar~a's Khat:uJana-khat:uJa-khiidya and an independent work called Tatt'L·a-
pradipikii or Cit-sukhf, on which the study of the present section is based. In
this work he quotes Udayana, Uddyotakara, Kumarila, Padmapada, Vallabha
(Lrliivatl), Salikanatha, Suresvara, Sivaditya, Kularka PaQ<;lita and Sridhara
10-2
analysis and interpretation of some of the most important concepts
of Sailkara Vedanta. He is not only a protector of the Advaita
doctrine of the Vedanta, but also an interpreter of the Vedantic con-
cepts1. The work is written in four chapters. In the first chapter
Citsukha deals with the interpretation of the Vedanta concepts of
self-revelation (sva-prakasa), the nature of self as consciousness
(iitmanal;z sa'f!lvid-rupatva), the nature of ignorance as darkness, the
nature of falsity (mithyiitva), the nature of nescience (avidyii), the
nature of the truth of all ideas (sarva-pratyayiiniim yathii""thatvam),
the nature of illusions, etc. In the second chapter he refutes the
Nyaya categories of difference, separateness, quality, action, class-
concepts, specific particulars (viSe~a), the relation of inherence
(samaviiya), perception, doubt, illusion, memory, inference, in-
variable concomitance (vyiiptz), induction (vyiipti-graha), existence
of the reason in the minor term (pak~a-dharmatii), reason (hetu),
analogy (upamiina), implication, being, non-being, duality, measure,
causality, time, space, etc. In the third chapter, the smallest of the
book, he deals with the possibility of the realization of Brahman
and the nature of release through knowledge. In the fourth chapter,
which is much smaller than the first two, he deals with the nature
of the ultimate state of emancipation.
Citsukha starts with a formal definition of the most funda-
mental concept of the Vedanta, namely the concept of self-reve-
lation or self-illumination (sva-prakiisa). Both Padmapada and
Prakasatman in the Pafica-padikii and Paiica-piidika-vivara1Ja had
distinguished the self from the ego as self-revelation or self-illumi-
(Nyiiya-kandatz). In addition to these he also wrote a commentary on the
Brahma-sutra-bhfi$ya of Sankara, called Bhii~·a-bhih·a-prakiisikii, Viy;ara~a
tiitparya-dtpikii, a commentary on the Pramii~a- miilii of Anandabodha, a com-
mentary on Mar:tc;lana's Brahma-siddhi, called Abhipriiya-prakiisikii, and an index
to the adhikara~as of the Brahma-sfitra, called Adhikara~a-mafijarl. His teacher
}fianottama wrote two works on Vedanta, called Nyiiya-sudhii and ]niina-
siddhi; but he seems to have been a different person from the J fianottama who
wrote a commentary on Suresvara's Nai~karmya-siddhi; for the latter was a
householder (as he styles himself with a householder's title, miira), and an
inhabitant of the village of Mangala in the Cola country, while the former was
an ascetic and a preceptor of the King of Gauc;la, as Citsukha describes him in
his colophon to his Tattva-pradtpikii. He is also said to have written the Brahma-
stuti, Virr;zu-puriitJa-{lkii, f)ag-darsa~a-sa1Jlgraha-vrtti, Adhikaratza-saizgati (a work
explaining the inter-relation of the topics of the Brahma-sutra) and a com-
mentary on the Nai~karmya- siddhi, called the Nai~karmya-siddhi-ttkii or the
Bhiiva-tattva-prakiisikii. His pupil Sukhaprakasa wrote a work on the topics
of the Brahma-siitra, called Adhikarat_!a-ratna-miilii.
1
Thus Pandita Harinatha Sarma in his Sanskrit introduction to the Tattva-
pradtpikii or Cit~sukhlspeaks of this work as advaita-siddhiinta-rak~ako 'py advaita-
siddhiinta-prakiisako vyutpiidakal ca.
nation (svayam-prakiisa). Thus Prakasatman says that consciousness
(saiJlvid) is self-revealing and that its self-revelation is not due to
any other self-revealing cause 1 . It is on account of this natural
self-revelation of consciousness that its objects also appear as self-
revealing2. Padmapada also says the same thing, when he states that
the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness; when
this consciousness appears in connection with other objects and
manifests them, it is called experience (anubhava), and, when it is
by itself, it is called the self or iitman 3 • But Citsukha was probably
the first to give a formal definition of the nature of this self-
revelation.
Citsukha defines it as that which is entitled to be called
immediate ( aparolqa-vyavahiira-yogya), though it is not an object
of any cognition or any cognizing activity (avedyatve 'pi) 4 • It may
be objected that desires, feelings, etc. also are not objects of any
cognition and yet are entitled to be regarded as immediate, and
hence the definition might as well apply to them; for the object of
cognition has a separate objective existence, and by a mind-object
contact the mind is transformed into the form of the object, and
thereby the one consciousness, which was apparently split up into
two forms as the object-consciousness which appeared as material
objects and the subject-consciousness which appeared as the
cognizer, is again restored to its unity by the super-imposition of
the subjective form on the objective form, and the object-form is
revealed in consciousness as a jug or a book. But in the case of
our experience of our will or our feelings these have no existence
separate from our own mind and hence are not cognized in the
same way as external objects are cognized. According to Vedanta
epistemology these subjective experiences of will, emotions, etc.
are different mental constituents, forms or states, which, being
directly and illusorily imposed upon the self-revealing conscious-
ness, become experienced. These subjective states are therefore
not cognized in the same way as external objects. But, since the
1
Sa1Jl'Vedana1Jl tu svayam-prakiisa eva na prakiisiintara-hetul:z. Paiica-piidikii-
vivara:tJa, p. 52.
2
tasmiid anubhaval:z sajiitiya-prakiisiintara-nirapek~al:z prakiisamiina eva 'l·i~aye
prakiisiidi-vyavahiira-nimittm_n bhavitmil arhati avyavadhiinena t-#aye pralulsii-
di-'l•yavahiira-nimittatviit. Ibid.
3
tasmiit cit-svabhiit-•a et-•iitmii tena tena prameya-bhedena upadhzyamiino 'nubha-
viibhidhiinlyaka1Jllablzate avivak#topiidlzir iitmiidi-sabdail;. Paiica-piidikii, p. 10.
" avedyatve saty aparok~a-vyavaluira-yogyatt•a1Jl svayam-pral?iisa-la~a~wm.
Cit-suklzl, p. 9·
experience of these states is possible only through a process of
illusory imposition, they are not entitled to be called immediate 1 •
So, though they appear as immediate, they have no proper
yogyatii, or, in other words, they are not entitled to be called
immediate. But in the true sense even external objects are but
illusory impositions on the self-revealing consciousness, and hence
they also cannot be said to be entitled to be called immediate.
There is therefore no meaning in trying to distinguish the self-
revealing consciousness as one which is not an object of cognition;
for on the Vedanta theory there is nothing which is entitled to be
called immediate, and hence the phrase avedyatve (not being an
object of cognition) is unnecessary as a special distinguishing
feature of the self-revealing consciousness; the epithet "imme-
diate" is therefore also unnecessary. To such an objection Citsukha's
reply is that the experience of external objects is only in the last
stage of world-dissolution and Brahmahood found non-immediate
and illusory, and, since in all our ordinary stages of experience the
experience of world-objects is immediate, the epithet avedyatva
successfully distinguishes self-revealing consciousness from all
cognitions of external objects which are entitled to be called im-
mediate and are to be excluded from the range of self-revealing con-
sciousness only by being objects of cognition. In the field of ordinary
experience the perceived world-objects are found to be entitled to
be called immediate no less than the self-revealing conscious-
ness, and it is only because they are objects of cognition that they
can be distinguished from the self-revealing consciousness.
The main argument in favour of the admission of the category
of independent self-revealing consciousness is that, unless an in-
dependent self-revealing consciousness is admitted, there would
be a vicious series in the process preceding the rise of any cog-
nition; for, if the pure experience of self-revealing consciousness
has to be further subjected to another process before it can be
understood, then that also might require another process, and that
another, and so there would be an unending series. Moreover,
that the pure experience is self-revealing is proved by the very
fact of the experience itself; for no one doubts his own ex-
perience or stands in need of any further corroboration or con-
firmation as to whether he experienced or not. It may be objected
1 aved_val'L'e 'pi niiparok~a-vyavahiira-yogyatii te~iim, adhyastatayaiva te~ii1Jl
siddhel;. Cit-sukhi, p. 10. Nin;taya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915.
xr] Citsukha's Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 151
that it is well known that we may be aware of our awareness of

anything (anu-·vyavasaya), and in such a case the self-revealing
consciousness may become further cognized. Citsukha's reply to
this is that, when one perceives a jug, there is the mental activity,
then a cessation of that activity, then a further starting of new
activity and then the knowledge that I know the jug, or rather I
know that I know the jug-and hence such a cognition cannot be
said to be directly and immediately cognizing the first awareness,
which could not have stayed through so many moments 1 • Again,
since neither the senses nor the external objects can of themselves
produce the self-revelation of knowledge, if knowledge were not
admitted as self-revealing, the whole world would be blind and
there would be no self-revelation. When one knows that he knows
a book or a jug, it is the cognized object that is known and not
the awareness that is cognized; there can be no awareness of
awareness, but only of the cognized object 2 • If the previous aware-
ness could be made the object of subsequent awareness, then this
would amount to an admission of the possibility of the self being
known by the self (svasyapi svena vedyatviipiitiit)-a theory which
would accord not with the Vedanta idealismt but with the
Buddhistic. It is true, no doubt, that the pure self-revealing con-
sciousness shows itself only on the occasion of a mental state; but
its difference from other cognitive states lies in the fact that it has
no form or object, and hence, though it may be focussed by a
mental state, yet it stands on a different footing from the objects
illuminated by it.
The next point that Citsukha urges is that the self is of the
nature of pure self-revealing consciousness (atmanal:z sartZvid-
rupatva). This is, of course, no new contribution by Citsukha, since
this view had been maintained in the U pani~ads and repeated by
Sankara, Padmapada, Prakasatman and others. Citsukha says that,
like knowledge, the self also is immediately revealed or experienced
without itself being the object of any cognizing activity or cognition,
and therefore the self is also of the nature of knowledge. No one
doubts about his own self; for the self always stands directly and
1 glzata-jfiiinodaya-samaye manasi kriyii tato v.:iblziigas tatab purva-sa1Jl}'Oga-·d-
niisas lata uttara-sa1Jlyogotpattis tato jiiiiniintaram iti aneka-k~at}a-vilambena utpa-

dyamiinasya ji'iiinasya aparok~atayii piir'l•a-jfiiina-griihakatviinupapattel;. Cit-
sukhi, p. 17.
2 vidito ghata ity atra anuvyavasiiyena gha{asyai'l.'a 'l.'iditat'l.·am m:aslyate na
tu ·vittefz. Ibid. p. 18.

immediately self-revealed. Self and knowledge being identical, there
is no relation between the two save that of identity (jiiiiniitmano"lt
sambandhasyai·va abhiiviit).
Citsukha defines falsity (mithyiitva) as the non-existence of a
thing in that which is considered to be its cause 1 . He shows this by
pointing out that a whole, if it is to exist anywhere, must exist in
the parts of which it is made, and, if it does not exist even there,
it does not exist anywhere and is false. It is, however, evident that
a whole cannot exist in the parts, since, being a whole, it cannot
be in the parts 2 • Another argument adduced by Citsukha for the
falsity of the world-appearance is that it is impossible that there
should be any relation between the self-revealing consciousness,
the knmver (drk), and the objects which are cognized (drsya).
Knowledge cannot be said to arise through sense-contact; for in
the illusory perception of silver there is the false perception of
silver without any actual sense-contact with silver. A reference to
subject-object relation ('l.,'i~aya-vi~ayi-bhiiva) cannot explain it, since
the idea of subject-object relation is itself obscure and unexplain-
able. Arguing as to the impossibility of properly explaining the
subject-object relation (vi~aya-vi~ayi-bhiiva) in knowledge, Citsukha
says that it cannot be held that the subject-object relation means
that knowledge produces some change in the object (vi~aya) and
that the knower produces such a change. For what may be the
nature of such a change? If it be described as jiiatatii, or the
character of being known, how can such a character be by my
knowledge at the present moment generated as a positive quality
in an object which has now ceased to exist? If such a quality can
be produced even in past objects, then there would be no fixed law
according to which such qualities should be produced. Nor can
such a relationship be explained on a pragmatic basis by a re-
ference to actual physical practical action with reference to objects
that we know or the internal volitions or emotions associated with
our knowledge of things. For in picking up a piece of silver that
we see in front of us we may quite unknowingly be drawing with it
the dross contained in the silver, and hence the fact of the physical
sarve~iim api bhiiviiniim iisrayatvena smtzmate
pratiyogitvam atyantiibhiiVarJl prati mNiitmatii. Cit-sukhl, p. 39.
Some of these definitions of falsity are collected in Madhusiidana's Advaita-
siddhi, a work composed much later than the Cit-sukhl.
2
arJZSina~z sva,_nsa-giityantiibhii'l:asya pratiyoginalz arJZsitviid itariirJZnva . ..
vimata!z pata!z etat-tantu-ni~!hiityantiib}uiva-pratiyogl avayavitviit pa!iintaravat.
Cit-sukhl, pp. 40, 41.
x1] Citsukha's Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 153
drawing of the dross cannot on that ground alone make it an object
of my knowledge, and hence the subject-object relation of know-
ledge cannot be defined as a mere physical action following cognition.
The internal mental states of volition and the etnotions associated
with knowledge belong to the knower and have nothing to do with
the object of knowledge. If, however, it is urged that objectivity
consists in the fact that whatever is known appears in conscious-
ness, the question arises, what does this appearing in consciousness
mean? It cannot mean that consciousness is the container and the
object is contained in it; for, consciousness being internal and the
object external, the object cannot be contained in it. It cannot be
a mere undefined relatedness ; for in that case the object may as
well be considered subject and the subject, object. If objectivity
be defined as that which can induce knoY~ ledge, then even the
senses, the light and other accessories which help the rise of
knowledge may as well be regarded as objects. Object cannot be
defined as that to which knowledge owes its particular form; for,
knowledge being identical with its form, all that helps the rise of
knowledge, the senses, light, etc., may as well be regarded as
objects. So, in whatever way one may try to conceive the nature
of the subject-object relation, he will be disappointed.
Citsukha follows the traditional view of nescience (ajfiiina) as
a positive entity without beginning which disappears with the rise
of true knowledge 1 . Nescience is different from the conception of
positivity as well as of negativity, yet it is called only positive
because of the fact that it is not negative 2 • Ignorance or nescience
is described as a positive state and not a mere negation of know-
ledge; and so it is said that the rise of right knowledge of any
object in a person destroys the positive entity of ignorance with
reference to that object and that this ignorance is something
different from what one would understand by negation of right
knowledge 3 • Citsukha says that the positive character of ignorance
becomes apparentwhen we say that"We donotknowwhetherwhat
you say is true." Here there is the right knowledge of the fact that
1aniidi-bhiiva-rupa7JZ yad-vijfiiinena viliyate tad ajfiiinam iti priijfia-lak~a7Jam
sa7[lpracak~ate aniiditve sati bhiiva-rupa7JZ vijfiiina-niriisyam ajfiiinam iti lak~a7Jaf!l
iha vivak#tam. Cit-sukhi, p. 57·
2
bhiivabhiiva-vilak~a7Jasya ajfiiinasya abhiiva-vila~at}atva-miilre7Ja bhiivatvo-
pacdriit. Ibid.
8
vigfta1Jl Deva-datta-ni~tha-pramtit}a-jfidna1Jl Devadatta-ni,~!ha-pramabhiivii
tiriktanadernivarttaka1Jl pramii7Jatviid Yajfiadattiidigata-pramd7Ja-jfiiinavad ity
anumiinam. Ibid. p. s8.
what is said is known, but it is not known whether what is said is
valid 1 • Here also there is a positive knowledge of ignorance of fact,
which is not the same as mere absence of knowledge. Such an
ignorance, however, is not experienced through sense-contact or
sense-processes, but directly by the self-revealing consciousness-
the siik#n. Just before the rise of right knowledge about an object
there is ignorance (ajiiiina), and the object, as qualified by such
an ignorance, is experienced as being unknown. All things are the
objects of the inner unmoved intuitive consciousness either as
known or as unknown 2 • Our reference to deep dreamless sleep as
a state in which we did not know anything (na kit{lcid-avedi~am) is
also referred to as a positive experience of ignorance in the dream-
less state.
One of the chief tenets of Vedanta epistemology lies in the
supposition that a presentation of the false is a fact of experience.
The opposite view is that of Prabhakara, that the false is never
presented in experience and that falsehood consists in the wrong
construction imposed upon experience by the mind, which fails to
note the actual want of association between two things which are
falsely associated as one. According to this theory all illusion
consists of a false association or a false relationing of two things
which are not presented in experience as related. This false asso-
ciation is not due to an active operation of the mind, but to a
failure to note that no such association was actually presented in
experience (asat{lSargiigraha). According to Prabhakara, the great
Mima:rpsa authority, the false is never presented in experience, nor
is the false experience due to an arbitrary positive activity of wrong
construction of the mind, but merely to a failure to note certain
distinctions presented in experience. On account of such a failure
things which are distinct are not observed as distinct, and hence
things which are distinct and different are falsely associated as one,
and the conch-shell is thus regarded as silver. But here there is
no false presentation in experience. \Vhatever is known is true;
falsehood is due to omissions of knowledge and failure in noting
differences.
Citsukha objects to this view and urges that such an explanation
1
tvadukte 'rthe pramiit;a-jniina'Jl mama niisti ity asya vis#ta-v#aya-jfiiinasya
pramiitviit. Cit-sukhl, p. 59·
2
asman-mate ajfiiinasya sii~i-siddlzatayii pramiit;iibodhyatviit, pramii7Ja-jfiiino-
dayiit priik-kiileajiiiina'Jl tad-vise#to 'rthal.z siik#-siddhal.z ajiiiita ity anuviida gocaral;
.. . sarva'Jl vastu jiiiitatayii ajiiiitatayii vii siik#-caitanyasya vi~ayal.z. Ibid. p. 6o.
xr] Citsukha's Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts ISS
can never explain all cases of false apprehension. Take the pro-
position, "There are false apprehensions and false presentations";
if this proposition is admitted to be correct, then Prabhakara's
contention is false; if it is admitted to be false, then here is a false
proposition, the falsehood of which is not due to a failure to note
differences. If the falsity of all propositions be said to be due to
a failure to note differences, then it would be hard to find out any
true proposition or true experience. On the analogy of our false
experience of the everchanging flame of a lamp as the same identical
one all cases of true recognition might no less be regarded as false,
and therefore all inferences would be doubtful. All cases of real
and true association could be explained as being due to a failure
to note differences. There could be no case in which one could
assure himself that he was dealing with a real association and
not a failure to apprehend the absence of association (asa1Jlsargii-
graha). Citsukha therefore contends that it is too much to expect
that all cases of false knowledge can be explained as being due to
a mere non-apprehension of difference, since it is quite reasonable
to suppose that false knowledge is produced by defective senses
which oppose the rise of true knowledge and positively induce
false appearance 1 • Thus in the case of the illusory perception
of conch-shell as silver it is the conch-shell that appears as a
piece of silver. But what is the nature of the presentation that
forms the object (iilambana) of false perception? It cannot be
regarded as absolutely non-existent (asat), since that which is abso-
lutely non-existent cannot be the object of even a false perception,
and moreover it cannot through such a perception (e.g. the tendency
of a man to pick up the piece of silver, which is but a false per-
ception of a piece of conch-shell) induce a practical movement on
the part of the perceiver. Neither can it be regarded as ex is tent ;
for the later experience contradicts the previous false perception,
and one says that there is no silver at the present time and there
was no silver in the past-it was only the conch-shell that appeared
as silver. Therefore the false presentation, though it serves all the
purposes of a perceptual object, cannot be described either as
existent or as non-existent, and it is precisely this character that
constitutes the indefinable nature ( anirvacanlyatii) of all illusions 2 •
1 tatlui do~ii~ziim api yathiirtha-jiiiina-pmtibandhakatvam ayathiirtha-jiiiina-
janakat'l:a1'fl ca ki1!l na syiit. Cit-suhhz, p. 66.

2
pratyeka1Jl sad asatt'l:iibhyii1!l 'Liciira-padmfit!l na yad giihate tad anirviicyam
iihur •cediinta-vedina~z. Ibid. p. 79-
It is unnecessary to deal with the other doctrines of Vedanta
which Citsukha describes, since there is nothing new in them and
they have already been described in chapter x of volume 1 of this
work. It is therefore desirable to pass on to his dialectic criticism of
the Nyaya categories. It will suffice, however, to give only a few of
these criticisms, as they mostly refer to the refutation of such kinds
of categories as are discussed in Srihan?a's great work Khm:uJana-
kha1J¢a-khadya, and it would be tedious to follow the refutation of
the same kinds of categories by two different writers, though the
arguments of Citsukha are in many cases new and different from
those given by Srihar!?a. Citsukha's general approach to such refu-
tations is also slightly different from that of Srihar!?a. For, unlike
Srihar!?a, Citsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the
Vedanta, and his refutations of the Nyaya categories were not
intended so much to show that they were inexplicable or indefinable
as to show that they were false appearances, and that the pure self-
revealing Brahman was the only reality and truth.
Thus, in refuting time (kala), Citsukha says that time cannot
be perceived either by the visual sense or by the tactual sense, nor
can it be apprehended by the mind (manas), as the mind only
operates in association with the external senses. Moreover, since
there are no perceptual data, it cannot be inferred. The notions of
before and after, succession and simultaneity, quickness and dura-
tion, cannot by themselves indicate the nature of time as it is in
itself. It may be urged that, since the solar vibrations can only be
associated with human bodies and worldly things, making them
appear as young or old only through some other agency such as
days, months, etc., such an agency, which brings about the con-
nection of solar vibrations with worldly things, is called time 1 . To
this Citsukha replies that, since the self itself can be regarded as
the cause of the manifestation of time in events and things in
accordance with the varying conditions of their appearance, it is
unnecessary to suppose the existence of a new category called time.
Again, it cannot be said that the notions of before and after have
time as their material cause; for the validity of these notions is
challenged by the Vedantist. They may be regarded as the im-
1 tarm:zi-parispanda-vise~ii1Jii1.n yuva-sthavira-saririidi-pitJ4e~u miisiidi-vicitra-
buddhi-janana-dviiret}a tad-upahite~ paratviiparatviidi-buddhi-janakatVaf!l na ca
tair asatp,baddhiinii7JZ tatra buddhi-janakatvm!J, na ca siik~iit sambandho ravi-
parispandiiniitp, pit}qair asti atab tat-satp,bandhakatayii kascid a~tadravya-vilak~a1JO
dravya-visefab SVikartavya!z, tasya ca kiila iti sa1Jljnii. (This is Vallabha's view
oftime.) Nayana-prasiidin1 commentary on Cit-sukhl, p. 321, by Pratyak-svarupa-
bhagavat. Nin;taya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915.
pressions produced by a greater or lesser quantity of solar vibra-
tions. There is therefore no necessity to admit time as a separate
category, since its apprehension can be explained on the basis of
our known data of experience. From considerations of some data
relative space (dik) has to be discarded; for relative space cannot
be perceived by the senses or inferred for want of data of ex-
perience. Both time and relative space originate from a sense of
relativity (apek~ii-buddhi), and, given that sense of relativity, the
mind can in association with our experience of bodily movements
form the notion of relative space. It is therefore unnecessary
to admit the existence of relative space as a separate category.
In refuting the atomic theory of the Vaise!?ikas Citsukha says
that there is no ground for admitting the Vaise!?ika atoms. If these
atoms are to be admitted on the ground that all things are to be
conceived as being divisible into smaller and smaller parts, then
the same may apply to the atoms as well. If it is urged that one
must stop somewhere, that the atoms are therefore regarded as
the last state, and are uniform in size and not further divisible,
then the specks of dust that are seen in the windows when the
sun is shining (called irasareJJus) may equally be regarded as the
last stage of divisible size. If it is contended that, since these are
visible, they have parts and cannot therefore be considered as
indivisible, it may be said in reply that, since the Nyaya writers
admit that the atoms can be perceived by the yogins, visibility of
the trasare?IUS could not be put forward as a reason why they could
not be regarded as indivisible. Moreover, if the atoms were partless,
how could they be admitted to combine to produce the grosser
material forms? Again, it is not indispensable that atoms should
combine to form bigger particles or make grosser appearances
possible; for, like threads in a sheet, many particles may make gross
appearances possible even without combining. Citsukha then re-
peats Sankara's refutation of the concept of wholes and parts,
saying that, if the wholes are different from the parts, then they
must be in the parts or they would not be there; if they are not
in the parts, it would be difficult to maintain that the wholes were
made of parts; if they are in the parts, they must be either wholly
or partly in them; if they are wholly in the parts, then there would
be many such wholes, or in each part the whole would be found;
and, if they are partly in the parts, then the same difficulty of wholes
and parts would appear.
Again, the concept of contact (smJlyoga) is also inexplicable. It
The Sankara- School of Vedanta [cH.
cannot be defined as the coming together of any two things which
are not in contact (apraptayol; priiptil; sat!lyogal;); for, until one
knows the meaning of the concept of contact, one cannot under-
stand the meaning of the phrase "not in contact." If it is defined
as the coming together of two things which are unrelated, then
contact (sat!lyoga) would include even the relation of inherence,
such as that which exists between a piece of cloth and the threads.
If it is defined as a relation which is produced in time and is
transitory (anityal; sambandhal; janyatva-viSe#to vii), then cases of
beginningless contact would not be included, and even the pos-
session of an article by purchase would have to be included as
contact, since this relation of possession is also produced in time.
It cannot be objected that "possession" is not a relation, since a
relation to be such must be between two things; for, if the objection
were valid, the relation between substance and quality would not
be a relation, since quality and substance exist together, and there
are no two separate things which can be related. If the objector
means that the relation must be between two terms, then there
are two terms here also, namely, the article possessed and the
possessor. Moreover, if contact is defined as relation which does
not connect two things in their entirety (avyiipya-vrttitva-viSe~ito),
then again it would be wrong, since in the case of partless entities
the relation of contact cannot connect the parts, as they have no
parts. Citsukha refutes the concept of separation (vibhiiga) on the
same lines and passes over to the refutation of number, as two,
three and the like.
Citsukha urges that there is no necessity of admitting the
existence of two, three, etc. as separate numbers, since what we per-
ceive is but the one thing, and then by a sense of oscillation and
mutual reference (apekfii-buddhz) we associate them together and
form the notions of two, three, etc. These numbers therefore do
not exist separately and independently, but are imaginatively pro-
duced by mental oscillation and association from the experience of
single objects. There is therefore no necessity of thinking that the
numbers, two, three, etc., are actually produced. We simply deal
with the notions of two, three, etc. on the strength of our powers
of mental association 1 .
1 iiropita-dvitva-tritviidi-viie#taikatva-samuccayiilambanii buddhir dvitviidi-
janiketi eel; na; tathiibhutiiyii eva buddher dvitviidi-vyavahiira-janakatvopapattau

dvitviidy-utpiidakatva-kalpanii-vaiyarthyiit. N ayana-prasiidinl, p. 300.
Citsukha then refutes the notion of class-concept (jiiti) on the
ground that it cannot be proved either by perception or by in-
ference. The question is what exactly is meant by class-concept.
If it is said that, when in perceiving one individual animal we have
the notion of a cow, and in perceiving other individual animals also
we have the same notion of cow, there is jiiti, then it may be replied
that this does not necessarily imply the admission of a separate
class-concept of cow; for, just as one individual had certain
peculiarities which entitled it to be called a cow, so the other
individuals had their peculiarities which entitled them to be called
cows. We see reflections of the moon in different places and call
each of them the moon. What constitutes the essentials of the
concept of cow? It is difficult to formulate one universal charac-
teristic of cows; if one such characteristic could be found, then
there would be no necessity of admitting the class-concept of cow.
For it would then be an individual characteristic, and one would
recognize it as a cow everywhere, and there would be no necessity
of admitting a separate class-concept. If one admits a class-concept,
one has to point out some trait or quality as that which indicates
the class-concept. Then again one could not get at this trait or
quality independently of the class-concept or at the class-concept
independently of it, and this mutual dependence would make the
definition of either of them impossible. Even if one admits the
class-concept, one has to show what constitutes the essentials of it
in each case, and, if such essentials have to be found in each case,
then those essentials would be a sufficient justification for knowing
a cow as cow and a horse as horse: what then is the good of
admitting a class-concept? Again, even if a class-concept be ad-
mitted, it is difficult to see how it can be conceived to be related
to the individuals. It cannot be a relation of contact, identity,
inherence or any other kind of relation existing anywhere. If all
class-concepts existed everywhere, there would be a medley of all
class-concepts together, and all things would be everywhere. Again.,
if it is held that the class-concept of cow exists only in the existing
cows, then how does it jump to a new cow when it is born? Nor
has the class-concept any parts, so as to be partly here and partly
there. If each class-concept of cow were wholly existent in each
of the individual cows, then there would be a number of class-
concepts; and, if each class-concept of cow were spread out over
all the individual cows, then, unless all the individual cows were
brought together, one could not have the notion of any class-
concept.
Speaking of the refutation of cause (kiirm;a), Citsukha says that
cause cannot be defined as mere antecedence (purva-kiila-bhavitva);
for then the ass which is always found in the house of a washerman
and on the back of which the washerman carries his clothes might
be regarded as a thing antecedent to the smoky fire kindled in the
washerman's house and thus as a cause of fire. If this antecedence
be further qualified as that which is present in all cases of the
presence of the effect and absent in all cases of the absence of the
effect, then also the washerman's ass may be considered to satisfy
the conditions of such an antecedence with reference to the fire
in the washerman's house (when the washerman is away from the
house with his ass, the fire in the washerman's house is also absent,
and it is again kindled when he returns to his house with his
ass). If" unconditionality" (ananyathii-siddha) is further added as
a qualifying condition of antecedence, even then the ass and the
common abiding elements such as space, ether and the like may
be regarded as causes of the fire. If it be argued that the ass is
present only because of the presence of other conditioning factors,
the same may be said of seeds, earth, water, etc., which are all
however regarded as being causes for tfie production of the shoots
of plants. If objection be raised against the possibility of ether
(al~asa) being regarded as the cause of smoke on the ground of its
being a common, abiding and all-pervasive element, then the same
argument ought to stand as an objection against the soul (which
is an all-pervasive entity) being regarded on the Nyaya view as the
cause of the production of pleasure and pain. The cause cannot
be defined as that which being there the effect follows; for
then a seed cannot be regarded as the cause of the shoot of the
plant, since the shoots cannot be produced from seeds without the
help of other co-operating factors, such as earth, water, light, air,
etc. Cause, again, cannot be defined as that which being present in
the midst of the co-operating factors or even accessories (sahakiiri),
the effect follows; for an irrelevant thing, like an ass, may be present
among a number of co-operating circumstances, but this would
not justify anybody calling an irrelevant thing a cause. Moreover,
such a definition would not apply to those cases where by the joint
operation of many co-operating entities the effect is produced.
Furthermore, unless the cause can be properly defined, there is
x1] Citsukha's Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 161
no way of defining the co-operating conditions. Nor can a cause be

defined as that which being there the effect follows, and which
not being there there is no effect (sati bhiivo 'saty abhiiva eva); for
such a maxim is invalidated by the plurality of causes (fire may
be produced by rubbing two pieces of wood, by striking hard
against a flint, or by a lens). It may be urged that there are
differences in each kind of fire produced by the different agencies:
to which it may be replied that, even if there were any such
difference, it is impossible to know it by observation. Even when
differences are noticeable, such differences do not necessarily imply
that the different effects belong to different classes; for the differ-
ences might well be due to various attendant circumstances. Again,
a cause cannot be defined as a collocation of things, since such a
collocation may well be one of irrelevant things. A cause cannot
be defined as a collocation of different causes, since it has not so
far been possible to define what is meant by" cause." The phrase
"collocation of causes" will therefore be meaningless. Moreover, it
may be asked whether a collocation of causes (siimagrz) be something
different from the causes, or identical \vith thetn. If the former
alternative be accepted, then effects would follow from individual
causes as well, and the supposition of a collocation of causes as
producing the effects would be uncalled-for. If the latter alternative
be accepted, then, since the individuals are the causes of the col-
location, the individuals being there, there is always the colloca-
tion and so always the e-ffect, which is absurd. Again, what does
this collocation of causes mean? It cannot mean occurrence in the
same time or place; for, there being no sameness of time and place
for time and place respectively, they themselves would be without
any cause. Again, it cannot be said that, if the existence of cause be
not admitted, then things, being causeless, would be non-existent;
for the Nyaya holds that there are eternal substances such as atoms,
souls, etc., which have no cause.
Since cause cannot be defined, neither can effect (kiirya) be
satisfactorily defined, as the conception of effect always depends
upon the notion of cause.
In refuting the conception of substance (dravya) Citsukha says
that a substance can be defined only as being that in which the
qualities inhere. But, since even qualities are seen to have qualities
and a substance is believed by the Naiyayikas to be without any
quality at the moment of its origination, such a definition cannot
DII II
properly distinguish or define a substance. If a substance be
defined in a roundabout way as that in which there is no presence
of the absolute negation of possessing qualities (gutJavattviity-
antiibhiiviinadhikaratJatii), then also it may be objected that such
a definition would make us regard even negation (abhiiva) as a
quality, since the absence of the negation of qualities, being itself
a negation, cannot exist in a negation 1 • It may again be asked
whether the absence of the negation of qualities refers to the
negation of a number of qualities or the negation of all qualities;
in either case it is wrong. For in the first case a substance, which
contains only some qualities and does not possess others, would
not be called a substance, and in the latter case it would be
difficult to find anything that cannot be called a substance; for
where is the substance which lacks all qualities? The fact also
remains that even such a roundabout definition cannot distin-
guish a substance from a quality; for even qualities have the
numerical qualities and the qualities of separateness 2 • If it is
argued that, if qualities are admitted to have further qualities,
there will be a vicious infinite, it may be said in reply that the
charge of vicious infinite cannot be made, since the qualities
of number and separateness cannot be said to have any
further qualities. Substances, again, have nothing in common
by virtue of which they could be regarded as coming under the
class-concept of substances 3 • Gold and mud and trees are all
regarded as substances, but there is nothing common in them
by virtue of which one can think that gold is the same as
mud or tree; therefore it cannot be admitted that in the sub-
stances one finds any characteristic which remains the same in
them all 4 •
Referring to qualities (gutJa), Citsukha deals with the definition
of gutJa in the VaiSe#ka-bhiirya ofPrasastapada. There Prasastapada
defines gu'l}a as that which inheres in a substance, is associated
with the class-concept of substance, is itself without any quality
1 tatraiva atyantiibhave'tivyiipte/:l; sopi hi gut~avattviityantiibhiivas tasyiidhi-
karat~am svasya svasminnavrtte/:l. Cit-sukhz, p. 176.
2 asminnapi vakra-lak~at~e gut~iid#u api Sa1J'lkhyii-prthaktva-gut~ayo/:l pr.atzte/:l
katha1J'l niitivyiipti/:l. Ibid. p. 177.
8 .jatim abhyupagacchatii tajjiiti-vyaiijaka1Jl ki1J'lcid-ava$yam abhyupeyam na ca
tannirupat~am susakam. Ibid. p. 178.

4
dravya1J'l dravyam iti anugata-pratyaya/:l pramiit~ariz iti cenna suvart~am
upalabhya mrttikiim-upalabhyamiinasya laukikasya tad eveda7J'l dravyam iti
pratyayii-bhiiviit parl/qakiit~ii1Jl ciinugata-pratyaye vipratipatte!J. Ibid. p. 179.
XI] Dialectic of Niigiirjuna and Vedanta Dialectic
and which has no motion (ni~kriya) 1 • But the definition of a
quality cannot involve the phrase "without a quality"; for quality
is still to be defined. Again, unless the gu1}a is properly defined,
its difference from motion is not known, and so the phrase
"which has no motion" is meaningless. The class-concept of
quality, again, can be determined only when the general character
of qualities is known and the nature of class-concepts also is
determined. Hence, from whatever point of view one may look
at the question, it is impossible to define qualities.
It is needless now to multiply examples of such refutation by
Citsukha. It will appear from what has been adduced that Citsukha
enters into detail concerning most concepts of particular categories
and tries to show their intrinsic impossibility. In some cases, how-
ever, he was not equal to the task and remained content with criti-
cizing the definitions given by the Naiyayikas. But it may be well
to point out here that, though Srihar!?a and Citsukha carried out an
elaborate scheme of a critique of the different categories in order to
show that the definitions of these categories, as given by the Nyaya,
are impossible, yet neither of them can be regarded as the originator
of the application of the dialectic method in the Vedanta. Sankara
himself had started it in his refutation of the Nyaya and other
systems in his commentary on the Vediinta-siltras, 11. I I.
The Dialectic of Nagarjuna and the Vedanta Dialectic.

The dialectic of Srihar!?a was a protest against the realistic
definitions of the Nyaya-Vaise!?ika, which supposed that all that was
knowable was also definable. It aimed at refuting these definitions
in order to prove that the natures of all things are indefinable, as
their existence and nature are all involved in miiyii. The only reality
is Brahman. That it is easy to pick holes in all definitions was
taught long ago by Nagarjuna, and in that sense (except for a
tendency to find faults of a purely verbal nature in Nyaya defini-
tions) Srihar~a's method was a continuation of Nagarjuna's, and
an application of it to the actual definitions of the Nyaya-Vaise!?ika.
But the most important part of Nagarjuna's method was de-
liberately ignored by Srihar!?a and his followers, who made no
attempt to refute Nagarjuna's conclusions. Nagarjuna's main
thesis is that all things are relative and hence indefinable in
1
riipiidiniitJZ gu7)iiniitJZ sarve~ii'tJZ gu7)atviibhisambandho dravyii.5ritatva1!l
nirgu7)atva'f!l ni~kriyatvam. Prasastapiida-bhti~ya, p. 94, The Vizianagram
Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895·
I I-2
themselves, and so there is no way of discovering their essences;
and, since their essences are not only indefinable and indescribable,
but incomprehensible as well, they cannot be said to possess any
essences of their own. Nagarjuna was followed by Aryadeva, a
Ceylonese by birth, who wrote a separate work on the same subject
in 400 verses. For about two centuries after this the doctrines
of Nagarjuna lay dormant, as is evidenced by the fact that Buddha-
gho~a of the fourth century A.D. does not refer to them. During
the Gupta empire, in the fifth century A.o.,Asailgaand Vasubandhu
flourished. In the sixth century A.D the relativist philosophy
of Nagarjuna again flourished in the hands of Buddhapalita, of
Valabhi in Surat, and of Bhavya, or Bhavaviveka, of Orissa. The
school of Bhavya was called l\!Iadhyamika-Sautrantika on account
of his supplementing Nagarjuna's arguments with special argu-
ments of his own. At this time the Yogacara school of Mahayana
monism developed in the north, and the aim of this school was
to show that for the true knowledge of the one consciousness
(vijfilina) all logical arguments were futile. Al1 logical arguments
showed only their own inconsistency 1 • It seems very probable
that Srihar~a was inspired by these Y ogacara authors, and their
relativist allies from Nagarjuna to Bhavya, and Candrakirti, the
master commentator on Nagarjuna'sMiidhyamika-klirikii. Buddha-
palita sought to prove that the apprehension and realization of the
idealistic monism cannot be made by any logical argument, since all
logic is futile and inconsistent, while Bhavaviveka sought to estab-
lish his idealistic monism by logical arguments. Candrakirti finally
supported Buddhapalita's scheme as against the scheme of Bhava-
viveka and tried to prove the futility of all logical arguments. It was
this lVIadhyamika scheme of Candrakirti that finally was utilized
in Tibet and Mongolia for the realization of idealistic monism.
In taking up his refutation of the various categories of being
Nagarjuna begins with the examination of causation. Causation
in the non-Buddhistic systems of philosophy is regarded as being
production from the inner changes of some permanent or abiding
stuff or through the conglomeration (siimagrl) of several factors
or through some factors operating upon an unchangeable and
abiding stuff. But Nagarjuna denies not only that anything is
ever produced, but also that it is ever produced in any one of
the above ways. Buddhapalita holds that things cannot arise
1 The Conception of Buddhist NirviitJa, pp. 66-67. Published by the Academy
of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Leningrad, 1927.

XI) Dialectic of N iigiirjuna and Vedanta Dialectic
of themselves, since, if they are already existing, there is no
meaning in their being produced; if things that are existing are
regarded as capable of being produced again, then things would
eternally continue to be produced. Bhavaviveka, criticizing
Buddhapalita, says that the refutation of Buddhapalita should
have been supplemented with reasons and examples and that his
refutation would imply the undesirable thesis that, if things are
not produced of themselves, they must be produced by other
factors. But Candrakirti objects to this criticism of Bhavaviveka
and says that the burden of proof in establishing the identity of
cause and effect lies with the opponents, the Sarpkhyists, who hold
that view. There is no meaning in the production of what already
exists, and, if that which is existent has to be produced again, and
that again, there will be an infinite regress. It is unnecessary to
give any new argument to refute the Sarpkhya sat-kiirya-viida view;
it is enough to point out the inconsistency of the Sarpkhya view.
Thus Aryadeva says that the Madhyamika view has no thesis of
its own which it seeks to establish, since it does not believe in the
reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality
and unreality 1 • This was exactly the point of view that was taken
by Sriha~a. Srihar!?a says that the Vedantists have no view of
their own regarding the things of the world and the various cate-
gories involved in them. Therefore there was no way in which
the Vedanta view could be attacked. The Vedanta, however, is free
to find fault with other views, and, when once this is done and the
inconsistencies of other positions are pointed out, its business is
finished; for it has no view of its own to establish. Nagarjuna
writes in his Vigraha-vyiivartanz thus:
When I have these (of my own to prove),

I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving);
But I have none. I cannot be accused (of being inconsistent).
If I did (really) cognize some (separate) things,
I could then make an affirmation or a denial
Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred).
But these (separate) things do not exist for me.
Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis 2 •
sad asat sad-asac ceti yasya pak~o na vidyate
upiilambhas cire1Jc"ipi tasya vakturtZ na sakyate.
Miidhyamika-vrtti, p. 16.
anyat pratltya yadi nama paro 'bhavi~yat
jiiyeta tarhi bahula/:l sikhino 'ndhakiiral;z
sarvasya janma ca bhavet khalu sarvatas ca
tulyam paratvam akhile 'janake 'pi yasmiit. Ibid. p. 36.
Candrakirti thus emphasizes the fact that it is not possible for
the Madhyamikas to offer new arguments or new examples in
criticizing any view, since they have no view of their own to support.
They cannot even prove their own affirmations, and, if their affirma-
tions contain any thesis, they quarrel with it also themselves. So
the Madhyamika scheme of criticism consists only in finding fault
with all theses, whatever they may be, and in replying to the
counter-charges so far as inconsistencies can be found in the
opponents' theses and methods, but not in adducing any new
arguments or any new counter-theses, since the Madhyamikas have
no theses of their own. In an argument one can only follow the
principles that one admits; no one can be defeated by arguments
carried on on the basis of principles admitted only by his opponents.
Things are not produced by any conglomeration of foreign
factors or causes; for, were it so, there would be no law of such
productionand<l.nythingmightcomefromanyother thing, e.g. dark-
ness from light 1 . And, if a thing cannot be produced out of itself
or out of others, it cannot be produced by a combination of then1
both. Again, the world could not have sprung into being without
any cause (ahetutal;).
The Buddhist logicians try to controvert this view by pointing
out that, whatever a view may be, it must be established by proper
proof. So, in order to prove the thesis that all existents are un-
produced, the l\1adhyamikas must give some proofs, and this would
involve a further specification of the nature of such proofs and a
specification of the number of valid proofs admitted by them. But,
if the thesis that "all existents are unproved" is a mere assertion
without any proof to support it, then any number of counter-
assertions may be made for which no proof need be shown ; and,
if proofs are not required in one case, they cannot be required in
the other. So one could with equal validity assert that all existents
are real and are produced from causes. The Madhyamika answer
to such an objection, as formulated by Candrakirti, is that the
l\'ladhyamika has no thesis of his own and so the question whether
his thesis is supported by valid proof or not is as meaningless as
the question regarding the smallness or the greatness of a mule's
horn. Since there is no thesis, the Madhyamika has nothing to
1
Miidhyamika-vrtti, p. 36. See also Stcherbatsky's The Conception of
Buddhist Nirviif)a, to which the author is indebted for the translation and some
of the materials of the last two paragraphs.
say regarding the nature of valid proofs (pramiir.za) or their number.
But it may well be asked why, if the Madhyamika has no thesis
of his own, should he hold the proposition that all existents are
unproduced (sarve bhiivli anutpanniil:z)? To this the l\1adhyamika
replies that such propositions appear as definite views only to
ordinary people, not to the wise. The proper attitude for the wise
is always to remain silent. They impart instruction only from a
popular point of view to those who want to listen to them. Their
arguments are not their own or those which they believe to be
right, but only such as would appeal to their hearers.
It is not out of place here to mention that the Madhyamika
school wishes to keep the phenomenal and the real or the transcen-
dental views wide apart. In the phenomenal view things are ad-
mitted to be as they are perceived, and their relations are also
conceived as real. It is interesting to refer to the discussion of
Candrakirti with Diimaga regarding the nature of sense-percep-
tions. While Dinnaga urges that a thing is what it is in itself
(sva-lak~ar.za), Candrakirti holds that, since relations are also per-
ceived to be true, things are relational as well. Phenomenally
substances exist as well as their qualities. The "thing in itself" of
Dinnaga was as much a relative concept as the relational things
that are popularly perceived as true; that being so, it is meaningless
to define perception as being only the thing in itself. Candrakirti
thus does not think that any good can be done by criticizing the
realistic logic of the Naiyayikas, since, so far as popular perceptions
or conceptions go, the Nyaya logic is quite competent to deal with
them and give an account of them. There is~ phenomenal reality
and order which is true for the man in the street and on which all
our linguistic and other usages are based. Dinnaga, in defining
perception, restricts it to the unique thing in itself (sva-lak~ar.za)
and thinks that all associations of quality and relations are ex-
traneous to perceptions and should be included under imagination
or inference. This however does violence to our ordinary experience
and yet serves no better purpose; for the definition of perception
as given by Dinnaga is not from the transcendental point of view.
If that is so, why not accept the realistic conceptions of the
Nyaya school, which fit in with the popular experience? This
reminds us of the attitude of the Vedantists, who on the one
hand accepted the view-point of popular experience and regarded
all things as having a real objective existence, and on the other
r68 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
hand considered them as false and unreal from the transcendental
point of view of ultimate reality. The attitude of the Vedantists
on this point seems to have been directly inspired by that of the
Madhyamikas. The attempts of Srihaq;a to refute the realistic
definitions of the Nyaya were intended to show that the definitions
of the Nyaya could not be regarded as absolute and true, as the
Naiyayikas used to think. But, while the Madhyamikas, who had
no view-points of their own to support, could leave the field of
experience absolutely undisturbed and allow the realistic defini-
tions of the Nyaya to explain the popular experience in any way
they liked, the Vedanta had a thesis of its own, namely, that the
self-luminous Brahman was the only reality and that it was
through it that everything else was manifested. The Vedanta there-
fore could not agree with Nyaya interpretations of experience and
their definitions. But, as the Vedanta was unable to give the
manifold world-appearance a footing in reality, it regarded it as
somehow existing by itself and invented a theory of perception by
which it could be considered as being manifested by coming in
touch with Brahman and being illusorily imposed on it.
Continuing the discussion on the nature of causation, Nagar-
juna and Candrakirti hold that collocations of causal conditions
which are different from the effect cannot produce the effect, as is
held by the Hinayana Buddhists; for, since the effect is not per-
ceived in those causal conditions, it cannot be produced out of
them, and, if it is already existent in them, its production becomes
useless. Production of anything out of some foreign or extraneous
causes implies that it is related to them, and this relation must
mean that it was in some way existent in them. The main principle
which Nagarjuna employs in refuting the idea of causation or
production in various ways is that, if a thing exists, it cannot be
produced, and, if it does not exist, it cannot be produced at all.
That which has no essence in itself cannot be caused by anything
else, and, having no essence in itself, it cannot be the cause of
anything else 1 •
Nagarjuna similarly examines the concepts of going and coming
and says that the action of going is not to be found in the space
traversed, nor is it to be found in that which is not traversed; and
apart from the space traversed and not traversed there cannot be
any action of going. If it is urged that going is neither in the space
1 Miidhyamika-vrtti, p. 90, I. 6.
traversed nor in the space untraversed, but in the person who
continues to go, since going is in him in whom there is the effort of
going, then this again cannot be right. For, if the action of going
is to be associated with the person who goes, it cannot be asso-
ciated with the space traversed. One action cannot be connected
with both; and, unless some space is gone over, there cannot be
a goer. If going is in the goer alone, then even without going one
could be called a goer, which is impossible. If both the goer and
the space traversed have to be associated with going, then there
must be two actions and not one; and, if there are two actions, that
implies that there are also two agents. It may be urged that the
movement of going is associated with the goer and that therefore
going belongs to the goer; but, if there is no going without the goer
and if there is no goer without going, how can going be associated
with the goer at all? Again, in the proposition "the goer goes"
(gantii gacchati) there is only one action of going, and that is
satisfied by the verb " goes " ; what separate " going" is there
by virtue of association with which a "goer" can be so called?
and, since there are no two actions of going, there cannot be a goer.
Again, the movement of going cannot even be begun; for, when
there is the motion of going, there is no beginning and when there
is no motion of going, there cannot be any beginning. Again, it
cannot be urged that "going" must exist, since its opposite, "re-
maining at rest" (sthiti), exists; for who is at rest? The goer
cannot be at rest, since no one can be a goer unless he goes; he who
is not a goer, being already at rest, cannot be the agent of another
action of being at rest. If the goer and going be regarded as
identical, then there would be neither verb nor agent. So there is
no reality in going. " Going" stands here for any kind of passage
or becoming, and the refutation of "going" implies the refutation
of all kinds of passage (ni~kar~m;a) as well. If seeds passed into the
state of shoots ( ailkura), then they would be seeds and not shoots;
the shoots neither are seeds nor are different from them; yet, the
seeds being there, there are the shoots. A pea is from another pea,
yet no pea becomes another pea. A pea is neither in another
pea nor different from it. It is as one may see in a mirror the
beautiful face of a woman and feel attracted hy it and run after
her, though the face never passed into the mirror and there was
no human face in the reflected image. Just as the essenceless
reflected image of a woman's face may rouse attachment in fools,
so are world-appearances the causes of our delusion and attach-
ment.
It is needless to multiply examples and describe elaborately
Nagarjuna's method of applying his dialectic to the refutation of
the various Buddhistic and other categories. But from what has
been said it may be possible to compare or contrast Nagarjuna's
dialectic with that of Sriharl?a. Neither Nagarjuna nor Sriharl?a is
interested to give any rational explanation of the world-process,
nor are they interested to give a scientific reconstruction of our
world-experience. They are agreed in discarding the validity of
world-experience as such. But, while Nagarjuna had no thesis of
his own to uphold, Srihar~a sought to establish the validity and
ultimate reality of Brahman. But, it does not appear that he ever
properly tried to apply his own dialectic to his thesis and attempted
to show that the definition of Brahman could stand the test of the
criticism of his own dialectic. Both Nagarjuna and Sriha~a were,
however, agreed in the view that there was no theory of the recon-
struction of world-appearance which could be supported as valid.
But, while Sriharl?a attacked only the definitions of the Nyaya,
Nagarjuna mainly attacked the accepted Buddhistic categories and
also some other relevant categories which were directly connected
with them. But the entire efforts of Sriharl?a were directed to
showing that the definitions of the Nyaya were faulty and that
there was no way in which the Nyaya could define its categories
properly. From the fact that the Nyaya could not define its
categories he rushed to the conclusion that they were intrinsically
indefinable and that therefore the world-appearance which was
measured and scanned in terms of those categories was also false.
Nagarjuna's methods differ considerably from those of Sriha~a in
this, that the concepts which he criticized were shown by him to
have been intrinsically based and constructed on notions which
had no essential nature of their own, but were understood only
in relation to others. No concept revealed any intrinsic nature of
its own, and one could understand a concept only through another,
and that again through the former or through another, and so on.
The entire world-appearance would thus be based on relative
conceptions and be false. Nagarjuna's criticisms are, however,
largely of an a priori nature, and do not treat the concepts in
a concrete manner and are not based on the testimony of .our
psychological experience. The oppositions shown are therefore
x1] Dialectical criticisms of Siintarak$ita and Kamalaftla 171
very often of an abstract nature and occasionally degenerate into
verbalism. But as a rule they are based on the fundamentally
relative nature of our experience. They are never half so elaborate
as the criticisms of Srihar~a; but at the same time they are funda-
mentally more convincing and more direct than the elaborate
roundabout logical subtleties of Srihar~a's dialectic. It cannot be
denied that, based on the dialectical methods of Nagarjuna,
Buddhapalita and Candrakirti, Srihar~a's criticisms, following an
altogether different plan of approach, show wonderful powers of
logical subtlety and finesse, though the total effect can hardly be
regarded as an advance from the strictly philosophical point of
view, while the frequent verbalism of many of his criticisms is a
discredit to his whole venture.
Dialectical criticisms of Santarak~ita and Kamalasila

(A.D. 76o) as forerunners of Vedanta Dialectics.
(a) Criticisms of the Siirrzkhya Pari1;1iima Doctrine.

In tracing the history of the dialectical ways of thinking in the
Vedanta it has been pointed out in the previous sections that the
influence of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti on Sailkara and some of
his followers, such as Srihar~a, Citsukha and others, was very great.
It has also been pointed out that not only Nagarjuna and Candra-
kirti, but many other Buddhist writers, had taken to critical and
dialectical ways of discussion. The criticism of the different schools
of Indian thought, as contained in Santarak~ita's Tattva-sarrzgraha
with Kamalasila's commentary Pafijikii, is a remarkable instance
of this. Santarak~ita lived in the first half of the eighth century
A.D., and Kamala8Ila was probably his junior contemporary. They
refuted the views of Kambalasvatara, a follower of the Lokayata
school, the Buddhist Vasumitra (A.D. 1oo), Dharmatrata (A.D. 1oo),
Gho~aka (A.D. 15o), Buddhadeva (A.D. zoo), the Naiyayika Vatsya-
yana (A.D. 3oo), the Mimaq1sist Sabarasv~min (A.D. 300), the
Saq1khyist Vindhyasvamin (A.D. 3oo), the Buddhist Sanghabhadra
(A.D. 350), Vasubandhu (A.D. 350), the Saq1khyist lsvarakr~~a
(A.D. 390), the Buddhist Dinnaga (A.D. 4oo), the Jaina Acaryasuri
(A.D. 478), the Saqlkhyist Mathara Acarya (A.D. soo), the Naiyayika
Uddyotakara (A.D. 6oo), the rhetorician Bhamaha (A.D. 64o), the
Buddhist Dharmakirti (A.D. 65o), the grammarian-philosopher
Bhartrhari (A.D. 6so), the l\limaq1sist Kumarila Bhana (A.D. 68o),
the Jaina Subhagupta (A.D. 700), the Buddhist Yugasena (A.D. 700),
the Naiyayika Aviddhakari).a (A.D. 7oo), Sankarasvamin (A.D. 7oo),
Pra8astamati (A.D. 700), Bhavivikta (A.D. 700), theJainaPatrasvamin
(A.D. 700), Ahrika (A.D. 700), Sumati (A.D. 700), and the Mimatpsist
Uveyaka (A.D. 700)1. It is not possible here, of course, to enter into
a complete analysis of all the criticisms of the different philosophers
by Santarak!?ita and Kamala8ila; yet some of the important points
of these criticisms may be noted in order to show the nature
and importance of this work, which also reveals the nature of
the critical thinking that prevailed among the Buddhists before
Sankara and by which Sankara and his followers, like Srihar!?a,
Citsukha or Anandajfiana, were in all probability greatly in-
fluenced.
In criticizing the Saq1khya views they say that, if the effects,
the evolutes, be identical with the cause, the pradhiina, why should
they be produced from the pradhiina? If they are identical, then the
evolutes themselves might be regarded as cause or the pradhiina
as effect. The ordinary way of determining causality is invariable
antecedence, and that is avowedly not available here. The idea of
pari1}iima, which means identity in diversity, the causal scheme
of the Saq1khya, is also inadmissible; for, if it is urged that any
entity changes into diverse forms, it may be asked whether the
nature of the causal entity also changes or does not change. If
it does not change, then the causal and the effect states should
abide together in the later product, which is impossible; if it
changes, then there is nothing that remains as a permanent
cause; for this would only mean that a previous state is arrested
and a new state is produced. If it is urged that causal trans-
formation means the assumption of new qualities, it may be
asked whether such qualities are different from the causal sub-
stance or not; if they are, then the occurrence of new qualities
cannot entitle one to hold the view that the causal substance is
undergoing transformations (pari'l}iima). If the changing qualities
and the causal substance are identical, then the first part of the
argument would reappear. Again, the very arguments that are
given in favour of the sat-karya-viida (existence of the effect in the
cause) could be turned against it. Thus, if curds, etc. already exist
1
These dates are collected from Dr B. Bhattacharya's foreword to the Tattva-
sa1Jlgraha. The present author, though he thinks that many of these dates are
generally approximately correct, yet, since he cannot spare the room for proper
discussions, does not take responsibility for them.
xr] Dialectical criticisms of Siintara/eyita and Kamalasila 173
in the nature of the milk, then what is the meaning of their being
produced from it? If there is no idea of production, there is no
idea of causality. If it is urged that the effects are potentially
existent in the cause, and causal operations only actualize them,
then it is admitted that the effects are actually non-existent in the
cause, and we have to admit in the cause some specific character-
istic, brought about by the causal operation, on account of the
absence of which the effects remained in the potential state in the
cause, and that the causal operations which actualize the effects
produce some specific determinations in the cause, in consequence
of which the effect, which was non-existent before, is actualized;
this would mean that what was non-existent could be produced,
which would be against the sat-kiirya-viida theory. In the light of
the above criticisms, since according to the sat-kiirya-viida theory
causal productions are impossible, the arguments of Sarpkhya in
favour of sat-kiirya-viida, that only particular kinds of effects are
produced from particular kinds of causes, are also inadmissible.
Again, according to Sarpkhya, nothing ought to be capable of
being definitely asserted, since according to the sat-kiirya-viida
theory doubts and errors are always existent as a modification
of either buddhi, manas or caitanya. Again, the application
of all Sarpkhya arguments might be regarded as futile, since all
arguments are intended to arrive at decisive conclusions; but de-
cisive conclusions, being effects, are already existent. If, however,
it is contended that decisive conclusions were not existent before,
but were produced by the application of arguments, then there is
production of what was non-existent, and thus the sat-kiirya-viida
theory fails. If it is urged that, though the decisive conclusion
(niscaya) is already existent before the application of the argumen-
tative premises, yet it may be regarded as being manifested by the
application of those premises, the Sarpkhyist may be asked to define
what he means by such manifestation (abhivyaktt). This manifes-
tation may mean either some new characteristic or some knowledge
or the withdrawal of some obscuration to the comprehension. In
the first alternative, it may again be asked whether this new
character (svabhiiviitilaya) that is generated by the application of
the premises is different from the decisive conclusion itself or
identical with it. If it is identical, there is no meaning in its
introduction; if it is different, no relation is admissible between
these two, since any attempt to introduce a relation between
1 74 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH.
two unrelated entities would launch us into a vicious infinite
(anavasthii). It cannot mean the rise of the knowledge about that
particular object for the manifestation of which the premises are
applied; for, according to the sat-kiirya-~~ada theory, that know-
ledge is already there. Again, it cannot mean the removal of the
obscuration of knowledge; for, if there is obscuration, that also
must be ever-existent. As a matter of fact, the whole of the
teachings of Sal!lkhya philosophy directed to the rise of true
knowledge ought to be false, for true knowledge is ever-existent,
and therefore there ought to be no bondage, and therefore all
persons should always remain emancipated. Again, if there is any
false knowledge, it could not be destroyed, and therefore there
could be no emancipation.
Santarak~ita and Kamala8ila then urge that, though the above
refutation of the sat-kiirya-~·iida ought naturally to prove the a-sat-
kiirya-viida (the production of that which did not exist before)
doctrine,yet a few words may be said in reply to the Sa~pkhya refuta-
tion of a-sat-kiirya-viida. Thus the argument that that which is non-
existent has no form (nairupya) and therefore cannot be produced is
false; for the operation of production represents itself the character
of the thing that is being produced. As the Satkaryavadins think that
out of the same three gutzas different kinds of effects may be pro-
duced according to causal collocations, so here also, according to the
law of different kinds of causal forces (karatza-sakti-pratiniyamiit),
different kinds of non-existing effects come into being. It is
meaningless to hold that the limitation of causal forces is to be
found in the pre-existence of effects; for, in reality, it is on account
of the varying capacities of the causal forces that the various effects
of the causes are produced. The production of various effects is
thus solely due to the diverse nature of the causal forces that
produce them. The law of causal forces is thus ultimately funda-
mental. The name a-sat-kiirya-viida, however, is a misnomer; for
certainly there is no such non-existent entity which comes into
being 1 • Production in reality means nothing more than the charac-
teristic of the moment only, divested from all associations of a
previous and a succeeding point of time 2 • The meaning of a-sat-
karya-viida is that an entity called the effect is seen immediately
1
na hy asan-niima kiiicid asti yad utpattim iiviset, kintu kiilpaniko 'ya1Jl vyava-
hiiro yad asad utpadyata iti yiivat. Tattva-sa1JlKraha-paiijikii, p. 33·
2
vastilnii1Jl purviipara-ko#-sflnya-k~m.za-miitriivasthiiy'i svabhiiva eva utpiida!J
ity ucyate. Ibid.
xi] Dialectical criticisms of Santarak#ta and Kamalasila 175
after a particular causal operation; and it certainly did not exist
before this second moment, since, if it did exist at the first moment
of the causal operation, it would have been perceived; it is therefore
said that the effect did not exist before; but this should not be
interpreted to mean that the Buddhists believed in the non-existing
existence of the effect, which suddenly came into being after the
causal operation.
Refuting the other Sa~pkhya doctrines, Santarak~ita and
Kamalasila point out that, if an effect (e.g. curd) is said to exist in
the cause (e.g. milk), it cannot do so in the actual form of the
effect, since then milk would have tasted as curd. If it is said to
exist in the form of a special capacity or potency (saktz), then the
existence of the effect in the cause is naturally denied; for it is the
potency of the effect that exists in the cause and not the effect
itself. Again, the Sa:rpkhyists believe that all sensible things are
of the nature of pleasure and pain; this, however, is obviously im-
possible, since only conscious states can be regarded as pleasurable
or painful. There is no sense at all in describing material things as
of the nature of pleasure or pain. Again, if objective material
things were themselves pleasurable or painful, then the fact that
the same objects may appear pleasurable to some and painful to
others would be unexplainable. If, however, it is held that even
pleasurable objects may appear painful to someone, on account of
his particular state of mind or bad destiny, then the objects them-
selves cannot be pleasurable or painful. Again, if objects are re-
garded as being made up of three gu'!las, there is no reason for
admitting one eternal prakrti as the source of them all. If causes
are similar to effects, then from the fact that the world of objects
is many and limited and non-eternal one ought to suppose that
the cause of the objects also should be many, limited and non-
eternal. It is sometimes held that, as all earthen things are produced
from one earth, so all objects are produced from one prakrti; but
this also is a fallacious argument, since all earthen things are
produced not out of ol).e lump of earth, but from different lumps.
Thus, though it may be inferred that the world of effects must
have its causes, this cannot lead us to infer that there is one such
cause as the prakrti of the Sarpkhyists.
(b) Criticism of lsvara.

One of the chief arguments of the Naiyayika theists in favour
of the existence of God is based on the fact that the specific forms
and shapes of the different objects in the world cannot be explained
except on the supposition of an intelligent organizer or shaper.
To this Santarak~ita and Kamala8Ila reply that we perceive only
the different kinds of visual and tactile sensibles and that there
are no further shaped wholes or so-called objects, which men
fancy themselves to be perceiving. It is meaningless to think that
the visual sensibles and tactile sensibles go together to form one
whole object. When people say that it is the same coloured object,
seen in the day, that we touched in the night when we did not
see it, they are wrong; for colour sensibles or sense-data are entirely
different kinds of entities from tactile sense-data, and it is meaning-
less to say that it is the same object or whole which has both
the colour and tactile characteristics. If two colour sensibles, say
yellow and blue, are different, then still more different are the
colour sensibles and the tactile ones. What exist therefore are not
wholes having colour and tactile characters, but only discrete
elements of colour and tactile sense-data; the combining of them
into wholes is due only to false imagination. There are no objects
which can be perceived by the two senses; there is no proof
that it is one identical object that is perceived by the eye as well
as touched. There exist therefore only loose and discrete sense-
data. There being thus no shaped wholes, the supposition of the
existence of God as shaper and organizer is inadmissible. The
mere fact that there are the effects cannot lead to the inference
that there is one intelligent creator and organizer, since a causal
inference cannot be made from mere similarity of any description;
there must be a law of unconditional and invariable connection
(pratibandha). The argument that, since jugs, etc. are made by an
intelligent potter, so trees, etc. must also have been made by
an intelligent creator, is faulty; for trees, etc., are so different
in nature from jugs, etc., that it is wrong to make any assertion
from the former to the latter. The general Buddhist arguments
against the existence of any eternal entity will also apply against
the existence of any eternal God. The argument that, since a state
of arrest breaks up into a state of motion or production in all
natural phenomena, there must be an intelligent creator, is wrong;
x1] Dialectical criticisms of Santarak#ta and Kamalastla 177
for there is no state of arrest in nature; all things in the world
are momentary. Again, if things are happening in succession, at
intervals, through the operation of a causal agent, then God also
must be operating at intervals and, by the arguments of the
opponents themselves, He must have another being to guide
His operations, and that another, and that another, and there
would thus be a vicious infinite. If God had been the creator,
then everything would have sprung into being all at once. He
ought not to depend on accessory assistance; for, He being the
creator of all such accessory circumstances, they could not render
Him any assistance in His creation. Again, if it is urged that the
above argument does not hold, because God only creates when He
wishes, then it may be replied that, since God's will is regarded
as eternal and one, the old objection of simultaneous production
holds good. l\1oreover, since God is eternal and since His will
depends only on Him and Him alone, His will cannot be transitory.
Now, if He and His will be always present, and yet at the moment
of the production of any particular phenomenon all other pheno-
mena are not produced, then those phenomena cannot be regarded
as being caused by God or by His will. Again, even if for argu-
ment's sake it may be granted that all natural objects, such as
trees, hills, etc., presuppose intelligent creators, there is no argu-
ment for supposing that one intelligent creator is the cause of all
diverse natural objects and phenomena. Therefore there is no
argument in favour of the existence of one omniscient creator.
The arguments urged in refutation of prakrti and Isvara would
also apply against the Patafijala-Sarp.khya, which admits the joint
causality of Isvara and pralqt£; for here also, prakrti and Isvara
being eternal causes, one would expect to have simultaneous pro-
duction of all effects. If it is urged that the three gu~ws behave
as accessory causes \vith reference to God's operation, then also
it may be asked whether at the time of productive activity (sarga)
the activity of dissolution or of maintenance (sthiti) may also be
expected to be operated, or whether at the time of dissolution,
there might be productive operation as well. If it is urged that,
though all kinds of forces are existent in prakrti, yet it is only
those that become operative that take effect, it may be objected
that some other kind of cause has to be admitted for making some
powers of prakrti operative, while others are inoperative, and this
would introduce a third factor; thus the joint causality of purzt~a
DII I2
The Saizkara School of Vedanta [CH.
and prakrti is also easily refuted. Again, the view that God
produces the world through kindness is also false; for, had it been
so, the world would not have been so full of misery. Again, there
being before creation no beings, God could not feel kindness to non-
existent beings. He would not have destroyed the world had He
been so kind; if He created and destroyed the world in accordance
with the good or bad deeds, then He would not be independent.
HadHebeenindependent,Hewouldnothave allowed Himself to be
influenced by the consequences of bad deeds in producing misery in
the world.· If He created the world out of mere playful instincts,
then these playful instincts would be superior to Him. If He
derived much enjoyment from His productive and destructive play,
then, if He were able, He would have created and destroyed the
world simultaneously. If He is not capable of creating and de-
stroying the world simultaneously, then there is no reason to
suppose that He would be able to do it at intervals. If it is urged
that the world was produced naturally by His own existence, then
there would be simultaneous production. If it is objected that,
just as spiders, though they naturally go on producing webs, yet
do not produce them all at once, so God also may be producing
the world gradually and not all at once, it may then be pointed
out that the analogy of spider's webs is false, since the spider does
not naturally produce webs, but only through greed for eating
insects, and its activities are determined by such motives. God,
however, is One who can have only one uniform motive. If it is
urged that creation flows from God unconsciously, as it were, it
may readily be objected that a being who creates such a great
universe without any intelligent purpose would indeed be very
unintelligent.
(c) Refutation of the Soul Theory.

The Nyaya view of the soul, that our thoughts must have a
knower and that our desires and feelings must have some entity
in which they may inhere and that this entity is soul and that it is
the existence of this one soul that explains the fact of the unity of
all our conscious states as the experience of one individual, is
objected to by Santarak~ita and Kamalasila. They hold that no
thought or knowledge requires any further knower for its illumina-
tion; if it had been so, there would be a vicious infinite. Again,
desires, feelings, etc., are not like material objects, which would
XI] Dialectical criticisms of Siintarak#ta and Kamalasila 179
require a receptacle in which they might be placed. The so-called
unity of consciousness is due to a false unifying imagination of
the momentary ones as one. It is also well known that different
entities may be regarded as combined on account of their fulfilling
the same kinds of functions. It is knowledge in its aspect of ego
that is often described as the self, though there is no objective
entity corresponding to ic It is sometimes argued that the existence
of the soul is proved by the fact that a man is living only so
long as his vital currents are connected with the soul, and that
he dies when they are disconnected from it; but this is false, since,
unless the existence of soul be proved, the supposition of its con-
nection with vital currents as determining life is untenable. Some,
however, say that the self is directly perceived in experience; if it
had not been, there would not have been such diversity of opinion
about its existence. The sense of ego cannot be said to refer to
the self; for the sense of ego is not eternal, as it is supposed to be.
On the other hand, it refers sometimes to our body (as when I say,
"I am white"), sometimes to the senses (as when I say, "I am
deaf"), and sometimes to intellectual states. It cannot be said that
its reference to body or to senses is only indirect; for no other per-
manent and direct realization of its nature is found in experience.
Feelings, desires, etc., also often arise in succession and cannot
therefore be regarded as inhering in a permanent self. The con-
clusion is that, as all material objects are soulless, so also are human
beings. The supposed eternal ·soul is so different from the body
that it cannot be conceived how one can help the other or even be
related to it. Thus there is hardly any argument in favour of the
soul theory of the Nyaya and Vaise~ika.
(d) Refutation of the Mzmiirrzsii Theory of the Self.
Kumarila believed that, though the nature of the self as pure
consciousness was eternal and unchangeable, yet it passed through
various changing phases of other feeling and volitional states. That
the self was of the nature of pure consciousness was proved by
the fact that it perceives itself to be knower in the past and in
the present. So the existence of the self is proved by the fact of
self-consciousness. To this Santarak~ita and KamalaSila reply that,
if the self is regarded as one eternal consciousness, then know-
ledge or the knowing faculty (buddhi) ought also to be regarded
as similarly one and eternal; but seemingly Kumarila does not
12-2
consider buddhi to be such. If the knowing faculty be regarded as
eternal and one, how are the varying states of cognition, such as
colour-cognition, taste-cognition, etc., to be explained? If it is
urged that, though the knowing faculty is one, yet (just as a fire,
though it has always a capacity of burning, yet burns only when
combustible substances are put in it) it only passes through
various kinds of perception according as various kinds of objects
are presented to it; or, just as a mirror, though it has always the
power of reflecting, yet only reflects when the objects are presented
to it, so the selves are eternally conscious and yet operate only in
connection with their specific bodies and grasp the various kinds of
sense-data, and all cognitions are forged from them( selves). If the
change of cognitions is due to the changing operations of the senses
and the sense-objects, then such a cognizing faculty cannot be
regarded as eternal and one. If the knowing faculty is to be re-
garded as eternal owing to an experience of continuity of conscious-
ness, then how can one explain the variety of cognitions? If it is
urged that the variety of cognitions is due to the assumption by the
cognizing faculty of various forms of objects, then how can one
explain the experience of the variety of cognitions in hallucinations,
when there are no objects? Moreover the Mimatp.sist does not
think that the cognizing faculty assumes the forms of the objects
cognized, but believes that cognition reveals the objects in the
objective world and the cognizing faculty has itself no forms
(niriikiirii buddhil;). The fact that there may be cognitions without
a corresponding real objective presentation proves that our cogni-
tions are subjective and self-revealed and that they do not reveal
objective entities. If it is urged that the knowing faculty has always
the power of revealing all things, then sound-cognition would be
the same as colour-cognition. The analogy of fire is also false, since
there is not one fire that is constant; the analogy of the reflecting
mirror is also false, since there is really no reflection in the mirror
itself; one can see a reflection in a mirror at a particular angle,
the mirror therefore is only an apparatus for producing an illusory
cognition. Again, the buddhi cannot be compared to a mirror as
an apparatus for producing illusory images; for then some other
buddhi would be necessary for perceiving illusory images. Again,
if the self is regarded as one and eternal, then it cannot pass through
the varying feeling and volitional states. If these states are not
entirely different from the self, then their changes would imply
the change of the self; and again, if they are entirely different from
xi] Dialectical criticistns of Santarak$ita and Kamalasila I 8 I
the self, how should their change affect the self? Again, if these
states all belong to the self and it is urged that it is when the
pleasurable state is submerged in the nature of the common self,
that the painful state may arise, it may be pointed out in objection
that, if the pleasurable states could be submerged in the nature of
the self in identity with itself, then they would be identical with
the nature of the self. It is also wrong to suppose that the sense of
self-consciousness refers to a really existing entity corresponding
to it. It has in reality no specific object to refer to as the self. It
may therefore be safely asserted that the existence of the self is
not proved by the evidence of self-consciousness.
(e) Refutation of the Siil{lkhya View of the Self.

Against the Sarpkhya view of the self it is pointed out that
the Sarpkhya regards the self as pure consciousness, one and
eternal, and that, as such, it ought not to be able to enjoy diverse
kinds of experiences. If it is held that enjoyment, etc., all belong to
buddhi and the puru~a only enjoys the reflections in the buddhi,
it may well be objected that if the reflections in the buddhi are
identical with puru~a, then with their change the pur~a also
undergoes a change; and if they are different, the pur~a cannot
be considered to be their enjoyer. Again, if the pralqti concen-
trates all its activities for the enjoyment of the purzt~a, how can
it be regarded as unconscious? Again, if all actions and deeds
belong to buddhi, and if buddhi be different from pur~a, why
should the puru~a suffer for what is done by the buddhi? If,
again, the nature of puru~a cannot be affected by the varying
states of pleasure and pain, then it cannot be regarded as an en-
joyer; and, if it could be affected, it would itself be changeable.
(f) The Refutation of the Upani~ad View of the Self.

The U pani!?adic thinkers hold that it is one eternal conscious-
ness that illusorily appears as all objects, and that there is in reality
no perceiver and perceived, but only one eternal consciousness.
Against this view it is urged by Santarak!?ita and Kamala8ila that,
apart from the individual cognitions of colour, taste, etc., no
eternal, unchangeable consciousness is experienced. If one eternal
consciousness is the one reality, then there cannot be a distinction
of false knowledge and right knowledge, bondage and emancipa-
tion. There being only one reality, there is no right knowledge
which need be attained.
The Sankara School of Vedanta [cR.
(g) Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of

Existing Entities.
Santarak~ita and Kamalaslla point out that the Naiyayikas
divide existing entities into two classes, as produced (krtaka)
and unproduced (a-krtaka), and they hold that those which are
produced are destructible. The Vatslputriyas also similarly divide
existing entities into momentary (e.g. ideas, sound, flame, etc.)
and non-momentary (e.g. earth, sky, etc.). On this point Santa-
rak~ita and Kamalaslla urge that whatever is produced is momen-
tary, since the destructibility of momentary things does not de-
pend on any cause excepting the fact that they are produced; for,
had the destructibility of such entities depended on conditions
or causes other than the fact of their being produced, then the
premise that whatever is produced is necessarily destructible would
be false. The N aiyayika view, therefore, that produced entities
depend for their destruction on other conditions, is false. If pro-
duced entities do not depend for their destruction on any other
condition or cause than the fact of their being produced, then they
must be destroyed the moment they are produced, or in other
words they are momentary. Moreover, destruction, being nega-
tion, is not a positive entity and is absolutely contentless, and only
positive entities depend on other conditions or causes for their
production. Destruction, being negation, is not produced by any
conditions or causes like a positive entity. Destruction therefore
is not generated by any separate causal apparatus, but the very
causes that lead to the production of an entity lead also to its
destruction the next moment. Destructibility being a necessary
characteristic of productibility, destruction cannot need the inter-
ference of any causes. It has also been stated above that destruc-
tion is pure negation and has therefore no characteristics which
have to be generated by any positive set of causes or conditions 1 •
1 The word k$m:tika, which is translated as "momentary," is, according to
Santarak~ita, a technical term. The character in an entity of dying immediately
after production, is technically called k$a7Ja, and whatever has this quality is
called k$aTJika (utpiidiiniintara-viniisi-svabhiivo vastunaft k$a1Ja ucyate, sa yas:yiisti
sa k$aTJika iti. Tatt'l:a-sarrzgraha, p. 142); k$a1Ja therefore does not mean time-
moment. It means the character of dying immediately after being produced.
The objection of Uddyotakara that what only stays for a moment of time (k$a7Ja)
cannot be called k$a?Jika, because at the expiry of the moment nothing remains
which can be characterized as momentary, is therefore inadmissible. There is,
howe,·er, no entity separate from the momentary character, and the use of the
term k$aTJika, which grammatically distinguishes the possessor of the momentary
character from the momentary character itself, is due only to verbal license.
x1] Dialectical criticisms of Siintarak$ita and Kamalaslla 18 3
Kumalasila and Santarak!?ita urge that existence (satt·l'a) can he
affirmed only of those entities which are capable of serving a purpose
(artha-kriyii-samarthii). They urge that entities can only serve a
purpose, if they are momentary. Entities that persist cannot serve
any purpose and therefore cannot have any existence. In order to
prove their thesis they enter into the following argument. If any
purpose is to be served, then that can be either in succession
or simultaneously, and no middle alternative is possible. If an
existing entity persists in time, then all its effects ought to come
about simultaneously; for, the complete cause being there, the
effects must also be there, and there is no reason why the effects
should happen in succession; but it is well known in experience
that effects happen only in succession and not simultaneously. If,
however, it is objected that even a persisting entity can perform
actions in succession owing to its association with successive acces-
sories (k1·ami1:zal.z sahakiiri7Jal.z), then one may well enquire as to
the nature of the assistance given by the successive accessories to
the persisting entity in the production of the effect; is it by pro-
ducing a special modification (atisayiidhiina) of the persisting cause
or by independent working in consonance with the productive
action of the persisting entity? In the first alternative, the special
modification may be either identical with or different from the
nature of the persisting entity, and both these alternatives are
impossible; for, if it is identical, then, since the effect follows in
consequence of the special modification of the accessories, it is the
element of this special modification that is to be regarded as the
cause of the effect, and not the persisting entity. If it is again urged
that the effect is due to the association of the special modification
with the persisting entity, then it would be impossible to define
the nature of such association; for an association may be either of
identity or of productivity (tiidiitmya and tad-utpattz), and neither
of them is possible in the present case, since the special modification
is recognized as being different from the persisting entity and is
acknowledged by assumption to be produced by the accessories.
Again, such association cannot be regarded as being of the nature
of samaviiya; for this special modification, being of the nature of
an additional assistance (upakiira), cannot be regarded as being of
the nature of inseparable inherence (samaviiya). If this special
modification be regarded as being neither of the nature of an
additional assistance (upakiira) nor of the nature of an essence
The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [CH.
identical with the persisting entity, and if it is still regarded as being
associated with the persisting entity in a relation of samaviiya, then
anything in the world could be regarded as being in the samaviiya
relation with anything else. In the other alternative, in which it
is maintained that the persisting entity awaits only the independent
working of the accessories, it may well be asked whether the causal
nature of the persisting entity is the same together with the totality
of the accessories as it is without them? In the former case, the
accessories would also be persistent. In the latter case, the per-
sisting entity can no longer be regarded as persisting.
Regarding the objection of Bhadanta Y ogasena, that the same
difficulties would arise in the assumption of entities as momentary,
Santarak!?ita and Kamala8Ila reply that in their view the accessories
behave in two ways, firstly, as independent co-operation (ekiirtha-
kriyii-kiiritii) and, secondly, as mutual help (parasparopakiiritii).
Thus in the first moment the different accessory-units are only
independently co-operant, since, in one moment, their mutual
actions cannot help one another; but in the second moment, the
effects may be regarded as being of a joint nature, and therefore
mutually determining one another, in the production of the effect
of the third moment. In this view, though each entity operates
independently, yet none of their operations are irrelevant. They
are all being· produced and determined by the respective causes
and conditions in a beginningless series.
The objection against the momentariness of all things on the
ground that things are perceived and recognized to be the same,
and as persisting, is not a valid one. For the fact of persistence
cannot be perceived by the senses and must be regarded as due
to false imagination. All recognition is due to the operation of
memory, which is almost universally recognized as invalid for
purposes of right knowledge. On this point it may be argued that
in recognition, if the entity now perceived be the same as the entity
perceived at a previous time, then how can a cognition in the past
comprehend an entity of the present time? If they are held to be
different, then it is acknowledged that the entities perceived as the
same in recognition are not really the same. The objector's argu-
ment that, since things pass by the same name, they must be
persistent is invalid; for it is well knmvn that even in ordinary per-
ception, where a flame is known to be destroyed every moment,
and produced anew, it is still said in common verbal usage to be
xi] Dialectical criticisms of Santarak~ita and KamalasUa 185
the same flame. Thus all existing things must be regarded as
momentary.
(h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency

of Entities.
It is objected by the Naiyayikas and others that, if things are
momentary, then the theory of karma would fail; for how can it
be understood that the deeds be performed by one, and the fruits
reaped by another? How, again, can it be understood that a momen-
tary cause which does not abide till the rise of the effect should
produce the same? Again, if objects are momentary, how can they
be perceived by the eye? The phenomena of recognition would
also be inexplicable, as there would be no permanent perceiver
who would identify the present and the past as being one. How,
again, would the phenomenon of bondage and of emancipation
apply to a non-permanent being? In reply to this Santarak~ita
and Kamalaslla say that, just as a seed by means of its invariable
power produces the shoots, without being superintended by any
conscious agent, so the inner states of a man may generate other
states, without being superintended by any permanent conscious
agent; the formula ( dharma-Sa'f[lketa) for all production is, "this
happening, that happens"; "this being produced, that is pro-
duced." It is through ignorance that a man cannot discern that
all subsequent states are determined by the natural forces of the
preceding ones and thinks of himself as performing this or that
action or as striving for emancipation. The true nature of things
cannot be determined by the illusory experience of ignorant people.
It is sometimes objected that the parts of a seed attain a due
constitution by assimilating nutritive elements at the second stage,
and then again at the third stage attain a new constitution by further
accretion of new nutritive elements, and that therefore it cannot
be held that the parts of the seed are entirely destroyed at the
second stage. To this the reply of Santarak~ita is that in the second
moment the effect is produced in dependence on the undestroyed
causal efficiency of the first causal moment; so that the effect
is produced by the causal efficiency of the first moment, when
the cause is not destroyed. The cause however perishes in the
second moment; for, once the cause has produced the effect, it
cannot be producing it again and again; if it did, there would be
a vicious infinite. It must therefore be admitted that the causal
efficiency of the cause ceases immediately after production 1 • The
view that the effect is produced simultaneously with the cause (saha-
bhuta1[l kiiryam) is unreasonable, since the cause cannot produce
the effect before it is itself produced; again, it cannot produce after
it is itself produced; for then the effect also has to be acknowledged
to be of the same nature as the cause; but at the same moment it
can have no scope for its efficiency. Thus the cause and effect
cannot be produced simultaneously. There is no necessity also for
admitting a causal operation (vyiipiira), as separate and distinct
from the cause. Invariable antecedence is the only qualification
of cause 2 • If a causal operation has to be admitted for connecting
the cause with the effect, then that would require another opera-
tion, and that another, and there would be a vicious infinite. If
the causal operation is admitted to be able to generate the effect
independently by itself, so can the cause be also admitted to be
able to produce the effect. The objection that, if antecedence be ad-
mitted to be alone the determinant of causality, then the fact, that
a thing is smelled after it is seen may also lead one to infer that colour
is the cause of smell, is invalid, for the Buddhists have no objection
to regarding colour as an accessory cause of smell. It must also be
remembered that the Buddhists do not regard mere antecedence
as the definition of cause, but invariable and necessary ante-
cedence3. Again, no difficulty need be experienced in perception,
if the objects are admitted to be momentary; for ideas may be
considered to have forms akin to the objects, or to be formless, but
revealing the objects. In either case the ideas are produced by
their causes, and the momentariness or permanence of objects has
nothing to do with their determination 4 • There are in reality no
agent and no enjoyer, but only the series of passing mental pheno-
mena. Causality consists in the determination of the succeeding
states by the previous ones. The objection of Uddyotakara, that, if
the mind is momentary, it cannot be modified (viisanii) by deeds
(karma), is invalid; for, in the Buddhist view, this modification
1 The Vaibha!?ikas are spoken of by Santarak!?ita as holding the view that
the effect is produced at the third moment. In this view the effect is produced
by the destroyed cause.
1
idam eva hi kiiryasya kiirm:ziipek~ii yat tad-anantara-blziivitvam. Tattva-
sa1pgraha, p. 177.
3
na hi vayam iinantarya-miitra1Jl kiirya-kiira1JO.-bhiiviidhigati-nibandhana1Jl
.• . yasyaiviinantara1Jl yad bhavati tat tasya kiirm:zam i~ate. Ibid. p. 180.
c Santarak!?ita and Kamalasila are Buddhists who style themselves niriikiira-
vijfiiina-vadin.
XI] Dialectical criticisms of Siintarak#ta and Kamalaslla 187
(viisanii) means nothing more than the production of a new mental
state of a modified nature. There is again no permanent perceiver
who remembers and recognizes; it is only when in a particular series
of conscious states, on account of the strength of a particular
perception, such particularly modified mental states are generated
as may be said to contain seeds of memory, that memory is possible.
The Buddhists also do not consider that there is one person
who suffers bondage and is liberated; they think that bondage
means nothing more than the production of painful states due to
ignorance (avidyii) and other mental causes, and that liberation
also means nothing more than purity of the mental states due
to cessation of ignorance through right knowledge.
(i) Refutation of the Nyiiya VaiSe~ika Categories.

Santarak~ita and Kamalasila attempt to refute the categories of
substance (dravya) with its subdivisions, quality (gu~za), action
(karma), generality, or class concepts (siimiinya), specific pecu-
liarities (vise~a), relation of inherence (samaviiya), and the conno-
tation and denotation of words (sabdiirtha). This refutation may
briefly be set out here.
Speaking against the eternity of atoms, they hold that, since no
special excellence can be produced in eternal entities, no conditions
or collocations of any kind can produce any change in the nature
of the atoms; thus, the atoms being always the same in nature,
all objects should be produced from them either at once, or not
at all. The mere fact that no cause of atoms is known is no ground
for thinking that they are causeless. Again, substance, as different
from characters and qualities, is never perceived. The refutation
of wholes (avayavt), which has already been effected, also goes
against the acceptance of substantive wholes, and so the four
substances earth water air and fire which are ordinarily re-
garded as subst~ntive~wholes made, up of atoms-also stand
refuted. Again, it is not easy to prove the existence of separate
and independent time and space entities; for spatial and temporal
determinations may well be explained as mental modifications due,
like other facts of experience, to their specific causes. The Buddhists
of course accept the existence of manas as an instrument separate
from the sense-organs, hut they do not admit its existence as an
eternal and single entity.
The refutation of substances implies the refutation of gu!las,
188 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cR.
which are supposed to be dependent on substances. If the sub-
stances do not exist, there can also be no relation of inherence, in
which relation the gu'l}aS are supposed to exist in substances. There
is, again, no meaning in acknowledging colours, etc., as different
from the atoms in which they are supposed to exist. The per-
ception of numbers also ought to be regarded as due to mental
modifications associated with particular cognitions. There is no
reason for holding that numbers should stand as separate qualities.
In a similar manner Santarak~ita and Kamala8Ila proceed with the
refutation of the other Nyaya qualities.
Proceeding with the refutation of action (karma), they hold that,
if all things are admitted to be momentary, then action cannot be
attributed to them; for action, involving as it does successive
separation of parts and association of contact-points, implies many
moments for its execution. If things are admitted to be persistent
or eternal, then also movement cannot be explained. If things are
admitted to be always moving, then they will be in motion while
they are perceived to be at rest, which is impossible. If things
are at rest by nature, there cannot be any vibratory movement in
them. The main principle involved in the refutation of gu'l}aS and
karmas consists in the fact that the gut:zas and karmas are regarded
by the Buddhists as being identical with the particular sense-data
cognized. It is wrong, in their view, to analyse the sense-data as
substances having qualities and motion as different categories in-
hering in them. 'Vhatever may be the substance, that is also the
quality which is supposed to be inhering in it, as also the motion
which it is supposed to execute.
Regarding the refutation of class-concepts the main drift of
Buddhist argument is that, though the perception of class-natures
may be supposed to be due to some cause, yet it is wrong to
assume the existence of eternal class-nature existing constantly
in all the changing and diverse individual members of a class.
For, howsoever we may try to explain it, it is difficult to see
how one thing can remain constantly the same, though all the
individual members in which it is supposed to exist are constantly
. changing. If class-natures are said to inhere owing to specific
qualities, e.g. cooking in the cook, then also it may be objected
that, since the operation of cooking is different in each case, there
is no one character "cooking" by virtue of which the class-nature
of cook is admissible. Moreover, a cook is called a cook even when
XI] Dialectic of Sankara and Anandajiiiina
he is not cooking. Considerations like these should lead aHy
thinking person to deny the existence of eternal class-natures.
Regarding the refutation of specific qualities (vise~a) it is held
that, if yogins can perceive the ultimate specific qualities as dif-
ferent from one another, they might equally perceive the atoms to
be different from one another; if the atoms cannot be perceived
as different except through some other properties, then the same
may be required of the specific properties themselves.
Regarding the refutation of samaviiya, or relation of inherence,
the Buddhist objects mainly to the admission of a permanent
samaviiya relation, though all the individuals in which this relation
may be supposed to exist should be changing or perishing. It is a
false supposition that the relation of inherence, such as that of the
cloth in the thread, is ever felt to be, as if the one (e.g. the cloth)
was existing in the other (threads), as the Naiyayikas suppose.
Dialectic of Sailkara and Anandajiiana.

It is well known that Sankaracarya in his commentary on the
Brahma-siltra, 11. ii 11-17, criticizes the atomic theory of the
Vaise!?ikas. His first thesis is that the production of an effect
different in nature from the cause, as in the case of the production
of the impure world from pure Brahman, can be justified on the
analogy of even the critics of the Vedanta, the Vaise!?ikas. The
Vaise!?ikas hold that in the production of the dvy-ar.zuka (containing
two atoms) from the paramii1JU (single atom) and of the catur-a7Juka
(containing four atoms) from the dvy-ar.zuka, all other qualities of
the paramar.zu and the dvy-ar.zuka are transferred to the dvy-ar.zuka
and catur-ar.zuka respectively, excepting the specific measures of
piirimii~ujalya (specific atomic measure) and ar.zu-hrasva (specific
measure of the dyads), which are peculiar to paramii1JU and d7)Y-
a7Juka respectively. Thus, though all other qualities of paramii1JUS
pass over to dvy-a1}ukas produced by their combination, yet the
specific parimar.zflalya measure of the paramiir.zus does not pass to
the dvy-ar.zukas, which are of the ar.zu-hrasva parimii7Ja. So also,
though all the qualities of dvy-ar.zulws would pass on to the catur-
m:zukas made out of their combination, yet their own specific
m:zu-hrasva parima1Ja would not pass on to the catur-a7Jukas, which
are possessed of their own measure, viz. the mahat parimii1Ja,
uncaused by the parimli1Ja of the dvy-a1Julws. This shows that the
The Saitkara School of Vedanta [CH.
Vaise~ikas believe that the parimii~;ujalya measure(parimii:r.za) of the
paramii1JUS may produce an altogether different measure in their
product, the d1ry-m;ukas, and so the a1Ju-hrasva measure of the
dvy-a1Jukas may produce an altogether different measure in their
product, the catur-m:zukas, viz. the mahat parimii1Ja. On this
analogy it may be contended that the Vaise~ikas have nothing
to object to in the production of an altogether different effect (viz.
the impure world) from an altogether different cause, the pure
Brahman. If it is urged that the measure of the paramii1JU cannot
pass on to the dvy-a1Juka only because its passage is rendered im-
possible by the taking possession of it by an opposite quality (the
a1Ju-hrasva parimii1Ja), then a similar reply may be given in the case
of the difference between the world and Brahman. Moreover,
since, according to the Vaise~ika theory, all products remain for
a moment without qualities, there is no reason why, when the
dvy-a1Juka was produced, the piirimii1J4alya measure should not
pass on to it. At that moment, since the parimii1Jt}alya measure
did not pass on to it as did the other qualities, it follows, not that
the passing of the piirimii1Jt}alya measure is opposed by the other
parimiir.za, but that it naturally did not pass on to it. Again, it
cannot be objected that the analogy of dissimilarity of qualities
(gu1Ja) cannot be cited in support of the dissimilarity of substances.
Sankara's second thesis is that the Vaise~ika view that atoms
combine is wrong, because, since the atoms are partless, and since
combination implies contact and contact implies parts which come
in contact, there cannot be any combination of atoms. More-
over, since before creation there is no one who can make an effort,
and since the contact of atoms cannot be effected without effort,
and since the selves, being unconscious at that time, cannot them-
selves make any effort, it is impossible to account for the activity
without which the contact of the atoms would also be impossible.
So the atoms cannot combine, for want of the effort needed for such
a contact. Sankara's third point is that the relation of samaviiya
upheld by the Vaise~ikas cannot be admitted; for, if to unite two
different objects the relation of samaviiya is needed, then samaviiya,
being itself different from them, would require another samaviiya
to connect itself with them, and that another, and that another,
and so on ad infinitum. If the relation of contact requires a further
relation of samaviiya to connect it with the objects irt contact, there
is no reason why samaviiya should not require some other relation
XI) Dialectic of Sankara and .iinandajiiiina
in its turn. Again, if the atoms are regarded as always operative
and combining, then there can be no dissolution (pralaya), and,
if they are always disintegrating, then creation would be impossible.
Again, since the atoms possess the qualities of colour, etc., they
must be the product of some simpler causes, just as other objects
having qualities are made up of simpler entities. l\1oreover, it is
not right to suppose that, since we have the idea of non-eternality,
this must imply eternality and that therefore the atoms must be
eternal; for, even though it implies the existence of etemality, it
does not imply that the atoms should be eternal, since there is such
an eternal thing as Brahman. Again, the fact that the cause of the
destruction of the atoms is not known does not imply that they
are eternal; for mere ignorance of the ways of destruction does
not imply eternality. Again, the Vaise~ikas are wrong in speaking
of six different categories and yet hold that all the five other
categories depend on substance for their existence or manifesta-
tion. A substance and its quality do not appear to be as different
as two substances. A substance appears black or white, and this
implies that the qualities are at bottom identical with the substance
(dravyiitmakatii gu1Jasya). It cannot, moreover, be urged that the
dependence of other categories on substance consists in their in-
separableness (ayuta-siddhatva) from it. This inseparableness can-
not be inseparableness of space; for, when threads constitute as their
product a piece of cloth, then the threads and the cloth cannot be
regarded as having the same space, yet, being cause and effect,
they are to be regarded as ayuta-siddha, or inseparable; and yet the
whiteness of the cloth is not regarded as abiding in the threads. If
inseparableness means inseparableness of time, then the two horns
of a bull, which exist at the same time, should also be regarded as
inseparable; and, if inseparableness means inseparableness of char-
acter or sameness of character, then quality cannot be regarded
as being different from substance. Again, since the cause exists
prior to the effect, it cannot be regarded as inseparable from the
cause, and yet it is asserted by the Vaise~ikas that their relation is
one of samaviiya, since they are inseparable in their nature.
Sankara, however, seldom indulges in logical dialectic like the
above, and there are only a few rare instances in which he attacks
his opponents from a purely logical point of view. But even here
he does not so much criticize the definitions of the Vaise~ikas as
point out the general logical and metaphysical confusions that
result from some of the important Vaise!?ika theories. It is easy
to note the difference of a criticism like this from the criticism
of Srihar!?a in his Khm:uJana-khaT}t]a-khiidya, where he uses all the
power of his dialectical subtleties to demolish the cherished
principles of pure logic as formulated by the Nyaya logicians.
It is not a criticism of certain doctrines in support of others, but
it is a criticism which aims at destroying the possibility of logical
or perceptual knowledge as a whole. It does not touch any specific
metaphysical views, but it denies the power of perception and
inference to give us right knowledge, and it supposes that it
achieves its purpose by proving that the Nyaya modes of definition
of perception and inference are faulty and self-contradictory.
Citsukha's attempts are more positive; for he criticizes not only
the Nyaya categories of logic, but also the categories of Vaise!?ika
metaphysics, and makes some positive and important statements,
too, about the Vedanta doctrine itself. Anandajfiana's Tarka-
sa'f[lgraha is another important work of negative criticism of the
Vaise~ika categories and in that sense a continuation on a more
elaborate scale of Citsukha's criticisms of the Vaise!?ika categories.
The importance of the Vaise~ika was gradually increasing, as it was
gradually more and more adopted by Vai~J).ava realistic writers,
such as 1\!Iadhva and his followers, and it was supposed that a
refutation of the Vaise~ika would also imply a refutation of the
dualistic writers who draw their chief support from Vaise!?ika
physics and metaphysics.
Anandajfiana, also called Anandagiri, was probably a native of
Gujarat and lived in the middle of the thirteenth century. Mr
Tripathi points out in his introduction to Anandajfiana's Tarka-
Sa'f[lgraha that Anandajfiana was a spiritual head of the Dvaraka
monastery of Sankara, of which Suresvaracarya was the first
teacher. He was a pupil of two teachers, Anubhutisvariipacarya
and Suddhananda. Anubhutisvariipacarya wrote five works, viz.
(I) a grammatical work called Siirasvata-prakriyii, (2) a commentary
on Sankara's commentary on Gau<;lapada's Mii1}t}ilkya-kiirikii,
(3) a commentary on Anandabodha Yati'sNyiiya-makaranda,called
Nyiiya-makaranda-sa'f[lgraha, (4) a commentary, called Candrikii,
on Anandabodha's Nyiiya-dzpiivalt, and (5) another commentary,
called Nibandha, on Anandabodha's Pramii1}a-miilii. Nothing is
known about his other teacher, Suddhananda, who is different
from the other Suddhananda, the teacher of Svayamprakasa of the
XI] Dialectic of Sankara and Anandajiiiina 1 93
seventeenth century, author of the Advaita-makaranda-tlkii. One of

the most distinguished of Anandagiri's pupils was AkhaD-<_H:inanda,
author of the Tatt~,a-dipana, a commentary on Prakasatman's
Pafica-piidikii-vivarm;a, as he refers to him as 5rimad-iinanda-
sailiihva-paiiciisya1Jl satala1Jl bhaje in the fourth verse of his Tattva-
dzpana. Anandagiri wrote a large number of works, which are mostly
commentaries. Of these his lsiiz,•iisya-bha~ya-tippmya, Kenopani~ad
bhii~ya-tippm;a, Viikya-vivara~za-Z-'Yiikhya, Kat/wpani~ad-bha~ya
tfkii, 111Utpjaka-bha~ya-vyiiMzyiina, 111ii~ujukya-Gaul)apiidiya-bha~ya
vyiikhyii, Taittirlya-bhii~ya-tippm;a, Chiindogya-bhii~ya-tzkii, Tait-
tirzya-bhii~ya-viirttika-tlkii, Siistra-prakiisikii, Brhad-iirmyyalw-
bhii~a-viirttika-tzkii, Brhad-iira~yaka-bha~ya-tzka, Siirzraka-
bha~ya-tikii (called also Nyiiya-nir~zaya), Gztii-bha~ya-z,·ivecana,
Paiiclkara~a-vivaratJa, with a commentary called Tattz,•a-candrika
by Rama Tirtha, a pupil of J agannathasrama (latter part of the
fifteenth century), and Tarka-sattzgraha have already been printed.
But some of his other works, such as Upadesa-siihasrz-viz,Iti,
Vakya-vrtti-tzkii, Atma-jriiinopadesa-fikii, Svariipa-nin;aya- fikii,
Tripurl-prakara~a-flkii, P adiirtha-tattva-nir_JJaya-vivara~a and
Tattviiloka, still remain to be printed. It will thus be seen
that almost all his works are but commentaries on Sailkara's
commentaries and other vvorks. The Tarka-sarpgraha and
Tattviiloka (attributed to "Janardana," which was probably the
name of Anandagiri when he was a householder) seem to be his
only two independent works 1 • Of these the manuscript of the
second work, in which he refutes the doctrines of many other
philosophers, including Bhaskara's pari~ziima doctrines, has, un-
fortunately, not been available to the present writer. The Tarka-
sa~ngraha is devoted almost wholly to a detailed refutation of the
Vaise~ika philosophy. The book is divided into three chapters. In
the first chapter, dealing with the criticism of substances ( dravya),
he starts with a refutation of the concepts of duality, reality
(tattva), existence (sattva), non-existence, positivity (bhiiz,·a) and
negativity (abhiiva). Anandojfiana then passes on to a refutation of
the definition of substance and its division into nine kinds
(according to the Vaise~ika philosophy). He then criticizes the first
substance, earth, and its diverse forms, as atoms (paramii~u) and
molecules(dvya~uka),anditsgrosserformsand their modified states,
1
See Mr Tripathi's introduction to his edition of the Tarlw-sa'Jlgraha,
Baroda, 1917.
DII 13
1 94 The Saizkara School of Vedanta [cH.
as bodies, senses and sense-objects, and continues to criticize the
other substances such as water, fire, air, and the theory of creation
and dissolution, iikiisa, time, space, self (iitman) and manas. In the
second chapter he goes on to the criticism of qualities (gu?fa),
such as colour (rupa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparsa),
the effects of heat on the transformations of objects through mole-
cular or atomic changes (pzlu-piika and pithara-piika), number
(sankhyii}, measure (parimii?fa), separateness (prthaktva), con tact
(sat!lyoga), separation (vibhiiga), the nature of knowledge, illusion
and dreams, the nature of right knowledge and its means (pramii?fa
and pramii}, perception (pratyak$a), inference (anumiina), con-
comitance (vyiipti), reason (hetu), fallacies (hetv iibhiisa), examples
(dr~tiinta), discussions, disputations and wranglings, testimony of
the scriptures (iigama), analogy (upamiina), memory, pleasure,
pain, will, antipathy (dve~a), effort (prayatna), heaviness, liquidity
(dravatva), virtue, vice, etc. In the third chapter he refutes the
notion of action, class-concept or universality (jiiti), the relation
of inherence (samaviiya) and different kinds of negation. The
thesis designed to be proved in all these refutations is the same as
that of Srlhar~a or Citsukha, viz. that in whatsoever manner the
Vaise~ikas have attempted to divide, classify or define the world
of appearances they have failed.
The conclusion at which he arrives after this long series of
criticisms and refutations reminds us of Anandabodha's conclu-
sions in his Nyiiya-makaranda, on which a commentary was written
by his teacher Anubhiitisvariipa Acarya, to which reference has
already been made when Anandabodha's views were under dis-
cussion. Thus Anandajiiana says that an illusory imposition cannot
be regarded as existent (sat); for, since it is non-existent in the sub-
stratum (adhi$thiina) of its appearance, it cannot be existent any-
where else. Neither can it be regarded as absolutely non-existent
(atyantiisat); for, had it been so, it would not have appeared as
immediately perceived (aparok~a-p1·atui-virodhiit); nor can it be
regarded as existent and non-existent in the same object. The only
alternative left is that the illusory imposition is indescribable in its
nature 1 . This indescribability ( anirviicyatva) means that, in which-
ever way one may try to describe it, it is found that none of those
ways can be affirmed of it or, in other words, that it is indescribable
1 piiriie~yiid anirviicyam iiropyam upagamyatii1{l sattviidinii1{l prakiiriir;zii1{l
priig-ukta-nyiiya-biidhaniit. Tarka-sa1Jigraha, p. 135·

XI) Dialectic of Sankara and Anandajfiana 195
in each and every one of those ways 1 • Now, since all appearances
must have something for their cause and since that which is not
a real thing cannot have a real thing as its material cause (na ca
avastuno vastu upiidiinam upapadyate), and, since they are all in-
describable in their nature, their cause must also be of that nature,
the nescience of the substratum 2 •
He then asserts that this nescience (ajfiiina), which is the material
out of which all appearances take their form, is associated with
Brahman; for Brahman could not be regarded as omniscient or the
knower of all (sarva-jfia} without its association with ajfiiina, which
is the material stuff of the all (the knower, the means of knowledge,
the objects and their relations) 3 • Everything else that appears
except the one reality, the self, the Brahman, is the product of
this aJiiiina. This one ajiiiina then can explain the infinite kinds of
appearances, and there is not the slightest necessity of admitting
a number of ajfiiinas in order to explain the diversity or the plurality
of appearances. The many selves are thus but appearances pro-
duced by this one ajfiiina in association with Brahman 4 • It is the
one ajFiiina that is responsible for appearances of the dream state as
well as of the waking state. It is the one ajfiiina which produces all
kinds of diversity by its diversity of functions or modes of opera-
tion. If there is only one reality, which through one ajiiiina appears
in all diverse forms of appearances, how is the phenomenon of
self-consciousness or self-recognition to be explained? To this
difficulty Anandajiiana's reply is that both the perceiving and the
perceived self are but false appearances in the antal;kara7Ja (an
aji1iina product), and that it does not in any way infect the one
true self with any kind of activity. Thus there is the one Brahman
and there is one beginningless, indescribable ajiiiina in connection
with it, which is the cause of all the infinitely diverse appearances
through which the former appears impure and suffers bondage,
as it were, and again appears liberated, as it were, through the
yena yena prakiiret;~a paro nirvaktum icchati
tena teniitmanii 'yogas tad-anirviicyatii matii. Tarka-sarp.graha, p. 136.
2 tasmiid rupyiidi-kiiryasyanirviicyatviit tad-upiidiinam api adhi~thiiniijiiiinam
upiideyam. Ibid. p. 137.

3 pramii~ataf;. sarvajiiatve 'pi pramiitrtvasya pramii~a-prameya-sambandhasya
ciijiiiina-sambandham antaret;liisiddhef;. tasmin ajiiiinavattvam avaS)Iam iisrayita-

vyam anyathii sarvajiiatviiyogiit. Ibid. pp. 137, 138.
' ekas tiivad iitmii dvayor api iivayof;. sampratipanno 'sti, tasya sviijiiiiniid eva
aviviida-siddhiid ekasmiid atiriktarp. sarvam pratibhiiti; . .. samastasyaiva bheda-
bhiinasyiipiiramiirthikasyaikajiiiina-siimarthyiid eva sambhaviin niijiiiina-bhede
hetur asti. Ibid. pp. 138, 139.
IJ-2
realization of the V edantic truth of the real nature of the selfl. In
fact there is neither bondage nor emancipation.
In view of the above it may be suggested that Anandajfiana is
following the same line of interpretation of the relation of ajiiana
to Brahman whith was upheld by Vacaspati and Anandabodha.
Anandajfiana's position as an interpreter of Sankara's philosophy
is evident from the number of able commentaries which he wrote
on the commentaries of Sankara and also from the references
made to him by later writers. Mr Tripathi collects the names
of some of these writers, as Prajfianananda, Se~a Sarilgadhara,
Vadivagisvara, Vadindra, Ramananda Sarasvati, Sadananda
Kasmiraka (A.D. 1547), Kr~t:lananda (A.D. 165o), lVIahesvara
Tirtha (A.D. 1650) and others.
Philosophy of the Prakatartha-vivaral)a (A.D. 1200).
The Prakatartha-vivarm:za (as the writer himself calls it in the

colophon of the work-priirabhyate vivarm:za1Jl prakatiirtham etat)
is an important commentary still in manuscript on Sankara's
commentary on the Brahma-siltra, which the present writer
had an opportunity of going through from a copy in the Adyar
Library, Madras, through the kind courtesy of the Lihrarian,
Mr T. R. Chintamani, who is intending to bring out an edition.
The author, however, does not anywhere in the work reveal his
own name and the references which can be found in other
works are all to its name as Prakatar or to the author of the
Prakatartha (prakatiirtha-kiira), and not to the author's personal
name 2 • This work has been referred to by Anandajfiana, of
the thirteenth century (Mw:zt}aka, p. 32; Kena, p. 23; Ananda-
srama editions A.D. 1918 and 1917), and it may well be supposed
that the author of the work lived in the latter half of the twelfth
1 Advitlyam iitma-tattvam, tatra ca aniidy anirviicyam ekam ajiiiinam ananta-
bheda-pratibhiina-nidiinam, tatas ciinekiirtha-kalu#tam iitma-tattvam baddham

iviinubhuyamiinam, vediinta-viikyottha-tattva-siik~iitkiira-pariikrta-sakiiryiijiiiina1Jl
muktam iva bhiiti; paramiirthato na bandho na muktir iti sakaryiijiiiina-nivrtty-
upalak#tam paripiir't)am iitma-tattvam eva parama-puru~iirtha-rupa'f!l sidhyati.
Tarka-sa1Jlgraha, p. 141.
2 The colophon of the work runs as follows :
jiiiitviipi yasya bahu-kiilam acintanena

vyiikhyiitum ak~amatayii paritiipi ceta/:l
tasyopatiipa-hara1Jiiya mayeha bhii~ye
priirabhyate vivara1Jat1l prakatiirtham etat.
MS. No. I, 38. 27, Govt. MSS. Library, Madras.
XI] Philosophy of the Prakatartha-vivara1Ja 1 97
century. He certainly preceded Ramadvaya, the author of the
Vedanta-kaumudt, who not only refers to the Prakatartha, but
has been largely influenced in many of his conceptions by the
argument of this work 1 • The author of the latter holds that the
indefinable maya in association with pure consciousness (cin-
miitra-sambandhint) is the mother of all existence (bhUta-prakrti).
Through the reflection of pure consciousness in maya is produced
lsvara (God), and by a transformation of Him there arises the
creator Brahma, and it is by the reflection of the pure consciousness
in the infinite parts of this Brahma that there arise the infinite
number of individual souls through the veiling and creating
functions of the maya. Maya or aji'iana is not negation, but
a positive material cause, just as the earth is of the jug (ajiiana'!l
nabhava upadanatvan mrdvat). But, being of the nature of veiling
(avararzatvat) and being destructible through right knowledge
(prakasa-heyatvat), it cannot be known as it is: still it may
well be regarded as the positive cause of all illusions 2 • The well-
known Vedantic term svaprakasa is defined in the Prakatartha as
illumination without the cognition of its own idea (sva-sa1{lvin-
nairapek~erza sphurarzam). The self is to be regarded as self-
revealing; for without such a supposition the revelation of the self
would be inexplicable 3 • The author of the Prakatartha then criticizes
the Kumarila view of cognition as being a subjective act, inferable
from the fact of a particular awareness, as also the Nyaya- Vaise~ika
and Prabhakara views of knowledge as an illumination of the object
inhering in the subject (atma-sama'viiyt vi~aya-prakaso jiianam), and
the Bhaskara view of knowledge as merely a particular kind of
activity of the self; and he ultimately holds the view that the mind
or manas is a substance with a preponderance of sattva, which has
an illuminating nature, and that it is this manaswhich, being helped
by the moral destiny(adHtadi-sahakrtam), arrives at the place where
the objects stand like a long ray of light and comes in contact with
it, and then as a result thereof pure consciousness is reflected upon
the object, and this leads to its cognition. Perceptual cognition, thus
defined, would be a mental transformation which can excite the
1
Vediinta-kaumudl, MS. transcript copy, p. 99·
iivaral}atviit prakiisa-heyatviid vii tamovat-svaril.pel}a pramii~za-yogyatve 'py
2
abhiiva-vyiiv_rtti-bhrama-kiira1Jalviidi-dharma-visi~!asya priimiil}ilzatva'f!l na viru-

dhyate. MS. p. 12.
3
iitmti sva-prakiisas tato 'nyathii'nupapadyamiinatve sati
praktisamtinatvtin na ya evarJl na sa evwrz yathii kumblzal;. Praka{iirtha MS.
revelation of an object (manal.z-paritJii:mal.z samvid-vyaiijako jiiiinam) 1 •
In the case of inference, however, the transformation of manas
takes place without any actual touch with the objects; and there is
therefore no direct excitation revealing the object; for the manas
there,beingin direct touch with the reason or the /inga,isprevented
from being in contact with the object that is inferred. There is
here not an operation by which the knowledge of the object can be
directly revealed, but only such a transformation of the manas
that a rise of the idea about the object may not be obstructed 2 •
The author of the Prakatiirtha accepted the distinction between
miiyii and a_jiiiina as conditioning lsvara and jiva.
Vimuktatman (A.D. 12oo).

Vimuktatman, a disciple of Avyayatman Bhagavat Pujyapada,
wrote his l~ta-siddhi probably not later than the early years of the
thirteenth century. He is quoted and referred to by l\1adhusudana
in his Advaita-siddhi and by Ramadvaya in his Vediinta-kaumudi
of the fourteenth century. It was commented upon by Jfianottama,
the teacher of Citsukha, and this commentary is called l~ta
siddlzi-·vyiiklzyii or l~ta-siddhi-'l:£vara1Ja. For reasons stated else-
where J fianottama could not have flourished later than the latter
half of the thirteenth century. Vimuktatman wrote also another
work, called Pramii1JQ-vrtti-nir1}aya, to which he refers in his
l~ta-siddhi (MS. p. 72). The work has not yet been published,
and the manuscript from the Adyar Library, which is a transcript
copy of a manuscript of the NaQ.uvil l\1atham, Cochin State, and
which has been available to the present writer, is very fragmentary
in many parts; so much so, that it is often extremely difficult to
follow properly the meaning of the discussions. The work is
divided into eight chapters, and is devoted in a very large
part to discussions relating to the analysis of illusions in the
Vedanta school and in the other schools of philosophy. This work
is to be regarded as one of the four traditional Siddhis, such as the
Brahma-siddhi by MaQ.Q.ana, the }la#karmya-siddhi by Suresvara,
1
MS. p. 54·
2 upalabdha-sambandhiirthii kiire1J.a pari'(Ultam mano
'niivabhiisa-vyavrtti-miitraphalam, na tu sa'f{lvid-vyaiijakam
liitgadi-samvid-vyavadhiina-pratibandhiit. MS. p. 54·
It is easy to see how Dhannarajadhvarindra elaborated his Vedantic theory of
perception and inference with these and other data wor!l-,~d out by his pre-
decessors. ·
xr] Vimuktiitman 1 99
the l#a-siddhi by Vimuktatman and the Advaita-siddhi by
Madhusiidana. Hitherto only the Nai~karmya-siddhi and the
Advaita-siddhi have been published. The Brahma-siddhi is expected
to be published soon in Madras; but as yet the present writer is
not aware of any venture regarding this important work.
The work begins with the interpretation of a salutation made
by the author, in which he offers his adoration to that birthless,
incognizable, infinite intuitive consciousness of the nature of self-
joy which is the canvas on which the illusory world-appearance
has been painted. Thus he starts the discussion regarding the
nature of the ultimate reality as pure intuitive consciousness
(anubhiltz). Nothing can be beginningless and eternal, except pure
consciousness. The atoms are often regarded as beginningless;
but, since they have colours and other sense-properties, they
are like other objects of nature, and they have parts also, as
without them no combination of atoms would be possible.
Only that can be indivisible which is partless and beginning-
less, and it is only the intuitive consciousness that can be said
to be so. The difference between consciousness and other objects
is this, that, while the latter can be described as the "this"
or the object, the former is clearly not such. But, though this
difference is generally accepted, dialectical reasoning shows that
the two are not intrinsically different. There cannot logically be
any difference between the perceiving principle (drk) and the
perceived (drsya); for the former is unperceived (adrsyatviit).
No difference can be realized between a perceived and an un-
perceived entity; for all difference relates two cognized entities.
But it may be argued that, though the perceiver may not be
cognized, yet he is self-luminous, and therefore the notion of
difference ought to be manifested. A reply to this objection
involves a consideration regarding the nature of difference. If
difference were of the nature of the entities that differed, then
difference should not be dependent on a reference to another (na
svarilpa-dntil:z prati-yogy-apek~ii). The difference has thus to be
regarded as a characteristic (dharma) different from the nature of
the differing entities and cognized by a distinct knowing process
like colours, tastes, etc. 1 But this view also is not correct, since it
is difficult to admit ''difference" as an entity different from the
1
tasmiit kathaiicit bhinno jiiiiniintara-gamyo riipa-rasiidivad bhedo 'hhyupeyafl.
Adyar f5.ta-siddhi MS. p. S·
differing entities ; for such a difference would involve another dif-
ference by which it is known, and that another and that another,
we should have an infinite regress; and the same objection applies to
the admission of mutual negation as a separate entity. This being
so, it is difficult to imagine how "difference" or mutual negation
between the perceiver and the perceived can be cognized ; for it is
impossible that there should be any other cognition by which this
"difference," or mutual negation which has the perceiver as one
of its alterna6ng poles, could be perceived 1 • Moreover, the self-
luminous perceiving power is always present, and it is impossible
that it could be negated-a condition without which neither
difference nor negation could be possible. Moreover, if it is
admitted that such a difference is cognized, then that very fact
proves that it is not a characteristic of the perceiving self. If this
difference is admitted to be self-luminous, then it would not await
a reference to another, which is a condition for all notions of
difference or mutual negation. Therefore, "difference" or" mutual
negation" cannot be established, either as the essence of the
perceiving self or as its characteristics ; and as there is no other
way in which this difference can be conceived, it is clear that there
is no difference between the perceiving self and its characteristics.
Again, negation is defined as the non-perception of a perceivable
thing; but the perceiving self is of the very nature of perception,
and its non-perception would be impossible. Admitting for the
sake of argument that the perceiving self could be negated, how
could there be any knowledge of such a negation? for without the
self there could be no perception, as it is itself of the nature of
perception. So the notion of the negation of the perceiving self
cannot be anything but illusion. Thus the perceiving self and the
perceived (drk and drsya) cannot be differentiated from each other.
The difficulty, however, arises that, if the perceiving self and the
perceived were identical, then the infinite limitations and differences
that are characteristic of the perceived would also be character-
istic of the perceiver; and there are the further objections to such
a supposition that it is against all ordinary usage and experience.
It may be argued that the two are identical, since they are both
eva'f!l ca sati na drg-drsyayor bhedo dr~tum sakyal:z

niipy anyonyiibhiival:z na hi drsab svaya'f!l dnteb
prati-yogy-ape~a-dr~fy-antara-dr$yarrz rupiintara'f!l sva'f!l
samasti svayarrt dn#tva-hiiniit. MS. p. 6.
XI) Vimuktiitman 201
experienced simultaneously (sahopalambha-niyamiit); but the reply

is that, as two are experienced and not one, they cannot be
regarded as identical, for in the very experience of the two
their difference is also manifested 1 • In spite of such obvious
contradiction of experience one could not venture to affirm the
identity of the perceiver and the perceived 2 • The maxim of
identity of the perceiver and the perceived because of simultaneous
perception cannot be regarded as true; for, firstly, the perceiver is
never a cognized object, and the perceived is never self-luminous,
secondly, the perceiver is always self-revealing, but not so the
perceived, and, thirdly, though the "perceived" cannot be re-
vealed without the perceiver, the latter is always self-revealed.
There is thus plainly no simultaneity of the perceiver and the
perceived. \Vhen a perceived object A is illuminated in con-
sciousness, the other objects B, C, D, etc. are not illuminated, and,
when the perceived object B is illuminated, A is not illuminated,
but the consciousness (samvid) is always self-illuminated; so no
consciousness can be regarded as being always qualified by a
particular objective content; for, had it been so, that particular
content would always have stood self-revealed 3 • Moreover, each
particular cognition (e.g. awareness of blue) is momentary and
self-revealed and, as such, cannot be the object of any other cog-
nition; and, if any particular awareness could be the object of any
other awareness, then it would not be awareness, but a mere object,
like a jug or a book. There is thus an intrinsic difference between
awareness and the object, and so the perceiver, as pure awareness,
cannot be identified with its object 4 • It has already been pointed
out that the perceiver and the perceived cannot be regarded as
different, and now it is shown that they cannot be regarded as
identical. There is another alternative, viz. that they may be both
identical and different (which is the bhediibheda view of Bhaskara
and Ramanuja and others), and Vimuktatman tries to show that
this alternative is also impossible and that the perceiver and the
1
abhede salza-bhiiniiyogiid dvayor hi salza-bhiinam na ekasyaiva na hi drsaiva
drk salza bhami bhavatiipy ucyate, niipi drsyenaiva driyarJl saha bhiitfti kintu
drg-drsyayofz saha bhiinam ucyate atas tayor bhedo bhiity eva. MS. p. 25.
2
tasmiit sarva-vyavahiim-lopa-prasaizgiin na bhedo drg-dr$yaofz. Ibid.
3
kirJl vidyud-vise#tatii nama sarJlvidafz svaritpam uta sarJlvedyasya, yadi
sam•oida!z siipi bhiity eva sarJlvid-bhiiniit sa1Jlvedya-svarfipa1Jl cet . tadii bhiiniin na
sarJlvido bhiinam. Ibid. p. 27.
4
asarJlvedyaiva sarJlvit samvedyarJl ciisarJlvid eva, atafz sarJlvedyasya ghata-
sukhiidefz sarJlvidas ciibheda-gandho 'pi na pramii?Javiin. Ibid. p. 31.
perceived cannot be regarded as being both identical and different.
The upholder of the bhediibheda view is supposed to say that,
though the perceiver and the perceived cannot, as such, be regarded
as identical, yet they may be regarded as one in their nature as
Brahman. But in reply to this it may be urged that, if they are
both one and identical with Brahman, there would be no difference
between them. If it is argued that their identity with Brahman
is in another form, then also the question arises whether their
forms as perceiver and perceived are identical with the form in
which they are identical with Brahman; and no one is aware of any
form of the perceiver and the perceived other than their forms
as such, and therefore it cannot be admitted that in spite of their
difference they have any form in which they are one and identical.
If again it is objected that it is quite possible that an identical
entity should have two different forms, then also the question
arises whether these forms are one, different or both identical with
that entity and different. In the first alternative the forms would
not be different ; in the second they would not be one with the
entity. Moreover, if any part of the entity be identical with any par-
ticular form, it cannot also be identical with other forms ; for then
these different forms would not be different from one another ;
and, if again the forms are identical with the entity, how can
one distinguish the entity (riipin) from the forms (riipa)? In the
third alternative the question arises whether the entity is identical
with one particular form of it and different from other forms, or
whether it is both identical with the same form and different.
In the first case each fom1 would have two forms, and these again
other two forms in which they are identical and different, and these
other two forms, and so on, and we should have infinite regress :
and the same kind of infinite regress would appear in the relation
between the entity and its forms. For these and similar reasons
it is impossible to hold that the perceiver and the perceived are
different as such and yet one and identical as Brahman.
If the manifold world is neither different nor identical nor
both different and identical with the perceiver, what then is its
status? The perceiver is indeed the same as pure perception
and pure bliss, and, if it is neither identical nor different nor
both identical with the manifold world and different, the manifold
world must necessarily be unsubstantial (avastu); for, if it had any
substantiality, it might have been related in one of the above three
XI] Vimuktiitman 203
ways of relation. But, if it is unsubstantial, then none of the above

objections would apply. But it may again be objected that, if the
world were unsubstantial, then both our common experience and
our practical dealing with this world would be contradicted. To
this Vimuktatman's reply is that, since the world is admitted to be
made up of miiyii (miiyii-nirmitatviibhyupagamiit), and since the
effects of miiyii canot be regarded either as substantial or as un-
substantial, none of the above objections would be applicable to
this view. Since the manifold world is not a substance, its admission
cannot disturb the monistic view, and, since it is not unsubstantial,
the facts of experience may also be justified 1 • As an instance
of such an appearance which is neither vastu (substance) nor
avastu, one may refer to dream-appearances, which are not regarded
as unreal because of their nature as neither substance nor not-
substance, but because they are contradicted in experience. Just
as a canvas is neither the material of the picture painted on it
nor a constituent of the picture, and just as the picture cannot be
regarded as being a modification of the canvas in the same way as
a jug is a modification of clay, or as a change of quality, like the
redness in ripe mangoes, and just as the canvas was there before
the painting, and just as it would remain even if the painting
were washed away, whereas the painting would not be there without
the canvas, so the pure consciousness also is related to this world-
appearance, which is but a painting of miiyii on it 2 •
Miiyii is unspeakable and indescribable (an£rvacanzyii), not as
different from both being and non-being, but as involving the
characters of both being and non-being. It is thus regarded as a
power of ignorance (av£dyii-saktt) which is the material cause of all
objects of perception otherwise called matter (sarva-jatjopiidiina-
bhutii). But, just as fire springing from bamboos may burn up
the same bamboos even to their very roots, so Brahma-knowledge,
which is itself a product of ignorance and its processes, destroys
the self-same ignorance from which it was produced and its
processes and at last itself subsides and leaves the Brahman to
1
prapaficasya vastutviibhiiviin niidvaita-honib avastutviibhiiviic ca pratyak$iidy-
apriimii1)yam· apy-ukta-do$iihhiiviit. MS. p. 64.
2
yatha citrasya bhittib siik.iiit nopiidiinam niipi saha.ill'f!l citTaT[l tasyiih niipy-
avasthiintara'!l mrda iva gha!iidib niipi gu't)iintariigama/:l iimrasyeva raktatiidi/:l na
ciisyiih janmiidis citriit priig ardhll'f!l ca bhiiviit, yady api bhitti'!l vinii citra'!' na
bhati tathiipi na sii citra'!' vina bhiiti ity evam-iidy-anubhUtir bhitti-jagac-citrayor
yojyam. Ibid. p. 73.
shine in its own radiance 1 • The functions of the pramii:l:zas, which

are all mere processes of ignorance, ajfiiina or avidyli, consist only
in the removal of obstructions veiling the illumination of the self-
luminous consciousness, just as the digging of a well means the
removal of all earth that was obstructing the omnipresent likiila
or space; the pramli1JaS have thus no function of manifesting the
self-luminous consciousness, and only remove the veiling ajiilina 2 •
So Brahma-knowledge also means the removal of the last rem-
nants of ajfiiina, after which Brahma-knowledge as conceptual
knowledge, being the last vestige of ajfiiina, also ceases of itself.
This cessation of ajiilina is as unspeakable as ajiiiina itself.
Unlike Mal).<;iana, Vimuktatman does not consider avidyli to be
merely subjective, but regards it as being both subjective and
objective, involving within it not only all phenomena, but all
their mutual relations and also the relation with which it is
supposed to be related to the pure consciousness, which is in reality
beyond all relations. Vimuktatman devotes a large part of his work
to the criticism of the different kinds of theories of illusion (khyiitt),
and more particularly to the criticism of anyathakhyiiti. These
contain many new and important points; but, as the essential
features of these theories of illusion and their criticisms have
already been dealt with in the tenth chapter of the first volume, it is
not desirable to enter into these fresh criticisms of Vimuktatman,
which do not involve any new point of view in Vedantic inter-
pretation. He also deals with some of the principal Vedantic topics
of discussion, such as the nature of bondage, emancipation, and
the reconciliation of the pluralistic experience of practical life
with the monistic doctrine of the Vedanta; but, as there are not
here any strikingly new modes of approach, these may be left
out in the present work.
Ramadvaya (A.n. IJoo).

Ramadvaya, a pupil of Advayasrama, wrote an important work,
called Vediinta-kaumudz, in four chapters, in which he discussed in
a polemical way many Vedantic problems while dealing with the
subject matter of Sankara's commentary on the first four topics
of the Brahma-sutra. The work has not yet been published ;
but at least one manuscript of it is available in the Government
1 2
MS. p. 137. Ibid. p. 143.
XI] Riimiidvaya 205
Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras: this through the kindness

of the Curator the present author had the opportunity of utilizing.
Ramadvaya also wrote a commentary on his Vediinta-kaumudi,
called Vediinta-kaumudi-vyiikhyiina, a manuscript of the first
chapter of which has been available to the present writer in the
library of the Calcutta Asiatic Society. These are probably the
only manuscripts of this work known till now. The date of the
writing of the copy of the Vediinta-kaumudi-vyiikhyiina is given
by the copyist Se!?anrsirpha as A.D. 1512. It is therefore certain
that the work cannot have been written later than the fifteenth
century. Ramadvaya in the course of his discussions refers to
many noted authors on Nyaya and Vedanta, none of whom are
later than the thirteenth century. Vimuktatman, author of the
l~ta-siddhi, has been placed by the present author in the early half
of the thirteenth century; but Ramadvaya always refers to him
approvingly, as if his views were largely guided by his; he also
in his Vediinta-kaumudi-vyiikhyiina (MS. p. 14) refers to
Janardana, which is Anandajfiana's name as a householder; but
J anardana lived in the middle of the thirteenth century; it seems
therefore probable that Ramadvaya lived in the first half of the
fourteenth century.
In the enunciation of the Vedantic theory of perception and
inference Ramadvaya seems to have been very much under the
influence of the views of the author of the Prakatiirtha; for, though
he does not refer to his name in this connection, he repeats
his very phrases with a slight elaboration 1 • Just as the cloudless
sky covers itself with clouds and assumes various forms, so the
pure consciousness veils itself with the indefinable a'l;idya and
appears in diverse limited forms. It is this consciousness that
forms the real ground of all that is known. Just as a spark of fire
cannot manifest itself as fire if there are no fuels as its condition,
so the pure consciousness, which is the underlying reality of all
objects, cannot illuminate them if there are not the proper conditions
to help it in its work 2 • Such a conditioning factor is found in
1
See Vediinta-kaumudi, MS. transcript copy, pp. 36 and 47·
2
Ramadvaya refers here to the dahariidhikarm:za of Sankara's commentary
on the Brahma-siitra, presumably to I. 3, 19, where Sankara refers to the supposed
distinction between the individual soul (jfva) and Brahman. Here Sailkara says
that his commentary is directed towards the regulation of those views, both
outside and inside the circle of Upani!?adic interpreters, which regard individual
souls as real (apare tu viidinal;z piiramiirthikam eva jaivarJl rupam zti manyante
asmadiyiis ca kecit). Such a view militates against the correct understanding of
206 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH.
manas, which is of the stuff of pure sattva: on the occasion of
sense-object contact this manas, being propelled by the moral
destiny (adHfiidi-kfUbdha1fl), transforms itself into the form of a
long ray reaching to the object itself1 . The pure consciousness, as
conditioned or limited by the antal:zkarm:za (antal:zkarm:ziivacchinna1fl
caitanya1fl), does by such a process remove its veil of avidyii, (though
in its limited condition as individual soul this avidyii formed its
own body), and the object also being in contact with it is mani-
fested by the same process. The two manifestations of the subject
and the object, having taken place in the same process (vrttz) there,
are joined together in the same cognition as "this object is known
by me " (vrtter ubhayasa1fllagnatvlic ca tad-abhivyakta-caitanya-
syiipi tathiitvena mayedam viditam iti sa'f{lSle~a-pratyaya/:z) ; and, as
its other effect, the consciousness limited by the antal:zkarar;a,
transformed into the form of the process (vrtti) of right knowledge
(pramii), appears as the cognizer (vrtti-lak~ar;a-pramlisrayiintal:z
karar;livacchimzas tat-pramlitetyapi vyapadiJyate) 2 • The object also
attains a new status in being manifested and is thus known as
the object (karma-kiirakiibhivyakta1fl ca tat prakasiitmanli phala-
vyapadeJa-bhiik). In reality it is the underlying consciousness that
manifests the 'l'!iti transformation of the antal:zkarar;a; but, as it is
illusorily identified with the antal:zkarar;a (antal:zkarar;a-caitanyayor
aikyiidhyiisiit), like fire and iron in the heated iron, it is also
identified with the vrtti transformation of the antal;karar;a, and,
as the vrtti becomes superimposed on the object, by manifesting
the 'l'!fti it also manifests the object, and thus apart from the
subjective illumination as awareness, there is also the objective fact
of an illumination of the object (eva1fl vrtti-vyafijakam api taptii-
yal:z-Pi1Jt}a-nyliyena tad-ekatam ivapta1fl vrttivad-vi~aya-prakatyat
mana sampadyate) 3 • The moments in the cognitive process in
perception according to Ramadvaya may thus be described. The
the self as the only reality which through avidyii manifests itself as individual
souls and with its removal reveals itself in its real nature in right knowledge as
parameivara, just as an illusory snake shows itself as a piece of rope. Parameivara,
the eternal unchangeable and upholding consciousness, is the one reality which,
like a magician, appears as many through avidyii. There is no consciousness
other than this (eka eva parameivaral,z kutastha-nityo vijiiana-dhiitur avidyayii-
miiyayii miiyavivad anekadhii vibhavyate niinyo vijiiiina-dhatur asti).
1
This passage seems to be borrowed directly from the Prakatiirtha, as may be
inferred from their verbal agreement. But it may well be that both the Vediinta-
kaumudl and the Prakatartha borrowed it from the Paiica-piidika-vivara't)a.
2
Vedanta-haumudl, MS. transcript copy, p. 36.
1
Ibid. p. 37•
XI] Riimiidvaya 207
sense-object contact offers an occasion for the moral destiny

(adr~ta) to stir up the anta}.zkara7Ja, and, as a result thereof, the
anta}.zkara7Ja or mind is transformed into a particular state called
'l,'rtti. The pure consciousness underlying the anta}.zkara7Jawas lying
dormant and veiled, as it were, and, as soon as there is a transfor-
mation of the anta}.zkara7Ja into a 'l,'rtti, the consciousness brightens
up and overcomes for the moment the veil that was covering it.
The vrtti thus no longer veils the underlying consciousness, but
serves as a transparent transmitter of the light of consciousness to
the object on which the 'l,'rtti is superimposed, and, as a result
thereof, the object has an objective manifestation, separate from
the brightening up of consciousness at the first moment of the
'l'rtti transformation. Now, since the vrtti joins up the subjective
brightening up of consciousness and the objective illumination of
the object, these two are joined up (sartz.Sle~a-pratyaya) and this
results in the cognition "this object is known by me "; and out
of this cognition it is possible to differentiate the knower as the
underlying consciousness, as limited by the anta}.zkara7Ja as trans-
formed into the vrtti, and the known as that which has been
objectively illuminated. In the Vediinta-paribhii!ii we hear of
three consciousnesses (caitanya), the pramiitr-caitanya (the con-
sciousness conditioned by the anta}.zkara7Ja), the pramii7Ja-caitanya
(the same consciousness conditioned by the vrtti of the anta}.zkara7Ja ),
and the vi~aya-caitanya (the same consciousness conditioned by
the object). According to this perception (pratyak~a) can be
characterized either from the point of view of cognition (jfiiina-
gata-pratya~atva) or from the point of view of the object, both
being regarded as two distinct phases, cognitional and objective,
of the same perceptual revelation. From the point of view of
cognition it is defined as the non-distinction (abheda) of the
pramii1Ja-caitanya from the v#aya-caitanya through spatial super-
imposition of the vrtti on the object. Perception from the point
of view of the object (vifaya-gata-pratyak~atva) is defined as the
non-distinction of the object from the pramiitr-caitanya or the
perceiver, which is consciousness conditioned by the anta}.zkara7Ja.
This latter view, viz. the definition of perception from the point of
view of the object as the non-distinction of the object from the
consciousness as limited by anta}.zkara7Ja (ghatiider anta}.zkara7Jiiva-
cchinna-caitanyiibheda}.z), is open to the serious objection that really
the non-distinction of the object (or the consciousness conditioned
by the antal;karm:za-antaljkarm;livacchinna-caitanya) but with the
cognition (pramli'l}a-caitanya or vrtti-caitanya); for the cognition
or the 'l,•rtti intervenes between the object and the perceiver, and
the object is in immediate contact with the vrtti and not with the
perceiver (antaljkara7Jlivacchinna-caita1lya). That this is so is also
admitted by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, son of Ramakr~~a Adhvarin,
in his Sikhli-ma1Ji commentary on the Vedlinta-paribhii~li 1 • But he
tries to justify Dharmaraja Adhvarindra by pointing out that he was
forced to define 'Ci~aya-gata-pratyak~atva as non-distinction of the
object from the subject, since this view was taken in Prakasatman's
Vivara7Ja and also in other traditional works on Vedanta 2 • This
however seems to be an error. For the passage of the Vivara7Ja to
which reference is made here expounds an entirely different view3 •
It says there that the perceptibility of the object consists in
its directly and immediately qualifying the cognitional state or
sense-knowledge (sm{lvid)~. That other traditional Vedantic inter-
preters entirely disagreed with the view of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra
is also evident from the account of the analysis of the perceptual
process given by Ramadvaya. Ramadvaya says, as has just been
pointed out, that it is the illuminated cognitive process, or the
·vrtti, that has the subject and the object at its two poles and
thus unites the subject and the object in the complex subject-
predicate form "this is known by me." The object is thus
illuminated by the 'Crtti, and it is not directly with the subject, but
with the "-'rtti, that the object is united. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra
himself raises an objection against his interpretation, that it might
be urged, if in perception there was non-distinction of the
object from the subject, then in perceiving an object, e.g. a book,
one should feel" I am the book," and not "I perceive the book";
in reply to such an objection he says that in the perceptual process
1 yad vii yogyatve sati vifaya-caitanyiibhinna-pramiit;a-caitanya-vifayatvarp
gha!iider v#ayasya pratyakfatva'f!l tathiipi vifayasyiiparokfalva'f!l samvida-

bhediit iti vivaraQ.e tatra tatra ca sii1Jlpradiiyikaifz pramiitrabhedasyaiva v#aya-
pratyakfa-lakia1)atveniibhidhiiniid evarp uktarp. Sikhii-ma1)i on Vediinta-pari-
bhiifii, p. 75, Bombay, 1911, Venkatesvara Press.
2 Ibid.
3 Tasmiid avyavadhiinena sa'f!lvid-upiidhitayiiparokfatii vi1ayasya. Panca-
piidikii-vivara1J.a, p. so, Benares, 1892.
4
It should be noted here that SG'f!lvid means cognitional idea or sense-
knowledge and not the perceiver (antafzkara1J.iivacchinna-caitanya), as the author
of the Sikhiimm;zi says. Thus Akhat:l~ananda in his Tattva-dipana commentary
explains the word SG'f!lvid as sa'f!lvic-chabdena indriyiirtha-samprayoga-ja-jniinasya
vivak#tatviit. Tattva-dipana, p. 194, Benares, 1902.
XI] Riimiidvaya
there is only a non-distinction between the consciousness underlying
the object and the consciousness underlying the perceiver, and this
non-distinction, being non-relational, does not imply the assertion
of a relation of identity resulting in the notion " I am the book" 1 •
This is undoubtedly so, but it is hardly an answer to the objection
that has been raised. It is true that the object and the subject are
both but impositions of avidyii on one distinctionless pure con-
sciousness; but that fact can hardly be taken as an explanation of
the various modes of experiences of the complex world of subject-
object experience. The difference of the Vedanticviewof perception,
as expounded in the Paiica-piidikii-vivarar;a, from the Buddhist
idealism (vijiiiina-viida) consists in this, that, while the Buddhists
did not accord any independent status to objects as outside the
ideas or percepts, the Vedanta accepted the independent mani-
festation of the objects in perception in the external world 2 • There
is thus a distinction between visional percept and the object; but
there is also a direct and immediate connection between them, and
it is this immediate relationship of the object to its awareness
that constitutes the perceptivity of the object (avyavadhiinena
samvid-upiidhitii aparok~atii vi§ayasya-Vivarar;a, p. so). The
object is revealed in perception only as an object of awareness,
whereas the awareness and the subject reveal themselves directly
and immediately and not as an object of any further intuition or
inference (prameyarrz karmatvena aparok~am pramiitr-pramiU punar
aparok~e eva kevalarrz na karmatayii) 3 •
The views of the Vediinta-kaumudz, however, cannot be regarded
as original in any sense, since they are only a reflection of the ex-
position of the subject in Padmapada's Paiica-piidikii and Praka-
satman's Paiica-piidika-vivarar;a. The development of the whole
theory of perception may be attributed to the Paiica-piidikii-
vivarar;a, since all the essential points of the perceptual theory can
be traced in that work. Thus it holds that all the world objects
are veiled by avidyii; that, as the antal:zkarar;a is transformed into
states by superimposition on objects, it is illuminated by the
underlying consciousness; and that through the spatial contact with
the objects the veil of the objects is removed by these antal:z-
karar;a transformations; there are thus two illuminations, namely
1
Vediinta-paribhii~ii, pp. 76, 77•
na ca vijiiiiniibhediid eva iiparok~yam avabhiisate
2 bahi~tvasyiipi rajatiider
iiparok~yiit. Paiica-piidikii-vivaratJa, p. so.
3
Paiica-piidikii, p. 17, Benares, 1891.
DII
of the antaJ.zkara7Ja transformations (called vrtti in the Vediinta-
kaumudt, and Vediinta-paribhii~ii and pure consciousness); to
the question that, if there were unity of the consciousness
underlying the object and the coqsciousness underlying the antalj-
kara7Ja (i.e. the subject) and the consciousness underlying the
antal:zkara7Ja modification (or vrtti), there would be nothing to
explain the duality in perception (e.g. "I perceive the book," and
not " I am the book," and it is only the latter form that could
be expected from the unity of the three consciousnesses), Praka-
satman's reply is that, since the unity of the object-consciousness
with the anta~zkara~w-consciousness (subject) is effected through
the modification or the 't:riti of the antaJ.zkara7Ja and, since the
antal:zkara7Ja is one with its vrtti, the vrtti operation is rightly
attributed to the antaljkara7Ja as its agent, and this is illuminated
by the consciousness underlying the antaljkarm;a resulting in the
perception of the knower as distinguished from the illumination
of object to which the operation of the vrtti is directed in spatial
superimposition-the difference between the subject and the
object in perception is thus due to the difference in the mode or
the condition of the 1.:rtti with reference to the subject and the
object 1 • This is exactly the interpretation of the Vediinta-kaumudz,
and it has been pointed out above that the explanations of the
Vediinta-pariblzii~ii are largely different therefrom and are in all
probability inexact. As this unity is effected between individual
subjects (consciousness limited by specific anta?zkara7Jas) and
individual objects (consciousness limited by specific a'l;idyii
materials constituting the objects) through the vrtti, it can result
only in revelation of a particular subject and a particular object
and not in the revelation of all subjects and all objects 2 • This has
been elaborated into the view that there is an infinite number of
ajtliina-veils, and that each cognitive illumination removes only one
ajiiiina corresponding to the illumination of one object 3 • But this
also is not an original contribution of Ramadvaya, since it was
also propounded by his predecessor Anandajfiana in his Tarka-
1
See Paiica-piidikii-vivara7Ja, p. 70, and Tattva-dipana, pp. 256-259,
Benares, 1902.
2
etat pramiitr-caitanyiibhinnatayaiva abhivyaktarJl tad vi~aya-caitanyarJl na
pramiitr-antara-caitanyiibhedena abhivyaktam alo na sarve~iim avabhiisyatvam.
Paiica-piidikii-vivara7Ja, p. 71.
3 yiivantijiiiiniini tiivanti sva-tantrii1Ji para-tantrii1Ji vii ajiiiiniini tato na dofafz.
Vediinta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 43·

XI] Riimiidvaya 211
sa1Jlgraha and by others 1 • The upshot of the whole discussion is that

on the occasion of a cognitive operation of the mind both the mind
and the cognitive operation become enlivened and illuminated by
the indwelling pure consciousness as subject-consciousness and
awareness, and through contact with this cognitive operation the
object also becomes revealed not as a mere content of awareness,
but as an objective fact shining forth in the external world.
Cognition of objects is thus not a mere quality of the self as knower,
as the N yaya holds, nor is there any immediate contact of the self with
the object (the contact being only through the cognitive operation);
the cognition is also not to be regarded as unperceived movement,
modification or transformation of the self which may be inferred
from the fact of the enlightenment of the object (jiiiitatii), as
Kumarila held, nor is the illumination of the object to be regarded
mere form of awareness without there being a corresponding as a
objective entity (vifayiibhivyaktir nii.ma vijiiiine tad-akiirollekha-
miitra1Jl na bahir-aizga-rilpasya vijiiiiniibhivyiiptil;z), as is held by the
Buddhist subjective idealists. The cognitive operation before its
contact with the object is a mere undifferentiated awareness, having
only an objective reference and devoid of all specifications of sense
characters, which later on assumes the sense characteristics in
accordance with the object with which it comes in contact. It
must be noted, however, that the cognitive operation is not an
abstract idea, but an active transformation of a real sattva stuff, the
mind (antal;zkara1Jll) 2 • Since in the continuous perception of the
same object we have only a rapid succession of cognitive acts, each
1 The theory is that there is an infinite number of the ajfiiina-veils; as soon
as there is the vrtti-object contact, the veil is removed and the object is illu-
minated; the next moment there is again an ajiziina-veil covering the object, and
again there is the vrtti-object contact, and again illumination of the object, and
thus there is very quick succession of veils and their removals, as the perception
of the object continues in time. On account of the rapidity of this succession
it is not possible to notice it (vrtti-vijfiiinasya siivayavatviic ca hriisa-da$iiyii1J1-
dlpa-jviiliiyii iva tamo 'ntara1J1- mohiintaram iivaritum vi~aya,_ pravartate tato
'pi kramamii1Ja1J1- k~a1Jiintare siimagry-anusiire7Ja vijfiiiniintara1J1- vi~ay ivara7Ja-
bhangenaiva sva-kiirya1J1- karoti, tathii sarvii1Jy api atisaighryiit tu jfiiina-bhedavad
iivara1Jiintara1J1- na la~yate. Vediinta-kaumudl, MS. copy, p. 46). This view of
the Vediinta-kaumudl is different from the view of the V ediinta-paribhii~ii, which
holds that in the case of continuous perception of the same object there are not
different successive awarenesses, but there is one unchanged continuous vrtti
and not different vrttis removing different ajiiiinas (kin ca siddhiinte dhiirii-
viihika-buddhi-sthale na jfiiinii-bhedab kintu yiiviid ghata-sphura7Jam tiivad
ghatiikiiriintal;kara7Ja-vrttir ekaiva na tu niinii vrtteb sva-virodhi-vrtty-utpatti-
parya1)tG'f!l sthiiyitviibhyupagamiit. Vediinta-parib~ii, pp. 26, 27, Bombay, 191 1).
2
atal; siivayava-sattviitmakam antal;kara7Jam eva anudbhuta-rilpa-sparsam
adrsyam aspr$ya1J1- ca vi~ayiikiire7Ja pari1Jamate. V ediinta-kaumudt, MS. copy, p. 42.
14-2
dispelling an intellectual darkness enfolding the object before its
illumination, there is no separate perception of time as an entity
standing apart from the objects ; perception of time is but
the perception of the succession of cognitive acts, and what is
regarded as the present time is that in which the successive time-
moments have been fused together into one concrete duration: it
is this concrete duration, which is in reality but a fusion of mo-
mentary cognitive acts and awarenesses, that is designated as the
present time 1 • According to Ramadvaya the definition of per-
ception would not therefore include the present time as a separate
element over and above the object as a separate datum of per-
ception; for his view denies time as an objective entity and regards
it only as a mode of cognitive process.
Ramadvaya's definition of right knowledge is also different
from that of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra. Ramadvaya defines right
knowledge (pramii) as experience which does not wrongly represent
its object (yathiirthiinubhavab pramii), and he defines the instru-
Inent of right knowledge as that which leads to it 2 • Verbally this
definitionisentirelydifferent from that of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra,
with whom the two conditions of pramii or right knowledge are
that it should not be acquaintance with what was already known
(anadhigata) and that it should be uncontradicted 3 • The latter
condition, however, seems to point only to a verbal difference from
Ramadvaya's definition; but it may really mean very much more
than a verbal difference. For, though want of contradiction
(Dharmaraja Adhvarindra's condition) and want of wrong repre-
sentation (Ramadvaya's condition) may mean the same thing, yet
in the former case the definition of truth becomes more subjective
than in the latter case; for want of wrong representation refers to
an objective correspondence and objective certainty. An awareness
may wrongly represent an object, but yet may not be found
contradicted in the personal history of one or even many observers.
Such a definition of truth becomes very relative, since its limits are
not fixed by correspondence with its object. Considering the fact
1
na kiilafz pratya~a-gocarafz ... stambhiidir eva priig-abhiiva-nivrtti-pradhva,_-
siinutpatti-rupo vartamiinal; tad-avacchinalz kiilo 'pi vartamiinafz sa ca tathii-
vidho 'neka-jiiiina-siidhiira~ eva, na caitiivatii jiiiina-yaugapadyiipattil; suksma-
kiiliipe~ayii kra.,a-sambhaviit, na ca sukjma-kiilopiidluniim apratltil} kiirya-
kramettaiva unnlyamiinatviit. Vediinta-kaumudi, MS. copy, pp. 2o-22.
2
Ibid. p. 16.
3
tatra smrti-vyiivrttam pramiitvam anadhigatiibiidhitiirtha-fl#aya-jiiiinatvam.
Vediinta-parib/zi4ii, p. 20.
XI] Ramiidvaya 213
that the Vedanta speaks of a real spatial superimposition of the

modification of the antal:zkarm:za (which is its cognitive operation) on
the object, a Vedanta definition of truth might well be expected to
be realistic and not subjectivistic or relativistic. The idealism of
the Vedanta rests content in the view that, however realistic these
cognitive relations to objects may be, they are impositions and
appearances which have as their ultimate ground one changeless
consciousness. The definition of pramii by Ramadvaya as an
awareness which does not give a wrong representation (yathiirthii-
nubhava) of objects could not be-found faulty because of the fact
that according to the Vedanta all dual experience of the world was
false; for, though it was ultimately so, for all practical purposes
it had a real existence, and Ramadvaya refers to the l~ta-siddhi to
justify his view on this point.
As to the other point, viz. that a pramii must always be that
which acquaints us with what is unknown before (anadhigata),
Ramadvaya definitely repudiates such a suggestion 1 • He says that
it often happens that we perceive things that we perceived before,
and this makes recognition possible, and, if we deny that these are
cases of right knowledge, we shall have to exclude much that is
universally acknowledged as right knowledge. Also it cannot be
conceived how in the case of the continuous perception of an
object there can be new qualities accruing to the object, so as to
justify the validity of the consciousness as right knowledge at every
moment; nor can it be said that the sense-organs after producing
the right knowledge of an object (which lasts for some time and
is not momentary) may cease to operate until a new awareness
is produced. There is therefore no justification for introducing
anadhigatat'l:a as a condition of perception. Turning to the difference
between perception and inference, Ramadvaya says that in inference
the inferred object does not form a datum and there is no direct
and immediate contact of the antal:zkarm:za with the inferred object
(e.g. fire). In inference the antal:zkara~a is in touch only with the
reason ortheli1iga(e.g.smoke), and through this there arises (li1igiidi-
bala-labdhiikiirollekha-miilre1Ja) an idea in the mind (e.g. regarding
the existence of fire) which is called inference 2 •
1
ajiiata-jiiiipana7Jl pramii~am iti tad asiiram. Vediinta-kaumuth, MS. copy,
p. 18.
2
Ibid. p. 47· One of the earliest explanations of the Vedantic view of
inference occurs in the Prakatiirtha-vivara~a, to which the Vediinta-kaumudi
is in all probability indebted.
On the subject of the self-validitY of knowledge (svatal;z-
priimiit)ya) Ramadvaya does not, like Dharmarajadhvarindra,
include the absence of defects (do~abhiiva) in the definition of
svatal;z-priimiit_lya. It may well be remembered that Dharmaraja
Adhvarindra defines validity {priimii'l}ya) of knowledge as an aware-
ness that characterizes an object as it is ( tadvati tat-prakiiraka-
jiiiinatvam), while self-validity (svatal;z-priimii'l}ya) is defined as the
acceptance by the underlyiug sak# consciousness of this validity in
accordance with the exact modes of the awareness (of which the
validity is affirmed), and in accordance with the exact objective con-
ditions of the awareness, in absence of any defects 1 • Ramadvaya,
however, closely follows Kumarila's view of the self-validity of
knowledge and defines it as that which, being produced by the
actual data of that cognition, does not contain any element which
is derived from other sources 2 • Later knowledge of the presence
of any defects or distorting elements may invalidate any cognition;
but, so long as such defects are not known, each cognition is
valid of itself for reasons similar to those held by Kumarila and
already discussed 3 • In this connection Ramadvaya points out that
our cognitions are entirely internal phenomena and are not in
touch with objects, and that, though the objects are revealed
outside, yet it is through our own internal conditions, merit and
demerit, that they may be perceived by us 4 •
Vidyaral)ya (A.o. 1350).

In addition to the Sarva-darsana-sa't{lgraha Madhava wrote two
works on the Sati.kara Vedanta system, viz. Vivarat_la-prameya-
sa't{lgraha and PaiicadaJz; and also Jzvan-mukti-vi·veka. Of these
the former is an independent study of Prakasatman's Paiica-piidika-
vivara1_2a, in which l\:Iadhava elaborates the latter's arguments in his
own way. His other work, Paiicadasl, is a popular compendium
in verse. Both these works attained great celebrity on account of
1
do~iibhiive sati yiivat-s•viisraya-griihaka-siimagri-griihyatvam; sviiirayo vrtti-
jniinam, tad-griihakaT!l siik#-jiiiinam teniipi vrtti-jiiiine grhyamii1}e tad-gata-
priimii1]yam api grhyate. Vediinta-paribhii~ii, pp. 336, 337·
2
vij1iiina-siimagri-janyatve sati yat tad-anya-janyatvaT!l tad-abhiivasyaiva
svatastvokty-angikiiriit. Vediinta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 52.
jiiaptiivapi jiiiina-jiiiipaka-siimagri-miitra-jfiiipyatva'!Z svatastvam. Ibid. p. 61.
3
A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 372-375.
4
priikafyena yuktasyiipi tasya na sarvair viditatvaT!l sva-prakiisam api
priikafyaT!l kasyacid eviidr~ta-yogiit sphurati na gu1}atve jfiiinasya kathancid
artha-yogafz samastiti. Vediinta-kaumudi, MS. copy, pp. 67, 68.
xr] Vidyiirar;ya 215
their clear and forcible style and diction. VidyaraQ.ya is reputed

to be the same as Madhava, brother of SayaQ.a, the great Vedic
commentator. He was a pupil of Sailkarananda, who had written
some works of minor importance on the Upani!?ads 1 •
VidyaraQ.ya in his Paficadmi repeats the Vivara'!Za view of the
Vedanta, that, whether in our awakened state or in our dreams or
in our dreamless condition, there is no moment when there is no
consciousness; for even in dreamless sleep there must be some
consciousness, as is evident from the later remembrance of the ex-
perience of the dreamless state. The light of consciousness is thus
itself ever present without any change or flickering of any kind.
It should therefore be regarded as ultimately real. It is self-
luminous and neither rises nor sets 2 • This self is pure bliss, because
nothing is so much loved by us as our own selves. If the nature
of self had been unobscured, we could not have found any enjoy-
ment in sense-objects. It is only because the self is largely obscured
to us that we do not rest content with self-realization and crave
for other pleasures from sense-objects. Miiyii is the cause of this
obscuration, and it is described as that power by which can be
produced the manifold world-appearance. This power (sakti),
cannot be regarded either as absolutely real or as unreal.
It is, however, associated only with a part of Brahman and
not with the whole of it, and it is only in association with a part
of Brahman that it transforms itself into the various elements and
their modifications. All objects of the world are thus but a complex
of Brahman and miiyii. The existence or being of all things is the
Brahman, and all that appears identified with being is the miiyii
part. Jlfiiyii as the power of Brahman regulates all relation and
order of the universe. In association with the intelligence of
Brahman this behaves as an intelligent power which is responsible
for the orderliness of all qualities of things, their inter-relations
and interactions 3 . He compares the world-appearance to a painting,
where the white canvas stands for the pure Brahman, the white
paste for the inner controller (antaryiimin), the dark colour for the
dispenser of the crude elements (sutriitman) and the coloration for
1
Bharatitirtha and his teacher Vidyatirtha also were teachers of VidyaraQ.ya.
VidyaraQ.ya thus seems to have had three teachers, Bharati Tirtha, Vidya Tirtha
and Sarikarananda.
2
nodeti niistamety ekii SG1Jl'Vid e~ii svayam-prabhii. PaiicadaSi, I. 7, Basumati
edition, Calcutta, 1907.
3
saktir asty aisvarl kiicit sarva-vastu-niyiimikii. 38. . .. cic-chiiyiivesata?z
saktis cetaneva vibhiiti sii. 40. Ibid. III.
the dispenser of the concrete elemental world (virat), and all the
figures that are manifested thereon are the living beings and other
objects of the world. It is Brahman that, being reflected through
the maya, assumes the diverse forms and characters. The false
appearance of individual selves is due to the false identification
of subjectivity-a product of maya-with the underlying pure
consciousness-Brahman. Vidyaral}.ya then goes on to describe
the usual topics of the Vedanta, which have already been dealt
with. The chief and important feature of Vidyaral}.ya's Paiicadasi
is the continual repetition of the well-established Vedantic prin-
ciples in a clear, popular and attractive way, which is very helpful
to those who wish to initiate their minds into the Vedantic ways
of self-realization 1 • His Vivaral}a-prameya-sarrzgraha is a more
scholarly work; but, as it is of the nature of an elaboration of the
ideas contained in Paiica-padika-vivara1Ja, which has generally been
followed as the main guide in the account of Vedanta given in this
and the preceding chapter, and there being but few ideas which
can be considered as an original contribution of Vidyaral}.ya to the
development of Vedantic thought, no separate account of its con-
tents need be given here 2 • The Jt'van-mukti-viveka, the substance
of which has already been utilized in section 17 of chapter x,
volume 1 of the present work, is an ethical treatise, covering more
or less the same ground as the Nai~karmya-siddhi of Suresvara.
Nrsirphasrama Muni (A.n-: xsoo).

Nrsirp.hasrama Muni (A.D. 1500) was a pupil of Girval}.endra
Sarasvati and Jagannathasrama and teacher of Narayal}.asrama, who
wrote a commentary on his Bheda-dhikkara. He wrote many works,
suchasAdvaita-dtpika,Advaita-paiica-ratna,Advaita-bodha-dtpika,
Ad-vaita-vada, Bheda-dhikkara, Vacarambha!la, Vedanta-tattva-
viveka, and commentaries on the Sarrzk~epa-sariraka and Paiica-
1
There are four commentaries on the Paiicadas'i:-Tattva-bodhini, Vrtti-
prabhiikara by Niscaladasa Svamin, Tiitparya-bodhinl by Ramakp:;:r:ta and
another commentary by Sadananda. It is traditionally believed that the Paiica-
da.~i was written jointly by Vidyara:r:tya and Bharati Tirtha. Niscaladasa Svamin
points out in his Vrtti-prabhiikara that Vidyara:r:tya was author of the first ten
chapters of the Paiicadasi and Bharati Tirtha of the other five. Ramakr!?:r:ta,
however, in the beginning of his comme:1tary on the seventh chapter, attributes
that chapter to Bharati Tirtha, and this fits in with the other tradition that the first
six chapters were written by Vidyara:r:tya and the other nine by Bharatitirtha.
2
He also wrote another work on the Vivara~a, called Vivarm;zopanyiisa, which
is referred to by Appaya Dik~ita in his Siddhiinta-leia, p. 68- Vivaratzopanyase
Bhtiratftirtha-vacanam.
XI] Nrsirrzhaframa Muni 217
piidikii-vivara1Ja, called Tattva-bodhini and Paiica-piidikii-vivara1Ja-

prakiisikii. Nrsirphasrama was very well reputed among his con-
temporaries, but it does not seem that he introduced any new ideas
into the Vedanta. He is more interested in emphasizing the fact
of the identity of Brahman with the self and the illusory character
of the world-appearance than in investigating the nature and con-
stitution of miiyii and the way in which it can be regarded as the
material stuff of world-appearance. He defines the falsehood of
world-appearance as its non-existence in the locus in which it
appears (pratipannopiidhiiv abhiiva-prati'yogi'tva ) 1 • When a piece of
conch-shell appears to be silver, the silver appears to be existent
and real (sat), but silver cannot be the same as being or existence
(na tiivad rajata-svaruparrz sat). So also, when we take the world-
appearance as existent, the world-appearance cannot be identical
with being or existence; its apparent identification with these is thus
necessarily false 2 • So also the appearance of subjectivity or egoistic
characters in the self-luminous self is false, because the two are
entirely different and cannot be identified. Nrsirphasrama, however,
cannot show by logical arguments or by a reference to experience
that subjectivity or egoism (aharrzkiira, which he also calls antal;-
kara1_2a or mind) is different from self, and he relies on the texts of
the Upani!?ads to prove this point, which is of fundamental im-
portance for the Vedanta thesis. In explaining the nature of the
perceptual process he gives us the same sort of account as is given
by his pupil Dharmaraja Adhvarindra in his Vediinta-paribhii~ii, as
described in the tenth chapter in the first volume of this work 3 •
He considers the self to be bliss itself (sukha-rupa) and does not
admit that there is any difference between the self and bliss (sa
ciitmii sukhiin na bhi'dyate) 4 • His definition of ajiiiina is the same
as that of Citsukha, viz. that it is a beginningless constitutive cause,
which is removable by true knowledge 5 • There is thus practically
1 Vediinta-tattva-viveka, p. 12. The Pandit, vol. xxv,May 1903. This work has
two important commentaries, viz. Tattva-viveka-dipana, and one called Tattva-
viveka-dlpana-vyiikhyii by Bhattoji.
2
Vediinta-tattva-viveka, p. 15.
3
:yadii antafzkarm;a-vrttyii ghatiivacchinna1Jl caitanyam upadhzyate tadii
antafzkarm;ii•vacchinna-ghatiivacchinna-caitanyayor vastuta ekatve 'py upiidhi-
bhediid bhinnayor abhedopiidhi-sambandhena aikyiid bhavaty abheda ity antalzkara-
1Jiivacchinna-caitanyasya vi~ayiibhinna-tad-adhi~thiina-caitanyasyiibheda-siddhy
artham vrtter nirgamana'f!l viicyam. Ibid. p. 22.
' Ibid. p. 29.
5 aniidy upiidiinatve sati jiiiina-nivartyam ajiiiinam, nikhila-prapaiicopadana-
brahma-gocaram eva ajiiiinam. Ibid. p. 43.

218 The Sankara School of Vediinta [cH.
no new line of argument in his presentation of the Vedanta. On
the side of dialectical arguments, in his attempts to refute" differ-·
ence" (bheda) in his Bheda-dhikkara he was anticipated by his great
predecessors Srihar~a and Citsukha.
Appaya Dikl?ita1 (A.D. 1550).

Appaya Dik~ita lived probably in the middle of the sixteenth
century, as he refers to N rsiip.hasrama lVIuni, who lived early in
that century. He was a great scholar, well-read in many branches
of Sanskrit learning, and wrote a large number of works on
many subjects. His grandfather was Acarya Dik~ita, who is said
to have been famous for his scholarship from the Himalayas to
the south point of India: the name of his father was Rangaraja
l\[akhindra (or simply Raja lVIakhindra). There is, however,
nothing very noteworthy in his Vedantic doctrines. For, in spite
of his scholarship, he was only a good compiler and not an original
thinker, and on many occasions where he had opportunities of
giving original views he contents himself with the views of others.
It is sometimes said that he had two different religious views at two
different periods of his life, Saiva and the Vedanta. But of this one
cannot be certain; for he was such an all-round scholar that the
fact that he wrote a Saiva commentary and a Vedantic commentary
need not lead to the supposition that he changed his faith. In the
beginning of his commentary Sivarka-mm:zi-dt.pil?a on Srika:t).tha's
Saiva commentary to the Brahma-sutra he says that, though the
right interpretation of the Brahma-siUra is the monistic interpre-
tation, as attempted by Sankara and others, yet the desire for
attaining this right wisdom of oneness (advaita-'vasana) arises only
through the grace of Siva, and it is for this reason that Vyasa in
his Brahma-sutra tried to establish the superiority of the qualified
Brahman Siva as interpreted by Srika:t).~hacarya. This sho\vs that
even while writing his commentary on Srika:t).tha's Sai'l:a-bhii~ya
he had not lost respect for the monistic interpretations of Sankara,
and he was somehow able to reconcile in his mind the Saiva
doctrine of qualified Brahman (sagU1:za-brahma) as Siva with the
Sankara doctrine of unqualified pure Brahman. It is possible,
1 He was also called Appayya Dik!?ita and Avadhani Yajva, and he studied
Logic (tarka) with Yajfiesvara Makhindra. See colophon to Appaya Dik~ita,s

commentary on the Nyiiya-siddhiinta-maiijarl of Janakinatha, called Nyiiya-
siddhiinta-maiijari-vyiikhyiina (MS.).
XI] Appaya Dzk#ta 2I9
however, that his sympathies with the monistic Vedanta, which
at the beginning were only lukewarm, deepened with age. He
says in his Siviirka-matzi-dtpika that he lived in the reign of King
Cinnabomma (whose land-grant inscriptions date from Sadasiva,
maharaja of Vijayanagara, A.D. I566 to I575; vide Hultzsch, S.l.
Inscriptions, vol. I), under whose orders he wrote the Siviirka-
ma~zi-dzpikii commentary on Srikal).tha's commentary. His grandson
Nilakal).tha Dik!?ita says in his Siva-liliirtza~·a that Appaya Dik!?ita
lived to the good old age of seventy-two. In the Oriental Historical
1Hanuscripts catalogued by Taylor, vol. 11, it is related that at
the request of the Pal).<;iya king Tirumalai N ayaka he came to the
Pal).<;iya country in A.D. I626 to settle certain disputes between the
Saivas and the Vai!?I).avas. Kalahasti-saral).a-Sivananda Yogindra,
in his commentary on the Atmiirpa1Ja-stava, gives the date of
Appaya Dik!?ita's birth as Kali age 4654, or A.D. I 554, as pointed
out by lVIahamahopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastri in his Sanskrit
introduction to the Siva-liliir7Java. Since he lived seventy-two
years, he must have died some time in I 626, the very year when
he came to the Pal).gya country. He had for his pupil Bhattoji
Dik!?ita, as is indicated by his own statement in the Tantra-
siddhiinta-dipikii by the latter author. Bhattoji Dik!?ita must there-
fore have been a junior contemporary of Appaya Dik!?ita, as
is also evidenced by his other statement in his Tattva-kaustubha
that he wrote this work at the request of King Keladi-Venkatendra,
who reigned from I604 to I626 (vide Hultzsch's second volume
of Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts)!.
It is said that Appaya Dik!?ita wrote about four hundred
works. Some of them may be mentioned here: Advaita-nir!laya,
Catur-mata-siira-sa't{lgraha (containing in the first chapter, called
Nyiiya-muktii~·ali, a brief summary of the doctrines of Madhva,
in the second chapter, called Naya-mayukha-miilika, the doctrines
of Ramanuja, in the third chapter the decisive conclusions from
the point of view of Srikal).tha's commentary called Naya-ma1Ji-
miilii and in the fourth chapter, called Naya-maiijari, decisive
conclusions in accordance with the views of Sankaracarya); Tattva-
muktiivali, a work on Vedanta; Vyiikara7Ja-viida-nak~atra-miilii,
a work on grammar; Purvottara-mimii't{lsii-viida-nak~atra-miilii
(containing various separate topics of discussion in Mimarp.sa and
1
See Mahamahopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastri's introduction to the Sh•a-
llliiT1)ava, Srirangam, I 9 I I •
Vedanta); Nyiiya-rak~ii-mat}i, a commentary on the Brahma-sfltra
following the monistic lines of Sankara; Vediinta-kalpa-taru-
parimala, a commentary on Amalananda's Vediinta-kalpa-taru,
a commentary on Vacaspati's Bhiimati commentary; Siddhiinta-
leJa-saiJlgraha, a collection of the views of different philosophers
of the monistic school of Sankara on some of the most important
points of the Vedanta, without any attempt at harmonizing them or
showing his own preference by reasoned arguments,and comprising
a number of commentaries by Acyutakr!?I}.ananda Tirtha ( KHt.Zii-
la'f!lkiira), Gangadharendra Sarasvati ( Siddhiinta-bindu-sikara),
Ramacandra Yajvan (Gurf,hiirtha-prakiisa), Visvanatha Tirtha,
Dharmaya Dik!?ita and others; Siviirka-mat_li-dlpikii, a com-
mentary on Srika:t}.tha's Saiva-bhii~ya on the Brahma-siltra; Siva-
kart}iimrta; Siva-tattva-viveka; Siva-puriit_la-tiimasatva-khat_lrf,ana;
Siviidvaita-nirt}aya; Siviinanda-lahari-candrikii, a commentary on
Sankara's Siviinanda-lahari; Siviircana-candrikii; Sivotkar~a-can
drikii; Sivotkar~a-maiijari; Saiva-kalpa-druma; Siddhiinta-ratnii-
kara; Madhva-mukha-bhanga, an attempt to show that Madhva's
interpretation of the Brahma-sutra is not in accordance with the
meaning of the texts of the U pani!?ads ; Riimiinuja-mata-khat_lrf,ana;
Riimiiyat_la-tiitparya-nirt_laya; Riimiiyat_la-tiitparya-sarrzgraha; Rii-
miiyat_la-bhiirata-siira-sarrzgraha ; Riimliyat}a-siira ; Riimiiyat_la-siira-
satJlgraha; Riimiiyat_la-siira-stava; ll-1imii1J1siidhikarat_la-miilii Upa-
krama-pariikrama, a short Mimarpsa work; Dharma-mimiirrzsii-
paribhii~ii; Niima-sarrzgraha-miilikii; Vidhi-rasiiyana; Vidhi-rasii-
yanopajivani; Vrtti-vlirttika, a short work on the threefold mean-
ings of words; Kuvalayiinanda, a work on rhetoric on which no less
than ten commentaries have been written; Citra-mimii1J1Sii, a work on
rhetoric; Jayolliisa-nidhi, a commentary on the Bhiiga'l)ata-puriit_la;
Yiidaviibhyudaya-tikii, a commentary on Venkata's Yiida'l-'ii-
bhyudaya; a commentary on the Prabodha-candrodaya niitaka, etc.
Prakasananda (A.D. I550-I6oo).

It has been pointed out that the Vedanta doctrine of monism
as preached by Sankara could not shake off its apparent duality in
association with miiyii, which in the hands of the later followers
of Sankara gradually thickened into a positive stuff through the
evolution or transformation of which all the phenomena of world-
appearance could be explained. The Vedantists held that this miiyii,
XI) Prakiisiinanda 221
though it adhered to Brahman and spread its magical creations

thereon, \vas unspeakable, indescribable, indefinable, changeable
and unthinkable and was thus entirely different from the self-
revealing, unchangeable Brahman. The charge of dualism against
such a system of philosophy could be dodged by the teachers of
Vedanta only by holding that, since Brahman was the ultimate reality,
maya ,,·as unreal and illusory, and hence the charge of duality
would be false. But when one considers that maya is regarded as
positive and as the stuff of the transformations of world-appearance,
it is hardly intelligible how it can be kept out of consideration
as having no kind of existence at all. The positive character of
maya as being the stuff of all world-appearance has to be given
up, if the strictly monistic doctrine is to be consistently kept.
Almost all the followers of Sankara had, however, been inter-
preting their master's views in such a way that the positive exist-
ence of an objective world with its infinite varieties as the ground
of perceptual presentation was never denied. The whole course of
the development of Vedanta doctrine in the hands of these Vedanta
teachers began to crystallize compactly in the view that, since the
variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained
by the pure changeless Brahman, an indefinable stuff, the maya,
has necessarily to be admitted as the ground of this world.
Prakasananda was probably the first who tried to explain Vedanta
from a purely sensationalistic view-point of idealism and denied
the objective existence of any stuff. The existence of objects is
nothing more than their perception (dntz). The central doctrine of
Prakasananda has already been briefly described in chapter x,
section 15, of volume I of the present work, and his analysis of the
nature of perceptual cognition has already been referred to in a
preceding section of the present chapter.
Speaking on the subject of the causality of Brahman, he says
that the attribution of causality to Brahman cannot be regarded
as strictly correct; for ordinarily causality implies the dual relation
of cause and effect; since there is nothing else but Brahman, it
cannot, under the circumstances, be called a cause. Nescience
(avidya), again, cannot be called a cause of the world; for causality
is based upon the false notion of duality, which is itself the out-
come of nescience. The theory of cause and effect thus lies outside
the scope of the Vedanta (karya-kiira'l}a-vadasya vediinta-bahir-
bhutatvat). When in reply to the question, "what is the cause of
the world?" it is said that nescience (ajfiana-literally, want of
knowledge) is the cause, the respondent simply wants to obviate the
awkward silence. The nature of this nescience cannot, however,
be proved by any of the pramil1JaS; for it is like darkness and the
pramil1Jas or the valid ways of cognition are like light, and it is
impossible to perceive darkness by light. Nescience is that which
cannot be known except through something else, by its relation
to something else, and it is inexplicable in itself, yet beginningless
and positive. It will be futile for any one to try to understand it
as it is in itself. Nescience is proved by one's own consciousness:
so it is useless to ask how nescience is proved. Yet it is destroyed
when the identity of the self with the immediately presented
Brahman is realized. The destruction of nescience cannot mean
its cessation together with its products, as Prakasatman holds in
the Vivara1Ja; for such a definition would not apply, whether
taken simply or jointly. Prakasananda, therefore, defines it as the
conviction, following the realization of the underlying ground, that
the appearance which was illusorily imposed on it did not exist.
This view is different from the anyatha-khyati view, that the sur-
mised appearance was elsewhere and not on the ground on which
it was imposed; for here, when the underlying ground is imme-
diately intuited, the false appearance absolutely vanishes, and it
is felt that it was not there, it is not anywhere, and it will not be
anywhere; and it is this conviction that is technically called badha.
The indefinability of nescience is its negation on the ground on
which it appears (pratipannopadhau ni~edha-pratiyogitvam). This
negation of all else excepting Brahman has thus two forms; in one
form it is negation and in another form this negation, being in-
cluded within " all else except Brahman," is itself an illusory
imposition, and this latter form thus is itself contradicted and
negated by its former form. Thus it would be wrong to argue that,
since this negation remains after the realization of Brahman, it
would not itself be negated, and hence it would be a dual principle
existing side by side with Brahman 1 •
True knowledge is opposed to false knowledge in such a way
1 Brahmm:zy adhyasyamiina'I'Jl sarva'I'Jl kiilatraye niistftiniicayasya asti riipadva-
yam ekam biidhiitmakam aparam adhyasyamiinatva'I'Jl; tatra adhyasJ amiinatvena

riipe?Ja sva-v#ayatvam; biidhatvena vi~ayitvam iti niitmiiiraya ity arthab tathii ca
niidvaita-kfatiQ.. Compare also Bhiimati on Adhyiisa-bhii~a. Nana Dik~ita seems
to have borrowed his whole argument from the Bhiimati. See his commentary
on the Siddhiinta-muktiivalz. The Pandit, 1890, p. 108.
This idea, however, is not by any means a new contribution of Prakasananda.
Thus Citsukhawrites thesame thing in his Tattva-dipikii(alsocalled Pratyak-tatt-
XI] Prakiisiinanda 223
that, when the former dawns, the latter is dispelled altogether. An

objection is sometimes raised that, if this be so, then the person
who has realized Brahma knowledge will cease to have a bodily
existence; for bodily existence is based on illusion and all illusion
must vanish when true knowledge dawns. And, if this is so, there
will be no competent Vedanta teacher. To this Prakasananda
replies that, even though the Vedanta teacher may be himself an
illusory production, he may all the same lead any one to the true
path, just as the Vedas, which are themselves but illusory products,
may lead any one to the right path 1 •
On the subject of the nature of the self as pure bliss (iinanda)
he differs from Sarvajfiatma Muni 's view that what is meant by
the statement that the self is of the nature of pure bliss is that there
is entire absence of all sorrows or negation of bliss in the self.
Bliss, according to Sarvajfiatma Muni, thus means the absence
of the negation of bliss (an-iinanda-vyavrtti-miitram iinandatvam) 2 •
He differs also from the view of Prakasatman that iinanda, or bliss,
means the substance which appears as blissful, since it is the object
that we really desire. Prakasatman holds that it is the self on
which the character of blissfulness is imposed. The self is called
blissful, because it is the ground of the appearance of blissfulness.
What people consider of value and desire is not the blissfulness,
but that which is blissful. Prakasananda holds that this view is not
correct, since the self appears not only as blissful, but also as pain-
ful, and it would therefore be as right to call the self blissful as
to call it painful. Moreover, not the object of blissfulness, which
in itself is dissociated from blissfulness, is called blissful, but that
which is endowed with bliss is called blissful (viSi~tasyaiva iinanda-
padiirthatviit)3. If blissfulness is not a natural character of the self,
it cannot be called blissful because it happens to be the ground on
which blissfulness is illusorily imposed. So Prakasananda holds
that the self is naturally of a blissful character.
Prakasananda raises the question regarding the beholder of the
va-pradipikii), p. 39, as follows: "sarve~iim api bhiiviiniim iisrayatvena sammate
pratiyogitvam atyantiibhiivam ·prati mr~iitmatii," which is the same as prati-
pannopiidhau ni~edha-pmtiyogitvam. Compare also Vediinta-paribhiifii, pp. 219
and 220, mithyiitva1Jl ca sviisrayatveniibhimata-yiivanni~!hiityantiibhiiva-prati
yogitvam. In later times Madhusudana freely used this definition in his
Advaita-siddhi.
1 kalpito 'pyupade#ii syiid yathii-siistrarrz samiidiiet
na ciivinigamo do~o 'vidyiivattvena nin:zayiit.
The Pandit, 1890, p. 16o.
2
Sa1Jlk~epa-siirzmka, 1. 1. 174.
3
Siddhiinta-muktiivau. The Pandit, 1890, p. 215.
experienced duality and says that it is Brahman who has this
experience of duality; but, though Brahman alone exists, yet there
is no actual modification or transformation (pari'!liima) of Brahman
into all its experiences, since such a view would be open to the ob-
jections brought against the alternative assumptions of the whole
of Brahman or a part of it, and both of them would land us in
impossible consequences. The vivaria view holds that the effect
has no reality apart from the underlying ground or substance. So
vivarta really means oneness with the substance, and it virtually
denies all else that may appear to be growing out of this one sub-
stance. The false perception of world-appearance thus consists in
the appearance of all kinds of characters in Brahman, which is
absolutely characterless (nifprakarikayal; saprakarakatvena bhaval;).
Since the self and its cognition are identical and since there is
nothing else but this self, there is no meaning in saying that the
Vedanta admits the vivarta view of causation; for, strictly speaking,
there is no causation at all (vi~·artasya biila-vyutpatti-prayojana-
taya)1. If anything existed apart from self, then the Vedantic
monism would be disturbed. If one looks at maya in accordance
with the texts of the Vedas, miiyii will appear to be an absolutely
fictitious non-entity (tuccha), like the hare's horn; if an attempt is
made to interpret it logically, it is indefinable (anirvacaniya),
though common people would always think of it as being real
(viistavi)2 • Prakasananda thus preaches the extreme view of the
Vedanta, that there is no kind of objectivity that can be attributed
to the world, that miiyii is absolutely non-existent, that our ideas
have no objective substratum to which they correspond, that the
self is the one and only ultimate reality, and that there is no
causation or creation of the world. In this view he has often to
fight with Sarvajfiatma Muni, Prakasatman, and with others who
developed a more realistic conception of miiyii transformation; but
it was he who, developing probably on the lines of IVlaQ.<;iana, tried
for the first time to give a consistent presentation of the Vedanta
from the most thorough-going idealistic point of view. In the
colophon of his work he says that the essence of the Vedanta as
biiliin prati vivarto 'ya'!l brahmatzab saka[a1Jl jagat

avivarttitam iinandam iisthitiib krtinal;z sadii.
The Pandit, 1890, p. 326.
tucchiinirvacaniyii ca viistavl cety asau tridhii
jiieyii miiyii tribhir bodhaib irauta-yauktika-laukikail;z.
Ibid. p. 420.
XI] Madhusudana Sarasvafi 225
preached by him is unknown to his contemporaries and that it

was he who first thoroughly expounded this doctrine of philo-
sophy1. Prakasananda wrote many other works in addition to his
Siddhiinta-muktiivali, such as Tiirii-bhakti-taraizgi1Jl, Manoramii
tantra-riija-tlka, Mahii-lak!;ml-paddhati and Sn-vidyii-paddhati,
and this shows that, though a thoroughgoing Vedantist, he was
religiously attached to tantra forms of worship. Nana Dik!?ita
wrote a commentary on the Muktiivali, called Siddhanta-pradtpikii,
at a time when different countries of India had become pervaded
by the disciples and disciples of the disciples of Prakasananda 2 •
Madhusudana Sarasvati (A.D. 15oo)s.

Madhusiidana Sarasvati, who was a pupil of Visvesvara Saras-
vati and teacher of Puru!?ottama Sarasvati, in all probability
flourished in the first half of the sixteenth century. His chief
works are Vediinta-kalpa-latika, Advaita-siddhi, Advaita-maiijari,
Advaita- ratna- rak!Ja1Ja, Atma- bodha- fikii, Ananda- mandiikinl,
Krwa-kutuhalaniitaka,Prasthiina-bheda,Bhakti-siimiinya-nirupa1Ja,
Bhagavad- gztii- gurjhiirtha- dtpika, Bhagavad- bhakti- rasiiyana,
Bhiigavata- purii1Ja- prathama- Sloka- vyiikhyii, Veda- stuti- ttkii,.
Sii1J¢ilya-sfitra-ttka, Siistra-siddhiinta-leia- fikii, Sa1Jlk!Jepa-siirlraka-
sara-sa1Jlgraha, Siddhiinta- tattva-bindu, H ari-lllii-vyiikhyii. His
most important work, however, is his Advaita-siddhi, in which he
tries to refute the objections raised in Vyasatirtha's Nyiiyiimrta 4
vediinta-sara-sarvasvam ajiieyam adhuniitanaib
ase~et~a mayokta'!l tat pur~ottama-yatnatal;.. .
The Pandit, 1890, p. 4:z8.
yacch#ya-si$ya-sandoha-vyiiptii bharata-bhumayal;.
vande tam yatibhir va:ndya7!z Prakaslinandam "iroaram.
Ibid. p. 488.
3
Ramajiia PaQ<;leya in his edition of .Madhusudana's Vediinta-kalpa-latika
suggests that he was a Bengali by birth. His pupil Puruf?Ottama Sarasvati in his
commentary on the Siddhanta-bindu-f"ikii refers to Balabhadra Bhanacarya as a
favourite pupil of his, and PaQ<;leya argues that, since Bhattacarya is a Bengali
surname and since his favourite pupil was a Bengali, he also must have been
a Bengali. It is also pointed out that in a family genealogy (Kula-paiijika) of
Kotalipara of Faridpur, Bengal, Madhusudana's father is said to have been
Pramodapurandara Acarya, who had four sons-Srinatha Cu<;lamaQ.i, Yada-
vananda Nyayacarya, Kamalajanayana and Vagisa Gosvamin. Some of the
important details of Madhusudana's philosophical dialectics will be taken up
in the treatment of the philosophy of Madhva and his followers in the third
volume of the present work in connection with Madhusudana's discussions with
Vyasatirtha.
4
The Advaita-siddhi has three commentaries, Advaita-siddhy-upanyiisa,
Brhat-{ika, and Laghu-candrika, by Brahmananda Sarasvati.
Dll 15
against the monistic Vedanta of Sankara and his followers.
l\1aterials from this book have already been utilized in sections 6,
7, 8, 9 and 10 of the tenth chapter of the present work. More will
be utilized in the third volume in connection with the controversy
between Vyasatirtha and Madhusudana, which is the subject-
matter of Advaita-siddhi. l\ladhusudana's Siddhiinta-bindu does
not contain anything of importance, excepting that he gives a con-
nected account of the perceptual process, already dealt with in the
tenth chapter and also in the section'' Vedantic Cosmology" of the
present volume. His Advaita-ratna-rak~a1_la deals with such subjects
as the validity of the Upani~ads: the Upani~ads do not admit
duality; perception does not prove the reality of duality; the
duality involved in mutual negation is false; indeterminate know-
ledge does not admit duality; duality cannot be proved by any
valid means of proof, and so forth. There is practically nothing
new in the work, as it only repeats some of the important arguments
of the bigger work Advaita-siddhi and tries to refute the view of
dualists like the followers of Madhva, with whom l\1adhusudana
was in constant controversy. It is unnecessary, therefore, for our
present purposes to enter into any of the details of this work. It is,
however, interesting to note that, though he was such a confirmed
monist in his philosophy, he was a theist in his religion and
followed the path of bhakti, or devotion, as is evidenced by his
numerous works promulgating the bhakti creed. These works,
however, have nothing to do with the philosophy of the Vedanta,
with which we are concerned in the present chapter .l\1adhusudana's
Vediinta-kalpa-latikii was written earlier than his Advaita-siddhi
and his commentary on the .lVIahimna~z stotra 1 • Ramajfia Pal)<;ieya
points out in his introduction to the Vediinta-kalpa-latikii that
the Advaita-siddhi contains a reference to his Gitii-nibandhana;
the Gitii-nibandhana and the Srimad-bhiigavata-tzkii contain refer-
ences to his Bhakti-rasiiyana, and the Bhakti-rasiiyana refers to the
Vediinta-kalpa-latikii; and this shows that the Vediinta-kalpa-latikii
was written prior to all these works. The Advaita-ratna-ra~a1_la
refers to the Advaita-siddhi and may therefore be regarded as a much
later work. There is nothing particularly new in the Vediinta-kalpa-
latikii that deserves special mention as a contribution to Vedantic
thought. The special feature of the work consists in the frequent
1
He refers to the Vedtlnta-kalpa-latikii and Siddhiinta-bindu in his Advaita-
siddhi, p. 537 (NirQ.aya-Sagara edition). See also Mahimnal.z-stotra-tfkii, p. 5·
XI] ]}1adhusiidana Sarasvati 227
brief summaries of doctrines of other systems of Indian philosophy

and contrasts them with important Vedanta views. The first
problem discussed is the nature of emancipation (mo/qa) and the
ways of realizing it: Madhusiidana attempts to prove that it
is only the Vedantic concept of salvation that can appeal to men,
all other views being unsatisfactory and invalid. But it does not
seem that he does proper justice to other views. Thus, for example,
in refuting the Sarpkhya view of salvation he says that, since the
Sarpkhya thinks that what is existent cannot be destroyed, sorrow,
being an existent entity, cannot be destroyed, so there cannot be
any emancipation from sorrow. This is an evident misrepresenta-
tion of the Sarpkhya; for with the Sarpkhya the destruction of
sorrow in emancipation means that the buddhi, a product of prakrti
which is the source of all sorrow, ceases in emancipation to have
any contact with purzt~a, and hence, even though sorrow may not be
destroyed, there is no inconsistency in having emancipation from
sorrow. It is unnecessary for our present purposes, however, to
multiply examples of misrepresentation by lV[adhusiidana of the
views of other systems of thought in regard to the same problem.
In the course of the discussions he describes negation (abhiiva)
also as being made up of the stuff of nescience, which, like other
things, makes its appearance in connection with pure consciousness.
He next introduces a discussion of the nature of self-knowledge,
and then, since Brahma knowledge can be attained only through
the U pani!?adic propositions of identity, he passes over to the dis-
cussion of import of propositions and the doctrines of abhihitiin-
vaya-viida, anvitiibhidhiina-viida and the like. He then treats of the
destruction of nescience. He concludes the work with a discussion
of the substantial nature of the senses. Thus the mind-organ is said
to be made up of five elements, whereas other senses are regarded
as being constituted of one element only. iVlanas is said to pervade
the whole of the body and not to be atomic, as the N aiyayikas
hold. Finally, l\1adhusiidana returns again to the problem of
emancipation, and holds that it is the self freed from nescience
that should be regarded as the real nature of emancipation.
CHAPTER XII
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGA-V.ii.SI$THA
THE philosophical elements in the various Purai)aS will be taken
in a later volume. The Yoga-vasi~tha-Riimiiya1Ja may be included
among the purii1Jas, but it is devoid of the general characteristics
of the purii1Jiis and is throughout occupied with discussions of
Vedantic problems of a radically monistic type, resembling the
Vedantic doctrines as interpreted by Sankara. This extensive
philosophical poem, which contains twenty-three thousand seven
hundred and thirty-four verses (ignoring possible differences in
different manuscripts or editions) and is thus very much larger
than the Srlmad-bhagavad-gua, is a unique work. The philosophical
view with which it is concerned, and which it is never tired of
reiterating, is so much like the view of Sankara and of Vijfianavada
Buddhism, that its claim to treatment immediately after Sankara
seems to me to be particularly strong. l\1oreover, the various inter-
pretations of the Vediinta-sutra which will follow are so much
opposed to Sankara's views as to make it hard to find a suitable
place for a treatment like that of the Yoga-viisi~tha unless it is
taken up immediately after the chapter dealing with Sankara.
The work begins with a story. A certain Brahmin went to the
hermitage of the sage Agastya and asked him whether knowledge
or work was the direct cause of salvation (mok§a-siidhana). Agastya
replied that, as a bird flies with its two wings, so a man can attain
the highest (paramaf!l padaf!l) only through knowledge and work.
To illustrate this idea he narrates a story in which Karui).ya, the
son of Agnivesya, having returned from the teacher's house after
the completion of his studies, remained silent and did no work.
When he was asked for the reason of this attitude of his, he
said that he was perplexed over the question as to whether the
action of a man in accordance with scriptural injunction was or
was not more fitted for the attainment of his highest than follow-
ing a course of self-abnegation and desirelessness (tyiiga-miitra).
On hearing this question of Karul)ya Agnivesya told him that
he could answer his question only by narrating a story, after
hearing which he might decide as he chose. A heavenly damsel
(apsarii/:z), Suruci by name, sitting on one of the peaks of the
CH. xn] Introduction of the Theme 229
Himalayas, once saw a messenger of Indra flying through the sky.

She asked him where he was going. In reply he said that a certain
king, Ari!?tanemi by name, having given his kingdom to his son
and having become free from all passions, was performing a course
of asceticism (tapas), and that he had had to go to him on duty and
was returning from him. The damsel wanted to know in detail
what happened there between the messenger and the king. The
messenger replied that he was asked by lndra to take a well-
decorated chariot and bring the king in it to heaven, but while
doing so he was asked by the king to describe the advantages and
defects of heaven, on hearing which he would make up his mind
whether he would like to go there or not. In heaven, he was
answered, people enjoyed superior, medium and inferior pleasures
according as their merits were superior, medium or inferior: when
they had exhausted their merits by enjoyment, they were reborn
again on earth, and during their stay there they were subject to
mutual jealousy on account of the inequality of their enjoyments.
On hearing this the king had refused to go to heaven, and, when
this was reported to lndra, he was very much surprised and he
asked the messenger to carry the king to Valmiki's hermitage and
make Valmiki acquainted with the king's refusal to enjoy the fruits
of heaven and request him to give him proper instructions for the
attainment of right knowledge, leading to emancipation (mok~a).
When this was done, the king asked Valmiki how he might attain
mok~a, and Valmiki in reply wished to narrate the dialogue of
Vasi!?tha and Rama (VaJiftha-rama-smpvada) on the subject.
Valmiki said that, when he had finished the story of Rama-
the work properly known as Ramayatza-and taught it to Bhara-
dvaja, Bharadvaja recited it once to Brahma (the god), and he,
being pleased, wished to confer a boon on him. Bharadvaja in
reply said that he would like to receive such instructions as would
enable people to escape from sorrow. Brahma told him to apply
to Valmiki and went himself to him (Valmiki), accompanied by
Bharadvaja, and asked him not to cease working until he finished
describing the entire character of Rama, by listening to which
people will be saved from the dangers of the world. \Vhen Brahma
disappeared from the hermitage after giving this instruction,
Bharadvaja also asked Valmiki to describe how Rama and his wife,
brother and followers behaved in this sorrowful and dangerous
world and lived in sorrowless tranquillity.
230 The Philosophy of the Yoga-viisi~tha [cH.
In answer to the above question Valmiki replied that Rama,
after finishing his studies, went out on his travels to see the various
places of pilgrimage and hermitages. On his return, however, he
looked very sad every day and would not tell anyone the cause
of his sorrow. King Dasaratha, Rama's father, became very much
concerned about Rama's sadness and asked Vasieytha if he knew
what might be the cause of it. At this time the sage Visvamitra
also visited the city of Ayodhya to invite Rama to kill the demons.
Rama's dejected mental state at this time created much anxiety,
and Visvamitra asked him the cause of his dejection.
Rama said in reply that a new enquiry had come into his mind
and had made him averse from all enjoyments. There is no happi-
ness in this world, people are hom to die and they die to be hom
again. Everything is impermanent (asthira) in this world. All
existent things are unconnected (bhiivii/:z ...parasparam asanginab).
They are collected and associated together only by our mental
imagination (mana/:z-kalpanayii). The world of enjoyment is created
by the mind (manal:z), and this mind itself appears to be non-
existent. Everything is like a mirage.
Vasi!?tha then explained the nature of the world-appearance,
and it is this answer which forms the content of the book. When
Valmiki narrated this dialogue of Va8i!?tha and Rama, king Ariey-
tanemi found himself enlightened, and the damsel was also pleased
and dismissed the heavenly messenger. Karul)ya, on hearing all
this from his father Agnivesya, felt as if he realized the ultimate
truth and thought that, since he realized the philosophical truth,
and since work and passivity mean the same, it was his clear duty to
followthecustomarydutiesoflife. When Agastyafinished narrating
the story, the Brahmin Sutikeyl)a felt himself enlightened.
There is at least one point which may be considered as a very
clear indication of later date, much later than would be implied by
the claim that the work was written by the author of the Riimiiya'!la.
It contains a sloka which may be noted as almost identical with
a verse of Kalidasa's Kumiira-sa1Jlbhava 1 • It may, in my opinion,
be almost unhesitatingly assumed that the author borrowed it
from Kalidasa, and it is true, as is generally supposed, that Kalidasa
1 Yoga-viisi~!ha, III. 16. so:
atha tiim atimiitra-vihvalii'l[l
sakrpiikasabhavii sarasvatl
iaphari'Jl hrada-so~a-vihvaliir[z
prathamii vn#r iviinvakampata.
xn] The Yoga-vtisi~tha Literature 2)1
lived in the fifth century A.D. The author of the Yoga-viisi~tha,

whoever he may have been, flourished at least some time after
Kalidasa. It may also be assumed that the interval between
Kalidasa's time and that of the author of the Yoga-'Diisi~tha had
been long enough to establish Kalidasa's reputation as a poet.
There is another fact which deserves consideration in this con-
nection. In spite of the fact that the views of the Yoga-viisi~tha
and Sankara 's interpretation of Vedanta have important points of
agreement neither of them refers to the other. Again, the views
of the Yoga-'l'iis#tha so much resemble those of the idealistic school
of Buddhists, that the whole work seems to he a Brahmanic modifi-
cation of idealistic Buddhism. One other important instance can
be given of such a tendency to assimilate Buddhistic idealism
and modify it on Brahmanic lines, viz. the writings of GauQa-
pada and Sankara. I am therefore inclined to think that the author
of the Yoga-viisi#ha was probably a contemporary of GauQapada
or Sankara, about A.D. 8oo or a century anterior to them.
The work contains six books, or prakara7Jas, namely, V airiigya,
Alumuk~u-vyavahiira, Utpatti, Sthiti, Upasama and Nirvii7Ja. It is
known also by the names of Ar~a-Riimiiya7Ja,_1fiiina-viisi~tha, Jt!lahii-
Riimiiya7Ja, Viisi~tha-Riimiiya7Ja or Viisi~tha. Several commen-
taries have been written on it. Of these commentaries I am par-
ticularly indebted to the Tiitparya-prakiisa of Anandabodhendra.
The Yoga-viis#tha is throughout a philosophical work, in the
form of popular lectures, and the same idea is often repeated
again and again in various kinds of expressions and poetical
imagery. But the writer seems to have been endowed with ex-
traordinary poetical gifts. Almost every verse is full of the finest
poetical imagery; the choice of words is exceedingly pleasing to
the ear, and they often produce the effect of interesting us more
by their poetical value than by the extremely idealistic thought
which they are intended to convey.
The Yoga-viisi~tha had a number of commentaries, and it was
also summarized in verse by some writers whose works also had com-
mentaries written upon them. Thus Advayaral)ya, son of Narahari,
wrote a commentary on it, cal1ed Viisi~tlza-Riimiiya7Ja-candrikii.
Anandabodhendra Sarasvati, pupil of Gangadharendra Sarasvati
of the nineteenth century, wrote the Tiitparya-prakiisa. Gangadha-
rendra also is said to have written a commentary of the same
name. Ramadeva and Sadananda also wrote two commentaries on
2J2 The Philosophy of the Yoga-viisi~tha [cH.
the work, and in addition to these there is another commentary,
called Yoga-vlisi~tha-tiitparya-Sa1{tlfraha, and another commentary,
the Pada-candrikii, was written by Madhava Sarasvati. The names
of some of its summaries areBrhad-yoga-vasinha, Laghu-jiiiina-viisi-
~tha, Yoga-viisi~tha-slokii/.z and Yoga-vlis#tha-Sa1f1~epa by Gau<Ja
Abhinanda of the ninth century, Yoga-viisi~tha-siira or Jiiiina-siira,
Yoga-viisi~tha-siira-Sa'f!lgraha and Viis#tha-siira or Viis#tha-siira-
gutjhiirthii by Ramananda Tirtha, pupil of Advaitananda. The
Yoga-viis#tha-Sa'f!l~epa of Gau<Ja Abhinanda had a commentary
by Atmasukha, called Candrikii, and another called Sa1f1Siira-
tara~z, by Mumma<Jideva. The Yoga-viisinha-siira also had two
commentaries by Piirl)ananda and Mahidhara. Mr Sivaprasad
Bhattacarya in an article on the Yoga-vlis#tha- Riimiiya~a in the
Proceedings of the Madras Oriental Conference of 1924 says that the
Mok~opiiya-siira, which is another name for the Yoga-•ciis#tha-siira,
was written by an Abhinanda who is not to be confused with
Gau<Ja Abhinanda. But he misses the fact that Gau<Ja Abhinanda
had also written another summary of it, called Yoga-vasinha-
SarJl~epa. Incidentally this also refutes his view that the Yoga-
vlis#tha is to be placed between the tenth and the twelfth centuries.
For, if a summary of it was written by Gau<Ja Abhinanda of the
ninth century, the Yoga-'lJiis#tha must have been written at least
in the eighth century. The date of the Yoga-vlis#tha may thus be
regarded as being the seventh or the eighth century.
The Ultimate Entity.

The third book of the Yoga-vlis#tha deals with ongmation
(utpatti). All bondage (bandha) is due to the existence of the per-
ceptible universe (drsya), and it is the main thesis of this work that it
does not exist. At the time of each dissolution the entire universe of
appearance is destroyed, like dreams in deep sleep (s~uptz). What
is left is deep and static (stimita-gambhira), neither light nor dark-
ness, indescribable and unmanifested (aniikhyam anabhivyaktam),
but a somehow existent entity. This entity manifests itself as
another (svayam anya ivollasan); and through this dynamic aspect it
appears as the ever-active mind (manas)-like moving ripples from
the motionless ocean. But in reality whatever appears as the diver-
sified universe is altogether non-existent; for, if it was existent,
xn] The Ultimate Entity 233
it could not cease under any circumstances 1 • It does not exist at
all. The ultimate indefinite and indescribable entity, which is pure
extinction (nirvii!la-miitra), or pure intelligence (paro bodhai.J),
remains always in itself and does not really suffer any transforma-
tions or modifications. Out of the first movement of this entity
arises ego (svatii), which, in spite of its appearance, is in reality no-
thing but the ultimate entity. Gradually, by a series of movements
(spanda) like waves in the air, there springs forth the entire world-
appearance. The ultimate entity is a mere entity of pure conceiving
or imagining (sarrzkalpa-pur~a) 2 • The Muni held that what appears
before us is due to the imagination of manas, like dreamland or
fairyland (yathii sarrzkalpa-nagararrz yathii gandharva-pattanam).
There is nothing in essence except that ultimate entity, and
whatever else appears does not exist at all-it is all mere mental
creations, proceeding out of the substanceless, essenceless mental
creations of the ultimate entity. It is only by the realization
that this world-appearance has no possibility of existence that the
false notion of ourselves as knowers ceases, and, though the false
appearance may continue as such, there is emancipation (mok~a).
This manas, however, by whose mental creations everything
springs forth in appearance, has no proper form, it is merely a
name, mere nothingness 3 • It does not exist outside or subjec-
tively inside us; it is like the vacuity surrounding tis everywhere.
That anything has come out of it is merely like the production of
a mirage stream. All characteristics of forms and existence are like
momentary imaginations. Whatever appears and seems to have
existence is nothing but manas, though this manas itself is merely
a hypothetical starting-point, having no actual reality. For the
manas is not different from the dreams of appearance and cannot
be separated from them, just as one cannot separate liquidity from
water or movement from air. Manas is thus nothing but the
hypothetical entity from which all the dreams of appearance pro-
ceed, though these dreams and manas are merely the same and
1
Yoga-viisi~tha, III. 3·
sarve~ii7Jlbhuta-jiitiinii'f(l sa1Jlsiira-vyavahiiri1:ziim
prathamo 'sau pratispandas citta-deha!z svatodaya!z
asmiit pilrviit pratispandiid ananyaitat-svarflpi1;ti
iya1Jl pravisrtii sr~!i!z spanda-sr~!ir iviiniliit.
III. 3· 14, 15.
riimiisya manaso ri7pa'f!l na ki'f(lcid api drsyate
niima-miitriid rte vyomno yathii sflnya-jatjiikrteb.
III. 4· 38.
2 34 The Philosophy of the Yoga-viisi~tha [cH.
lt lS impossible to distinguish between them 1 • Avidyii, sarrzsrti,

dtta, manas, bandha, mala, tamas are thus but synonyms for the
same concept2 • It is the perceiver that appears as the perceived,
and it is but the perceptions that appear as the perceiver and
the perceived. The state of emancipation is the cessation of this
world-appearance. There is in reality no perceiver, perceived or
perceptions, no vacuity (sunya), no matter, no spirit or conscious-
ness, but pure cessation or pure negation, and this is what we mean
by Brahman 3 . Its nature is that of pure cessation (siinta),andit is this
that the Sarpkhyists call puru~a, the Vedantins call" Brahman,"
the idealistic Buddhists call "pure idea" (vijfiiina-miitra) and the
nihilists" pure essencelessness" (sunya) 4 • It is of the nature of pure
annihilation and cessation, pervading the inner and the outer
world 5 • It is described as that essencelessness (sunya) which does
not appear to be so, and in which lies the ground and being of the
essenceless world-appearance (yasmin sunyalfl jagat sthitam), and
which, in spite of all creations, is essenceless 6 • The illusory world-
appearance has to be considered as absolutely non-existent, like
the water of the mirage or the son of a barren woman. The ultimate
entity is thus neither existent nor non-existent and is both statical
and dynamical (spandiispandiitmaka)1; it is indescribable and un-
nameable (kimapy avyapadeiiitmii) and neither being nor non-
being nor being-non-being, neither statical being nor becoming
(na hhiivo bha·vanarrz na ca). The similarity of the philosophy of
the Yoga-viisz~tha to the idealistic philosophy of the Laitkiivatiira-
sutra is so definite and deep that the subject does not require any
elaborate discussion and the readers are referred to the philosophy
of the Lafzkii·vatiira in the first volume of the present work. On
Vedanta lines it is very similar to Prakasananda's interpretation
of the Vedanta in later times, called dr~ti-suti-viida, which can
probably be traced at least as far back as Gauqapada or Mar:H;lana.
Prakasatman refers to the Yoga-viisijtha as one of his main
authorities.
pur1Je Pilr1Jat!l prasarati sante siinta'f!l vyavasthitam
vyomany evodita'l!l 'l-yoma brahma1)i brahma ti.ithati
na drs·yam asti sad-rupa'f!l na dr~tii na ca darsana'f!l
na sunya'l!l na jatfa'f!l no cic chiintam evedam iitatam.
III. 4· 69, 70.
2 3 4
III. 4· 46. III. 5· 6-7. niisa-rupo viniisiitmii. m. 5· 16.
5 6 7
III. 7· 22. III. 9· 59· III. 9· 49·
xn] Origination 235
Origination.
The world as such never existed in the past, nor exists now,
nor will exist hereafter; so it has no production or destruction in
any real sense 1 • But yet there is the appearance, and its genesis
has somehow to be accounted for. The ultimate entity is, of course,
of the nature of pure cessation (santa), as described above. The
order of moments leading to the manifestation of the world-
appearance can be described in this way: At first there is some-
thing like a self-reflecting thought in the ultimate entity, producing
some indescribable objectivity which gives rise to an egohood.
Thus, on a further movement, which is akin to thought, is produced
a state which can be described as a self-thinking entity, which
is clear pure intelligence, in which everything may be reflected.
It is only this entity that can be called conscious intelligence
(cit). As the thought-activity becomes more and more concrete
(ghana-sa1{lvedana), other conditions of soul (jiva) arise out of it.
At this stage it forgets, as it were, its subject-objectless ultimate
state, and desires to flow out of itself as a pure essence of creative
movement (bhavana-matra-sara). The first objectivity is aka/a,
manifested as pure vacuity. At this moment arise the ego (aha1{lta)
and time (kala). This creation is, however, in no sense real. and is
nothing but the seeming appearances of the self-conscious move-
ment (sva-Sa1{lvedana-matrakam) of the ultimate being. All the
network of being is non-existent, and has only an appearance of
existing. Thought (sa1{lvit), which at this moment is like the aka/a
and the ego and which is the seed (bija) of all the conceivings
of thought (bhavana), formulates by its movement air 2 • Again,
bandhyii-putra-vyoma-bane yathii na stafz kadiicana
jagad-iidy akhila1Jl drsya1Jl tathii niisti kadiicana
na cotpanna1Jl na ca dhva'lJlSi yat kiliidau na vidyate
utpatti/:l krdrsl tasya nasa-sabdasya ka kathii. m. 11. 4, S·
mana[z sa'tflpadyate lola1Jl kalanii-kalanonmukham;
kalayantl manaT:z saktir iidau bhiivayati kfat)iit.
iikiisa-bhiivaniimacchiim iabda-bija-rasonmukhlm;
tatas lii1Jl ghanalii'tfl jiiia1Jl ghana-spanda -kramiin manafz.
IV. 44· 16, 17.
A comparison of numerous passages like these shows that each mental
creation is the result of a creative thought-movement called bhii'lJanii, and each
successive movement in the chain of a succession of developing creative move-
ments is said to be ghana, or concrete_ Ghana ha<> been paraphrased in the Tatparya-
prakiisa as accretion (upacaya). Bhiiviina is the same as spanda; as the result of
each thought-movement, there was thought-accretion (ghana), and corresponding
to each ghana there was a semi-statical creation, and foJlowing each ghana there
was a spanda (ghana-spanda-kramlit) _
The Philosophy of the Yoga-viisi~tha [cH.
following the iikiisa moment and from it as a more concrete state
(ghanzbhuya), comes forth the sound-potential (kha-tan-miitra). This
sound-potential is the root of the production of all the Vedas, with
their words, sentences and valid means of proof. Gradually the
conceivings of the other tan-miitras of sparsa, tejas, rasa and gandha
follow, and from them the entire objective world, which has no
other reality than the fact that they are conceptions of the
self-conscious thought 1 • The stages then are, that in the state of
equilibrium (sama) of the ultimate indescribable entity called the
Brahman, which, though pure consciousness in essence, is in an un-
manifested state, there first arises an objectivity (cetyatva) through
its self-directed self-consciousness of the objectivity inherent
in it (satas cetylif!Zsa-cetaniit); next arises the soul, where there
is objective consciousness only through the touch or connection
of objectivity (cetya-sar!',yoga-cetaniit) instead of the self-directed
consciousness of objectivity inherent in itself. Then comes the
illusory notion of subjectivity, through \vhich the soul thinks that it
is only the conscious subject and as such is different from the object
(cetyailw-paratii-vaJiit). This moment naturally leads to the state of
the subjective ego, which conceives actively (buddhitviikalana1J1),
and it is this conceiving activity which leads to the objective con-
ceptions of the different tan-miitras and the world-appearance.
These are alJ, however, ideal creations, and as such have no reality
apart from their being as mere appearance. Since their nature is
purely conceptual (vikalpa), they cannot be real at any time. All
that appears as existent does so only as a result of the conceptual
activity of thought. Through its desire, "I shall see," there comes
the appearance of the two hollows of the eye, and similarly in the
case of touch, smell, hearing and taste. There is no single soul,
far less an infinite number of them. It is by the all-powerful
conceptual activity of Brahman that there arises the appearance of
so many centres of subjective thought, as the souls (jzvas). In
reality, however, the jzvas have no other existence than the con-
ceptualizing activity which produces their appearance. There is
no materiality or form: these are nothing but the self-flashings
of thought (citta-camatkiira).
Manas, according to this theory, is nothing but that function
of pure consciousness through which it posits out of itself an object
of itself. Here the pure conscious part may be called the spiritual
1 III. 12.
xn] Karma, Manas and the Categories 237
part and its objectivity aspect the material part 1 • In its objectivity
also the cit perceives nothing but itself, though it appears to per-
ceive something other than itself (svam evanyatayli drstva), and
this objectivity takes its first start with the rise of egohood
(ahaf!llli).
But to the most important question, namely, how the original
equilibrium is disturbed and how the present development of the
conceptual creation has come about, the answer given in the
Yoga-vlis~tha is that it is by pure accident (klikataliya-yogena)
that such a course of events took place. It is indeed disappointing
that such a wonderful creation of world-appearance should have
ultimately to depend on accident for its origin 2 • It is considered
irrelevant to enquire into the possibility of some other cause of
the ultimate cause, the Brahman 3 •
Karma, Manas and the Categories.

Karma in this view is nothing but the activity of the manas.
The active states of manas are again determined by their preceding
moments and may in their turn be considered as determining the
succeeding moments. \Vhen any particular state determines any
succeeding state, it may be considered as an agent, or kartli; but,
as this state is determined by the activity of the previous state,
otherwise called the karma, it may be said that the karma generates
the karta, the kartii by its activity again produces karma, so that
karma and karla are mutually determinative. As in the case of
the seed coming from the tree and the tree coming from the
seed, the cycle proceeds on from kartli to karma and from karma
to karla, and no ultimate priority can be affirmed of any one of
them 4 • But, if this is so, then the responsibility of karma ceases;
the root desire (vasanli) through which a man is born also makes
him suffer or enjoy in accordance with it; but, if karla and karma
spring forth together, then a particular birth ought not to be de-
termined by the karma of previous birth, and this would mean
cito yac cetya-kalana1'J1 tan-manasttJam udiihrtam
cid-bhiigo 'triijarjo bhiigo jiitf,yam atra hi cetyatii. III. 91. 37.
2
III. 96. 15, IV. 54· 7·
3
Brahmatzalz kara1Ja1'J1 lli'.n syiid iti vaktu1'J1 na yujyate
svabhiivo nirvise~atviit paro vaktu1Jl na }'llJ}'ate. IV. 18. 22.
yathii karma ca kartii Ctl paryiiye7Jeha sa1Jtgatau
karma7Jii kriyate kartii kartrii karma pra7Jlyate
bfjiinkuriidivan-nyiiyo loka-vedokta eva salz. m. 95· 19, 20.
The Philosophy of the Yoga-vds#tha [cH.
that man's enjoyment and sorrow did not depend on his karma.
In answer to such a question, raised by Rarnacandra, Vasi~tha says
that karma is due not to iitman, but to manas. It is the mental
movement which constitutes karma. When first the category of
manas rises into being from Brahman, lwrma also begins from that
moment, and, as a result thereof, the soul and the body associated
with it are supposed to be manifested. Karma and manas are in one
sense the same. In this world the movement generated by action
(kri'yii-spanda) is called karma, and, as it is by the movement of
manas that all effects take place, and the bodies with all their
associated sufferings or enjoyments are produced, so even the
body, which is associated with physical, external karma, is in reality
nothing but the manas and its activity. Manas is essentially of the
nature of karma, or activity, and the cessation of activity means the
destruction of manas ( karma-niiSe mano-niiSalz )1. As heat cannot
be separated from fire or blackness from collyrium, so movement
and activity cannot be separated from manas. If one ceases, the
other also necessarily ceases. ~fanas means that activity which
subsists between being and non-being and induces being
through non-being: it is essentially dynamic in its nature and
passes by the name of manas. It is by the activity of manas that
the subject-objectless pure consciousness assumes the form of a
self-conscious ego. A1anas thus consists of this constantly positing
activity (ekiinta-kalanalz). The seed of karma is to be sought in the
activity of manas (karma-bijarrz manalz-spanda), and the actions
(kriyii) which follow are indeed very diverse. It is the synthetic
function (tad-anusandhatte) of manas that is called the functioning
of the conative senses, hy which all actions are performed, and
it is for this reason that karma is nothing but manas. Manas,
buddhi, aha'flkiira, citta, karma, kalpanii, sarrzsrti, viisanii, vidyii,
prayatna, smrti, indriya, prakrti, miiyii and kriyii are different
only in name, and they create confusion by these varied names;
in reality, however, they signify the same cone !pt, namely, the
active functioning of manas or citta. These different names are
current only because they lay stress on the different aspects of
the same active functioning. They do not mean different entities,
but only different moments, stages or aspects. Thus the first
moment of self-conscious activity leading in different directions
is called manas. When, after such oscillating movement, there is
1
III. 95·
xn] Karma, Manas and the Categories 239
the position of either of the alternatives, as" the thus," it is ca11ed
buddhi. When by the false notions of associations of body and
soul there is the feeling of a concrete individual as" 1," it is called
aha'f!lkiira. When there is reflective thought associated with the
memory of the past and the anticipations of the future, it is called
citta. When the activity is taken in its actual form as motion or
action towards any point, it is called karma. When, leaving its
self-contained state, it desires anything, we have kalpanii. When
the citta turns itself to anything previously seen or unseen, as being
previously experienced, we have what is called memory (smrtz).
When certain impressions are produced in a very subtle, subdued
form, dominating all other inclinations, as if certain attractions or
repulsions to certain things were really experienced, we have the
root inclinations (viisanii). In the realization that there is such a
thing as self-knowledge, and that there is also such a thing as the
false and illusory world-appearance, we have what is called right
knowledge (vidyii). When the true knowledge is forgotten and the
impressions of the false world-appearance gain ground, we have
what are called the impure states (mala). The functions of the five
kinds of cognition pledse us and are called the senses (indriya). As
all world-appearance has its origin and ground in the highest self,
it is called the origin (prakrti). As the true state can neither be
called existent nor non-existent, and as it gives rise to all kinds of
appearance, it is called illusion (miiyii) 1 • Thus it is the same ap-
pearance which goes by the various names of jiva, nzanas, citta
and buddhi2 •
One of the peculiarities of this work is that it is not a philo-
sophical treatise of the ordinary type, but its main purpose lies in
the attempt to create a firm conviction on the part of its readers, by
repeating the same idea in various ways by means of stories and
elaborate descriptions often abounding in the richest poetical
imagery of undeniably high aesthetic value, hardly inferior to that
of the greatest Sanskrit poet, Kalidasa.
1 III. 96. 17-31.
2
Jlva ity ucyate loke mana ity api kathyate
cittam ity ucyate saiva buddhir ity ucyate tathti.
III. 96. 34·
The Philosophy of the Y oga-viisi~tha [CH.
The World-Appearance.
The Yoga-'lJiis#tha is never tired of repeating that this world is
like a hare's horn, a forest in the sky, or a lotus in the sky. The state
of Brahman is higher than the state of manas. It is by becoming
manas that Brahman transforms itself into thought-activity and
thus produces the seeming changeful appearances. But Brahman in
itself cannot have anything else (brahma-tattve 'nyatii niistz). But,
though there is this change into manas, and through it the production
of the world-appearance, yet such a change is not real, but illusory;
for during all the time when this change makes its appearance
and seems to stay, Brahman remains shut up within itself, change-
less and unchangeable. All objective appearance is thus nothing
but identically the same as the Brahman, and all that appears
has simply no existence. The seer never transforms himself into
objectivity, but remains simply identical with himself in all ap-
pearances of objectivity. But the question arises, how, if the world-
appearance is nothing but the illusory creative conception of manas,
can the order of the world-appearance be explained? The natural
answer to such a question in this system is that the seeming
correspondence and agreement depend upon the similarity of the
imaginary products in certain spheres, and also upon accident. It
is by accident that certain dream series correspond with certain
other dream series 1 • But in reality they are all empty dream con-
structions of one manas. It is by the dream desires that physical
objects gradually come to be considered as persistent objects
existing outside of us. But, though during the continuance of the
dreams they appear to be real, they are all the while nothing but
mere dream conceptions. The self-alienation by which the pure
consciousness constructs the dream conception is such that, though
it always remains identical with itself, yet it seems to posit itself as
its other, and as diversified by space, time, action and substance
( de$a-kiila-kriyii-dravyai!z).
The d;fference between the ordinary waking state and the
dream state consists in this, that the former is considered by us as
associated with permanent convictions (sthira-pratyaya), whereas
the latter is generally thought to have no permanent basis.
Any experience which persists, whether it be dream or not,
1 melanam api svakiya-parakfya-svapniinii1Jl daiviit kvacit sa1]'lviidavat sviintafz-
kalpaniitmakam eva. Yoga-viisi..~tha-tiitparya-prakiisa, IV. 18. 46.

XII] The JVorld-Appearance
comes to be regarded as permanent, whereas, if even our waking
conceptions come to be regarded as changeful, they lose their
validity as representing permanent objects, and our faith in them
becomes shaken. If the dream experiences persisted in time and
the waking experiences were momentary, then the waking state
would be considered as a dream and the dream experiences would
be considered as ordinary experiences in the dream state. It is
only with the coming of the waking state that there is a break of
the dream experiences, and it is then that the latter are contra-
dicted and therefore regarded as false. But so long as the dream
experiences lasted in the dream state, we did not consider them
to be false; for during that time those dream experiences appeared
somehow to be permanent and therefore real. There is thus no
difference between dream states and waking states except this,
that the latter are relatively persistent, continuous and per-
manent (sthira), while the former are changeful and impermanent
(asthira) 1 •
There is within us a principle of pure consciousness, which
is also the vital principle (jtva-dhiitu), vitality (vtrya), and body
heat (tejas). In the active condition, when the body is associated
with manas, action and speech, the vital principle moves through
the body, and on account of this all sorts of knowledge arise, and
the illusion of world-appearance inherent in it is manifested as
coming from outside through the various sense apertures. This
being of a steady and fixed character is called the waking state
(jiigrat). The su~upta, or deep sleep state, is that in which the body
is not disturbed by the movement of the manas, action or speech.
The vital principle remains still in itself, in a potential state without
any external manifestation, as the oil remains in the sesamum
(taila-Sa1Jlvid yathii tile) 2 • When the vital principle (jtva-dhiitu) is
very much disturbed, we have experiences of the dream state.
Whenever the manas strongly identifies itself with any of its
concepts, it appears to itself as that concept, just as an iron ball
in fire becomes itself like fire. It is the manas that is both the
perceiver (puru~a) and the perceived universe (visva-rilpatii) 3 •
jiigrat-svapna-dasii-bhedo na sthiriisthirate vinii

samal:z sadaiva sarvatra samasto 'nubhavo 'nayol:z
svapno 'pi svapna-samaye sthairyiijjiigrattvam rcchati
asthairyiit jagrad eviiste svapnas tadrsa-bodhatal;z.
IV. 19. II, 12.
2 3
IV. 19. 23. IV. 20. 4·
DU 16
The Philosophy of the Yoga-vasi~tha [cH.
The followers of the SaJ11khya consider manas to be pure con-
sciousness ; they have also explained their doctrines in other de-
tails, and they think that emancipation cannot be attained by any
way other than that which the SaJ11khya suggests. The followers of
the Vedanta also consider that emancipation is attained if one
understands that all this world is Brahman and if there is self-control
and cessation of desires together with this knowledge, and that this is
the only way of salvation. The Vijiianavadins (Idealistic Buddhists)
think that, provided there is complete self-control and cessation of
all sense desires, one may attain emancipation, if he understands
that the world-appearance is nothing but his own illusion. Thus
each systen1 of thought thinks too much of its own false methods
of salvation (svair eva niyama-bhramail;.), springing from the tradi-
tional wrong notions. But the truth underlying all these concep-
tions is that manas is the root of all creations. There is nothing
intrinsically pleasurable or painful, sweet or bitter, cold or hot,
and such appearances arise only through the habitual creations of
the mind. When one believes and thinks with strong faith in any
particular manner, he begins to perceive things in that particular
manner during that particular time 1 •
Nature of Agency (Kartrtva) and the Illusion of

World Creation.
Whenever we ascribe agency (kartrtva) to any person in respect
of deeds producing pleasure or pain, or deeds requiring strenuous
exercise of will-power, as those of the Yoga discipline, we do it
wrongly; for agency consists in the grasp of will and resolution, and
so it is·an internal determination of the mind, of the nature of domi-
nant and instinctive desires and inclinations (viisanabhidhanafz ) 2 •
The inner movement of feeling in the person towards the enjoyment
of experiences takes place in accordance with these fixed desires or
inclinations leading him to specific forms of enjoyment. All enjoy-
ment is thus a natural consequence of our nature and character as
active agents. Since all active agency (kartrtva} consists in the
najiienehu padiirthe~u rupam ekam udiryate
dr<Jha-bhiivanayii ceto yad yathii bhiivayaty alam
tat tat-phala'f!l tad-iikiira'f!l tiitJat-kiila'f!l prapaiyati.
na tad asti na yat satya'!l na tad asti na yan mnii.
IV. 21. 56, 57·
2
yohyantara-sthiiyiil;z manovrtter nislayal;z upiideyatii-pratyayo viisaniibhidhii-
natatkartrtva-sabdenocyate. IV. 38. 2.
xn] Nature of Agency and Illusion of World Creation 243
inner effort of will, the enjoyment following such an inner exercise
of will is nothing but the feeling modifications of the mind follow-
ing the lead of the active exercise of the will. All action or active
agency is thus associated with root inclinations (viisanii), and is
thus possible only for those who do not know the truth and have
their minds full of the root inclinations. But those who have no
viisanii cannot be said to have the nature of active agents or of
enjoying anything. Their minds are no doubt always active and
they are active all the time; but, as they have no viisanii, they are
not attached to fruit, and there is the movement without any
attachment. \Vhatever is done by manas is done, and what is not
done by it is not done; so it is the manas that is the active agent,
and not the body; the world has appeared from the mind (citta or
manas), is of the essence of manas, and is upheld in manas. Every-
thing is but a mental creation and has no other existence.
Ultimately, everything comes from Brahman ; for that is the
source of all powers, and therefore all powers (saktayaJ;,) are seen
in Brahman-existence, non-existence, unity, duality and multi-
plicity all proceed from Brahman. The citta, or mind, has evolved
out of pure consciousness (cit) or Brahman, as has already been
mentioned, and it is through the latter that all power of action
(karma), root desires (viisanii), and all mental modifications appear.
But, if everything has proceeded from Brahman, how is it that the
world-appearance happens to be so different from its source, the
Brahman? When anything comes out of any other thing, it is
naturally expected to be similar thereto in substance. If, therefore,
the world-appearance has sprung forth from Brahman, it ought to
be similar in nature thereto; but Brahman is sorrowless, while the
world-appearance is full of sorrow; how is this to be explained?
To such a question the answer is, that to a person who has a
perfect realization of the nature of the world-appearance, as being
a mere conceptual creation from the Brahman and having no
existence at all, there is no sorrow in this world-appearance nor
any such quality which is different from Brahman. Only in the
eyes of a person who has not the complete realization does this
difference between the world-appearance and Brahman seem to
be so great, and the mere notion of the identity of Brahman and
the universe, without its complete realization, may lead to all sorts
of mischief. On this account instruction in the identity of the
Brahman and the world-appearance should never be g1ven to
16-2
The Philosophy of the Yoga-viis#tha [cH.
anyone whose mind has not been properly purified by the essential
virtues of self-control and disinclination to worldly pleasures 1 • As
in magic (indrajiila), non-existent things are produced and existent
things are destroyed, a jug becomes a cloth, and a cloth becomes
a jug, and all sorts of wonderful sights are shown, though none of
these appearances have the slightest essence of their own ; so is
the entire world-appearance produced out of the imagination of
the mind. There is no active agent (kartr) and no one enjoyer
(bhoktr) of the pleasures and sorrows of the world, and there is
no destruction whatsoever 2 •
Though the ultimate state is the indescribable Brahman or cit,
yet it is from manas that all creation and destruction from cycle
to cycle take their start. At the beginning of each so-called
creation the creative movement of manas energy is roused. At
the very first the outflow of this manas energy in the direction
of a conceptual creation means an accumulation of energy in manas,
called ghana, which is a sort of statical aspect of the dy~amical
energy (spanda). At the next stage there is a combination of this
statical state of energy with the next outflow of energy, and the
result is the stabilized accretion of energy of the second order; this
is again followed by another outflow of energy, and that leads to
the formation of the stabilized energy of the third order, and so on.
The course of thought-creation is thus through the interaction of
the actualized energy of thought with the active forms of the energy
of thought, which join together, at each successive outflow from
the supreme fund of potential energy. Thus it is said that the first
creative movement of manas manifests itself as the iikiisa creation,
and that, as a result of this creative outflow of energy, there is an
accretion of energy in manas; at this moment there is another
outflow (spanda) or movement on the part of manas, as modified
by the accretion of energy of the previous state, and this outflow
of manas thus modified is the creation of air. The outflow of this
second order, again, modifies manas by its accretion, and there is
a third outflow of energy of the manas as modified by the previous
accretion, and so on. This process of the modification of energy
by the outflow of the manas modified at each stage by the accretion
of the outflow of energy at each of the preceding states is called
iidau Jama- dama-priiyair gu7;1ail;z Ji~a'!' vi.Jodhayet
paJciit sarvam ida'!' brahma suddhas tvam iti bodhayet.
IV. 39• 23.
niitra kascit kartii na bhoktii na viniiSam eti. IV. 39· 41.
xu] The Stage of the Saint 245
ghana-spanda-krama 1 • The creation of all the so-called tan-miitras
(subtle states) of akasa, viiyu, tejas, ap and k#ti takes place in this
order, and afterwards that of the aharrzkiira and buddhi, and thus
of the subtle body (pury-aftaka); thereafter the cosmic body of
Brahman is formed and developed in accordance with the root desire
(vasana) inherent in monas. Thus here we have first the akasa
tan-miitra, then the vayu tan-miitra from the akasa tan-matra plus
the outflow of energy, then, from the akasa tan-miitra plus the
vayu tan-miitra plus the outflow of energy of the third order, tejas
tan-miitra, and so on. Then, after the tan-miitra, the aharrzkiira and
the buddhi, we have the subtle body of eight constituents (five
tan-miitras, aharrzkiira, buddhi and the root manas), called the
pury-a~taka of Brahma. From this develops the body of Brahma,
and from the creative imagination of Brahma we have the grosser
materials and all the rest of the world-appearance. But all this is
pure mental creation, and hence unreal, and so also are all the
scriptures, gods and goddesses and all else that passes as real.
The Stage of the Saint (Jivan-mukta).

Emancipation (muktz) in this system can be attained in the
lifetime of a person or after his death ; in the former case it is
called sa-deha-muktata, or jtvan-muktata. The jivan-mukta state is
that in which the saint has ceased to have any desires (apagatai-
~atJaiJ), as if he were in a state of deep sleep (su~uptavat). He is
self-contained and thinks as if nothing existed. He has always an
inward eye, even though he may be perceiving all things with his
external eye and using his limbs in all directions. He does not
wait for the future, nor remain in the present, nor remember the
past. Though sleeping, he is awake and, though awake, he is asleep.
He may be doing all kinds of actions externally, though he remains
altogether unaffected by them internally. He internally renounces
all actions, and does not desire anything for himself. He is full of
bliss and happiness, and therefore appears to ordinary eyes to
be an ordinary happy man; but in reality, though he may be doing
all kinds of things, he has not the delusion of being himself an active
agent (tyakta-kartrtva-vibhramal;). He has no antipathy, grief,
emotions, or outbursts of pleasure. He is quite neutral to all who
1
IV. 44· IJ-JO.
do him ill or well; he shows sympathetic interest in each person
in his own way; he plays with a child, is serious with an old man,
an enjoyable companion to a young man, sympathetic with the
sorrows of a suffering man. He is wise and pleasant and loving to
all with whom he comes in contact. He is not interested in his
own virtuous deeds, enjoyments, sins, in bondage or emancipation.
He has a true philosophic knowledge of the essence and nature of
all phenomena, and, being firm in his convictions, he remains
neutral to all kinds of happenings, good, bad, or indifferent. But
from the descriptions it appears that this indifference on the part
of a saint does not make him an exclusive and unnatural man;
for, though unaffected in every way within himself, he can take
part in the enjoyment of others, he can play like a child and can
sympathize with the sorrows of sufferers 1 .
Jlvan-mukti, or emancipation while living, is considered by
Sankara also as a possible state, though he does not seem to have
used the term in his works. Thus, on the basis of Chandogya,
VI. 14. 2, he says that knowledge destroys only those actions
which have not already begun to yield their fruits; those actions
which have already begun to yield fruits cannot be destroyed by
true knowledge, and so it is not possible for anyone to escape
from their effects, good or bad; and it has to be admitted that
even after the dawning of true knowledge the body remains
until the effects of the actions which have already begun to yield
fruits are exhausted by enjoyment or suffering. In explaining such
a condition Sankara gives two analogies: (I) as a potter's wheel
goes on revolving when the vessel that it was forming is completed,
so the body, which was necessary till the attainment of true know-
ledge, may continue to exist for some time even after the rise of
knowledge; (2) as, when a man through some eye-disease sees
two moons instead of one, he continues to do so even when he is
convinced that there are not two moons but one, so, even when the
saint is firmly convinced of the unreality of the world-appearance, he
may still continue to have the illusion of world-appearance, though
internally he may remain unaffected by it 2 • Of the Upani~ads
only the later JI,Iuktika Upani~ad, which seems to have drawn
its inspiration from the Yoga-vus#tha, mentions the word jivan-
mukta, meaning those saints who live till their fruit-yielding
1 v. 77·
2
Sankara's Siiriraka-bhii~a or the Brahma-sutra, Iv. i. 15, 19.
XII] The Stage of the Saint 247
actions (priirahdha-karma) are exhausted 1 • But, though the word
is not mentioned, the idea seems to be pretty old.
The conception of sthita-prajila in the Srimad-bhaga'Dad-gitii
reminds us of the state of a jlvan-mukta saint. A sthita-prajiia (man
of steady wisdom) has no desires, but is contented in himself, has
no attachment, fear or anger, is not perturbed by sorrow nor longs
for pleasure, and is absolutely devoid of all likes and dislikes. Like
a tortoise within its shell, he draws himself away from the sense-
objects2. This conception of the Srimad-bhagavad-gltii is referred to
in the Yoga-'l·iisi~tha, which gives a summary of it in its own way 3 •
But it seems as if the conception of the saint in the Yoga-viisi~tha
has this advantage over the other, that here the saint, though
absolutely unaffected by all pleasures and sufferings, by virtue and
vice, is yet not absolutely cut off from us; for, though he has no
interest in his own good, he can show enjoyment in the enjoyment
of others and sympathy with the sufferings of others; he can be
as gay as a child when with children, and as serious as any philo-
sopher when with philosophers or old men. The Srimad-bhaga-
vad-gitii, though it does not deny such qualities to a saint, yet does
not mention them either, and seems to lay stress on the aspect
of the passivity and neutral character of the saint; whereas the
Yoga-viis#tha, as we have already said, lays equal stress on both
these special features of a saint. He is absolutely unattached to
anything, but is not cut off from society and can seemingly take
part in everything without losing his mental balance in any way.
The Gitii, of course, always recommends even the unattached
saint to join in all kinds of good actions; but what one misses
there is the taking of a full and proper interest in life along
with all others, though the saint is internally absolutely unaffected
by all that he may do.
The saint in the Yoga-viisi~tha not only pcrfonns his own
actions in an unattached manner, but to all appearance mixes with
the sorrows and joys of others.
The question whether a saint is above the tyranny of the
effects of his own deeds was also raised in Buddhist quarters.
Thus we find in the Kathii-vatthu that a discussion is raised as
to whether a saint can be killed before his proper time of death,
and it is said that no one can attain nirvii'!la without enjoying the
1
Muktika Upani~ad, 1. 42, also II. 33, 35, 76.
2
Srlmad-bhagm:ad-gltii., II. 55-58. 3
Yoga-vii.si~tha, VI. 52-58.
The Philosophy of the Yoga-viis#fha [cH.
fruits of accumulated intentional deeds 1 • A story is told in the
Dhamma-pada commentary (the date of which, according to E. W.
Burlingame, is about A.D. 450), how the great saint Moggallana
was torn in pieces by thieves, and his bones were pounded until
they were as small as grains of rice; such a miserable death of such
a great saint naturally raised doubts among his disciples, and these
were explained by Buddha, who said that this was due to the crime
of parricide, which lVIoggallana had committed in some previous
birth ; even though he had attained sainthood (arhattva) in that
life, he could not escape suffering the effect of his misdeeds, which
were on the point of bearing fruit 2 • This would naturally imply
the view that sainthood does not necessarily mean destruction of
the body, but that even after the attainment of sainthood the body
may continue to exist for the suffering of the effects of such actions
as are on the point of bearing fruit.
The different Indian systems are, however, not all agreed re-
garding the possibility· of the jzvan-mukta state. Thus, according
to the Nyaya, apavarga, or emancipation, occurs only when the
soul is absolutely dissociated from all the nine kinds of qualities
{will, antipathy, pleasure, pain, knowledge, effort, virtue, vice and
rooted instincts). Unless such a dissociation actually occurs, there
cannot be emancipation; and it is easy to see that this cannot
happen except after death, and so emancipation during the period
while the body remains is not possible 3 • The point is noticed by
Vatsyayana in a discussion on Nyiiya-siitra, IV. 2. 42-45, where
he raises the question of the possibility of knowledge of external
objects through the senses and denies it by declaring that in
emancipation (apavarga) the soul is dissociated from the body
and all the senses, and hence there is no possibility of knowledge;
and that with the extinction of all knowledge there is also ulti-
mate and absolute destruction of pain 4 • The Vaise~ika holds the
same view on the subject. Thus Srihar~a says that, when through
right knowledge (paramiirtha-darsana) all merit ceases, then the
1 Kathii-vatthu, XVII. 2.
2
Buddhist Legends by E. \V. Burlingame, vol. 11. p. 304. The same legend
is repeated in the introduction to Jiitaka 522.
3 tad evam na•viiniim iitma-gU7;ziinii'!l nirmfilocchedo 'pavarga!z
tad evedam ukta'!l bhavati tad-atyanta-viyogo 'pavarga(l.
Nyiiya-maiijarz, p. so8.
yasmiit sarva-du!zkha-b'ija'!l sarl'a-du!zkhiiyatana'!l ciipavarge
vichidyate tasmiit sarve7Ja du!zkhena vimukti!z
apavargo no nirb'ija'!z niriiyatanaf!Z ca du!zkham utpadyate.
Vatsyayana on Nyiiya-siitra, IV. 2. 43·
XII] The Stage of the Saint 249
soul, being devoid of the seeds of merit and demerit, which produce
the body and the senses, etc., and the present body having been
destroyed by the exhaustive enjoyment of the fruits of merit and
demerit, and there being no further production of any new body
by reason of the destruction of all the seeds of karma, there is
absolute cessation of the production of body, like the extinction
of fire by the burning up of all the fuel; and such an eternal non-
production of body is called mok!a (emancipation) 1 •
Prabhakara seems to hold a similar view. Thus Salikanatha, in
explaining the Prabhakara view in his Prakarm:za-paiicikii, says that
emancipation means the absolute and ultimate destruction of the
body, due to the total exhaustion of merit and demerit 2 • The
difficulty is raised that it is not possible to exhaust by enjoyment
or suffering the fruits of all the karmas accumulated since be-
ginningless time; he who, being averse to worldly sorrows and all
pleasures which are mixed with traces of sorrow, works for emanci-
pation, desists from committing the actions prohibited by Vedic
injunctions, which produce sins, exhausts by enjoyment and
suffering the good and bad fruits of previous actions, attains true
knowledge, and is equipped with the moral qualities of passionless
tranquillity, self-restraint and absolute sex-control, exhausts in the
end all the potencies of his karmas (nil;se~a-karmiiSaya) and attains
emancipation 3 • This view, however, no doubt has reference to a very
advanced state in this life, when no further karma is accumulating;
but it does not call this state mok!a during life; for mok~a,
according to this view, is absolute and ultimate non-production
of body.
The Siit'(lkhya-kiirikii, however, holds that, when true knowledge
is attained (samyagjiiiiniidhigama), and when in consequence none
of the karmas of undetermined fruition (aniyata-vipiika), accumu-
lated through beginningless time, are able to ripen for bearing
fruit, the body may still continue to remain simply by the inertia,
as it were, of the old avidyii; just as even after the potter has
ceased to operate the potter's wheel may continue to move as a
1
yathii dagdhendhanasyiinalasyopaiamal:z punar anutpiida eva7!Z punal:z iari-
riinutpiido mo'klal:z. Nyiiya-kandali, p. 283.
Prasastapiida also writes: tadii nirodhiit nirbijasyiitmanal:z saririidi-nivrttil:z
punal:z iaririidy-anutpattau dagdhendhaniinalavad upasamo mokfa iti. Praiastapiida-
bhiiJyb, p. 282.
2
iityantikas tu dehocchedo nil:ziefa-dharmiidharma-parikfaya-nibandhano mokfa
iti. Prakarm;za-paiicikii, p. 156.
3
Ibid. p. I57·
The Philosophy of the Y oga-viisi~tha [cH.
result of the momentum which it has acquired (cakra-bhramivad
dhrta-sartral; }1 .
The word jtvan-mukta is not used either in the Kiirikii or
in the Tattva-kaumudt or in the Tattva-vibhiikara. The Sii'f!lkhya-
siltra, however, uses the term and justifies it on the same grounds
as does Vacaspati 2 • The Sii'f!lkhya-siltra, more particularly the
Pravacana-bhii~ya, raises the threefold conception of manda-viveka
(feeble discrimination), madhya-'Di'l'eka (middle discrimination),
and viveka-nifpatti (finished discrimination) 3 • The stage of manda-
viveka is that in which the enquirer has not attained the desired
discrimination of the difference between prakrtz' and puru~a, but is
endeavouring to attain it; the madhya-viveka stage is the state of
the jtvan-mukta. But this is an asamp1·ajiiiita state, i.e. a state in
which there is still subject-object knowledge and a full conscious
discrimination. The last stage, 'l'iveka-n#patt£, is an asamprajiiiita
state in which there is no subject-object knowledge, and therefore
there cannot in this stage be any reflection of pleasure or sorrow
(due to the fructifying karma-priirabdha-karma} on the puru~a.
TheYoga also agrees with the general conclusion of the Sarp.khya
on the subject. A man who nears the state of emancipation ceases
to have doubts about the nature of the self, and begins to re-live
the nature of his own self and to discriminate himself as being
entirely different from his psychosis (sattva); but, as a result of
the persistence of some decayed roots of old impressions and
instincts, there may, in the intervals of the flow of true discrimi-
native knowledge, emerge other ordinary cognitive states, such
as "I am," "mine," "I know," "I do not know"; yet, in-
asmuch as the roots of the old impressions have already been
burnt, these occasional ordinary cognitive states cannot produce
further new impressions. The general impressions of cognition
(jiiiina-Sa'f!lskiira), however, remain until the final destruction
of citta. The point here is that, the roots in the world of sub-
conscious impressions being destroyed, and the occasional appear:-
ance of ordinary cognitive states being but remnants produced
by some of the old impressions, the roots of which have already
1
Sii1!:khya-kiirikii, 67, 68. The Tattva-kaumudi here essays to base its remarks
on Chiindogya, VI. 14. 2, as Sail.kara did in his bhii~ya on the Brahma-siltra. The
Tattva-vibhiikara of Varpsidhara 1\iisra, in commenting on Vacaspati's Tott"L·a-
kaumudl, quotes Mu7Jt/.al<a Upani!ad, 11. 2. 8, and also Snmad-bhagavad-gztii, IV.
37, for its .support. Compare Yoga-viisi!{ha: ghanii na viisanii yasya punar-
janana-varjitii.
2 3
Sii.,khya-siltra, III. 77-83. Ibid. III. 77, 78.
Intense ·virakti is that in which the person does not desire anything
in this life, whereas very intense virakti is that in which the person
ceases to have any desires for all future lives 1 • VidyaraQya takes
great pains to prove, by reference to various scriptural texts, that
there are these two distinct classes of renunciation (sannyiisin),
though one might develop into the other 2 • As regards the nature
of jzvan-mukti, VidyaraQya follows the view of the Yoga-viisi~tha,
though he supports it by other scriptural quotations. On the subject
of bodiless emancipation (videha-mukti) also he refers to passages
from the Yoga-viisi~tha. Jzvan-mukti is the direct result of the
cessation of all instinctive root desires (viisanii-~aya), the dawning
of right knowledge (tattva-jiiiina), and the destruction of manas
(mano-nii1a). Vidyaral).ya, however, holds that on account of steady
right knowledge even the seeming appearance of passions and
attachment cannot do any harm to a jzvan-mukta, just as the bite
of a snake whose fangs have been drawn cannot do him any harm.
Thus he gives the example of Yajfiavalkya, who killed Sakalya by
cursing and yet did not suffer on that account, because he was
already a jl·van-mukta, firm in his knowledge of the unreality of
the world. So his anger was not real anger, rooted in instinctive
passions, but a mere appearance (iibhiisa) of it 3 •
Energy of Free-will (Pauru~a).
One of the special features of the Yoga-viisi~tha is the special

emphasis that it lays upon free-will and its immense possi-
bilities, and its power of overruling the limitations and bondage of
past karmas. Pauru~a is defined in the Yoga-viis#!ha as mental and
physical exertions made in properly advised ways (siidhupad#ta-
1 If the ascetic has ordinary desires he is called ha'T[lSa; if he desires emancipa-
tion, he is called parama-ha'T[lSa. The course of their conduct is described in the

Pariisara-smrti, ]l•van-mukti-viveka, 1. 1 1. \Vhen a man renounces the world for
the attainment of right knowledge, it is called vivid#ii-sa1[lnyiisa (renunciation for
thirst of knowledge), as distinguished from ·vidt:at-sa1Jznyiisa (renunciation of the
wise) in the case of those who have already attained right knowledge. The latter
kind of sa1[lnyiisa is with reference to those who are jlvan-mukta.
2 It is pointed out by Vidyaral)ya that the ArutJikopani~ad describes the
conduct and character of vividi~ii.-sa1[lnyiisa, in which one is asked to have a staff,

one loin-cloth and to repeat the Aral)yakas and the Upani!?ads only, and the
Parama-ha1!f.Sopani~at describes the conduct and character of vidvat-sa1[lnyiisa, in
which no such repetition of the Upanil?ads is held necessary, since such a person
is fixed and steady in his Brahma knowledge. This makes the difference between
the final stages of the two kinds of renunciation (JlVan-mukti-viveka, 1. 2o-24).
3 Jl·van-mukti-viveka, pp. 183-186.
XII] The Stage of the Saint
been burnt, these occasional ordinary cognitive states are like
passing shadows which have no basis anywhere; they cannot,
therefore, produce any further impressions and thus cannot be
a cause of bondage to the saint. \Vith the advance of this state
the sage ceases to have inclinations even towards his processes of
concentration, and there is only discriminative knowledge; this
state of samiidhi is called dharma-megha. At this stage all the roots
of ignorance and other afflictions become absolutely destroyed,
and in such a state the sage, though living (jivann eva), becomes
emancipated (virnukta). The next stage is, of course, the state of
absolute emancipation (kaivalya), when the citta returns back to
prakrti, never to find the puru~a again 1 •
Among later writers Vidyaral).ya wrote on this subject a treatise
which he called Jivan-mukti-viveka 2 • It is divided into five chapters.
In the first he deals with the authorities who support ji'L•an-mukti;
in the second, with the nature of the destruction of instinctive root
inclinations (viisanii); in the third, with the destruction of manas
(mano-niisa); in the fourth, with the final object for which jivan-
mukti is sought; and in the fifth, with the nature and characteristics
of those saints who have attained jivan-mukti by wisdom and right
knowledge (vidvat-Sa1Jlnyiisa), and have virtually renounced the
world, though living. The work is more a textual compilation
from various sources than an acute philosophical work examining
the subject on its own merits. The writer seems to have derived
his main inspiration from the Yoga-viis#tha, though he refers
to relevant passages in several other works, such as Brhad-
iiral}yaka Upan#ad, 1l1aitreyi-briihma1}a, Kahola-briihmal}a, Siirira-
briihmal}a, Jabiila-briihmal}a, Katha-valll, Gitii, Blziiga'L·ata, Brhas-
pati-smrti, S1lta-sa1Jlhitii, Gaw;fa-piida-kiirika, Sankara-bh~ya,
Brahma-siltra, Paiica-piidiJ:ii, V#1}u-purl!1Ja, Taittirlya-brahma1Ja,
Yoga-sutra, 1Vai~karmya-siddhi, Kaz~Uaki, Paiicadasi, Antaryiimi-
briihma1}a, Jtyiisa-bhii~ya, Brahma-upan#ad, the works of Yama,
Parasara, Bodhayana, Medhatithi, Visvarupa Acarya, etc.
Disinclination, to passions and desires (viraktz) is, according
to him, of two kinds, intense (tivra) and very intense (tivratara).
1
Yoga-siltra and Vyiisa-bha~ya, IV. 29-32.
2
This VidyaraQya seems to be later than the VidyaraQya who wrote the
Paiicadail, as quotations from the chapter Brahmtinanda of the Paficadai'l are
found in it (chap. n, pp. 195, 196, Chowkhamba edition). So my identification
of the VidyaraQya of the Paficadail with the writer of Jlvan-mukti-viveka in the
first volume (p. 419) of the present work seems to be erroneous.
XII) Energy of Free-will 253
miirgeya), since only such actions can succeed 1 • If a person desires
anything and works accordingly in the proper way, he is certain to
attain it, if he does not turn back in midway 2 • Pauru~a is of two
kinds, of the past life (priii?.tana) and of this life (aihz"ka), and the
past pauru~a can be overcome by the present pauru~a 3 • The karma
of past life and the karma of this life are thus always in conflict
with each other, and one or the other gains ground according to
their respective strength. Not only so, but the endeavours of any
individual may be in conflict with the opposing endeavours of
other persons, and of these two also that which is stronger wins 4 •
By strong and firm resolution and effort of will the endeavours of
this life can conquer the effect of past deeds. The idea that one
is being led in a particular way by the influence of past karmas
has to be shaken off from the mind; for the efforts of the past life
are certainly not stronger than the visible efforts of the moment.
All efforts have indeed to be made in accordance with the
direction of the scriptures (siistra). There is, of course, always a
limit beyond which human endeavours are not possible, and there-
fore it is necessary that proper economy of endeavours should be
observed by following the directions of the scriptures, by cultivating
the company of good friends, and by adhering to right conduct,
since mere random endeavours or endeavours on a wrong line cannot
be expected to produce good results 5 • If one exerts his will and
directs his efforts in the proper way, he is bound to be successful.
There is nothing like destiny (daiva ), standing as a separate force:
it has .a continuity with the power of other actions performed
in this life, so that it is possible by superior exertions to destroy
the power of the actions of previous lives, which would have
led to many evil results. Whenever a great effort is made or
a great energy is exerted, there is victory. The whole question,
whether the daiva of the past life or the pauru~a of this life will
win, depends upon the relative strength of the two, and any part of
the daz"va which becomes weaker than the efforts of the present life
siidhi1padif!a-miirgn;a yan marw-'izga-vicef#tam
tat paurufa1Jl tat saphalam anyad unmatta-ce1#tam.
l'oga-viisiftha, II. 4· 11.
yo yam artha1[l priirthayate tad-artha1[l cehate kramiit
avasya1[l sa tam iipnoti na ced ardhiin ni•oartate.
Ibid. II. 4· I 2.
3
Ibid. II. 4· 17. ' Ibid. ll. 5· 5, 7·
5 sa ca sac-chiistra-sat-saizga-sad-iiciirair nija1[l phala1[l
dadiitfti svabhiivo 'yam anyathii niirtha-siddhaye.
Ibid. II. 5· 25-
2 54 The Philosophy of the Yoga-viisi§tha [cH.
in a contrary direction is natura1ly annulled. It is only he who
thinks that destiny must lead him on, and consequently does not
strive properly to overcome the evil destiny, that becomes like an
animal at the mercy of destiny or God, which may take him to
heaven or to hell. The object of all endeavours and efforts in this
life is to destroy the power of the so-called destiny. or daiva, and
to exert oneself to his utmost to attain the supreme end of life.
The Yoga-viisi~tha not only holds that pauru~a can conquer and
annul daiva, but it even goes to the extreme of denying daiva and
calling it a nwre fiction, that, properly speaking, does not exist at all.
Thus it is said that endeavours and efforts manifest themselves as
the movement of thought (sa1Jlv£t-spanda), the movement of manas
( manab-spanda), and the movement of the senses (a£ndr£ya). Thought
movement is followed by movement of the psychosis or ceias;
the body moves accordingly, and there is also a corresponding
enjoyment or suffering. If this view is true, then daiva is never
seen anywhere. Properly speaking, there is no da£va, and wherever
any achievement is possible, it is always by continual strenuous effort
of will, standing on its mvn account, or exercised in accordance
with the siistra or with the directions of a teacher1 . It is for all
of us to exert ourselves for good and to withdraw our minds from
evil. By all the pramii1Jf!-S at our disposal it is found that nothing
but the firm exercise of will and effort achieves its end, and that
nothing is effected by pure daiva; it is only by the effort of eating
that there is the satisfaction of hunger, it is only hy the effort of
the vocal organs that speech is effected, and it is only by the effort
of the legs and corresponding muscles that one can walk. So
everything is effected by personal efforts, when directed with the
aid of the siistra and proper advisers or teachers. What passes as
daiva is a mere fiction; no one has ever experienced it, and it cannot
be used by any of the senses; and the nature of efforts being
essentially vibratory (spr;znda), one can never expect such move-
ment from the formless, insensible, so-called daiva, which is only
imagined and can never be proved. Visible efforts are all tangible
and open to immediate perception; and, even if it is admitted
that daiva exists, how can this supposed formless (amurta) entity
come 1n contact with it? It is only fools who conceive the
siistrato gurutas caiva svatas ceti tri-siddhaya~z

sarvatra purUfiirthasya na daivasya kadiicana.
Yoga-viis#tha, II. 7· 11.
XII] Energy of Free-will 255
existence of dai·va, and depend on it, and are ruined, whereas those
who are heroes, who are learned and wise, always attain their
highest by their free-will and endeavour 1 •
Rama points out to Vasi~tha in n. 9 that dai-va is fairly well
accepted amongst all people, and asks how, if it did not exist, did
it come to be accepted, and what does it mean after all? In answer
to this V a.Si~tha says that, when any endeavour (paur~a) comes to
fruition or is baffied, and a good or a had result is gained, people
speak of it as being daiva. There is no daiva, it is mere vacuity,
and it can neither help nor obstruct anyone in any way. At the
time of taking any step people have a particular idea, a particular
resolution; there may be success or failure as the result of opera-
tion in a particular way, and the whole thing is referred to by
ordinary people as being due to daiva, which is a mere name, a
mere consolatory word. The instinctive root inclinations (viisanii)
of a prior state become transformed intn karma. A man works in
accordance with his viisanii and by viisanii gets what he wants.
Viisanii and karma are, therefore, more or less like the potential
and actual states of the same entity. Daiva is but another name
for the km·mas performed with strong desire for fruit, karma thus
being the same as viisanii, and viisanii being the same as manas,
and manas being the same as the agent or the person (pur~a); so
daiva does not exist as an entity separate from the puru~a, and
they are all merely synonyms for the same indescribable entity
(durniscaya). Whatever the manas strives to do is done by itself,
which is the same as being done by daiva. There are always in
manas two distinct groups of viisaniis, operating towards the good
and towards the evil, and it is our clear duty to rouse the former
against the latter, so that the latter may be overcome and dominated
by the former. But, since man is by essence a free source of active
energy, it is meaningless to say that he could be determined by
anything but himself; if it is held that any other entity could
determine him, the question arises, what other thing would de-
termine that entity, and what else that entity, and there would
thus be an endless vicious regression2 • Man is thus a free source
mutjhai/:1 praka/pita1Jl daiVa1Jl tat-pariis te k~a)'a1Jl gatii/:1,

priijiiiis tu pauru~iirthena padam uttamatii'!l gatii./:1,.
Yoga-viis#tha, II. 8. t6.
anyas tVii1Jl cetayati cet ta1Jl cetayati ko 'parab
ka ima1Jl cctayet tasmii.d anavasthii. na vii.stavl.
Ibid. II. 9· 29.
The Philosophy of the Yoga-viisi~tha (CH.
of activity, and that which appears to be limiting his activity is
but one side of him, which he can overcome by rousing up his
virtuous side. This view of puru~tl-kara and karma seems to be
rather unique in Indian literature.
Pral).a and its Control.

The mind (citta), which naturally transforms itself into its
states (vrtti), does so for two reasons, which are said to be like its
two seeds. One of these is the vibration (parispanda) of pra1Ja,
and the other, strong and deep-rooted desires and inclinations
which construct (dr¢ha-bhavana) 1 • When the pra1Ja vibrates and is
on the point of passing through the nerves (nafji-saf!ZSparsanodyata),
then there appears the mind full of its thought processes (sa'f!Zveda-
namaya). But when the pra1Ja lies dormant in the hollow of the
veins (sira-sara1Jz"-kotare), then there is no manifestation of mind,
and its processes and the cognitive functions do not operate 2 • It is
the vibration of the pra1Ja (pra1Ja-spanda) that manifests itself
through the citta and causes the world-appearance out of nothing.
The cessation of the vibration of pra1Ja means cessation of all
cognitive functions. As a result of the vibration of pra1Ja, the
cognitive function is set in motion like a top ('Dita). As a top spins
round in the yard when struck, so, roused by the vibration of
pra1Ja, knowledge is manifested; and in order to stop the course
of knowledge, it is necessary that the cause of knowledge should
be· first attacked. When the citta remains awake to the inner sense,
while shut to all extraneous cognitive activities, we have the
highest state. For the cessation of citta the yogins control pra1Ja
through pra1Jayama (breath-regulation) and meditation (dhyana),
in accordance with proper instructions 3 •
Again, there is a very intimate relation between viisana and
pra1Ja-spanda, such that vasana is created and stimulated into
activity, prll1Ja-spanda, and prll1Ja-spanda is set in motion through
vasana. When by strong ideation and without any proper delibera-
tion of the past and the present, things are conceived to be one's
own-the body, the senses, the ego and the like-we have what is
1
Yoga-viisi~tha, v. 91. 14.
2 I have translated Sirii as veins, though I am not properly authorized to
do it. For the difference between veins and arteries does not seem to have
been known.
3
Yoga-viis#!ha, v. 91. 2o-27.
xn] Prii1Ja and its Control 2 57
called viisanii. Those who have not the proper wisdom always
believe in the representations of the ideations of viisanii without
any hesitation and consider them to be true; and, since both the
viisanii and the prii1Ja-spanda are the ground and cause of the
manifestations of citta, the cessation of one promptly leads to the
cessation of the other. The two are connected with each other in
the relation of seed and shoot (bljiinkuravat); from prli1Ja-spanda
there is viisanii, and from viisanii there is prii1Ja-spanda. The object
of knowledge is inherent in the knowledge itself, and so with the
cessation of knowledge the object of knowledge also ceases 1 •
As a description of prii1Ja we find in the Y oga-viisiftha that it is
said to be vibratory activity (spanda-saktt) situated in the upper part
of the body, while apiina is the vibratory activity in the lower part
of the body. There is a natural prii1Jliyiima going on in the body
in waking states as well as in sleep. The mental outgoing tendency
of the prli1Jas from the cavity of the heart is called recaka, and the
drawing in of the prli1Jas (dviidasiingult) by the apiina activity is
called puraka. The interval between the cessation of one effort of
apiina and the rise of the effort of prii1Ja is the stage of kumbhaka.
Bhusm._19a, the venerable old crow who was enjoying an excep-
tionally long life, is supposed to instruct Vasi~tha in VI. 24 on the
subject of prii1Ja. He compares the body to a house with the ego
(aha'f!lklira) as the householder. It is supposed to be supported
by pillars of three kinds 2 , provided with nine doors (seven aper-
tures in the head and two below), tightly fitted with the tendons
(sniiyu) as fastening materials and cemented with blood, flesh and
fat. On the two sides of it there are the two niit}is, £tja and p£ngalii,
lying passive and unmanifested (nimil£te). There is also a machine
(yantra) of bone and flesh (asthi-mliJ!lsa-maya) in the shape of three
double lotuses (padma-yugma-traya) having pipes attached to them
running both upwards and downwards and with their petals closing
upon oneanother(anyonya-m£lat-komala-saddala). When it is slowly
samula1[l naryata}.z k#pra1[l mula-cchediid iva druma}.z.
sa1Jlvida1[l viddhi sa1Jlvedya1Jl bija1Jl dhiratayii vinii
na sa1Jlbhavati sa1[lVedya1[l taila-hinas tilo yathii
na bahir niintare ki1Jlcil sa1JlVedya1[l vidyate Prthak.
Yoga-viisiftha, v. 91. 66 and 67.
2
tri-prakiira-mahii-sthil7Jam, VI. 24. 14. The commentator explains the three
kinds of pillars as referring to the three primal entities of Indian medicine--
vii.yu (air),pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm)-viita-pitta-kapha-lak~a7Ja-tri-prakiirii
mahiinta}.z sthu'l}ii vi~tambha-kiif.thiini yasya. I am myself inclined to take the
three kinds of pillars as referring to the bony structure of three parts of the body-
the skull, the trunk, and the legs.
DII 17
filled with air, the petals move, and by the movement of the petals
the air increases. Thus increased, the air, passing upwards and
downwards through different places, is differently named as prii:l}a,
apiina, samiina, etc. It is in the threefold machinery of the lotus
of the heart (hrt-padma-yantra-tritaye) that all the prii'l}a forces
operate and spread forth upwards and downwards like the rays
from the moon's disc. They go out, return, repulse and draw
and circulate. Located in the heart, the air is called prii'l}a: it is
through its power that there is the movement of the eyes, the opera-
tion of the tactual sense, breathing through the nose, digesting of
food and the power of speech 1 • The prii'l}a current of air stands
for exhalation (recaka) and the apiina for inhalation (puraka), and
the moment of respite between the two operations is called kum-
bhaka; consequently, if the prli1:za and apiina can be made to cease
there is an unbroken continuity of kumblzaka. But all the functions
of the prii!W, as well as the upholding of the body, are ultimately
due to the movement of citta 2 • Though in its movement in the
body the prii'l}a is associated with air currents, still it is in reality
nothing but the vibratory activity proceeding out of the thought-
activity, and these two act and react upon each other, so that, if
the vibratory activity of the body be made to cease, the thought-
activity will automatically cease, and vice-versa. Thus through
spanda-nirodha we have prii1_1a-nirodha and through prii'l}a-nirodlza
we havespanda-nirodha. In the Yoga-viisi#ha, III. 13. 31, viiyu is
said to be nothing but a vibratory entity (spandateyat sa tad viiyul;).
In Y. 78 it is said that citta and movement are in reality one
and the same, and are therefore altogether inseparable, like the
snow and its whiteness, and consequently with the destruction of
one the other is also destroyed. There are two ways of destroying
the citta, one by Yoga, consisting of the cessation of mental states,
and the other by right knowledge. As water enters through the
crevices of the earth, so air (viita) tnoves in the body through the
niitjzs and is called prii1Ja. It is this priil}a air which, on account of
its diverse functions and works, is differently named as apiina, etc.
1 Yoga-viisi~tha, VI. 24. It is curious to note in this connection that in the
whole literature ~f the Ayur-Yeda there is probably no passage where there is such
a clear description of the respiratory process. Pupphusa, or lungs, are mentioned
only by name in Susruta-sa1[lhitii, but none of their functions and modes of
operation are at all mentioned. It is probable that the discovery of the
respiratory functions of the lungs was made by a school of thought different
from that of the medical school.
2
Ibid. VI. zs. 61-74·
xn] Prii1Ja and its Control 259
But it is identical with citta. From the movement of prll1Ja there
is the movement of citta, and from that there is knowledge (samvid).
As regards the control of the movement of prii1Ja, the Yoga-vasinha
advises several alternatives. Thus it holds that through concen-
trating one's mind on one subject, or through fixed habits of long
inhalation associated with meditation, or through exhaustive ex-
halation, or the practice of not taking breath and maintaining
kumbhaka, or through stopping the inner respiratory passage by
attaching the tip of the tongue to the uvula 1 , or, again, through
concentration of the mind or thoughts on the point between the
two brows, there dawns all of a sudden the right knowledge and
the consequent cessation of prii1Ja activities 2 •
Professor 1\Iacdonell, writing on prii'l}a in the Ved£c Index,
vol. n, says," prii'l}a, properly denoting' breath,' is a term of wide
and vague significance in Vedic literature." In the narrow sense
prii'l}a denotes one of the vital airs, of which five are usually
enumerated, viz. prii1Ja, apiina, vyiina, udiina and samiina. The
exact sense of each of these breaths, when all are mentioned, cannot
be determined. The word prli1Ja has sometimes merely the general
sense of breath, even when opposed to apiina. But its proper sense
is beyond question "breathing forth,'' "expiration." But, though
in a few cases the word may have been used for "breath" in its
remote sense, the general meaning of the word in the Upani!?ads
is not air current, but some sort of biomotor force, energy or
vitality often causing these air currents 3 • It would be tedious to
refer to the large number of relevant Upani~ad texts and to try
to ascertain after suitable discussion their exact significance in each
tiilu-mala-gatii:rrz yatniij jihvayiikramya ghanfikiim
firdhva-randhra-gate prii7Je priit)a-spando nirudhyate.
Yoga-viis#tha, v. 78. 25.
2
It is important to notice in this connection that most of the forms of prii7Ja-
yiima as herein described, except the hatha-yoga process of arresting the inner
air passage by the tongue, otherwise known as khecarl-mfidrii, are the same as
described in the sfitras of Patail.jali and the bhii~ya of Vyasa; and this fact has
also been pointed out by the commentator Anandabodhendra Bhik!?u in his
commentary on the above.
3
Difference between prii7Ja and viiyu, Aitareya, II. 4; the niisikya prii7Ja, I. 4·
Relation of prii7Ja to other functions, Kautitaki, 11. 5; prii7Ja as life, II. 8;
prii7Ja connected with vayu, II. 12; prii7Ja as the most important function of
life, II. 14; prii7Ja as consciousness, 111. 2. Distinction of niisikya and mukhya
prii7Ja, Chiindogya, II. 1-9; the function of the five viiyus, III. 3-5; prii7Ja as the
result of food, I. 8. 4; of water, VI. 5· 2, VI. 6. 5, VI. 7· 6; priiiJa connected with
iitman, as everything else connected with prii7Ja, like spokes of a wheel, Brhad-
iira7Jyaka, II. s. 15; prii~za as strength, ibid. v. 14. 4; prii7Ja as force running
through the su~um7Jii nerve, ]}faitrl, VI. 21 ; etc.
17·2
260 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsiftha [cH.
case. The best way to proceed therefore is to refer to the earliest
traditional meaning of the word, as accepted by the highest Hindu
authorities. I refer to the Vediinta-sutra of Badarayal)a, which may
be supposed to be the earliest research into the doctrines discussed
in the Upani~ads. Thus the Vediinta-sutra, II. 4· 9 (na viiyu-kriye
J>rthag upadesiit), speaking of what may be the nature of priir:za, says
that it is neither air current (viiyu) nor action (kriya), since priir:za
has been considered as different from air and action (in the
Upani~ads). Sailkara, commenting on this, says that from such
passages as yalz priir:zab sa e~a viiyulz paiica 'vidhalz priir:zo piino vyiina
udiinalz samanalz (what is priil}a is ~iiyu and it is fivefold, priir:za,
apiina, vyiina, udiina,samiina), it may be supposed that vayu (air)
is priir:za, but it is not so, since in Chiindogya, 111. 18. 4, it is stated
that they are different. Again, it is not the action of the senses,
as the Sarpkhya supposes; for it is regarded as different from the
senses in Mu1J¢aka, II. 1. 3· The passage which identifies viiyu with
priil}a is intended to prove that it is the nature of viiyu that has
transformed itself into the entity known as priil}a (just as the
human body itself may be regarded as a modification or trans-
formation of k#ti, earth). It is not viiyu, but, as Vacaspati says,
"viiyu-bheda," which Amalananda explains in his Vediinta-kalpa-
taru as viiyolz paril}iima-rupa-karya-vise~alz, i.e. it is a particular
evolutionary product of the category of viiyu. Sankara's own state-
ment is equally explicit on the point. He says, "viiyur eviiyam
adhyiitmam iipannalz paiica-vyuho vise~iitmaniivat#thamiinalz priir:zo
nama bhar:zyate na tattviintara'f!l niipi viiyu-miitram," i.e. it is viiyu
which, having transformed itself into the body, differentiates
itself into a group of five that is called viiyu; priil}a is not alto-
gether a different category, nor simply air. In explaining the
nature of priitza in 11. 4· 10-12, Sankara says that priir:za is not as in-
dependent as jzva (soul), but performs everything on its behalf, like
a prime minister (riija-mantrivaj jzvasya sarviirtha-karal}atvena
upakaral}a-bhuto na svatantralz). Priil}a is not an instrument like
the senses, which operate only in relation to particular objects; for,
as is said in Chiindogya, v. 1. 6, 7, Brhad-iirar:zyaka, IV. 3· 12 and
Brhad-iiral}yaka, 1. 3· 19, when all the senses leave the body the
priil}a continues to operate. It is that by the functioning of which
the existence of the soul in the body, or life (jzva-sthitz), and the
passage of the jzva out of the body, or death (jivotkriintz), are
possible. The five viiyus are the five functionings of this vital
XII] Prt17Ja and its Control
principle, just as the fivefold mental states of right knowledge,
illusion, imagination (vikalpa), sleep and memory are the different
states of the mind. Vacaspati, in commenting on Vediinta-siltra,
II. 4· 11, says that it is the cause which upholds the body and the
senses (dehendriya-vidhiira7Ja-kiira7Ja1Jl prii1JaJ.z), though it must be
remembered that it has still other functions over and above the
upholding of the body and the senses (na kevala1JZ sarlrendriya-
dhiira1Jam asya kiiryam, Vacaspati, ibid.). In Vediinta-siltra, II.
4· 13, it is described as being atomic (a1Ju), which is explained
by Sailkara as" subtle" (suk~ma), on account of its pervading the
whole body by its fivefold functionings. Vacaspati in explaining it
says that it is called "atomic" only in a derivative figurative sense
(upacaryate) and only on account of its inaccessible or indefinable
character (duradhigamatii), though pervading the whole body.
Govindananda, in commenting upon Vediinta-siltra, II. 4· 9, says
that priil}a is a vibratory activity which upholds the process of life
and it has no other direct operation than that (parispanda-rupa-
prii7Janiinukillatviid aviintara-vyiipiiriibhiiviit). This seems to be
something like biomotor or life force. With reference to the
relation of prii7Ja to the motor organs or faculties of speech, etc.,
Sankara says that their vibratory activity is derived from prii1Ja
( viig-iidi~u parispanda-liibhasya prii1Jiiyattatvam, II. 4· 19). There are
some passages in the Vediinta-sutra which may lead us to think
that the five viiyus may mean air currents, but that it is not so is
evident from the fact that the substance of the prii1Ja is not air (etat
prii7Jiidi-paizcakam iikiisiidi-gata-rajo-'1JlSebhyo militebhya utpadyate),
and the rajas element is said to be produced from the five bhutas,
and the prii1Jas are called kriyiitmaka, or consisting of activity.
Rama Tirtha, commenting on the above passage of the Vediinta-
siira, says that it is an evolutionary product of the essence of viiyu
and the other bhutas, but it is not in any sense the external air
which performs certain physiological functions in the body ( tathii
mukhya-prii1JO 'pi viiyor biihyasya siltriitmakasya vikiiro na siirfra-
madhye nabhovad vrtti-liibha~miitreya avasthito biihya-viiyur eva) 1 •
Having proved that in Vedanta prii1Ja or any of the five viiyus means
biomotor force and not air current, I propose now to turn to the
Sarpkhya-Yoga.
The Sarpkhya-Yoga differs from the Vedanta in rejecting the
view that the prii7Ja is in any sense an evolutionary product of the
1 Vidvan-mano-ra1ijanl, p. 105, Jacob's edition, Bombay, 1916.
The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsi~tha [cH.
nature of vayu. Thus VijfH1nabhik~u in his Vijiianamrta-bhii!ya
on Vedanta-sutra, II. 4· 10, says that pratza is called viiyu because
it is self-active like the latter (svatafz kriyavattvena ubhayoi.J, priitta-
viiyvofz sajatyiit). Again, in II. 4· 9, he says that priitta is neither air
nor the upward or downward air current (mukhya-pra1JO na vayu!J
napi siir:Zrasya urdhv-adho-vgamana-la~a1Jii vayu-kriya).
What is pra7Ja, then, according to Sarp.khya-Yoga? It is
mahat-tattva, which is evolved from prakrti, which is called buddhi
with reference to its intellective power and priitta with reference
to its power as activity. The so-called five viiyus are the different
functionings of the mahat-tattva (siimanya-kiirya-sadhiiratza'!l yat
kiiratza'!l mahat-tattva'!l tasyaiva vrtti-bhediifz pratziipaniidayafz; see
Vijiianiimrta-bhii~ya, II. 4· I I). Again, referring to Sii'!lkhya-kiirikii,
29, we find that the five vayus are spoken of as the common func-
tioning of buddhi, aha'!lkiira and manas, and Vacaspati says that
the five viiyus are their life. This means that the three, buddhi,
aha'!lkiira and manas, are each energizing, in their own way, and
it is the joint operation of these energies that is called the fivefold
priitta which upholds the body. Thus in this view also pratta is
biomotor force and no air current. The special feature of this
view is that this biomotor force is in essence a mental energy
consisting of the specific functionings of buddhi, aha'!lkiira and
manas 1 • It is due to the evolutionary activity of antafzkara7Ja.
In support of this view the Sa'!lkhya-pravacana-bhaVJa, II. 3 I,
Vyiisa-bhiiVJa, 111. 39, Vacaspati's Tattva-vaisiiradt, Bhik!?u's Yoga-
varttika, and Nagesa's Chiiya-vyiikhyii thereon may be referred
to. It is true, no doubt, that sometimes inspiration and expiration
of external air are also called priitta; but that is because in inspira-
tion and expiration the function of priitta is active or it vibrates. It
is thus the entity which moves and not mere motion that is called
priitta 2 • Ramanuja agrees with Sailkara in holding that pratta is
not air (vayu), but a transformation of the nature of air. But it
should be noted that this modification of air is such a modification
as can only be known by Yoga methods 3 •
The Vaise~ika, however, holds that it is the external air which
1
Gau<;lapada's bhiifya on the SaT[lkhya-kiirikii, 29 compares the action of
prii7Ja to the movement of birds enclosed in a cage which moves the cage:
compare Sailkara's reference to Vediinta-sutra, II. 4· 9·
2
Riimiinuja-bhiifya on Vediinta-sutra, II. 4· 8.
8
See the Tattva-muktii-kaliipa, 53-55, and also Riimiinuja-bhiiDJa and Sruta-
prakiilikii, II. 4· z-zs.
XII] PrtilJa and its Control
according to its place in the body performs various physiological
functions 1 • The medical authorities also support the view that
viiyu is a sort of driving and upholding power. Thus the Bhiiva-
prakiisa describes 'viiyu as follows: It takes quickly the do~as,
dhiitus and the malas from one place to another, is subtle, com-
posed of rajo-gu1}a; is dry, cold, light and moving. By its move-
ment it produces all energy, reg1 ~ates inspiration and expiration
and generates all movement and action, and by upholding the
keenness of the senses and the dhiitus holds together the heat,
senses and the mind 2 • Vahata in his A#ii1iga-Sa1Jlgraha also regards
viiyu as the one cause of all body movements, and there is nothing
to suggest that he meant air currents 3 • The long description of
Caraka (r. 12), as will be noticed in the next chapter, seems to
suggest that he considered the viiyu as the constructive and
destructive force of the universe, and as fulfilling the same kinds of
functions inside the body as well. It is not only a physical force
regulating the physiological functions of the body, but is also the
mover and controller of the mind in all its operations, as knowing,
feeling and willing. Susruta holds that it is in itself avyakta
(unmanifested or unknowable), and that only its actions as
operating in the body are manifested (avyakto vyakta-karmii ca).
In the Yoga-viisi#ha, as we have already seen above, prii1}a or
viiyu is defined as that entity which vibrates (spandate yat sa tad
viiyu/:t, III. 1 3) and it has no other reality than vibration. Prii1Ja itself
is, again, nothing but the movement of the intellect as ahaf!lkiira 4 •
Prii1}a is essentially of the nature of vibration (spanda), and
mind is but a form of prii1}a energy, and so by the control of the
mind the five viiyus are controlled 5 • The Saiva authorities also
agree with the view that prii1}a is identical with cognitive activity,
which passes through the nii{lls (nerves) and maintains all the body
movement and the movement of the senses. Thus K~emaraja says
that it is the cognitive force which passes in the form of prii1Ja
through the nii¢ls, and he refers to Bhana Kallata as also holding
the same view, and prii1Ja is definitely spoken of by him as force
(kutila-viihini prii1}a-sakti/:t) 6 • Sivopadhyaya in his Vivrti on the
1
Nyiiya-kandall of Sridhara, p. 48.
2
Bhiiva-prakiisa, Sen's edition, Calcutta, p. 47·
3
Vahata's A~!iiilga-sa1Jlgraha and the commentary by Indu, Trichur, 1914,
pp. 1]8, 212.
4
Yoga-viisi~tha, III. 14. 5
Ibid. v. 13, 78.
6
Siva-sutra-vim.ariinl, III. 43, 44·
Vijfiana-bhairava also describes priir;za as force (sakti), and the
Vijfiiina-bhat"rava itself does the same 1 • Bhatta Ananda in his
Vz}fiiina-kaumudi describes priir;za as a functioning of the mind
(citta-vrtti).
Stages of Progress.
It has been already said that the study of philosophy and
association with saintly characters are the principal means with
which a beginner has to set out on his toil for the attainment of
salvation. In the first stage (prathamii bhumikii) the enquirer has to
increase his wisdom by study and association with saintly persons.
The second stage is the stage of critical thinking ( vicara~;zii); the
third is that of the mental practice of dissociation from all passions,
etc. (asaflga-bhiivanii); the fourth stage (vilapani) is that in which
through a right understanding of the nature of truth the world-ap-
pearance shows itself to be false; the fifth stage is that in which the
saint is in a state of pure knowledge and bliss (suddha-sa1Jlvit-mayii-
nanda-rupa). This stage is that of the jtvan-mukta, in which the
saint may be said to be half-asleep and half-awake (ardha-supta-
prabuddha). The sixth stage is that in which the saint is in a state
of pure bliss; it is a state which is more like that of deep dreamless
sleep (su~upta-sadrsa-sthitz). The seventh stage is the last transcen-
dental state (turyiitzta), which cannot be experienced by any saint
while he is living. Of these the first three stages are called the
waking state (jagrat), the fourth stage is called the dream state
(svapna), the fifth stage is called the dreamless (su~upta) state, the
sixth stage is an unconscious state called the turya, and the seventh
stage is called the turyiitita 3 •
Desire (icchii) is at the root of all our troubles. It is like a mad
elephant rushing through our system and trying to destroy it.
The senses are like its young, and the instinctive root inclinations
(viisanii) are like its flow of ichor. It can only be conquered by
the close application of patience (dhairya). Desire means the
imaginations of the mind, such as "let this happen to me," and
this is also called saflkalpa. The proper way to stop this sort of
imagining is to cease by sheer force of will from hoping or desiring
in this manner, and for this one has to forget his memory; for
1
Vijiiiina-bhairava and Vivrti, verse 67.
2
See the N_viiya-kandalf of Sridhara, p. 48, and also Dinakari and RiimarUdrf
on the Siddhiinta-muktiivalf on Bhiilii-parichcheda, p. 44·
3 Yoga-viis#tha, VI. 120.
xn] Stages of Progress
so long as memory continues such hopes and desires cannot be
stopped. The last stage, when all movement has ceased (aspanda)
and all thoughts and imaginations have ceased, is a state of un-
consciousness (avedanam) 1 • Yoga is also defined as the ultimate
state of unconsciousness (avedana), the eternal state when every-
thing else has ceased 2 • In this state citta is destroyed, and one is
reduced to the ultimate entity of consciousness; and thus, being
free of all relations and differentiations of subject and object,
one has no knowledge in this state, though it is characterized as
bodhiitmaka (identical with consciousness). This last state is indeed
absolutely indescribable (avyapadesya), though it is variously de-
scribed as the state of Brahman, Siva, or the realization of the
distinction of prakrti and puru~a 3 • The Yoga-viisiftha, however,
describes this state not as being.essentially one of bliss, but as a state
of unconsciousness unthinkable and indescribable. It is only the
fifth state that manifests itself as being of the nature of iinanda;
the sixth state is one of unconsciousness, which, it seems, can
somehow be grasped; but the seventh is absolutely transcendental
and indescribable.
The division of the progressive process into seven stages
naturally reminds one of the seven stages of prajfiii (wisdom) in
Pataiijali's Yoga-sutra and Vyiisa-bhii§ya. The seven stages of
prajiiii are there divided into two parts, the first containing four
and the second three. Of these the four are psychological and the
three are ontological, showing the stages of the disintegration of
dtta before its final destruction or citta-vimukti4 • Here also the
first four stages, ending with viliipanl, are psychological, whereas
the last three stages represent the advance of the evolution of dtta
towards its final disruption. But, apart from this, it does not seem
that there is any one to one correspondence of the prajfiii states
of the Yoga-v~tha with those of Pataiijali. The Yoga-viisiftha
occasionally mentions the name Yoga as denoting the highest state
and defines it as the ultimate state of unconsciousness (avedana1Jl
v-idur yogam) or as the cessation of the poisonous effects of desire 5 .
In the first half of the sixth book, chapter 125, the ultimate state
is described as the state of universal negation (sarviipahnava).
Existence of citta is pain, and its destruction bliss; the destruction
1 Yoga-viisqfha, VI. 126. 3
z Ibid. VI. 126. 99· Ibid. VI. 126. 71-'72.
' See my A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, p. 273.
5
Icchti-vqa-viktirasya viyoga1Jl yoga-ntimakam. Yoga-vtisq{ha, VI. 37· I; also
ibid. VI. 126. 99·
The Philosophy of the Yoga-vas#tha [cH.
of citta by cessation of knowledge-a state of neither pain nor
pleasure nor any intermediate state-a state as feelingless as that
of the stone (Pi:i!iitzavat-samam), is the ultimate state aimed at 1 •
Karma, according to the Yoga-vii.si$tha, is nothing but thought-
activity manifesting itself as subject-object knowledge. Abandon-
ment of karma therefore means nothing short of abandonment of
thought-activity or the process of knowledge 2 • Cessation of karma
thus means the annihilation of knowledge. The stirring of karma
or activity of thought is without any cause; but it is due to this
activity that the ego and all other objects of thought come into
being·; the goal of all our endeavours should be the destruction of
all knowledge, the unconscious, stone-like knowledgeless state 3 •
As there are seven progressive stages, so there are also seven
kinds of beings according to the weakness or strength of their
viisaniis. There are svapna-jiigara, saizkalpa-jiigara, kevala-
jiigrat-sthita, ciriij-jiigrat-sthita, ghana-jiigrat-sthita, jiigrat-svapna
and /qitza-jagaraka. Svapna-jiigara (dream -awake) persons are those
who in some past state of existence realized in dream experience all
our present states of being and worked as dream persons (~vapna
nara). The commentator in trying to explain this says that it is not
impossible; for everything is present everywhere in the spirit, so it is
possible that we, as dream persons of their dream experience,should
be present in their minds in their viisanii forms ( tad-antal;-karatze
viisaniitmanii sthitii/;) 4 • As both past and present have no existence
except in thought, time is in thought reversible, so that our exist-
ence at a time future to theirs does not necessarily prevent their
having an experience of us in dreams. For the limitations of time
and space do not hold for thought, and as elements in thought
everything exists everywhere (sarva1Jl sarvatra vidyate) 5 • By dreams
these persons may experience changes of life and even attain to
final emancipation. The second class, the saizkalpa-jiigaras, are those
who without sleeping can by mere imagination continue to con-
ceive all sorts of activities and existences, and may ultimately
attain emancipation. The third class, the kevala-jiigaras, are those
who are born in this life for the first time. When such beings pass
1 This turlyiitlta stage should not be confused with the sixth stage of su~pti,
which is often described as a stage of pure bliss.

2
sarve$ii'!l karma'l)iim eva1fl vedana1fl bljam uttamam
svarupa1fl cetayitviintas tata/:t spanda/:t pravartate.
Yoga-vasinha, vi. I I. 2. 26.
3 Ibid. 111. IS. I6. ' Ibid. vi. 2. so. 9· Tiitparya-prakiisa. 6 Ibid.
xn] Methods of Right Conduct
through more than one life, they are called cira-jiigaras. Such
beings, on account of their sins, may be born as trees, etc., in
which case they are called ghana-jiigaras. Those of such beings
suffering rebirth who by study and good association attain right
knowledge are called jiigrat-svapna-sthita; and finally, those that
have reached the turya state of deliverance are called k#-1Ja-jiigaraka.
Bondage (bandha), according to the Yoga-viisi~tha, remains so
long as our knowledge has an object associated with it, and de-
liverance (mo~a) is realized when knowledge is absolutely and
ultimately dissociated from all objects and remains in its tran-
scendent purity, having neither an object nor a subject 1 •
Methods of Right Conduct.

The Yoga-viisi#ha does not enjoin severe asceticism or the
ordinary kinds of religious gifts, ablutions or the like for the realiza-
tion of our highest ends, which can only be achieved by the control
of attachment (raga), antipathy (dve~a), ignorance (tarnal;), anger
(krodha), pride (mada), and jealousy (miitsarya), followed by the
right apprehension of the nature of reality 2 • So long as the mind
is not chastened by the clearing out of all evil passions, the per-
formance of religious observances leads only to pride and vanity
and does not produce any good. The essential duty of an enquirer
consists in energetic exertion for the achievement of the highest
end, for which he must read the right sort of scriptures (sac-chiistra)
and associate with good men 3 • He should somehow continue his
living and abandon even the slightest desire of enjoyment (bhoga-
gandham parityajet), and should continue critical thinking (viciira).
On the question whether knowledge or work,jiiiina or karma, is to
be accepted for the achievement of the highest end, the Yoga-
viis#tha does not, like Sankara, think that the two cannot jointly
be taken up, but on the contrary emphatically says that, just as
jiiiinasya jiieyatiipattir bandha ity abhidhlyate
tasyaiva jiieyatii-siintir mok~a ity abhidhlyate.
Yoga-viis#fha, VI. II. 190. I.
sva-paurtlla-prayatnena vivekena vikiiJinii
sa devo jiiiiyate riima na tapal;z-sniina-karmabhil;z.
Ibid. III. 6. 9·
a Good men are defined in the Y oga-viisi~tha as follows :
dese yattJ sujana-priiyii lokiil;z siidhu1Jl praca~ate
sa visi~tal;z sa siidhul;z syiit tattt prayatnena satttJrayet.
Ibid. III. 6. 20.
268 The Philosophy of the Y oga-viisi~tha [cH.
a bird flies with its two wings, so an enquirer can reach his goal
through the joint operation of knowledge and work 1 •
The main object of the enquirer being the destruction of citta,
all his endeavours should be directed towards the uprooting of
instinctive root inclinations (viisanii), which are the very substance
and root of the citta. The realization of the truth (tattva-jiiiina), the
destruction of the viisaniis and the destruction of the citta all mean
the same identical state and are interdependent on one another,
so that none of them can be attained without the other. So, aban-
doning the desire for enjoyment, one has to try for these three
together; and for this one has to control one's desires on one hand
and practise breath-control (prii!Ja-nirodhena) on the other; and
these two would thus jointly co-operate steadily towards the final
goal. Such an advancement is naturally slow, but this progress,
provided it is steady, is to be preferred to any violent efforts to
hasten (hatha) the result 2 • Great stress is also laid on the necessity
of self-criticism as a means of loosening the bonds of desire and
the false illusions of world-appearance and realizing the dissocia-
tion from attachment (asanga) 3 •
Yoga-vasi~tha, Sailkara Vedanta and Buddhist

Vijiianavada.
To a superficial reader the idealism of the Yoga-viisz~tha may
appear to be identical with the Vedanta as interpreted by Sankara;
and in some of the later Vedanta works of the Sankara school, such
as the Jivan-mukti-viveka, etc., so large a number of questions dealt
with in the Yoga-viisi~tha occur that one does not readily imagine
that there may be any difference between this idealism and that
of Sankara. This point therefore needs some discussion.
The main features of Sankara's idealism consist in the doctrine
that the self-manifested subject-objectless intelligence forms the
ultimate and unchangeable substance of both the mind (antal:zka-
ra!Ja) and the external world. Whatever there is of change and
mutation is outside of this Intelligence, which is also the Reality.
But, nevertheless, changes are found associated with this reality
or Brahman, such as the external forms of objects and the diverse
mental states. These are mutable and have therefore a different
kind of indescribable existence from Brahman; but still they are
1 2
Yoga-viisinha, 1. I. 7, 8. Ibid. v. 92. I Ibid. v. 93·
XII] Buddhist and Vedanta Idealism
somehow essentially of a positive nature 1 • Sankara's idealism does
not allow him to deny the existence of external objects as apart
from perceiving minds, and he does not adhere t0 the doctrine of
esse est percipi. Thus he severely criticizes the views of the Buddhist
idealists, who refuse to believe in the existence of external objects
as apart from the thoughts which seem to represent them. Some
of these arguments are of great philosophical interest and remind
one of similar arguments put forth by a contemporary British
Neo-realist in refutation of Idealism.
The Buddhists there are made to argue as follows: When two
entities are invariably perceived simultaneously they are identical ;
now knowledge and its objects are perceived simultaneously;
therefore the objects are identical with their percepts. Our ideas
have nothing in the external world to which they correspond, and
their existence during dreams, when the sense-organs are uni-
versally agreed to be inoperative, shows that for the appearance of
ideas the operation of the sense-organs, indispensable for estab-
lishing connection with the so-called external world, is unneces-
sary. If it is asked how, if there are no external objects, can the
diversity of percepts be explained, the answer is that such diversity
may be due to the force of viisaniis or the special capacity of the
particular moment associated with the cognition 2 • If the so-called
external objects are said to possess different special capacities
which would account for the· diversity of percepts, the successive
moments of the mental order may also be considered as possessing
special distinctive capacities which would account for the diversity
of percepts generated by those cognition moments. In dreams it
is these diverse cognition moments which produce diversity of
percepts.
Sankara, in relating the above argument of the Buddhist idealist,
says that external objects are directly perceived in all our per-
ceptions, and how then can they be denied? In answer to this,
if it is held that there is no object for the percepts excepting the
sensations, or that the existence of anything consists in its being
perceived, that can be refuted by pointing to the fact that the inde-
pendent existence of the objects of perception, as apart from their
being perceived, can be known from the perception itself, since the
1 See the account of Sankara Vedanta in my A History of Indian Philosophy,
vol. Cambridge, 1922, chapter x.
1,
2 Kasyacid eva jiiiina- kja7J.asya sa tiidrsalz siimarthyiitisayo viisanii-pari1Jiimalz.
Bhiimatr, u. 1 I. 28.
The Philosophy of the Y oga-viis#tha [CH.
perceiving of an object is not the object itself; it is always felt that
the perception of the blue is different from the blue which is
perceived; the blue stands forth as the object of perception and
the two can never be identical. This is universally felt and acknow-
ledged, and the Buddhist idealist, even while trying to refute it,
admits it in a way, since he says that what is inner perception appears
as if it exists outside of us, externally. If externality as such never
existed, how could there be an appearance of it in consciousness?
When all experiences testify to this difference between knowledge
and its object, the inner mental world of thoughts and ideas and
the external world of objects, how can such a difference be denied?
You may see a jug or remember it: the mental operation in these
two cases varies, but the object remains the same 1 •
The above argument of Sankara against Buddhist idealism
conclusively proves that he admitted the independent existence of
objects, which did not owe their existence to anybody's knowing
them. External objects had an existence different from and inde-
pendent of the existence of the diversity of our ideas or percepts.
But the idealism of the Yoga-vasi~tha is more like the doctrine of
the Buddhist idealists than the idealism of Sankara. For according
to the Yoga-vasi#ha it is only ideas that have some sort of existence.
Apart from ideas or percepts there is no physical or external world
having a separate or independent existence. Esse est percipi is the
doctrine of the Yoga-vasi#ha, while Sankara most emphatically
refutes such a doctrine. A. later exposition of Vedanta by Prakas-
ananda, known as Veda. ·l-siddhanta-muktavalz, seems to derive
its inspiration from the Yoga-vasz~tha in its exposition of Vedanta
on lines similar to the idealism of the Yoga-vasiftha, by denying the
existence of objects not perceived (ajiiata-sattvanabhyupagama) 2 •
Prakasananda disputes the ordinarily accepted view that cognition
of objects arises out of the contact of senses with objects; for
objects for him exist only so long as they are perceived, i.e. there
is no independent external existence of objects apart from their
perception. All objects have only perceptual existence (pratUzka-
sattva). Both Prakasananda and the Yoga-vasi#ha deny the
existence of objects when they are not perceived, while Sankara
not only admits their existence, but also holds that they exist in
the same form in which they are known ; and this amounts vir-
tually to the admission that our knowing an object does not add
1
Sankara's bhiiDJa on the Brahma-sutra, 11. 2. 28.
11 Siddhiinta-muktiivall. See The Pandit, new series, vol. XI, pp. 129-139.
xu] Buddhist and Vedanta Idealism
anything to it or modify it to any extent, except that it becomes
known to us through knowledge. Things are what they are, even
though they may not be perceived. This is in a way realism. The
idealism of Sankara's Vedanta consists in this, that he held that
the Brahman is the immanent self within us, which transcends all
changeful experience and is also ultimate reality underlying all
objects perceived outside of us in the external world. \Vhatever
forms and characters there are in our experience, internal as well
as external, have an indescribable and indefinite nature which
passes by the name of miiyii 1 • Sankara Vedanta takes it for granted
that that alone is real which is unchangeable; what is changeful,
though it is positive, is therefore unreal. The world is only unreal
in that special sense; miiyii belongs to a category different from
affirmation and negation, namely the category of the indefinite.
The relation of the real, the Brahman, to this miiyii in
Sailkara Vedanta is therefore as indefinite as the miiyii; the real
is the unchangeable, but how the changeful forms and characters
become associated with it or what is their origin or what is their
essence, Sankara is not in a position to tell us. The Yoga-viisiftha
however holds that formless and characterless entity is the ultimate
truth; it is said to be the Brahman, cit, or void (sunya); but,
whatever it may be, it is this characterless entity which is the
ultimate truth. This ultimate entity is associated with an energy
of movement, by virtue of which it can reveal all the diverse forms
of appearances. The relation between the appearances and the
reality is not external, indefinite and indescribable, as it is to
Sankara, but the appearances, which are but the unreal and
illusory manifestations of the reality, are produced by the opera-
tion of this inner activity of the characterless spirit, which is in
itself nothing but a subject-objectless pure consciousness. But this
inner and immanent movement does not seem to have any dia-
lectic of its own, and no definite formula of the method of its
operation for its productions can be given; the imaginary shapes
of ideas and objects, which have nothing but a mere perceptual
existence, are due not to a definite order, but to accident or chance
(kiikatiiltya). Such a conception is indeed very barren, and it is
here that the system of the Y oga-viisi~tha is particularly defective.
Another important defect of the system is that it does not either
criticize knowledge or admit its validity, and the characterless
entity which forms its absolute is never revealed in experience.
1 See my A History of l11dian Philosophy, vol. I, ch. x.
The Philosophy of the Yoga-viisi~tha (CH. XII
With Sankara the case is different; for he holds that this absolute
Brahman is also the self which is present in every experience and is
immediate and self-revealed. But the absolute of the Yoga-viis#tha
is characterless and beyond experience. The state of final emancipa-
tion, the seventh stage, is not a stage of bliss, like the Brahmahood
of the Vedanta, but a state of characterlessness and vacuity almost.
In several places in the work it is said that this ultimate state is
differently described by various systems as Brahman, distinction
of pra/qti and puru~a, pure vijiiana and void (sunya), while in truth
it is nothing but a characterless entity. Its state of mukti (emanci-
pation) is therefore described, as we have already seen above, as
pii~ii1Javat or like a stone, which strongly reminds us of the
Vaise~ika view of mukti. On the practical side it lays great stress
on pauru~a, or exertion of free-will and energy, it emphatically
denies daiva as having the power of weakening pauru~a or even
exerting a superior dominating force, and it gives us a new view
of karma as meaning only thought-activity. As against Sankara, it
holds that knowledge (jiiana) and karma may be combined together,
and that they are not for two different classes of people, but are
both indispensable for each and every right-minded enquirer. The
principal practical means for the achievement of the highest end of
the Yoga-viis#tha are the study of philosophical scripture, asso-
ciation with good men and self-criticism. It denounces external
religious observances without the right spiritual exertions as being
worse than useless. Its doctrine of esse est percipi and that no
experiences have any objective validity outside of themselves, that
there are no external objects to which they correspond and that
all are but forms of knowledge, reminds us very strongly of
what this system owes to VijfHinavada Buddhism. But, while an
important Vijfianavada work like the Lankavatiira-siltra tries to
explain through its various categories the origin of the various
appearances in knowledge, no such attempt is made in the Yoga-
vasi~tha, where it is left to chance. It is curious that in the Sanskrit
account of Vijfianavada by Hindu writers, such as Vacaspati and
others, these important contributions of the system are never re-
ferred to either for the descriptive interpretation of the system or
for its refutation. While there are thus unmistakable influences of
Vijfianavada and Gau<;lapada on the Yoga-viisiftha, it seems to have
developed in close association with the Saiva, as its doctrine of spanda,
or immanent activity, so clearly shows. This point will, however,
be more fully discussed in my treatment of Saiva philosophy.
CHAPTER XIII
SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS
IT may be urged that the speculations of the thinkers of the

medical schools do not deserve to be recorded in a History of
Indian Philosophy. But the force of such an objection will lose
much in strength if it is remembered that medicine was the most
important of all the physical sciences which were cultivated in
ancient India, was directly and intimately connected with the
Sarpkhya and Vaise!?ika physics and was probably the origin of the
logical speculations subsequently codified in the Nyiiya-sutras 1 •
The literature contains, moreover, many other interesting ethical
instructions and reveals a view of life which differs considerably
from that found in works on philosophy; further, it treats of many
other interesting details which throw a flood of light on the scholastic
methods of Indian thinkers. Those, again, who are aware of the
great importance of Hat}la Yoga or Tantra physiology or anatomy
in relation to some of the Yoga practices of those schools will no
doubt be interested to know for purposes of comparison or con~
trast the speculations of the medical schools on kindred points of
interest. Their speculations regarding embryology, heredity and
other such points of general enquiry are likely to prove interesting
even to a student of pure philosophy.
Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda.

Susruta says that Ayur-veda (the science of life) is an upiiizga
of the Atharva- Veda and originally consisted of Ioo,ooo verses
in one thousand chapters and was composed by Brahma before
he created all beings (Susruta-sa1Jlhitii, 1. 1. 5). What upiiizga
exactly means in this connection cannot easily be satisfactorily
explained. l)alhat;a (A.D. 1 100) in explaining the word in his
Nibandha-Sa'f!lgraha, says that an upiiizga is a smaller aizga (part)-
" aizgam eva alpatviid upiiizgam." Thus, while hands and legs are
regarded as aizgas, the toes or the palms of the hands are called
upiiizga. The Atharva- Veda contains six thousand verses and about
1 The system of Satp.khya philosophy taught in Caraka-sa'l!lhitii, IV. I, has
already been described in the first volume of the present work, pp. 2IJ-2I7.
DII IB
Speculations in the Medical Schools (cH.
one thousand prose lines. If the Ayur-veda originally contained

Ioo,ooo verses, it cannot be called an upatJga of the Atharva-Veda,
if upiit;zga is to mean a small appendage, as l)alha:r;ta explains it.
For, far from being a small appendage, it was more than ten times
as extensive as the Atharva- Veda. Caraka, in discussing the nature
of Ayur-veda, says that there was never a time when life did
not exist or when intelligent people did not exist, and so there
were always plenty of people who knew about life, and there
were always medicines which acted on the human body according
to the principles which we find enumerated in the Ayur-veda.
Ayur-veda was not produced at any time out of nothing, but
there was always a continuity of the science of life; when we
hear of its being produced, it can only be with reference to a
beginning of the comprehension of its principles by some original
thinker or the initiation of a new course of instruction at the
hands of a gifted teacher. The science of life has always been in
existence, and there have always been people who understood it in
their own way; it is only with reference to its first systematized
comprehension or instruction that it may be said to have a be-
ginning1. Again, Caraka distinguishes Ayur-veda as a distinct Veda,
which is superior to the other Vedas because it gives us life, which
is the basis of all other enjoyments or benefits, whether they be of
this world or of another2 • Vagbhata, the elder, speaks of Ayur-veda
not as an upiit;zga, but as an upaveda of the Atharva- Veda 3 • The
Mahii-bhiirata, 11. II. 33, speaks of upaveda, and Nilaka:r;ttha, ex-
plaining this, says that there are four upavedas, Ayur-veda, Dhanur-
veda, GiindharvaandArtha-siistra. Brahma-vaivarta, a later puriit;za,
says that after creating the J3.k, Yajus, Sarna and Atharva Brahma
created the Ayur-veda as the fifth Veda 4 • Roth has a quotation in
his Wiirterbuch to the effect that Brahma taught Ayur-veda, which
was a vediiizga, in all its eight parts 5 •
1 Caraka, 1. 30. 24. This passage seems to be at variance with Caraka, 1. 1. 6;
for it supposes that diseases also existed always, while Caraka, 1. 1. 6 supposes
that diseases broke out at a certain point of time. Is it an addition by the reviser
Drdhabala?
··a Caraka, I. 1. 42 and Jfyur-tJeda-dipikii of CakrapaQ.i on it.
3 A~tiinga-saTMJTaha, 1. 1. 8. Gopatha-Briihma1)a, 1. 10, however, mentions
five vedas, viz. Sarpa-veda, PiSiica-veda, Asura-veda, Itihiisa-veda and Purii'l)a-

veda, probably in the sense of upaveda, but Ayur-veda is not mentioned in this
.onnection.
f. Brahma-vaivarta-purii1)a, I. 16. 9, 10.
6 Brahmii vediingam ~tiingam iiyur-vedam abhii~ata. This quotation, which
occurs in the Worter.buch in connection with the word iiyur-veda, could not
XIII] Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda 275
We thus find that Ayur-veda was regarded by some as a Veda
superior to the other Vedas and respected by their followers as a
fifth Veda, as an upaveda of the Atharva-Veda, as an independent
upaveda, as an upiiizga of the Atharva- Veda and lastly as a vediiizga.
All that can be understood from these conflicting references is
that it was traditionally believed that there was a Veda known as
Ayur-veda which was almost co-existent with the other Vedas, was
entitled to great respect, and was associated with the Atharva- Veda
in a special way. It seems, however, that the nature of this asso-
ciation consisted in the fact that both of them dealt with the curing
of diseases and the attainment of long life; the one principally by
incantations and charms, and the other by medicines. What Susruta
understands by calling Ayur-veda an upiiizga of the Atharva- Veda
is probably nothing more than this. Both the Atharva- Veda and
Ayur-veda dealt with the curing of diseases, and this generally
linked them together in the popular mind, and, the former being
the holier of the two, on account of its religious value, the latter
was associated with it as its literary accessory·. Darila Bhatta, in
commenting upon Kausika-siltra, 25. 2, gives us a hint as to what
may have been the points of contact and of difference between
Ayur-veda and the Atharva- Veda. Thus he says that there are two
kinds of diseases; those that are produced by unwholesome diet,
and those produced by sins and transgressions. The Ayur-veda
was made for curing the former, and the Atharvan practices for the
latter 1 • Caraka himself counts penance (priiyas-citta) as a name of
medicine (bhe~aja) and CakrapaQ.i, in commenting on this, says that
as priiyas-citta removes the diseases produced by sins, so medicines
(bhe~aja) also remove diseases, and thus priiyas-citta is synonymous
with bhe~aja2.
But what is this Ayur-veda? We now possess only the
treatises of Caraka and Susruta, as modified and supplemented by
later revisers. But Susruta tells us that Brahma had originally
produced the Ayur-veda, which contained Ioo,ooo verses spread
over one thousand chapters, and then, finding the people weak
in intelligence and short-lived, later on divided it into eight subjects,
be verified owing to some omission in the reference. It should be noted that
vedi.iilga is generally used to mean the six aizgas, viz. Si~i.i, Kalpa, Vyiikara~a,
Chandas, Jyoti~ and Nirukta.
1
dvi-praki.iri.i vyi.idhaya/:t i.ihi.ira-nimittii a$ubhanimittiiJ ceti; tatra i.ihi.ira-
samutthi.ini.i1Jl. va#amya i.iyurveda1J1. cakiira adharma-samutthi.ini.i1Jl. tu si.istramidam
ucyate. Darila's comment on Kausika-siltra, 25. 2.
2 Caraka, VI. I. 3 and Ayur-veda-dipiki.i, ibid.
18-2
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
viz. surgery (salya), treatment of diseases of the head (siiliikya),
treatment of ordinary diseases (kiiya-cikitsii), the processes of
counteracting the influences of evil spirits (bhuta-vidyii), treatment
of child diseases (kaumiira-bhrtya), antidotes to poisons (agada-
tantra), the science of rejuvenating the body (rasiiyana) and the
science of acquiring sex-strength (viijtkarm:za) 1 • The statement of
Susruta that Ayur-veda was originally a great work in which the
later subdivisions of its eight different kinds of studies were not
differentiated seems to be fairly trustworthy. The fact that Ayur-
veda is called an upiiizga, an upaveda, or a vediiizga also points to its
existence in some state during the period when the Vedic literature
was being composed. We hear of compendiums of medicine as early
as the Priitisiikhyas 2 • It is curious, however, that nowhere in the
U pani!?ads or the Vedas does the name" Ayur-veda" occur, though
different branches of study are mentioned in the former 3 • The
A!?tanga Ayur-veda is, however, mentioned in the Mahii-bhiirata,
and the three constituents (dhiitu), viiyu (wind), pitta (bile) and
Slepnan (mucus), are also mentioned; there is reference to a theory
that by these three the body is sustained and that by their decay the
body decays (etail:z /eyz'l}ais ca k~zyate), and Kr!?I)atreya is alluded to as
being the founder of medical science (cikitsitam) 4 • One of the earliest
systematic mentions of medicines unmixed with incantations and
charms is to be found in the Mahii-vagga of the Vinaya-Pitaka,
where the Buddha is prescribing medicines for his disciples 5 •
These medicines are of a simple nature, but they bear undeniable
marks of methodical arrangement. We are also told there of a
surgeon, named Akasagotto, who made surgical operations (sattha-
kamma) on fistula (bhagandara). In Rockhill's Life of the Buddha
we hear of Jivaka as having studied medicine in the Taxila U niver-
1
Susruta-sa1Jzhitii, I. I. s-<J.
2 R.V. Priitisiildzya, I6. 54 (55), mentioned by Bloomfield in The Atharva-
Veda and Gopatha-Briihmm;a, p. 10. The name of the medical work mentioned
is Subhe$aja.
3 IJ.g-veda'IJl bhagavo 'dhyemi Yajur-veda'f!l siima-vedam iitharvm.za$ caturtham
itihiisa-purii1Ja'f!l paiicama'f!l vediinii'IJl vedam pitrya'f!l riiSi'f!l daivatp nidhi'f!l viiko-

viikyam ekiiyanaTJl deva vidyii'IJl brahma-vidyii'IJl bhilta-vidyii'IJl kjattra-vidyii'lf'
nak$atra-vidyii1Jl sarpa-deva-jana-vidyii'lf', Chiindogya, VII. I. 2. Of these
bhilta- vidyii is counted as one of the eight tantras of Ayur-veda, as we find it in
the Susruta-samhitii or elsewhere.
4
Mahii-bharata,II.II. 25, x11.342. 86, 87, XII. 210.21. Kp?Qiitreyais referred
to in Caraka-sa1Jlhitii, VI. IS. I29, and CakrapaQ.i, commenting on this, sa~s that
Kp_;l).iitreya and Atreya are two authorities who are different from Atreya
Punarvasu, the great teacher of the Caraka-sa,hitii.
5 Vinaya-Pitaka, Mahii-vagga, VI. I-I4.
sity under Atreya 1 • That even at the time of the Atharva-Veda
there were hundreds of physicians and an elaborate pharmacopreia,
treating diseases with drugs, is indicated by a mantra therein which
extols the virtues of amulets, and speaks of their powers as being
equal to thousands of medicines employed by thousands of medical
practitioners 2 • Thus it can hardly be denied that the practice of
medicine was in full swing even at the time of the Atharva- Veda;
and, though we have no other proofs in support of the view that
there existed a literature on the treatment of diseases, known by
the name of Ayur-veda, in which the different branches, which
developed in later times, were all in an undifferentiated condition,
yet we have no evidence which can lead us to disbelieve Susruta,
when he alludes definitely to such a literature. The Caraka-Sa'f!lhitii
also alludes to the existence of a beginningless traditional continuity
of Ayur-veda, under which term he includes life, the constancy
of the qualities of medical herbs, diet, etc., and their effects on
the human body and the intelligent enquirer. The early works
that are now available to us, viz. the Caraka-sa'f!lhitii and Su.Sruta-
SarJlhitii, are both known as tantras 3 • Even Agnivesa's work
(Agnivesa-sarJlhitii), which Caraka revised and which was available
at the time of Cakrapal)i, was a tantra. What then was the Ayur-
veda, which has been variously described as a fifth Veda or an
upaveda, if not a literature distinctly separate from the tantras
now available to us 4 ? It seems probable, therefore, that such a
literature existed, that the systematized works of Agnivesa and
others superseded it and that, as a consequence, it cameultimatelyto
be lost. Caraka, however, uses the word'' Ayur-veda" in the general
sense of" science oflife." Life is divided by Caraka into four kinds,
viz. sukha (happy), dul:zkha (unhappy), hila (good) and ahita (bad).
Sukham iiyul:z is a life which is not affected by bodily or mental
diseases, is endowed with vigour, strength, energy, vitality, activity
and is full of all sorts of enjoyments and successes. The opposite
of this is the asukham iiyul_z. Hitam iiyul:z is the life of a person
who is always willing to do good to all beings, never steals others'
property, is truthful, self-controlled, self-restrained and works
1
Rockhill's Life of the Buddha, p. 65.
2 Atharva-veda, II. 9· 3. sata7Jl hy asya bh#ajab- sahasram uta Vlrudhab-.
3 Gurv-iijfiii-liibhiinantara7Jl etat-tantra-karat;~a7Jl. Cakrapa~i's Ayur-veda-
dipikii, 1. 1. 1 ; also Caraka-sa7Jlhitii, I. 1. 52.
' Cakrapa~i quotes the Agnivesa-sa7Jlhitii in his Ayur-veda-dlpikii, VI. 3·
177-185.
with careful consideration, does not transgress the moral injunc-
tions, takes to virtue and to enjoyment with equal zeal, honours
revered persons, is charitable and does what is beneficial to
this world and to the other. The opposite of this is called ahita.
The object of the science of life is to teach what is conducive to
all these four kinds of life and also to determine the length of such
a life 1 .
But, if Ayur-veda means" science of life," what is its connection
with the Atharva-Veda? We find in the Caraka-Sa1Jlhitii that
a physician should particularly be attached (bhaktir iidesyii) to the
Atharva-Veda. The Atharva-Veda deals with the treatment of
diseases (cikitsii) by advising the propitiatory rites (svastyayana),
offerings (bali), auspicious oblations (maizgala-homa), penances
(niyama), purificatory rites (priiyas-citta),fasting (upaviisa) and in-
cantations (mantra) 2 • Cakrapat:ti, in commenting on this, says that,
since it is advised that physicians should be attached totheAthan:a-
Veda, it comes to this, that the Atharva-Veda becomes Ayur-veda
(Atharva-vedasya iiyurvedatvam uktattZ bhavatt). The Atharva-
Veda, no doubt, deals with different kinds of subjects, and so Ayur-
veda is to be considered as being only a part of the Atharva-Veda
(Atharva-vedaikadesa eva iiyur-vedal;). Viewed in the light of
CakrapaQ.i's interpretation, it seems that the school of medical
teaching to which Caraka belonged was most intimately connected
with the A tharva- Veda. This is further corroborated by a com-
parison of the system of bones found in the Caraka-sa1Jlhitii with
that of the Atharva-Veda. Susruta himself remarks that, while he
considers the number of bones in the human body to be three
hundred, the adherents of the Vedas hold them to be three hun-
dred and sixty; and this is exactly the number counted by Caraka 3 •
The Atharva-Veda does not count the bones; but there are with
regard to the description of bones some very important points in
1 Cm·aka, 1. 1. 40 and I. 30. zo-23:
hitiihita'IJl sukha'IJl dul.zkham iiyus tasya hitiihita'IJl
miina1Jl ca tac ca yatroktam iiyur-vedal.z sa ucyate.
In I. 30. 20 the derivation of Ayur-veda is given as iiyur vedayati iti iiyur-vedal.z,
i.e. that which instructs us about life. Susruta suggests two alternative deri-
vations-iiyur asmin vidyate anena vii iiyur vindatity iiyur-vedal.z, i.e. that by which
life is known or examined, or that by which life is attained. Su1ruta-Sa7Jlhitii,
I. I. '4·
2 Caraka, 1. 30. 20.
3
Tn1Ji sa~a~thiiny asthi-satiini veda-viidino bhii~ante; salya-tantre tu tri1JY eva
satiini. Susruta-Sa'IJlhitii, III. 5· I8. Trl'IJi ~a~thiini satiiny asthnii'IJl saha danta-
nakhena. Caraka-sa'!Jlhitii, IV. 7. 6.
which the school to which Caraka belonged was in agreement with
the Atharva-Veda, and not with Susruta. Dr Hoernle, who has
carefully discussed the whole question, thus remarks: "A really
important circumstance is that the Atharvic system shares with the
Charakiyan one of the most striking points in which the latter
differs from the system of Susruta, namely, the assumption of a
central facial bone in the structure of the skull. It may be added
that the Atharvic term prati~thii for the base of the long bones
obviously agrees with the Charakiyan term adhi~thiina and widely
differs from the Susrutiyan kurca 1 ." The Satapatha-briihma1Ja,
which, as Dr Hoernle has pointed out, shows an acquaintance
with both the schools to which Caraka and Susruta respectively
belonged, counts, however, 360 bones, as Caraka did 2 • The word
veda-viidino in Susruta-sa1{lhitii, 111. 5· 18 does not mean the fol-
lowers of Ayur-veda as distinguished from the Vedas, as J!alhaJ)a
interprets it, but is literally true in the sense that it gives us the
view which is shared by Caraka with the Atharva-Veda, the
Satapatha-briihma1Ja, the legal literature and the purii1}as, which
according to all orthodox estimates derive their validity from
the Vedas. If this agreement of the Vedic ideas with those of the
Atreya school of medicine, as represented by Caraka, be viewed
together with the identification by the latter of Ayur-Veda with
Atharva- Veda, it may be not unreasonable to suppose that the
Atreya school, as represented by Caraka, developed from the
Atharva- Veda. This does not preclude the possibility of there being
an Ayur-veda of another school, to which Susruta refers and from
which, through the teachings of a series of teachers, the Sufruta-
Sa1(lhitii developed. This literature probably tried to win the respect
of the people by associating itself. with the Atharva- Veda, and
by characterizing itself as an upiinga of the Atharva- Veda 3 •
Jayanta argues that the validity of the Vedas depends on the
fact that they have been composed by an absolutely trustworthy
1
A. F. Rudolf Hoernle's Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, p. 113.
2 Ibid. pp. 105-Io6. See also Satapatha-briihma1Ja, x. 5· 4· 12, also XII. 3· 2.
3 and 4, xn. 2. 4· 9-14, VIII. 6. 2. 7 and 10. The Yiijfiavalkya-Dharma-siistra,
Vip:zu-smrti, Vi~1}u-dharmottara and Agni-Purii1Ja also enumerate the bones of the
human body in agreement with Caraka as 360. The source of the last three
was probably the first ( Yiijfiavalkya-Dharma-siistra), as has been suggested by
Dr Hoernle in his Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, pp. 40-46. But none
of these non-medical recensions are of an early date: probably they are not earlier
than the third or the fourth century A.D.
3 The word upiiilga may have been used, however, in the sense that it was a
supplementary work haYing the same scope as the Atharva- Veda.

280 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH.
person (iipta). As an analogy he refers to Ayur-veda, the validity
of which is due to the fact that it has been composed by trust-
worthy persons (iipta). That the medical instructions of the Ayur-
veda are regarded as valid is due to the fact that they are the
instructions of trustworthy persons (yato yatriiptaviidatra'f!l tatra
priimii'l}yam iti vyiiptir grhyate). But it may be argued that the
validity of Ayur-veda is not because it has for its author trustworthy
persons, but because its instructions can be verified by experience
(nanviiyur-vediidau priimii?zya'f!l pratyak~iidi-sa'f!lviidiit pratipanna'f!l
niipta-priimii1}yiit). Jayanta in reply says that the validity of Ayur-
veda is due to the fact of its being composed by trustworthy
persons; and it can be also verified by experience. He argues also
that the very large number of medicines, their combinations and
applications, are of such an infinite variety that it would be
absolutely impossible for any one man to know them by employing
the experimental methods of agreement and difference. It is only
because the medical authorities are almost omniscient in their
knowledge of things that they can display such superhuman
knowledge regarding diseases and their cures, which can be taken
only on trust on their authority. His attempts at refuting the view
that medical discoveries may have been carried on by the applica-
tions of the experimental methods of agreement and difference and
then accumulated through long ages are very weak and need not
be considered here.
The fourth Veda, known as the Atharva-Veda or the Brahma-
Veda, deals mainly with curatives and charms 1 • There is no reason
to suppose that the composition of this Veda was later than even
the earliest ~g- Vedic hymns; for never, probably, in the history
1
Some of the sacred texts speak of four Vedas and some of three Vedas, e.g.
"asya mahato bhiztasya ni[lSvasitam etad rg-vedoyajur-veda/:t siima-vedo 'tharviin-
girasa/:t," Brh. II. 4· 10 speaks of four Vedas; again" Yam nayas trayz-viflo vidu/:t
rca/:tsiimiiniyajil1Jlp," Taittirzya-briihmatza,I.II. 1. z6speaks of three Vedas. Sayal).a
refers to the Mzmii1Jlsii-siltra, II. 1. 37 "ie~e Yaju~z-iabda/:t" and says that all the
other Vedas which are neither ~k nor Sarna are Yaju~ (SayaQa's Upodghiita to
the Atharva- Veda, p. 4, Bombay edition, 1895). According to this interpretation
the Atharva-Veda is entitled to be included within Yaju~. and this explains the
references to the three Vedas. The Atharva- Veda is referred to in the Gopatha-
Briihma7J.a, II. z6 as Brahma-Veda, and two different reasons are adduced.
Firstly, it is said that the Atharva- Veda was produced by the ascetic penances
of Brahman; secondly it is suggested in the Gopatha-Brahmii1}a that all Atharval).ic
hymns are curative (bhe~aja), and whatever is curative is immortal, and whatever
is immortal is Brahman-" Ye 'tharvii1Jas tad bhe~aja'f!l, yad bhe~aja1Jl tad amrta'f!l,
yad amrta'IJl tad Brahma." Gopatha-briihma7J.a, III. 4· See also Nyiiya-maiijari,
pp. zso-z6I.
of India was there any time when people did not take to charms
and incantations for curing diseases or repelling calamities and
injuring enemies. The IJ.g- Veda itself may be regarded in a large
measure as a special development of such magic rites. The hold
of the Atharval)ic charms on the mind of the people was prob-
ably very strong, since they had occasion to use them in all
their daily concerns. Even now, when the J3.g-Vedic sacrifices
have become extremely rare, the use of Atharval)ic charms and of
their descendants, the Tantric charms of comparatively later times,
is very common amongst all classes of Hindus. A very large part
of the income of the priestly class is derived from the performance
of auspicious rites (svastyayana), purificatory penances (priiyas-
citta), and oblations (homa) for curing chronic and serious illnesses,
winning a law-suit, alleviating sufferings, securing a male issue
to the family, cursing an enemy, and the like. Amulets are used
almost as freely as they were three or four thousand years ago, and
snake-charms and charms for dog-bite and others are still things
which the medical people find it difficult to combat. Faith in the
mysterious powers of occult rites and charms forms an essential
feature of the popular Hindu mind and it oftentimes takes the
place of religion in the ordinary Hindu household. It may there-
fore be presumed that a good number of Atharval)ic hymns
were current when most of the J3.g-Vedic hymns were not yet
composed. By the time, however, that the Atharva- Veda was
compiled in its present form some new hymns were incorporated
with it, the philosophic character of which does not tally with the
outlook of the majority of the hymns. The Atharva- Veda, as
Sayal)a points out in the introduction to his commentary, was
indispensable to kings for warding off their enemies and securing
many other advantages, and the royal priests had to be versed in
the Atharval)ic practices. These practices were mostly for the
alleviation of the troubles of an ordinary householder, and ac-
cordingly the Grhya-sutras draw largely from them. The oldest
name of the Atharva- Veda is Atharviingirasal;, and this generally
suggested a twofold division of it into hymns attributed to Atharvan
and others attributed to Angiras; the former dealt with the holy
(santa), promoting of welfare (pau~tika) and the curatives ( bhe~ajiini),
and the latter with offensive rites for molesting an enemy {iibhi-
ciirika), also called terrible (ghora). The purposes which the Athar-
val)ic charms were supposed to fulfil were numerous. These may
Speculations in the Medical Schools (CH.
be briefly summed up in accordance with the KauSika-sutra as
follows: quickening of intelligence, accomplishment of the virtues
of a Brahmacarin (religious student); acquisition of villages,
cities, fortresses and kingdoms, of cattle, riches, food grains,
children, wives, elephants, horses, chariots, etc.; production of
unanimity (aikamatya) and contentment among the people;
frightening the elephants of enemies, winning a battle, warding
off all kinds of weapons, stupefying, frightening and ruining the
enemy army, encouraging and protecting one's own army, knowing
the future result of a battle, winning the minds of generals and chief
persons, throwing a charmed snare, sword, or string into the fields
where the enemy army may be moving, ascending a chariot for
winning a battle, charming all instruments of war music, killing
enemies, winning back a lost city demolished by the enemy;
performing the coronation ceremony, expiating sins, cursing,
strengthening cows, procuring prosperity; amulets for promoting
welfare, agriculture, the conditions of bulls, bringing about various
household properties, making a new-built house auspicious, letting
loose a bull (as a part of the general rites-Jriiddha), performing
the rites of the harvesting month of Agrahayal).a (the middle of
November to the middle of December); securing curatives for
various otherwise incurable diseases produced by the sins of past
life; curing all diseases generally, Fever, Cholera, and Diabetes;
stopping the flow of blood from wounds caused by injuries from
weapons, preventing epileptic fits and possession by the different
species of evil spirits, such as the bhuta, pisiica, Brahma-riik~asa,
etc.; curing viita, pitta and Sle~man, heart diseases, Jaundice,
white leprosy, different kinds of Fever, Pthisis, Dropsy; curing
worms in cows and horses, providing antidotes against all kinds
of poisons, supplying curatives for the diseases of the head, eyes,
nose, ears, tongue, neck and inflammation of the neck; warding
off the evil effects of a Brahmin's curse; arranging women's
rites for securing sons, securing easy delivery and the welfare of
the foetus; securing prosperity, appeasing a king's anger, know-
ledge of future success or failure; stopping too much rain
and thunder, winning in debates and stopping brawls, making
rivers flow according to one's wish, securing rain, winning in
gambling, securing the welfare of cattle and horses, securing large
gains in trade, stopping inauspicious marks in women, performing
auspicious rites for a new house, removing the sins of prohibited
XIII] Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Jl.eda
acceptance of gifts and prohibited priestly services; preventing bad
dreams, removing the evil effects of unlucky stars under whose
influence an infant may have been born, paying off debts, removing
the evils of bad omens, molesting an enemy; counteracting the
molesting influence of the charms of an enemy, performing aus-
picious rites, securing long life, performing the ceremonies at birth,
naming, tonsure, the wearing of holy thread, marriage, etc.; per-
forming funeral rites, warding off calamities due to the disturbance
of nature, such as rain of dust, blood, etc., the appearance
of yak~as, riik~asas, etc., earthquakes, the appearance of comets,
and eclipses of the sun and moon.
The above long list of advantages which can be secured by the
performance of Atharval).ic rites gives us a picture of the time when
these AtharvaQ.ic charms were used. Whether all these functions
were discovered when first the Atharval).ic verses were composed
is more than can be definitely ascertained. At present the evidence
we possess is limited to that supplied by the KauSika-siitra. Ac-
cording to the Indian tradition accepted by Sayal).a the compila-
tion of the Atharva- Veda was current in nine different collections,
the readings of which differed more or less from one another. These
different recensions, or siikhiis, were Paippalada, TaQ.<Ja, MaQ.<Ja,
Saunakiya, Jajala, Jalada, Brahmavada, Devadacia, and Caral).a-
vaidya. Of these only the Paippalada and Saunakiya recensions
are available. The Paippalada recension exists only in a single un-
published Tiibingen n1anuscript first discovered by Roth 1 • It
has been edited in facsimile and partly also in print. The Sauna-
kiya recension is what is now available in print. The Saunakiya
school has the Gopatha-briihmat.:za as its Brahmal).a and five
sutra works, viz. Kaui-ika, Va'itiina, Nak~atra-kalpa, Ang-irasa-
kalpa and Sant£-kalpa 2 ; these are also known as the five kalpas
(paiica-kalpa). Of these the Kaui-ika-siitra is probably the earliest
and most important, since all the other four depend upon it3 •
The Na~atra-kalpa and Santi-kalpa are more or less of an astro-
logical character. No manuscript of the Angirasa-kalpa seems to
be available; but from the brief notice of Sayal).a it appears to
1 Der Atharvaveda in Kashmir by Roth.
2 The Kauiika-siltra is also known as Sa,hitii-vidhi and Sa1flhitii-kalpa. The
three kalpas, Nak~atra, Angirasa and Santi, are actually Pariiinas.
3 'tatra Sakalyena sa1flhitii-mantriit;ii1!' Siintika-pa~fikiid#u karmasu viniyoga~
vidhiiniit samhitii-vidhir nama Kauiikam sutram; tad eva itarair upajlvyatviit.

Upodhghiita.of SayaQ.a to the Atharva-Veda, p."25.
have been a manual for molesting one's enemies (abhiciira-karma).
The V aitiina-siitra dealt with some sacrificial and ritualistic details.
The Kausika-siitra was commented on by Darila, Ke8ava, Bhadra
and Rudra. The existence of the Caral).a-vaidya (wandering medical
practitioners) siikhii reveals to us the particular siikhii of the
Atlzar'va- Veda, which probably formed the old Ayur-veda of the
Atreya-Caraka school, who identified the Athar~,a- Veda with
Ayur-veda. The suggestion, contained in the word Ciirm:za-vaidya,
that the medical practitioners of those days went about from place
to place, and that the sufferers on hearing of the arrival of such
persons approached them, and sought their help, is interesting1 .
Bones in the Atharva- Veda and Ayur-veda.

The main interest of the present chapter is in that part of the
Atharva- Veda which deals with curative instructions, and for this
the KauSika-siltra has to be taken as the principal guide. Let us
first start with the anatomical features of the Atharva- Veda 2 • The
bones counted are as follows: 1. heels (piir~r,zz, in the dual number,
in the two feet) 3 ; 2. ankle-bones (gulphau in the dual number) 4 ;
1
Is it likely that the word Caraka (literally, a wanderer) had anything to do
with the itinerant character of Caraka's profession as a medical practitioner?
2
Hymns 11. 33 and x. 2 are particularly important in this connection.
3
Caraka also counts one piir~t;i for each foot. Hoernle (Studies in the Medicine
of Ancient India, p. 1 28) remarks on the fact, that Caraka means the backward
and downward projections of the os calcis, that is, that portion of it which can
be superficially seen and felt, and is popularly known as the heel. The same
may be the case with the Atharva- Veda. Susruta probably knew the real nature
of it as a cluster (ktlrca); for in Sarlra-sthiina VI he speaks of the astragalus as
kzlrca-iiras, or head of the cluster, but he counts the piir~t;i separately. Hoernle
suggests that by piirHti Susruta meant the os calcis, and probably did not
think that it was a member of the tarsal cluster (kurca). It is curious that
Vagbhata I makes a strange confusion by attributing one piir~1Ji to each hand
(A~tiiilga-sa1Jl!Jraha, II. 5; also Hoernle, pp. 91-96).
4
Gulpha means the distal processes of the two bones of the leg, known as the
malleoli. As counted by Caraka and also by Susruta, there are four gulphas. See
Hoernle's comment on Susruta's division, Hoernle, pp. 81, 82, 102-104. Susruta,
III. v. 19, has" tala-ktlrca-gulpha-saiJliritiini daia," which J)alhar;~.a explains as tala
(5 ialiilliis and the one bone to which they are attached)-6 bones, lulrca-2 bones,
gulpha-z bones. Hoernle misinterpreted OalhaJ).a, and, supposing that he spoke
of two kurcas and two gulphas in the same leg, pointed out a number of incon-
sistencies and suggested a different reading of the Susruta text. His translation
of valaya as "ornament" in this connection is also hardly correct; "l.:alaya prob-
ably means "circular." Following J)alhar:ta, it is possible that the interpretation
is that there are two bones in one cluster (kurca) in each leg, and the two bones
form one circular bone (valayiisthi) of one gulpha for each leg. If this is accepted,
much of what Hoernle has said on the point loses its value and becomes hyper-
critical. There are two gulphas, or one in each leg, according as the constituent
pieces, or the one whole valayiisthi, is referred to. On my interpretation Susruta
XIII) Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda z8s
3· digits (aizgulayab in the plural number)!; 4· metacarpal and
metatarsal bones (ucchlaizkhau in the dual number, i.e. of the
hands and feet) 2 ; 5· base (prat#thii) 3 ; 6. the knee-caps (a~thlvantau
in the dual) 4 ; 7. the knee-joints (jiinunob sandhi) 5 ; 8. the shanks
(jaizghe in the dual) 6 ; 9· the pelvic cavity (Sro!li in the dual) 7 ;
10. the thigh bones (ilril in the dual) 8 ; 11. the breast bones
knew of only two bones as forming the kurca, and there is no passage in Susruta
to show that he knew of more. The os calcis would be the piirp:~i, the astragalus,
the kurca-siras, the two malleoli bones and the two gulpha bones.
1
Both Caraka and Susruta count sixty of these phalanges {pa1Ji-padiiizguli),
whereas their actual number is fifty-six only.
3 Caraka counts these metacarpal and metatarsal bones (pii1Ji-piida-saliika) as
twenty, the actual number. Susruta collects them under tala, a special term used
by him. His combined tala-kilrca-gulpha includes all the bones of the hand and
foot excluding the anguli bones (phalanges).
3
Caraka uses the term pii1Ji-pada-saliikiidhi~!hiina, Yajfiavalkya, sthiina, and
Susruta, kurca. Caraka seems to count it as one bone. Kurca means a network
of (1) flesh (mii1llSa), (2) sirii, (3) sniiyu, (4) bones (miimsa-Sirii-sniiyv-asthi-jiiliini).
All these four kinds of network exist in the two joints of the hands and feet.
4
Hoernle remarks that in the Atharva- Veda a~thlvat and janu are synony-
mous; but the text, x. 2. 2, seems clearly to enumerate them separately. The
~!hivat is probably the patella bone. Caraka uses the terms jiinu and kapiilikii,
probably for the knee-cap (patella) and the elbow pan (kapiilikii). Kapiilikii
means a small shal1ow basin, and this analogy suits the construction of the elbow
pan. Susruta uses the term kr7.rpara (elbow pan), not in the ordinary list of
bones in Sarlra, v. 19, but at the time of counting the manna in ibid. VI. 25.
5
This seems to be different from a~thzvat (patella).
6
The tibia and the fibula in the leg. Caraka, Bhela, Susruta and Vagbhata I
describe this organ rightly as consisting of two bones. The Atharva-Vedajustly
describes the figure made bv them as being a fourfold frame having its ends
closely connected together (catu~fayatfl yuj'yate sa'I'Jlhitiintam). The corresponding
two bones of the fore-arm (aratni)-radius and ulna-are correctly counted by
Caraka. Curiously enough, Susruta does not refer to them in the bone-list. The
biihu is not enumerated in this connection.
7 Caraka speaks of two bones in the pelvic cavity, viz. the os innominatum on
both sides. Modern anatomists think that each os innominatum is composed

of three different bones: ilium, the upper portion, ischium, the lower part,
and the pubis, the portion joined to the other innominate bone. The ilium and
ischium, however, though they are two bones in the body of an infant, become
fused together as one bone in adult life, and from this point of view the counting
of ilium and ischium as one bone is justifiable. In addition to these a separate
bhagiisthi is counted by Caraka. He probably considered (as Hoernle suggests)
the sacrum and coccyx to be one bone which formed a part of the vertebral column.
By bhagiisthi he probably meant the pubic bone; for CakrapaQi, commenting
upon bhagiisthi, describes it as" abhimukha'I'Jl kafi-sandhiina-kiiraka'lfJ tiryag-asthi"
(the cross bone which binds together the haunch bones in front). Susruta,
however, counts five bones: four in the guda, bhaga, nitamba and one in the trika.
Nitamba corresponds to the two sro1}i-phalaka of Caraka, bhaga to the bhagiisthi,
or pubic bone, guda to the coccyx and trika to the triangular bone sacrum.
Susruta's main difference from Caraka is this, that, while the latter counts the
sacrum and coccyx as one bone forming part of the vertebral column, the former
considers them as two bones and as separate from the vertebral column. Vagbhata
takes trika and guda as one bone, but separates it from the vertebral column.
8 Caraka, Susruta and Vagbhata I count it correctly as one bone in each leg.
Caraka calls it ilru-nalaka.

286 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
(uras)l; 12. thewindpipe(grzviib in theplural) 2 ; 13. thebreast(stanau
in the dual) 3 ; 14. the shoulder-blade (kaphoif.au in the dual) 4 ; 15. the
shoulder-bones (skandhiin in the plural)5 ; 16. the backbone (pr~tfb
1 Caraka counts fourteen bones in the breast. Indian anatomists counted
cartilages as new bones (taru~a asthi). There are altogether ten costal cartilages
on either side of the sternum. But the eighth, ninth and tenth cartilages are
attached to the seventh. So, if the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth cartilages
are considered as a single bone, there are altogether seven bones on either side
of the sternum. This gives us the total number of fourteen which Caraka counts.
The sternum was not counted by Caraka separately. With him this was the
result of the continuation of the costal cartilages attached to one another without
a break. Su8ruta and Vagbhata I curiously count eight bones in the breast, and
this can hardly be accounted for. Hoernle's fancied restoration of the ten of
Susruta does not appear to be proved. Yajiiavalkya, however, counts seventeen,
i.e. adds the sternum and the eighth costal cartilage on either side to Caraka's
fourteen bones, which included these three. Hoemle supposes that Yajiia-
valkya's number was the real reading in Susruta; but his argument is hardly
convincing.
2
The windpipe is composed of four parts, viz. larynx, trachea, and two
bronchi. It is again not a bone, but a cartilage; but it is yet counted as a bone
by the Indian anatomists, e.g. Caraka calls it "jatru" and Susruta "kat.ztha-
natfr,." Hoernle has successfully shown that the wordjatru was used in medical
books as synonymous with windpipe or neck generally. Hoernle says that
originally the word denoted cartilaginous portions of the neck and breast (the
windpipe and the costal cartilages), as we read in the Satapatha-briihmat,za:
"tasmiid imii ubhayatra pariavo baddhii/:l kikasiisu ca jatrUiU" (the ribs are
fastened at either end, exteriorly to the thoracic vertebrae and interiorly to the
costal cartilages-jatru). In medical works it means the cartilaginous portion
of the neck, i.e. the windpipe (Caraka), and hence is applied either to the neck
generally or to the sterno-clavicular articulation at the base of the neck (Susruta).
It is only as late as the sixth or seventh century A.D. that, owing to a misinter-
pretation of the anatomical terms sandhi and a1f1Sa, it was made to mean clavicle.
See Hoernle's Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, p. r68.
3 "Parivayos catur-vi7[liati/:l piirsvayos tiivanti caiva sthalakiini tiivanti caiva
sthiilakiirbudiini," i.e. there are twenty-four bones in the piiriva (ribs), twenty-
four sthiilakas (sockets), and twenty-four sthiilakiirbudas (tubercles). Susruta
speaks of there being thirty-six ribs on either side. A rib consists of a shaft
and a head;" at the point of junction of these two parts there is a tubercle which
articulates with the transverse process of corresponding vertebrae, and probably
this tubercle is arbuda. '' There are, no doubt, twenty-four ribs. The sthalakas and
arbudas cannot properly be counted as separate bones; but, even if they are
counted, the total number ought to be 68 bones, as Hoernle points out, and not
72, since the two lowest have no tubercles.
' Kaphotja probably means scapula or shoulder-blade. Caraka uses the
word a1f1Sa-phalaka. Caraka uses two other terms, a~aka (collar-bone) and a1f1Sa.
This word a7Jlsa seems to be a wrong reading, as Hoernle points out; for in
reality there are only two bones, the scapula and the collar-bone. But could it
not mean the acromion process of the scapula? Though Susruta omits the
shoulder-blade in the counting of bones in Siirfra, v. (for this term is ak~aka
saT[ljiie), yet he distinctly names a1f1Sa-phalaka in Sarfra, VI. 27, and describes
it as triangular (trika-sa7Jlbaddhe); and this term has been erroneously interpreted
as grfvaya a1f1Sa-dvayasya ca yal;l saT[lyogas sa trika/:l by (>alhaJ).a. The junction
of the collar-bone with the neck cannot be called trika.
6 Caraka counts fifteen bones in the neck. According to modern anatomists
there are, however, only seven. He probably counted the transverse processes
XIII] Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda
in the plural) 1 ; 17. the collar-bones (a1J1SaU in the dual) 2 ; 18. the
brow (laliita); 19. the central facial bone (kakii/ikii) 3 ; 20. the pile
of the jaw (hanu-citya) 4 ; 21. the cranium with ten1ples (kapiilam) 5 •
and got the number fourteen, to which he added the vertebrae as constituting
one single bone.
Susruta counts nine bones. The seventh bone contains spinous and transverse
processes and was probably therefore counted by him as three bones, which,
together with the other six, made the total number nine.
1
Caraka counts forty-three bones in the vertebral column <Pr~tha-gatiistlzi),
while the actual number is only twenty-six. Each bone consists of four parts,
viz. the body, the spinous process, and the two transverse processes, and Caraka
counts them all as four bones. Susruta considers the body and the spinous
process as one and the two transverse processes as two; thus for the four bones
of Caraka, Susruta has three. In Caraka the body and the spinous process of
the twelve thoracic vertebrae make the number twenty-four; the five lumbar
vertebrae (body+ spine+ two transverses) make twenty. He adds to this the
sacrum and the coccyx as one pelvic bone, thus making the number forty-five;
with Susruta we have twelve thoracic vertebrae, six lumbar vertebrae, twelve
transverses, i.e. thirty bones. The word klkasa (A.V. II. 33· 2) means the whole of
the spinal column, anukya (A.V. II. 33· 2) means the thoracic portion of the
spine, and udara the abdominal portion.
2
Both Caraka and Susruta call this ak~aka and count it correctly as two
bones. Cakrapal)..i describes it as" ak1a-vivak1akau jatru-sandhel:z kflakau" (they
are called ak~aka because they are like two beams-the fastening-pegs of the
junction of the neck-bones).
Susruta further speaks of a7JlSa-Pltha (the glenoid cavity into which the head
of the humerus is inserted) as a samudga (casket) bone. The joint of each of the
anal bones, the pubic bone and the hip bone (nitamba) is also described by him
as a samudga. This is the "acetabulum, or cotyloid cavity, in which the head
of the femur, is lodged" (Suiruta, Siirira, v. 27, a7JlSa-Pltha-guda-bhaga-nitambe1U
samudgiifz).
3
Laliita is probably the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brow and kaluJpkii
the lower portion, comprising the body of the superior maxillary together with
the molar and nasal bones. Caraka counts the two molar {gat;fja-kilfa), the two
nasal, and the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brows as forming one continuous
bone (ekiisthi niisikii-gat;fja-kuta-laliitam).
4
According to Caraka, the lower jaw only is counted as a separate bone
(eka7fL hanv-asthi), and the two attachments are counted as two bones (dve
hanu-mula-bandhane). Susruta, however, counts the upper and the lower jaws as
two bones (hanvor dve). Though actually each of these bones consists of two
bones, they are so fused together that they may be considered as one, as was
done by Susruta. Caraka did not count the upper jaw, so he counted the sockets
of the teeth (dantolilkhala) and the hard palate (tiil~Jiaka). Susruta's counting of
the upper hanu did not include the palatine process; so he also counts the tiilu
(eka7fL tiiluni).
6 Sankha is the term denoting the temples, of which both Caraka and
Susruta count two. Caraka counts four cranial bones (catviiri siralz-kapiiliini) and
Susruta six (Sirasi 1at). The brain-case consists of eight bones. Of these two are
inside and hence not open to view from outside. So there are only six bones
which are externally visible. Of these the temporal bones have already been
counted as sankha, thus leaving a remainder of four bones. Susruta divides the
frontal, parietal and occipital bones into two halves and considers them as
separate bones, and he thus gets the number six. Both the frontal and occipital
are really each composed of two bones, which become fused in later life.
Though the author has often differed from Dr Hoemle, yet he is highly in-
debted to his scholarly explanations and criticisms in writing out this particular
section of this chapter.
z88 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda.

We have no proofs through which we could assert that the writer
of the Atharva- Veda verse knew the number of the different bones
to which he refers; but it does not seem possible that the references
made to bones could have been possible without a careful study
of the human skeleton. Whether this was done by some crude
forms of dissection or by a study of the skeletons of dead bodies
in a state of decay is more than can be decided. Many of the organs
are also mentioned, such as the heart (hrdaya), the lungs (kloma)l,
the gall-bladder (halikr1Ja) 2 , the kidneys (matsniibhyiim) 3 , the liver
(yakna), the spleen (plthan), the stomach and the smaller intestine
(antrebhya/:z), the rectum and the portion above it (gudiibhya]:z), the
1 Caraka counts kloma as an organ near the heart, but he does not count
pupphusa. In another place (Cikitsii, xvn. 34) he speaks of kloma as one of the
organs connected with hiccough (hrdaya'I'Jl kloma kat.ztha'I'Jl ca tiiluka'I'Jl ca samiisritii
mrdvz sa ~udra-hikveti nrva'I'Jl siidhyii prakzrtitii}. Cakrapa~ describes it as
pipiisii-sthiina (seat of thirst). But, whatever that may be, since Caraka considers
its importance in connection with hiccough, and, since he does not mention
pupphusa (lungs-Mahci-vyutpatti, 100), kloma must mean with him the one
organ of the two lungs. Susruta speaks of pupphusa as being on the left side
and kloma as being on the right. Since the two lungs vary in size, it is quite
possible that Susruta called the left lung pupphusa and the right one kloma.
Vagbhata I follows Susruta. The Atharva- Veda, Caraka, Susruta, Vagbhata
and other authorities use the word in the singular, but in Brhad-iiravyaka, 1. the
word kloma is used in the plural number; and Sankara, in commenting on this,
says that, though it is one organ, it is always used in the plural (nitya-bahu-va-
caniinta). This, however, is evidently erroneous, as all the authorities use the
word in the singular. His description of it as being located on the left of the
heart (yakrc ca klomiinai ca hrdayasyiidhastiid dak#t.zottarau mii'I'JlSa-khat.zf.jau, Br.
1. 1, commentary of Salikara) is against the verdict of Susruta, who places it on
the same side of the heart as the liver. The Bhiiva-prakiisa describe& it as the root
of the veins, where water is borne or secreted. That kloma was an organ which
formed a member of the system of respiratory organs IS further proved by its
being often associated with the other organs of the neighbourhood, such as the
throat (kavtha) and the root of the palate (tiilu-mula). Thus Caraka says," udaka-
vahiinii'I'Jl srotasii'I'Jl tiilu-mula'I'Jl kloma ca .. • . Jihvii-tiilv-o~tha-kavtha-kloma-io~am
•• . dr~tvii" (Vimiina, v. 10). Sarrigadhara, I. v. 45, however, describes it as a gland
of watery secretions near the liver (jala-viihi-iira-mula'I'Jl trp:tii-l:chiidanaka'I'Jl
tilam).
2 This word does not occur in the medical literature. SayaQa describes it as
"etat-sarrzjiiakiit tat-Sa'I'Jlbandhiit mii'I'JlSa-pivr/a-viie~iit." This, however, is quite

useless for identification. Weber thinks that it may mean "gall" (lndische
Studien, 13, 206). Macdonell considers it to be "some particular intestine"
(Vedic Index, vol. u, p. soo).
3 SayaQa paraphrases matsniibhyiim as vrkyiibhyiim. Caraka's reading is
vukka. SayaQa gives an alternative explanation: "matsniibhyiim ubhaya-piirsva-
sa'!lhandhiibhyii'I'Jl vrkyiibhyii'I'Jl tat-samlpa-stha-pittiidhiira-piitriibhyiim." If this
explanation is accepted, then matsnii would mean the two sacs of pitta (bile) near
the kidneys. The two mats1ll'h in this explanation would probably be the gall
bladder and the pancreas, which latter, on account of its secretions, was probably
considered as another pittiidhiira.
xnr] Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda
larger intestine (vani:lithu, explained by Sayaf).a as sthaviriintra), the
abdomen (udara), the colon (pliiSi)\ the umbilicus (niibhi), the
marrow (majjabhyab), the veins (sniivabhyab) and the arteries
(dhamanibhya/_1.)2. Thus we see that almost all the important organs
reported in the later Atreya-Caraka school or the Susruta school
were known to the composers of the Atharvaf).ic hymns 3 •
Bolling raises the point whether the Atharva- Veda people knew
the difference between the sira and the dlzamani, and says, "The
apparent distinction between veins and arteries in 1. I 7. 3 is offset
by the occurrence of the same words in vn. 35· 2 with the more
general sense of 'internal canals' meaning entrails, vagina, etc.-
showing how vague were the ideas held with regard to such
subjects 4 ." But this is not correct; for there is nothing in r. I 7. 3
which suggests a knowledge of the distinction between veins and
arteries in the modern sense of the terms, such as is not found in
VII. 35· 2. The sukta 1. I7 is a charm for stopping the flow of
blood from an injury or too much hemorrhage of women.
A handful of street-dust was to be thrown on the injured part
and the hymn was to be uttered. In 1. I7· 1 it is said," ]""hose hiriis
(veins?) wearing red garment (or the receptacles of blood) of
woman which are constantly flowing should remain dispirited, like
daughters without a brother 5 ." SayaQa, in explaining the next
verse, r. 17. 2, says that it is a prayer to dhamanis. This verse runs
as follows: "Thou (Sayaf).a says 'thou Sira') of the lower part,
remain (i.e. 'cease from letting out blood,' as Sayaf).a says), so
thou of the upper part remain, so thou of the middle part, so thou
1 Pliisi is paraphrased by SayaQa as "bahu-cchidriin mala-piitriit" (the vessel
of the excreta with many holes). These holes are probably the orifices of the
glands inside the colon (mala-p(/.tra). The Satapatlza-briihma'l}a, XII. 9· 1. 3
enumerates all these organs as being sacred to certain gods and sacrificial
instruments-hrdayam eviisyaindrab pur(}(f<isal;, yakrt sii'Litral;, klomii t•iiru'f.la!z,
matme e'L'iisyiis·vatthmrz ca piitram audumbarm.n ca pittm_n naiyagrodlzam antrii~zi
stlzii/yalz f!Uda upiisayani syena-piitre pfllzlisandi niiblzi}.z kumblzo 'L'atli~!lzulz pfiisi!z
scl.tatnnul. tad yat sii bahudlzii vitnz~lll bhavati tasmiit plaiir bahudlul. u'krtta!r.
Vasti, or bladder, is regarded as the place where the urine collects (A.V. I. J. 6).
2 Sayat.la says that snii<t'a means here the smaller Siras and dhamanr the thicker
ones (the arteries)-silhsmafz iiriilz sniiva-sabdena uryante dhamani-sabdena

sthuliilz (A.V. 11. 33).
3 A.V. x. 9 shows that probably dissection of animals was also practised.
l\Iost of the organs of a cow are mentioned. Along with the organs of human
beings mentioned ahoYe two other organs are mentioned, viz. the pericardium
(puritat) and the bronchial tubes (saha-ka~tfhilui). A.V. x. 9· 15.
4 Enryclopaedia of Rcli;Jiun and Ethirs, "Diseases and m~dicine: Vedic.".
5 Sayal)a paraphrases hira as sirii and describes it as a canal (mi~/t) for carrymg
blood (rajo-vahana-ml..jya!z), and the epithet" lohita-viisasa!t" as either" wearing

red garment" or" red," or" the rcceptadc of blood" (rudhirafya nh'll.sa-bhutii,:.l.
10
DII
small, so thou the big dhamani1 ." In the third verse both the
hiriis and dhamanis are mentioned. "These in the middle were
formerly (letting out blood) among a hundred dhamanis and
thousands of hiras (and after that) all the other (niit}is) were playing
with (others which have ceased from letting out blood) 2 ." Hymn
VII. 35 is for stopping the issue of a woman who is an enemy. The
third verse says, " I close with a stone the apertures of a hundred
hiriis and a thousand dhamanis." Sayal)a, in explaining this verse,
says that the hiriis are fine niit}ts inside the ovary (garbha-
dharm:ziirtham antar-avasthitii}; suk~mii yii niit}ya};) and the dhamanis
the thicker uiit}ts round the ovary for keeping it steady (garbhii-
sayasya ava~ta1Jlbhikii bahya sthula yii nat}yal;). The only point of
difference between this verse and those of I. I 7 is that here siriis
are said to be a hundred and dhamanis a thousand, whereas in the
latter, the dhamanis were said to be a hundred and the Siras a
thousand. But, if Sayal)a's interpretation is accepted, the dhamanis
still appear as the bigger channels and the siriis as the finer ones.
Niit}i seems to have been the general name of channels. But
nowhere in the Atharva- Veda is there any passage which suggests
that the distinction between veins and arteries in the modern sense
of the terms was known at the time. In A.V. 1. 3· 6 we hear of two
niit}ls called gavinyau for carrying the urine from the kidneys to
the bladder 3 • The gods of the eight quarters and other gods are
said to have produced the foetus and, together with the god of de-
livery (Sii~a), facilitated birth by loosening the bonds of the womb 4 •
1 The previous verse referred to siriis as letting out blood, whereas this verse
refers to dhamanis as performing the same function. Sayat].a also freely para-
phrases dhamani as sirii (mahl mahatl sthulatarii dhamanil;z sirii t#thiid it ti$thaty
eva, anena prayoge1Ja nivrtta-rudhira-sriivii avat#thatiim).
2
Here both the dhamani and the hirii are enumerated. Sayat].a here says
that dhamanis are the important niifjls in the heart (hrdaya-gatiiniim pradhiina-
niifj'iniim), and hiriis or siras are branch niif)fs (Sirii~iitp sakhii-nii¢iniim). The
number of dhamanis, as here given, is a hundred and thus almost agrees with
the number of niifjis in the heart given in the Katha Upani~ad, VI. 16 (Satatp
caikii ca hrdayasya niifjyal;z).
The Praina Upani!ad, III. 6 also speaks of a hundred naf)fs, of which there
are thousands of branches.
3
antrebhyo vinirgatasya miltrasya miltriisaya-priipti-siidhane piiriva-dvaya-
sthe niifjyau gavlnyau ity ucyete. SayaJ).a's Bhiil)la. In 1. 11. 5 two niifjis called
gavlnikii are referred to and are described by SayaJ).a as being the two
niif)fs on the two sides of the vagina controlling delivery (gavlnike yonel;z
piiriva-vartinyau nirgamana-pratibandhike nii{iyau-SayaJ).a). In one passage
(A.V. 11. 12. 7) eight dhamanis called manya are mentioned, and SayaJ).a says
that they are near the neck. A niif)f called sikatiivat'f, on which strangury
depends, is mentioned in A.V. I. 17. 4·
4
Another goddess of delivery, Sii!?iiJ).i, is also invoked.
XIII] Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda
The term jariiyu is used in the sense of placenta, which is said to
have no intimate connection with the flesh and marrow, so that
when it falls down it is eaten by the dogs and the body is in no
way hurt. A reference is found to a first aid to delivery in ex-
panding the sides of the vagina and pressing the two gavinil~ii
niil}is 1 • The sniivas (tendons) are also mentioned along with dha-
manis, and Sayal).a explains them as finer siras (Suksmiilz siriih
sniiva-sabdena ucyante). The division of dhamanis, Siriis and sniivas
thus seems to have been based on their relative fineness: the
thicker channels (niil}is) were called dhammzis, the finer ones were
called siriis and the still finer ones sniivas. Their general functions
were considered more or less the same, though these probably
differed according to the place in the body where they were
situated and the organs with which they were associated. It
seems to have been recognized that there was a general flow of
the liquid ele1nents of the body. This probably corresponds to the
notion of srotas, as we get it in the Caraka-Sa'f!lhitii, and which will
be dealt with later on. Thus A.V. x. 2. I I says, "who stored in him
floods turned in all directions moving diverse and formed to flow
in rivers, quick (tivrii), rosy (aru~ii), red (lohini), and copper dark
(tiimra-dhilmrii), running all ways in a man upward and down-
ward? " This clearly refers to the diverse currents of various liquid
elements in the body. The semen, again, is conceived as the thread
of life which is being spun out2 • The intimate relation between the
heart and the brain seems to have been dimly apprehended. Thus
it is said, "together with his needle hath Atharvan sewn his head
and heart3 ." The theory of the viiyus, which we find in all later
literature, is alluded to, and the prii~a, apiina, vyiina and samiina
are mentioned 4 • It is however difficult to guess what these prii~a,
apiina, etc. exactly meant. In another passage of the Atharva-
Veda we hear of nine prii~as (nava prii~iin navabhil; sa'f!lmimite),
and in another seven prii~as are mentioned 5 • In another passage
1 vi te bhinadmi vi yoni1JZ vi gavlnike. A.V. 1. 11. 5.
2
Ko asmin reto nyadadhiit tantur iitayatiim iti (Who put the semen in him,
saying, Let the thread of life be spun out? A.V. x. 2. 17).
3
1Vfurdhiinam asya sa'!Zs'fvyiitharvii hrdaya1Jl ca yat (A.V. x. 2. 26). See
also Griffith's translations.
' Ko asmin prii1Jam avayat ko apiinarrz vyiinam u samiinam asmin ko deve 'dhi
sisriiya puru~e (\Vho has woven prii1Ja, apiina, vyiina and samiina into him and
which deity is controlling him? A.V. x. 2. 13).
6
Sapta prii1Jiin a~tau manyas (or majjfias) tii1]'ls te vrlciimi brahma1Jii (A.V. 11.
12. 7). The Taittinya-briihma1Ja, I. 2. 3· 3 refers to seven prii1Jas, sapta vai
xg-2
we hear of a lotus with nine gates (nava-dviirarp.) and covered
with the three gu~as 1 • This is a very familiar word in later
Sanskrit literature, as referring to the nine doors of the senses,
and the comparison of the heart with a lotus is also very common.
But one of the most interesting points about the passage is that
it seems to be a direct reference to the gu~a theory, which re-
ceived its elaborate exposition at the hands of the later Saf[lkhya
writers: it is probably the earliest reference to that theory. As
we have stated above, the real functions of the prii~a, etc. were
not properly understood; prii~a was considered as vital power or
life and it was believed to be beyond injury and fear. It was as
immortal as the earth and the sky, the day and the night, the sun
and the moon, the Brahmai)as and the K~attriyas, truth and false-
hood, the past and the future 2 • A prayer is made to prii~a and
apiina for protection from death (p1·ii~iipiinau mrtyor mli piilll1Jt
S'Diihii) 3 • In A. V. III. 6. 8 manas and citta are separately mentioned
and SayaJ).a explains manas as meaning antal;kara~a, or inner
organ, and citta as a particular state of the manas (mano-vrtti-
vise~e~a), as thought 4 • H~re also the heart is the seat of conscious-
ness. Thus in a prayer in III. 26. 6 it is said," 0 i\1itra and VaruJ).a,
take away the thinking povver (citta) from the heart (hrt) of this
woman and, making her incapable of judg1nent, bring her under
my controP." The ojas with which we are familiar in later medical
works of Caraka and others is mentioned in A.V. II. 18, where
izrsa~yiih prii~iih. Again a rf'ference to the seven senses is found in A.V. x. 2. 6:
ka!z sapta khiini vitatarda ilr$a~zi. In A.V. xv. IS. 16. 17 seven kinds of pt·ii~a.
apiina and vydna are described. These seem to serve cosmic functions. The
seven prd~zas are agni, liditya, candramatz, pavamana, dpa~t, paiava!z and prajtilz.
The seven apiinas are paur~umuzsr, ll${akii, amiiviisyti, iraddhii, dik$ii, yajiia and
dak~i~zii. The seven kinds of vyiina are blulmi, autarih$llf!l, dyau!z, nak$alrii~i,
rtu'L·a~z, (Jrtaviilz and Sll1Jl1.latsariib.
1
prupf.arzlw1JZ tzava-dt.'iirmtz tribhir gu~zebhir ii'i:rtalJz
tasmin yad ya~lsam (ltmwrvat tad 'l.'ai Br.lhma-'l!ido vidufz.
(Those who know Brahman know that being to be the self which resides in the
lotus rlowcr of nine gates cmrercd by the three gm..zas. A.V. X. 8. 43.) The niit/.is
uja, piitgalii and SU$Wtt~za, which figure so much in the later Tantric works, do
not appear in the Atharva- Veda. No reference to priil;.ztiyiima appears in the
Athar'l.'a-Veda.
~ A.V. 11. IS.
3
Ibid. 11. 16. 1. Prii~za and apiina are asked in another passage to enter a
man as bulls enter a cow-shed. Sayar;Ja calls pra~1a, apiiua "sariras-dharaka"
(A.V. III. II. s). They are also asked not to leave the body, but to bear the limbs
till old age (m. 11. 6).
1
A1anas and citta are also separately counted in A.V. III. 6. 8.
:; The word dttinafz is sometimes used to mean men of the same ways of
thinking (cittilla~z samilna-citta-yuhlll~l-Siiyar;Ja. A.V. m. IJ. s).
XIII) Practice of Medicine in the Atharva- Veda 2 93
Agni is described as being ojas and is asked to give ojas to the

worshipper 1•
Practice of Medicine in the Atharva- Veda.

As we have said above, there is evidence to show that even at
the time of the Atharva- Veda the practice of pure medicine by
professional medical men had already been going on. Thus the
verse II. 9· 3, as explained by SayaJ).a, says that there were hundreds
of medical practitioners (sala'f!l hy asya bhi~ajaM and thousands of
herbs (sahasram uta 1-'irudhal;), but what can be done by these can
be effected by binding an amulet with the particular charm of this
verse 2• Again (II. 9· 5), the Atharvan who binds the amulet is
described as the best of all good doctors (subhi~aktama). In VI. 68. 2
Prajapati, who appears in the Atreya-Caraka school as the original
teacher of Ayur-veda and who learnt the science from Brahma, is
asked to treat (with medicine) a boy for the attainment of long
life3 • In the Kausika-siUra a disease is called liizgi, i.e. that which
has the symptoms (linga), and medicine (bhai~ajya) as that which
destroys it (upatiipa). Darila remarks that this upatiipa-karma
refers not only to the disease, but also to the symptoms, i.e. a
bhaz~ajya is that which destroys the disease and its symptoms4 • In
the Atharva- Veda itself only a few medicines are mentioned, such
as _jangifja (xix. 34 and 35), gulgulu (XIX. 38), ku~tha (XIX. 39) and
sata-viira (XIX. 36), and these are all to be .used as amulets for pro-
tection not only from certain diseases, but also from the witchcraft
(krtyii) of enemies. The effect of these herbs was of the same
miraculous nature as that of mere charms or incantations. They
did not operate in the manner in which the medicines prescribed
1 Ojo' sy ojo me diil.z sviilui (A.V. 11. XVIII. 1). Sayat:ta, in explaining ojal.z,
says," ojal.z sarzra-sthiti-kiirm;am a~tamo dhiitufz." He quotes a passage as being
spoken by the teachers (iiciiryail.z): "ksetrajiiasya tad ojas tu kevaliisraya i~yate
yathii snehal.z pradipasya yathiibhram asani-tvi~afz" (Just as the lamp depends on
the oil and the lightning on the clouds so the oja}:t depends on the k~hetra-jna
(self) alone).
2 Sata'!l yii bhe~ajiini te sahasrarJz sa1Jlgatiini ca
sre~tham iisriiva-bhe~aja'!l vasi~thmrz roga-tliisanam.
(Oh sick per:;on! you may have applied hundreds or thousands of medicinal
herbs; but this charm is the best specific for stopping hemorrhage. A.V. VI. 45. 2.)
Here also, as in 11. 9· 3, the utterance of the charm is considered to be more
efficacious than the application of other herbs and medicines. \Vater was often
applied for washing the sores (v1. 57. 2).
3
Cikitsatu Prajiipatir dirghiiyutviiya cak~ase (vi. 68. 2).
4 Darila's comment on the Kausika-sUtra, 25. 2.
294 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cu.
in the ordinary medical literature acted, but in a supernatural way.
In most of the hymns which appear as pure charms the KauJika-
sutra directs the application of various medicines either internally
or as amulets. The praise of Atharvan as physician par excellence
and of the charms as being superior to all other medicines pre-
scribed by other physicians seems to indicate a period when most
of these Atharval).ic charms were used as a system of treatment
which was competing with the practice of ordinary physicians with
the medicinal herbs. The period of the Kausika-siltra was probably
one when the value of the medicinal herbs was being more and
more realized and they were being administered along with the
usuai Atharval).ic charms. This was probably a stage of recon-
ciliation between the drug system and the charm system. The
special hymns dedicated to the praise of certain herbs, such as
jang£tja, ku~tha, etc., show that the ordinary medical virtues of
herbs were being interpreted on the miraculous lines in which the
charms operated. On the other hand, the drug school also came
under the influence of the Atharva- Veda and came to regard it
as the source of their earliest authority. Even the later medical
literature could not altogether free itself from a faith in the
efficacy of charms and in the miraculous powers of medicine
operating in a supernatural and non-medical manner. Thus
Caraka, VI. I. 39 directs that the herbs should be plucked according
to the proper rites (yathli-vidhz), and Cakrapal).i explains this by
saying that the worship of gods and other auspicious rites have to
be performed (mafzgala-devatlircanlidi-purvaka1Jt); in VI. 1. 77 a
compound of herbs is advised, which, along with many other
virtues, had the power of making a person invisible to all beings
(adrsyo bhutlinli1Jt bhavati) ; miraculous powers are ascribed to the
fruit lima/aka (Emblic l\1yrobalan), such as that, if a man lives
among cows for a year, drinking nothing but milk, in perfect sense-
control and continence and meditating the holy gliyatrl verse,
and if at the end of the year on a proper lunar day in the month
of Pau~a (January), Magha (February), or Phalguna (March), after
fasting for three days, he should enter an lima/aka garden and,
climbing upon a tree full of big fruits, should hold them and
repeat (japan) the name of Brahman till the lima/aka attains im-
mortalizing virtues, then, for that moment, immortality resides in
the lima/aka ; and, if he should eat those limalakas, then the goddess
Sri, the incarnation of the Vedas, appears in person to him (svaya7Jt
XIII] Practice of Medicine in the Atharva-Veda 295
ciisyopat#thanti srlr vedaviikya-riipi1Ji, VI. 3· 6). In VI. I. 8o it is
said that the rasiiyana medicines not only procure long life, but, if
they are taken in accordance with proper rites (yathii-vidhz), a man
attains the immortal Brahman. Again in VI. 1. 3 the word priiyaJ-
citta (purificatory penance) is considered to have the same meaning
as aUfadha or bhe~aja. The word bhe~aja in the Atharva-Veda
meant a charm or an amulet which could remove diseases and
their symptoms, and though in later medical literature the
word is more commonly used to denote herbs and minerals,
either simple or compounded, the older meaning was not aban-
doned1. The system of simple herbs or minerals, which existed
independently of the Atharva- Veda, became thus intimately con-
nected with the system of charm specifics of the Atharva- Veda;
whatever antagonism may have before existed between the two
systems vanished, and Ayur-veda can1e to be treated as a part of
the Atharva- Veda 2 • Prajapati and Indra, the mythical physicians
of the Atharva- Veda, came to be regarded in the Atreya-Caraka
school as the earliest teachers of Ayur-veda 3 •
Bloomfield arranges the contents of the Atharv(l- Veda in
fourteen classes: I. Charms to cure diseases and possession by
demons (bhai~ajyiini); 2. Prayers for long life andhealth(iiYUfYiiTJi);
3· Imprecations against demons, sorcerers and enemies (iibhiciiri-
1 The A.V. terms are bhe~ajam (remedy), bhe~afi (the herbs), and bhe~ajll;
(waters). The term bhai~aj'ya appears only in the Kausika and other siltras and
BrahmaQas. Bloomfield says that the existence of such charms and practices
is guaranteed moreover at least as early as the Indo-Iranian (Aryan) period by
the stems bae~aza and bae~azya (maiithra bae~aza and bae~azya; haoma bae~azya),
and by the pre-eminent position of water and plants in all prayers for health
and long life. Adalbert Kuhn has pointed out some interesting and striking re-
semblances between Teutonic and Vedic medical charms, especially in connection
with cures for worms and fractures. These may perhaps be mere anthropological
coincidences, due to the similar mental endowment of the two peoples. But it
is no less likely that some of these folk-notions had crystallized in prehistoric times,
and that these parallels reflect the continuation of a crude Indo-European folk-
lore that had survived among the Teutons and Hindus. See Bloomfield's The
Atharva- Veda and Gopatha-Briihmarza, p. s8, and Kuhn's Zeitschrijt fur
vergleichende Sprachjorschung, XIII. pp. 49-74 and 113-157·
2
The Atharva- Veda itself speaks (XIX. 34· 7) of herbs which were current in
ancient times and medicines which were new, and praises the herb jangitja as
being better than them all--na tvii purva o~adhayo na tvii taranti yii navii!.z.
3
A.V. VI. 68. 2-Cikitsatuprajiipatir dfrghiiyutviiya ca~ase; ibid. XIX. 35· I -
lndrasya nama grhrzanto r~ayal} jaitgir.Ja'l!l dadan (The r#s gave jangitja, uttering
the name of Indra). This line probably sl!_ggested the story in the Caraka-saf!Zhitii,
that Indra first instructed the r~!S in Ayur-veda. See ibid. XI. VIII. 23-yan
miitall rathakrltam amrtaf!Z veda bhe~ajaf!Z tad indro apsu priivesayat tad iipo datta
bheyajam. The immortalizing medicine which Matali (the charioteer of lndra)
bought by selling the chariot was thrown into the waters by Indra, the master of
the chariot. Rivers, give us back that medicine!
Speculations t"n the Medt"cal Schools [cu.
kiini and krtyii-pratiharm:ziinz); 4· Charms pertaining to women
(stri-karmii1Ji); 5· Charms to secure harmony, influence in the
assembly, and the like (saumanasyiinz); 6. Charms pertaining to
royalty (riija-karmiiiJz); 7. Prayers and imprecations in the interest
of Brahmins; 8. Charms to secure property and freedom from
danger (pau~fikiinz); 9· Charms in expiation of sin and defilement
(priiyascittiinz); IO. Cosmogonic and theosophic hymns; I I. Ritual-
istic and general hymns; I 2. The books dealing with individual
themes (books IJ-I8); IJ. The twentieth book; I4. The kuntiipa
hymns 1 ; of these we have here to deal briefly with 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9,
more or less in the order in which they appear in the Atharva- Veda.
A.V. 1. 2 is a charm against fever (jvara), diarrhoea (atisiira),
diabetes (atimiltra), glandular sores (niil}i-vra'(la); a string made of
muiiJa grass is to be tied, the mud from a field or ant-hill is to be
drunk, clarified butter is to be applied and the holes of the anus
and penis and the mouth of the sore are to be aerated with a
leather bladder and the charm is to be chanted. The disease iisriiva,
mentioned in this hymn, is explained by SayaJ).a as meaniag diabetes
(miltriitisiira) 2 • I. 3 is a charm against stoppage of urine and stool
(mutra-puri~a-nirodlza). Along with a chanting of the hymn the
patient is to be made to drink either earth from a rat's hole
(mfi:liika-mrttikii), a putikii plant, curd, or saw-dust from old wood,
or he is to ride an elephant or a horse, or to throw an arrow; a fine
iron needle was to be passed through the urinal canal. This is
probably the earliest stage of what developed in later times as
the ·oasti-kriyii3 • I. 7 and I. 8 are charms for driving av·:ay evil
spirits,yiitudhiinas and kimidins, when a man is possessed by them.
I. IO is a charm for dropsy (jalodara): a jugful of water con-
tllining grass, etc. is to he sprinkled over the body of the patient.
1. 1 I is a charm for securing easy delivery. I. I 2 is a charm for
all diseases arising from disturbance of viita, pitta and Sle~man
fat, honey and clarified butter or oil have to be drunk. Head-
disease (slr~aktz) and cough (kiisa) are specially mentioned. I. I7
1 !\lr llloomfield's The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Briihma1)a, p~ 57·
2 131oomfield says that iisriiva means atlsiira or diarrhoea (ibid. p. 59). The
same physical applications for the same diseases are directed in A.V. 11. 3·
rfsriiva denotes any disease which is associated with any kind of diseased ejection.
Thus in 11. 3· 2 SayaQa says that iisriiva means atisiiriitimutra-niiljl-vra1)iidaya~l.
3
Pra te bhinadmi mehana7!1 vartra1f1. veiantyii iva evii te matra1f1. mucyatiim
bahir biil iti sarvakam (I open your urinal path like a canal through which the
waters rush. So may the urine come out with a whizzing sound-A.V. f. 3· 7).
All the verses of the hymn ask the urine to come out with a whizzing sound.
XIII] Practice of Medicine in the Atharva-Veda 2 97
is a charm for stopping blood from an injury of the veins or

arteries or for stopping too much hemorrhage of women. In the
case of injuries a handful of street-dust is to be thrown on the
place of injury or a bandage is to be tied with sticky mud 1 . 1. 22
is a charm against heart-disease and jaundice-hairs of a red cow
are to be drunk with water and a piece of a red cow's skin is to
be tied as an amulet. It is prayed that the red colour of the sun
and the red cow may come to the patient's body and the yellow
colour due to jaundice may go to birds of yellow colour. 1. 23,
which mentions kiliisa or ku#ha (white leprosy) of the bone, flesh
and skin and the disease by which hairs are turned grey (palita),
is a charm against these 2 • The white parts are to be rubbed with
an ointment made of cow-dung, bhrnga-riija, haridrii indravaru1Ji
and nilikii until they appear red. The black medicines applied
are asked to turn the white parts black. I. 2 5 is a charm against
takman, or fever-the patient has to be sprinkled with the water
in which a red-hot iron axe has been immersed. The descrip-
tion shows that it was of the malarial type; it came with cold
(Sita) and a burning sensation (Soci). Three types of this fever
are described: that which came the next day (anyedyul:z), the
second day (ubhayedyul:z), or the third day (trtiyaka) 3 • It was also
assoc;iated with yellow, probably because it produced jaundice.
II. 9 and 10 are charms against hereditary (k~etriya) diseases,
leprosy, dyspepsia, etc. 1 Amulets of arjuna wood, barley, sesamum
,and its flower had also to be tied when the charm was uttered 5 •
II. 31 is a charm against various diseases due to worms. The priest,
when uttering this charm, should hold street-dust in his left hand
and press it with his right hand and throw it on the patient. There
are visible and invisible worms; some of them are called algmpju
and others saluna; they are generated in the intestines, head and
1
is alsCl a charm for the same purpose.
:i:V. 12
2
VI. 135-137 is also a charm for strengthening the roots of the hair. Kiika-
miici with bhrnga-riija has to be drunk.
3
Namaft sUiiya takmane namo rilrtiya soci~e kr1Jomi
yo anyedyur ubhayedyur abhyeti trttyakiiya namo astu takmane.
See also A.V. VII. 123. 10, where the third-day fever, fourth-day fever and
irregular fevers are referred to.
' The word k~etrfya has been irregularly derived in PaQini's rule, v. 2. 92
(k$etriyac parak$etre cikitsya"ft}. Commentaries like the Kiisika and the Pada-
mafijarz suggest one of its meanings to be "curable in the body of another
birth, (janmiintara-sarlre cikitsyab}, that is, incurable. I, however, prefer the
meaning"hereditary," as given hy SayaQa in his commentary on A.V. II. 10. 1,
as being more fitting and reasonable.
5
Yak$man is also counted as a k~etrzya disease (n. 10. 6).
Speculations in the Medical Schools [cu.
heels; they go about through the body by diverse ways and cannot
be killed even with various kinds of herbs. They sometimes reside
in the hills and forests and in herbs and animals, and they enter
into our system through sores in the body and through various
kinds of food and drink 1 • II. 33 is a charm for removing yakpnan
from all parts of the body. III. 7. I is a charm for removing all
hereditary (leyetriya) diseases; the horn of a deer is to be used as
an amulet. III. II is a charm against phthisis (riija-ya/eyman)-
particularly when it is generated by too much sex-indulgence; the
patient is to eat rotten fish 2 . IV. 4 is a charm for attaining virility-
the roots of the kapittha tree boiled in milk are to be drunk when
the charm is uttered. IV. 6 and 7 are charms against vegetable
poisoning-the essence of the krmuka tree is to be drunk. v. 4 is a
charm against fever ( takman) and phthisis; the patient is to take the
herb kzqtha with butter when the charm is uttered 3 • v. 1 I is a
charm against fever 4 • v. 23 is a charm against worms-the patient
is given the juice of the twenty kinds of roots 5 . VI. I 5 is a charm
for eye-diseases; the patient has to take various kinds of vegetable
leaves fried in oil, particularly the mustard plant 6 • VI. 20 is a
charm against bilious fever (szqmi~o jvarasya); it is said to produce
a great burning sensation, delirium and jaundice. VI. 2I is a charm
for increasing the hair-the hair is to be sprinkled with a decoction
of various herbs. VI. 23 is a charm against heart-disease, dropsy
and jaundice. VI. 25 is a charm for inflammation of the glands
of the neck (gm.uja-miilii)1. VI. 8 5 is a charm against consumption
(riijay-ak!man); VI. 90 for colic pain (Sula) 8 ; VI. 105 for cough and
1
11. 31. s. I have adopted Sayat)a's interpretation.
2
vn. 78 is also a charm for inflammation of the neck (ga1)r.ja-miilii) and
phthisis (yak~ma).
3 Ku~tha was believed to be good for the head and the eyes (v. 4· 10).
4
Gandhara Mahav~a. Mufijaviin, and particularly Balhika (Balkh), were
regarded as the home of fever; so also the country of Anga and Magadha. It
was accompanied by cold (sita) and shivering (rura[z). It was often attended with
cough (kiisa) and consumption (valiisa). It attacked sometimes on the third or
fourth day, in summer or in autumn (Siirada), or continued all through the year.
6
This is one of the few cases where a large number of roots were com-
pounded together and used as medicine along with the charms.
6
Some of the other plants are alastilii, siliiiijiilii, nfliigalasiilii.
7
Also vn. 78, where apacit appears as a name for the inflammation of the
neck (gala-ga1J.r.Ja). Three different types of the disease are described. Apacit is
at first harmless, but when it grows, it continues more to secrete its discharges,
like boils on the joints. These boils grow on the neck, the back, the thigh-joint
and the anus. See further VI. 83, where conch-shell is to be rubbed and applied.
VIII. 83 is also a charm for it. Blood had to be sucked off the inflamed parts
by a leech or an iguana (grha-godhikii).
8
A piece of iron is to be tied as an amulet.
XIII] Practice o.f Medicine in the Atharva-Veda 299
other such diseases due to phlegm (s/e~mii) ; VI. I 09 for diseases of
the rheumatic type (viita-vyiidhi 1 ). VI. I27 is a cham1 for abscess
(vidradha), phlegmatic diseases (valiisa) and erysipelatous inflam-
mation (visarpa). Various kinds of visarpa in different parts of the
body are referred to. Heart-disease and phthisis are also men-
tioned2. There are said to be a hundred kinds of death (mrtyu)
(A.V. VIII. 5· 7), which are explained by Sayal).a as meaning
diseases such as fever, head-disease, etc. Several diseases are men-
tioned in IX. I 8-first the diseases of the head, Sir~akti, Sir~iimaya,
kan..za-sula and visalpaka, by which secretions of bad smell come
out from the ear and the mouth, then fever proceeding from head
troubles with shivering and cracking sensations in the limbs.
Takman, the dreaded autumnal fever, is so described. Then comes
consumption; then come valiisa, kiihiibiiha of the abdomen, diseases
of kloma, the abdomen, navel and heart, diseases of the spine, the
ribs, the eyes, the intestines. the visalpa, vidradha, wind-diseases
('oiitikiira), alaji and diseases of the leg, knee, pelvis, veins and head.
Bolling, in his article on diseases and medicine (Vedic) in the
Encyclopaedia ofReligion and Ethics, makes the following remark con-
cerning the theory of the origin of diseases. "To be noted however
is the fact that the Hindu theory of the constitution of the body
of three elements, bile, phlegm and wind, does not appear in early
Atharvan texts. Viiti-krta-niiSani of VI. 44· 3 cannot be urged as
proof to the contrary, as it means, not destructive of (diseases) pro-
duced by the wind in the body (viiti-krta-niisani), but destructive
of that which has been made into wind. Evidently, from its asso-
ciation with diarrhoea, it refers to wind in the intestines." This
does not seem to me to be correct. The phrase which Bolling quotes
is indeed of doubtful meaning; SayaQ.a takes it as being composed
of two words, viiti (healer by aeration) and krta-niiSani (destroyer
of evil deeds which brought about the disease). But, however
that may be, there are other passages on the subject, which Bolling
seems to have missed. Thus in 1. I2. 3 diseases are divided into
three classes, viz. those produced by water, by wind, and those
which are dry-yo abhrajii viitajii yai ca s~mal..z 3 • The phlegm of
the later medical writers was also considered watery, and the word
1
Pippali is also to be taken along with the utterance of the charm. It is
regarded as the medicine for all attacked by the diseases of the wind (viitf-
krtasya bhe~ajzm). It is also said to cure madness (k#ptasya bhe~ajfm).
2
Cipudru is a medicine for valiisa. Cipudrur abhicak~m;zam (vi. 127. 2).
3 Compare also viittkiirasya (IX. IJ. 20).
300 Speculations in the Medical Schools [en.
abhraja probably suggests the. origin of the theory of phlegm,
as being one of the upholders and destroyers of the body. The
word 'lJlitaja means, very plainly, diseases produced by wind, and
the pitta, or bile, which in later medical literature is regarded as
a form of fire, is very well described here as su~ma, or dry. Again
in VI. 109 we have pippalf as viitt-krtasya bhefajfm. The context
shows that the diseases which are referred to as being curable by
pippali are those which are considered as being produced by wind
in later literature; for "madness" (~ipta) is mentioned as a
viitt-krta disease. The word su~ma comes from the root "su~," to
dry up, and in slightly modified forms is used to mean a "drying
up," "burning," "strength," and "fiery." In one place at least
it is used to describe the extremely burning sensation of delirious
bilious fever, which is said to be burning like fire 1 . l\1y own
conclusion therefore is that at least some AtharvaQ.ic people had
thought of a threefold classification of all diseases, viz. those pro-
duced by wind, those by \Vater, and those by fire, or those which
are dry and burning. This corresponds to the later classification
of all diseases as being due to the three do~as, wind (vayu), phlegm
(kapha or S!e~ma) and bile (pitta). Apart from the ordinary diseases,
many were the cases of possession by demons and evil spirits, of
which we have quite a large number. Some of the prominent ones
are Yatudhiina, Kimzdin, Pisaca, Pisaci, Aml'l)ii, Dvayavin, Rak~a~,
1lJagundi, Ali~nsa, Fatsapa, Palala, Anupalala, Sarku, Koka,
ll1alimluca, Palifaka, Va·vrivasas, Asre~a, f!.k~agrlva, Pramzlin,
Dun;ama, Sunamii, Kuk#la, Kusula, Kakubha, Srima, Araya,
Karuma, Khalaja, Sakadluimaja, Uru1_1rja, Afatmata, Kumbham~ka,
Sayaka, J.Yagnaka, Taizgak•a, Pavinasa, Gandharva, Brahmagraha,
etc. 2 Some of the diseases with their troublous symptoms
were (poetically) personified, and diseases which often went to-
gether were described as being related as brothers and sisters.
Diseases due to worms were well known, in the case of both men
1
VI. 20. 4· For other references where the word su~ma occurs in more or
less modified forms see I. 12. 3, III. 9· 3, IV. 4· 3, IV. 4· 4, v. 2. 4, v. 20. 2, VI. 6s. I,
VI. 73· 2, IX. I. 10, 20, IX. 4· 22, etc.
2
See 1. 28. 35, 11. 9, II. 14, VIII. 6. The last passage contains a good descrip-
tion of some of these beings. There were some good spirits which fought with
evil ones and favoured men, such as Piri.ga, who preserved the babe at birth and
chased the amorous Gandharvas as wind chases cloud. VIII. 6. 19, 25 says that
sometimes the higher gods are also found to bring diseases. Thus Takman was
the son of Varur:ta (vi. 96. 2) and he produced dropsy (1. 10. 1-4, n. 10. I,
Iv. 16. 7, etc.). Parjanya (rain-god) produced diarrhoea, and Agni produced
fever, headache and cough.
XIII] Practice of 1\Jedicine in the Atharva-Veda 301
and of cattle. There were also the diseases due to sorcery, which
played a very important part as an offensive measure in Vedic
India. l\'Iany of the diseases were also known to be hereditary
(k~etriya). From the names of the diseases mentioned above it
will be found that most of the diseases noted by Caraka existed
in the Vedic age.
The view-point from which the Vedic people looked at diseases
seems to have always distinguished the different diseases from their
symptoms. Thus the fever was that which produced shivering,
cold, burning sensation, and the like, i.e. the diagnosis was mainly
symptomatic. In addition to the charms and amulets, and the
herbs which were to be internally taken, water was considered to
possess great medica.l and life-giving properties. There are many
hymns which prai"e these qualities of water 1 • The medicinal pro-
perties of herbs were often regarded as being due to water, which
formed their essence. Charms for snake poisons and herbs which
were considered to be their antidotes were in use. Scanty
references to diseases and their cures are found sparsely scattered
in other ~g- Vedic texts and Brahmal)as. But nothing in these
appears to indicate any advance on the Athar-Da- Veda 2 in medical
kno\vledge. Apart from these curatives there were also the already
mentioned charms, amulets and medicines for securing long
life and increasing virility, corresponding to the Rasiiyana and
the Viiji-kara1_la chapters of Caraka and other medical works. We
cannot leave this section without pointing to the fact that, though
most diseases and many remedies were known, nothing in the way
of nidiina, or causes of diseases, is specified. The fact that there
existed a threefold classification of diseases, viz. abhraja, viitaja and
su~ma, should not be interpreted to mean that the Vedic people
had any knowledge of the disturbance of these clements operating
as nidiinas as they were understood in later medical literature. The
three important causes of diseases were evil deeds, the sorcery of
enemies, and possession by evil spirits or the anger of certain gods.
1
apsu antar amrtam apsu bhqajam (There is immortality and medicine in
\Vater-I. 4- 4). See also I. 5· 6, 33, II. 3, III. 7· 5, IV. 33, VI. 24. 92, VI. 24-. 2, etc.
2
For a brief survey of these J3..g- V edtc and other texts see Bolling's article
"Disease and :-.. Iedicine (Vedic)" in Encyclopaedia of Reli'gion and Ethics.
The Foetus and the Subtle Body.

A human body is regarded by Caraka as a modification of the
five elements, ether, air, fire, water and earth, and it is also the
seat of consciousness (cetanii) 1 • The semen itself is made of the
four elements, air, fire, water and earth; ether is not a constituent
of it, but becomes connected with it as soon as it issues forth,
since iikiisa or antariksa (ether) is all-pervading. The semen that
is ejected and passes into the ovary is constituted of equal parts of
air, fire, water and earth; the ether becomes mixed with it in the
ovary; for iikiisa itself is omnipresent and has no movement of
its own 2 ; the semen is the product of six kinds of fluids (rasa).
But the foetus cannot be produced simply by the union of the
semen of the father and the blood (so~ita) of the mother. Such
a union can produce the foetus only when the iitman with its
subtle body, constituted of air, fire, water and earth, and manas
(mind-the organ involved in all perception and thought), be-
comes connected with it by means of its karma . .The four
elements constituting the subtle body of the iitman, being the
general causes of all productions, do not contribute to the essential
bodily features of the child 3 • The elements that contribute to
the general features are, (1) the mother's part-the blood, (2) the
father's part-the semen, (3) the karma of each individual; the
part played by the assimilated food-juice of the mother need
not be counted separately, as it is determined by the karma
of the individual. The mental traits are determined by the
state of mind of the individual in its previous birth. Thus, if
the previous state of life was that of a god, the mind of the child
1
garbhas tu khalu antarik§a viiyv-agni-toya-bhii.mi-vikiiras cetaniidhi~thiina
blzutal;z. Caraka, IV. 4· 6.
2
viiyv-agni-bhumy-ab-gu1)a-piidavat tat ~atjbhyo rasebhyal:z prabhiivaJ ca tasya.
Caraka, IV. 2. 4· iikiisa7'{l tu yady-api sukre piiiica-bhautike 'sti tathiipi na puru~a
sarlriin nirgatya garbhasaya7'{l gacchati, kintu bhuta-catu~fayam eva kriyiivad yiiti
iikiisa7'{l tu vyapakam eva tatriigatena sukre1)a Sa1flbaddha7'{l bhavati. Cakrapai:ll's
Ayur-veda-dlpikii, IV. 2.4. Susruta however considers $ukra (semen) as possessing
the qualities of soma, and iirtava (blood) as possessing the qualities of fire. He says,
however, that particles of the other bhutas (earth, air and ether, as l)alhal)a
enumerates them) are separately associated with them (saumya'!l sukram iirtavam
iigneyam itare~iim apy atra bhii.tiinii7'{l siinnidhya7'{l asty a1)Unii vise~eya parasparo-
pakiiriit pariinugrahiit paraspariinupravesac ca-Susruta, Ill. J. 1), and they
mutually co-operate together for the production of the foetus.
3
yiini tv iitmani suk~mii1)i bhatiini iitivahika-rupii1)i tiini sarva-siidhiira1)atvena
avise~a-siidriya-kiira1)iinlti neha boddhavyani. Cakrapai:ll's Ayur-veda-dlpikii,
IV. 2. 23-27.
XIII) The Foetus and the Subtle Body 3°3
will be pure and vigorous, whereas, if it was that of an animal,
it will be impure and dulP. When a man dies, his soul, together
with his subtle body, composed of the four elements, air, fire,
water and earth, in a subtle state and manas, passes invisibly into
a particular womb on account of its karma, and then, when it
comes into connection with the combined semen and blood of the
father and mother, the foetus begins to develop 2 • The semen and
blood can, however, operate as causes of the production of the
body only when they come into connection ·with the subtle body
transferred from the previous body of a dying being 3 • Susruta
(III. 1. 16) says that the very subtle eternal conscious principles
are manifested (abhivyajyate) when the blood and semen are in
union (parama-silk~miis cetaniivantal; siisvatii lohita-retasal.z sanni-
piite~v abhivya:fyante). But later on (III. 3. 4) this statement is
modified in such a way as to agree with Caraka's account; for
there it is said that the soul comes into contact with the combined
semen and blood along with its subtle elemental body (bhiUiitmanii).
In another passage a somewhat different statement is found
(Susruta, III. 4· 3). Here it is said that the materials of the de-
veloping foetus are agni, soma, sattva, rajas, tamas, the five senses,
and the hhutiitmii-all these contribute to the life of the foetus
and are also called the prii1JaS (life ) 4 • :Qalhal).a, in explaining this,
says that the agni (fire) spoken of here is the heat-power which
manifests itself in the fivefold functionings of digestion (piicaka),
viz. brightening of the skin (bhriijaka), the faculty of vision
Te~ii7'fl vlse~iid balavanti yiini
bhavanti miitii-pitr-karma-jiini
tiini vyavasyet sadrsatva-liizga1JZ
satva'f!l yathiinii.kam api vyavasyet.
Caraka, IV. 2. 27.
Anuka7'{l priiktaniivyavahitii deha-jiitis tena yathiinukatJZ
iti yo deva-sanriid avyavadhiineniigatya bhavati sa
det.'a-satvo bhiivati, etc. CakrapaQ.i, IV. 2. 23-27.
bhu.tais caturbhil; sahital;z su-su~air
mano-javo deham upaiti dehiit
karmiit-makatviin na tu tasya drsyii1fl
divya7'{l vinii rjarsanam asti rii.Pa1'fl. Caraka, IV. 2. 3·
3
yady api sukra-rajasl kiira7Je, tathiipi yadaiviitiviihikatJZ su~ma-bhuta-rii.pa
sarira7'{l priipnutal;z, tadaiva te sarlra'f!l janayata{z, niinyadii. Cakrapa:Q.i, IV.
2. J6.
4
This bhuiiitmii, i.e. the subtle body together with the soul presiding over
it, is called by Susruta karma-puru~a. Medical treatment is of this karma-pur~a
and his body (sa e~a karma-puru~al; cikitsiidhikrtai;-Susruta, III. 1. 16). Susruta
(I. 1. 21) again says," paiica-mahiibhuta-sariri-samaviiya?z purUfa ity ucyate; tasmin
knyii so 'dhi~!hiinam." (In this science, the term puru~a is applied to the unity
of five elements and the self (sarlrl), and this is the object of medical treatment.)
Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH.
(iilocaka), coloration of the blood, the intellectual operations and
the heat operations involved in the formation and work of the
different constituent elements (dhiitu), such as chyle, blood, etc.;
the soma is the root-power of all watery elements, such as mucu8,
chyle, semen, etc., and of the sense of taste; viiyu represents that
which operates as the fivefold life-functionings of prli!UJ, apiina,
samiina, udiina, and vyiina. I)alhal).a says further that sativa, rajas
and tamas refer to manas, the mind-organ, which is a product of
their combined evolution. The five senses contribute to life by
their cognitive functionings. The first passage seemed to indicate
that life was manifested as a result of the union of semen and
blood ; the second passage considered the connection of the soul
with its subtle body (bhutiitmii) necessary for evolving the semen-
blood into life. The third passage introduces, in addition to these,
the five senses, sativa, rajas, and tamas, and the place of semen-
blood is taken up by the three root-powers of agni, and viiyu.
These three powers are more or less of a hypothetical nature,
absorbing within them a number of functionings and body-consti-
tuents. The reason for these three views in the three successive
chapters cannot be satisfactorily explained, except on the supposi-
tion that Susruta's work underwent three different revisions at
three different times. Vagbhata the elder says that the moment
the semen and the blood are united, the life principle (jiva), being
moved by manas (mano-javena), tainted, as the latter is, with the
afflictions (klesa) of attachn1ent, etc., comes in touch with it 1 •
The doctrine of a subtle body, as referred to in the medical works,
may suitably be compared with the Sa1p.khya view. Cakrapal)i him-
self, in explaining Caraka-smphitii, IV. 2. 36, says that this doctrine
of a subtle body (iitiviihika sarira) is described in the iigama, and by
iigama the Sa1p.khya agama is to be understood (tena iigamiid eva
siirrtkhya-dariana-rupiid iitiviihika-saririit). The Siirrtkhya-kiirikii 39
speaks of a subtle body (suk~ma deha) and the body inherited from
1 gate puriil:ze rajasi nave '-casthite suddhe garbhasyiisaye miirge ca bzfiitmanii
suklam avikrtam avikrtena vtiyunti preritam anyaii ca mahii-bhiltair anugatam

iirtavena abhimiirchitam anvak~am eva riigiidi-kleia-vasiinuvartina sva-karma-
coditenamano-jm..Jenajzveniibhisa1JlSNfmJlgarbhiisayam upayati. A~tiinga-sa1Jlgraha,
n. 2. Indu, in explaining this, says, "bzfiitmanti garbha-kiira1Ja-mahii-bhUta-
s•vabhiivena . .. siik~ma-svarfipai!z manas-sahaciiribhis tanmiitrtikhyair mahii-bhutair
anugata1Jl strz-k~etra-priiptyti karma-vasiid iirta•oena misrl bhUtam anva~a'f!l misrl-
bhiiva-hzna-kalam eva . .. mano-javena jz·veniibhisa1fZSr~tam priipta-sa1Jlyoga1Jl
garbhaiaya1Jl iuklam upayiiti." His further explanations of the nature of
applications of the jz?..Ja show that he looked up Pataiijali's Yo,;a-siitras for the
details of avidyii, etc., and the other kleias.
XIII] The Foetus and the Subtle Body
the parents. The silk~ma continues to exist till salvation is attained,
and at each birth it receives a new body and at each death it leaves
it. It is constituted of mahat, aha1Jlkiira, the eleven senses and the
five tan-miitras. On account of its association with the buddhi,
which bears the impress of virtue, vice, and other intellectual
defects and accomplishments, it becomes itself associated with
these, just as a cloth obtains fragrance through its connection with
campak flowers of sweet odour; and hence it suffers successive
rebirths, till the buddhi becomes dissociated from it by the attain-
ment of true discriminative knowledge. The necessity of admitting
a subtle body is said to lie in the fact that the buddhi, with the
aha1Jlkiira and the senses, cannot exist without a supporting body;
so in the interval between one death and another birth the buddhi,
etc. require a supporting body, and the subtle body is this sup-
port1. In the Sii1JZkhya-pravacana-bh~ya, v. 103, it is said that this
subtle body is like a little tapering thing no bigger than a thumb,
and that yet it pervades the whole body, just as a little flame
pervades a whole room by its rays 2 • The Vyiisa-bh~ya, in
refuting the Sarp.khya view, says that according to it the citta
(mind), like the rays of a lamp in a jug or in a palace, contracts
and dilates according as the body that it occupies is bigger or
smaller3 • Vacaspati, in explaining the Yoga view as expounded by
Vyiisa, says that in the Sarp.khya view the citta is such that it
cannot, ~imply by contraction and expansion, leave any body at
death and occupy another body without intermediate relationship
with a subtle body (iitiviihika-sarira). But, if the citta cannot itself
leave a body and occupy another, how can it connect itself with
a subtle body at the time of death? If this is to be done through
another body, and that through another, then we are led to a
vicious infinite. If it is argued that the citta is connected with such
a subtle body from beginningless time, then the reply is that such
a subtle body has never been perceived by anyone (na khalu etad
adhyak~a-gocara1Jl); nor can it be regarded as indispensably neces-
sary through inference, since theYoga view can explain the situation
without the hypothesis of any such body. The citta is all-pervading,
1
Sli'f!lkhya-tattva-kaumudi, 39, 40, 41.
2yathli dipasya sarva-grha-vyapitve 'pi kalika-kliratva1Jl . .. tathaiva liriga-
dehasya deha-vyapitve 'py angunha-parimli1)atvam. Satrzkhya-pravacana-bhli~a,
V. IOJ.
8 ghata-priisiida-pradipa-kalpa1fl sarikoca-vikii.Si cittam sanra-parimlit:,ziikiira-
miitram ity apare pratipanniil;. Vyiisa-bhii~a on Patai'ijali's Yoga-sutras, IV. 10.

DU 20
and each soul is associated with a separate citta. Each citta connects
itself with a particular body by virtue of the fact that its manifes-
tations (vrtti) are seen in that body. Thus the manifestations of
the all-pervading citta of a soul cease to appear in its dying body
and become operative in a new body that is born. Thus there is
no necessity of admitting a subtle body (iitiviihikatva'f!l tasya na
mnyiimahe) 1 •
The Vaise~ika also declines to believe in the existence of a
subtle body, and assigns to it no place in the development of the
foetus. The development of the foetus is thus described by
Sridhara in his Nyiiya-kandali 2 : "After the union of the father's
semen and the mother's blood there is set up in the atoms consti-
tuting them a change through the heat of the womb, such that their
old colour, form, etc. become destroyed and new similar qualities
are produced; and in this way, through the successive formation of
dyads and triads, the body of the foetus develops; and, when such
a body is formed, there enters into it the mind (antal.zkara7Ja), which
could not have entered in the semen-blood stage, since the mind
requires a body to support it (na tu sukra-so1Jitiivasthiiyii'f!l sari-
riiSrayatviin manasal.z). Small quantities of food-juice of the mother
go to nourish it. Then, through the unseen power (adrfta), the
foetus is disintegrated by the heat in the womb into the state of
atoms, and atoms of new qualities, together with those of the
food-juice, conglomerate together to form a new body." According
to this view the subtle body and the mind have nothing to do
with the formation and development of the foetus. Heat is the
main agent responsible for all disintegration and re-combination
involved in the process of the formation of the foetus.
The Nyaya does not seem to have considered this as an im-
portant question, and it also denies the existence of a subtle body.
The soul, according to the Nyaya, is all-pervading, and the Mahii-
bhiirata passage quoted above, in which Yama draws out the purufa
1 Vacaspati's Tattva-vaiiiiradi, IV. 10. Reference is made to Mahii-bhiirata,
III. 296. 17, aizgu~tha-miitrampuru~a'T{l n;·scakar~a yamo baliit. Vacaspati says that
puru~a is not a physical thing and hence it cannot be drawn out of the body.
It must therefore be interpreted in a remote sense as referring to the cessation
of manifestation of citta in the dying body (na ciisya ni~kar~alz sambhavati,
ity aupaciiriko vyiikhyeyas tathii ca cites cittasya ca tatra tatra vrtty-abhii'l:a eva
ni~ kar~iirthalz).
The Sii'T{lkhya-pravacana-bhii~ya, v. 103, says that the thumb-like puru~a
referred to in Mahii-bhiirata, III. 296. 17, which Yama drew from the body of
.Satyavan, has the size of the subtle body (liizga-deha).
:! Nyiiya-kandali, Vizianagram Sanskrit series, 1895, p. 33·
XIII] The Foetus and the Subtle Body 307
of the size of a thumb, has, according to Nyaya, to be explained
away 1 • In rebirth it is only the all-pervading soul which becomes
connected with a particular body (ya eva dehiintara-Saf!Zgamo 'sya,
tam eva taj-jfiiil;-para-lokam iihulz) 2 •
Candrakirti gives us an account of the Buddhist view from the
Sali-stamba-siltra 3 • The foetus is produced by the combination
of the six constituents (~a7pJii1JZ dhiitunii1Jl samaviiyiit). That which
consolidates (sa1JZSle~a) the body is called earth (prthi·vi-dhiitu);
that which digests the food and drink of the body is called fire
( tejo-dhiitu); that which produces inhalation and exhalation is called
air (viiyu-dhiitu); that which produces the pores of the body
(antal;-sa~iryam) is called ether (iikiiSa-dhiitu); that by which
knowledge is produced is called the vijiiiina-dhiitu. It is by the
combination of them all that a body is produced (sarve~ii1JZ sama-
viiyiit kiiyasyotpattir bhavatt). The seed of vijfiiina produces the
germ of name and form (niima-1·upiinkura) by combination with
many other diverse causes. The foetus is thus produced of itself,
not by another, nor by both itself and another, nor by god, nor
by time, nor by nature, nor by one cause, nor by no cause, but
by the combination of the mother's and the father's parts at the
proper season 4 • The combination of father's and mother's parts
gives us the five dhiitus, which operate together when they are in
combination with the sixth dhiitu, the vijfiiina.
The view that the foetus is the result of the joint effect of the
six dhiitus reminds us of a similar expression in Caraka, IV. 3· Caraka
gives there a summary of the discussions amongst various sages
on the subject of the causes of the formation and develop1nent of the
foetus: where there is a union between a man with effective semen
and a woman with no defect of organ, ovary and blood, if at the
time of the union of the semen and blood the soul comes in touch
with it through the mind, then the foetus begins to develop 5 • When
it is taken care of by proper nourishment, etc., then at the right time
1
ta.~miin na lzrt-pur.u}arike yiivad-avasthiinam iitmanalz ata eva aizgu~tha
miitra1Jl puru~a1Jl n£scakar~a baliid yama iti Vyiisa-vacanam evam-param
avagantavyam (Jayanta's Nyiiya-mafijari, p. 469).
2
Ibid. p. 473·
8 1W.adhyamika-vrtti (Bibliotheca Buddhica), pp. s6o-61.
4
Ibid. p. s67.
6
In the Vaise~ika also the all-pervading iitman comes into touch with the
foetus through the manas; but the difference is this, that here the manas is an
operative factor causing the development of the foetus, whereas there the manas
goes to the foetus when through the influence of body-heat it has already de-
veloped into a body.
20-2
J08 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cu.
the child is born, and the whole development is due to the com-
bined effect of all the elements mentioned above (samudayiid e1iirrz
blziiviiniim). The foetus is born of elements from the mother
and the father, the self, the proper hygienic care of the parents'
bodies (siitmya) and the food-juice; and there is also operant
with these the sattva or manas, which is an intermediate vehicle
serving to connect the soul with a former body when it leaves
one (aupapiiduka) 1 • Bharadvaja said that none of these causes can
be considered as valid; for, in spite of the union of the parents,
it often happens that they remain childless ; the self cannot pro-
duce the self; for, if it did, did it produce itself after being born
or without being born? In both cases it is ,impossible for it to
produce itself. Moreover, if the self had the power of producing
itself, it would not have cared to take birth in undesirable
places and with defective powers, as sometimes happens. Again,
proper hygienic habits cannot be regarded as the cause; for
there are many who have these, but have no children, and
there are many who have not these, but have children. If it
was due to food-juice, then all people would have got children.
Again, it is not true that the sattva issuing forth from one body
connects itself with another; for, if it were so, we should all have
remembered the events of our past life. So none of the above
causes can be regarded as valid. To this Atreya replied that it is
by the combined effect of all the above elements that a child is
produced, and not by any one of them scparately 2 • This idea is
again repeated in IV. 3· 20, where it is said that just as a medical
room (kutiigiirartt vartuliikiirarrz grhartt jaintiika-sveda-pratipaditam
-CakrapaQ.i) is made up of various kinds of things, or just as a
chariot is made up of a collection of its various parts, so is the
foetus made up of the combination of various entities which con-
tribute to the fprmation of the embryo and its development (niinii-
vidhiiniirrz garbha-kiirii1Jiit[l blziiviiniirrz samudayiid abhinirvartate) 3 •
The idea of such a combined effect of causes as leading to the
production of a perfect whole seems to have a peculiar Buddhistic
ring about it.
Bharadvaja, in opposing the above statement of Atreya, asks
what, if the foetus is the product of a number of combined causes,
1
Caraka-satp.hitii!.. IV. 3. 3.
2 neti bhagaviin Atreyafz. sarvebhya ebhyo bhiivebhyafz samuditebhyo garbho
'bhinirvartate. Ibid. IV. 3. II.
3
Ibid. IV. 3· 20.
XIII] The Foetus and the Subtle Body
is the definite order in which they co-operate together to produce
the various parts (katham aya1Jl sandhiyate)? Again, how is it
that a child born of a woman is a human child and not that of
any other animal? If, again, man is born out of man, why is not
the son of a stupid person stupid, of a blind man blind, and of
a madman mad? Moreover, if it is argued that the self perceives
by the eye colours, by the ear sounds, by the smell odours, by
the organ of taste the different tastes, and feels by the skin the
different sensations of touch, and for that reason the child does not
inherit the qualities of the father, then it has to be admitted that
the soul can have knowledge only when there are senses and is
devoid of it when there are no senses; in that case the soul is not un-
changeable, but is liable to change (yatra caitad ubhaya1Jl sambhavati
jiiatvam ajiiatva1Jl ca sa-vikiiras ciitmii)l. If .the soul perceives the
objects of sense through the activity of the senses, such as per-
ceiving and the like, then it cannot know anything when it has
no senses, and, when it is unconscious, it cannot be the cause of the
body-movements or of any of its other activities and consequently
cannot be called the soul, iitman. It is therefore simple nonsense
to say that the soul perceives colours, etc. by its senses.
To this Atreya replies that there are four kinds of beings,
viz. those born from ovaries, eggs, sweat and vegetables. Beings
in each class exist in an innumerable diversity of forms 2 • The
forms that the foetus-producing elements (garbha-karii bhiivii/:z)
assume depend upon the form of the body where they assemble.
Just as gold, silver, copper, lead, etc. assume the form of any
mould in which they are poured, so, when the foetus-producing
elements assemble in a particular body, the foetus takes that par-
ticular form. But a man is not infected with the defect or disease
of his father, unless it be so bad or chronic as to have affected his
semen. Each of our limbs and organs had their germs in the
semen of the father, and, when the disease or defect of the father
is so deep-rooted as to have affected (upatiipa) the germ part of
any particular organ in the seed, then the child produced out of
the semen is born defective in that limb; but, if the defect or
disease of the father is so superficial that his semen remains
unaffected, then the disease or defect is not inherited by the son.
The child does not owe sense-organs to his parents; he alone is
responsible for the goodness or badness of his sense-organs ; for
1 2
Caraka-stlT{lhitii, IV. 3· 21. Ibid. IV. 3· 22, 23.
JIO Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
these are born from his own self (litma-jiinindriyli1Jz). The presence
or absence of the sense-organs is due to his own destiny or the fruits
of karma (dai•aa). So there is no definite law that the sons of
idiots or men with defective senses should necessarily be born
idiots or be otherwise defective 1 • The self (iitman) is conscious only
when the sense-organs exist. The self is never without the sattva
or the mind-organ, and through it there is always some kind of
consciousness in the self2 • The self, as the agent, cannot without
the sense-organs have any knowledge of the external world leading
to practical work; no practical action for which several accessories
are required can be performed unless these are present; a potter
who knows how to make a jug cannot succeed in making it
unless he has the organs with which to make it3 • The fact that
the self has consciousness even when the senses do not operate
is well illustrated by our dream-knowledge when the senses lie
inoperative 4 • Atreya further says that, when the senses are com-
pletely restrained and the manas, or mind-organ, is also re-
strained and concentrated in the self, one can have knowledge
of all things even without the activity of the senses 5 • The self is
thus of itself the knower and the agent.
This view of Caraka, as interpreted by Cakrapal).i, seems to be
somewhat new. For the self is neither pure intelligence, like the
pU1·u~a of the Sarpkhya-yoga, nor the unity of being, intelligence and
bliss, like that of the Vedanta. Here the soul is the knower by
virtue of its constant association with manas. In this, however, we
are nearer to the Nyaya- Vaise~ika view. But in the Nyaya-Vaise!?ika
view the soul is not always in contact with manas and is not always
conscious. The manas in that view is atomic. The view that the
1 Caraka-smphitii, IV. 3. 25.
2
Ibid. IV. 3· 26, na hy-asattva"tz kadiicid iitmii sattva-viSe~iic copalabhyate
jfiiina-vise~a"tz. Cakrapani, in commenting on this, says that our knowledge of the
external world is due to the operation of the sense-organs in association with
the mind-organ. If these sense-organs do not exist, we cannot have any know-
ledge of the external world, but the internal organ of mind is always associated
with the self: so the knowledge which is due to this mind-organ is ever present
in the self (yat tu kevala-mano-janyam iitma-jiiii.narrz, tad bhavaty eva sarvadii). It
seems that both sattva and manas are used to denote the mind-organ.
3
The word kiirya-jfianam in Caraka-sarrzhitii, IV. 3· 27, has been explained by
Cakrapal).i as kiirya-pravrtti-janaka-biihya-v#aya-jiiiinam. The knowledge that
the self has when it has no sense-organs operating in association with the mind
has no object (nirvi~aya); in other words, this knowledge which the self always
has is formless.
4
Ibid. IV. 3· 31.
6
viniipindriyaib samiidhi-baliid eva yasmiit sarvajno bhavati; tasmii.j jna-sva-
bhiiva eva nirindriyo 'py iitmii (Cakrapal)i's Caraka-tiitparya-pkii, IV. 3· 28-29).
XIII] The Foetus and the· Subtle Body JII
soul has always a formless consciousness has undoubtedly a

Vedantic or Sarpkhyaic tinge; but the other details evidently
separate this view from the accepted interpretations of these
schools. The theory of the soul, however, as here indicated comes
as a digression and will have to be discussed more adequately later
on.
On the subject of the existence of subtle bodies we have already
quoted the views of different Indian schools of philosophy for the
purpose of suggesting comparisons or contrasts with the views of
Caraka. Before concluding this section reference must be made
to the Vedanta views with regard to the nature of subtle bodies.
According to the Vedanta, as interpreted by Satikara, the subtle
body is constituted of five particles of the elements of matter
(bhuta-suk~mail;), with which are also associated the five viiyus,
prii'!la, apiina, etc. 1 Those who perform good deeds go to the
region of the moon, and those who commit sins suffer in the
kingdom of Yama and then are again born in this world 2 • Those
who, as a reward of their good deeds, go to the kingdom of the
moon and afterwards practically exhaust the whole of their fund
of virtue and consequently cannot stay there any longer, begin
their downward journey to this earth. They pass through iikiisa,
air, smoke and cloud and then are showered on the ground with
the rains and absorbed by the plants and again taken into the
systems of persons who eat them, and again discharged as semen
into the wombs of their wives and are reborn again. In the
kingdom of the moon they had watery bodies (candra-ma'!ltfale yad
am-mayam sarzram upabhogiirtham iirabdham) for the enjoyment
available in that kingdom; and, when they exhaust their good deeds
through enjoyment and can no longer hold that body, they get a
body which is like iikiisa and are thus driven by the air and come
into association with smoke and cloud. At this stage, and even
when they are absorbed into the body of plants, they neither enjoy
pleasure nor suffer pain. A difference must be made between the
condition of those who are endowed with plant-bodies as a punish-
ment for their misdeeds and those who pass through the plant-
bodies merely as stations on their way to rebirth. In the case of
the former the plant life is a life of enjoyment and sorrow, whereas
in the case of the latter there is neither enjoyment nor sorrow.
1
The Bhii~ya of Sankara on the Brahma-sutra, III. i. 1-7.
2
Ibid. III. i. IJ.
JI2 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
Even when the plant-bodies are chewed and powdered the souls
residing in them as stations of passage do not suffer pain ; for
they are only in contact with these plant-bodies (candra-ma7Jifala-
skhal£tiinii1Jl vrihy iidi-sa1Jlile1a-mlitTa1Jl tad-bhiival:z) 1 •
We thus see that it is only the Sarpkhya and the Vedanta that
agree to the existence of a subtle body and are thus in accord with
the view of Caraka. But Caraka is more in agreement with the
Vedanta in the sense that, while according to the Sarpkhya it is the
tan-miitras which constitute the subtle body, it is the fine particles
of the gross elements of matter that constitute the subtle bodies in
the case both of the Vedanta and of Caraka. The soul in one atomic
moment becomes associated successively with iikiiia, air, light,
heat, water, and earth (and not in any other order) at the time
of its entrance into the womb 2 •
Foetal Development3 •
When the different elements of matter in conjunction with the
subtle body are associated with the self, they have the appearance of
a little lump of mucus (kheta-bhilta) with all its limbs undifferentiated
and undeveloped to such an extent that they may as well be said
1
Bhii~a of Sankara, III. i. 25, also III. i. 22-27.
2
Caraka-sa'f!l.hitii, IV. 4· 8. CakrapaQi, commenting on this, says that there is
no special reason why the order of acceptance of gross elements should be from
subtler to grosser; it has to be admitted only on the evidence of the scriptures-
ayarrz ca bhuta-graha1}a-krama iigama-siddha eva niitra yuktis tathii-vidhii
hrdayangamiisti.
8 In the Garbha Upani~ad, the date of which is unknown, there is a descrip-
tion of foetal development. Its main points of interest may thus be summarized:
the hard parts of the body are earth, the liquid parts are water, that which is
hot (u~1}a) is heat-light (tejalz), that which moves about is viiyu, that which is
vacuous is iikiisa. The body is further said to depend on six tastes (la4-iiiraya),
sweet (madhura), acid (am/a), salt (lava1}a), bitter (tikta), hot (katu) and pungent
(k~iiya), and it is made up of seven dhiitus of chyle (rasa), blood (sol}ita) and
flesh (mil'f!l.sa). From the six kinds of rasa comes the so1}ita, from s01)ita comes
miirrzsa, from mii'f!l.sa comes fat (medas), from it the tendons (sniiyu), from the
sniiyu bones (asthi), from the bones the marrow (majjii), from the marrow the
semen (sukra). By the second night after the union of semen and blood the
foetus is of the form of a round lump called kala/a, at the eighth night it is of
the form of a vesicle called budbuda, after a fortnight it assumes the form of a
spheroid, pi1)tja; in two months the head appears, in three months the feet,
in four months the abdomen, heels and the pelvic portions appear, in the fifth
month the spine appears, in the sixth month the mouth, nose, eyes and ears
develop; in the seventh month the foetus becomes endowed with life Ulvena
sarrzyukto bhavatt), in the eighth month it becomes fully developed. By an excess
of semen over blood a male child is produced, by the excess of blood a female
child is produced, when the two are equal a hermaphrodite is produced. When
air somehow enters and divides the semen into two, twins are produced. If the
minds of the parents are disturbed (vyiikulita-miinasa/:z), the issue becomes either
blind or lame or dwarf. In the ninth month, when the foetus is well developed
XIII] Foetal Development 31 3
not to exist as to exist. Susruta remarks that the two main con-
stituents of the body, semen and blood, are respectively made up
of the watery element of the moon (saumya) and the fiery element
(iigneya); the other elements in atomic particles are also associated
with them, and all these mutually help one another and co-operate
together for the formation of the body 1 • Susruta further goes on
to say that at the union of female and male the heat (tejal;z)
generated rouses the viiyu, and through the coming together of
heat and air the semen is discharged 2 • Caraka,however, thinks that
the cause of discharge of semen is joy (har~a) 3 • The semen is not
produced from the body, but remains in all parts of the body,and
it is the joy which causes the discharge and the entrance of the
semen into the uterus 4 • Thus he says that, being ejected by the
self as joy (har~a-bhuteniitmanodiritas ciidh~thitas ca), the semen
constituent or the seed, having come out of the man's body, be-
comes combined with the menstrual product (iirtava) in the uterus
(garbhiiSaya) after it has entrance thereinto through the proper
channel (udtena pathii). According to Susruta the ejected semen
enters into the female organ (yonim abhiprapadyate) and comes into
association there with the menstrual product 5 • At that very moment,
the soul with its subtl~ body comes into association with it and
thus becomes associated with the material characteristics of sattva,
with all its organs, it remembers its previous birth and knows its good and
bad deeds and repents that, on account of its previous karma, it is suffering the
pains of the life of a foetus, and resolves that, if it can once come out, it will
follow the Sa~pkhya-yoga discipline. But as soon as the child is born it comes
into connection with V aiP.Zava viiyu and forgets all its previous births and
resolutions. A body is called sarzra, because three fires reside in it (frayante),
viz. the ko#hiigni, darsaniigni and jfiiiniigni. The ko~fhiigni digests all kinds of
food and drink, by the darsaniigni forms and colours are perceived, by the
jiiiiniigni one performs good and bad deeds. This Upanil?ad counts the cranial
bones as being fourt the vital spots (marman) as being 107, the joints as 18o, the
tissues (sniiyu) as 109, the siriis, or veins, as 700, the marrow places as soo, and
the bones as 300.
1
Suiruta-sa1{lhitii, III. 3· 3·
2
Ibid. 111. 3· 4, Nin;taya-Sagara edition, 1915. l)alhaQa, commenting on this,
says, "sukha-la~a1Ja-vyiiyiimajo~ma-viuna1JI. vidrutam aniliic cyutam."
8
Caraka-sa1{lhitii, IV. 4· 7·
" CakrapaQi, commenting on Caraka-sa1{lhitii, IV. 4· 7, says that "niifzgebhyab
Su.kram utpadyate kintu sukra-rupatayaiva vyajyate," i.e. the semen is not pro-
duced from the different parts of the body, but it exists as it is and is only mani-
fested in a visible form after a particular operation (Su5ruta, 111. 3· 4).
6
As l)alhaQa interprets this, the female organ here means the uterus; thus
l)alhaQa says, "yones tritlyiivartiivasthita-garbhaiayyiim pratipadyate," i.e. the
semen enters into the third chamber of the female organ, the place of the
foetus. The uterus is probably considered here as the third chamber, the preceding
two being probably the vulva and the vagina.
rajas and tamas, and godly (deva), demonic (asura), and other
characteristics. Caraka, referring to the question of the association
of the soul with the material elements, says that this is due to
the operation of the soul acting through the mind-organ (sattva-
kara~za)1. Cakrapai).i, in commenting on the above passage, says
that the self (iitman) is inactive; activity is however attributed to
the soul on account of the operative mind-organ which is asso-
ciated with it. This, however, seems to be a compromise on the
part of CakrapaQ.i with the views of the traditional Sa111khya
philosophy, which holds the soul to be absolutely inactive; but the
text of the Caraka-sa'!lhita does not here say anything on the
inactivity of the soul; for Caraka describes the soul as active
(pravartate) as agent (kartr) and as universal performer (visva-
karman), and the sativa is described here only as an organ of the
soul (sattva-kara1Ja).
In the first month, the foetus has a jel1y-like form ·(kalala} 2 ;
in the second month, the material constituents of the body having
undergone a chemical change (abhi'prapacyamana) due to the action
of cold, heat and air (sito~miinilai/:z), the foetus becomes hard
(ghana). If it is the foetus of a male child, it is spherical (pi1_1tja);
if it is of a female child, it is elliptical (pesi); if it is of a herma-
phrodite, it is like the half of a solid sphere (arbuda) 3 • In the
third month five special eminences are seen, as also the slight
differentiation of limbs. In the fourth month the differentiation
of the limbs is much more definite and well n1anifested; and owing
to the manifestation of the heart of the foetus the entity of con-
sciousne~s becomes also manifested, since the heart is the special
seat of consciousness; so from the fourth month the foetus mani-
fests a desire for the object:;; of the senses. In the fifth month the
consciousness becomes more awakened ; in the sixth intelligence
begins to develop; in the seventh the division and differentiation of
1
Sattva-kara~w gu~a-J(ra/un,:riiya pravartate-Camka-sarp}zitii, IV. 4· 8.
Cakra.pal).i rightly points out that gu~a here means material elements which
possess qualities--gu!Javmzti bhiltiini. The word gu~a is used in all these passages
in the sense of material entity or blzfita. Though gu!Ja means a quality and
f(tt~zin a substance, yet the \·icw adopted here ignores the difference between
qualities and substances, and gu~za, the ordinary word for quality, stands here
for substance (gw,:ra-gu7Ji1lor abhedopaciiriit-Cakrapar)i, ibid.).
2 J)alhal).a explains kala/a as sinf(hiina-prakhyam.
3
On the meanings of the words jJesz and arbuda there is a difference of
opinion between l)alhal).a and Gayi. Thus Gayi says that pest means quadrangular
(catur-asra) and arbuda means the form of the bud of a silk cotton tree (sii/mali-
muku/iikiiram).
XIII] Foetal Development
limbs become complete; in the eighth, the vital element (ojas) still
remains unsettled, and so, if a child is born at this time, it becomes
short -lived 1 •
Caraka, in ·describing the part played by different material
elements in the fonnation of the body, says that from the element
iikiisa are formed sound, the organ of hearing, lightness (liighava),
subtleness of structure (sauk~mya) and porosity (vireka); from 'Dliyu
(air) are formed the sensation of touch, the organ of touch, rough-
ness, power of movement, the disposition of the constituent elements
(dhiitu-vyuhana), and bodily efforts; from fire, vision, the organ of
vision,digestion,heat,etc.; from water, the sensation of taste and the
taste-organ, cold, softness, smoothness and watery characteristics;
from earth, smell, organ of smell, heaviness, steadiness and hard-
ness. The parts of the body which are thus formed fron1 different
material elements grow and develop with the accession of those
eleP.lents from which they have grown 2 • As the whole world is
made up of five elements (bhuta), so the human body is also made
up of five elements 3 • Caraka maintains that the senses and all
other litnbs of the body which grow before birth make their
appearance simultaneously in the third month~. \Vhen, in the third
month, the sense-organs grow, there grow in the heart feelings and
desires. In the fourth month the foetus becomes hard, in the fifth
it gets more flesh and blood, in the sixth there is greater develop-
ment of strength and colour, in the seventh it becomes complete
with all its limbs, and in the eighth month there is a constant
exchange (,f vital power (ojas) between the mother and the foetus.
The foetus being not yet perfectly developed, the vital fluid passes
from the mother to the foetus; but, since the latter cannot retain
it, it returns to the mother 5 • Cakrapal)i, commenting on this,
says that such an exchange is only possible because the foetus
1 Susruta-sa,zhitii, III. 3· 30.
2
Caraka-sarp.hitii, IV. 4· 12.
a evam ayarp. loka-sammita]J puru~al:z-yiivanto hi loke bhiiva-viSeliis tiivantab
puru~e, yiivantab puru~e tiivanto loke (Caraka-sa,hitii, IV. 4· 13). In ibid. IV. 3,
it is said that the foetus gets its skin, blood, flesh, fat, navel, heart, kloma, spleen,
liver, kidneys, bladder, colon, stomach, the larger intestines, and the upper and the
lower rectum from the mother, and its hair, beard, nails, teeth, bones, veins
and semen from the father; but, however this may be, it is certain that the
development of all these organs is really due to the assimilation of the five
elements of matter. So the development ofthe humal) foetus is, like the develop-
ment of all other things in the world, due to the accretion of material elements.
" Ibid. IV. 4· 14.
6 miitur ojo garbha'!l gacchaati yad ucyate, tad-garbhauja eva miitr-sambaddha'!l
san miitroja iti vyapadisyate. CakrapaQi, IV. 4· 24.

is still undeveloped, and the foetus, being associated with the
mother, serves also as the mother's vital power (ojas); for other-
wise, if the ojas went out altogether from the mother, she could
not live.
There is a good deal of divergence of opinion as regards the
order of the appearance of the different limbs of the foetus. Two
different schools of quarrelling authorities are referred to by Caraka
and Susruta. Thus, according to Kumara8iras and Saunaka the
head appears first, because it is the seat of the senses; according
to Kankayana, the physician of Balhika, and Krtavirya the heart
appears first, because according to Krtavirya (as reported in
Susruta) this is the seat of consciousness (cetanii) and of buddhi
and manas; according to Bhadrakapya (as reported by Caraka) the
navel come!;) first, since this is the place where food is stored, and
according to Parasara (as reported in Susruta), because the whole
body grows from there. According to Bhadra Saunaka (as re-
ported by Caraka) the smaller intestine and the larger intestine
(pakviiSaya) appear first, since this is the seat of air (miirutiidhi-
~thiinat'lJiit); according to Ba<Jisa (as reported by Caraka) the hands
and feet come out first, because these are the principal organs,
and according to 1\'larkal).<;ieya (as reported by Susruta), because
they are the main roots of all efforts (tan-mulatviic ce~tiiyii}.z) ; ac-
cording to Vaideha Janaka (as reported by Caraka) the senses
appear first, for they are the seats of understanding (buddhy-adhi~
thiina); according to Marici (as reported by Caraka) it is not
possible to say which part of the body develops first, because it
cannot be seen by anyone (parok~atviid acintyam) ; according to
Subhuti Gautama (as reporttJ by Susruta) the middle part of the
body (madhya-sarfra) appears first, since the development of other
parts of the body is dependent on it (tan-nt"baddhatviit sarva-giitra-
sambhavasya); according to Dhanvantari (as reported by both
Caraka and Susruta) all the parts of the body begin to develop
together (yugapat sarviiflgiibhinirvrtti), though on account of their
fineness and more or less undifferentiated character such develop-
ment may not be properly noticed, as with the parts of a growing
bamboo-shoot or a mango fruit(garbhasyasilk~matviin nopalabhyante
varrzsiinkuravat cilta-phalavac ca) 1 • Just as the juicy parts and the
stone, which are undifferentiated in a green mango at its early
stages, are all found clearly developed and differentiated when it
1 Su$ruta-sa,hitii, III. 3· 32 and Caraka-sa,mitii, IV. 6. 21.
XIII) Foetal Development
is ripe, so, when the human foetus is even in the early stages of
development, all its undifferentiated parts are already developing
there pari passu, though on account of their fineness of structure
and growth they cannot then be distinguished.
Referring to the early process of the growth of the foetus,
Susruta says that, as the semen and blood undergo chemical changes
through heat, seven different layers of skin (kala) are successively
produced, like the creamy layers (santiinikii} formed in milk. The first
layer,one-eighteenth of a paddy seed (dhiinya) in thickness, is called
avabhiisini; the second, one-sixteenth of a paddy seed, lohitii; the
third, one-twelfth of a paddy seed, $veta; the fourth, one-eighth, is
called tiimrii; the fifth, one-fifth, 1.1edini; the sixth, of the size of a
paddy seed, rohi1Ji; the seventh, of the size of two paddy seeds,
mii'f!lsa-dharii. All these seven layers of skin come to about six
paddy seeds, or roughly one inch. This is said to hold good only
in those places of the body which are fleshy. Apart from these
seven kaliis of skin there are also seven kaliis between the different
dhiitus. A dhiitu (from the root dhii, to hold) is that which supports
or sustains the body, such as chyle (rasa), blood (rakta), flesh
(mii'f!lsa), fat (medas), bone (asthz), marrow (majjii), semen (sukra)
and the last vital fluid (ojas). Lymph (kapha), bile (pitta) and
excreta (purqa) have also to be counted as dhiitus. These kaliis,
however, are not visible; their existence is inferred from the
fact that the different dhiitus must have separate places allotted to
them, and the kaliis are supposed to divide the layer of one dhiitu
from another and are covered with lymph and tissues (sniiyu) 1 • In
the first kala, known as the mii'f!lsa-dharii, the veins, tissues, etc. of
the flesh are found; in the second, the rakta-dharii, is found the
blood inside the flesh; in the third, called the medo-dharii, there is
the fat which is found in the abdomen and also between the smaller
bones 2 • The fourth kala is the sle~ma-dharii, which exists in the
joints; the fifth is the puri~a-dharli, which exists in the intestine
(pakviiSaya) and separates the excreta; the sixth and the seventh
are the pitta-dharii and the sukra-dharii.
Susruta thinks that the liver and spleen are produced from
1 The kala is defined by Vrddha-Vagbhata as yas tu dhiitv dsayiintarefU kledo
'vat#thate yathiisvam upnabhir vipakvafz. sniiyu-slepna-jarayu-cchannal;z kiiJtha iva

siiro dhiitu-siira-se1ol 'patviit kalii-SaTflji'iafz. (A1tiiriga-sa7f'l!Taha, Siirfra, v).
2 The fat inside the smaller bones is called medas, whereas that inside the
larger ones is called majjii, or marrow, and the fat of pure flesh only is called
vapa, or fat.
JI8 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cH.
blood, pupphusa (lungs) from the froth of blood, and utztfuka (a
gland in the colon?) from the dirt of blood (sor.Jita-kitta-prabhava).
The best parts (prasiida) of blood and lymph are acted upon by
bile, and viiyu works in association therewith; by this process the
entrails, rectum and bladder are produced; and, when the heating
process goes on in the abdomen, the tongue is produced, as the
essence of lymph, blood and flesh. The air, being associated with
heat, enters the flesh and changes the currents, the muscles (pesl}
are differentiated, and by the oily part of fat the viiyu produces
the veins (sira) and tissues (sniiyu). From the essential part of
blood and fat the kidneys (vrkka) are produced, from the essential
part of flesh, blood, lymph and fat the testicles, and from the
essence of blood and lymph the heart, which is the centre of the
dhamanis through which flows the current of life (priir}a-vahii).
Underneath the heart on the left side there are the spleen and the
pupphusa, and on the right side the liver and the kloma (right
lung?), and this is particularly the place of consciousness. At the
time of sleep, when it is covered with Sle~man having a super-
abundance of tamas, the heart remains contracted.
The foetus grows through the chyle of the mother and also
through the inflation of the body of the foetus by air 1 • The navel
of the body is the heating centre (jyotil;.-sthiina), and the air, starting
from here, continues to inflate the body.
It must be borne in mind that a foetus is the product of several
causes operating jointly. A defect of any particular limb at birth
is due to some defect in that part of one or more of the operating
causes through the influence of which that particular limb was
produced. The cause of foetal development is not a question
of organs or limbs which were absolutely non-existent: they
already existed, in the potential form, in the causes operating
jointly. The joint causes did not produce something absolutely
new, but their joint operation helped to actualize all that was
already inherent in them. Of all the joint causes the self remains
unchanged in all changes of the body. The changes of pleasure
and pain or such other characteristics as are considered to be due
to the soul are really due either to sattva or manas, or to the body 2 •
Cakrapal)i, commenting on this, says that the fact that a soul may
1
SuJruta-sa?flhita, III. 4· 57.
2
nir-vikaral:z paras tv atmii sarva-bhfitiinii1]l m·rvile~a-sattva-sanrayos tu vise5iid
viSe5opalabdhil:z. Caraka-sarphitii, IV. 4· 34·
XIII] Growth and Disease
take its birth as this or that animal does not imply that the soul is
liable to change (paramiitma-vikiirii na bhavantz) ; for such a change
is due to the excessive preponderance of sattva, rajas or lamas,
which are in reality due to virtue and vice, which in themselves
are but the characteristics of mind (sattva-rajas-tamal;-prabalatii-
rilpa-vikiiraja-manojanya-dharmiidharma-janyiiny eva) 1 •
There are three kinds of morbid elements (do~a) of the body,
viz. viita, pitta and sle~man, and two morbid elements which affect
the mind (sattva), viz. rajas and tamas. By the disorder of the
first three the body becomes diseased, and by that of the second
two the mind becomes affected. These, however, will be dealt with
more fully later on.
Growth and Disease.

The three elements, viiyu, pitta and kapha, are counted both
as constituents (dhiitus) and as do~as, or morbid elements. Dhiitus
are those elements which uphold the body. The body is the con-
glomeration (samudiiya) of the modification of five bhutas, or
elements, and it works properly so long as these elements are in
proper proportions (sama-yoga-viihin) in the body 2 • The modifica-
tions of the five elements which co-operate together to uphold
the body are called dhiitus. When one or more of the dhiitus
fall off or exceed the proper quantity (dhiitu-vai~amya), one or
more dhiitus may be in excess or deficient either in partial ten-
dencies or in entirety (akiirtsnyena prakrtyii ca). It has to be
noted that, as CakrapaQ.i explains, not every kind of excess
or deficiency of dhiitus produces dhiitu-vai~amya, or disturbance
of the equilibrium of the dhiitus: it is only when such deficiency
or excess produces affections of the body that it is called
dhiitu-vai~amya. That amount of excess or deficient;y which does
not produce trouble or affection of the body is called the normal
measure of the dhiitus (priikrta-miina) 3 • It is indeed obvious that
such a definition of prakrta-miina and dhiitu-va#amya involves a
vicious circle, since the normal measure or priikrta-miina of dhiitus
is said to be that which exists when there is no trouble or affection,
and dhiitu-va(r;amya is that which exists when there is trouble
1 CakrapaQ.i's commentary, Caraka, IV. 4·
2 Caraka-sarrzhitii, 1v.6.4. CakrapaQ.i, in commenting on the word sama-yoga-
viihin, explains sama as meaning ucita-pramiit;a (proper quantity).
3 etad eva dhiitilniif!t priikrta-miina'!l yad a•vikiira-kiiri, Cakrapal).i's comment
on Caraka-sarrzhitii, IV. 6. 4·
in the body; the trouble or affection of the body has thus to
be defined in terms of dhiitu-vaifamya. The only escape from
this charge is that dhiitu-vaifamya and disease are synonymous,
and the priikrta-miina of dhiitus is the same as health. When the
dhiitus are in their normal measure, there canno,t be any va~amya,
except of a local nature, as when, for example, the pitta existing in
its own proper measure is somehow carried by viiyu to a part
of the body and there is consequently a local excess. Whatever
leads ~o the increase of any particular dhiitu automatically leads
also to the decrease of other dhiitus which are opposed to it. Things
having the same sort of composition as a particular bodily dhiitu
increase it, and things having a different composition decrease it
(siimiinyam ekatva-kararrz vise~as tu Prthaktva-krt) 1 • The normal
health of a man is but another name for his dhiitu-siimya; a man
is said to be unhealthy, or to be in a state of dhiitu-va#amya, when
symptmns of disease (vikiira) are seen. Slight variations of the
due proportion of dhiitu do not entitle us to call them instances of
dhiitu-vai~amya unless there is vikiira or symptoms of it externally
expressed. The daily course of a healthy man ought to be such
that the equilibrium of dhiitus may be properly maintained. The
sole aim of Ayur-veda is to advise diet, medicines, and a course of
behaviour, such that, if they are properly followed, a normally
healthy person may maintain the balance of his dhiitus and a man
who has lost the equilibrium of his dhiitus may regain it. The aim
of Ayur-veda is thus to advise men how to secure dhiitu-siimya
(dhiitu-siimya-kriyii coktii tantrasyiisya prayojanam) 2 •
If a normally healthy man wishes to keep his health at its
normal level, he has to take things of different tastes, so that there
may not be an excess of any particular kind of substance in the
body. Diseases are caused through the excessive, deficient, and
wrongful administration of sense-objects, the climatic charac-
teristics of heat and cold, and the misuse of intelligence 3 • Thus
the sight of objects with powerful light, the hearing of loud sounds
like the roaring of thunder, the sn1elling of very strong odours,
too much eating, the touching of too much cold or heat or too
much bathing or massage are examples Gf atiyoga, or excessive
association with sense-objects. Not to see, hear, smell, taste or
1 2
Caraka-sa1!J}zitii, I. I. 44· Ibid. I. I. 52.
8 kiila-buddhlndriyiirthiinii'J!l yogo mithyii na ciiti ca
dvayiiSrayiitJii'J!l vyiidhlnii'J!l tri-vidho hetu-sa'J!lgrahalz.
Jbid. I. I. 53·
XIII] Growth and Disease 321
touch at all would be ayoga, or deficient association with sense-

objects. To see objects very near the eye, at a very great distance,
or to see frightful, hideous, unpleasant and disturbing sights, would
be examples of the improper use (mithyii-yoga) of the visual sense.
To hear grating and unpleasant sounds would be examples of the
improper use of the ear; to smell bad and nauseating odours would
be examples of mithyii-yoga of the nose; to eat together different
kinds of things, which in their combination are so opposed as to
be unhealthy, is an example of the improper use of the tongue;
to be exposed to sudden heat and cold are examples of the im-
proper use of touch 1 • Similarly, all activities of speech, mind and
body, when they are performed to an excessive degree, or not
performed at all, or performed in an undesirable or unhealthy
manner, are to be considered respectively as examples of atiyoga,
ayoga and mithyii-yoga of the effort of speech, mind and body
(viifz-manal:z-sarira-pra·crttz) 2 • But these are all due to the misuse of
intelligence (prajfiiipariidha). vVhen a particular season manifests
its special characteristics of heat, cold or rains to an excessive
degree or to a very deficient degree or in a very irregular or
unnatural manner, we have what are called atiyoga, ayoga and
mithyii-yoga of time (kiila)S. But the misuse of intelligence, or
prajr1iipm·iidha, is at the root of all excessive, deficient or wrongful
association with sense-objects 4 ; for, when proper things are not
taken at the proper time or proper things are not done at the
proper time, it is all misuse of intelligence and is therefore included
under prajfiapariidha. When certain sinful deeds are performed by
praj11apariidha, and, by the sins (adharma) associated with those
deeds, which become efficient only after a certain lapse of time,
illness is produced, the real cause of the illness is primarily
adharma or its root cause, prajiiiipariidha; kala, or time, however,
may still be regarded in some sense as the cause through which
the adharma is matured and becomes productive.
The principle of growth and decay is involved in the maxim
1
Caraka-sa'!lhitii, 1. 11. 37.
2
Ibid. I. I I. 39. 40. Cakrapa:Q.i says that this includes sinful deeds which
produce illness and unhappiness, siirira-miinasika-·viicanika-karma-mithyii-yo-
genaivii-dharmotpiidiiviintara-vyiipiiret;.aiviidharma-janyiitlii1JZ vikiiriit;.iim kriya-
miinatviit.
8
Three seasons only are mentioned, Sito~ma-•oar~a-lak~at;.iib pu11ar heman-
ta-f(rl~ma-var~iil_z. Ibid. 1. I 1. 42.
4
Thus Cakrapat)i, commenting on this, says," buddhy-apariidhasyaiva indri-
yiirthatiyogiidi-hetutviit." Ibid. I. 1. 53.
DII 21
that the different constituents of the body grow when articles
of food having similar constituents are taken, and that they
decay when articles of food having opposite qualities are taken
( evam eva sarva-dhiitu-gm:ziinii1Jl siimiinya-yogiid vrddhz'r vz'par-
yayiidd hriisaiJ)l. Thus, flesh increases by the intake of flesh, so
does blood by taking blood, fat by fat, bones by cartilages, marrow
by marrow, semen by semen and a foetus by eggs 2 • But the prin-
ciple applies not only to the same kind of substances as taken in
the above example, but also to substances having largely similar
qualities, just as the seminal fluid may be increased by taking milk
and butter (samiina-gm:za-bhuyz'#hiiniim anyaprakrttniim apy-iihiira-
vz'kiiriir;iim upayogaiJ) 3 • The ordinary conditions of growth always
hold good, namely, proper age of growth, nature, proper diet and
absence of those circumstances that retard growth. The assimila-
tion of food is effected by heat which digests, air which collects
together all things for the action of heat, water which softens, fat
which makes the food smooth, and time which helps the process
of digestion 4 • As any particular food is digested and changed, it
becomes assimilated into the body. The hard parts of the food
form the hard parts of the body and the liquid parts form the
liquid parts such as blood and the like; and unhealthy food, i.e.
food which has qualities opposed to the natural qualities of the
body, has a disintegrating influence on the body.
As regards the growth of the body through the essence of the
food-juice, there are two different views summed up by Cakrapal).i
(1. 28. 3). Some say that the chyle is transformed into blood, and
the blood into flesh, and so forth. As regards the method of this
transformation, some say that, just as the whole milk is changed
into curd, so the whole chyle is transformed into blood, while
others say that this transformation is somewhat like the circula-
tion in irrigation (kedari-kulyii-nyiiya). The rasa (chyle) produced as
a result of the digestive process, coming into association with rasa
as the body-constituent (dhiitu-rilpa-rasa), increases it to a certain
extent; another part of the rasa, having the same colour and smell
as blood, goes to blood and increases it, and another part similarly
goes to flesh and increases it; and the same process takes place
with reference to its increasing fat, etc. Here the whole circula-
1 Caraka-sG.7{lhitii, 1. I. 43 and 44, also IV 6. 9 and particularly IV. 6. IO.

2 Ibid. IV. 6. IO. Cakrapal)i explains iima-garbha as atpja.
8 Ibid. IV. 6. 11. ' Ibid. IV. 6. 14 and IS.
XIII] Growth and Disease 323
tion begins by the entrance of the entire chyle into the constituent
rasa (rasa-dhiitu); in passing through some part remains in the rasa
and increases it, the unabsorbed part passes into blood, and what
is unabsorbed there passes into flesh and so on to the other higher
constituents of bones, marrow and semen 1 • But others think that,
just as in a farm-house pigeons of different descriptions sit together
(khale kapota-nyiiya), so not all the digested food-juice passes
through the channel of the rasa-dlziitu, but different parts of it pass
through different channels from the very first stage. That part of
it which nourishes rasa enters into the channel of its circulation,
that part of it which nourishes the blood goes directly into that,
and so on. But there is generally this time limitation, that the part
which nourishes the blood enters into it only when the part which
nourishes rasa-dhiitu has been absorbed in it; so again the part
which enters into flesh can only do so when the part which
nourishes blood has been absorbed in it. Thus the circulatory
system is different from the very beginning; and yet the nourish-
lnent of blood takes place later than that of rasa, the nourishment
of flesh later than that of blood, and so on (rasiid rakta'f!l tato
miif!Zsam ityiider ayam arthal:z yad rasa-pu~ti-kiiliid uttara-kiila'f!l
rakta'f!l jiiyate, etc.). The upholders of the last view maintain that
the other theory cannot properly explain how a nourishing diet
(vr~ya), such as milk, can immediately increase the seminal fluid,
and that, if it had to follow the lengthy process of passing through
all the circulatory systems, it could not do its part so quickly; but
on the second theory, milk through its special quality (prabhiiva)
can be immediately associated with the seminal fluid and there-
by increase it 2 • But Cakrapal).i remarks that the earlier theory
(kediirl-kulyii) is as good as the later one. For on that view
also it might be held that by milk its special quality (prabhiiva)
1
There are two kinds of rasa, called dhiitu-rasa and po~aka-rasa. See
Cakrapa~i's comment on Caraka-sa'!lhitii, VI. IS. I4 and IS.
2
pari~riima-pak~e. vr!)la-prayogasya raktiidi-riipiipatti-krame1)iiticire1)a sukra1[l
bhavattti; ~IriidayaJ ca sadya eva vr~Yii drsyante, khale-kapota-pak~e tu vnyotpanno
rasa~ prabhiiviic chfghram eva Jukre?Ja sa1[Zbaddha~ san tat-pu~tim karotiti yuktam
(Cakrapa~i on Caraka-sa'!lhitii, I. 28. 3). Elsewhere (ibid. VI. IS. 32) it is said
that those articles of food which stimulate semen (vnya) are, according to some
authorities, changed into semen in six days and nights, whereas in the ordinary
course, as is said in Susruta, it takes a month for the transformation of ordinary
articles of food into semen. But Caraka does not favour any time limitation
and urges that, just as the movement of a wheel depends upon the energy spent
on it, so the time that a particular food takes for getting itself transformed into
semen or into any other dhiitu depends upon the nature of the food and the
powers of digestion.
324 Speculations in the Medical Schools [cu.
passed quickly through the various stages and became associated
with the seminal fluid. Nor can it be said that according to the
first theory every case of impurity of rasa (rasa-du~ti) is also a
case of impurity of blood (rakta-du~ti), as is argued; for not the
whole of rasa is transformed into blood, but only a part of it. So
the rasa part may be impure, but still the part that goes to form
blood may be pure; thus both theories are equally strong, and
nothing can be said in favour of either. In Caraka-sa'f!lhitii, VI. 15.
I4 and IS, it is said that from rasa there is rakta (blood), from
rakta flesh, from flesh fat, from fat bones, from bones marrow,
from marrow semen. The two theories above referred to deal with
the supposed ways in which such transformations occur.
In addition to the seven dhiitus, or body-constituents, spoken
of above there are ten upa-dhiitus, which are counted by Bhoja as
sirii, sniiyu, ovarial blood and the seven layers of skin 1 . Caraka
says in VI. I 5. I 5 that fron1 1'asa is also produced milk, and from
milk ovarial blood; again, the thick tissues or ligaments (ka~ujarii)
and siriis are produced from blood, and from flesh are pro_duced fat
(·vasii) and the six layers of skin, and from fat (medas) are produced
the five tissues. The chyle, or rasa, becomes tinged with red by the
heat of bile. The blood, again, being worked upon by viiyu and
heat, becomes steady and white, and is called fat (medas). The
bones are a conglomeration of earth, heat and air and therefore,
though produced from flesh and fat, are hard. They are made
porous by 'l'iiJU running through them, and the pores are filled in
by fat, which is called marrow. From the oily parts of marrow,
again, semen is produced. Just as water percolates through the
pores of a new earthen jug, the semen percolates through the pores
of the bones, and there is also a flow of this seminal fluid through
the body by way of its own ducts. By the rousing of desires and sex
joy and by the heat of the sex act the semen oozes out and collects
in the testes, from which it is ultimately liberated through its
proper channel 2 •
1 Cakrapa:.:ti on Caraka-sartzhitii, VI. IS. 14- and IS, a quotation from Bhoja.
Ojas is counted as an upa-dhiitu.
2 Caraka-sa7[zhitii, VI. rs. 22-29.
XIII] 17ayu, Pitta and Kapha 325
Vayu, Pitta and Kapha.

The qualities of the body are briefly of two kinds, those which
make the system foul, the mala, and those which sustain and
purify the body, the prasiida. Thus in the pores of the body are
formed many undesirable bodily growths which seek egress; some
constituents of the body, such as blood, are often turned into pus;
the viiyu (air), pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm or lymph) may
become less or more than their normal measure (prakupita), and
there are other entities which, existing in the body, tend to weaken
or destroy it; these are all called malas. Others which go towards
the sustenance and the growth of the body are called prasiida 1 •
But viiyu,pitta and kapha are primarily responsible for all kinds
of morbidities of the body, and they are therefore called do~a. It
must, however, be noted that the viiyu, pitta and kapha and all
other malas, so long as they remain in their proper measure
(svamiina), do not pollute or weaken the body or produce diseases.
So even malas like viiyu, pitta and kapha, or sweat, urine, etc., are
called dhiitus, or body-constituents, so long as they do not ex-
ceed their proper measure, and thus instead of weakening the body
they serve to sustain it. Both the mala-dhiitus and the prasiida-
dhiitus in their proper measure co-operate together in sustaining
the body 2 • When various kinds of healthy food and drink are
exposed in the stomach to the internal fire of the digestive organs,
they become digested by heat. The essential part of the digested
food is the chyle (rasa), and the impurities which are left out and
cannot be assimilated into the body as its constituents are called
kitta or mala. From this kitta are produced sweat, urine, excreta,
vayu, pitta, Sle~man and the dirt of ear, eye, nose, mouth and of
the holes of the hairs of the body, the hair, beard, hair of the
body, nails, etc. 3 The impurity of food is excreta and urine, that
of rasa is phlegm (kapha), that of flesh bile (pitta) and that of fat
(medas) sweat4 • This view of viiyu, pitta and kapha seems to
indicate that these are secretions, waste-products (kitta), like
the other \'taste-products of the body. But the theory of waste-
products is that, when they are in their proper measure, they serve
to sustain the body and perform important functions, but, when
1
Caraka-sa'!lhitii, IV. 6. 17.
2
evmrt rasa-malau sva-pramii~uivasthitav iisrayasya sama-dhiitor dhiitu-siim-
yam anuvartayatal.z (ibid. 1. 28. 3).
3
Ibid. I. 28. 3- ' Ibid. VI. rs. 30.
they exceed the proper limit or become less than their proper
measure, they pollute the body and may ultimately break it. But
of all waste-products viiyu, pitta and kapha are regarded as being
fundamentally the most important entities, and they sustain the
work of the body by their mutual co-operation in proper measure,
and destroy it by the disturbance of balance due to the rise or fall
of one, two or all three of them.
As has already been said, the body is composed of certain
constituents, such as rasa and rakta. The food and drink which we
take go to nourish the different dhiitus. Not all the food and drink
that we take, however, can be absorbed into the system, and conse-
quently certain waste-products are left 1 • The question arises, what
is it that sustains the system or breaks it? It has already been
noticed that the due proportion of the dhiitus is what constitutes
the health of the body. This due proportion, however, must, as is
easy to see, depend on the proper absorption of food and drink in
such a way that each of the dhiitus may have its due share and
that only, neither less nor more. It is also necessary that there
should be a due functioning of the causes of waste or accretion,
working in a manner conducive to the preservation of the proper
proportion of the constituents with reference to themselves and
the entire system. Deficiency or excess of waste-products is there-
fore an invariable concomitant of all disturbances of the balance
of dhiitus, and hence the deficiency or excess of waste-products
is regarded as the cause of all dhiitu-vai~amya. So long as the
waste-products are not in deficiency or excess, they are the agents
which constitute the main working of the system and may them-
selves be therefore regarded as dhiitus. It is when there is excess
or deficiency of one or more of them that they oppose in various
ways the general process of that working of the system and are
to be regarded as do~as or polluting agents. There are various
waste-products of the body; but of all these viiyu,pitta and kapha
are regarded as the three most important, being at the root of
all growth and decay of the body, its health and disease. Thus
1 Sarngadhara (Iv. 5) counts seven visible waste-products which are different
from the three malas referred to here as vayu, pitta and kapha. These are (r) the
watery secretions from tongue, eyes and cheeks, (2) the colouring pitta, (3) the
dirt of ears, tongue, teeth, armpits and penis, (4) the nails, (5) the dirt of the
eyes, (6) the glossy appearance of the face, (7) the eruptions which come out in
youth, and beards. Ra«;ihamalla, in commenting on this, refers to Caraka-sa7{lhitii,
VI. 15. 29-30, in support of the above passage of Sanigadhara. Most of the malas
are chidra-malas, or impurities of the openings.
XIII] Vayu, Pitta and Kapha 327
Atreya says in answer to Kapyavaca's remarks in the learned dis-
cussions of the assembly of the sages, "In one sense you have
all spoken correctly; but none of your judgments are absolutely
true. Just as it is necessary that religious duties (dharma), wealth
(artha) and desires (kiima) should all be equally attended to, or
just as the three seasons of winter, summer and rains all go in
a definite order, so all the three, viita, pitta and Sle~man or kapha,
when they are in their natural state of equilibrium, contribute to
the efficiency of all the sense-organs, the strength, colour and
health of the body, and endow a man with long life. But, when
they are disturbed, they produce opposite results and ultimately
break the whole balance of the system and destroy it 1 ." There is
one important point to which the notice of the reader should par-
ticularly be drawn. I have sometimes translated mala as" polluting
agents or impurities" and sometimes as "waste-products," and
naturally this may cause confusion. The term mala has reference
to the production of diseases 2 • Kitta means waste-products or
secretions, and these may be called mala when they are in such
proportions as to cause diseases. vVhen, however, a mala is in such
proportions that it does not produce any disease, it is not a mala
proper but a mala-dhiitu (nirbiidha-kariin maliidzn prasii1{lde smhcak~
mahe)3. In another passage of Caraka (1. z8. 3), which has been
referred to above, it is said that out of the digested food and drink
there are produced rasa and kitta (secretion) called mala ( tatriihiira-
prasiidiikhya-rasa~l kiftal!l ca maliikhyam abhinirvartate), and out of
this kz#q is produced sweat, urine, excreta, viiyu,pitta and Sle~man.
These malas are also dhiitus, inasmuch as they sustain the body as
much as the other dhiitus, rasa or 1·akta, etc. do, so long as they
are in their proper proportions and balance ( te sarva eva dhiitavo
maliikhyii/:l prasiidiikhyiis ca) 4 • Vagbhata, however, takes a different
view of this subject. He separates the do~a, dhiitu and mala and
speaks of them as being the roots of the body. Thus he says that
viiyu sustains the body, contributing energy (utsiiha), exhalation
(ucchviisa), inspiration (ni/:lsviisa), mental and bodily movement
(ce#ii), ejective forces (·vega-pravartana); pitta helps the body by
1 Caraka-sa'l'flhitii, 1. 12. 13.
2
tatra mala-bhfitiis te ye ianrasya biidhakarii/.1 syulz. Caraka-sa'l'flhitii, IV. 6. 17.
3
Cakrapiir:ti on Caraka-sa'l'flhitii. Compare Siirizgadhara, IV. 8: viiyub pitla1Jl
kapho do~ii dhiitavai ca malii matiib, i.e. viiyu, pitta and kapha are known as do~a,
dhiitu and mala.
4
Also eva'l'fl rasa-malau sva-pramii~ziivasthitav iifrayasya sama-dhiitor dhiitu-
siimyam anuvartayatab (Caraka-sa'f!lhitii, 1. 28. 3).
Speculations in the 1V!edical Schools [cH.
digestive function, heat, the function of sight, imagination (medhii),
power of understanding (dhi), courage (saurya), softness of the
body; and Sle~man, by steadiness, smoothness, by serving to unite
the joints, etc. The functions of the seven dhiitus, beginning with
rasa, are said to be the giving of satisfaction through the proper
functioning of the senses (prt;~ana or rasa), the contribution of
vitality (jivana), the production of oiliness (sneha), the supporting
of the burden (dhiira~a) of the bones (astht), the filling up of bone
cavities (pura~a or majjii) and productivity (garbhotpiida of /ukra);
of males it is said that the excreta has the power of holding the
body, while urine ejects the surplus water and sweat holds it back 1 •
The elder Vagbhata distinguishes the dhiitus from viiyu, pitta and
lwpha by calling the latter do~a (polluting agents) and the former
du~ya {the constituents which are polluted). He further definitely
denies that the malas of dhiitus could be the cause of disease. He
thus tries to explain away this view (that of Caraka as referred to
above) as being aupaciirika, i.e. a metaphorical statement 2 • The
body, according to him, is a joint product of do~a, dhiitu and
mala 3 • Indu, the con1mentator on the A~tiiizga-sa1J1graha, however,
emphasizes one important characteristic of the do$aS when he says
that the dynamic which sets the dhiitus in motion (do~ebhya eva
dhiitilnii~n pra·vrtti~z) is derived from the do~ as, and the circulation
chemical activities, oiliness, hardness, etc. of the chyle (rasa) are
derived from them 4 • Owing to the predominance of one or other
of the do~as from the earliest period, when the foetus begins to
develop, the child is said to possess the special features of one
or other of the do~as and is accordingly called viita-prakrti, pitta-
prakrti or sle:"ma-prakrti. Vagbhata further says that disease is not
dhiitu-'l•ai~amya, but do~a-·cai$mnya, and the equilibrium of do$aS or
do~a-siimya is health. A disease, on this view, is the disturbance
of do~as, and, as do$as arc entities independent of the dhiitus,
the disturbance of do~as may not necessarily mean the dis-
turbance of dhiitus 5 • In another passage the elder Vagbhata says
1
A~tiiilga-hrdaya, 1. 11.
1-5.
2
tajjiin ity-upaciiret)a tan iilmr ghrta-diiha•vat
rasiidisthe~u do~e~u ·vyiidhayas sambhavanti ye.
AHiiilga-smrzgraha, 1. I.
3
lndu, the commentator on the A~tii1iga-S01Jl.(!raha, puts it as sarzra1Jl ca do1a-
dhiitu-mala-samudiiyal.z (1. 1).
4
tathii ca dhiitu-po~iiya rasasya valuma-piika-sneha-kiithinyiidi do~a
prasiida-labhyam eva (ibid.).
5
Ayur-veda is closely associated with the Sarp.khya and Nyaya-Vaise~ika,
which alone deal with some sort of phy::.ics in Indian philosophy. It is pointed
XIII] V iiyu, Pitta and Kapha
that, as the manifold universe is nothing but a modification of the
gu'!las, so all diseases are but modifications of the three do~as, or,
as in the ocean waves, billows and foam are seen which are in
reality the same as the ocean, so all the different diseases are
nothing but the three do~as 1 • The elder Vagbhata uses also in
another place the simile of the three gu'!las with reference to the
three do~as. Thus he says," As the three gu'!las co-operate together
for the production of the world in all its diversity, in spite of the
mutual opposition that exists among themselves, so the three do~m~
also co-operate together, in spite of natural opposition, for the pro-
duction of the diverse diseases 2 ." In the treatment of the bone
system the present writer agrees with Dr Hoernle that Vagbhata
always attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Caraka
and Susruta by explaining away the unadjustable views of one or
the other. Here also the same tendency is seen. Thus, on the one
hand, he explained away as being metaphorical (aupaciiriki) the
expressed views of Caraka that the dhiitu-malas are the do~as. On
the other hand, he followed the statements of the Uttara-tantra
that the three do~as, the dhiitus, excreta and urine sustain a man's
body. He further follows the Uttara-tantra in holding that the three
do~as are the three gm;as (bhinnii do~iis trayo gU1Jii/;). I)alhal).a
identifies z·iiyu with rajas, pitta with sativa and kapha with tamas 3 •
In the Siltra-sthiina Susruta mentions blood (sorzita) as having
the same status as viiyu, pitta and kapha and holds that the body
out by Narasirp.ha Kaviraja (a writer from the south) in his Vivarm;za-siddlziinta-
cintiimm:zi (the only manuscript of which is in possession of the present writer)
that acco:-ding to Sarp.khya it is the do~a transforming itself from a state of
equilibrium to a state of unbalanced preponderance of any of them that is
to be called a disease (vai~amya-siimyiivasthii-bhinniivasthii-viSe~avad do~atvarJl
rogat'l.Jam). The Naiyayikas, however, hold that disease is a separate entity or
substance, which is produced by do~a, but which is not itself a do,w (dravyatve
sati do,w-bhinna-do~a-janyatVa1Jl rogatvam). So a disease is different from its
symptoms or effects. Narasirp.ha further holds that, since Caraka speaks of
diseases as being fiery (agneya) and aerial (viiyavya), he tacitly accepts the
diseases as separate substances. That Caraka sometimes describes a disea:;e
as being dhiitu-vai~amya is to be explained as due to the fact that, since
dhiitu-vai~amyas produce diseases, they are themselves also called diseases in a
remote sense (yat tu C arakena dhiitu-vai~amyasya rogatvam uhtatJl tat te~iiTfl tathii-
vidha-dubkha-kartrtviid aupaciirikam. Vivarava-siddhiinta-cintiimm;li, MS. p. 3).
1
A~tiiilga-satJlgraha, I. 22.
2
iirambhakarJl virodhe 'pi mitho yadyadguva-trayam
viivasya dr~tatJlyugapad vyiidher do~a-traya'Jl tathii (ibid. I. 21).
3
rajo-bhuy#tho miirutal.z, rajo hi pravartaka'Jl sarva-bhiiViinii'Jl pittarJl sattvot-
katatJl/aghu-prakiilakatviit, rajo-yukta'!l vii ity eke kaphas tamo-bahulalz, guru-prii-
varm;iitmakatviid ity iihur bhi~ajafz. Yady evam tat katharJl kapha-pralqtike purJlsi
sattva-gw;.opapannatii pathitii, ucyate, guva-dvitayam api kaphejiiiitavya'l!l sattva-
tamo-bahulii iipa (Oalhal)a on Susruta, Uttara-tantra, 66. 9).
depends on food and drink as well as on the various combinations
of viiyu,pitta, kapha and s01:zita in health and disease. :QalhaQa, in
commenting on this, says that, Susruta's work being principally a
treatise on surgery, its author holds that blood with all its impurities
plays an important part in producing disturbances in all wounds 1 •
Susruta further speaks of viita, pitta and sle§man as the causes of
the formation of the body (deha-sambhava-hetavafz). The viita, pitta
and kapha, situated in the lower, middle and upper parts of the
body, are like three pillars which support the body, and blood also
co-operates with them in the same work. :QalhaiJ.a remarks that
v.:iita, pitta and kapha are concomitant causes, working in co-
operation with semen and blood 2 • Susruta further derives viita
from the root vii, to move, pitta from tap, to heat, and sle~man
from sli~, to connect together. The Sutra-sthiina of Susruta com-
pares kapha, pitta and viiyu with the moon (soma), the sun
(surya) and air (anila) but not with the three gutyas, as is found
in the supplementary book, called the Uttara-tantra. In discussing
the nature of pitta, he says that pitta is the fire in the body and
there is no other fire but pitta in the body. Pitta has all the
qualities of fire, and so, when it diminishes, articles of food with
fiery qualities serve to increase it, and, when it increases, articles
of food with cooling properties serve to diminish it. Pitta, according
to Susruta, is situated between the stomach (iimiisaya) and the
smaller intestines (pakviisaya), and it cooks all food and drink and
separates the chyle on the one hand, and the excreta, urine, etc.
on the other. Being situated in the above place, between the
stomach and the smaller intestines (tatra-stham eva), by its own
power (iitma-saktyii) it works in other pitta centres of the body
and by its heating work (agni-karma) sets up the proper activities
at those places. In its function of cooking it is called piicaka, in
its function in the liver and spleen, as supplying the colouring
matter of blood, it is called "colouring" (raiijaka), in its function
in the heart it serves intellectual purposes (siidhaka), in its function
in the eyes it is called "perceiving," or locaka, in its function of
giving a glossy appearance to the skin it is called bhriijaka. It is
hot, liquid and blue or yellow, possesses bad smell, and after
1 etad dhi salya-tantram, salya-tantre ca vra~w.fz pradhiina-bhiitafz vra~e ca
dt7~ye~umadhye raktasya priidhiinyam iti S01Jitopiidiinam (ibid.). Susruta also uses
the word do~a to mean pus (ptiya) (I. 5· 12).
2
Susruta, I. 21. 3 and 4· J)alhat:ta, commenting on this, writes:" iukriirtaviidi
sahakiiritayii deha-janakii abhipretiiJ.z."
XIII] Vayu, Pitta and Kapha 33 1
passing through unhealthy digestive actions tastes sour. Coming
to Sle~man, Susruta says that the stomach is its natural place;
being watery, it flows down\vards and neutralizes the bile-heat,
which otherwise would have destroyed the whole body by its ex-
cessive heat. Being in iimiisaya, it works in the other centres of
Sle~man, such as the heart, the tongue, the throat, the head
and in all the joints of the body. The place of viiyu is the pelvic
regions and the rectum (srm:zi-guda-Sa1Jlsraya); the main place of the
blood, which is counted as do~a by Susruta, is regarded as being the
liver and the spleen 1 • I have noticed above, that in the /ltharva-
Veda mention is found of three kinds of diseases, the airy (viitaja),
the dry (s~ma) and the wet (abhraja) 2 • In the Caraka-samhitii
1-'iita, pitta and lwpha are regarded as being produced from kitta,
or secretions. They are thus regarded here as being of the nature
of internal waste-products of unassimilated food-juice at the
different stages of its assimilation, as chyle, flesh, etc., which have
important physiologicai functions to perform for the preservation
of the process of the growth of the body, when they are in due
proportions, and they break up the body when they are in undue
proportions. What exactly ki!ta means is difficult to determine. It
may mean merely the part of the food-juice unassimilated as chyle,
or the part of it unassimilated as blood, and so forth; or it may
mean such unassimilated products, together with the secretions
from the respective dhiitus, which absorb the substantial part
of the food-juice and throw off some of its impurities into the
unabsorbed material; this at least is what kitta ought to mean,
if it is interpreted as dhiitu-mala, or impurities of dhiitus. These
secretions and waste-products form the source of most of the con-
structive and destructive forces of the body. The watery character
of kapha and the fiery character of pitta are not ignored; but their
essence or substance is considered to be secretive, or of the nature
of waste-product. Susruta, however, does not seem to refer to
this secretive aspect, but he seems to have grasped the essential
physiological activity of the body as being of the nature of digestive
operation and the distribution of the heat and the products of
digestion; and the analogy of cooking, as requiring fire, water and
air, seems to have been well before his mind. Susruta also seems to
1
Susruta-saf!Zhitii, I. 11. 8-16.
2
Ye abhrajii viitajii yai ca iupno (Atharva- Veda, I. 12. 3); again, agner iviisya
dahata eti SU~mitza/; (ibid. VI. 20. 4).
332 Speculations in the 111edical Schools [cH.
have leant more towards the view of the physiological operations

of the body as being due to elemental activities, the food-juice
taking the place of earth and the other three principles being fire
(pitta), water (Sle~man) and air (viita). The reason why the prin-
ciples of the body are here regarded as being transformations
of fire, water and air is not explained by Susruta. The supple-
mentary Uttara-tantra, however, thinks that they are the three
gm;as. Vagbhata, always fond of taking a middle course in his
endeavour to reconcile the different attempts to grasp the prin-
ciples under discussion, holds that they are comparable to the
three gu1JaS, because, though opposed to one another, they also
co-operate together; and, because diseases are but modifications of
the do~as, he further thinks that do~as, dhiitus and dhiitu-malas
are quite different entities; but he is unable to give any definite
idea as to what these do~as are. The person who seems to have
had the most definite conception of the do~as was Caraka. In the
Uttara-tantra and by Vagbhata the Saq1khya analogy of the gu1Jas
seems to have had a very distracting influence, and, instead of
trying to find out the true physiological position of the do~as, these
writers explain away the difficulty by a vague reference to the
Saq1khya gu1Jas.
Let us now return to Caraka. By him viiyu is described as
being dry (ru~a), cold (SUa), light (laghu), subtle (siik~a), moving
(cala), scattering everything else in different directions (visada) and
rough (khara)l. It is neutralized in the body by those things which
have opposite qualities. In the healthy constructive process the
·viiyu is said to perform physiological functions as follows: it
sustains the machinery of the body (tantra-yantra-dhara~z), it mani-
fests itself as priina, udana, sam ana and apiina and is the generator
of diverse kinds of efforts; it is the force which controls (niyantii)
the mind from all undesirables and directs (pra1Jelii) it to all that
is desirable, is the cause of the employment of the sense-organs,
is the carrier of the stimulation of sense-objects, collects together
1 Caraka-sa1Jzhitii, 1. 1. 58. Cakrapat;~i, in commenting on this, says that, though
viiyu is described as neither hot nor cold according to the Vaise~ika philosophy,
yet, since it is found to increase by cold and decrease by heat, it is regarded
as cold. Of course, when connected with pitta it is found to be hot, but that is
on account of its association with the heat of pitta (yoga-viihitviit}. In the
Vata-kala-kaliya chapter (1. 12. 4), six qualities of viita are mentioned; silk~ma is
not mentioned, however, and, in place of cala, diiru7Ja is mentioned. Cakrapat;~i
says that diiru7Ja means the same as cala. In the same chapter (1. 12. 7) viiyu
is qualified as su#ra-kara, i.e. that which makes holes.
XIII] Vayu, Pitta and Kapha 333
the dhatus of the body, harmonizes the functions of the body
as one whole, is the mover of speech, is the cause of touch and
sounds, as also of the corresponding sense-organs, the root of joy
and mental energy, the air for the digestive fire, the healer of
morbidities, the ejecter of extraneous dirts, the operating agent for
all kinds of circulation, the framer of the shape of the foetus, and
is, in short, identical with the continuity of life (iiyu~o 'nuvrtti-
pratyaya-bhuta). When it is in undue proportions, it brings about
all sorts of troubles, weakens the strength, colour, happiness and
life, makes the mind sad, weakens the functions of the sense-organs,
causes malformations of the foetus, produces diseases and all
emotions of fear, grief, delirium, etc., and arrests the functions of
the prii~ws.
It is interesting to note how Vayorvida describes the cosmic
functions of air as the upholding of the earth, causing the burning
of fire, the uniform mot~on of the planets and stars, the production
of clouds, the showering of rains, the flow of rivers, the shaping of
flowers and fruits, the shooting out of plants, the formation of the
seasons, the formation of the strata of minerals, the production of
the power of seeds to produce shoots, the growing up of crops, etc .I
In the same discussion 1\llarici considers fire to be contained in the
pitta and productive of all good and bad qualities, digestion and
indigestion, vision and blindness, courage and fear, anger, joy,
ignorance, etc., according as it is in equilibrium or is disturbed.
Kapya maintains that soma, contained in Sle~man, produces all
good and bad qualities, such as firmness and looseness of the
body, fatness, leanness, energy and idleness, virility and impotence,
knowledge and ignorance, etc. 2
These discussions seem to indicate that before Atreya's treatise
was written attempts were made to explain the physiological func-
tions of the body in health and disease by referring them to the
operation of one operative principle. The Chiindogya Upan#ad
speaks of earth, water and fire as being world-principles of con-
struction: the different viiyus were known as early as the Atharva-
Veda, and vayu is regarded in many of the Upani~ads as the prin-
ciple of life. It seems fairly certain that the theory of 'Diita, pitta
and kapha is a later development of the view which regarded air
(pavana), fire (dahana) and water (toya) as the fundamental con-
stitutive principles of the body. Thus Susruta refers to this view
1 Caraka-saTflhitii, I. 12. 8. 2
Ibid. 1. u. I I and I2.
in 111. 4· 8o: "Some say that the constitution (prakrtz) of the human
body is elemental (bhautikz), the three constitutive elements being
air, fire and water 1 ." The advance of the medical schools of thought
over these speculations and over others which consider the body
to be a product of one bhuta or of many bhiltas is to be sought
in this, that, besides allowing the material causes (upadiina) of
the body to be the dhiitus, they emphasized the necessity of ad-
mitting one or more inherent dynamic principles for the develop-
ment and decay of the body. This explains how viita, pitta and
kapha are regarded both as dhatu and as do1a, as prakrti and as
vikrti. Thus Caraka says, as has already been mentioned, that
from the time of the formation of the foetus the viita, pitta and
kapha are working, but in more or less diverse ways and in diverse
systems, with equal viiyu, pitta, mala and kapha (sama-pittanila-
kapha) or different degrees of predominance of them as viitala,
pittala and sle~mala 2 • Men of the Sle~ala type are generally
healthy, whereas viitala and pittala persons are always of indifferent
health. Later on, when there is a disease with the predominance
of that dofa which is predominant in man's constitution from his
birth, the newly collected do1a produces morbidity on the lines on
which the predominating do~a of his constitution is working ; but this
newly collected do~a does not augment the corresponding original
do~a. The original dofa is never increased, and, whatever may be
the predominance of a dofa due to any disease, the constitutional
condition of the do~as remains the same. Thus a vlita-pra.krti
person does not become Slefma-prakrti or pitta-prakrti, and vice-
versa. The dofaS which are constitutional always remain as the
prakrtim iha narti7Jiim bhautikiT!l kecid iihul}
pavana-dahana-toyail} kirtitiis tiis tu tisral;.
Susruta, 111. 4· 8o.
2 Caraka refers to a view that there are none who may be regarded as
sama-viita-pitta-Sle~man (or having equal viita, pitta and sle~man). Since all men
take various kinds of diet (•vi~amiihiiropayogitviit), they must be either viita-
prakrti, pitta-prakrti, or sle~ma-prallrti. Against this Caraka says that sama-viita-
pitta-sle~man is the same thing as health or freedom from disease (aroga). All
medicines are applied for attaining this end, and there cannot be any doubt
that such a state exists. Again, the terms viita-prakrti, pitta-prakrti and sle~ma
prakrti are incorrect; for prakrti means health. What they mean by viita-prakrti is
that viita is quantitatively predominant (iidhikya-bhiiviit sii do~a-prakrtir ucyate),
and quantitative predominance is the same as vikiira; so the proper terms are
vatala, pittala, etc. When a viitala person takes things which increase vlita, his
viita increases at once; but when he takes things which increase pitta or Jlepnan,
these do not increase in him as rapidly as viita does. So in the case of a pittala
person pitta increases rapidly when articles which increase pitta are taken, and
so with regard to Sle~an (Caraka-saTflhitii, III. 6. 14-18).
XIII] V iiyu, Pitta and Kapha 335
constant part engaged in their physiological operations. The later
accretion of the do~as or their deficiency has a separate course of
action in producing diseases, and there is no interchange between
these later collections of do~as or their deficiency and the con-
stitutional constant parts of the do~as known as prakrti1 • The only
sense (as CakrapaQ.i says) in which a do~a is related to a consti-
tutional (prakrti) do~a is that a do~a grows strong in a system in
which a corresponding do~a is constitutionally predominant, and it
grows weaker when the opposite is the case 2 • It is not out of place
in this connection to say that, though the do~as are mutually op-
posed to one another, they do not always neutralize one another,
and it is possible for them to grow simultaneously violent in a
system. In the six seasons of rains (var~ii), autumn (Sarat), late
autumn (hemanta), winter (sita), spring (vasanta) and summer
(gri~ma) there is an alternate collection (cay a), disturbance (prakopa)
and lowering down (prasama) of the three do~as, pitta, sle~man
and viiyu respectively. Thus, for example, in the rains (var~ii)
there is collection of pitta, in the autumn (sarat) there is dis-
turbance of pitta, in the harvesting season (hemanta) there is
lowering of pitta and collection of Sle~man, in the summer
there is collection of viita, and so forth 3 • Contrasting the
functions of the do~as in the normal (prakrtz) and abnormal
(vikrtz) states, Caraka says that in the normal state the heat of
1 Ibid. 1. 7. 38-41. The passage prakrti-sthaTfl yadii pittaTfl miirutal) slepna1Ja~z
k~aye (I. 17. 45) is often referred to in support of the view that the new accretions
of do~as affect the prakrti-do~as. But Cakrapar:ti explains it differently. He says
that a disease may be caused by a do~a which is not in excess of the constant
constitutional quantity (prakrti-miina) by virtue of the fact that it may be carried
from one part of the body to another and thereby may produce a local accretion
or excess, though the total quantity of do~a may not be in excess.
2
samiinii1rz hi prakrtiTfl priipya do~a/:l pravrddha-balo bha.vati, asamiiniiTfl tu
priipya tathii balaviin na syiit (Cakrapar:ti on Caraka-saTflhitii, I. 17. 62).
3
Ibid. 1. 17. 112. See also Cakrapar:ti's comments on these . .l)alhar:ta, in com-
menting on Susruta-saTflhitii, 1. 21. 18, says that saizcaya of do~as means aggre-
gation or accumulation in general (dehe 'tirupii'lJ!ddhis caya~z); prakopa of do~as
means that the accumulated do~as are spread through the system (vilayana-rupii
<t•rddhi/:l prakopal)). The external signs of the caya of viita are fullness of the
stomach and want of motions; of pitta yellowish appearance and reduction of heat
(mando~1Jalii); of kapha heaviness of the limbs and feeling of laziness. In all cases
of caya there is a feeling of aversion to causes which increase the particular do~a
of which there has been caya (caya-kiira1Ja-vidve~as ca). The stage of caya is the
first stage of operation in the growth and prevention of diseases. If the do~as
can be removed or neutralized at this stage, there is no further disease. The
usual indication of the disturbance (prakopa) of viiyu is disorders of the stomach;
of pitta, acidity, thirst and burning; of kapha, aversion to food, palpitation
(hrdayotkleda), etc. The prakopa of blood (so1}ita) is always due to the prakopa
of viita, pitta or kapha. This is the second stage of the progress of diseases. The
pitta occasions digestion; slepnan is strength and vitality, and
viiyu is the source of all activities and the life of all living beings;
but in the abnormal state pitta produces ~any diseases; Slepnan
is the dirt of the system and the cause of many troubles, and viita
also produces many diseases and ultimately death. The places
(sthiiniini) at which the affections of viita, pitta and kapha are
mostly found are thus described by Caraka: of viita the bladder,
rectum, waist and the bones of the leg, but the smaller intestine
(pakvii.Saya) is its particular place of affection; of pitta sweat,
blood and the stomach, of which the last is the most important; of
sle~man the chest, head, neck, the joints, stomach and fat, of which
the chest is the most important. There are eighty affections of
'l-'iita, forty of pitta and twenty of Slepnmz 1 • But in each of these
various affections of viita, pitt a and Slepnan the special features
and characteristics of the corresponding dosas are found. Thus
Caraka in 1. 20. 12-23 describes certain symptoms as leading to
a diagnosis of the disease as being due to the disturbance of ~·iita,
pitta or kapha. But a question may arise as to what may con-
sistently with this view be considered to be the nature of viiyu,pitta
and kapha. Are they only hypothetical entities, standing as symbols
of a number of symptoms without any real existence? In such
an interpretation reality would belong to the symptoms, and
the agents of morbidity, or the do~as, would only be convenient
symbols for col1ecting certain groups of these symptoms under
one name. Wherever there is one particular set of symptoms, it is
to be considered that there is disturbance of viiyu; wherever there
is another set of symptoms, there is disturbance of pitta, and so
third stage is called prasiira. At this stage there is something like a fermentation
of the do~as (paryupta-ki'l}'l'odaka-pi~!a-samaviiya iva). This is moved about by
vayu, which though inanimate, is the cause of all motor activities. When a
large quantity of water accumulates at any place, it breaks the embankment and
flows down and joins on its way with other streams and flows on all sides; so
the do~as also flow, sometimes alone, sometimes two conjointly, and sometimes
all together. In the whole body, in the half of it, or in whatever part the fer-
mented do~as spread, there the symptoms of diseases are showered down, as
it were, like water from the clouds (do~o vikiira'f{Z nabhasi meghm1at tatra •var~ati).
When one do~a, e.g. viiyu, spreads itself in the natural place of another do~a,
e.g. pitta, the remedy of the latter will remove the former (viiyo!z pitta-sthii1la-
gatasya pittavat pratlkiiral:t). The difference between prakopa and prasiira is
thus described by .Oalhar:ta: just as when butter is first stirred up, it moves a
little; this slight movement is like prakopa; but, when it is continuously and
violently stirred to flow out, in froths and foams, it may then be called prasiira
(Susruta-sa1Jlhitii, I. 21. 18-32). The fourth stage is when the purva-rupa is
seen, and the fifth stage is the stage of rupa or vyiidhi (disease) (ibid. 38, 39).
1 Caraka-sa1Jlhitii, I. 20. II.
XIII] V ayu, Pitta and Kapha 337
forth. But there are serious objections against such an inter-
pretation. For, as we have shown above, there are many passages
where these do~as are described as secretions and waste-products,
which in their normal proportions sustain and build the body
and in undue proportions produce diseases and may ultimately
break up the system. These passages could not be satisfactorily
explained upon the above interpretation. 1\tloreover, there are
many passages which describe pitta and kapha as entities having
a particular colour and material consistency, and it is also said that
there are particular places in the body where they collect, and
this would be impossible upon the interpretation that they are
not real entities, but hypothetical, having only a methodological
value as being no more than convenient symbols for a collective
grasp of different symptoms 1 •
The attribution of a certain number of specific qualities to the
do~as is due to a belief that the qualities of effects are due to the
qualities of causes. So, from the diverse qualities of our bodies
considered as effects, the causes were also considered as having
those qualities from which those of the effects were derived. Thus,
in connection with the description of the qualities of viita, Caraka
says that on account of the qualities of rauk~ya the bodies of those
having congenital vii.ta tendency are rough, lean and small, and
1 The secretory character of these do~as is amply indicated by such passages
as those which regard viita, pitta and ile~man as requiring some space in the
stomach for digesting the food materials, e.g. ekaT!l punar viita-pitta-sle~m:ziim
(ibid. III. 2. 3); Sle~a hi snigdha-sla~'f}a-mrdu-madhura-siira-siindra-manda
stimita-guru-ftta-vijjaliicchal} (Sle~an is smooth, pleasing, soft, sweet, substantial,
compact, inert, benumbed, heavy, cold, moist and transparent--ibid. 111. 8. 14.
7. 5) ; pittam ~1Ja7fl ttkroaT!l dravaTfl visram amla'Y{t kafukaTfl ca (pitta is hot, sharp
and liquid, and possesses bad odour, and is acid and pungent and bitter--ibid.
111. 8. 14. 7· 6); viitas tu rilk~a-laghu-cala-bahu-ftghra-ftta-par~a-visadal} (viita is
rough, light, moving, manifold, quick; cold, coarse and scattering--ibid. III.
8. 14. 7· 7)·
It must, however, be noted that the translation I have given of some of these
words cannot be regarded as satisfactory; for in the translation I could only give
one sense of a word, which in the original Sanskrit has been used in a variety of
senses which the word has. Thus, for example, I have translated ril~a as" rough."
But it also means" slim,"" lean,"" having insomnia," or (of a voice) "broken,"
and so forth. There is no English synonym which would have so many senses.
Mahamahopadhyaya Kaviraj Gar:tanatha Sen, of Calcutta, tries to divide the
do~as into two classes, invisible (sak~ma) and visible (sthala)-Siddhiinta-nidana,
pp. 9-11. But though such a distinction can doubtless be made, it has not been
so distinguished in the medical literature, as it is of little value from the medical
point of view; it also does not help us to understand the real nature of the do~as.
The nature and the functions of the do~as do not depend in the least on their
visibility or invisibility, nor can the visible do~a be regarded as always the
product of the invisible one.
Dll 22
~peculations in the J.\11edical Schools [cH.
the voices of such people are rough, weak, grating, slow and
broken, and they cannot sleep well (jiigaruka); again, on account
of the quality of lightness of viiyu, the movements of a man with
congenital viita tendency would be light and quick, and so would
be all his efforts, eating, speech, and so forth. It is easy to see
that the resemblance of the qualities of viiyu to the qualities of
the body is remote; yet, si~ce the special features and characteristics
of one's body were considered as being due to one or the other of
the body-building agents, these characteristics of the body were
through remote similarity referred to them.
There is another point to be noted in connection with the
enumeration of the qualities of the do~as. The disturbance of a do~a
does not necessarily mean that all its qualities have been exhibited
in full strength; it is possible that one or more of the qualities of a
do~a may run to excess, leaving others intact. Thus viiyu is said to
possess the qualities of ruk~a, laghu, cala, bahu, stghra, sua, etc.,
and it is possible that in any particular case the sUa quality may
run to excess, leaving others undisturbed, or so may slta and ruk~a,
or sita, ruk~a and laghu, and so forth. Hence it is the business of
the physician not only to discover \Vhich do~a has run to excess,
but also to examine which qualities of which do~a have run to
excess. The qualities of do~as are variable, i.e. it is possible that a
do{•a in its state of disturbance will remain a do~a, and yet have
some of its qualities increased and others decreased. The nature of
the disturbance of a do~a is determined by the nature of the dis-
turbance of the qualities involved (a'f!lSlif!Zsa-vikalpa)l. The natural
inference from such a theory is that, since the entities having
this or that quality are but component parts of a do~w, a do~a
cannot be regarded as a whole homogeneous in all its parts. On
this view a do~a appears to be a particular kind of secretion which
is a mixture of a number of different secretions having different
qualities, but which operate together on the same lines. When a
particular do~a is in a healthy order, its component entities are in
certain definite proportions both with regard to themselves and to
1 Caraka-saT[lhitii, 11. 1. 10. 4· CakrapaQ.i, in commenting on this, says:" tatra
do~ii?Jiim UTflSiimsa-vikalpo yatlzii-viite prakiipite ,pi kadiicid viitasya sUiiT[lio balaviin
bhavati, kadiicillaghv-a7fZsal;l, kadiicid riik~ii'l!lia(l kadiicillaghu-ruk~ii'!lial;l." The
do~a or do~as which become prominently disturbed in a system are called
anubandhya, and the do~a or do~as which at the time of diseases are not primarily
disturbed are called anubandha. V{hcn three of the do~as are jointly disturbed,
it is calledsannipiita, and when two are so disturbed it is called sa7fZSarga (ibid.m.
6. II).
XIII] V ayu, Pitta and Kapha 339
the total do~a. But, when it is disturbed, some of the component
secretions may increase L1 undue proportions, while others may
remain in the normal state; of course, the quantity of the whole
do~a may also increase or decrease. A do~a such as kapha or pitta
should therefore be regarded as a name for a collection of secre-
tions rather than one secretion of a homogeneous character. It
will be easily seen that, on taking into consideration the com-
parative strengths of the different components of a do~a and the
relative strengths of the other components of other do~as and the
relative strengths and proportions of each of the do~as amongst
themselves, the number of combinations is innumerable, and the
diseases proceeding from such combinations are also innumerable.
The whole system of Caraka's treatment depends upon the ascer-
tainment of the nature of these affections; the names of diseases
are intended to be tnere collective appellations of a number of
affections of a particular type 1 .
One further point which ought to be noted with regard to the
constructive and destructive operations of vii.yu, pitta and kaplza
is that they are independent agents which work in unison with a
man's karma and also in unison with a man's mind. The opera-
tions of the mind and the operations of the body, as performed by
. vayu,p£tta and kapha on the materials of the dhii.tus, rasa, rakta,
etc., run parallel to each other; for both follow the order of human
karma, but neither of them is determined by the other, though
they correspond to each other closely. This psycho-physical
parallelism is suggested throughout Caraka's system. Caraka, in
trying to formulate it, says: "siirlram api satvam anuvidhzyate
SafVa1Jl ca Siirlram" (the mind COrresponds to the body and the
body to the mind). It may be remembered in this connection that
the ultimate cause of all dhiitu-'cai~mU_l'a or ahhi'glziita (bodily in-
juries through accidents, a fall and the like) is foolish action (prajfiii.-
pariidha). Again viita, pitta and kapha are found to perform
not only physical operations, but also intellectual operations of
various kinds. But all intellectual operations belong properly to
mind. \Vhat is meant by attributing intellectual functions to viiyu,
p£tta and kapha seems to be a sort of psycho-physical parallelism,
mind corresponding to body, body corresponding to mind, and
both corresponding to karma.
1 yad viitiirabdhatviidi-jfiiinam eva kiirm:zam rogii1Jii7fl cikitsiiyiim upakiiri;
niima-jiiiina7Jl tu vyavahiira-miitra-prayojaniirtham (Cakrapal)i on Caraka-

saTflhitii, I. 18. 53).
22-2
Head and Heart 1 •

The most vital centres of the body are the head, the heart and
the pelvis (vastz). The prli7Jas, i.e. the vital currents, and all the
senses are said to depend (sritii/;l) on the head 2 • The difference
between head (sir~a) and brain (masti§ka) was known as early as
the Atharva-Veda. Thus in A.V. x. 2. 6 the word sir~a is used in
the sense of" head," and in verses 8 and 26 of the same hymn the
word masti§ka is used in the sense of "brain 3 . " Head-disease is
also mentioned in the Atharva- Veda, I. 12. 3, as sir~akti. The brain-
matter is called mastulunga in Caraka-sa1J'lhitii, VIII. 9· 101; the
word masti~ka is used in the same chapter in the sense of brain-
matter (vni. 9· 8o), as has also been explained by CakrapaQ.i 4 •
The passage from Caraka, VIII. 9· 4, quoted above shows that at
least Dr<J.habala considered the head to be the centre of the senses
and all sense currents and life currents. Cakrapa:Q.i, in commenting
upon this passage, says that, though the currents of sensation and
life pass through other parts of the body as well, yet they are
particularly connected with the head (sirasi visefetza prabaddhiim),
because, when there is an injury to the head, they are also injured.
According to Caraka and Dr<J.habala all the senses are particularly
connected with the head, as well as the p1·iitzas, but the heart is
regarded as the vital centre of the p1·iitzas, as well as of the man as,
as I shall point out later on. Bhela, who is as old as Caraka,
considers the brain to be the centre of the manas, a view which
is, so far as I know, almost unique in the field of Sanskrit
1 The different names of the heart in Caraka-sa'f{Zhitii are mahat, artha,
hrdaya (1. 30. 3).

2
Cakrapa1.1i, however, explains it as sritii iva sritiifz, i.e." as if they depended
on" (1. 17. 12), because, when the head is hurt, all the senses are hurt. It is said
in ibid. VI. 26. I that there are one hundred and seven vital centres (marma),
and of these the three most important are the head, the heart and the pelvis.
Also in VIII. 9· 16, hrdi murdhni ca vastau ca nnui'l'fl prii?Jiib prati~thitii~z. In
VIII. 9· 4 it is distinctly said that all the senses and the currents of senses and
prii1Ja are dependent on the head as the rays of the sun are dependent on the
sun-sirasi indriyii1Ji indriya-prii?Ja-vahiini ca srotii1'[lSi suryam iva gabhastayafz
samiritiini.
• 3 "Which was that god who (produced) his brain, his forehead, his hindhead
(kakli#ka), who first his skull, who, having gathered a gathering in man's jaw,
ascended to heaven" (A.V. x. 2. 8). "Atharvan, having sewed together his head
(murdhlinam) and also his heart, aloft from the brain the purifying one sent
(them) forth, out of the head" (ibid. 26). (Whitney's translation, Harvard
oriental series.)
4
Masti~ka'l'fl firo-majja. Cakrapal.li, vm. 9· So of Caraka-sa'f{Zhitii. The word
masti~ka is sometimes, though rarely, used in the sense of head, as in the passage
quoted by Cakrapa1.1i in vm. 9· So--mast#ke '~tiingulam patfam.
XIII] Head and Heart 34 1
literature. He says that manas, which is the highest of all senses
(sarvendriya-param), has its seat between the head and the palate
(siras-tiilv-antara-gatam). Being situated there, it knows all the
sense-objects (v#ayiin indriyii?Ziim) and the tastes which come near
it (rasadikan samzpa-sthan). The original cause of manas and the
energy of all the senses and the cause of all feelings and judgments
(buddlzz), the citta, is situated in the heart. The citta is also the
cause of all motor functions and activities, such that those who are
possessed of good cittas follow a good course and those who are
possessed of bad cittas follow a bad course. The manas knows the
citta, and thence proceeds the choice of action; then comes the
understanding, deciding what is worth doing and what is not.
Buddhi, or understanding, is the understanding of certain actions
as good (Subha) and certain others as bad (asubha) 1 • It seems plain
that Bhela distinguishes between manas, citta and buddhi. Of
these manas is entirely different from citta and, so far as can be
made out from Bhela's meagre statements, it is regarded as the
cause of all cognitions and as having its seat in the brain. The citta
was regarded as the cause of all activities, feelings and judgments,
and the heart was regarded as its seat. Buddhi was probably the
determinate understanding and judgment which was but a function
of the citta. Bhela says that the do~as in the brain affect the manas,
and, as a result of this, the heart is affected, and from the affections
of the heart the understanding (buddhi) is affected, and this leads
to madness 2 • In another passage, while describing the different
functions of pitta, Bhela says that there is a special kind of iilocaka
pitta called the cak~ur-vaise#ka, which, by bringing about the
contact of manas with the soul, causes cognition and, transmitting
it to the citta, produces the discriminative visual knowledge
by which different objects are comprehended by the eye. The
1 siras-tiilv-antara-gata1Jl. sarvendriya-para1Jl. mana/:z tatra-stha'tJl tad dhi
vi~ayiin indriyii1Jii1Jt rasiidikiin . .. kiiratJatJt sarva-buddhlnii'tJl citta1Jl. hrdaya-
sa1Jl.srita1Jl kriyiitJiim cetariisii1Jl. ca citta1Jl. sar'l.Jasya kara7Jam. Bhela's chapter on
" Unmiida-cikitsitam." Calcutta University edition, p. 149.
2
iirdhva'tJl prakupitii do~ii/:z
Siras-tiilv-antare sthitii/:z,
miinasa1Jl. du~ayanty iisu
tatas citta1Jl. vipadyate
citte vyiipadam iipanne
buddhir niisa1J7. niyacchati
tatas tu buddhi-vyiipattau
kiiryiikiirya'tJl na budhyate
eva1Jl. pravartate vyiidhir
unmiido nama diiru1Jal:z. Ibid. p. 149·
judgmental state, however, is different, and it is produced by a
special kind of iilocaka pitta called the buddhi-vaiSe#ka, which is
situated at the point between the eyebrows, and, being there,
holds together the subtle forms emanating from the self (susuk!miin
arthiin iitma-krtan), associates the data (dhiirayatz), integrates them
with other similar known facts (pratyudiiharati), remembers the
past, and, after producing our knowledge in conceptual and judg-
mental forms, wills for future realization, generates instructive
actions, and is the force which operates in meditation (dhyiina)
and restraint of thoughts (dhiira~zii)l.
Susruta does not state anything of importance concerning
the brain; but there seems to be little doubt that he knew that
particular nerves in the head were connected with particular sense
functions. Thus he says in 111. 6. 28 that there are two nerves (Sirii)
lower down the ears on their back, called 'l'idhurii, which, if cut,
would produce deafness; on both sides of the nasal aperture inside
the nasal organ there are two nerves called phm:za, which, if cut,
would destroy the sensation of smell; at the back of the eyebrows,
below the eyes, there are the nerves called the apiinga, which, if
cut, would produce blindness. All these cognitive nerves meet in
passing at the centre of the eyebrow (srngiitaka )2 • He further says
that the nerves are attached to the brain inside the skull on the
upper part of it (mastakiibhyantaropari#hiit sira-sandhi-sannipiita)
and this place, called the romiivarta, is the supreme superintendent
(adhipatz). Caraka says that the head is the place for the senses.
It cannot be decided whether he took this in any deeper sense
or whether he means simply that the sense-organs of ear, eyes,
nose and taste are situated in the head.
Caraka considers the heart (hrdaya) to be the only seat of
consciousness 3 • The seats of prii~za are said to be the head, throat,
heart, navel, rectum, bladder, the vital fluid ojas, semen, blood
and flesh 4 • In 1. 19. 3 Caraka, however, excludes navel and flesh
and includes the temples (sankha) in their place. It is difficult to
determine what is exactly meant by prii~a here. But in all prob-
ability the word is used here in a general way to denote the vital
parts. In 1. 30. 4 and 5 Caraka says that the whole body with
1 Bhela's chapter on "Puru~a-niscaya," p. 81.
2
glzrii1)a-srotriik#-jih·vii-santarpatfl1ZiitJZ sirii1)ii'f!l madhye sirii-sannipiitab s_rizgii-
takiini. Susruta-sm{lhitii, 111. 6. 28.
3
Caralw-sa'f!lhitii, IV. 7. 8, hrdaya'!l cetaniidh#thiinam ekam.
1
Ibid. 9·
XIII] Head and Heart 343
the four extremities, the trunk, and the head, collectively called
~afj-aizga, knowledge (vijiiiina), the senses, the sense-objects, the
self, manas and the objects bf thought (cintya), are all supported
(sm{lsrita) by the heart, just as a house is supported by pillars and
rafters 1 • It is plain, as Cakrapal).i explains, that the body cannot
subsist in the heart. \Vhat is 1neant is that, when all is well with
the heart, it is well with all the rest. Caraka holds that the manas
and the soul reside in the heart and so also do cognition, pleasure
and pain, not, however, in the sense that the heart is the place
\vhere these reside, but in the sense that they depend on the
heart for their proper functioning; if the heart is wrong, they also
go wrong, if the heart is \veil, they also work well. Just as rafters
are supported by pillars, so are they all supported hy the heart.
But Cakrapal).i does not seem to agree with this view of Caraka,
and he holds that, since the heart is affected by strong thoughts,
pleasure and pain, the mind and the soul actually reside in the
heart and so do pleasure and pain. The self, which is the cause of
all knmvledge of sense-objects and the upholder (dhiirin) of the
system, resides in the heart. It is for this reason that, if a man is
struck in the heart, he swoons away, and, if the heart bursts, he dies.
It is also the place of the supreme vitality (param ojas) 2 • The heart
is also regarded as the place where all consciousness is concen-
trated (tatra caitanya-sar!lgrahal}.). Caraka says that the heart is the
centre of the prii'!la currents (prii'!la-'l·ahiinii1J1 srotasii1J1 hrdaya1J1
mfi.lam, III. 5· 9) and also of the currents of mental activity (II.
7· 3). In the Apasmiira-nidiina (II. 8. 4) Caraka speaks of the
heart as being the supreme place of the inner self (antar-iitmanal}.
sre~tham iiyatanam).
It may not be out of place here to point out that the Taittiriya
Upani~ad (I. 6. 1) also speaks of the heart as being the space where
L Caralw-sm.nhita, 1. 30. 5·
2
CakraraDi says that the mention of param ojas here proves that Caraka be-
liewd in another, aparam ojas. The total quantity of aparam ojas in the bodv is half
a handful (ardluinjali-parimii~la), while that of param ojas is only eight drops of
a white-red and slightly yellowish liquid in the heart. The dhaman1s of the
heart contain half a handful of aparam ojas, and in the disease known as prameha
(urinary disease) it is this ojas that is wasted; but even with waste of this ojas
a man may live, whereas with the slightest waste of the param ojas a man cannot
live. Ojas ought not to be regarded as the eighth dhiitu; for it only supports
(dluirayati) the body, but does not nourish it. Ojas, however, is sometimes used
also in the sense of rasa (Caraka-sa~nhitii 1. 30. 6, Cakrapat)i's commentary). See
also ibid. 1. 17. 74 and 75 and Cakrapat)i's comment on the same. Qjas is,
however. regarded in the Atharva-Veda, 11. 17, as the eighth dhiitu.
manomaya pur'U!a, i.e. the mind-person, resides. In many other
Upani~ads the heart is the centre of many niirfis, or channels 1 •
Sati.kara, in explaining Brh. II. I. 19, says that the na¢is or siras,
called hitii, which are developed out of the food-juice and are
272,000 in number, emanate from the heart and spread over the
whole body (puritat) 2 • The buddhi resides in the heart and from
there controls the external senses. Thus, for example, at the time
of hearing in the awakened state the buddhi passes through these
11iirjis to the ear and from there expands the auditory organ and
superintends it. When the buddhi thus expands, we have the
state of awakening, when it contracts, the state of deep sleep
(su$uptz).
The Circulatory and the Nervous System.

The names sira (also hirii) and dhamani, of two different kinds
of channels in the body, seem to have been distinguished at a period
as early as the Atharva- Veda 3 • The Brhad-iirm:zyaka Upani$ad de-
scribes the hita niirfis of the heart as being as fine as a thousandth
part of a hair, and they are said to carry white, blue, yellow and
green liquids; Sati.kara, commenting on this, says that these various
colours are due to the various combinations of viita, pitta and
S!e~man which the nii¢ts carry 4 • He states that the seventeen
elements (five bhiltas, ten senses, prii'!za and antal;karatJa) of the
subtle body, which is the support of all instinctive desires, abide
1 See Brh. II. I. 19, IV. 2. 2 and 3, IV. 3· 20, IV. 4· 8 and 9; Chiind. VIII. 6. 6;
Katha, VI. 16; Kau~. IV. 19; Mu7Jcf. 11. 2. 6; Maitr'i, Bibliotheca Indica, 1870,
VI. 2I, vn. II; Prasna, 111. 6 and 7.
2 The word purltat r.1eans principally the covering of the heart. But Sankara
takes it here to mean the whole bodv.

3 sata1!l hirii~l sahasra1!l dhamanir uta. Atharva- Veda, VII. 36. 2. Saya:r:m
explains hirii as garbha-dhiirmJiirthatJl antar-avasthitii/:z siik$mii niilj.yal:z and
dltamant as garbhiisayasya avanambhikii sthiilii niiljya/:z. Atharva-Veda, 1. 17.
1, 2, also seems to distinguish hira from dhamanl. In I. I7. 1 the hiriis are
described as being of red garments (lohita-viisasa/:z), which Sayat;1a explains as
lohitasya rudhirasya niviisa-bhfitii hi (the abode of blood) and paraphrases as
rajo-vahana-niicf.ya/:z. It seems, therefore, that the larger ducts were called
dhamants. In 1. 17. 3 the Atharva-Veda speaks of hundreds of dhaman'is and
thousands of hiriis.
4 Brh. IV. 3· 20, with Sankara's commentary. Anandagiri, in commenting on
the same, quotes a passage from Susruta which is substantially the same as
Susruta-sa1!lhitii, 111. 7· 18, to show that those Siras which carry viita are rosy
(arwJa), those which carry pitta are blue, those ·which carry blood are red, and
those which carry sle$man are white:
arU1Jiil:z sirii viita-·cahii nflii!z pitta-vahii[l siriilz
asrg-vahiis tu rohil}yo gauryal.z sle$ma-·vahiih sirii[l.
XIII] The Circulatory and the Nervous System 345
in these niirjls. In Brhad-iirm;yaka, IV. 2. 3 it is said that there is
the finest essence of food-juice inside the cavity of the heart; it is
this essence which, by penetrating into the finest nii{lis, serves to
support the body. It is surrounded by a network of niic}is. From
the heart it rushes upwards through the extremely fine hita nii{lts.
which are rooted in the heart. Chiindogya, VIII. 6. 6 speaks of
101 nii{lis proceeding from the heart, of which one goes towards
the head 1 . In 11lu1J¢. II. 2. 6 it is said that, like spokes in a wheel,
the nii{lls are connected with the heart. Prasna, 111. 6 and 7, how-
ever, says that in the heart there are one hundred nii{lis and in
each of these are twenty-two hundred branches and the vyiina
·viiyu moves through these. The Jl.1aitri Upani~ad mentions the
su~um'l}ii nii¢1 proceeding upwards to the head, through which
there is a flow of prii1}a 2 • None of these passages tell us any-
thing definite about the nii{lls. All that can be understood from
these passages is that they are some kind of ducts, through which
blood and other secretions flow, and many of these are extremely
fine, being about the thousandth part of a hair in breadth. The
na{la, or hollow reed, is described in the ~g- Veda (VIII. 1. 33)
as growing in ponds and in the Atharva- Veda (IV. 19. 1) as being
viir#ka, or "produced in the rains." This word may have some
etymological relation with nii{lt 3 • In another place it is said that
women break na¢a with stones and make mats out of them 4 •
The word nii(ii is also used in the Atharva- Veda in the sense
of "ducts 5 ." In Atharva-Veda, v. 18. 8 the word nii{likii is used
1 This passage is sometimes referred to in later literature to show that the
su~um~u'i 11iirjl, which goes towards the
head, was known as early as the Chiindogya
Upani~ad. See also Katha, VI. 16.
2 Urdhva-gii niitf,z su~um'l}iikhyii prii~za-Sat!lciiri~zl. l'vlaitrl, VI. 21. Sayal).a, in
his commentary on A.V. 1. 17. 3, quotes the following verse:

madhya-sthiiyii/:1 su~um7_uiyiib parva-paftcaka-smttbhm:iil:z
siiklzopasiiklzatiil!l prii{>tii?l Sirii /afl~a-trayiit paYO'f!l
ardha-lak~mn iti priilwb sar'iriirtha-·z:iciirakii[z.
3 Macdonell makes the following remarks in his Vedic Index, vol. I, p. 433:
"Nacja is found in several passages of the l}g- Veda (1. 32, 8; I79, 4; II. 34, 3;
VIII. 6g, 2; x. II, 2; 105, 4) but its sense is still obscure. It is identified by
Pischel (Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandisd1en Gesellsdzaft, 35, 7I7 et seq.;
Vedische Studien, I. r83 et seq.) with Na~la, being explained by him in one
passage (I. 32. 8). Here Caland and Henry, L'Agni~toma, p. 3I3 would read
na!am. See also \Vackernagel, Altindische Gramnwtik, 1. I73, as a reed boat,
which is split, and over which the waters go, etc."
4 yatluJ nmf.a'!l kasipune striyo bhindanty asmanii (Atharva- Veda, VI. 138.
5).
5 In the Atharva- Veda, VI. 138. 4, the niicfts are described as ducts over the
testes, through which the seminal fluid flows: .ve te niiljyau deva-krte yayos ti~thati
vnflYG'f!l tete bhinadmi (I break with a stone upon a stone those two ducts of yours
Speculations in the J\.1edical Schools [cH.
to denote the speech organ (vak). The word dhamani is used
in ~g- Veda, II. 11. 8 and is paraphrased by Saya1:1a as sound
(sabda) and by Macdonell as "reed" or "pipe1 .'' If Sayal).a's
explanations are to be accepted, then in A.V. II. 33· 6 the word
snava means fine siras (suk~ma~z-siral;) and dhaman'i the larger ducts
(dhamani-sabdena sthulal;). In VI. 90. 5 one hundred dhamanls
are said to surround the body of a person suffering from colic or
gout (sula), and Sayal).a paraphrases dhamani here as nO.fjl. In
Chandogya, III. 19. 2, the rivers are said to be dhamanls (ya
dhamanayas ta nafjyal;), and Sankara paraphrases dhamanz as sira.
I have already referred to the use of the word hira in the Atharva-
Veda; the word is also used in the !Jg- Veda 2 •
The above references show that nlifjzs, siriis (or hiras) and
dhamanls were all ducts in the body, but sometimes the nafjzs or
sirlis had also the special sense of finer channels, whereas the
dlwmanis were the larger ducts. I shall now come to Caraka:
it will be found that there was not much advance towards a
proper understanding of the significance of their distinction and
functions.
Caraka plainly regards dhamanls, Siras and srotas (secretory
currents) as ducts and thinks that different names are applied to
them on account of their different functions. He says that the
roots of the ten dhaman'is are in the heart. These carry through-
out the body the ojas, by which all people live and without which
they all die. It is the essence by which the foetus is formed,
and which goes to the heart at a later stage, when the heart is
formed; when it is lost, life also ceases to exist; it is the essence
of the body and the seat of the prlit:zas. These ducts are called
dhamanls, because they are filled with chyle from outside; they
are called srotas, because the chyle, etc. which nourish the body
are secreted (srava!IO.l) out of these; and they are called Sira,
made by God over your two testes, through which your semen flows). In
x. 7· 15 and 16, the hollows of the seas are described as niit/.is (samudro yasya
niigyal.z), and so also the interspace of the quarters of the sky (yasya catasral.z
pradiso niiljya?1).
1 "Dhamanl, 'reed,' appears to denote 'pipe' in a passage of the IJ.g- Veda
(II. I 1. 8) and in a citation appearjng in the Nirulua (vi. 24)." Vedic Index,
vol. 1, p. 390. The word sirii is spelt with a palatal "s" in Caraka and with a
dental in the Vedas, and it has therefore been differently spelt in this chapter
in different contexts.
2 t·va1Jt vrtram iisayiina7!Z siriisu maho vajre1Ja si~vapa(t. R.V. 1. 121. 1 I. The
word dhamanl is spelt with a long "i" in Caralw and with a short "i" in the
Atharva- Veda.
xrn] The Circulatory and the Nervous System 347
because they go (sarm;iit sirii/:z) to the different parts of the body 1 •
The ten dhamanfs spread out in manifold branches throughout
the body. In the Caraka-sa1(lhitii srotas means properly the path
through which the successive evolutionary products of the body-
constituents (dhiitus) or other kinds of secretion run and accumu-
late together with elements of their own types 2 • Cakrapal).i explains
it thus: The transformation into blood takes place in connection
with chyle (rasa). The coming together of rasa with blood at a
different part of the body cannot take place without a path of trans-
mission, called srotas. So the transformation of dhiitus takes place
through the function of this path of transmission. So for each
kind of product there is a separate srotas. Viiyu, pitta and kapha
may be said to go about through all the SJ·otas, though there are,
no doubt, special channels for each of the three 3 • Gangadhara,
however, takes the srotas as being the apertures through which
the dhiitus and other waste-products flow 4 • In whatever way it
may be looked at, the srotas is, according to Caraka, nothing but
the duct of the dhamanis. Caraka opposes the view of those who
think that the body is nothing but a collection of srotas, for the
simple reason that the substances which pass through these srotas
and the parts of the body where they are attached are certainly
different from the srotas themselves. There are separate srotas
for the flow of prii~za, water, food-juice, blood, flesh, fat, bony
materials, marrow, semen, urine, excreta and sweat; viita, pitta
and Sle~man, however, flow through the body and all the channels
(sarva-srotii1(lsi ayana-bhutiim). For the supply of materials for the
suprasensual elements of the body, such as manas, etc., the whole
of the living body serves as a channel 5 • The heart is the root of all
1
dlzmii.nii.d dhamanyal:z sravm;ii.t srolii.1Jtsi sarm:rii.t 4irii./:z. Caraka-saf!Zhitii., 1.
JO. I I. 2 Ibid. III. 5· 3·
3 Do~ii1J.ii.'f!l tu sarva-iarzra-caratvena yathii-sthftla-sroto 'bhidhiine 'pi sarca-
srotii'f!lSY evagamaniirtlwf!Z vak~yante . .. viitiidiniim api pradhii.na bhutiidhamanyafz
santy eva. Cakrapiil).i's comment on ibid.
4 iihiira-pari1Jiima-raso hi srotasii1Jl chidra-rupa1Jl panthiinaf!Z 'l-'inii gantuf!l na
iaknoti, na ca srotas chidra-pathena gamana'f!l dnii tad-uttarottara-dhiitutvena

parit:ramati, etc. Gangadhara's Jalpa-kalpa-taru on ibid.
5 Gangadhara, in commenting on this passage (Caraka-sa'f!thitii, III. 5. 7),
" tadvad atzndriyii~zii'f!l puna/; sattviidiniif!Z kevalaf!Z cetaniivac chanram ayana-b/iil.-
tam adhi~thiina-bhiifll1Jl ca," says, .. mana iitmii srotra-spariana-nayana-rasan'a-
glm'i1J.a-huddhy-ahmikiiriidiniif!l kevalam cetaniit•at sajzt•a'f!l sarzra-sroto 'yana-
bhiitam adhi~thiina-bhfitaf!l ca." There are several passages in Caraka where
we hear of mano-vaha currents (currents carrying manas); if manas, buddhi,
ahaizkii.ra, etc. can all be carried in currents, they must be considered as having
some material spatial existence. These manas, buddhi and ahankiira may be
atlndriya, but they are not on that account non-ph}sical.
priir.za channels, i.e. the channels of the prii:l}a viiyu; for viiyu in
general moves through all parts of the body. When these are
affected, there is either too much or too little respiration; the
respiration may be very slow or very quick, and it is attended with
sound and pain. From these signs therefore one can infer that the
priir.za channels have been affected. The source of water channels is
the palate, and the seat of thirst is in the heart (kloma) 1 • When these
are affected, the tongue, palate, lips, throat and kloma become
dried up, and there is great thirst. The stomach is the source of all
currents carrying food, and, when these are affected, there is no
desire for food, but indigestion, vomiting and the like. The heart is
the source, and the ten dhamanis are the paths, of the chyle (rasa)
currents. The liver and spleen are the source of blood currents.
The tendons and skin are the sources of flesh currents. The kidneys
are the sources of fat channels; fat and pelvis, of bone channels; the
bones and joints, of marrow channels; the testes and penis, of
semen channels; the bladder, the pubic and the iliac regions, of
urine channels; the intestines and the rectum, of the excreta
channels, and the fat and pores of hairs, of perspiration channels 2 •
It is curious, however, to note that, in spite of the fact that
here the siriis and dhamanis are regarded as synonymous, their
number is differently counted in IV. 7· 13, where it is said that
there are two hundred dhamanis and seven hundred siriis, and the
finer endings of these are counted as 29,956. It is reasonable to
suppose, in accordance with the suggestions found in the Atharva-
Veda, that, though the dhamanis and Siriis were regarded by Camka
as having the same functions, the former were larger than the
latter 3 • Gangadhara, in commenting on this passage, says that
siriis, dhamanls and srotas are different on account of their being
different in number and of their having different functions and
different appearances. It is well known that a distinction between
Siriis and dhamanis is drawn by Susruta, to which I shall presently
refer, but Caraka positively denies any such distinction; and this
1 Caraka-sm.nhitii, III. 5· 10. CakrapaQ.i explains it (kloma) as hrdaya-stham
pipiisii-sthiinam, and Gangadhara as the point of conjunction between the throat
and the heart (ka'}fhoraso/:1 sandhi!z).
2 The synonyms for srotas given by Caraka are sirii, dhamanl, rasa-viihinl,
nii£/i, panthii, nziirga, Sarlra-chidra, SG7!lV!liiSa1fZV!liini (Open at the root, but

closed at the end), sthiina, asaya and niketa.
3
There is one passage of Dr9habala (Caraka-sa1flhitii, VI. 29. 23) which
seems to draw a distinction between siriis and dhamanls; for there, as a
symptom of a disease, it is said that the siriis have expanded (iiyiima) and the
dhamanls have become contracted (smikoca).
XIII] The Circulatory and the Nervous System 349
is accepted by his commentator Cakrapai)i also 1 • Gangadhara is
unable to point out any passage in Caraka to prove his opinion or
to state more explicitly what is the difference of functions and
appearances between the dhamanzs and siras. In fact Gangadhara's
remarks are directly borrowed from Sufruta, III. 9· 3, without
acknowledgment, and it is very surprising that he should not know
the difference of views on this point between Caraka and Susruta
and should try to support Caraka by a quotation from Susruta on
the very point on which they materially differ.
Susruta refers to Caraka's view that siras, srotas and dharmanzs
are the same and opposes it, saying that they are different in
appearance, number and functions.:J!alhai)a, in explaining this, says
that the siriis carry viita, pitta, Slefman, blood, etc., and are rosy'
blue, white and red, whereas the dhamanzs that carry sense-im-
pressions of sound, etc. have no distinctive colour, and the srotas
have the same colour as the dhiitus which flow through them.
Again, the principal szriis are torty in number, the principal
dhamanzs twenty-four and the principal srotas twenty-two in
number. The siriis permit us to contract or expand our limbs or
perform other motor functions, and they allow the mind and senses
to operate in their own ways and serve also to fulfil other functions
of moving rapidly (prasyandana), etc., when viiyu works in them.
When pitta flows through the siriis, they appear shining, create
desire for food, increase digestive fire and health. When slepnan
passes through them, they give an oily appearance to the body,
firmness of joints and strength. When blood passes through them,
they become coloured and filled also with the different dhiitus and
produce the sense-cognition of touch. Viiyu, pitta, slepnan and
blood-any one of these may flow through any and every Sirii 2 •
The dhamanzs are more like sensory nerves, since they carry
sensations of sound, colour, taste and smell (sabda-rupa-rasa-
gandha-vahatviidika1J1 dhamanzniim). The srotas carry prii'l}a, food,
water, chyle, blood, flesh and fat 3 • It is on account of their close
proximity, similar functions, fineness (saukfmyiit), and also because
of the fact that they have been referred to in similar terms by older
authorities, that they have sometimes been regarded as perform-
ing the same work, though their functions are really different 4 •
1 na ca Carake Susruta iva dhamani-sirii-srotasiim bhedo t•ivaksitah. Cakra-
pal).i's commentary on Caraka, 111. s. 3· . . .

2 3 l)alhat;ta on ibid. III. 9· 3· 4
Susruta-sa7!Zhitii, m. 7· 8-17. Ibid.
35° Speculations in the Medical Schools (CH.
I)alhai).a, in explaining this, says that, as, when a bundle of grass
is burning, the burning of each separate blade of grass cannot be
perceived on account of their contiguity, so the siriis, dhamants
and srotas are situated so close to one another that it is very difficult
to observe their separate functions and work. Sirii, srotas, miirga,
kha and dhamant are the general names used to denote the canals
or ducts of the body 1 • It is on account of the similarity of action
of all these ducts that their functions are sometimes confused.
The dhamanis start from the navel; ten proceed to the upper
part of the body, ten to the lower part and four crosswise ( tir-
yag-giilz). Those ten which go to the upper part of the body,
branch out, are divided into three classes, and are thirty in number.
Of these there are altogether ten for carrying 'lJiita, pitta, kapha,
s01;zita and rasa, two for each; there are eight for carrying
sabda, riipa, rasa and gandha, two for each; there are two for
the organ of speech, two for making noise (gho~a), as distin-
guished from speech; two for going to sleep, two for being awake;
two for bearing tears, two for carrying milk in women, and it is
the same two dhamanis that carry the semen in men. It is by
these dhamanis that the body on the upper side of the navel (e.g.
sides, back, chest, shoulders, hands, etc.) is held fast to the lower
part. The carrying of viita, etc. is the common quality of all these
dhamanis.
Those dhamanis which branch out downwards are thirty in
number. They eject viita, urine, excreta, semen, menstrual blood,
etc. downwards. They are connected with the place of pitta
(pittiisaya), draw downwards the materials not fit for being ab-
sorbed, and nourish the body with the assimilable products of
digestion. The dhamanis connected with the pittiisaya carry the
food-juice throughout the body, as soon as it is digested by the
action of heat, by supplying it to the upper circulatory dhamanis
and through them to the heart, which is designated as the seat
of rasa (rasa-sthiina) 2 • Ten dhamanis carry viita, pitta, Sol}ita,
1 Thus Qalhal).a remarks:
akaslyiivakiisii:nii7JZ dehe niimiini dehinii7JZ
sirtil.z srotti7Jlsi miirgii[l kha7Jl dhamanyab.
2 Susruta, Siirira, IX. 7 and 8; see also :OalhaQ.a's commentary on it. The
apertures of some dhamanis by which the food-juice is circulated through the
body are as fine as lotus fibres, and some grosser than them, as the apertures
of lotus stalks. Thus some dhamanls have very fine apertures, and others grosser
apertures.
yathii. svabhii.vatab khtini mnziile~u bise~u ca
dhamanlnii1f1 tathii khiini raso yair upaciyate. Ibid. IX. 10.
XIII] The Circulatory and the Nervous System 35 1
kapha and rasa; two, connected with the intestines, carry the
food-juice; two carry water; two are connected with the bladder
for ejecting urine; two are for the production of semen (sukra-
priidur-bhii:va), two for its ejection, and it is these which regulate
the menstrual flow in the case of women; two, connected with
the larger intestines, eject the excreta; there are eight others which
carry perspiration. It is by these dhamanzs that the intestines,
waist, urine, excreta, rectum, bladder and penis are held together.
Each of the other four dhamanls, which go crosswise (tiryag-gab ),
has hundreds and thousands of branches, which, innumerable as
they are, are spread all over the body, like so many windows; their
mouths are at the holes of the hairs, through which perspiration
goes out and which nourish the body with rasa, and through these
the effective principles (vlrya) of oil, watery sprinklings, oint-
ments, etc. enter the body after being acted on by bhriijaka (heat
of the skin)l. It is again these which carry the pleasurable and
painful sense-impressions of touch 2 • The dhamanzs direct the five
senses to the five sense-objects for their cognition. There is the
cognizer ( mantr) and the manas organ; the dhamanz which is con-
nected with manas on one side and the dhamanis which carry the
different sense-impressions on the other make the sense-data
cognized by the self3 • The various sensory and motor dhamanzs
are further named in Susruta, 111. vi. 28. Down below the back
of the ear there are two dhamanzs, called vidhura, which, when
injured, produce deafness; inside the two nostrils there are the
two dhamanzs called pha~w which, when hurt, arrest the sensation
of smell. Below the eyebrows on the two sides of the eye there
are the two dhamanis, called apiinga, which, when hurt, produce
blindness: there are also two other dhamanis, above the eyebrows
and below them, called iivarta, which, when hurt, also produce
blindness. Susruta also speaks in this connection of a place inside
1 Susruta, Siirlra, IX. 7 and 8; see also l)alhaQa's commentary on it.
2 l)alhaQa, in commenting on this passage of Susruta, III. ix. 9, says:" tair eva
mano-'nugatail;z sukhiisukha-rii.paf!l sparsa7J1. karmiitmii grh7Jlte." (It is through
these dhamanls, as connected by manas, that the self, as associated with the subtle
body, receives the pleasurable and painful impressions of touch.)
3 paiiciibhibhii.tiis tv atha paiica-krtval;z
paiicendriya1Jl paiicasu bhiivayanti
paiicendriya7J1. paiicasu bhiivayitvii
paiicatvam iiyiinti viniiia-kiile. Susruta, 111. ix. 11.
l)alhaQa, in commenting on the above, says: "manta hi sar'ire eka eva, mano 'py
ekam eva, tena manasii yaiva dhamanl iabdiidi-·vahiisu dhammti~ abhiprapannii
saiva dhamanl S'l.:a-dharma7J1. griihayati mantiira7J1. niinyeti."
the skull on the upper part of the brain, where all the Siriis have
met together, as the adhipati superintendent.
In describing the siriis (7oo in number) Susruta says that these
are like so many canals by which the body is watered and by the
contraction and expansion of which the movements of the body
are rendered possible. They start from the navel and branch out
like so many fibres of leaves. The principal Siriis are forty in
number; of these ten are for the circulation of viita, ten for pitta,
ten for kapha and ten for rakta (blood). The siras of viita circu-
lation again branch out into 175 siriis, and the same is the case
with those which circulate pitta, kapha and rakta. We have thus
altogether 700 Siriis. When viita is properly circulated through the
Siriis, it becomes possible for us to move our limbs without ob-
struction and to exercise our intellectual functions. But it should
be noted that, though some Siriis are regarded as mainly circulating
viiyu or pitta or kapha, yet they all, at least to some extent, circulate
all three1 •
There are goo snayus, and these have also holes within them
(su#riib}, and these, as well as the km;ujariis, which ate also but
special kinds of sniiyus, serve to bind the joints of the body, just
as the several pieces of planks are held together in a boat. Susruta
also mentions five hundred muscles. The marmas are vital spots
in flesh, sirii, sniiyu and bones which are particularly the seats of
prii1Ja: when persons are hurt in these places, they may either
lose their lives or suffer various kinds of deformity. The srotas
are again described by Susruta as being ducts, other than sira and
dhamanl, which start from the cavity of the heart and spread out
through the body 2 • These srotas carry the currents of prii1Ja, food-
juice, water, blood, flesh, fat, urine, excreta, semen and menstrual
blood.
The Nervous System of the Tantras.
The nerve system of the Tantras, however, is entirely different
from that of the medical systems of Caraka and Susruta. It starts
with the conception of the spinal column (meru-da1Jtfa), which is
regarded as one bone from the bottom of the back to the root of
na hi viita7J1. sirii/:z kiiscin na pitta7J1. keva[atfZ tathii
ile~miinam vii vahanty etii atafz sarvavahii/:z smrtii/:z.
Suiruta, III. vii. 16.
2 Suiruta, Siirlra, IX. 13:
muliit khiid antara7J1. dehe prasrta7J1. tv ablzivahi yat
srotas tad iti vijiieya7J1. iirii-dhamani-varjitam.
XIII] The Nervous System of the Tantras 353
the neck. In the passage inside this spinal column there is a nerve
(niitji}, called su~umtzii, which is again in reality made up of three
niit}ls, su~umtzii, vajrii and citri1Ji 1 • All niit}is start from the root at
the end of the vertebral column, called kii1Jtfa, and they proceed
upwards to the highest cerebral nerve-plexus, called sahasriira, and
are seventy-two thousand in number. The place of the root of
these niitjts (kii1Jtfa) is an inch above the anus and an inch below
the root of the penis. If su~um7Jii is the central nerve of the spinal
cord, then on its extreme right side is the itjii, and then parallel to
it towards the su~umtzii are the giindhiiri, stretching from the corner
of the left eye to the left leg, hasti-jihvii, stretching from the left
eye to the left foot, saizkhin'i, branching on the left, kuhu (the pubic
nerve on the left) and also the viroodarii, the lumbar nerves. On
the extreme left of it is the piilgalii, and between it and the su~umtzii
arc the pil~ii, stretching from below the corner of the right eye to
the abdomen, pasyanti, the auricular branch or the cervical plexus,
sarasvaU and viiratzii (the sacral nerve). The saizkhinl (the auricular
branch or the cervical plexus on the left) goes parallel to the
su~umtzii, but takes a turn in the region of the neck and passes on to
the root of the left ear-holes; in another branch it passes through the
inner side of the region of the forehead, where it gets joined with
the citritzl niitjl and enters into the cerebral region. The su~um~zii
nii{li is a sort of duct inside the spine, which encases within it the
'vajrii niitjl, and that again encases within it the citri1Jl niitjl, which
has within it a fine aperture running all through it, which is the fine
aperture running through the spinal cord 2 • This inner passage
1
But according to the Tantra-cz""iqiima!li, ~umt;zii is not inside the spinal
column but outside it. Thus it says," tad-biihye tu tayor madhye su~umt;zii vahni-
sa'!lyuta."This,however ,isagainsttheviewof the $at-cakra-nirz""ipa!la, which takes
SfiiUmt;ziito be inside tl.e passage of the spine. According to the Nigama-tattva-
siira-tantra, iqii and piizgalii are both inside the spine, but this isentirelyagainst the
accepted view. Dr Sir B. N. Seal thinks that su~um!lii is the central passage or
channel of the spinal cord and not a separate niiq'i (The Positive Sciences of the
Ancient Hindus, pp. 219, 226, 227). Mr Rele in his The Mysterious Kut;zqalin'i
(PP·3S,J6)thinks that it is anii4'fwhich is situated centrally and passes through the
spinal column (meru-dat;zl/a); but, judging from the fact that it is said to originate
in the sacrum, from which it goes upwards to the base of the skull, where it
joins with the plexus of a thousand nerves called brahma-cakra (cerebrum in the
vault of the skull) and is divided at the level of the lat-ynx (kat;ztha) into anterior
and posterior parts between the two eyebrows (iijfiii-cakra) and the cavity in
the brain (brahma-randhra) respectively, Rele thinks that this SfiiUmt.,lii nii4'f is
nothing but the spinal cord.
2
Nii4'fisderived by Pun:1ananda Yati,in hiscommentaryon the $at-cakra-nirfi-
Pa!la, from the root naif, to go, as a passage or duct (na¢a gatau iti dhiitor naqyate
gamyate 'nayii padavyii iti nii4'f). Mahamahopadhyaya GaQanatha Sen makes a
D!I 23
within the citri1:zt niit}l is also called brahma-niit}i; for there is no
further duct or niit}l within the citri'!ll 1 • The SUJUm'!lii thus in all
probability stands for our spinal cord. The sufUm'!lii, however, is
said to take a tum and get connected with the sankhini in the inside
region of the forehead, whence it becomes connected with the
aperture of the sankhinl (saizkhinl-niilam iilambya) and passes to the
cerebral region. All the niitjts are connected with the su~um'!lii.
Ku'!lf!alinl is a name for supreme bodily energy, and, because the
channel of the su~um'!lii, the brahma-niit}i, is the passage through
which this energy flows from the lower part of the trunk to the
regions of the nerve-plexus of the brain, SUfUm'!lii is sometimes
called ku'!lf!alint; but ku'!lf!alinl itself cannot be called a nerve,
and it is distinctly wrong to call it the vagus nerve, as Mr Rele
does 2 • The itjii niit}i on the left side of the su~um'!lii outside the
spine goes upwards to the nasal region, and pingalii follows a
corresponding course on the right side. Other accounts of these
niit}is hold that the it}ii proceeds from the right testicle and the
pingalii from the left testicle and passes on to the left and the right
of the su~um'!lii in a bent form (dhanur-iikiire). The three, however,
meet at the root of the penis, which is thus regarded as the junction
of the three rivers, as it were (triveyt}, viz. of su~um'!lii (compared to
the river Ganga), itja (compared to Yamuna) and pingalii (compared
to Sarasvati}. The two niit}is, itja and pi~galii, are also described
as being like the moon and the sun respectively, and SUJum'!lii as
fire 3 • In addition to these niit}is the Yogi-yiijfiavalkya mentions
the name of another niit}i, called alambu~ii, making the number of
the important niit}ts fourteen, including su~um'!lii and counting
su~um'!lii as one niit}i (i.e. including vajrii and citrit~i}, though the
total number of niitfis is regarded as being seventy-two thousand.
SrikaQ.ada in his Niitfi-vijfilina counts the number of niitfis as
thirty-five millions. But, while the Tantra school, as represented
in the works $at-cakra-nirupa'!la, Jiiiina-sarrzkalini, Yogi-yiijiia-
valkya, etc., regards the niitfis as originating from the nerve-plexus
very serious mistake in his Pratyak~a-siirlraka when he thinks that the niil/J.s are
to be regarded as being without apertures (nlrandhra). They are certainly not so
regarded in the Ayur-veda or in the $at-cakra-nirilpm:.za and its commentaries. In
Yoga and Tantra literature the term niir/J generally supersedes the term sirii of
the medical literature.
1 Sabda-brahma-riipiiyii/:l ku7J4alinyii/:l parama-siva-sannidhi-gamana-patha
riipa-citri7Jl-niitfy-antargata-siinya-bhiiga iti. Purt:Iananda's commentary on $at-

cahra-nirupa7Ja, St. 2.
11 Su~um1Jiiyai ku1J4alinyai. Hatha-yoga-pradfpikii, IV. 64.
3
~'at-cakra-niriipa7Ja, St. 1 and Yogi-yiijiiavalkya-sa1{lhitii, p. 18.
XIII] The Nervous System of the Tantras 355
lying between the root of the penis and the anus, and while Caraka
regards them as originating from the heart, SrikaQ.ada regards
them as originating from the region of the navel (niibhi-kanda) and
going upwards, downwards and sideways from there. SrikaQ.ada,
however, compromises with the Tantra school by holding that of
these thirty-five millions there are seventy-two thousand niit}is
which may be regarded as gross and are also called dhamanis,
and which carry the sense-qualities of colour, taste, odour, touch
and sound (paiicendriya-gu1}iivahii). There are again seven hundred
niit}is with fine apertures, which carry food-juice by which the body
is nourished. Of these again there are twenty-four which are more
prominent.
The most important feature of the Tantra school of anatomy
is its theory of nerve-plexuses (cakra). Of these the first is the
iidhiira-cakra, generally translated as sacro-coccygeal plexus. This
plexus is situated between the penis and the anus, and there are
eight elevations on it. It is in touch with the mouth of the su~um7Jii.
In the centre of the plexus there is an elevation called svaympbhu-
liizga, like a fine bud with an aperture at its mouth. There is a
fine thread-like fibre, spiral in its form, attached to the aperture
of the svaympbhu-liilga on one side and the mouth of the s~um7Jii
on the other. This spiral and coiled fibre is called kula-ku7J¢alini;
for it is by the potential mother-energy, as manifested in its move-
ment of a downward pressure of the apiina viiyu and an upward
pressure of the prii7Ja viiyu, that exhalation and inhalation are made
possible and life functions operate. Next comes the sviidh#thiina-
cakra, the sacral plexus, near the root of the penis. Next comes
the lumbar plexus (ma7;1i-pura-cakra), in the region of the
navel. Next is the cardiac plexus (aniihata-cakra or viSuddha-
cakra), in the heart, of twelve branches. Next is the laryngeal and
pharyngeal plexus, at the junction of the spinal cord and the
medulla oblongata, called the bhiirati-sthiina. Next comes the
lalanii-cakra, opposite the uvula. Next to this is the iijiiii-cakra
between the eyebrows, within which is the mana.S-cakra, the centre
of all sense-knowledge and dream-knowledge, and the seat of
manas, the mind-organ. Vijiianabhik~u says in his Yoga-viirttika
that one branch of the su~um7Jii goes upwards from here, which is
the niit}i for carrying the functions of manas and is called nzano-vahii
niit}i; the Jiiiina-sar:tZkalini tantra calls it jiiiina-niit}i. It seems,
therefore, that it is through this niit}i that connection is established
between the soul, residing in the brain, and the manas, residing in
the manaJ-cakra. Sati.kara Misra argues in his commentary on
the VaiSepka-siitras, v. 2. 14 and 15, that the niifjis are then1selves
capable of producing tactile impressions; for, had it not been so,
then eating and drinking, as associated with their corresponding
feelings, would not have been possible, as these are effected by the
automatic functions of prii7Ja 1 • Above the ajiiii-cakra comes the
soma-cakra, in the middle of the cerebrum, and finally, in the upper
cerebrum, there is the sahasriira-cakra, the seat of the soul. The
process of Yoga consists in rousing the potential energy located in
the adhiira-cakra, carrying it upwards through the aperture of the
citri1Ji or the brahma-niifji, and bringing it to the brahma-randhra
or the sahasriira. This ku7J¢alini is described as a fine fibre like a
lightning flash (tafjid iva vilasat tantu-rilpa-svariipa), which raises
the question whether this is actually a physical nerve or merely a
potential energy that is to be carried upwards to the upper cere-
brum in the sahasrara-cakra; and it cannot, I think, be yet satis-
factorily explained. But, judging from a wide comparison of the
texts, it seems pretty certain that it is the ku1}f/,ali sakti or the
ku1J¢ali energy which is carried upwards. If the ku7J¢ali energy is
inexhaustible in its nature, the whole discussion as to whether the
iidhiira-cakra is depleted or not or whether the ku1J¢alini herself
rises or her eject, as raised in Sir John's Serpent Power, pp. JOI-J20,
loses its point. How far the cakras can themselves be called nerve-
plexuses is very doubtful, since the nerve-plexuses are all outside
the spinal aperture; but, if the ku7J¢alini is to pass through the
aperture of the citri7Ji niifji and at the same time pass through the
cakras, the cakras or the lotuses (padma) must be inside the spinal
cord. But, supposing that these nerve-plexuses represent the corre-
sponding places of the cakras inside the spinal cord, and also because
it has become customary to refer to the cakras as plexuses, I have
ventured to refer to the cakras as such. But it must be borne in
mind that, as the ku1J¢alini is a mysterious power, so also are the
cakras the mysterious centres in the path of the ascent of the
ku1J¢alini. A nerve-physical interpretation of them as nerve-
plexuses would be very unfaithful to the texts. A more detailed
discussion on these subjects will be found in the treatment of
Tantra philosophy in a later volume of this work. The chief
interest of the present section is only to show that the Tantra
1
See Dr Sir B. N. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, pp. 222-225.
XIII] The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry 357
anatomy is entirely different in its conception from the Ayur-veda
anatomy, which has been the subject of our present enquiry.
Another fact of importance also emerges from these considera-
tions, namely, that, though in Dr<Jhabala's supplementary part of
the Siddhi-sthiina the head is associated with sensory consciousness,
Caraka's own part refers to the heart as the central seat of the
soul. But the Tantra school points to the upper cerebrum as the
seat of the soul and regards the spinal cord and its lower end as
being of supreme importance for the vital functions of the body.
The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry.

The theory of Rasas or tastes plays an important part in
Ayur-veda in the selection of medicines and diet and in diagnosing
diseases and arranging their cures. In 1. 26 of Caraka we hear of a
great meeting of sages in the Caitraratha Forest, attended by
Atreya, Bhadrakapya, Sakunteya, PiirQ.ak!?a Maudgalya, HiraQ.yak!?a
Kausika, Kumarasiras Bharadvaja, Varyovida, the Vaideha king
Nimi, Ba<;lisa and Kankayana, the physician of Balkh, for the
purpose of discussing questions of food and tastes.
Bhadrakapya held that taste, or rasa, was that which could be
perceived by the organ of the tongue and it was one, viz. that of
water. Sakunteya held that there were two rasas, nutritive (upa-
samanlya) and denutritive (chedanlya). PiirQ.ak!?a held that there
were three rasas, upasamanlya, chedanlya and neutral (siidhiira'!la).
HiraQ.yak!?a held that there were four rasas, sweet and good,
sweet and harmful, distasteful and good, distasteful and harmful.
Kumarasiras held that there were five rasas, earthy, watery, fiery,
airy and ethereal (iintarik~a). Varyovida held that there were six
rasas, heavy (guru), light (laghu), cold (Sua), hot (u~'!la), smooth
(snigdha) and dry (ru~a). Nimi held that there were seven rasas,
sweet (madhura), sour (amla), salt (lava'!la), hot (katu), bitter (tikta),
pungent (ka~iiya) and alkaline (k~iira). Ba<;lisa added one more to
these, viz. unmanifested (avyakta), and held that there were eight
rasas. Kankayana held that the rasas were of infinite variety and
could not be counted, on account of the diversity of substances in
which they are located (ii.Sraya), their specific properties as light or
heavy (gu~a), their action in developing or reducing the consti-
tuents of the body (karma) and their diversity as apparent to the
organ of taste. Atreya Punarvasu held that there are six rasas only,
sweet (madhura), acid (amla), saline (lava7Ja), hot and pungent
(katu), bitter (tikta) and astringent (kll§iiya). The source (yonz) of
all these rasas is water. Its actions are sedative (upasamana) and
denutritive (chedana), and a basis of equilibrium (siidhiira7Jatva)
of the rasas is reached when those having the above opposite
actions are mixed together. Pleasantness (sviidu) or unpleasantness
(asviidu} of taste depends on liking or disliking. The seats of rasas
are the essences of the five elements (paiica-mahii-bhuta-vikiirii/:z)
modified in accordance with five conditions, viz. (I) specific nature
of the substance (prakrtt); (2) as acted upon by heat or other
agents (vikrtz); (3) association with other things (viciira); (4) the
place in which the substance is grown (desa); (5) the .time at
which it is produced (kiila)l. The gu7;1as of heaviness, lightness,
cold, warm, moisture and dryness belong to the things to which
the rasas belong. The alkaline (leyiira) should not be counted as a
separate rasa, as it is made up of more than one rasa and affects
more than one sense-organ; for it has at least two important rasas
(of "hot and pungent" and "saline") and it affects not only the
organ of taste, but also that of touch, and does not naturally belong
to any substance, but has to be created by artificial processes.
There is p.o such separate rasa which can be called unmanifested
(avyakta). Water is the origin of all rasas; so all rasas may be
considered as existing in an unmanifested state in water, but that
is no reason why we should say that water has a separate taste
called" unmanifested ";moreover, when a substance has two rasas,
one dominant and the other extremely feeble, the feeble rasa may
be regarded as unmanifested ; or, when in a compound of different
rasas, say, of a syrup, a slight hot taste is added, this may be con-
sidered as unmanifested; but certainly there is no rasa to which
the name "unmanifested" (avyakta) could be given. The view
that there is an infinite number of rasas is untenable; for, though
it may be urged that the same rasa may occur differently in different
objects, that would only go to show that there are various grades
of forms of each particular rasa and not prove that with each
variety of a particular rasa the rasa itself is wholly different. Again,
1 Thus mudga (a sort of kidney-bean), which is a bhuta-vikiira, has the rasas
of astringent and sweet and is yet light by nature, though one would expect it
to be heavy on account of its rasas of astringent and sweet. Vikrti is best
exemplified in the case of fried paddy, which is lighter than rice. It is well
known that by composition wholly new properties may be generated in the
product. Medicinal herbs vary in their properties in accordance with the time
of plucking.
xnr] The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry 359
if different rasas are mixed together, the mixed rasa itself is not
entitled to be counted as a separate rasa; for its qualities are just
as the sum total of the qualities of the different rasas which are
its constituents, and no independent work can be attributed to
this mixed rasa (na sa'!lST#iinii'l!l rasiinii'l!l karmopadiSanti bud-
dhimanta/:z), as in the case of a compound of two or more sub-
stances, as mentioned above (viciira).
Though on account of the predominance of one or the other
of them they are called earthy (piirthiva), watery (iipya), fiery
(iigneya), airy (viiyavya) or ethereal (iikiisiitmaka), yet all substances
are compounded of the five elements. All substances, whether
animate or inanimate, are to be considered as medicines (a~adha),
provided they are applied in the proper way (yukti) and for specific
purposes (artha). A substance can be a medicine only when it is
applied in the proper way and for specific purposes; nothing can
unconditionally be considered a medicine. The medicative in-
fluence is exerted both by virtue of the specific agency of a sub-
stance (dravya-prabhiiva) and by the specific agency of its qualities,
as also by their joint influence 1 . The action of medicines is called
karman, its potency virya, the place where they operate adhi-
karm;a, the time of operation kiila, the mode of operation upiiya,
and the result achieved phala.
As regards the origin of rasas, it is suggested that water
gets mixed with the five elements in the air and also after its fall
on the ground. These rasas nourish the bodies of all plants and
animals. All the five elements are present in all rasas; but in some
rasas some of the elements predominate, and in accordance with
this there are differences among the various rasas. Thus, with
the predominance of soma there is a sweet taste, with the pre-
dominance of earth and fire an acid taste, with water and fire
a saline taste, with air and fire, hot and pungent, with air and
iikiisa, bitter, with air and earth, astringent. The different elements
1 The medicinal effect of substances may be distinguished from the medicinal
effect of qualities, as when by certain stones (ma7;1i) poison may be removed or

by the use of certain amulets certain diseases may be cured. Again, there may
be cases where simply by the application of heat a certain disease may be cured,
irrespective of the substance which possesses heat as its property. It seems that
only the sense-properties and mechanical properties are here counted as gu7Jas;
other kinds of properties were considered as being due to the thing (dravya)
itself. For, in addition to the sense-properties, the twenty qualities, guru,
laghu, sUa, u~~. snigdha, ru/qa, manda, tlk~tJa, sthira, siira, mrdu, ka{hina,
visada, picchila, ilak~tJa, khara, sukpna, sthula, sandra and drava, are counted a~
gutJaS (Caraka-sa1Jlhitii, 1. i. 48; 1. 25. 35; I. 26. 11).
which take part in the formation of rasas are said to be instrumental
causes (nimitta-kiira1JD) of the rasas; this explains how, though
fire has no rasa, yet it may help the generation of a particular
rasa 1 • Destiny or unknown cause (adr#a) is, however, the general
cause of such combinations of elements with water.
In the very first chapter of the Caraka-sa'J!Zhitii, substances
(dravya) are counted as being the five elements, viz. iikasa, air,
light, heat, water and earth, together with soul, manas, time and
space. Of these those substances which possess sense-organs are
called animate and those which do npt are called inanimate 2 • The
gutzas are the sense-properties of hearing, touch, colour, taste and
smell, the mechanical and other properties which all elements
have in common, such as heaviness, lightness, cold, heat, and
moisture, dryness, dullness, sharpness, steadiness, mobility, soft-
ness, hardness, motion, slipperiness, smoothness, roughness,
grossness, fineness, thickness, liquidity, etc., and desire, hatred,
pleasure, pain and effort, intelligence (including memory), con-
sciousness, patience, egoism, etc., distance (para), nearness (apara),
combination (yuktz), number, contact, disjunction (vibhiiga),
separateness, measure, inertia (sa'J!ZSkiira) and repetition (abhyiisa).
The definition of substance (dravya) is, that which possesses quality
(gutza) and action (karma) in the relation of inherence and is also
the inseparable material cause (samaviiyi-kiira1Ja) of all effects.
Gutzas are things which are themselves inactive and exist in dravyas
in an inseparable relation of inherence. The gutzas themselves
cannot contain any further gutzas 3 •
The above being the theory of dravya and gutza, the question
arises as to the way in which medicines operate in human bodies.
The most general and obvious way in which the different medic1nes
were classified was by their different tastes, which were considered
primarily to be six in number, as has already been pointed out.
Each of the tastes was considered as being capable of producing
certain good or bad physiological effects. Thus the sweet taste is
1 lha ca kiira1)lltVatfZ bhutiinlitfl rasasya madhuratviidi-visqa eva nimitta-
kiira1)lltvam ucyate. Cakrapill).i on Caraka, I. 26. 38.

11 Caraka-sQ'!lhitii, I. I. 47· Even trees were regarded as being possessed of
senses and therefore animated or cetana. Cakrapal).i says that, since the sun-
flower continues to tum its face towards the sun, it may be regarded as being
possessed of the sense of sight; again, since the lavali (Averrhoa acida) plant
fructifies through hearing the sound of thunder, the plants have auditory
organs, etc.
• Ibid. I. 1. 47, 48 and so, with Cakrapal)i's commentary.
XIII] The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry
said to increase blood, flesh, fat, marrow, semen, life, to do good to
the six senses, and to produce strength and colour of the body; to
do good to the skin and throat, to destroy pitta, poison and miiruta
(morbidity of air), and to produce moistening, cold and heaviness,
etc. The acid (amla) is said to rouse digestion, develop the body,
and to remove viita; it is light, warm, moist, etc. The saline taste
is digestive; it removes viita, secretes kapha; and it is moist, warm,
etc. And so on with the other tastes. But, of course, all these
qualities cannot belong to the tastes; as has already been pointed
out, the gu7Jas cannot possess further gu7Jas, and the tastes (rasa)
are themselves gu7JaS; so, when certain functions or properties are
attributed to the rasas, they must be considered as belonging
to the substances which possess those specific rasas (rasii iti
rasa-yuktiini dravyii1}i) 1 •
From Susruta's statements it appears that there was a great
difference of opinion regarding the relative prominence of dravya
and its properties 2 • There were some who held that dravya was the
most important, since dravya remained permanent, whereas rasa,
etc. are always changed; so dravya is relatively permanent. Again,
dravya is grasped by the five senses, and not its gu7Jas. The dravya
is also the support of the rasas, etc. All operations have to be done
with the dravya, and the authoritative texts also speak of operations
with the dravyas, and not \vith the rasas; the rasas depend largely
on the nature of the dravyas. Others hold that rasas are the most
important, since it is of them that we become directly aware when
we take our food, and it is said that they remove the various
morbidities of viita, etc. Others hold that the potency (vzrya) of
things is the most important, since it is by their potency that
medicines act 3 • This potency is of two kinds, hot (uP.Za) and cold
(sua); some think that it is of eight kinds, hot (u~7Ja), cold (sUa),
moist (snigdha), dry (ruk~a), moving (visada), slippery (picchila),
soft (mrdu) and sharp (ti~7Ja). Sometimes potency or vzrya over-
comes rasa by its power and makes its own tendencies felt; thus,
though sugar-cane ought to remove viita on account of its sweetness,
it really increases it on account of its being szta-vzrya (of cold
1
Caraka-sa1[lhitii, 1. 26. 39, CakrapaQi's commentary.
2
Susruta, Sutra-sthiina,40. 3· Dravya is defined by Susruta as kriyii-guttavat
samaviiyi-kiirattam.
3 ihau~adha-karmiitti urdhviidho-bhiigobhayabhiiga-sa'1fl$odhana-Sa1[lsamana-
Sa1[lgriihakiigni-dfpaina-prapitjana-/ekhana-vf1'!lhatta-rasiiyana-viijikaratta-svaya-
thakara-vilayana-dahana-diiratta-miidana-priittaghna- vi~ a- prasamaniini vlrya-
priidhanyiid bhavanti. Susruta, 1. 40. S·
potency)!. Others· say that the rasa, as digested by the stomach
(piika), is most important, since things can produce good or bad
effects only when they are digested. Some hold that each rasa
remains unchanged by digestion, though according to others there
are only three kinds of rasa resulting from digestion or piika, viz.
sweet, acid and hot (katu); whereas Susruta held that there were
only two kinds of rasa resulting from digestion, viz. sweet and hot;
for, in his view, acid was not the result of digestion (amlo vipiiko
niistz). According to Susruta it is the pitta which is turned into
acid. Those objects which have more of earth and water in them
are turned into sweet taste, whereas those which have tejas, air and
· iikiisa as their ingredients are turned into hot taste (katu).
Speaking of the differences of view regarding the relative
importance of dravya, rasa, virya and vipiika, Susruta says that
they are all important, since a medicine produces effects in all
those four ways according to its own nature 2 • The view of Susruta,
as explained by Cakrapa.Q.i in the Bhiinumati, seems to be that
food, drink and medicine are all products of the five mahii-
bhiltas, and rasa, Virya and vi'piika are dependent on the dravya and
are like its potency (saktz), through which it works 3 • Cakrapa.Q.i,
commenting on this in the Bhiinumati, says that even in those cases
where certain rasas are said to remove or increase certain mor-
bidities (do~a) it is only because of their importance that they are
so described; the real agent in all such cases is the dravya, since the
rasa, etc. are always dependent on the dravya. Apart from the
sakti as manifested in rasa, etc., the dravya also operates by itself
in an unthinkable way (acintya), which is also called prabhiiva and
which is comparable with the attractive force exerted by magnets
on iron. The dravya by itself is thus differentiated from its sakti,
and it is said to have a peculiar operative mode of its own, as
distinguished from that of its sakti or potency, as manifested in
rasa, virya or vipiika, and this mode of operation is considered to
1 etiini khalu vfryii1Ji sva-bala-gu7Jotkar~iit rasam abhibhuyiitma-karma

kurvanti. Suiruta, ibid. The vlrya is said to remain both in the dravya and in the
rasa. Thus in Susruta, I. 40. s-8, it is said that, if in those rasas which remove viita
there is dryness (rauk~ya), lightness (liighava) and cold (saitya), then they will
not remove viiyu; so, if in those which remove pitta there is sharpness (taik~7Jya),
heat (au~7Jya) and lightness (laghutii), then they will not remove pitta, and so on.
2 catur7Jiim api samagryam icchanty atra vipaicitafz. Susruta, 1. 40. 13.
8 dravya-Jakti-rupakii rasa-vfrya-vipiikii yathii-yoga1Jl nimitta-kiira7Jalii1f&
samaviiyi-kiira7Jalii1Jl vii bhajanto na kartrtayii vyapadisyante dravya-parii-

dhlnatviit. Bhiinumatf, 1. 40. 13.
be quite unthinkable (acintya) as to the way in "which it operates 1 •
Thus some medicines operate by rasa, some by vipiika, or the rasa
resulting from the digestive operation (e.g. sutzfhi, which, though
hot in taste and hot in vzrya, is sweet after digestive operation),
some by vzrya (e.g. kulattha, though pungent, yet removes viiyu
on account of its hot ·vzrya), some by both rasa and vipiika, some
by dravya-prabhiiva, vzrya and rasa, some by dravya-prabhiiva,
vzrya, rasa and vipiika.
Caraka, however, differs from Susruta in this view of drayva
and rasa, vzrya and vipiika; for, according to him, rasa, vzrya
and vipiika, themselves being gu7Jas, cannot possess further gutzas.
He does not admit a sakti as different from the dravya. Thus in
the case of prabhiiva, while Susruta holds that it is a specific sakti,
or the thing operating in unaccountable ways, Caraka thinks that
this sakti is identical with the thing itself. Thus CakrapaQi in
explaining Caraka-Sa1'{lhitii, I. z6. 72, says," saktir hi svarilpam eva
bhiiviinii1J'l, niitirikta1'{l kincid dharmiintara1'{l bhiiviiniim" (potency
is the nature of things and is no separate property distinct from
them). Vzrya in its general sense means" the potency or power
of medicines to produce effects," and as such includes within it
both rasa and vipiika; but, since these have special names, the term
virya is not applied to them 2 • Apart from this there is special
virya in a technical sense (piiribht4ika). In the view which con-
siders this virya to be of two kinds, snigdha and rilk~a, these are
to be taken as specific characteristics; but in the view which
considers the virya to be of eight kinds, these are to be taken as
a different set of characteristics of dravya or substance 3 • This
virya is believed to be more powerful than rasa, so that, when
the virya and rasa of a thing come into conflict, it is the vzrya
which predominates and not the rasa. ·
Vagbhata junior makes some remarks in support of the name
vzrya, as given to the characteristics which go by that name.
He says that, since the vzrya characteristics of things remain un-
changed even after digestion, and since the things are primarily
1 dravyam iitmanii iaktyii prabhiiviikhyayii do1a1Jl hanti . .. atra dravya-iakti-
kiiryodiihara7Jamyathii kar$aka-maf}ir loha-ialyam iikar1ati. Bhiinumatf, I. 40. 13.

2 tasya piikasya tad-rasasya vipiikasya ca Prthan-nirdeiiin na vlrya-vyavahiiralz
siistre . .. Carake tu siimiinya-vlrya-iabdena te 'pi grhttiifz. Ibid. 1. 40. 5·

8 yadii dvividha1Jl vlryam tadii snigdha-ril~iidlnii1Jl . .. rasiidi-dharmata-
yaiva kiirya-grahaf}a1Jl vak~yati hi madhuro rasafz snigdha ity iidi a~tavidha-Vfrya
pak1e tu ... balavat-kiirya-kartrtva-vivak~ayii vfryatvam iti sthitifz. Ibid. I. 40.
4·
in use for medical purposes and each of them would include many
substances and rasas, this character justly deserves to be called
virya, or the potency-in-chief for producing medical effects 1 • He
further says that rasa is baffled by vipiika, that rasa and vipiika
can baffle virya, if they work in the same direction, and that they
may all be baffled by prabhiiva. These remarks, however, are
true only in those cases where rasa, virya and vipiika exist in the
same proportion, and it must be borne in mind that some objects
may have rasa of such a predominant type that it may overcome
the vipiika or the vi1ya 2 • As regards the relative priority of virya
and vipiika, Sivadasa in commenting on CakrapaQ.i's Dravya-gutza-
sa,graha says that virya is prior to vipiika; and this would imply
that, as virya can supersede rasa, so vipiika may supersede virya.
If we look back to the earliest history of the development
of Indian medical ideas in the Atharva-Veda, we see that there
were two important classes of medicines, viz. the amulets, ma1}is
and water. Atharva-Veda, 1. 4· 4, 1. 5, 1. 6, 1. 33, VI. 24,-vi. 92, etc.
are all in praise of water as medicine, and water is regarded there
as the source of all rasa or taste. Thus from the earliest times
two different kinds of medicines were used. Of these the amulets
were more or less of a miraculous effect. It was not possible to
judge which kind of amulet or matzi would behave in which way;
their mode of operation was unthinkable (acintya). It is easy to see
that this mode of operation of medicines was what was considered
a prabhiiva by Caraka and Susruta. With them prabhava means
the mysterious operation of a medicine acting in an unaccountable
way, so that, though -two medicines might be exactly similar in
rasa, virya and vipiika, they might behave differently with regard
to their medicinal effects 3 • Such an effect was thus naturally con-
sidered as unthinkable. But the analogy of the old matzis was
fresh in the minds of these medical thinkers when conceiving this
prabhiiva, and it was in reality an extension of that idea to other
unaccountable effects of medicines 4 • As none of the chemical effects
1
A~tiiilga-hrdaya, 1. 9. 15. 2
Ibid. 1. 28.
3
rasa-vlrya-vipiikiina1Jl siimiinya1Jl yatra lak~yate vise5a~ karma7J.ii1Jl caiva
prabhiivas tasya ca smrta~. Caraka-sa1Jlhitii, 1. 26. 69. CakrapaQi, in commenting
on this, says," rasiidi-kiiryatvena yan niivadhiirayitU1.n sakyate kiirya1Jl tat pra-
bhiiva-krtam iti silcayati; at a evokla1Jl • prabhiivo 'cintya ucyate' rasa-Vlrya-vipiika-
tayiicintya ity artha~."
" ma7)lnii1Jl dhiira7J.iyiinii1Jl karma yad vividhiitmakat{l, tat-prabhiiva-krta1Jl
te1iim prabhavo 'cintya ucyate. (The various actions of amulets are to be con-
sidered as being due to a prabhiiva which is unthinkable--ibid. 1. 26. 72.)
(in the modern sense) of medicines on human organs were known,
the most obvious way in which the medical effects of herbs, roots,
etc. could be classified was on the basis of taste, and by Caraka and
Susruta we are told the effects of the different rasas on the different
morbidities of the body, viiyu, pitta and kapha. As the main
source of all diseases was unequal increase or decrease of viiyu,
pitta and kapha, a classification which described the rasas in such
a way that one could know which rasa increased or decreased
which of the n1orbidities was particularly useful. But it is
obvious that such a classification, though simple, could not be
universally true; for, though the taste is some indication of the
medici:1al property of any substance, it is not an infallible one.
But no other mode of classification was known; it was supposed
that the taste (rasa) of some substances changed altogether after
digestion and that in such cases the taste which changed after
digestion (piika) would be operative. Cakrapal).i says that in those
cases where the taste on the tongue (rasa) agrees with the taste
as produced after the digestive process, the effect in that direction
becomes very strong, but in the case where the latter differs
from the former the operation of rasa becomes naturally weak,
because the force of the taste produced by the final operation of
the digestive process is naturally strong 1 • Caraka thought that
there were only three rasas as the result of digestion, viz. kafu,
madhura and amla; Susruta rejected the last, as has already
been described. But even this was not sufficient; for there were
many other effects of medicine which could not be explained on
the above suppositions. In explaining this, the theory of virya
was introduced. In addition to taste substances were considered
to possess other properties of heat and cold, as judged by inference,
tactual properties of slipperiness, movement, moisture and dry-
ness, etc., sharpness, etc. as manifested by odour, and these were
supposed to produce effects in supersession of rasa and vipiika. It
was only in the cases where no sensible data of any kind could be
found to indicate the medical properties of the thing that the idea
of prabhiiva was introduced. The chapters in Ayur-veda on dravya
1 CakrapaQ.i on Caraka, 1. 26. 65. CakrapAQ.i points out that the hot (kafu)
taste is at first useful in cleaning the phlegm of the throat, but, since it becomes
sweet after digestion, it acts as a nutrient (vnya). But, except in the case of
such local actions, it is difficult to understand why the rasa which was altered
by digestion should have any such effect as CakrapaQ.i suggests (viparyaye tu
durbalam iti jneyam).
and gu!la deal with. the enumeration of prabhiiva and also of rasa,
vipiika and virya wherever there is a divergence among them, as
determined by empirical observation. This is very necessary not
only for the selection of medicines and diet in the cure of diseases,
but also for prevention of diseases. It is well to remember that
many diseases were supposed to arise through eating together things
which are opposed to each other in rasa, vipiika or virya.
The Psychological Views and other Ontological

Categories.
Caraka in the eighth chapter of the Sutra-sthiina counts the
senses as being five in number. Though both the Sarp.khya and the
Vaise~ika systems, to which Ayur-veda is largely indebted for its
philosophical ideas, admit'manas, or mind-organ, as a separate sense
(indriya), Ayur-veda here differs from them and, as Cakrapal).i says,
separates manas from the ordinary senses by reason of the fact that
it has many functions which are not possessed by any of the other
senses (cakfur-iidibhyo 'dhika-dharma-yogitayii) 1 • Caraka himself,
however, in another place speaks incidentally of a sixth sense
(~a¢-indriya) in connection with the description of sweet taste 2 •
Manas is, however, here described as transcending the senses
(atindriya). Cakrapal)i, in explaining the atzndriya character of
manas, says that it is called atindriya because it is not a cause
of the knowledge of external objects like the other senses. Manas
is, indeed, the direct cause of pleasure and pain, but it is the
superintendent of all the senses (adluffhiiyaka). ~Janas is also
called sattva and cetas. The self is, however, the permanent subject
of all acts of consciousness (cetanii-pratisandhiitii). When the manas
comes into contact with its objects, viz. pleasure or pain or the
objects of thought, and the self makes an effort at grasping these
objects, then there is a movement on the part of man as, by which
it feels pleasure or pain, or thinks the objects of thought, or moves
the sense-organs. Thus, when the self makes an effort and the
objects of pleasure or pain or thought are present, then the manas
turns to these as its objects and moves the senses, and the senses,
guided by it, grasp their respective objects and produce their
knowledge.
1 CakrapaQ.i's commentary on Caraka-smphitii, I. 8. 3·
2 Caraka-smphitii, I. 26. 41, tatra madhuro rasa/:z ••. ~a4 indriya-prasiidanal:z.
xnr] Psychological Views and Ontological Categories 367
The one manas appears as diverse on account of the diversity of
its objects of thought (e.g. the mind may sometimes take religious
thoughts and appear religious and at other times take lustful
thoughts and appear lustful), diversity of sense-objects with which
it is associated (e.g. the mind may grasp colour, smell or sound,
etc.), and diversity of ways of imagination (e.g. "This will do
good to me, or "This will do me harm," etc.). In the same man
the mind may sometimes appear as angry, ignorant or virtuous.
But in reality the manas is one and the same for each person; all
these differences do not appear at the same time with the same
person, as might have been the case if there were many minds for
one and the same person. Moreover, the manas is atomic; for
otherwise many different objects or functions could be performed
by one and the same manas at the same time.
It may be asked, if one and the same manas can show
different kinds of moral propensities, sattva, rajas or tamas, how
can any person be characterized as slittvika, rlijasika or tlimasika?
The answer is that a man is called slittvika, rlijasika or tlimasika
according as predominance of one or other of these gutzas is
observed in that man.
llfanas is supposed to move the senses, which are constituted
of likiiJa, air, light, heat, water and earth; and the seats of the
senses are the physical sockets of the eye, the ear, the nostrils, the
tongue and the skin. The five sense-cognitions are produced
through the contiguity of the senses, the sense-objects, manas
and soul. They are short-lived (k~atzika), but not exactly momen-
tary, as the Buddhists would like to have them 1 • They also are of
determinate nature (niscaylitmikal;). As Cakrapal).i says, it is quite
possible for transitory sense-cognitions to give a determinate report
of their objects. Though all the senses are made up of the five
elements, yet those senses which contain any element in a pre-
ponderating degree were conceived as made up of that element.
The sense that has a particular e~ement in a preponderating degree
is regarded as having by virtue of that a special capacity for
grasping that particular element 2 •
The connection of the body, tne senses, the manas and the self
1 Cakrapal).i's commentary on Caraka-smphitii, I. 8. II. K~atrikii ity iiSutara-

viniisinyab na tu bauddha-siddhiintavad eka-kwJJ.iivasthiiyinyab.
2
tatra yad-yad-iitmakam indriya1{l viseyiit tat-tad-iitmakam eviirtham anu-
grh1)iiti tat-svabhiiviid vibhutviic ca. (Caraka, I. 8. I4.)
is called life (fivita)l. The self is everywhere regarded as the agent
which unites the acts of consciousness (jfiiina-pratisandhiitii).
Cakrapal)i says that, since the body is momentary (sarirasya
kfm;zikatvena), it may be argued that the union of the self with
the body is also momentary. The answer that Cakrapal).i gives to
such an objection is that, though the body is momentary, yet,
since the momentary bodies are repeated in a series, the series as
a whole may be looked upon as one; and, though the union of the
self with each term of the series is momentary, yet, since the series
may be looked upon as one, its union with the self may also be
regarded as one (santiina-vyavasthito 'yam ekatayii ucyate) 2 • In
another place Caraka says that the manas, the self and the body
are connected together like a tripod, on which life rests; if any one
of the components is missing, the unity is broken 3 •
It has already been pointed out that, according to Caraka,
the self is active and that by its activity the mind moves; and
it is by the operation of mind that the senses move. The self
is also regarded as being cetana (conscious). But this consciousness
does not belong to the self in itself, it is attained only by its
connection with the senses through manas 4 • It is, however,
necessary to note that apart from this se]f there is, according to
Caraka, another transcendent self (para}; iitmii), different from the
self which participates in the union of the body and the senses
(which is also technically called the sa1[lyogi-purUfa) 5 • The subtler,
or transcendent, self is unchangeable (nir-vikiira). Knowledge
implies a process and a change, and this self manifests con-
sciousness only in those parts where it becomes associated with
manas and the senses. Thus, though the self is eternal, yet the
rise of consciousness in it is occasional. The unchangeableness
of the self consists in its being able to unite with itself its past and
future states 6 • If the self were not permanent, it could not unite
with itself all its past experiences. The sufferings and enjoyment
1 Caraka, 1. I. 4I. The other synonyms of life are dhiiri, nityaga and
2
anubandha. Ibid. I. 1. 41.
8 sattvam iitmii sa1"ira1[l ca trayam etat tri-dat:,ujavat
lokas tl~!hati sa1Jlyogiit tatra sarva1Jl prat#!hitam. Ibid. I. 1. 45·
4 idam eva ciitmanas cetanatva1Jl, yad indriya-sa1Jlyoge sati jniina-siilitva1Jl,
na nikr~!asyiitmanai cetanatvam. Cakrapa:Qi on Caraka, I. I . 47·

5 nirvikiirab paras tv iitmii satva-bhuta-gutzendriyaib. Caraka, I. I. 55· tena
sattva-saririitma-melaka-rilpo ya iitma-sabdena ucyate ta1Jl vyiivartayati. Cakra-
pa:Qi on the above.
• nityatva1Jl ciitmanab purviipariivasthiinubhutiirtha-pratisandhiiniit. Cakra-
pa:Qi on Caraka, 1. I. 55·
XIII] Psychological Views and Ontological Categories 369
that affect us should not be attributed to the self, but to manas
(drsyamiina-riigiidi-vikiiras tu manast).
The special feature of this view of self is that it is permanent
and unchangeable; this self seems to hold within it all the indi-
vidual egos which operate in association with their respective senses,
manas and body. It becomes endowed with consciousness only
when it is in association with the senses. Pleasure, pain and the
movements involved in thought-processes are attributed to manas,
though the manas is also considered to derive its activity from the
self. The states of consciousness that are produced are all united
in the self. The self, thus diverted in its subtler aspect from the
senses and manas, is eternal and unchangeable, whereas in its
aspect as associated with manas and the senses it is in the sphere
of change and consciousness. This view is therefore different from
those of the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy.
It is well to note in this connection that the Caraka-Sa'f!zhitii
begins with an enumeration of the Vaise~ika categories, and, though
it often differs from the Vaise~ika view, it seems to take its start
from the Vaise~ika. It enumerates the five elements, manas, time,
space and self as substances (dravya); it enumerates the gu7JaS,
such as the sensible qualities, the mechanical or physical qualities
given in the list beginning with heaviness (gurv iidayal;), intelli-
gence (buddht), and those beginning with remoteness (para) and
ending with effort (prayatna). But what is this gurv iidi list? There
is no such list in the Vaisefika-siitras. Cakrapal).i, however, refers to
an enumeration given in a later chapter (1. 25. 35) by Caraka, where
however these gu7JaS are not enumerated as belonging to all sub-
stances, but only to the food and drink that we take 1 • But the list
referred to as pariidi (beginning with pariidi) prayatniinta (ending in
prayatna) is not to be found anywhere in the Caraka-Sa'f!zhitii. This
may be a reference to the Vaisefika-sutra, 1. 1. 6 2 • But, if this is so,
it leaves out a number of other gu:JJ,as enumerated in the V aiSe§ika-
siitra which were counted there in the pariidi list 3 • Caraka
himself gives a list of gu7JaS beginning with para which includes
some of those gu7Jas included in the V aisefika-siitra already
1 iihiiratvam iihiirasyaikavidham arthiibhediit sa puna/:z ... vi1rtiati-gu7JO guru-
laghu-iuo~7Ja-snigdha-rilk~a-manda-tikroa-sthira-sara-mrdu- kathina- viiada-pic-
chila-ilakroa-khara-sii~a-sthiila-siindra-draviinugamiit. C araka-satflhitii, I. 5 .J 5.
2
paratviiparatve buddhayal:z sukha-dul.zkhe icchii-dve~au prayatnas ca gu7Jii~z.
Vaiie#ka-siitra, I. 1. 6.
3 riipa-rasa-gandha-ipariii/:z sa1{lkhyii-parimii7}iini PrthaktvatfZ smp.yoga-
vibhiigau paratviiparatve. Ibid.
DII 24
referred to and some more. The gu'l}as enumerated are para, apara,
yukti, sa1J1khyii, sa1J'lyoga, vibhiiga, prthaktva, parimii1Ja, sa1J1Skiira,
and abhyiisa 1 • Para means "superiority" or" importance" (pra-
dhiina), apara means "inferiority" or "unimportance" (apra-
dhiina). This importance or unimportance is with reference to
country, time, age, measure, the rasa resulting from digestion
(piika), potency (virya) and taste (rasa). Thus, a dry country is
called para and a marshy one apara; the rains (visarga) of early
and late autumn (sarat and hemanta) are called para, whereas the
season of drought (winter, spring and summer) is called apara;
with reference to piika, virya and rasa, para and apara mean
"suitability" and "unsuitability"-that which is suitable to one is
para and that which is unsuitable to him is apara. Yukti means
proper selection of medicines with reference to certain diseases
(do~iidy-apek~ayii bhe~ajasya samicina-kalpanii} ; sa1J1khyii means
"number"; sa1J1yoga, the mixing up or compounding of two or
more substances; vibhiiga, separation; prthaktva, difference. The
mountains Hirn.alaya and Meru are prthak, because they are
situated in different places and cannot unite; again, even though
a pig and a buffalo may meet together, they always remain different
from each other; and again, in the same class, say in a collection
of peas, each pea is different in identity from the other; in the last
case difference in number constitutes a difference in identity; thus,
wherever there is a numerical difference (anekatii}, there is difference
in identity. Prthaktva thus stands for three kinds of difference,
spatial difference, difference of characters and difference of identity
due to numerical distinction. Parimii1Ja means measurement by
weight, sa1J1Skiira means the production of new qualities and
abhyiisa means habit due to constant practice (satata-kriyii). It
is evident from the above that, though the terms used are the
same as those used by Kal).ada in the V aiSe#ka-sii.tra, yet they are
mostly used in different senses in accordance, probably, with
medical tradition. But this list does not end with prayatna; it
seems therefore that pariidi and prayatniinta stand for two dif-
ferent lists and should not be combined together. We have above
the pariidi list. The prayatniinta is a different list of gu1Jas. It
includes, as Cakrapal).i says, icchii (desire), dve~a (hatred), sukha
1
Pariiparatve yuktis ca saT{lklzyii saT{lyoga eva ca, vibhiigas ca prthaktvaT{l ca
pariml11Jllm athiipi ca, satpSkiiriibhyiisa ity ete gu1Jiilz jiieyiilz pariidayalz. Caraka-
saT{lhitii, 1. 26. 27-29.
XIII] Psychological Views and Ontological Categories 371
(pleasure), dul:zkha (pain) and prayatna (effort). Prayatna means
that particular quality by the rise of which in the soul the manas
is moved to activity.
Karma (movement) is described as prayatniidi-ce~#tam, i.e.
a movement of the nature of conscious effort; the word iidi in
prayatniidi is explained by Cakrapal).i as meaning "of the nature
of 1 ."
Samaviiya means the relation of inseparable inherence, as in
the case of qualities and substances. Cakrapal).i, in explaining the
nature of samaviiya, says that it is eternal, so that, even when in a
particular case it may disappear, it continues to exist in other cases.
It is never destroyed or created anew, but only its appearance
is or is not manifested in particular cases 2 • In the case of
siimiinya and viSe~a, again, Caraka seems to add a new sense to
the words. In the Vaise~ika systems the word siimiinya means
a class concept; but here it means the concrete things which have
similar constituents or characteristics; and viSe~a, which means in
Vaise~ika ultimate specific properties differentiating one atom from
another, means in Caraka concrete things which have dissimilar
and opposite constituents or characteristics. Siimiinya and viSe~a
thus have a significance quite different from what they have in the
V aiSe#ka-siltras. The principle of siimiinya and vise~a is the main
support of Ayur-veda; for it is the principle which underlies
the application of medicines and the course of diets. Substances
having similar constituents or characteristics will increase each
other, and those having dissimilar constituents or characteristics
will decrease each other. Thus a substance having the character-
istics of viita will increase viita and decrease sle~an, which is
dissimilar to it, and so on. Siimiinya is thus defined as tulyiirtlzatii,
i.e. performing similar purposes. Instead of having only a con-
ceptual value, siimiinya and vise~a are here seen to discharge
a pragmatic work of supreme value for Ayur-veda. As regards
the theory of substances (dravya) also, though Caraka borrowed
the enumeration of categories, Cakrapal).i says that the simpler
bhutas formed parts of the complex ones (bhiltiintariinupravesa),
and in support of this idea he quotes a siltra from the Nyaya-
siltra, which, however, there occurs as an opponent's view, since
the theory of bhiltiinupravesa was not believed in by the Nyaya-
1 iidi-Jabda!J prakiiraviicf. Cakrapal)i's commentary on Caraka-sa1{lhitii, I.
I. 48. 2 Ibid. I. I. 49·
372 Speculations in the Medical Schools (CH.
Vaise~ika school; with that school none of the elements entered
into any other, and their qualities were fixed in themselves.
However, in spite of these modifications, the relation of Nyaya-
Vaise!jiika with Caraka seems to be close. But the detailed descrip-
tion of the school of Sa:rpkhya,in IV. 1 ,as has already been mentioned
and explained in the first volume of the present work, in the
chapter on Sarpkhya, does not seem to have much bearing on the
needs of Ayur-veda; and so the whole chapter does not appear to
fit in with the rest of the work, and it is not referred to in other
parts of the book. It is not improbable that this chapter was
somehow added to the book from some other treatise.
Susruta does not, like Caraka, enumerate the categories of the
Vaise~ika, and his account of Sarpkhya is very faithful to the
traditional account given in lsvarakp:;Q.a's Kiirikii and in the
Sii1Jtkhya-siltra. Having described the Sarpkhya theory, Susruta
says that according to medical science the causes of things are
sixfold, viz. ( 1) nature of things (svabhiiva), (2) God (lsvara),
(3) time (kala), (4) accidental happenings (yadrcchii), (5) destiny
(niyati) and (6) evolution (paritziima)l. As I)alhaQ.a points out,
Susruta has in several places referred to the operation of all these
causes. Thus the formation of the limbs of the body in the foetus-
state is said to be due to nature (svabhiiva) ; God as fire is said to
operate as the digestive fire in the stomach and to help digestion;
time as seasons is said to be the cause of the increase and decrease
of do~as; destiny means virtue and vice, and diseases and recovery
from them are sometimes attributed to these. Jejjata, in com-
menting on Susruta (as reported by I)alhaQ.a), says that all the
above six causes, with the exception of God, are but different
names of prakrti. Gayi, however, thinks that the above six causes
represent the instrumental cause, though prakrti may still be con-
sidered as being the material cause (upiidiina-kiirar;a).
As I)alhaQ.a and Gayi think, there is no reason to suppose that
Susruta described the Sa:rpkhya doctrine; for, immediately after
describing the sixfold causes, he speaks of the elements as being
constituted of the three gur;as, sattva, rajas and lamas. Even the
senses are regarded as being material. Souls are according to Ayur-
veda eternal, though they are limited to their bodies and are not
all-pervasive. They are manifested when the semen and the blood
combine, and it is this bodily self, suffering transmigration owing
1 Suiruta-sm.nhita, III. I. I I.
XIII] Logical Speculations and Terms 373
to virtue and vice (called karma-puru~a), with which medical
science is concerned. When the self is in association with manas,
it has the following qualities: pleasure, pain, desire, hatred,
effort, prii:IJ,a and apiina (the upward current of breath and the
downward force acting in the direction of the rectum), the opening
and closing of the eyelids, the action of the intellect as decision
or buddhi (niscaya), imagination (saf!lkalpa), thought (viciira7Jii),
memory (smrti), scientific knowledge (viJiiiina), energy (adhya-
vasiiya) and sense-cognitions (v#ayopalabdhi). The qualities of
manas are divided into three classes, viz. siittvika, riiJasa and
tiimasa; of these the siittvika ones are kind actions, the desire of
enjoying gradually, mercy, truthfulness, virtue, faith, self-know-
ledge, retentive power (medhii), intelligence (buddhz), self-control
(dhrtz), and sense of duty for the sake of duty (anabh#ang-a); the
riiJasa qualities are suffering, impatience, pride, untruthfulness,
cruelty, boastfulness, conceit (mana), joy, passion and anger; the
tiimasa qualities are dullness, viciousness, want of retentive power,
idleness and sleepiness.
Logical Speculations and Terms relating to

Academic Dispute.
Things are either existent (sat) or non-existent (asat)~ and they
can be investigated by the four pramii7Jas, viz. the testimony of
trusty persons (aptopadesa), perception (pratyak~a), inference
(anumiina) and the coming to a conclusion by a series of syllogisms
of probability (yukti) 1 .
Those whose minds are free from the impurities of raJas and
tam as through the force of their ascetic endeavours, who possess un-
limited knowledge extending through the past, present and future,
are to be considered as trustworthy (iipta). Such persons neither
have any deficiency of knowledge nor would they willingly say
anything untrue. They must be considered as absolutely trusty
(iipta), and their testimony may be regarded as true 2 •
The valid and certain knowledge that arises as the result of
the relation of self, senses, monas and sense-objects is called
"perception." This contact of the sense with the object is re-
garded by CakrapaQi as being of five kinds, viz. ( 1) contact with
the dravya (substance), called sal!lyoga; (z) contact with the gll1:zas
1
Caraka-sa1Jlhitii, I. I I . 17. z Ibid. I. II. 18, 19.
(qualities) through the thing (sa1{Zyukta-samaviiya) in which they

inhere by samaviiya (inseparable) relation; (3) contact with the
gu7Jas (such as colour, etc.) in the generic character as universals
of those qualities, e.g. colouredness (rilpatva), which exist in the
gu7Jas in the samaviiya relation ; this is called sa1Jtyukta-samaveta-
samaviiya since the eye is in contact with the thing and the colour
is in the thing by samaviiya relation, and in the specific colour
there is the universal colour or the generic character of colour by
samaviiya relation; (4) the contact called samaviiya by which sounds
are said to be perceived by the ear: the auditory sense is iikliia,
and the sound exists in iikliia by the samaviiya relation, and thus
the auditory sense can perceive sound by a peculiar kind of contact
called samaveta-samaviiya; (5) the generic character of sound
as the sound universal (sabdatva) is perceived by the kind of
contact known as samaveta-samaviiya. It is only immediately
resulting (tadiitve) cognition of such a contact that is called per-
ception (pratyak~a); for inference, memory, etc. also may come
in as a result of such a cognition at later stages through other
successive processes (piira1Jtparya) .• CakrapaQ.i further notes that
tb.e four kinds of contact spoken of here are the real causes of
the phenomenon of perception; in reality, however, "knowledge
that results as the effect of sense-contact " would be a sufficient
definition of pratyakia; so in the perception of pleasure, though
none of these contacts are necessary, it is regarded as a valid
case of direct perception. Contact with the self is, of course,
necessary for all kinds of cognition 1 • It is easy to see that the
above theory of perception is of the same type as that found in
the Nyaya system. The nir-vikalpa perception is not taken into
consideration ; for there is nothing corresponding to the term
avyapadesya in the Nyiiya-siltra 2 • Inference must be based
on perception, by which the concomitance of the hetu can first
be observed. Inference is of three kinds, viz. from kiirya (effect)
to kiira7Ja (cause), as the inference of cohabitation from pregnancy;
from cause to effect, as the inference of the future production of
1 CakrapaQi on Caraka-sa7[lhitii, I. II. 20.
2 The definition of pratyak~a given in Caraka-sa7[lhitii, I. II. 20, is:
iitmendriya-mano-'rthiinii'!l sannikarsiit pravartate
vyakta tadatve yii buddhib pratyak,a'!l sii nirucyate.
The definition of pratya~a in the Nyiiya-siitra is as follows:
indriyiirtha-sannikar~otpanna'!l jiianam avyapadeJyam
avyabhiciiri vyavasiiyatmaka'!l pratyak,am.
For a discussion thereon see vol. I, pp. 333-343.
fruit from a seed with the other attendant causes, sprinkling with
water and the like; and inference by associations other than that of
cause and effect, as the inference of fire from smoke 1 •
Yukti is not counted as a separate pramli1Ja by any other system
of Indian thought. When our intelligence judges a fact by a complex
weighing in mind of a number of reasons, causes or considerations,
through which one practically attains all that is desirable in life,
as virtue, wealth or fruition of desires, we have what may be called
yukti2 • As CakrapaQi points out, this is not in reality of the nature
of a separate pramii:l}a; but, since it helps pramli1Jas, it is counted
as a pramli1Ja. As an example of yukti, Caraka mentions the fore-
casting of a good or bad harvest from the condition of the ground,
the estimated amount of rains, climatic conditions and the like.
CakrapaQi rightly says that a case like this, where a conclusion is
reached as the combined application of a number of reasonings, is
properly called uha and is current among the people by this name.
It is here counted as a separate pramli1Ja. It is in reality an in-
ference of an effect from causes and, as such, cannot be used at
the present time, and hence it cannot be called tri-kiila, valid in
all the three times, past, present and future, as Caraka says.
The Buddhist, writes Santarak~ita in discussing Caraka's doc-
trine of yukti as a separate pramli1Ja, holds that yukti consists in the
observation that, since, when this happens, that happens, and, since,
when this does not happen, that does not happen, this is the cause
of that. It may be argued that this is not a case of inference, since
there is no proposition equivalent to the proposition with a dntiinta,
or example, in Nyaya inference (e.g. whatever 1s smoky is fiery, as
the kitchen). It is held, as Kamala5ila interprets, that the cause-
effect idea is derived from the idea of" this happening, that hap-
pens," and there is no other idea in the notion of causality; if in any
case any particular example is given, then another example might
be asked for, and after that another, and we should have regressus
pratyak~a-piirva1Jl tri-vidha'!l
tri-kiilat{l ciinum'iyate
vahnir nigiil]ho dhiimena
maithuna'!l garbha-darsaniit.
Evat{l vyavasyanty atftat{l
b'ijiit phalam aniigatat{l
drstvii bljiit phala'f!l jiitam
ihaiva sadrsam budhiib.
Caraka-sa'!lhitii, 1. 11. 21, 22.
buddhib pa$yati yii bhiiviin bahu-kiira'l)a-yogajiin
yuktis tri-kiila sii jiieyii tri-vargab siidhyate yayii. Ibid. I. 11. 25.
ad infinitum 1 • These arguments in support of yukti as the conclud-
ing of the cause-eff~ct relation from" this happening, that happens"
relation are refuted by Santarak!?ita and Kamalasila, who point out
that there are no separate cognitive processes which link up the
relation of "this happening, that happens" with the cause-effect
relation, because both these convey the same concept. The cause-
effect relation is the same as "this happening, that happens."
It may be argued that, whenever anything invariably and un-
conditionally happens on the happening of any other thing, then
the two are considered to be related as cause and effect, just as a
jug, etc. are invariably seen to appear after the proper operations
of the potter and his wheels. If this is yukti, then it is not a different
source of knowledge.
CakrapaQ.i, however, points out that these criticisms are all
beside the point, since yukti, according to Caraka, is not kiirya-
kiirarJatii from tad-bhiiva-bhiivitii; it is the arriving at a conclusion
as a result of a series of reasonings. But it is important to note
that in 111. 4· 6 and 7 Caraka speaks of three kinds of pramlirJas,
viz. pratyak~a, anumiina and sabda, and describes anumiina as being
tarka depending on yukti. Tarka is explained by CakrapaQi as
being the knowledge of things which cannot be perceived (tarko
'pratyak~a-jfiiinam), and yukti is here paraphrased by CakrapaQ.i as
the relation of a-vinii-bhiiva. It is said in this connection that a
disease is to be determined by pratyak~a, the medical texts (iipto-
padesa) and inference. But in 111. 8. 6. 33 and 34 Caraka counts
aitihya as iiptopadesa, though ordinarily aitihya is considered in
1
dr~tiinte 'py ata eva tad-bhiiva-blziivitviit kiiryatii-pratipatti!z, tatriipi
dn!iinto 'nyo 'nve~a7Jzya!z, tatriipy apara ity anavasthii. Kamalasila as quoted by
CakrapaQ.i on Caraka-sa1Jlhitii, 1. 1 1. 25.
Santarak:?ita misrepresents Caraka's view of yukti in a very strange manner.
He says that, when from the fact that in all cases when A is present B is present
and in all cases when A is absent B is also absent one thinks A to be the cause
of B, this is regarded by Caraka as the new pramii1)a of yukti. Santarak:?ita's
exact words are:
asmin sati bhavaty eva na bhavaty asatzti ca
tasmiid ato bhavaty eva yuktir e~ii 'bhidhlyate
pramii1)iintaram eveyam ity iiha carako muni!z
niinumiinam iya1Jl yasmiid drnanto 'tra na labhyate.
Tattva-sa1Jlgraha, p. 482.
This, however, is entirely different from what Caraka says, as is pointed out by
Cakrapar:ti in his commentary on Caraka-sa1Jlhitii. Caraka's idea of yukti is the
logic of probability, i.e. when from a number of events, circumstances, or
observations one comes to regard a particular judgment as probable, it is called
yukti, and, as it is different from inference or any of the other accepted pramiir,ras,
it is to be counted as a separate pramii1)a. So far as I know, this is the only
example of the introduction of the logic of probability in Indian thought.
Indian philosophy as being "tradition" or long-standing popular
belief, different from iiptopadesa; upamiina, under the name of
aupamya, is also referred to.
It may not be out of place here to note that the obstacles to
perception referred to in the Sii'f!Jkhya-kiirikii are all mentioned
here. Thus it is said that even those things which have colour
(rupa) cannot be perceived if they are covered by a veil, or if the
senses are weak, or if the mind is unsettled, or if they are mixed
up in any homogeneous .medium indistinguishable from them,
or when in the case of smaller lights they are overcome by stronger
luminaries, or when they are too fine or too subtle 1 •
Logic was of use with Indian medical men not only in diag-
nosing a disease, but also in the debates which they had with one
another. The rival practitioners often had to show their skill and
learning in debates on occasions of the treatment of illness of rich
patients. The art of carrying on a dispute successfully was con-
sidered an important acquisition among medical practitioners.
Thus we have a whole set of technical terms relating to disputes,
such as are never found in any other literature, excepting the
Nyiiyp-siltra. In the Caraka-sa1J1hitii almost the whole of the chapter
called the "Roga-bhi~ag-jitiya-ttimiina " (III. 8) is devoted to this
purpose. It is well to remember that different kinds of disputes
and fallacies are mentioned in the Nyiiya-sutra, and it will be useful
to refer to these when dealing with similar topics from either the
Caraka-sa'f!Jhitii or the Suiruta-sa1J1hitii.
The four terms referred to in connection with disputes in the
!vyiiya-siltra are tarka, viida, jalpa and vita1}¢ii. Tarka is said to
be the same as uha, and this is explained as a process of reasoning
carried on in one's mind before one can come to any right con-
clusion. It is a name for the subjective weighing of different
alternatives on the occasion of a doubt before a conclusive affirma-
tion or denial (nir'f}aya) is made. Disputes are said to be of three
kinds, viida, jalpa and vita1}¢ii. Viida means a discussion for the
ascertainment of truth, jalpa a dispute in which the main object
is the overthrow of the opponent rightly or wrongly, and vita1}¢ii
a dispute in which attempts are made to discover the faults of
the opponent's thesis without any attempt to offer any alternative
thesis. Viida is thus essentially different in its purpose from jalpa
and vitatz¢ii; for viida is an academical discussion with pupils,
1 Caraka-sa'!lhitii, I. 11. 8.
teachers) fellow-stUdents and persons seeking truth solely for the
purpose of arriving at right conclusions, and not for fame or gain1 •
Jalpa, on the other hand, is that dispute which a man carries on
while knowing himself to be in the wrong or unable to defend
himself properly from his opponents except by trickery and other
unfair methods of argument.
Caraka, in 111. 8, says that a medical man should hold discussions
(sambhiiJii) with other medical men. Discussion increases zeal for
knowledge (sartthar~a), clarifies knowledge, increases the power of
speech and of achieving fame, removes doubts in the learning
acquired before and strengthens convictions. In the course of these
discussions many new things may be learnt, and often out of zeal
an opponent will disclose the most cherished secret teachings of his
teachers. These discussions are of two classes, friendly (sandhiiya
sarttbhii~ii) and hostile (vigrhya sarttbhii~ii). A friendly discussion is
held among wise and learned persons who frankly and sincerely
discuss questions and give their views without any fear of being
defeated or of the fallacies of their arguments being exposed. For
in such discussions, even though there may be the fallacies de-
scribed, no one would try to take advantage of the other, no one is
jubilant over the other's defeat and no attempt is made to mis-
interpret or misstate the other's views.
Caraka then proceeds to give instructions as to how one should
behave in an assembly where one has to meet with hostile disputes.
Before engaging oneself in a hostile discussion with an opponent
a man ought carefully to consider whether his opponent is inferior
(para) to him and also the nature of the assembly (pari§at) in which
the discussion is undertaken. A pari~at may be learned (jfiiinavati)
or ignorant (mil{lhii), and these again may be friendly (suhrt),
neutral (udiisfnii), or hostile (pratinivi§tii). When an opponent is to
be judged, he is to be judged from two points of view, intellectual
and moral. Thus, on the one hand, it has to be considered whether
he is learned and wise, whether he remembers the texts and can
reproduce them quickly and has powers of speech, and on the
other hand, whether he is of an irritable temperament, or of a
fearful nature, etc. A man mnst carefully consider whether his
opponent is superior to him in these qualifications or not.
1 viida1Jl ca nin:raya-phaliirthibhir ella sqya-sabrahmaciiri-gurubhib saha v'fta-
riigaib, na khyiiti-labha-rabhasa-prativardhamiina-spardhiinubandha-vidhuriitma-
bhir iirabheta. Nyiiya-maiijarf, p. 594·
No disputes should be undertaken in a hostile assembly; for
even the best arguments might be misinterpreted. In an ignorant,
friendly or neutral assembly it is possible to win a debate by pro-
ceeding tactfully against an opponent who is looked down upon
by famous or otherwise great persons. In beginning conversations
with such persons attempts may be made to puzzle them by
reciting long sutras and to demoralize or stun them, as it were,
by jokes, banter and gestures and by using satirical language.
When a man has to enter into a dispute with his equal, he
should find out the special point in which his opponent is weak
and attack him there and should try to corner him in such positions
as are generally unacceptable to people in general. Caraka then
proceeds to explain a number of technical terms in connection
with such disputes. Like the Nyaya, Caraka divides such hostile
disputes (viida) into two classes,jalpa and vitm:uJii. Pratijfiii is the
enunciation of a thesis which is sought to be proved, e.g. "The
puru~a is eternal." Sthiipanii is the establishing of a thesis by
syllogistic reasonings involving propositions with hetu, dntiinta,
upanaya and nigamana. Thus the above thesis (pratijiiii), "The
punt~a is eternal," is to be supported by a reason (hetu), "because
it is uncreated ";by an example (dntiinta), "The sky is uncreated
and it is eternal"; by a proposition showing the similarity between
the subject of the example and the subject of the thesis (upanaya),
viz. "Just as the iikiisa is uncreated, so the puru~a is also uncreated" ;
and finally by establishing the thesis (nigamana), "Therefore the
puru~a is eternal 1 ."
Pratifthiipanii is the attempt to establish a proposition contrary
to the proposition or the thesis put forth by the opponent. Thus,
when the thesis of the sthapanii is "Pur~a is eternal," the prati-
sthiipanii proposition would be "Puru~a is non-eternal," because
"it is perceivable by the senses," and "The jug which is per-
ceptible to the senses is non-eternal," and" Puru~a is like the jug,"
so "Pur~a is non-eternal."
Caraka defines hetu as "the cause of knowledge" (hetur niima
upalabdhi-kiira7Jam), and the cause of knowledge is the pramal)as of
pratyakJa, anumiina, aitihya and aupamya. The definition of hetu
in the Nyaya-siltra refers only !o the perceived hetu in the
case of inference, through a similarity or dissimilarity to which a
1 It is easy to see that Caraka admitted in a syllogism all the five propositions
that are admitted in the Nyiiya-sutra.

relation is established by inference 1 • Here Caraka points out that
a hetu may be either perceived, inferred or found by analogy or
from the scriptures, but, in whichever way it may be found, when
it leads to knowledge, it is called a hetu. Thus, when I say, "The
hill is fiery, because it smokes" (parvato vahnimiin dhumavattviit),
the smoke is the hetu, and it is directly perceived by the eye. But
when I say, "He is ill, because he is of low digestion," the hetu is
not directly perceived, but is only inferred; for the fact of one's
being in low digestion cannot be directly perceived. Again, when
it is said, "Puru~a is eternal, because it is uncreated" (nitya/:l
puru~ab a-krtakatviit), the uncreatedness (a-krtakatva) is the hetu,
but it is neither perceived, nor inferred, but accepted from the
testimony of the scriptures. Again, in the proposition," His face
is most beautiful, because it has been compared \\tith the moon"
(asya mukha1J1 kiintatama1J1 candropamatviit), the fact of being com-
pared with the moon is the hetu and it is known by upa!'lii 2 • Thus
Caraka's definition of hetu does not really come into conflict with
that of Gautama: he only says that a hetu may be discovered
by any of the pramii7JaS, and, by whichever pramii7Ja it may be
discovered, it may be called a hetu, if it is invariably and uncon-
ditionally (a-vinii-bhiiva) associated with the major term (siidhya) 3 •
Caraka then proceeds to describe uttara, which is in purport
the same as the jiiti of the Nyiiya-sutras. When an opponent wants
to prove a thesis on the basis of a similarity of the subject of the
thesis with the hetu, attempts have to be made to upset the thesis
by showing its dissimilarity to the hetu. Thus one may say that
the feeling of cold in a man must be due to his being affected by
snow, dews, or chilly air, because effects arise from causes similar
to them; in reply it may be said that effects are dissimilar from
their causes, since a burning fever may often be an effect of cold 4 •
udiihara7Ja-siidharmyiit siidhya-siidhana1Jl hetub
tathii vaidharmyiit. Nyiiya-sutra, I. J.. 34, 35·
2 See Gangadhara's Jalpa-kalpa-taru, 111. 8. 122.
3
hetuf cii•viniibhiit-•a-liizga-vacana'l!l yady api, tathiiplha liizga-pragriihakii1Ji
pratyakfiidi-pramii7Jiiny eva yathokta-hetu-millatvena hetu-sabdeniiha.
Cakrapar:ti on Caraka, III. 8. 6. 25.
' siidharmya-vaidharmyiibhyii1{l pratyavasthiina1Jljiitil;. Nyiiya-siltra, I. 2. 18.
There are twenty-four kinds of this jiiti, e.g. (1-2) siidharmya-vaidharmya-sama,
(3-8) utkar~iipakar~a-va77Jyiivar7Jya-vikalpa-siidhya-sama, ( 9-1 o) prapty-apriipti-
sama, (11-12) prasaizga-pratidntanta-sama, (13) anutpatti-sama, (14) Sa1Jlfaya-
sama, (15) prakara7Ja-sama, (16) ahetu-sama, (17) arthiipatti-sama, (18) avise~a
sama, (19) upapatti-sama, (20) upalabdhi-sama, (21) anupalabdhi-sama, (22) nitya-
sama, (23) anitya-sama, (24) kiirya-sama.
Sadlzarmya-vaidharmya-sama is that in which, when an argument is given on
XIII] Logical Speculations and Terms
The long list of jiitis given in the Nyiiya-siitra and explained
in the commentaries and in the Nyiiya-maiijari is not referred to
the basis of the similarity or dissimilarity to a certain hetu, it is pointed out

that quite the opposite conclusions may be drawn from other points of similarity
or dissimilarity with other hetus. Thus, when it is said, "Sabda is non-eternal,
because it is produced by an effort, and whatever is produced by an effort is
non-eternal, as a jug," it may be answered, "Sabda is eternal, because it is
partless : a partless entity like the iikiiia is found to be eternal ; there is no special
reason why on account of its similarity to a jug sound should be non-eternal,
and not eternal owing to its similarity to iihiiia." An escape from the dilemma
is possible by enquiring as to what may constitute an unconditional and
invariable (avyabhiciiri) similarity.
Utkar~iipakar~a-van;yiivan;ya-vikalpa-siidhya-sama is that in which similarity
is pressed too far. Thus it is urged that, because sound is non-eternal like a jug,
it must also be visible like a jug, and, if it is not so, it cannot be non-eternal
like a jug. Moreover, it may be said that the reason why sound is expected
to be non-eternal like a jug is that the former is produced by an effort
(prayatniintanyaka). But things which are produced by efforts differ in many
of their qualities; thus a cloth is soft, and a jug is hard, though both of them
are produced by effort; so it may be argued that, though iabda is as much a
product of effort as a jug, it may not agree with the jug in being non-eternal.
Moreover, instead of arguing that sound is like a jug, it may as well be
argued that a jug is like sound; so that the status of the jug is as uncertain as
sound itself {yadi yathii ghatas lathii iabda/;l priipta'fl tarhi yathii iabda/;l tathii
ghata iti iabdai ciinityatayii siidhya iti ghato 'pi siidhya eva syiid anyathii hi na tena
tulyo bhavet-Nyiiya-manjan, p. 624). In answer to these kinds of fault-finding
the proper argument is that no similarity should be extended beyond its limits,
and an example (dntiinta) should not be considered to have the same status as
a probandum (siidhya); for an example is that which is already agreed upon
among the disputants and the common people (laukika-pari~akiitJii'fl yasminn
arthe buddhi siimya,. sa dntanta/;l).
Priipty-apriipti-sama is that in which it is urged that, if the hetu and the
probandum are together, they cannot be distinguished from each other; if they
are separate, hetu cannot lead us to the siidhya. The answer to this is that a
hetu can produce an effect either by direct contact (e.g. the rope and the stick
in contact with clay produce a jug) or from a distance (e.g. the iyena sacrifice
can destroy an enemy from a distance).
Prasanga· sama is that in which a reason for the hetu is asked. Thus, if the
character of immediately following an effort {prayatniintariyakatva) is the cause
of non-eternality, what can establish the prayatniintanyakatva of a jug, etc.?
The answer to this is that a reason is necessary only for that which is not directly
experienced as being evident in itself. That a jug immediately follows the efforts
that produce it is directly experienced and does not require any argument or
reason to establish it, as no light is required to see a burning lamp.
Drstiinta-sama is that in which from the same hetu two different conclusions
are s~~-n to result. Thus it may be said that both the jug and iikiiia have
the character of immediately following an effort (e.g. as by digging new space
is produced in underground wells which before the effort of digging were solid
earth without space-kupa-khanana-prayatniinantara'fl tad-upalambhiit-and this
character is therefore to be regarded as prayatniintariyaka); yet, as a jug is
non-eternal and iikiiia eternal, so iabda, though it immediately follows an effort,
is eternal. The answer is that, if such an opposite conclusion is drawn, a separate
hetu has to be given, which is not done in the present case.
If sound is non-eternal, it must possess the character of coming into existence
immediately after an effort that produces it; but how can it possess that character
before being produced or coming into existence? If it cannot at that stage
by Caraka ; nor does the technical name of jati find any place in
Caraka's description of it. If these elaborate descriptions of jati
possess that character, it must be eternal, since the cause of its non-eternality is
absent. This objection is called anutpatti-sama. The reply is that, unless the sound
is in existence, its eternality or non-eternality cannot be discussed. If it is
non-existent, of what is the eternality to be affirmed by the opponent?
Again, it may be argued that sabda has prayatniintarzyakatva, and therefore
it may be expected to be non-eternal; it is perceived by the senses, and therefore
it may be expected to be eternal, like so many other sensible objects. This doubt
is called sat{liaya-sama. A doubt remains a doubt only so long as the special
features which remove a doubt are not discovered. Though a man may have
many qualities in common with a post, the doubt cannot remain when the
special features of a man (e.g. his having a head and hands and feet) are known.
Prakarat}a-sama is that in which an entity is equally related to hetus, so that
no one conclusion can properly be drawn. Thus, sound has both prayatniinta-
rlyakatva and niravayavatva (partlessness). Though, according to the first, it
may be said to be non-eternal, according to the second it may be said to be
eternal; so it is eternal. The answer is that the second hetu cannot be pressed
as leading to a conclusion, because the first also is admitted to exist.
Ahetu-sama is the objection that there can be no argument from a hetu; for,
if there is no siidhya (probandum), what is it that the hetu produces? and again,
if there is no hetu before the siidhya, how can the siidhya be produced? So,
as hetu is only a concomitant of siidhya, no inference is possible from it.
The answer is that it is quite possible that from the previously existing hetu
the non-existing siidhya should be produced. Arthiipatti-sama is where, for
example, owing to the fact that sound is partless, it appears to be similar to
iikiisa and hence by implication to be eternal. This is against the previous
thesis that it is non-eternal owing to its being prayatniintarfyaka. AviSe~a-sama
is the objection, that if on account of having the same characteristic of pra-
yatniintarfyakatva, sabda and ghafa are said to be equally non-eternal, then,
owing to all things having the same quality of existence (sattii), they are all the
same. The answer to this is that equality in one respect does not mean equality
in all respects.
Upapatti-sama is where a jug may be expected to be non-eternal owing
to its prayatniintarlyakatva and eternal owing to its being partless like iikiiSa.
Upalabdlzi-sama is where it is urged that, when by a terrible storm a tree
is broken, there is sound which is not the result of any human effort (prayatniinta-
nyakat'l.•a), and yet it is non-eternal; again, lightning is not the result of human
effort, still it is non-eternal. The answer is that the concomitance is between
prayatniintanyakatva and non-eternality and not between non-eternality and
prayatniintarlyakatva; so that all that is produced by human effort is non-
eternal, but not vice-versa. It should also be noted that by prayatniintariyakatva
emphasis is laid on the fact that all things that possess this character are pro-
duced. Anitya-sama is an objection where it is urged, for example, that,
if on account of the similarity of sound to a jug, the former is non-eternal,
then, since in some way or other all things in the world must have some simi-
larity to a jug, all things must be non-eternal. The nitya-sama objection runs
as follows: Is non-eternality in sound non-eternal or eternal? If the latter, then
in order that an eternal quality may abide in it, sound itself must be eternal.
If the former, then on some occasions at least sound must be eternal.
The kiirya-sama objection suggests that prayatntintarlyakatva leads to pro-
duction in two ways, either by bringing into existence that which was
non-existent, or by removing the veil from something which was in a veiled
condition; and it remains undecided what sort of prayatniintarlyakatva applies
to sabda.
The above interpretations are all based on Jayanta's Nyiiya-maiijan.
were known to Caraka, it is unlikely that he should have passed
them over without referring to them.
An example (dr#iinta) is that on which the common folk and
the learned are of the same opinion, since examples involve facts
which are perceived by all and known to all, e.g. the fire is hot,
water is liquid, the earth is firm. A siddhiinta, or conclusion, is
that to which one could arrive after a searching enquiry and
demonstration by proper reasons. This siddhiinta is of four kinds,
viz. (I) sarva-tantra-siddhiinta, or conclusions accepted by all, e.g.
"There are causes of diseases; there are diseases; curable ones
can be cured,; (2) prati-tantra-siddhiinta, or conclusions which are
not accepted by all, but are limited to particular books or persons:
e.g. some say that there are eight rasas, others say that there are
six; some say that there are five senses, others, that there are six;
(3) adhikara7Ja-siddhiinta, or conclusions which being accepted
or proved, other conclusions also become proved or accepted:
e.g. if it is proved that emancipated souls do not reap the fruits
of kanna, as they are without any desire, then the doctrine of the
suffering of the fruits of karma, emancipation, the existence of
soul and existence after death will have to be considered as refuted;
(4) abhyupagama-siddhiinta, or conclusions which are accepted
only for the sake of an argument, and which are neither examined
critically nor considered as proved 1 •
Sabda is a collection of letters which may be of four kinds, viz.
{I) dr~tiirtha-of experienced purport (e.g. "The do~as lose their
equilibrium through three causes"); (2) adrifiirtha--of unper-
ceivable purport (e.g." There is after-life; there is emancipation");
(3) satya, or truth, that which tallies \Vith facts (e.g. "There is
Ayur-veda ; there are means for curing curable diseases '') ; (4) anrta,
the opposite of truth, untruth 2 • Sm,Jaya, or doubt, occurs with
reference to things about which no certainty is attained. Thus
those who are unhealthy and inactive die soon, whereas those who
are healthy and active live a long life. So there is a doubt whether
in this world death happens timely or untimely. Prayojana, or the
object of action, is that for which anything is begun. Thus one
may think that, if there is untimely death, I shall form healthy
habits and leave off unhealthy habits, so that untimely death may
1 All these siddhdntas occur under the same names in the Nyiiya-sutra,
I. I. 28, 29, 30, 31.
2 The first two divisions, dr~tiirtha and adr~tiirtha, occur in the Nyiiya-sutra,
I. x. 8, sa dvividho dHtiidrnarthatvat.
Speculat-ions in the Med£cal Schools [cH.
not touch me 1 • Sa-vyabhiciira means variability, e.g. "This may
or may not be a medicine for this disease 2 ." Jijiiiisii means ex-
perimenting; a medicine is to be advised after proper experiments
(jijiiiisii). Vyavasiiya means decision (niscaya), e.g. "This is a
disease due to predominance of viiyu; this is the medicine for this
disease." Artha-priipti is the same as the well-known arthiipatti, or
implication, when on making a statement, some other thing which
was not said becomes also stated; it is a case of implication, e.g.
the statement, "This disease cannot be cured by allowing the
patient to take his normal food and drink," implies that it can be
cured by fasting, or, if it is said, "He should not eat during the
day," this means that" He should eat during the night 3 ." Smrzbhava
is the source from which anything springs, e.g. the six dhiitus may
be considered as the sa1Jlbhava of the foetus; wrong diet, of disease;
and right course of treatment, of health.
Anuyojya means a faulty answer which omi~s such details as
should have been given in the answer, e.g. "This disease can be
cured by purificatory action"; such an answer is faulty, as it does
not state whether the purification should be made by vomiting
or purging. Ananuyojya is what is different from anuyojya.
Anuyoga is a question put by a learned man in a discussion as an
enquiry about the reason for a thesis put forward by a learned
colleague: e.g. a learned man says," Puru~a is eternal," and another
learned man asks, ''What is the reason?" Such a question is call~d
anuyoga. A counter-question, such as "What is the reason for
your asking such a question?" is called praty-anuyoga.
Viikya-do~a, or faulty statement, is of five kinds, viz. nyuna,
adhika, anarthaka, apiirthaka and viruddha. Nyuna, or the fault
of omission, is that in which any of the five propositions necessary
for a syllogism is omitted. It may also be applied to those cases in
which, when a statement has to be supported by a number of
1 Prayojana, which means pleasure and pain, is referred to in the Nyiiya-
sutra, I. 1. 1, though it is nowhere critically examined. It is explained by

Vatsyayana as that which goads men to action (yena prayuktalz prat:artate).
Uddyotakara explains it as the realization of pleasure and the fear of pain (sukha-
priipti-dul:zkha-hiini).
2 ar.aikiintikalz sa-vyabhiciiralz. Nyiiya-sutra, I. 2. 5· E.g." sound is eternal"
because it is untouchabl"!; but untouchability does not lead to eternality, since

the touchable atoms are eternal, whereas untouchable thoughts are short-
lived.
8 CakrapaQ.i says that Caraka does not think that artha-priipti is a separate
pramiif}a; according to him it is a case of inference, and hence is not included

in the list of pramii1Jas.
XIII) Logical Speculations and Terms
reasons, only one is offered and others are omitted, materially
affecting the strength of the support of the original statement. Thus
several reasons are given in support of the eternality of puru~a,
viz. beginninglessness, not being the product of any effort, un-
changeableness, etc. Proposing to give all these reasons, and giving
only one, is an instance of nyuna. Adhika is where, when Ayur-
veda is being discussed, the opponent makes irrelevant references
to learned works on politics or the art of government. It may also
mean cases where words or statements are needlessly repeated.
Such a repetition is of two kinds, verbal repetition and sense
repetition. Verbal repetition is the repetition of the same word,
while the other is the repetition of the sense only, though different
words may be used. Anarthaka and apiirthaka mean the use of
meaningless and unconnected words or expressions. Viruddlza, or
contrary statement, means the making of a statement contrary
to the example ( drf!anta-viruddha) or the accepted conclusion
(siddhiinta), e.g. cold water is hot, for so is fever; or when a
medical man (vaidya) says that medicine does not cure diseases.
Samaya-viruddha is the making of any statement against the
accepted conclusions of any particular sastra. Thus, for example,
if a Mimaf!1saka says that animals should not be sacrificed, it will
be against his accepted doctrine that animals should be sacrificed.
Or, if in any system of philosophy treating of emancipation ( mo~a
siistra) it be said that injury to living beings is good, then this is
against the accepted tenet of that siistra. Vlikya-praSG'f!lSii is that
kind of statement in which the faults mentioned above in viikya-
do~a do not occur.
Chala means a rejoinder in which the statement of the opponent
is wilfully misinterpreted. It is of two kinds, viik-chala and siimlinya-
chala. The word nava means "nine" as well as "new," and if,
when one says about one's opponent, "This physician is nava-
tantra" (has newly learnt his texts), and the opponent replies,
"I have not nine text-books, I have one text," the other person
objects, "I do not say you have nine texts, I say that you are
navabhyasta-tantra" (have newly learnt the texts), naviibhyasta-
tantra might also mean "read nine times "; and then the opponent
might well say, "I have several times read the texts, and not nine
times, as you say." This is an example of viik-chala.
Again, when a physician says "Medicine cures diseases," the
opponent may take the most general characteristics of the terms
DII 25
and say that the above statement comes to this, that an existent
entity cures another existent entity; and, if this is so, then, since
bronchitis exists (san kiisal;) and consumption exists (san k§ayal;),
bronchitis, being an existent entity, must cure another existent
entity, consumption. This is called siimiinya-chala 1 •
Fallacies ( a-hetu) are of three kinds, prakaratJa-sama, sa1Jlsaya-
sama and var!Jya-sama 2 • Prakara7Ja-sama is where that which
1
Chala is treated in the Nyiiya-sfitra exactly on the same lines as here.
Thus the definition of chala there (1\l..yiiya-sii.tra, 1. 2. xo) is vacana-vighiito 'rtha-
vikalpopapattyii chalam (to attack one's speech by a wilful misinterpretation
of it is chala). This is divided into three classes, viik-chala, siimiinya-chala and
upaciira-chala; of these viik-chala is exactly the same as in Caraka-sai[thitii,
and so also the siimiinya-chala (because a Brahman is well-read in scriptures,
a vriitya (outcast Brahman) is also well-read, because he also is a Brahman in
some sense). Upaciira-chala, which, however, resembles viik-chala, is not men-
tioned in the Caraka-sa1{llzitii. Its definition in the Nyiiya-sii.tra, 1. 2. 14,is dharma-
vikalpa-nirdeie 'rtlza-sad-bhiiva-prati5edha upaciira-chalam (to make one's state-
ment impossible by taking it in one sense, say the primary, when the secondary
one was intended). Thus, if it is said, "This porter is an ass,, it may be objected
that the porter, being a man, cannot at the same time be an ass. Gautama,
however, tentatively raises the objection that chatas should be regarded as three
in number and not two, taking upaciira-chala within siimiinya-chala. This
means a criticism in view of Caraka's division of chala into two classes. For
Gautama argues that, if on account of some similarity upaciira-clzala should be
included within siimiinya-chala, and chalas should be counted as being of two
kinds instead of three, then for the very same reason of similarity chalas may
as well be regarded as being of one kind instead of two. So, in view of the specific
differences that exist between the chalas, they should be regarded as being of
three kinds.
!I Nyiiya-szttra, I. 2. 4, describes the fallacies (hetv-iibhiisa) as of five kinds,
sa-vyabhiciira, viruddha, prakarm;a-sama, siidhya-sama and kiiliitlta.
Sa-'l.Wabhiciira lzetu is that which has no invariable concomitance with the
proband~m, e.g. sound is eternal because it is untouchable, and that which is
touchable is non-eternal, like a jug. But untouchability has no invariable
concomitance with eternality; for an atom is touchable and at the same time
eternal, and thoughts (buddhi) are untouchable and at the same time non-eternal.
Viruddha hetu is where the reason (hetu) demolishes the very theory
on which its security depends, e.g. this changeable world (vikiiro) disappears
(vyakter apaiti), because it is non-eternal (nityatva-prati~edhiit); but, though it
disappears (apeto 'pi), yet it exists (asti), because it is not destructible (viniisa-
prati5edhiit). Now a thing which is non-eternal cannot but be destructible.
Destructibility and eternality cannot abide together.
Prakara1Ja-sama is where two opposite hetus exist in a thing, so that
nothing can be affirmed by either of them. Thus it may be argued with as much
force that" sound is eternal, because it has in it the qualities of eternal things,"
as that "sound is non-eternal, because it has in it the qualities of non-eternal
things,; so no conclusion can be drawn from either of these hetus.
Siidhya-sama is where the hetu itself remains to be proved. Thus in the
argument, "shadow is a substance because it moves," the movability of shadows
is a doubtful point and is itself in need of proof. Does a shadow move like
a man, or is it that because the covering entity moves that at different places the
light is veiled and this gives rise to the formation of shadows at different places?
Kiiliitfta is where the hetus in the case of the accepted example and the
case to be proved vary, because in the latter case the hetu is not properly a
is given as the hetu. remains to be proved. Thus, when it is said
that, since the self is different from the body, it is eternal, and
because the body is unconscious it is non-eternal, it may be urged
(as by the Carvaka school of philosophers) that both the points,
viz. that the self is different from the body and that the body is
not endowed with consciousness, which are offered as the hetu,
are then1selves to be proved; for according to the Carvakas the
body is endowed with consciousness and is non-etenial. A re-
ference to the footnote below shows that this prakaralJ-a-sama is
different fron1 the prakara'l}a-sama of the Nyiiya-sutra. Sa,daya-
sama is that in which that which is the cause of doubt is offered
as the hetu for a particular conclusion, e.g. This person quotes a
passage from Ayur-veda-is he or is he not a physician? Even a
man who is not a physician might have heard a passage somewhere
and quoted it. Now, therefore, quoting a passage from Ayur-veda
leaves us in doubt as to the man's being a physician or not. If
this itself is offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion and if
it is said, "He is a physician because he has quoted a passage from
Ayur-veda," it becomes a case of sartzsaya-sama. Gautama speaks
of sa'f!daya-sama as an instance of jiiti; but the former is a case
where a doubt is ·not removed because of the fact that the thing
about which anything is affirmed possesses two opposite qualities,
so that no affirmation can be made on the strength of any of these
characteristics. Here, however, sa'f!lsaya-sama is used in the sense
that what is itself doubtful is adduced as the reason for a
particular conclusion.
V ar'l}ya-sama is where an affirmation is made about a thing
on the strength of another affinnation which itself remains to
be proved and is hence in the same condition as the previous
affirmation, e.g. "Buddhi is non-eternal, like sound, as it is un-
touchable, like the latter." But the non-eternality of sound stands
as much in need of proof as that of buddhi, and the former affirma-
tion cannot be made on the basis of the latter. This fallacy is
hetu; for the hetu and siidhya exist in two successive moments and are therefore
not concomitant; but in the former case they are concomitant aml simultaneous,
e.g. sound is eternal, becau!ie it is manifested, like colour, owing to a particular
contact, like light, being manifested by the contact of a stick and a drum, just
as colour is manifested by the contact of ljght with a thing. llut the similarity
fails; for, while colour is manifested simultaneously with the contact of light and
the things, sound is heard at a moment different from that at which actual
contact of the stick and the drum takes place.
25-2
Speculations in the 1\-Iedical Schools (cH.
similar to the jati c~lled siidhya-sama and the fallacy siidhya-sama
of Gautama already described in the footnotes to page 386.
AtUa-kiila is that in which that which should be said first is
said later, e.g. the thesis, or pratijiiii, should be stated first and the
conclusion, or nigamana, last; if instead the nigamana is stated first
and the pratijiiii after, then we have the fault of kiiliittta.
Upalambha (criticisn1) is the finding fault with the hetus, also
called a-hetu, as described above, or hetv-iibhiisas. Parihiira (reply)
means the reply given to the objections pointed out by an opponent;
e.g. the self is eternal, since so long as it remains in the body it shows
signs of life, and, when it is away, though the body still remains
the same, yet there is no sign of life; therefore the self is different
from the body and is eternal. Pratijiiii-hiini (to give up one's
thesis) is where, being cornered by the opponent, one is forced to
give up one's original thesis. Thus one may start with the thesis
that purufa is eternal, but, being cornered, one may give it up and
say that purufa is not eternal. Abhyanujiiii (to bring a counter-
charge) is that in which a disputant, instead of refuting the charge
brought against him by his opponent, charges his opponent with
the same defects 1 • Hetv-antara (dodging with a wrong reason) is
where, when tbe cause of some root fact (prakrti) is asked, the
reply refers to the cause of the modifications or manifestations
(1:ikrti) of that root fact 2 • Arthiintara (wrong answer) is where,
when the definition of one thing (e.g. fever) is asked, a definition
of another thing (e.g. diabetes) is given 3 .1\ligraha-sthiina is where,
in a learned assembly, a statement, though thrice repeated, is not
understood by the opponent. Caraka counts among the nigraha-
sthiinas many of the cases which have already been enumerated
and described. Thus he counts pratijilii-hiini, abhyanujfiii, kiiliitita,
a-hetu, nyuna, atirikta, ·vyartha, apiirthaka, punar-ukta, 'l.'iruddha,
hetv-antara, arthiintara 4 •
1 This corresponds to matilnujiiii of the Nyiiya-siltra, v. 1. 42.
2 In Nytiya-sr1trc, v. 2. 6, we hear of a hettJ-antara, but that seems to be
different from this. The significance of hett.1-antara, as it stands there, may be
illustrated as follows. .An adherent of Saq1khya says that all this world of things
is derived from one root cause, because all these are limited and whatever is
limited is derived from one root cause. This may be refuted by pointing out that
there are many limited things which are derived from more than one root cause.
To this the Sarp.khya adherent replies that only those w!uch are associated with
pleasure and pain and ignorance are to be regarded as proceeding from one
root cause; but this .i.s an addition which was not contained in the original thesis.
8 This is also mentioned in the Nyiiya-siltra, v. 2. 7·
fo The nigraha-sthiinos mentioned in the Nyiya-siitra, v. 2. I,arethe following:
pratijiiti-hiini, pratijiiiintara, pratijiia-virodha, pratijiiii-sannyiisa, hetv-antara,
XIII) Logical Speculations and Terms
After this Caraka further describes the ten categories, a know-
ledge of which he thinks is very necessary for a mastery of the
subject-matter of Ayur-veda. These are karm:za (the agent or the
mover}, karm;a (the instrument necessary for an agent to bring
about an effort), karya-yoni (the material c~mse by the modification
of which effects are produced), karya (that for the production of
which the mover makes his effort), kiirya-phala (that for which a
particular effect is intended by the agent), anubandha (the good
or bad result which attaches itself to the doer after the produc-
tion of the effect), desa (place), kala (the seasons, days, etc.),
pravrtti (the effort and the action needed for the production
of the effect) and upaya (the passivity and special aptitude
of the agent, the instrument and the material cause which can
make the effect possible). The physician is the cause (kara!la),
the medicines the instruments (kara!la); the want of equilibrium
of the dhatus the karya-yoni; ~e restoration of the equilibrium
of the dhatus the karya; the happy state of body and 1nind
the kiirya-phala; length of life, anubandha; the place and the
diseased person, desa; the year and the condition of the diseased
person, kala; the efforts of the physician, pravrtti; the qualifi-
cations of the physician, the qualities of the medicine, etc.,
upiiya.
It may be pointed out in this connection that the Uttara-tantra
of Susruta also mentions thirty-two technical terms helpful to
physicians in refuting the statements of hostile critics and in estab-
lishing their own points, which are called tantra-yukti1 • These are
said to be adhikara!la, yoga, padiirtha, hetv-artha, uddesa, nirdesa,
upadda, apadesa, pradesa, a tidesa, apavarja, vakya-se~a, arthiipatti,
viparyaya, prasanga, ekanta, anekanta, purva-pa~a, nin;aya, anu-
mata, vidhiina, anagatiive~a!la, atikriintiivek~a1Ja, saT{lsaya, vyii-
khyana, sva-sa1J1jfia, nirvacana, nidarsana, niyoga, samuccaya, vikalpa
and uhya. But these technical terms are maxims for the interpre-
tation of textual topics, like the maxims of Mimarpsa, and are not
points of dispute or logical categories. It is said that these maxims
are like the sun to a group of lotuses, or like a lamp to a house,
arthiintara, nirarthaka, avijiiiitiirtha, apiirthaka, apriipta-kiila, nyilna, adhika,
punar-ukta, ananubhii$ana, ajniina, apratibhii, vikfepa, matiinujiiii, paryanuyojyo-
pekwt;a, niranuyojyiinuyoga, apa-siddhiinta, hetv-iibhiisa. Many of these, however,
are not mentioned by Caraka.
1 asad-viidi-prayuktiinii'!l viikyiinii'!l prali$edhii1101J'l sva-viikya-siddhir api ca
kriyate tantra-yuktital;z. Susruta-sa'!lhitii, Uttara-tantra, 65. 5·

for the illumination .or the expression of the subject of discourse 1 •

This remark very much resembles the remark of Vatsyayana that
iinvtkfikt (logic) is like a light to all sciences (pradipab sarva-vi-
dyiiniim). But the difference between tantra-yukti and iinvi/eyiki is
this, that, while the former refers to the laws of thought, the latter
refers to technical modes of expression in medical science in
general and in the Suiruta-sa'f!lhitii in particular. They therefore
refer to the ways of deducing the inner meaning or intention of
the medical texts from their abbreviated forms of expression. Thus,
when one reads in the text," about rasa or do~a," and nothing else
is said, one understands that this style of expression signifies thet
it is an adhikara7Ja (topic of discourse) and that something is going
to be related about rasa or do~a, though it is not explicitly so stated.
Now the maxim (tantra-yuktz) of yoga means that the verb at a
distant part of the sentence may be joined with its relevant ca.,~
in another part of the sentence 2 • The maxim of padartha means
that, when a word having two or more senses is used, ~hen that
meaning alone has to be accepted which suits the previous and
the later contexts. Thus, when it is said in a medical text that we
shall now describe the origin of the Veda, then only Ayur-veda is
to be meant and not J3.g, Yajus or Atharva. The maxim of hetv-artha
illustrates the condition of invisible things by visible and known
examples. Thus it is said that, just as a muddy ball becomes dis-
solved and sticky through water, so do milk and other drugs dissolve
a boil by their application. The maxim of uddela is the method of
briefly touching a subject without going into details. Thus, when
one says "disease" (salya), it means both internal and external
diseases without any kind of specification. The maxim of nirdesa
is the method of describing a thing in detail. The maxim of upadesa
is the method of giving a general instruction. Thus it is said that
one should not sit up at night nor sleep during the day. This is,
however, only a general instruction which has its exceptions. The
yathiimbuia-vanasyiirkab pradi.po vefmano yathii
prabodlzyasya prakiisiirtlzas tatlzii tantrasya yuktayab.
Susruta-sa'T[llzitii, Uttara-tantra, 6s. 7.
tailam pivec ciimrta-valn-nimba-hiT[lSriiblzayii-vrk~aka-pippalibhib
siddlzarn. baliibhyiir{l ca sa-devadiiru hitiiya nityaT{l gala-gm;u!a-roge.
Ibid. 9, 10.
In the above verse it is enjoined that a particular medical decoction is to be
made with a number of drugs which are to be boiled (siddham), and this boiled
decoction has to be drunk (pivet). But the word pivet is in the first line and the
word siddham is in the third line, and it is allowed that these two distant
words may be combined (yoga).
XIII] Logical Speculations and Terms 39 1
maxim of apadesa is the method of showing the reasons of things.
Thus it is said that phlegm (Sle~man) increases through the taking
of sweet things (madhureya sle~mii 'bhivardhate). The maxim of
pradeia is the analogy by which a present difficulty is solved
in the way in which a past difficulty was solved (prakrtasya
atikriintena siidhanam pradesa/:t). Thus it may be said that, since
this has cured Devadatta in this way in the past, it would also cure
Yajiiadatta in a similar way now. The maxim of atidesa is that of
anticipating a future event from a present indication or prognosti-
cation. Thus from the fact of the increase of uprising wind in a
man's system it may be predicted that he will have a specific
bowel-disease (udiivarta). The maxim of apa'varja consists in
allowing exceptions to general directions (e.g. cases of poisoning
should not be fomented, except in the case of poisoning through
the bites of insects). The n1axim of viikya-se~a consists in supplying
an idea suggested by the context, but not expressly mentioned.
Thus when it is said "of the head, hands, feet, sides, back, belly,
heart," it is the whole man that is to be understood though it is
not expressly stated in the context. That which is understood, by
implication, though not directly mentioned, is called the maxim of
arthiipatti. Thus, when a man says "I shall eat rice," it is under-
stood that he is not thirsty, but hungry. The maxim of vipmyaya
is that by virtue of which from a positive or a negative assertion its
contrary is asserted also, e.g. when it is said that those who are lean,
weak and of fearful temperament are difficult to be cured. The
maxim of prasailga is that by virtue of which allusion is made to
things repeatedly described in another chapter. The maxim of
ekiinta allows of affirming a specific action of things unexception-
ably (e.g. madana fruit induces vomiting, i.e. under all circum-
stances). The tnaxim of anekiinta is that by virtue of which one
understands that different opinions prevail on a particular subject.
Thus some teachers think that substances are the most important,
while others think that rasa is so; others, again, think that the
inner essence (virya) is the most important, while still others think
that chemical action through digestion (vipiika) is so. The maxims
of piirva-pak~a and uttara-pak~a allow of discussing a matter in the
form of question and answer. The maxim of anumata is that by
virtue of which it is to be understood that, when the opinion of
other authorities is referred to and not contradicted, it is signified
that it is approved. The maxim of vidhiina is that by virtue of
which one understands that, when certain descriptions follow
certain enumerations, the former are to be taken in the order in
which the latter are related. The maxim of aniigatiive/qllT}a allows
of leaving certain things for future description and elaboration,
and atikriintiivek~a'l}a permits alluding to things described before
(e.g. it is said in the Sloka-sthiina that this matter will be' de-
scribed in the Cikitsii chapter, and about another matter it may
be said in the Cikitsii chapter that it has been described in the
Sloka-sthiina). The maxim of sarrzsaya allows a way of statement
which may create doubt and confusion in the mind of the reader.
The method of elaborate description is called vyiikhyiina. The
method of using wtlrds in a sense different from what they have in
other literatures is called sva-sarrzjiiii, i.e. technical use (e.g. mithuna
in Ayur-veda means honey and clarified butter). A definition is
called nirvacana. The maxim of nidarsana allows of describing
anything after the analogy of other things. Thus it may be said
that, just as fire in a room grows bigger and bigger with wind,
so does a boil grow with viita, pitta and kapha. Niyoga means a
direction (e.g. "only what is good to the system is to be taken").
Samuccaya means the taking of two or more things together as
having equal value. Vikalpa is the method of giving alternative
or optional directions. Ohya is the maxim by which things which
are apparent from the context can be unders~ood.
It is easy to see that of these thirty-two maxims some are ways
of interpreting ideas, others are ways of interpreting the arrange-
ment and manner of textual words and their connections, while
there are others which are but descriptions of specific peculiarities
of style. The redactor (Nagarjuna) says that he has collected all
these maxims as general principles of textual understanding, and
he calls them sabda-nyiiyiirtha, i.e. the meaning of the maxims of
verbal interpretation.
Did Logic Originate in the Discussions

of Ayur-veda Physicians?
Dr Mahamahopadhyaya Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan in his
History of Indian Logic supposes without adducing any reason that
the Caraka-sarrzhitii gives a summary of the principal doctrines of
Anvlk~iki, possibly as propounded by Medhatithi Gautama. He
further says that the doctrines of Anvik!?iki evidently did not con-
XIII] Identification of Gautama 393
stitute a part of the original A yur-veda of Punarvasu Atreya, and
that these doctrines seem to have been incorporated into the
Caraka-sa'f!lhitii by the redactor Caraka, in whose time they were
widely known and studied. Dr Vidyabhusan's theory is that both
Caraka and Ak~apada borrowed the Nyaya doctrines from lVledha-
tithi Gautama, but, while Caraka accepted them in their crude
forms, Ak~apada pruned the1n thoroughly before they were assimi-
lated in the Nyaya-sutra 1 •
But Dr Vidyabhusan 's Medhatithi Gautama is more or less a
mythical person, and there is no proof that he ever wrote anything,
or that Caraka borrowed anything from a 1\:ledhatithi Gautama,
or that the Nyaya doctrines found in the Caraka-sa'![lhitii were not
contained in the original treatise of Agnivesa, now lost. Dr Vidya-
bhusan refers to the evidence of a number of works, such as the
Kusumiiiijali, Na#adha-carita and Nyaya-sutra-vrtti, which refer
to Gautama as being the founder of Anvik~iki. But none of these
authorities are earlier than the tenth century. He refers a] so to the
authority of the Padma-purii1Ja, Skanda-purli1Ja and Gandharva-
tantra, none of which can be regarded as a work of any considerable
antiquity. Vatsyayana himself refers to Ak~apada as the person to
whom Nyaya (the science of Logic) revealed itself2 • Uddyotakara
also refers to Ak~apada as the utterer of the Nyaya-siistra, and so
also does Vacaspati 3 • There is therefore absolutely no reason why
the original authorship of Nyaya should be attributed to a Gautama,
as against Ak~apada, on evidence which cannot be traced to any
period earlier than the tenth century and which is collected from
Pural)a sources directly contradicted by the earliest Nyaya au-
thorities. The Nyiiya-sastra, therefore, cannot be traced on the
evidence of the earliest Nyaya authorities to any earlier Gautama;
for, had this been so, it would certainly have been mentioned
1 History of Indian Logic, pp. 2~ and 26, by Mahamahopi\dhyi\ya Satish
Chandra Vidyabhusan. Calcutta University, 1921.

11 Yo 'ktapiidam r#1!' nyiiya!l pratyabhiid vadatii1!' vara1f'
tasya Viitsyayana ida1f' bhii$ya-jiitam avartayat.
Viitsyiiyana-bhii$Ya, 2. 24, A.D. 400.
Dr Vidyabhusan's translation of it as "The Nyaya philosophy manifested itself
(in a regular form) before Ak~apada" is inexact.
a yad Akfapiida!l pravaro mumnii7!'
Jamiiya siistra, jagato jagiida.
Nyliya-viirttika of Uddyotakara (A.D. 6oo). Opening lines.
atha bhagavatli Aktapadena nibJreyasa-hetau siistre pra1J.'ite. Nyaya-viirttika-tiit-
parya-tJkli of Vacaspati. Dr Vidyabhusan's translation of the Nyiiya-viirttika
word siistra as "Nyi\yasi\stra in a systematic way, is again inexact.
by either Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara or Vacaspati. Jayanta also
attributes the elaborate Nyaya work to Ak!?apada and does not
seem to know that thi:; elaborate treatise, the Nyaya-sut1·a, was
based on the teachings of an earlier authority 1 • If any such
authorities were known, they would certainly have been men-
tioned for the dignity and the prestige of the Siistra. Gautama is
an old name, and we find it attached to one of the Rsis of the
lf.g-veda (1. 62. 78. 85; IV. 4); he is mentioned in the S~tapatha
briihma7Ja (1. 4· I. 10; III. 3· 4· 19, etc.); in the Taittiriya-priitisiikhya
(1. 5), in the .~:4.sva/iiyana-srauta-sutra (1. 3; II. 6, etc.) and in other
similar older works; but nowhere is he spoken of as being the
author of the Nyiiya-siistra. Gautama is also mentioned in the
1l1ahii-bhiirata several times, but nowhere is he referred to as the
author of the Nyaya-siistra. The passage of the Mahii-bhiirata on
which Dr Vidyabhusan bases his theory of a lVIedhatithi Gautama
does not say that l\tledhatithi was the author of Anvlk!?ikl or Nyaya,
nor does it say that l\1edhatithi and Gautama were identical
persons 2 • The name Gautama is a patronymic, and the passage of
the J\;/ahii-bhiirata referred to by Dr Vidyabhusan clearly means
that the highly wise l\1edhatithi of the Gautama race was engaged
in asceticism. This is corroborated by the fact that the passage of
Bhasa referred to by Dr Vidyabhusan mentions .1\tledhatithi as a
teacher of Nyiiya-siistra and does not call him Gautama, nor does
it say that Medhatithi was the originator of Nyaya 3 • Dr Vidya-
hhusan's theory, therefore, of l\1edhatithi Gautama being the
originator of the Nyiiya-siistra falls down like a house of cards. His
identification of l\:Iedhatithi Gautama's birthplace as Mithila, his
ascertainment of his date, his identification of Persian references
to l\Iedhatithi Gautama and his so-styled references to Medhatithi
Gautama in the Anguttara-nikiiya and the Brahma-jiila-sutta are
no less fictitious 4 • The Gautama tradition of Nyaya need not be
followed; but it may incidentally be mentioned that an Atreya
Gautama, who is described as being Sarpkhya (probably in the
sense of wise, philosopher, or learned), is counted in the list of the
Ak~apiida-prat:zzto hi vitato Nyiiya-piidapal;..
Opening lines of the Nyiiya-maiijarz of Jayantabhatta (A.D. 88o).
J1,1edhiitithir mahii-priijfio Gautamas tapasi sthital;.
vimrsya tena kiilena patnyiil;. sa1JlSthyii-vyatikramam.
Mahii-bhiirata, Santi-parva, 265.45, Vangavasi edition.
3
Medhiitither Nyiiya-siistram (having learnt Nyiiya-siistra from Medhatithi).
Bhasa's Pratimii-niitaka, Act v, p. 79· M. M. Ganapati Sastri's edition.
4
History of Indian Logic, by Dr Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan, pp. 17-21.
XIII) Ayur-veda a Science of Causes 395
sages who assembled together to discover the causes and remedies
of diseases; side by side with this Atreya, another Atreya is also
mentioned as bhik~u .Atreya 1 • A number of sages are mentioned
in the Caraka-smJlhita as persons who discussed the problem of
the rise of diseases and how they could be removed. Among these
Bharadvaja volunteered to proceed to Indra to learn from him
the science of healing. Indra instructed him in the subject, being
learned in the three subjects of the (hetu) causes (of diseases),
knowledge of the (linga) signs (of diseases) and the knowledge of
medicines. Bharadvaja, having learnt this elaborate science in
three divisions, repeated it to the sages in exactly the same manner
in which he learnt it. After this it is said that Punarvasu taught
Ayur-veda to his six disciples, Agnive8a, Bhela and others. Cakra-
paJ).i, the commentator, says that Punarvasu was the disciple of
Bharadvaja, and quotes as his authority a statement of Harita.
But on this point Caraka himself is silent.
But one thing emerges from this half-mythical account of the
origin of Ayur-veda, viz. that the Ayur-veda was occupied from
the beginning with the investigation of the nature of causes (hetu)
and reasons (linga) for legitimate inferences in connection with
the enquiry into the causes of diseases and the apprehension of
signs or indications of the same. In the Nidana-sthiina of Caraka
eight synonyms for reason (hetu) are given, viz. hetu, nimitta,
iiyatana, kartr, karm:za, pratyaya, samutthiina and nidana. It is
curious enough that the words pratyaya and ayatan.a are used,
which are presumably Buddhistic. The word pratyaya, in the
sense of cause, is hardly found in Indian philosophy, except in
Buddhism. The use of so many terms to denote cause evidently
suggests that before Caraka's redaction there must have been an
extensive literature which had used these words to denote cause.
As a matter of fact, the word pratyaya is hardly ever used in
the Caraka-sa1[thitii to signify cause, though it is counted here as
one of the synonyms of hetu, or cause. The natural implication of
this is that the word pratyaya was used for hetu in some earlier
literature, from which Caraka collected it; so with other words,
such as samutthiina, iiyatana, which are counted in the list as
synonyms for hetu, but are not actually used in the body of the
text. This may lead us to think that the discussion of hetu under
1 Atreyo Gautama!z sii1Jlkhyal;. In this passage Atreya may, however, be
taken as a man separate from the wise Gautama.
various names is an old subject in Ayur-veda literature existing
before Caraka, from which Caraka collected them.
We know that Ayur-veda was primarily concerned with three
questions, viz. how diseases originated, how they were known,
and what were their cures. It was in this connection that the
principle of causality was first from a practical necessity applied
in Ayur-veda. Thus, if it is known that a person has been exposed
to sudden cold or has enjoyed a heavy feast, then, since it is known
that cold leads to fever and over-feeding to indigestion, with the
very first symptoms of uneasiness one may at once infer that the
patient is likely to get fever or to have diarrhcea or acute indiges-
tion. Or, if it is known that the patient has a strong diarrhcea,
then it can similarly be inferred that he has eaten indigestible
articles. Thus the two principal kinds of inference which were of
practical use to the Ayur-veda physicians were inference of the
occurrence of a disease from a knowledge of the presence of the
causes of that disease, i.e. from cause to effect, and inference of the
specific kinds of unhygienic irregularity from the specific kind of
disease of the patient, i.e. from the effect to the cause. The other
and third kind of inference is that of inference of disease from its
early prognostications (purva-rupa). CakrapaJ).i, in commenting on
the possibility of inference of specific diseases from their early
specific prognostications, compares it with inference of rain from
an assemblage of dark clouds or of the future rise of the Krttika
constellation frorn the rise of the constellation Rohil)i, which
immediately precedes it. Both these are cases of inference of
future occurrences of causation or coexistence. The prognostica-
tion may, however, be of the nature of an immediately and in-
variably associated antecedent which may drop altogether when
the disease shows itself. Thus before a high fever the hair of the
patient may stand erect; this standing erect of the hair in a specific
manner is neither the cause nor is it coexistent with fever, since it
may vanish when the fever has actually come. It is, however, so
invariably associated with a specific kind of fever that the fever
can be inferred from it 1 • Again, when there is any doubt among
a number of causes as to which may be the real cause of the
disease, the physician has to employ the method of difference or
1 These two kinds of purva-rilpa are thus described by Cakrapat:ti in his
commentary on Caraka-sa'f!lhitii, n. 1. 7: tac ca purva-rupa1f' dvi-vidham ekam

bhiivi- vyiidhy-avyakta -lingam ... dvitlyarrz tu d01a- dui)Ja -sammurchanii -janyam
av-yakta-lingiid anyad eva yathii jvare biila-pradve~a-roma-harfiidi.
XIII] Inductive 1nethods in Ayur-veda 397
the method of concomitant variation for its proper ascertainment.
That similar things produce the same kind of effects and opposite
things produce opposite results are two of the accepted postulates
of the law of siimiinya and 'l-'ise~a in the Caraka-sa1J'lhita 1 • Now,
applying these two principles, it is held that in a case of doubt
as to any kind of irregularity being the cause of any particular
disease it has to be found out by experiment whether the application
of the suspected cause (e.g. cold) increases the disease (e.g. fever);
if it does, and if the application of its opposite (e.g. heat) decreases
the disease, then cold is to be regarded as the cause of the disease.
If the application of any particular kind of element increases an
effect (a particular kind of disease) and the application of its
opposite decreases it, then t~1at particular element may be regarded
as the cause of that effect. Caraka holds that the three methods,
viz. the cause and effect relation (nidana), the method of invariable
prognostication (pilrva-ri1pa) and the method of concomitant
variation (upasaya, \Vhich includes anupa5aya also) are to be
en1ployed either jointly or separately for the ascertainment of
the nature of diseases which have already occurred or which
are going to happen in the near future 2 • Caraka thus urges that
the physician should examine carefully the causes of diseases by
the application of all these methods, so that they may be ascer-
tained from their visible effects. Caraka then goes on to give
examples of a number of diseases and the causes or prognostica-
tions by which their natu~e can be ascertained. He then says that
a disease which is at first only an effect of some other causes
may act as a cause of other diseases and may thus be regarded
both as an effect and as a cause. There is therefore no absolute
difference between a cause and an effect, and that which is a
cause may be an effect and that which is an effect may also in
its turn be a cause. Sometimes a disease may behave as cause
of another disease and then cease to exist itself, whereas again,
one disease may exist side by side with another disease which
it has produced and aggravate its effects. Then, again, a disease
(cause) may produce a disease (effect), and that effect another
effect. Thus one cause may produce one effect as weJl as many
effects, and one effect may be due to one or to many causes, and
1 Caraka-sarrzhitii, I. r. 44·
2 The other two methods of sarrzpriipti and riipa need not be discussed in
this connection.
again many causes-may jointly produce many effects. Thus, though
fever, delirium, etc. may all be produced by dryness (ru/qa), yet
under certain circumstances fever alone may be produced by it.
Again, fever may also be produced by the combination of a number
of causes which under other circumstances may produce jointly
a number of diseases. So one entity may be an invariable con-
comitant (liizga) of one event or of many events, and there may also
be a number of invariable concomitants of one event. Thus fever
is the invariable concomitant of hygienic irregularities in general,
and all fevers have heat as their invariable concomitant. From
certain kinds of hygienic irregularities fever can be inferred; but
these can also be associated with a number of other diseases 1 •
Hence it is evident that the determination of the nature of
causes and effects and the inference of facts or events of invariable
concomitance were an indispensable necessity for the Ayur-veda
physicians in connection with the diagnosis of diseases and the
ascertainment of their causes and cures. It was for this reason
that Caraka divided inference into three classes, from causes to
effects, from effects to causes and from the association of other
kinds of invariable concomitants. The Nyiiya-sfitra of A~apada
contains expressions which seem to have been borrowed from
Nagarjuna's Madhyamika-kiirikli and from the Laizkiivatlira-szltra
and the regulations of Buddhistic idealism, and hence it is generally
believed to have been composed in the second or the third century
A.D. 2 In this fundmnental and earliest work of Nyaya philosophy
inference (anumiina) is described as being of three kinds, viz. from
cause to effect (piirvavat), fron1 effect to cause (se~avat), and in-
ference from similarities (slimiinyato-dnta) not comprehended
under the cause-effect relation. Now it is exactly these three forms
of inference that are described in the Caraka-SatJZhitii, and, so
far as is known to the present writer, this is the earliest work
which describes inference in such a systematic manner, and so it
1 See Caraka-sa'f!lhitii, 11. 8. 22-27.

2 H. Ui's The VaiseP,ka Philosophy, p. 16. L. Suali's Filosofia Indiana,
p. 14. Jacobi, article in J.A.O. Sodety, vol. XXXI, p. 29, 191 I.
A commentary on Nagarjuna's Pramii1Ja-?-oidhva1JlSana called Pramii1Ja-
vidhva'f!Hana-sambhiiP,ta-vrtti reproduces Nagarjuna's definition of the cate-
gories, which are the same as the categories enumerated in the first siltra of
Ak~apada's Nyiiya-siltra. But, as Walleser points out in his Life of Niigiirjmra
from Tibetan and Chinese Sources, it is impossible to fix Nagarjuna's date exactly.
He may have lived at any time between the second and the fourth centuries A.D.
So no fruitful result can be attained by considerations of this kind.
XIII] Logical Terms in ~f\lytiya and Ayur-veda 399
may naturally be regarded as the source fron1 which Ak~apada
drew his ideas. Now Caraka's work may be regarded as a revision
of Agnivesa's work, based on Atri's teachings, based on Bhara-
dvaja's instructions. Agnivesa's work is now lost, and it is not
known what exactly were the contributions of Caraka in his re-
vision of Agnivesa's work; but, since we find no work of an
earlier date, Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina, which treats of the logical
subjects found in the Caraka-sa'!lhitii, and since these logical
discussions seem to be inextricably connected with medical dis-
cussions of diagnosis of diseases and the ascertainment of their
causes, it seems very natural to suppose that Caraka got his materials
from Agnivesa, who probably got them from still earlier sources.
Incidentally it may be mentioned that Jayanta, in his J.Vyiiya-
maiijari, discussing the question of the probable sources from
which Ak!?apada drew his materials, suggests that he ptobably
elaborated his work from what he may have gathered from some
other science (Siistriintariibhyasiit); but it is difficult to say whether
by siistriintara Jayanta meant Ayur-veda. The Nyiiya-sutra, how-
ever, expressly justifies the validity of the Vedas on the analogy
of the validity of Ayur-veda, which is a part of the Vedas 1 •
The similarity of the Nyiiya-siltra definition of inference to
Caraka's definition is also very evident; for while the former begins
tat-purvaka'!l tri-vidham (where tat-purvaka1Jl means pratyak~a
purvaka1Jl), the latter begins pratyak~a-purvaka1Jl tri-vidham tr£-
kiila1Jl. But, while Caraka knows only the three forms of inference,
he has no names for these three types such as are supplied by
Ak!?apada, viz. purvavat (related to purva, the prior, or the cause),
se~avat (related to se~a, the later, or the effect) and siimiinyato-dnta
(from observed similarity in the past, present and future, which is
also emphasized by Caraka in the same n1anner) 2 • From the con-
Mantriiyurveda-priimii1;tyavac ca tat-priimii1_lyam iipta-priimtl1Jyiit.
Nyiiya-siltra, II. 1. 68.
Jayanta enters into a long discussion in his Nyiiya-maiijar'f, trying to prove
that it was through his omniscience that Caraka could write his work and that
he neither discovered the science by inductive methods nor derived it from
previous traditional sources.
11
Evarrz vyavasyanty alitarrz bijat phalam aniigatarrz
dntvii b'fjiit phala1,.n jiitam ihaiva sadrsarrz budhiil;.
Caraka-sa'l{lhitii, I. 11. 22.
Vatsyayana, in his commentary on the Nyii.ya-sutra, illustrates pi1.rvavat (from
cause to effect) as the inference of rain from the rise of clouds, se~avat (from effect
to cause) as the inference of rain in the uplands from the flooding of the river
in the lower regions and siimii.nyato-d1·na(from similar behaviour) as the inference
of the motion of heavenly bodies from their changes of position in the sky at
siderations detailed in the preceding footnote it may well be assumed
that Ak~apada's contribution to the definition of inference consists
in his giving names to the types of floating inference described in
Caraka-sa1Jlhitii. It is not improbable that the Nyiiya-siltra derived
its theory of five propositions, and in fact most of the other logical
doctrines, from Caraka, as there are no earlier works to which these
can be traced 1 • Caraka 's definition of perception as the knowledge
different times. But he also gh·es another meaning of these three terms purvavat,
ie~avat and siimiinyato-dr~fa. He interprets purvavat here as the inference of fire
from smoke "on the analogy of past behaviour of co-presence," ie~avat as the
inference of the fact that sound is quality because it is neither substance nor
action, by the method of residues (ie~a), and siimiinyato-dnta as the inference
of the existence of soul from the existence of desire, which is a quality and as
such requires a substance in which it would inhere. This is not an inference from
similarity of behaviour, but from the similarity of one thing to another (e.g.
that of desire to other qualities), to extend the associations of the latter
(inherence in a substance) to the former (desire), i.e. the inference that desire
must also inhere in a substance.
In the case of the terms purvavat and ie~avat, as these two terms could be
grammatically interpreted in two different ways (with matup suffix in the sense
of possession and vati suffix in the sense of similarity of behaviour), and as the
words purva and ie~a may also be used in two different ways, Vatsyllyana inter-
prets them in two different ways and tries to show that in both these senses
they can be justified as modes of inference. It seems obvious that the names
purvavat, se~avat and siimiinyato-dntf! were given for the first time to the threefold
inference described by Caraka, as this explains the difficulty felt by Vatsyayana
in giving a definite meaning to these terms, as they had no currency either in
traditional or in the contemporaneous literature of Vatsyayana. Uddyotakara,
in his commentary on Vatsyayana, contributes entirely original views on the
subject. He takes Ak!?apiida's sutra, atha tat-purvaka1Jl tri-vidham anumiina1f1
purvavac che~avat siimiinyato-dr~taf!l ca, and splits it up into atha tat-purvaka1J'
tri-·oidham anumiina71z and pun,a•vac che~a?.-'at siimiinyato-dr~ta'!' ca; by the first
tri-vidha he means mference from positive instances (anvayi), from negative
instances (vyatireki) and from both together (am.,aya-·vyatireki). He gives two
possible interpretations of the terms pflrvavat, ie~a·vat and siimiinyato-dnta, one
of which is that purvavat means argument from cause to effect, ie1avat that from
effect to cause and siimiinyato-drna is the inference on the basis of relations other
than causaL The Sii71tkhya-karikii also mentions these kinds of inference. The
Miithara-vrtti again interprets the threefold character of inferences (tri-vidha
anumiina) in two ways; it says, firstly, that tri-vidha means that an inference has
three propositions, and, secondly, that it is of three kinds, viz. purvavat (from
the effect, e.g. flooding of the river, to the inference of the cause, e.g. showers in
the upper region), ie~avat (from part to whole, e.g. tasting a drop of sea-water
to be saline,one infers that the whole sea is saline), and siimiinyato-duta (inference
from general association, e.g. by seeing flowering mangoes in one place one
infers that mangoes may have flourished in other places as well). Curiously
enough, the Miithara-vrtti gives another example of w'imiinyato-drfta which is
very different from the examples of siimiinyato-dr1ta hitherto considered. Thus
it says that, when one says, " It is illuminated outside," another replies, "The
moon must have risen."
1 For more or less fanciful reasons Mr Dhruva suggests that the terms
purvavat and sefavat were borrowed in the Nyiiya-sutra from the Mimii1JZSii-sutra
and that this sfltra must therefore be very old (Proceedings and Transactions of
the First Oriental Conference, Poona, 1922). This argument is invalid for more
XIII] Nature of Ayur-veda /Jiscussions
that arises through the contact of the self, the senses, the mind
and the objects seems very much like an earlier model for Ak~a
pada's definition of perception, which adds three more qualifi-
cations to make the meaning more complex and precise 1 • The idea
that in the first instance perception is indeterminate (nir-vikalpa
or a-vyapaddya) is a later development and can hardly be traced
in Hindu philosophy earlier than the .lvyaya-siltra2 • The similarity
of the various categories of viida,jalpa, -vitmpjii, clzala,jiiti, nigraha-
sthiina, etc., as enumerated in Caraka, to those of the Nyiiya-
siltra has been duly pointed out in a preceding section. The only
difference between the two sets of enumeration and their elabora-
tion is that Caraka's treatment, being the earlier one, is less full
and less complex than that of Ak~apada.
The fact that physicians in counsel earnestly discussed to-
gether, in order to arrive at right conclusions regarding both
the theoretical causes of diseases and their cures and their actual
practical discernment in individual cases, is abundantly clear from
even a very superficial study of the Caraka-sa1Jlhitii. The entire
work seems to be a collection of discussions of learned physi-
cians with Atri as their chairman. Where differences of opinion
are great, they are all noted, and Atri's own opinion on them is
given, and, where there was more or less unanimity, or where Atri
himself lectured on specific problems, his own opinion alone is
given. It is also related how a good and clever physician is to defeat
his opponents in dispute, not only in a legitimate and scientific
way, but also by sophistic wrangling and unfair logical tricks. It
was a practical necessity for these physicians to earn their bread
in the face of strong competition, and it is easy to see how the
logical tricks of chala, jiiti and nigraha-sthiina developed into a
regular art of debate, not always for the discovery of truth, but
also for gaining the victory over opponents. We hear of debates,
discussions or logical disputes in literature much earlier than the
than one reason. Firstly, grantin,g that the Mimii1]1.Sii-siitra is very old (which
is doubtful), the fact that these two logical terms were borrowed from it does
not show that it must be a very old work; for even a modern work may borrow
its terminology from an older treatise. Secondly, the fact that these three terms
were borrowed from early sources does not show that the theory of tri-vidha
anumiina in the Nyiiya-sutra is either its own contribution or very old. Mr
Dhruva's arguments as to the Miithara-vrtti being subsequent to Vatsyayana's
commentary. are also very weak and do not stand criticism.
1 indriyiirtha-sannikar~otparmam jiiiinam avyapadesyam avyabhicari vyavasii-
yiitmakii'!l pratyak~am. Nyiiya-siitra, 1. 1. 4· •

2 Caraka uses the word vikalpa in n. 1. 10. 4 in the sense of distinction
(bheda) of superiority and inferiority (utkar~a-prakar~a-riipa).
DII
Caraka-sa1JZhitii; but nowhere was the acquirement of this art
deemed so much a practical necessity for earning a living as among
the medical men. And, since there is no mention of the develop-
ment of this in any other earlier literature, it is reasonable to
suppose that the art of debate and its other accessories developed
from early times in the traditional medical schools, whence they
are found collected in Caraka's work. The origin of the logical art
of debate in the schools of Ayur-veda is so natural, and the illus-
trations of the modes of dispute and the categories of the art of
debate are so often taken from the medical field, that one has little
reason to suspect that the logical portions of the Caraka-salJZhita
were collected by Caraka from non-medical literature and grafted
into his work.
Ayur-veda Ethics.
The length of the period of a man's lifetime in this iron age (kali-
yuga) of ours is normally fixed at one hundred years. But sinful
actions of great enormity may definitely reduce the normal length
to any extent. Ordinary vicious actions, however, can reduce the
length of life only if the proper physical causes of death, such as
poisoning, diseases and the like, are present. If these physical
causes can be warded off, then a man may continue to live until
the normal length of his life, one hundred years, is reached, when
the body-machine, being worn out by long work, gradually breaks
down . .1\Iedicines may, however, in the case of those who are not
cursed by the commission of sins of great enormity, prolong the
normal length of life. It is here that Caraka and his followers
differ from all other theories of karma that flourished on the soil of
India. The theory is not accepted in any Indian system of thought
except that of Caraka. In spite of the many differences that pre-
vail amongst these theories, ~hey may still be roughly divided into
four classes. Thus there are, first, the paur~a-vadins, such as those
who follow the Yoga-viis#tha school of thought and are idealists of
the extreme type, thinking that all our experiences can be controlled
by a determined effort of the will and that there is no bond of
previous karma, destiny, or fatality which cannot be controlled or
overcome by it. Human will is all-powerful, and by it we can
produce any change of any kind in the development of our future
well-being. There is, again, the view that God alone is responsible
for all our actions;and that He makes those whom He wants to
XIII] Ayur-veda Ethics
raise perform good actions and those whom He wants to take the
downw£lrd path commit sinful deeds. There is also the view that
God rewards or praises us in accordance with our good or bad deeds,
and that we alone are responsible for our actions and free to act
as we choose. There i~ a further view, elaborately dealt with in
Patafijali's Yoga-siltra, that our deeds determine the particular
nature of our birth, the period of our lifetime and the nature of our
enjoyments or sufferings. Ordinarily the fruits of the actions of a
previous birth are reaped in the present birth, and the ripened
fruits of the actions of the present birth determine the nature of the
future birth, period of life and pleasurable or painful experiences,
while the fruits of extremely good or bad actions are reaped in this
life. In none of these theories do we find the sort of common-sense
eclecticism that we find in Caraka. For here it is only the fruits
of extremely bad actions that cannot be arrested by the normal
efforts of good conduct. The fruits of all ordinary actions can be
arrested by normal physical ways of well-balanced conduct, the
administration of proper tnedicines and the like. This implies that
our ordinary non-moral actions in the proper care of health, taking
proper tonics, medicines and the like, can modify or arrest the
ordinary course of the fruition of our karma. Thus, according to
the effects of tny ordinary karma I may have fallen ill; but, if
I take due care, I may avoid such effects and.may still be in good
health. According to other theories the laws of karma are im-
mutable. Only the fruits of unripe karma can be destroyed by
true knowledge. The fruits of ripe karma have to be experienced
in any case, even if tn1e knowledge is attained. The peculiar
features of Caraka's theory consist in this, that he does not intro-
duce this imn1utability of ripe karmas. The effects of all karmas,
excepting those which are extremely strong, can be modified by
an apparently non-moral course of conduct, involving the ob-
servance of the ordinary daily duties of life. Ordinarily the law of
karma .implies the theory of a moral government of the universe
in accordance with the good or bad fruits of one's own karma.
\Ve may be free to act as we choose; but our actions in this life,
excepting those of great enormity, determine the experiences of
our future lives, and so an action in this life cannot ordinarily be
expected to ward off any of the evils of this life which one is
predestined to undergo in accordance with the karma of a previous
birth. Moreover, it is the moral or immoral aspects of an action that
determine the actual nature of their good or bad effects, success or
failure. This implies a disbelief in our power of directly controlling
our fortunes by our efforts. The theory of karma thus involves a
belief in the mysterious existence and ripening of the ·sinful and
virtuous elements of our actions, which alone in their course of
maturity produce effects. If the theory that sins bring their punish-
ment, and virtues produce their beneficial effects, of themselves,
is accepted, its logical consequences would lead us to deny the
possibility of mere physical actions modifying the fruition of these
karmas. So the acceptance of the moral properties of actions leads
to the denial of their direct physical consequences. If through my
honest efforts I succeed in attaining a happy state, it is contended
that my success is not due to my present efforts, but it was pre-
destined, as a consequence of the good deeds of my previous birth,
that I should be happy. For, if the fruition was due to my ordinary
efforts, then the theory that all happy or unhappy experiences
are due to the ripening of the karmas of the previous births falls
to the ground. If, on the other hand, all success or failure is due
to our proper or improper efforts, then the capacity of sins or
virtues to produce misery or happiness may naturally be doubted,
and the cases where even our best efforts are attended ·with failure
are not explained. But, if our ordinary efforts cannot effect any-
thing, and if the modes of our experiences, pleasures and sufferings,
and the term of our life are already predestined. then none of our
efforts are of any use in warding off the calamities of this life, and
the purpose of the science of medicine is baffled. In common-sense
ways of belief one refers to "fate" or "destiny" only when the
best efforts fail, and one thinks that, unless there is an absolute
fatality, properly directed efforts are bound to succeed. Caraka's
theory seems to embody such a common-sense view. But the
question arises how, if this is so, can the immutability of the law
of karma be preserved? Caraka thinks that it is only the extremely
good or bad deeds that have this immutable character. All other
effects of ordinary actions can be modified or combated by our
efforts. Virtue and vice are not vague and mysterious principles
in Caraka, and the separation that appears elsewhere between the
moral and the physical sides of an action is not found in his
teaching 1 .
He seems to regard the "good," or the all-round manifold
1 Caraka-samhitii, 111. J. 28-38.
utility (hita) of an action, as its ultimate test. What a man has to
do before acting is carefully to judge and anticipate the utility of
his action, i.e. to judge whether it will be good for him or not;
if the effects are beneficial for him, he ought to do it, and, if they
are harmful, he ought not to do it 1 • Our ultimate standard of good
actions lies in seeking our own good, and to this end the proper
direction and guidance of our mind and senses are absolutely
necessary. Caraka applies here also his old principle of the golden
mean, and says that the proper means of keeping the mind in
the right path consists in avoiding too much thinking, in not
thinking of revolting subjects, and in keeping the mind active.
Thoughts and ideas are the objects of the mind, and one has to
avoid the atiyoga, mithyii-yoga and a-yoga of a11 thoughts, as just
described. "Self-good," or iitma-hita, which is the end of all our
actions, is described as not only that which gives us pleasure and
supplies the material for our comfort, ease of mind and long life,
but also that which will be beneficial to us in our future life.
Right conduct (sad-vrtta) leads to the health and well-being of
body and mind and secures sense--control (indriya-vijaya).
The three springs of action are our desire for self-preservation
(prii1Jai~a1Jii), our desire for the materials of comfort (dhanai~a1Jii),
and our desire for a happy state of existence in the future life
(paralokai~a1Jii). 'Ve seek our good not only in this life, but also
in the after-life, and these two kinds of self-good are summed
up in our threefold desire-for self-preservation, for the objects
that lead to happiness, and for a blessed after-life. Right con-
duct is not conduct in accordance with the injunctions of the
Vedas, or conduct which leads ultimately to the cessation of all
sorrows through cessation of all desires or through right know-
ledge and the extinction of false knowledge, but is that which
leads to the fulfilment of the three ultimate desires. The cause of
sins is not transgression of the injunctions of the scriptures, but
errors of right judgment or of right thinking (prajniiparadha).
First and foremost is our desire for life, i.e. for health and pro-
longation of life; for life is the precondition of all other good
things. Next to our desire for life is our desire for wealth and
the pursuit of such vocations of life as lead to it. The third is
1 buddhyii samyag ida7Jl mama hitam idam mamiihitam ity m•ek~yiivek~ya kar-
mw:zii7Jl pravrttznii1Jl samyak pratipiidanena ity ahita-lwrma-parityiigena hita-

karmiicara1Jena ca. Cakrapal).i on Caraka, 1. 8. 17.
the desire for a blessed after-life. In this connection Caraka intro-
duces a discussion to prove the existence of a future state of
existence. He says that a wise man should not entertain doubts
regarding the existence of a future life, since such doubts might
hinder the performance of right conduct. The mere fact that we
cannot experience its existence with our senses is not a sufficient
negative proof. For there are few things which can be directly
experienced by the senses, and there are many which exist, but are
never experienced by the senses. The very senses with which we
experience other things cannot themselves be subject to sense-
experience1. Even sensible things cannot be perceived if they are
too near or too distant, if they are covered, if the senses are
weak or diseased, if the mind is otherwise engaged, if they are
mixed up with similar things, if their light is overcome by stronger
light, or if they are too small 2 • It is therefore wrong to say that
what is not perceived by the senses does not exist. If, again, it is
argued that the foetus must derive its soul from the parents, then
it may be pointed out that, if the soul of the foetus migrated from
either of the parents, then, since the soul is without parts, it could
not have migrated in parts, and such a total migration would mean
that the parents would be left without any soul and would die.
As the soul could not migrate from the parents to the child, so
neither can the mind nor the intellect be said to have so migrated.
IVloreover, if all life must be derived from the migration of other
souls, then how can insects come into being, as many do, with-
out parent insects 3 ? Consciousness exists as a separate and be-
ginningless entity, and it is not created by anyone else. If, however,
the supreme soul be regarded as its cause, then in that sense it
may be conceived as having been produced therefrom 4 • The
theory of the after-life consists according to Caraka principally in
the view that the soul is existent and uncreated, and that it is
associated with the foetus at a certain stage of its development in
the womb. He also refers to the evidence of rebirth which we
1 yair eva tiivad indriyailz pratya~am upalabhyate tiiny eva santi ciipratyak-
5iit;zi. Caraka, I. I 1. 7.
2 satii1J1 ca riipiit;ziim ati-sannikar5iid ati-viprakar5iid iivarat;ziit karat;za-daurba-
lyiin mano 'navasthiiniit samiiniibhihiiriit abhibhaviid ati-sauk5myiic ca pratyak5iinu-

palabdhilz. Ibid. I I. 8. ·
3 sa1J1Sveda-jiinii1JZ maJakiidinii'f!l tathodbhij-jiinii'f!l gat;z<Jupadiidtnii'f!l cetaniiniim
miitii-pitarau na vidyete tatas te5iim acaitanya'f!l syiin miitii-pitroJ cetana-

kiirat;zayorabhiiviit. Cakrapal).i on Caraka, 11. I I .
4
On this point Cakrapal).i gives a different interpretation in 1. 11. I3.
have in the difference of the child from the parents; in the fact
that, though other causes are more or less the same, two children
differ in colour, voice, appearance, intelligence and luck; in
the fact that some are servants, whereas others are their rich
masters; in the fact that some are naturally in good health, while
others are in bad, or are different in the length of life; from the
fact that infants know how to cry, suck, smile or fear without any
previous instruction or experience; that with the same kind of
efforts two persons reap two different kinds of results; that some
are naturally adepts in certain subjects and dull in others; and
that there are at least some who remember their past lives; for
from these facts the only hypothesis that can be made is that these
differences are due to the karma of one's past life, otherwise called
daiva, and that the fruits of the good and bad deeds of this life
will be reaped in another. It has also been pointed out in a
previous section that a child does not owe his or her intellectual
parts to the father or to the mother. These gifts belong to the
soul of the child, and there is therefore no reason to suppose that
the son of an intellectually deficient person will on that account
be necessarily dull. ·
Caraka further urges that the truth of rebirth can be demon-
strated by all possible proofs. He first refers to the verdict of the
Vedas and of the opinions of philosophers, which are written for
the good of the people and are in conformity with the views of
the wise and the virtuous and not in opposition to the opinions
of the Vedas. Such writings always recommend gifts, penances,
sacrifices, truthfulness, non-injury to all living beings and sex-
continence as leading to heavenly happiness and to liberation
(mok~a). The sages say that liberation, or the cessation of rebirth,
is only for those who have completely purged off all mental and
bodily defects. This implies that these sages accepted the theory
of rebirth as true; and there have been other sages who also have
distinctly announced the truth of rebirth. Apart from the testi-
mony of the Vedas and of the sages, even perception (pratyak~a)
also proves the truth of rebirth. Thus it is seen that children
are often very different from their parents, and even from the
same parents the children born are often very different in colour,
voice, frame of body, mental disposition, intelligence and luck, as
described above. The natural inference to be based on these data
directly experienced is that no one can avoid the effects of the
deeds he has performed, and that therefore what was performed
in a past birth is indestructible and always follows a man in hi~
present birth as his daiva, or karma, the fruits of which show in
his present life. The deeds of the present birth will again accumu-
late fruits, which will be reaped in the next birth. From the present
fruits of pleasurable or painful experiences their past seeds as past
karma are inferred, and from the present deeds as seeds their
future effects as pleasurable or painful experiences in another birth
are also inferred. Apart from this inference oth~r reasons also
lead to the same condition. Thus the living foetus is produced by
the combination of the six elements, to which connection with the
self from the other world is indispensable; so also fruits can only
be reaped when the actions have been performed and not if
they are not performed-there cannot be shoots without seeds. It
may he noted in this connection that in no other system of Indian
thought has any attempt been made to prove the theory of rebirth
as has here been done. A slight attempt was made in the Nyaya
system to prove the theory on the ground that the crying, sucking
and the natural fear of infants implies previous experience. But
Caraka in a systematic manner takes up many more points and
appeals to the different logical proofs that may be adduced. Again,
we find the nature of the fruits of action (karma) discussed in
the Vyasa-bhiifya on the Yoga-sutra of Patafijali. It is said in the
Y oga-sutra, II. 13, that the karmas of past life determine the par-
ticular birth of the individual in a good or bad or poor or rich
family and the length of life and pleasurable or painful experiences.
But that physical differences of body, colour, voice, temperament,
mental disposition and special intellectual features are also due
to the deeds of the past life seems to be a wholly new idea. It is,
however, interesting to note that, though Caraka attributes the
divergence of intelligence to deeds of the past life, yet he does not
attribute thereto the weakness or the strength of the moral will.
Caraka further refers to the collective evil effects of the mis-
deeds of people living in a particular locality, which may often
lead to the outbreak of epidemics. Speaking of the outbreak of
epidemic diseases, he says that they are due to the pollution of
air and water, and to country and climatic revolutions. The pollu-
tion of air consists in its being unnatural for the season, dull and
motionless, too violent, too dry, too cold, too warm, stormy, of
the nature of whirlwind, too humid, dusty, smoky, impure or of
bad smell. The pollution of water consists in its being of unnatural
colour, bad smell, bad taste, containing impurities (when devoid
of its natural qualities), which are often avoided by water birds,
and being unpleasant, and having its sources largely dried up.
The pollution of a particular locality occurs when it is infested
with lizards, wild animals, mosquitoes, flies, insects, mice, owls,
predatory birds or jackals, or when it is full of wild creepers, grass,
etc., or when there is a failure of crops, the air smoky, etc. The
pollution of time consists in the happening of unnatural climatic
conditions. The cause of these epidemic conditions is said to be
the demerit (adharma) due to the evil deeds of past life, the com-
mission of which is again due to bad deeds of previous life. When the
chief persons of a country, city or locality transgress the righteous
course and lead the people in an unrighteous manner, the people
also in their conduct continue to grow vicious and sinful. And,
as a result of the misdeeds of the people of the locality, the gods
forsake that place, there is no proper rain, the air, water and the
country as a whole become polluted and epidemics break out.
Thus the misdeeds of a people can, according to Caraka, pollute
the whole region and ultimately ruin it. When a country is ruined
by civil war, then that also is due to the sins of the people, who
are inflated with too much greed, anger, pride and ignorance.
Thus epidemics are caused by the conjoint sins of the people of
a particular region. But even at the time of the outbreak of such
epidemics those who have not committed such bad actions as to
deserve punishment may save themselves by taking proper medi-
cines and by leading a virtuous life. Continuing to establish his
theory that all climatic and other natural evils are due to the
commission of sins or adharma, Caraka says that in ancient times
people were virtuous, of strong and stout physique and extremely
long-lived, and on account of their virtuous ways of living there
were no climatic disturbances, no famines, no failure of crops, no
drought and no pollutions leading to epidemics and diseases.
But at the close of the satya-yuga, through over-eating some
rich men became too fat, and hence they became easily tired, and
hence became lazy, and on account of laziness they acquired the
storing habit (saiicaya), and, through that, the tendency to receive
things from others (parigraha), and, through that, greed (lobha).
In the next, Treta, age, from greed there arose malice, from
malice lying, from lying desire, anger, conceit, antipathy, cruelty.
410 Spec.ulations in the lV!edical Schools [cH.
violence (abhighiita), fear, sorrow and anxiety. Thus in the Treta age
dharma diminished by a quarter, and so the earthly production of
harvest, etc. also diminished by a quarter, and the bodies of living
beings lost their vitality accordingly; their length of life diminished,
and diseases began to grow. So in the Dvapara age there was a
further diminution of the quantities of earthly productions and a
further weakening of human constitution and shortening of the
length of life.
It may be remembered that in Susruta, 111. 1, it is said that
many persons of the medical school of thought had conceived this
world to have come into being either through time (kala), in the
natural process by a blind destiny (niyatz), or through a mere nature
(svabhiiva), accidental concourse of things (yadrccha), or through
evolution (paritzlima) by the will of God; and they called each of
these alternatives the pra}qti, or the origin of the world1 • But the
notion of the Sarp.khya prakrti holds within it all these concepts,
and it is therefore more appropriate to admit one prakrti as the
evolving cause of the world. Gayi, in interpreting this, holds that
prakrti is to be regarded as the evolving material cause, whereas
time, natural process, etc. are to be regarded as instrumental
causes for the world-manifestation. According to Susruta the
selves (kfelra-jiia) are not in the medical school regarded as all-
pervasive (a-sarva-gata), as they are in the Sarp.khya system of
thought. These selves, on account of their virtues or vices, trans-
migrate from one life to another as men or as different animals; for,
though not all-pervasive, they are eternal and are not destroyed
by death. The selves are not to be regarded as self-revealing,
as in Sarp.khya or the Vedanta; but they can be inferred, as
the substance or entity to which the feelings of pleasure and
pain belong, and they are always endowed with consciousness,
though they may not themselves be regarded as of the nature of
pure consciousness. They are cetanavantal.z (endowed with con-
1
The primary use of prakrti may have been due to the idea of ~n enquiry
regarding the source and origin of the world. Prakrti literally mean!; "source"
or "origin." So the term was probably used in reference to other speculations
regarding the origin of the world before it was technically applied as a Sarpkhya
term. The ideas of svahhiiva, kala, etc. seem to have been combined to form
the technical Sarpkhya concept of prakrti, and two schools of Sarpkhya, the
Kapila and the Pataiijali schools, arose in connection with the dispute as to the
starting of the evolution of prakrti accidentally (yadrcchii) or by the will of God.
The idea of prakrti was reached by combining all the alternative sources of
world-manifestation that were current before, and so they are all conserved in
the notion of prakrti.
XIII] Springs of action in the Caraka-sarrzhitii
sciousness) and not cit-svarupiih (of the nature of consciousness).
They ar~ extremely subtle or fine (parama-silk~ma), and this epithet
is explained by :Qalhai).a as meaning that the selves are as small
as atoms. But, being always endowed with consciousness, they can
also through self-perception (pratya~a) be perceived as existing.
The transmigration of these selves is regulated by the tnerit and
demerit of their deeds. J!alhai).a says that through excessive sins
they are born as anitnals, through an admixture of virtues and sins
they are born as tnen, and through a preponderance of virtues they
are born as gods. But according to Caraka not only is the nature
of transmigration controlled by the good or bad deeds of a man,
but even the productivity of nature, its purity or pollution; and
the thousand and one things in which nature is helpful or harmful
to men are determined by good and bad deeds (dharma and
adharma). Dharma and adharma are therefore regarded as the
most important factors in determining most of the human con-
ditions of life and world-conditions of environment. Such a view
is not opposed to the Sa111khya theory of world-creation; for there
also it is held that the evolution of prakrti is determined by the
good or bad deeds of the selves; but, though implied, yet in no
Sa111khya work is such a clear and specific determination of world-
conditions and world-evolution through the merit and den1erit of
human beings to be found. Freedmn of human \Vill is almost
wholly admitted by Caraka, and, where the fruits of previous
actions are not of a confirmed character, they can be averted or
improved. by our efforts. Our efforts thus have on the one hand
a costnical or universal effect, as detennining the conditions of the
developtnent of the material world, and on the other hand they
determine the fate of the individual. The fruits of our actions
determine our birth, our experiences and tnany intellectual gifts;
but they do not determine the nature of our wi11 or affect its
strength of application in particular directions.
Springs of action in the Cara~a-sarphita.
The chief feature of Caraka's springs of action consists in the

fact that he considers three pritnary desires as the motive causes
of all our actions. These are, as has already been said, the desire
for life, the desire for riches and the desire for future life. In this
Caraka seems to have a view uniquely different from that of most
412 Specu_lations in the Medical Schools [cH.
of the systems of philosophy, which refer to a number of emotions
as the root causes prompting us to action. Thus the Vaise~ika
regards attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain as the cause of
all our actions. Pleasure is defined as being a sort of feeling which
is approved and welcomed and towards which an attraction is
naturally felt. Pleasures, therefore, when they arise, must always
be felt, and there cannot be anything like unfelt pleasures. Apart
from sensory pleasures, Sridhara in his fvyaya-kandali discusses
the existence of other kinds of pleasure, due to the remembering
of past things, or to calmness and contentedness of mind or
self-knowledge. Pleasures are, however, regarded as the fruits of
meritorious deeds (dharma) performed before. Pain, the reverse
of pleasure, may be defined as an experience from which we are
repelled and which is the result of past misdeeds. Desire, as the
wish to have \Vhat is unattained (apriipta-priirthanii), may be either
for the self (s·viirtha) or for others (pm·iirtha). Such desires may be
prompted by any of the following: longing for happiness in heaven
or on earth (l~iima), appetites (abhiliifa), longing for the continua-
tion and recurrence of the enjoyment of pleasurable objects, com-
passion for others (karuf1ii), disinclination to worldly enjoyment
(vairiigya), intention of deceiving others (upadhii), subconscious
motives (bhiiva). Prasastapada, however, distinguishes between
desires for enjoy~ent and desires for work. But he does not
include the positive Buddhist virtues of friendship (maitrl) and a
feeling of happiness in the happiness of others (muditii), and he is
content with only the negative virtue of compassion (karu'!lii). He
also counts anger, malice, suppressed revengefulness (manyu),
jealousy of the good qualities of others ( ak~amii), and envy arising
from a sense of one's inferiority (amar~a). But, in spite of this
elaborate classification, Prasastapada makes in reality two broad
divisions, namely, desires arising from attachment to pleasures, and
those from aversion to pain. Pain is as much a positive feeling as
pleasure and cannot be regarded as mere negation of pleasure.
Though Prasastapada knows that there is such a thing as desire for
work, yet he does not give it any prominent consideration, and the
net result of his classification of the springs of action is that he thinks
that all desires are prompted by attachment to feelings of pleasure
and antipathy to pain. Feelings, therefore, are to be regarded here as
fundamentally determining all desires and through them all actions.
The Naiyayikas think that attachment and antipathy can be
XIII] Springs of action in the Caraka-sa'f!lhitii
traced to a more fundamental root, viz. ignorance or delusion
(moha). Thus Vatsyayana, by tracing attachment or antipathy
to ignorance, tend!.> to intellectualize the psychological basis of
Prasastapada. For moha would mean want of knowledge, and, if
attachment and antipathy be due to want of knowledge, then one
can no longer say that feelings ultin1ately determine our actions, as it
is the absence of right knowledge that is found to be ultimately the
determinant of the rise of all feelings and emotions. Jayanta, how-
ever, in his Nyiiya-maiijari, counts ignorance (moha), attachment
(riiga) and antipathy (dve~a) as being three parallel defects (do~a)
which prompt our efforts 1 • Under attachment he counts sex-
inclination (klima), disinclination to part with that which would
not diminish by sharing with others (matsara), jealousy (sprhii),
inclination towards birth again and again ( trr!lii) and inclination
towards taking forbidden things (lobha). Under dve~a he counts
emotional outbursts of anger with burning bodily conditions,
envy (ir~yii), jealousy at the good qualities of others (asilyii),
injuring others (droha) and concealed malice (manyu). Under
ignorance he counts false knowledge (mithya-jiiiina), perplexity
due to indecision (vicikitsii), sense of false superiority (mada) and
mistakes of judgment (pramiida). But he adds that of the three
defects, riiga, dve~a and moha, moha is the worst, since the
other two arise through it. For it is only the ignorant who are
under the sway of attachment and antipathy. To the objection
that in that case moha ought not to be counted as a defect in itself,
but as the source of the other two defects, Jayanta replies that,
though it is a source of the other two defects, it of itself also leads
people to action and should therefore be counted as a defect in
itself. It is no doubt true that all defects are due to false knowledge
and are removed by right knowledge; yet it would be wrong to
count the defects as being of only one kind of false knowledge
(mithyii-jiiiina) ; for the three defects are psychologically felt to
have three distinctive characteristics. Jayanta, while admitting
that the feelings of attachment or antipathy are due to ignorance,
considers them to be psychologically so important as to be re-
garded as independent springs of action. Thus, while he was
in nominal agreement with Vatsyayana in regarding attachment
and antipathy as being due to moha, he felt their independent
1 Te5ii7!l do$ii1Jii1!l trayo riiSayo bhavanti riigo dve5o moha iti. Nyiiya-mafijar'i,
p. soc.
psychological importance and counted them as parallel defects
prompting our efforts.
Patafijali divides all our actions into two classes, vicious (kl#ta)
and virtuous (akl#ta). The virtuous actions are prompted by our
natural propensity towards emancipation, while the vicious ones
are prompted by ignorance (avidyii), egoism· (asmitii), attachment
(raga), antipathy (dve~a) and the will to live (abhinivesa). The
latter four, though of the nature of feeling, are yet regarded as
being only manifestations of the growth and development of
ignorance (avidyii). It is a characteristic peculiarity of the Sarp.khya
philosophy that thoughts and feelings are not regarded there as
being intrinsically different; for the gu1Jas form the materials of
both thoughts and feelings. What is thought in one aspect is
feeling in another. It was on this account that false knowledge
could be considere~ to ~ave developed into the feelings of egoism,
attachment and antipathy, and could be regarded as being of the
same stuff as false knowledge. In the Nyaya psychology, thought
and feelings being considered intrinsically different, a difficulty
was felt in reconciling the fact that, while ignorance could be
regarded as being the cause of the feelings of attachment and anti-
pathy, the latter could not be regarded as being identical with
ignorance (moha). Jayanta, therefore, while he traced raga and
dve~a to moha, ontologically considered them as parallel factors
determining our actions psychologically. In the Sarp.khya-Yoga
metaphysics this difficulty could be obviated; for that school did not
consider feelings to be different from thoughts, since the thoughts
are themselves made up of feeling-stuff; hence even false know-
ledge (avidyii) need not be regarded as being wholly an intellectual
element, since it is itself the product of the feeling-stuff-the gu1Jas.
It is needless to refer in detail to the theories of the springs
of action in other systems of Indian thought. From what has
already been said it would appear that most systems of Indian
Philosophy consider false knowledge to be at the root of all our
worldly activities through the mediation of feelings of attachment,
antipathy and self-love. There is an inherent pessimism in most
systems of Indian thought, which consider that normally we are
all under the evil influence of false knowledge and are all gliding
on the downward path of sins and afflictions. They also consider
that all attachments lead to bondage and slavery to passions, and
thereby lead us away from the path of liberation. Actions are
XIII] Springs of action in the Caraka-sarrzhitii
judged as good or bad according as they lead to liberation or
bondage; their efficacy is in securing the transcendental realization
of the highest truth and the cessation of rebirth, or obscuration of
the nature of reality and exposure to the miseries of rebirth.
But Caraka gives us a scheme of life in which he traces the
springs of all our actions to the three fundamental motives or bio-
logical instincts of life-preservation, worldly desire of acquiring
riches for enjoyment, and other worldly aspirations of self-realiza-
tion. According to him these three fundamental desires sum up
all springs of action. On this view will appears to be more funda-
mental than feeling or know ledge. Caraka does not seem to begin
from the old and stereotyped idea that false knowledge is the
starting-point of the world. His is a scheme of a well-balanced
life which is guided by the harmonious play of these three funda-
mental desires and directed by perfect wisdom and unerring judg-
ment. Evil and mischief creep in through errors of judgment, by
which the harmony of these desires is broken. All kinds of mis-
deeds are traced, not to feelings of attachment or antipathy, but
to errors of judgment or foolishness (prajiiiipariidha). This prajiiii-
pariidha may be con1pared to the moha or avidyii of the Nyaya and
Yoga. But, while the Nyaya and Yoga seem to refer to this molza or
avidyii as a fundamental defect inherent in our mental constitution
and determining its activities as a formative element, Caraka's
prajfiiipariidha is not made to occupy any metaphysical status, but
expresses itself only in the individual lapses of judgment.
Caraka, however, did not dare to come into conflict with the
prevailing ethical and philosophical opinions of his time, and we
find that in Siirzra, 1 he largely accepts the traditional views. He
says there that it is the phenomenal self (bhutiitman or sa1!lyoga-
puru~a) that feels pleasure and pain, and in connection with the
duty of a physician to remove all physical sufferings produced by
diseases he says that the ultimate healing of all pain consists in
the permanent nai~thiki (removal) of pain by the removal of
grasping (upadhii)l. He says there that grasping (upadhii) is itself
sorrowful and the cause of all sorrows. All sorrows can be re-
moved by the removal of all grasping tendencies. Just as a silk-
worm draws out its cocoon thread to its own destruction, so does
1
Cakrapat)i interprets upadhii as desire (tn1Jii); hut it seems to me that it
would have been more correct to interpret it as the Buddhist upiidiina, or
grasping. Cakrapat)i on Caraka, IV. I. 93·
the miserable man of ignorance draw desires and longings from
the objects of sense. He is wise indeed who considers all objects
as fire and withdraws himself from them. With the cessation of all
actions (aniirambha) and dissociation fron1 sense-objects there is no
more fear of being afflicted with sorrows. Sorrows, again, are said
to proceed from four causes, namely, the wrong notion of non-
eternal things (e.g. sense-objects) as eternal (buddhi-vibhra1_nSa), the
want of the power of controlling the n1ind from undesirable courses
(dhrti-viblzrattzsa), forgetfulness of the nature of right knowledge
(smrti-vibhra1_nsa) and the adoption of unhygienic courses (asiitmya-
arthiigama). Prajt1iipariidha is defined here as a wrong action that
is done through the confusion of intelligence and want of self-
control and right knowledge (dhz-dhrti-smrti-vibhra~ta), and this
is supposed to rouse up all maladies and defects (sarva-do~a
prakopa~za). Some of the offences that may be counted under
prajt1iipariidha are as follows : to set things in motion, to try to
stop moving objects, to let the proper time for doing things pass
by, to begin an action in the wrong manner, not to behave in the
accustomed manner, not to behave modestly and politely, to insult
respected persons, to go about in wrong places or at wrong times,
to take objects which are known to be harmful, not to abide by
the proper course of conduct described in the Caraka-Sa1J1hitii,
1. 1 . 6; the passions of jealousy, vanity, fear, anger, greed, ignorance,
egoism, errors, all actions promp~.ed by these and whatever else
that is prompted by ignorance (moha) and self-ostentation (rajas).
Prajiiiipariidha is further defined as error of judgment (vi~ama
vijiiiina) and as wrong enterprise (vi~ama-pravartanii), proceeding
out of wrong knowledge or erroneous judgment. It will thus appear
that it is wise to take prajt1iipariidha in the wider sense of error of
judgment or misapplied intelligence, regarding it as the cause of
all kinds of moral depravity, unhealthy and unhygienic habits and
accidental injuries of all kinds. As Caraka admitted the existence
of the self and of rebirth and regarded moral merit (dharma) and
demerit (adharma) as the causes of all human enjoyment and
sufferings, and of the productivity or unproductivity of the ground,
and the hygienic or unhygienic conditions of water, air and the
seasons, he had to include within prajiiiipariidha the causes that led
to vices and sins. The causes of all sorrows are, firstly, wrong
consideration of the non-eternal as eternal and of the injurious as
good; secondly, want of self-control ; and, thirdly, the defect of
XIII) Springs of action in the Caraka-sa'f{lhita
memory (smrti-bhra'f(lsa), through which the right knowledge and
right experience of the past cannot be brought into effect. Thus,
though in a sense Caraka compromises with the traditional schools
of philosophy in including philosophical ignorance or miscon-
ception within prajiiiipariidha, and though he thinks that philo-
sophical ignorance produces sins, yet he takes prajiiiipariidha in
the very wide sense of error of judgment, leading to all kinds of
transgression of laws of health and laws of society and custom,
risky adventures, and all other indiscreet and improper actions.
Prajiiiipariidha, therefore, though it includes the philosophical
moha of the traditional school of philosophy, is yet something
very much more, and is to be taken in the wider sense of error of
judgment. Caraka, no doubt, admits jealousy, vanity, anger, greed,
ignorance (moha), etc., as producing improper action, but he admits
many other causes as well. But the one supreme cause of all these
subsidiary causes is prajiiiipariidha, or error of judgment, taken in
its wide sense. It will not, therefore, be wrong to suppose that,
according to Caraka, all proper actions are undertaken through
the prompting of three fundamental desires, the desire for life,
the desire for wealth and enjoyment, and the desire for spiritual
good. And all improper actions are due to improper under-
standing, confusion of thought, and misdirected intelligence
(prajiiiipariidha). The three fundamental desires, ur1associated \Vith
any error of judgment or lack of understanding, may thus be re-
garded as the root cause of all proper actions. There is, therefore,
nothing wrong in giving full play to the functioning of the three
fundamental desires, so long as there is no misdirected under-
standing and confusion to turn them into the wrong path. Caraka
does not seem to agree with other systems of philosophy in holding
the feelings of attachment and antipathy to be the springs of all
actions. Actions are prompted by the normal active tendencies of
the three fundamental desires, and they become sinful when our
energies are wrongly directed through lack of understanding.
Though Caraka had to compromise with the acknowledged view
of the systems of Indian Philosophy that the cessation of all
sorrows can be only through the cessation of all actions, yet it
seems clear that the course of conduct that he approves consists
in the normal exercise of the three fundamental desires, free from
the commission of any errors of judgment (prajiiiipariidha).
Thus Caraka does not preach the ideal of leaving off desires,
DII 27
attachments, feelings and actions of all kinds, nor does he
advocate the Gitii ideal of the performance of duties without
attachment. His is the ideal of living one's life in a manner that
is most conducive to health, long life, and proper enjoyment. Our
only care should be that we do not commit any mistake in eating,
drinking and other actions of life which may directly or indirectly
(through the production of sins) produce diseases and sufferings
or jeopardize our life and enjoyment in any way. This unique
character of Caraka's ethical position is very clearly proved by
the code of conduct, virtues and methods of leading a good life
elaborated by Caraka. He no doubt shows a lip-sympathy with
the ideal of giving up all actions (sannyiisa); but his real sympathies
seem to be with the normal scheme of life, involving normal en-
joyments and fruition of desires. A normal life, according to
Caraka, ought also to be a virtuous life, as vices and sins are the
sources of all sorrows, sufferings and diseases in this life and
the next.
Good Life in Caraka.

It is well worth pointing out at the outset that "good life" in
Caraka means not only an ethically virtuous life, but a life which
is free from diseases, and which is so led that it attains its
normal length. l\1oral life thus means a life that is free from
the defect of prajiiiipariidha. It means wise and prudent life;
for it is only the want of wisdom and prudence that is the
cause of all physical, social, physiological, moral and spiritual
mischiefs. To be a good man, it is not enough that one should
practise the ethical virtues: a man should practise the physical,
physiological and social virtues as well. He must try to live a
healthy and long life, free from diseases and sufferings and free
from reproaches of any kind. It is important to note that Caraka
does not believe in the forced separation of the physical life from
the mental and the moral. Physical diseases are to be cured by
medicines, while mental diseases are to be cured by right and
proper knowledge of things, self-control and self-concentration.
The close interconnection between body and mind was well
known from early times, and even the Mahii-bhiirata (xn. 16) says
that out of the body arise the mental diseases and out of the mind
arise the bodily diseases. Caraka also thinks that a physician should
try to cure not only the bodily diseases but also the mental diseases.
XIII] Good Life in Caraka
The .:.llahii-bhiirata further says in the same chapter that there are
three elements in the body, viz. heat, cold and air; when they
are in a state of equipoise, the body is healthy, and when any one
of them predominates, there is disease. The mind is constituted
of sattva, rajas and tamas; when these are in a state of equipoise,
the mind is in proper order, and when any one of them pre-
dominates, it becomes diseased. Caraka, however, thinks that it is
only when rajas and tamas predominate that the mind gets diseased.
But, whatever these differences may be, it is evident that, when
Caraka speaks of life, he includes both mind and body, and it is
the welfare of both that is the chief concern of the physician.
Caraka's prohibitions and injunctions are therefore based on this
twofold good of body and mind that ought to be aimed at.
Mter speaking of the harmfulness of attempting to control
some of the bodily excretory movements, he recommends the
necessity of attempting to control certain other mental and bodily
tendencies. Thus he forbids all persons to indulge rashly in their
unthinking tendencies to eommit mistakes of mind, speech and
action. A man should also control his passion of greed, and his
feelings of grief, fear, anger, vanity,shamelessness,envy,attachment
and solicitude. He should not speak harshly or talk too much or
use stinging words or lie or speak irrelevantly or untimely. He
should not injure others by his body, indulge in unrestricted-sex-
gratifications, or steal. Injury to living beings (hi1J1sii) is supposed
to produce sins and thereby affects one's longevity. Non-injury
is thus described as being the best way of increasing life (ahi1J1sii
p1·ii7Ja-vardhaniiniim). The man who follows the above right course
of life is called virtuous, and he enjoys wealth, satisfies his desires,
abides by the laws (dharma) of a good life, and is happy. Along
with the proper and well-controlled exercise of the moral func-
tions Caraka advises people to take to well-controlled bodily
exercises (vyiiyiima). When moderately performed, they give light-
ness, power of doing work, steadiness (sthairya) and fortitude
(dul:zkha-sahz~1Jutii). Avoidance of unwise courses and non-com-
mission of errors of judgment (tyiigal:z prajiiiipariidhiiniim), sense-
control, remembrance of past experiences (smrti), due knowledge
of one's own powers, due regard to proper time and place and
good conduct prevent the inrush of mental and bodily diseases;
for it is these which are the essentials of a good life, and a wise
man always does what is good for himself. Caraka further advises
27-2
that one should not keep company with those who are sinful in
character, speech .and mind, or with those who are quarrelsome,
greedy, jealous, crooked, light-minded or fond of speaking ill of
others or cruel or vicious, or with those who associate with one's
enemies. But one should always associate with those who are wise,
learned, aged, with men of character, firmness, self-concentration,
ready experience, with those who know the nature of things and
are full of equanimity, and those who direct us in the right path,
are good to all beings, possess a settled character and are peaceful
and self-contented. In these ways a man should try, on the one
hand, to secure himself against the inrush of mental troubles which
upset one's moral life and, on the other hand, properly to attend
to his bodily welfare by taking the proper kind of food at the
proper time and attending to other details of physical well-being 1 •
The rules of good conduct (sad-vrtta) are described in detail
by Caraka as follows 2 :
A man should respect gods, cows, Brahmat;tas, preceptors
(guru), elderly persons, saints and teachers (iiciirya), hold.auspicious
amulets, bathe twice and clean all the pores of the body and feet
and cut his hair, beard and nails three times in a fortnight. He
should be well-dressed, should always oil his head, ears, nose and
feet, comb his hair, scent himself and smoke (dhuma-pii). He should
recognize others with a pleasant face, help others in difficulties,
perform sacrifices, make gifts, talk delightfully, nicely and for
the good of others, be self-controlled (vasyiitman) and of a
virtuous temperament. He should envy the cause of another's
prosperity in the form of his good character and other causes of
his personal efficiency (hetiiv tr~yu), but should not be jealous of
the fruits of these in the form of a man's prosperity or wealth
(phale nerDJu). He should be of firm decision, fearless, suscep-
tible to the feeling of shame, intelligent, energetic, skilful, of a
forgiving nature, virtuous and a believer (iistika). He should use
umbrellas, sticks, turbans and shoes, and should at the time of
walking look four cubits of ground in front of him; he should
avoid going to impure, unclean and dirty places; he should try to
appease those who are angry, soothe the fears of those who have
become afraid, help the poor, keep his promises, bear harsh words,
be self-controlled, remove the causes of attachments and antipathy
(riiga-d'l•e~a) and behave as the friend of all living beings. Again,
1 See Caraka-sa'!lhitii, I. 7· I Ibid. I. 8.
XIII) Good Life in Caraka 421
one should not tell lies, or take that which belongs to others, should
not commit adultery, or be jealous at other people's wealth, should
not be given to creating enemies, should not commit sins, or do
wrong even to a sinner, or speak about the defects or secrets of
others; should not keep cmnpany with the sinful or with those
who are the king's enemies or with madmen, the mean, wicked, out-
cast, or those who make abortions. One should not climb into bad
vehicles, lie on hard beds, or beds without sheets or pillows,
should not climb steep mountain sides or trees or bathe in fast
flowing rivers with strong currents; one should not go about
places where there are great fires raging, or laugh loudly or yawn
or laugh without covering the face, or pick one's teeth. Again,
one should not break the laws ordained by a large number of
persons, or other laws in general; should not go about at night in
improper places, or make friends with youngsters, old or greedy
people, fools, sinners or eunuchs; one should not be fond of wines,
gambling, prostitutes, divulge secrets, insult others, be proud or
boastful or speak il1 of old people, teachers, kings or assemblages
of persons, or talk too much; one should not turn out relations,
friends or those who know one's secrets. One should attend at the
proper time to every action, should not undertake to do anything
without properly examining it, or be too procrastinating, or be
under the influence of anger and pleasure; one should not be
very down-hearted in afflictions, or too elated in success, or too
disappointed in failures; should practice sex-continence, try to be
wise, make gifts, be friendly and compassionate to all and always
contented. It is needless to continue to enumerate all the qualities,
which would commonly be included within the requisites of a
good life. In this Caraka seems to cut an ahsolutely new way,
and in no other branch of Indian thought can we note such an
assemblage of good qualities of all the different kinds necessary
not only for a virtuous life, but for the healthy and successful
life of a good citizen.
It has already been pointed out that error of judgment or
delusion, in whichever sphere it may be exercised, is the root of
all mischiefs and all troubles. And Caraka demonstrates this by
enumerating in his schedule of good conduct proper behaviour in
all the different concerns and spheres of life. To Caraka the con-
ception of life is not as moral or immoral, but as good (hita) and bad
(ahita). It is true, no doubt, that here and there stray statements are
found in the Caraka-sa1{lhita which regard the cessation of all
sorrows as the ultimate end of life; but it is obvious that Caraka's
main approach to the subject shows very clearly that, though moral
virtues are always very highly appreciated, yet the non-moral
virtues, such as the proper taking care of the well-being of one's
own body and the observance of social rules and forms of etiquette
or normal prudent behaviour, are regarded as being equally neces-
sary for the maintenance of a good life. Transgressions and
sins are the causes of mental worries, troubles and also of many
mental and physical diseases, and one ought therefore to take
proper care that they may not enter into one's life; and it is said
that the diseases produced by strong sinful acts cannot be cured
by the ordinary means of the application of medicines and the
like, until with the proper period of their sufferings they subside
of themselves. But sins and transgressions are not the only causes
of our desires, accidents and other domestic, social and political
troubles. It is through our imprudent behaviour and conduct,
which are due to error of judgment (prajiiaparadha), as our other
sins and immoral acts are, that all our bodily and mental troubles
happen to us. A good life, which is the ideal of every person, is
a life of peace, contentment and happiness, free from desires and
troubles of all kinds. It is a life of prudence and well-balanced
judgment, where every action is done with due consideration to
its future consequences and where all that may lead to troubles
and difficulties is carefully avoided. It is only such a life that
can claim to be good and can be regarded as ideal. A merely
moral or virtuous life is not our ideal, which must be good in
every respect. Any transgression, be it of the rules of hygiene,
rules of polite society, rules of good citizenship, or any deviation
from the path which prudence or good judgment would recom-
mend to be wise, may disturb the peace of life. A scheme of
good life thus means a wise life, and observance of morality is
but one of the many ways in which wisdom can be shown.
Ayur-veda, or the Science of Life, deals primarily with the ways
in which a life may be good (hita), bad (ahita), happy (sukha) or
unhappy (asukha). A happy life is described as a life undisturbed
by bodily and mental diseases, full of youth and proper strength,
vitality, energy, power of launching new efforts, endowed with
wisdom, knowledge and efficient sense-organs-a life which is full
of all kinds of desirable enjoyments and in which the ventures that
XIII] Ayur-veda Literature
are undertaken are all successful. The opposite of this is what
tnay be called an unhappy life. The happy life thus represents
a life so far as it is happy and enjoyable and so far as it satisfies
us. The good life is the life as it is moulded and developed by our
right conduct. In a way it is the good life that makes a happy life.
They who seek a good life should desist from the sins of taking
other people's possessions and be truthful and self-controlled.
They should perform every action with proper observation, care and
judgment, and should not be hasty or make mistakes by their care-
lessness; they should attend to the attainment of virtue, wealth and
the enjoyments of life without giving undue emphasis to any of
them; they should respect those who are revered, should be learned,
wise and of a peaceful mind and control their tendencies to attach-
ment, anger, jealousy and false pride; they should always make
gifts; they should lead a life of rigour (tapas) and attain wisdom,
self-knowledge or philosophy (adlzyiitma-7-·idal:z), and behave in such
a way that the interests of both the present life on earth and the
life hereafter may be attended to with care and judgment, always
remembering the lessons of past experience 1 • It is now clear that
the ideal of good life in Caraka is not the same as that of the
different systems of philosophy which are technically called the
Science of Liberation (mok~a-siistra). The fundamental idea of a
good life is that a life should be so regulated that the body and
mind may be free from diseases, that it should not run into un-
necessary risks of danger through carelessness, that it should be
virtuous, pure and moral; that it should be a prudent and wise life
which abides by the laws of polite society and of good and loyal
citizens, manifesting keen alertness in thought and execution and
tending constantly to its own good-good for all interests of life,
body, mind and spirit.
Ayur-veda Literature.
The systematic development of Indian· medicine proceeded
primarily on two principal lines, viz. one that of Susruta and the
other that of Caraka. It is said in Susruta 's great work, Susruta-
saJ!lhitii, that Brahma originally composed the Ayur-veda in one hun-
dred verses, divided into one thousand chapters, even before he had
created human beings, and that later on, having regard to the
shortness of human life and the poverty of the human intellect,
1 Caraka-SmJlhitii, I. 30. 22.
he divided it into the eight parts, Salya, Siiliikya, etc., alluded to
in a previous section. But this seems to be largely mythical. It is
further said in the same connection in the Susruta-sa1Jlhitii, 1. 1
that the sages Aupadhenava, Vaitaral).a, Aurabhra, Pau~kalavata,
Karavirya, Gopurarak~ita, Susruta and others approached
Dhanvantari or Divodasa, king of Kasi, for medical instruction.
Susruta's work is therefore called a work of the Dhanvantari
school. Though it was revised at a later date by Nagarjuna, yet
Susruta himself is an old writer. A study of the Jatakas shows that
the great physician Atreya, a teacher of Jivaka, lived in Taxila
shortly before Buddha 1 • It has been said in a preceding section
that in the enumeration of bones Susruta shows a knowledge of
Atreya 's system of osteology. Hoernle has further shown in
sections 42, s6, 6o and 61 of his "Osteology," that the Satapatha-
Briihmm;a, which is at least as old as the sixth century B.C., shows
an acquaintance with Susruta's views concerning the counting of
bones. But, since Atreya could not have lived earlier than the sixth
century B.C., and since the Satapatha-Briihmar;a of abou·t the sixth
century B.c. shows an acquaintance with Susruta's views, Hoernle
conjectures that Susruta must have been contemporary with
Atreya's pupil, Agnivesa 2 • But, admitting Hoernle's main conten-
tions to be true, it may be pointed out that by the term veda-
viidinal:z in Susruta-sa11zhitii, III. 5· 18 Susruta may have referred
to authorities earlier than Atreya, from whom Atreya also may
have drawn his materials. On this view, then, the lower limit of
Susruta's death is fixed as the sixth or seventh century B.C., this
being the date of the Satapatha-Briihmar;a, while practically nothing
can be said about the upper limit.
But it is almost certain that the work which now passes by
the name of Susruta-sarrzhitii is not identically the same work that
was composed by this elder Susruta (vrddha Suiruta). J!alhaQa,
who lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century, says in
his Nibandha-sa1Jlgraha that Nagarjuna was the reviser of the
Susruta-sarrzhitii 3 ; and the Susruta-sarrzhitii itself contains a supple-
mentary part after the Kalpa-sthiina, called the Uttara-tantra (later
work). In the edition of Susruta by P.lVIuralidhar, of Pharuknagar,
there is a verse at the beginning, which says that that which was
1 Rockhill's Life of Buddha, pp. 65 and 96.
2 Hoernle's Medicine of Ancient India, Part I, "Osteology," pp. 7 and 8.
3 Pratisa'flskartiiplha Niigiirjuna eva. l)alhat:ta's Nibandha-Sa1!llJraha, 1. 1. 1.
so well taught for the good of the people hy the great sage Dhan-
vantari to the good pupil Susruta became famous all over the
world as Susruta-sa~nhitii, and is regarded as the best and the chief
of the threefold~~ yur-veda literature, and that it was strung together
in the form of a hook by no other person than Nagarjuna 1 . Cakra-
pal)i also in his Bhanumatt refers to a reviser (prati'sa7Jzskartr); but
he does not mention his name. Gayadasa's pailjika on Susruta,
Susruta-candrika or l\yaya-candri'ka, has an observation on the
eighth verse of the third chapter of the :.Yidiina-sthiina, in which he
gives a different reading hy Nagarjuna, which is the same as the
present reading of Susruta in the corresponding passage 2 • Again,
Bhatta Narahari in his Ti'ppa~zi on the Astiitiga-hrdaya-sa1Jlhitii,
ca11ed Vagbha ta-kha~uJana-ma~ujana, in discussing murjha-garbha-
nidana, annotates on the reading vasti-d'l·iire ·vipanniiyiih, which
Vagbhata changes in borrowing from Susruta's vastimara-vipamzii-
yiilz (II. R. 14), and says that vasti'-d'0·are is the reading of Nagarjuna 3 •
ThatNagarjuna had the habit of making supplements to his revisions
of works is further testified by the fact that a work called Yoga-
sataka, attributed to Nagarjuna, had also a supplementary chapter,
called Uttara-tantra, in addition to its other chapters, Kiiya-ciki'tsii,
Siiliikya-tantra, Salya-tantra, Vi~a-tantra, Bhutavi'dyii, Kaumilra-
tantra, Rasilyana-tantra and Viljzkarm.za-tantra. This makes it
abundantly clear that what passes as the Susruta-smrzhitii was either
entirely strung together from the traditional teachings of Susruta
or entirely revised and enlarged hy Nagarjuna on the basis of a
nuclear work of Susruta which was available to ~agarjuna. But
was Nagarjuna the only person who revised the Susruta-sa1Jlhitii?
l)alhaJ).a's statement that it was Nagarjuna who was the reviser
of the work (p1·ati'sarrzslwrtapzha Nilgiirjuna eva) is attested hy the
verse of the Muralidhar edition (Niigiirjunenaiva grathi'tii); but
the use of the emphatic word eva in both suggests that there
may have been other editions or revisions of Susruta by other
writers as well. The hopelessly muddled condition of the readings,
Upadi$!ii tu yii sam_,.,~!! Dhanvantari-11wlwr$i1Jtl
Suiruttiya swli$ytlya loklinii'fl hita-vtinchayii
sarvatra bhuvi 'tikhvtitii ntimnti Suiruta-samhitii
Ayur-vedat-raylmadhye sre$fhii miinyii tatl;ottamii
sii ca Niigiirjunenaiva ~:rathitii grantha-rfipata!z.
2
Niigiirjunas tu pathati; iarlwrii sikatii meho bhasmiikh:yo 'smari-'lwnrtam iti.
In the Nin:taya-Sagara edition of IQI5 this is u. 3· 13, whereas in ]ivananda's
edition it is 11. 3· 8_ See also Dr Cordier's Recentes DecouvertesdeMSS. Medicaux
Sanscrits dans 1'/nde, p. IJ.
3
ata eva Niigiirjunair vasti-dviira iti patlzyate.
chapter-divisions ~nd textual arrangements in the chapters in
different editions of the Susruta-sa1J1hitii is such that there can be no
doubt that from time to time many hands were in operation on
this great work. Nor it is proper to think that the work of revising
Susruta was limited to a pre-Cakrapal).i period. It is possible to
point out at least one case in which it can be almost definitely
proved that a new addition was made to the Susruta-saJ?lhitii
after Cakrapal).i, or the text of Susruta known to J!alhal')a was
not known to Cakrapal).i. Thus, in dealing with the use of catheters
and the processes of introducing medicine through the anus
(vasti-kriyii) in IV. 38, the texts of the Sufruta-sa'!lhitii commented
on by J!alhal).a reveal many interesting details which are untouched
in the chapter on Vasti in the Caraka-saJ?lhitii ( Uttara-vasti, Siddhi-
stlziina, xn). This chapter of the Caraka-saJ?lhitii was an addition
by Dr9habala, who flourished in Kasmira or the Punjab, prob-
ably in the eighth or the ninth century. When Cakrapal).i wrote
his commentary in the eleventh century, he did not make any
reference to the materials found in the Suhuta-Sa1J1hitii, nor did he
introduce them into his own medical compendium, which passes
by the name of Cakradatta. Cakrapal).i knew his Suiruta-saJ?lhitii
well, as he had commented on it himself, and it is extremely un-
likely that, if he had found any interesting particulars concerning
1-·asti-kriyii in his text, he should not have utilized them in his
commentary or in his own medical work. The inference, there-
fore, is almost irresistible that many interesting particulars re-
garding vasti-kriyii, absent in the texts of the Sus1·uta-sa1J1hitii in
the ninth and eleventh centuries, were introduced into it in the
tv.·elfth century. It is difficult, however, to guess which Nagar-
juna was the reviser or editor of the Suiruta-sa1J1hitii; it is very
unlikely that he was the famous Nagarjuna of the Miidhyamika-
kiirikii, the great teacher of Sunyavada; for the accounts of the
life of this Nagarjuna, as known from Chinese and Tibetan
sources, nowhere suggest that he revised or edited the Suiruta-
sa1J1hitii. Alberuni speaks of a Nagarjuna who was born in Dihaka,
near Somanatha (Gujarat), about one hundred years before
himself, i.e. about the middle of the ninth century, and who
had written an excellent work on alchemy, containing the sub-
stance of the whole literature of the subject, which by Alberuni's
time had become very rare. It is not improbable that this
Nagarjuna was the author of the Kak~aputa-tantra, which is
XIII] Ayur-:veda Literature
avowedly written with materials collected fro~ the alchemical
works of various religious communities and which deals with
the eightfold miraculous acquirements (a~ta-siddhi). But Vrnda
in his Siddlza-yoga refers to a formula by Nagarjuna which was
said to have be('n written on a pillar in Pataliputra 1 • This
formula is reproduced by CakrapaQi Datta, Vangasena and by
Nityanatha Siddha in his Rasa-ratniikara. But since Vrnda,
the earliest of these writers, flourished about the eighth or the
ninth century, and since his formula was taken from an in-
scription, it is not improbable that this Nagarjuna flourished a
few centuries before him.
Of the commentaries on the Susruta-Sa'f!lhitii the most im-
portant now current is I)alhaQa's Nibandha-sa'f!lgraha. I)alhaQa
quotes CakrapaQi, of A.D. 1o6o, and is himself quoted by Hemadri,
of A.D. 1260. He therefore flourished between the eleventh and
the thirteenth centuries. It has been pointed out that sufficient
textual changes in the Susruta-sarrzhitii had occurred between Cakra-
paQi and I)alhaQa's time to have taken at least about one hundred
years. I am therefore inclined to think that I)alhaQa lived late in
the twelfth, or early in the thirteenth, century at the court of King
Sahapala Deva. CakrapaQi had also written a commentary on the
Susruta-sa'f!lhitii, called Bhiinumati, the first book of which has been
published by Kaviraj Gangaprasad Sen. Dr Cordier notes that
there is a complete manuscript of this at Benares. Niscala Kara and
SrikaQtha Datta sometimes quote from CakrapaQi's commentary
on the Susruta-smtzhitii. I)alhaQa's commentary is called Nibandlza-
smtzgraha, which means that the book is collected from a number
of commentaries, and he himself says in a colophon at the end of
the Uttara-tantra that th(' physician I)alhal)a, son of Bharata, had
written the work after consulting many other commentaries 2 •
At the beginning of his !\7ibandha-smtzgraha he refers to Jaiyyata,
Gayadasa, Bhaskara's pailjikii, Srimadhava and Brahmadcva. In
his work he further mentions Caraka, Harita, Jatukarl)a, Kasyapa,
Kn?I)atreya, Bhadrasaunaka, Nagarjuna, the two Vagbhatas,
Videha, Hariscandra, llhoja, Karttika Kul)qa and others. I lari-
scandra was a commentator on the Caralw-samhitii. It is curious,
however, that, though I)alha!).a refers to Bhask~ra and Srlmadhava
1Nagarjunena lihhitii stambhe Piitaliputralu, ": 149.
2 Nibandlul.n ballldo 'lfik$Yll 1.midyab Srihhiiraf(/.tmajab
uttara-sthii11am alwmt suspa$fllf!l l)alhm;n hhi$td?.
Concluding verse of l)alhar:m'scomment~uyon Susruta's Uttara-tantra, chap.66.
at the beginning of his commentary, he does not refer to them
in the body of it~ Hoernle, however, is disposed to identify
Bhaskara and Karttika Ku1.1<Ja as one person. Vijayarak~ita and
SrikaQtha Datta, commentators on Madhava's Nidiina, refer to
Karttika Kui)<Ja in connection with their allusions to the Smruta-
sa1J1hitii, but not to Bhaskara. A Patna inscription (E.I.I. 340, 345)
says that King Bhoja had given the title of Vidyapati to Bhaskara
Bhatta. Hoernle thinks that this Bhaskara was the same as Bhaskara
Bhana. Hoernle also suggests that Vrnda Madhava was the same
as Srimadhava referred to by QalhaQa. Madhava in his Siddha-yoga
often modifies Susruta's statements. It may be that these modifi-
cations passed as Madhava's Tippa7Ja. Since Gayadasa and Cakra-
pal).i both refer to Bhoja and do not refer to one another, it may
be that Gayadasa was a contemporary of Cakrapal)i. Hoernle
thinks that the Brahmadeva referred to by QalhaQa was Sribrahma,
the father of Mahesvara, who wrote his Siihasiinka-carita in A.D.
I I I I. Mahesvara refers to Hariscandra as an early ancestor of his.
It is not improbable that this Hariscandra was a commentator on
Caraka. The poet lVIahesvara was himself also a Kaviraja, and
Heramba Sena's Gurjha-bodhaka-sa1{lgraha was largely based on
1\lahesvara's work. Jejjata's commentary passed by the name of
Brhal-laghu-pafijikii; Gayadasa's commentary was called the
Susruta-candrikii or Nyiiya-candrikii and Srimadhava or Madhava-
Kara's Tippa7Ja was called Sloka-viirttika. Gayadasa mentions the
names of Bhoja, Suranandi and Svamidasa. Gayadasa's panjikii has
been discovered only up to the Nidiina-sthiina, containing 3000
grant has. Among other commentators of Susruta we hear the
names of Gomin, A~a<Jhavarman, Jinadasa, Naradanta, ·Gadadhara,
Ba~pacandra, Soma, Govardhana and Prasnanidhana.
It may not be out of place here to mention the fact that the
Sar:pkhya philosophy summed up in the Siirfra-sthiina of Susruta
is decidedly the Sar:pkhya philosophy of Isvarakr~Qa, which, as I
have elsewhere pointed out, is later than the Sar:pkhya philosophy
so elaborately treated in the Caraka-sa1J1hitii 1 • This fact also sug-
g~sts that the revision of Susruta was executed after the composition
of Isvarakr~I)a's work (about A.D. zoo), which agrees with the view
expressed above that the revision of Susruta was the work of Nagar-
juna, who flourished about the fourth or the fifth century A.D.
But it is extremely improbable that the elaborate medical doctrines
1 History of Indian Philosophy, vol. r, pp. 313-322.
of an author who lived at so early a date as the sixth century B.C.
could have remained in a dispersed condition until seven, eight
or nine hundred years later. It is therefore very probable that
the main basis of Susruta's work existed in a codified and well-
arranged form from very early times. The work of the editor or
reviser seems to have consisted in introducing supplements, such
as the Uttara-tantra, and other chapters on relevant occasions. It
does not seem impossible that close critical and comparative
study of a number of published texts of the Susruta-sa1J1hitii
and of unpublished manuscripts may enable a future student to
separate the original from the supplementary parts. The task,
however, is rendered difficult by the fact that additions to the
Susruta-sm!lhitii \Vere probably not limited to one period, as has
already been pointed out above.
It is well known that Atri's medical teachings, as collected by
Agnivda in his Agnivesa-tantra, which existed at least as late as
Cakrapar;i, form the basis of a revised work by Caraka, who is
said to have flourished during the time of Kar;i!?ka, passing by
the name of Caraka-safJ1hitii 1 • It is now also well known that
Caraka did not complete his task, but left it half-finished at a
point in the Cikitsii-sthiina, seventeen chapters of which, together
with the books called Siddhi-sthiina and Kalpa-sthiina, were added
by Kapilabala's son, Dr<;lhabala, of the city ofPaficanada, about the
ninth century A.D. The statement that Dr<;lhabala supplemented the
work in the above way is found in the current texts of the Caraka-
sm.nhitii2. Niscala Kara in his Ratna-prabhii describes him as author
of the Caraka-pariSi~ta, and Cakrapar;i, Vijayarak!?ita and Arur;a-
datta (A.D. 1240), '"·henever they have occasion to quote passages
from his supplementary parts: all refer to Dr<;lhabala as the author.
The city of Paficanada was identified as the Punjab by Dr U. C. Dutt
in his 1llateria A1edica, which identification was accepted by Dr
Cordier and referred to a supposed modem Panjpur ,north of Attock
in the Punjab. There are several Paficanadas in different parts of
India, and one of them is mentioned in the fifty-ninth chapter of
the Kiisi-khm:uJa; Gangadhara in his cominentary identifies this
with Benares, assigning no reason for such identification. Hoernle,
however, thinks that this Paficanada is the modern village of
1 On Caraka's being the court-physician of Km;i~ka see S. LeYi, Notes sur
les lnd'J-Scythes, in Journal Asiatique, pp. 444 sqq.

~ Caraka-sm!thitii, VI. 30 and Siddlzi-sthiina, VII. 8.
Pantzinor ("five channels" in Kashmir) and holds that Dr9habala
was an inhabitant of this place. There are many passages in Caraka
which the commentators believe to be additions of the Kasmira
recension (Kiismlra-piiJha). Madhava quotes a number of verses
from the third chapter of the sixth section, on fevers, which verses
arc given with the omission of about twenty-four lines. Vijaya-
rak~ita, in his commentary on lVIadhava's lvidiina, says that these
lines belong to the Kasmira recension. Existing manuscripts vary
very much with regard to these lines; for, while some have the lines,
in others they are not found. In the same chapter there are other
passages which are expressly noted by Cakrapa1_1idatta as belonging
to Kasmira recensions, and are not commented upon by him. '"(here
are also other examples. Hoernle points out that Jivananda's edition
of 1877 gives the Kasmira version, while his edition of 1896, as
well as the editions of Gangadhara, the two Sens and Abinas,
have Caraka's original version. 1\tladhava never quotes readings
belonging to the Kasmira recension. Hoemle puts together four
points, viz. that Caraka's work was revised and completed by
Drghabala, that there existed a Kasmira recension of the Caraka-
sa1J1hitii, that Dr9habala calls himself a native of Paiicanada city,
and that there existed a holy place of that name in Kasmira; and
he argues that the so-called Kasmira recension represents the re-
vision of the Caraka-sartzhitii by Dr9habala. Judging from the
fact that l\'Iadhava takes no notice of the readings of the Kasmira
recension, he argues that the latter did not exist in Madhava's
time and that therefore l\Iadhava's date must be anterior to that
of Dr9habala.
But which portions were added to the Caraka-sa1J1hitii by
Drghabala? The obvious assumption is that he added the last
seventeen chapters of the sixth book (Cikitsii} and the seventh and
eighth books 1 • But such an assumption cannot hold good, since
there is a great divergence in the counting of the number of the
chapters in different manuscripts. Thus, while }ivananda's text
marks Arsas, Atisara, Visarpa, l\1adatyaya and Dvivra1_1iya as the
ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth chapters of Cikitsii
and therefore belonging to the original Caraka, Gangadhara's text
asmin saptiidasiidltyii kalpiil;. siddhaya eva ca
niisiidyante 'gnivesasya tantre Carakasa'f!I.Skrte
tiin etiin Kapilaba/a}; se~iin Drtfhabalo 'karot
tantrasyiisya mahiirthasya ptlrm;iirtha'fl yathiiyatham.
VI. JO. 274·
XIII] Ayur-veda Literature 431
calls the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth chapters
Unmada, Apasmara, K~atak~IQa, Svayathu and Udara. The seven-
teen chapters attributed to Dr<Jhabala have consequently different
titles in the Garigadhara and Jivananda editions. Hoemle has dis-
cussed very critically these textual problems and achieved notable
results in attributing chapters to Caraka or Dr<Jhabala 1 • But it is
needless for us to enter into these discussions.
IVIahamahopadhyaya Kaviraj Ga1.1anatha Sen, merely on the
strength of the fact that the Riija-tarangifll is silent on the matter 2 ,
disputes the traditional Chinese statement that Caraka wa~ the
court-physician of Ka1.1i~ka. There is no ground to believe as
gospel truth a tradition, which cannot be traced to any earlier
authority than Bhoja (eleventh century), that Pataiijali was the
author of a medical work, and that therefore Pataiijali and Caraka
could be identified. His comparisons of some passages from
Caraka (Iv. 1) with some sutras of Pataiijali are hardly relevant
and he finally has to rest for support of this identification on the
evidence of Ramabhadra Dik~ita, a man of the seventeenth or the
eighteenth century, who holds that Pataiijali had written a work
on medicine. He should have known that there were more
Pataiijalis than one, and that the alchemist and medical Pataiijali
was an entirely different person from Pataiijali, the grammarian.
The most important commentary now completely available to
us is the Ayur-veda-dzpikii, or Caraka-tiitparya-tzkii, of CakrapaQi-
datta. Another important commentary is the Caraka-paiijikii by
Svamikumara. He was a Buddhist in faith, and he refers to the
commentator Hariscandra. The Caraka-tattva-pradzpika was
written in later times by Sivadasasena, who also wrote the Tattva-
candrikii, a commentary on Cakradatta. We hear also of other
commentaries on Caraka by Ba~pacandra or Vapyacandra, Isana-
deva, Isvarasena, Vakulakara, Jinadasa, Munidasa, Govardhana,
Sandhyakara, Jaya nandi and the Caraka-candrikii of Gayadasa.
Among other ancient treatises we may mention the Kiisyapa-
sarrzhitii, discovered in KathmaQQii, a medical dialogue between
Kasyapa, the teacher and Bhargava, the student. It is interesting
to note that it has some verses (lVIS., pp. 105-110) which are
identical with part of the fifth chapter of the first book of Caraka.
There is another important manuscript, called Bhiiradviija-
1
:J.R.A.S., 1908 and 1909.
2
Pratyak~a-siirzram, introduction.
sa1[thitii, which contains within it a small work called Bhesaja-
kalpa, a commentary by Venkate8a 1 • Agnive8a's original work,
the Agnivesa-sa'f!lhitii, which was the basis of Caraka's revision,
was available at least up to the time of Cakrapat).i; Vijayarak~ita
and Srikai)thadatta also quote from it 2 • Jatiikari)a's work also
existed till the time of the same writers, as they occasionally quote
from Jatukan;a-sarJZhitii 3 • The PariiSara-sarJZhitii and K~iirapii1Ji
Sa1Jlhitii were also available down to Srikai)thadatta's, or even down
to Sivadasa's, time. The Hiirita-SarJZhitii (different from the printed
and more modem .text) was also available from the time of
Cakrapai)i and Vijayarak~ita, as is evident from the quotations
from it in their works. Bhela's work, called Bhela-SarJZhitii, has
already been published by the University of Calcutta. It may be
remembered that Agnivesa, Bhela, J atiikan;a, Parasara, Harita
and K~arapai)i were all fellow-students in medicine, reading with
the same teacher, A.treya-Punarvasu; Agnivesa, being the most
intelligent of them all, wrote his work first, but Bhela and his
other fellow-students also wrote independent treati_ses, which
were read before the assembly of medical scholars and approved by
them. Another work of the same school, called Kharm;ada-sarJZhitii,
and also a ViSviimitra-SarJZhitii, both of which are not now available,
are utilized by CakrapaQi and other writers in their commentaries.
The name sarJZhitii, however, is no guarantee of the antiquity of
these texts, for the junior Vagbhata's work is also called A~!iiilga
hrdaya-SarJZhitii. We have further a manuscript called V araruci-
SarJZhitii, by Vararuci, and a Siddha-siira-SarJZhitii by Ravigupta,
son of Durgagupta, which are of comparatively recent date. The
Brahma-vaivarta-purii7Ja refers to a number of early medical works,
such as the Cikitsii-tattva-vijiiiina of Dhanvantari, Cikitsii-darsana
of Divodasa, Cikitsii-kaumudl of Kasiraja, Cikitsii-siira-tantra and
Bhrama-ghna of Asvini, Vaidyaka-sarvasva of Nakula, Vyiidhi-
sindhu-vimardana of Sahadeva, Jiiiiniir1Java of Yama, Jlviidana of
Cyavana, Vaidya-sandeha-bhaiijana of Janaka, Sarva-siira of
Candrasuta, Tantra-siira of Jabala, Vediinga-siira of Jajali, Nidiina
of Paila, Sarva-dhara of Karatha and Dvaidha-niT1}aya-tantra of
1
See Dr Cordier's Recentes Decouvertes de MSS. Medicaux Sanscrits dans
l'Inde (1898-1902).
2
See Cakrapal).i's commentary on Caraka-sarphitii, II. 2, also SrikaQtha on
the Siddha-yoga, Jvariidhikii.ra.
3 CakrapaQi's commentary, II. 2 and n. 5, also Srikal).tha on the Nidiina
(K~udra-roga).
1•
Agastya But nothing is known of these works, and it is difficult
to say if they actually existed.
It is well known that there were two Vagbhatas (sometimes
spelt Vahata). The earlier Vagbhata knew Caraka and Susruta.
It is conjectured by Hoernle and others that the statement of
I-tsing (A.D. 67s-685), that the eight arts formerly existed in eight
books, and that a man had lately epitomized them and made them
into one bundle, and that all physicians in the five parts of India
practised according to that book, alludes to the A~!iiizga-Saf!lgraha
of Vagbhata the elder. In that case Vagbhata I must have flourished
either late in the sixth century or early in the seventh century; for
1-tsing speaks of him as having epitomized the work" lately," and
on the other hand time must be allowed for the circulation of such
a work in the five parts of India. A comparison of Susruta and
Vagbhata I shows that the study of anatomy had almost ceased to
exist in the latter's time. It is very probable that Vagbhata was a
Buddhist. The A:r:fii1iga-Saf!lgraha has a commentary by lndu; but
before Indu there had been other commentators, whose bad ex-
positions were refuted by him 2 •
l\'fadhava, Dnlhabala and Vagbhata II all knew Vagbhata I.
lV1adhava mentions him by name and occasionally quotes from
him both in the Siddha-yoga and in the Nidiina, and so also does
Dnlhabala 3 • Hoernle has shown that Dnlhabala's 96 diseases of
the eye are based on Vagbhata's 94· Vagbhata II towards the end
of the Uttara-sthiina of his A~tiiizga-hrdaya-saf!Zhitii definitely ex-
presses his debt to Vagbhata I. But they must all have flourished
before Cakrapal)i, who often refers to Dglhabala and Vagbhata II.
If, as Hoernle has shown, l\Iadhava was anterior to Dp;lhabala, he
also must necessarily have flourished before Cakrapal)i. Hoernle 's
argument that l\1adhava flourished before Dglhabala rests upon
the fact that Susruta counts 76 kinds of eye-diseases, while
Vagbhata I has 94· Dp;lhabala accepts Vagbhata I 's 94 eye-diseases
with the addition of two more, added by l\Iadhava, making his list
come to 96. ~1adhava had accepted Susruta's 76 eye-diseases and
1
It is curious to notice that the Brahma-·vaivarta-puriir:za makes Dhanvantari,
Kasiraja and Divodasa different persons, which is contrary to Susruta's state-
ment noted above.
2
Durvyiihhyii-·vi~a-suptasya Viiha{asyiismad-ulltaya!z smlfu sa1Jl·citti-dayinyas
sad-iigama-pari~krtii. lndu's commentary, 1. 1.
3 Siddha-yoga, 1. 27, A~!iinga-sa'!lgraha, II. 1, Nidiina, II. 22 and 23, Sa1Jl-
gmha, 1. 266, Caralw-sa1Jlhitii (Jivananda, 1896), Cikitsita-sthiina, xvr. 31,
Sa'!tgraha, 11. 26. Again, Cikitsita-sthiina, XVI. 53, etc., Sa1Jlgraha, 11. 27, etc.
DII 28
added two of his own 1 • The second point in Hoemle's argument
is that Madhava in his quotations from Caraka always omits the
passages marked by Vijayarak~ita as Kasmira readings, which
Hoerp.le identifies with the revision work of Dnlhabala. These
arguments of Hoernle appear very inconclusive; for, if the
so-called Kasmira recension can be identified with Dr<Jhabala's
revision, both Dr<;ihabala's Kasmira nativity and his posteriority
to Madhava can be proved; but this proposition has not been
proved. On the other hand, CakrapaQi alludes to a Dr<;ihabala
satpskara side by side with a Kasmira reading, and this seems
to indicate that the two are not the same 2 • The suggestion of
Madhava's anteriority on the ground that he counts 78 eye-
diseases is rather far-fetched. Madhava's date, therefore, cannot
be definitely settled. Hoernle is probably correct in holding that
Dr<Jhabala is anterior to Vagbhata3 • However, the relative an-
teriority or posteriority of these three writers does not actually
matter very much; for they lived at more or less short intervals
from one another and their dates may roughly be assigned to a
period between the eighth and tenth centuries A.D.
Vagbhata Il's A~fiitiga-hrdaya-sa1Jlhitii has at least five com-
mentaries, viz. by AruQadatta (Sarviitiga-sundarz), Asadhara,
Candracandana (Padiirtha-candrikii), Ramanatha and Hemadri
(Ayur-veda-rasiiyana). Of these Arul_ladatta probably lived in A.D.
1220. l\'Iadhava's Rug-viniScaya, a compendium of pathology, is
one of the most popular works of Indian l\ledicine. It has at least
seven commentaries, viz. by Vijayarak!?ita (Madhu-kosa), Vaidya-
vacaspati (Ataizka-dzpana), Ramanatha Vaidya, Bhavanisahaya,
Naganatha (Nidiina-pradtpa), Gal).esa Bhisaj and the commentary
known as Siddhiinta-candrikii or Vivarm;za-siddhiinta-candrikii,
by Narasirpha Kaviraja 4 • Vijayarak!?ita's commentary, however,
1
Hoernle thinks that the total number of 76 eye-diseases ordinarily found
in the printed editions of Madhava's Nidii.na is not correct, as they do not
actually tally with the descriptions of the different eye-diseases given by
Madhava and do not include pa~ma-kopa and pak~ma-sii.tii varieties. Hoernle's
"Osteology," p. 13.
2
Cakra's commentary, 1. 7. 46-so.
3 See Hoernle's "Osteology," pp. 14-16.
4
Narasirp.ha Kaviraja was the son of Nilakal).tha Bhatta and the pupil of
Ramakr~t:la Bhatta. He seems to have written another medical work, called
Madhu-matl. His Vivara1J.a-siddhii.nta-candrikii., though based on Vijaya's
Madhu-ko~a. is an excellent commentary and contains much that is both
instructive and new. The only manuscript available is probably the one that
belongs to the family library of the author of the present work, who is preparing
an edition of it for publication.
closes with the 33rd chapter, and the rest of the work was accom-
plished by Srikal)thadatta, a pupil of Vijayarak~ita. Vrnda (who
may be the same as l\!Iadhava) wrote a Siddha-yoga, a book of
medical formulas, well known among tnedical writers.
In connection with this brief account of Indian medical
works the Nava-nlfaka, and the other mutilated medical treatises
which have been discovered in Central Asia and which go by the
name of "Bower manuscript," cannot be omitted. This manu-
script is written on birch leaves in Gupta characters and is
probably as old as the fifth century A.D. It is a Buddhist work,
containing many medical formulas taken from Caraka, Susruta
and other unknown writers. It will, however, be understood that
an elaborate discussion of chronology or an exhaustive account
of Indian medical works would be out of place in a work like
the present.· The Ayur-veda literature, and particularly that part
which deals with medical formulas and recipes, medical lexicons
and the like, is vast. Aufrecht's catalogue contains the names
of about 1500 manuscript texts, most of which have not yet
been published, and there are many other manuscripts not
mentioned in Aufrecht's catalogue. Among the books now
much in use may be mentioned the works of San\gadhara, of the
fourte~nth century, Sivadasa's commentary on Cakrapal)i, of the
fifteenth century, anrl the Bhiiva-prakiisa of Bhavamisra, of the
sixteenth. Vailgasena's work is also fairly common. Among ana-
tomical texts Bhoja's work and Bhaskara Bhatta's Sarzra-padminz
deserve mention. The Aupadhenava-tantra, Pau~kaliivata-tantra,
V aitarm.za-tantra and Bhoja-tantra are alluded to by Qalhat).a.
The Bhiiluki-tantra and Kapila-tantra are mentioned by Cakrapal)i
in hisBhiinumatl commentary. So much for the anatomical treatises.
Videha-tantra, 1Vimi-tantra, Kiinkiiyana-tantra, Satyaki-tantra,
Kariila-tantra and Krf~liilreya-tantra on eye-diseases are alluded
to in Srikarnha's commentary on Madhava's Nidiina. The Saunaka-
tantra on eye-diseases is named in the commentaries of Cakrapal)i
and Qalhal).a. The Jtvaka-tantra, Parvataka-tantra and Bandhaka-
tantra are alluded to by Qalhai)a as works on midwifery. The
Hira1}yiik~ya-tantra on the same subject is named by Srikal).tha,
whereas the Kasyapa-sat{lhitii and Alambiiyana-sa1Jlhitii are cited
by Srikal).~ha on toxicology. The Usanas-sa1Jlhitii, Sanaka-smrzhitii,
Lii!yiiyana-sa1Jlhitii are also mentioned as works on toxicology.
Among some of the other important Tantras may be mentioned
28-2
Speculations in the Medical Schools (CH. XIII
Nagarjuna's Yoga-sataka, containing the eight regular divisions of

Indian Medicine, and Nagarjuna's Jiva-sutra and Bhe~aja-kalpa, all
of which were translated into Tibetan. Three works on the A#iiilga-
hrdaya, called A#iiilga-hrdaya-niima-vaiduryaka-bhii~a, Padiir-
tha-candrikii-prabhiisa-niima, A~tiiizga-hrdaya-vrtti and V aidyakii-
~tiinga-hrdaya-vrtter bhe~aja-niima-silci, were· also translated into
Tibetan.
The Ayur-veda-siltra is a work by Yoganandanatha, published
with a commentary by the same author in the M ysore University
Sanskrit series in 1922, with an introduction by Dr Shama Sastry.
It is rightly pointed out in the introduction that this is a very
modern work, written after the Bhiiva-prakasa, probably in the
sixteenth century. It contains sixteen chapters and is an attempt
to connect Ayur-veda with Patafijali's Yoga system. It endeavours
to show how different kinds of food increase the sattva, 1·ajas and
tamas qualities and how yoga practices, fasting and the like, in-
fluence the conditions of the body. Its contribution, whether as· a
work of Ayur-veda or as a work of philosophy, is rather slight. It
shows a tendency to connect Yoga with Ayur-veda, while the Vtra-
si'!lhiivalokita is a work which tries to connect astrology with the
same.
CHAPTER XIV
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHAGAVAD-GiTA
The Gita Literature.

THE Gztii is regarded by almost all sections of the Hindus as one
of the most sacred religious works, and a large number of commen-
taries have been written on it by the adherents of different schools
of thought, each of which explained the GUii in its own favour.
Sarikara 's bhii~ya is probably the earliest commentary now available;
but from references and discussions found therein there seems to
be little doubt that there were previous commentaries which he
wished to refute.
Sankara in his interpretation of the Gttii seeks principally to
emphasize the dogma that right knowledge can never be com-
bined with Vedic duties or the duties recommended by the legal
scriptures. If through ignorance, or through attachment, a man
continues to perform the Vedic duties, and if, as a result of s~cri
fices, gifts and tapas (religious austerities), his mind becomes pure
and he acquires the right knowledge regarding the nature of the
ultimate reality-that the passive Brahman is the all-and then,
when all reasons for the performance of actions have ceased for
him, still continues to perform the prescribed duties just like
common men and to encourage others to behave in a similar
manner, then such actions are inconsistent with right knowledge.
\Vhen a man performs actions without desire or motive, they
cannot be considered as karma at all. He alone may be said to be
performing karma, or duties, who has any interest in them. But
the wise man, who has no interest in his karma, cannot be said
to be performing karma in the proper sense of the term, though
to all outward appearances he may be acting exactly like an
ordinary man. Therefore the main thesis of the Gztii, according
to Satikara, is that liberation can come only through right know-
ledge and not through knowledge combined with the performance
of duties. Sankara maintains that all duties hold good for us only
in the stage of ignorance and not in the stage of wisdom. \Vhen
once the right knowledge of identity with Brahman dawns and
ignorance ceases, all notions of duality, which are presupposed by
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii (CH.
the performance of actions and responsibility for them, cease 1 • In
interpreting GUii, III. I, Sailkara criticizes the opinions of some
previous commentators, who held that obligatory duties cannot be
given up even when true wisdom is attained. In reply he alludes
to legal scriptures (smrti-siistra), and asserts that the mere non-
performance of any duties, however obligatory, cannot lead to
evil results, since non-performance is a mere negation and of
mere negation no positive results can come out. The evil effects
of the non-performance of obligatory duties can happen only to
those who have not given up all their actions ( a-Sa1Jtnyiisi-v~ayatviit
pratyaviiya-priiptel.z). But those who have attained true wisdom
and have consequently given up all their actions transcend the
sphere of duties and of the obligatory injunctions of the Vedas,
and the legal scriptures cannot affect them at all. The perform-
ance of duties cannot by itself lead to liberation; but it leads
gradually to the attainment of purity of mind (sattva-suddht)
and through this helps the dawning of the right knowledge,
with which all duties cease 2 • In a very lengthy discussion on
the interpretation of Gitii, XVIII. 67, Sailkara tries to prove that
all duties presuppose the multiplicity of the world of appearance,
which is due to ignorance or nescience, and therefore the sage who
has attained the right knowledge of Brahman, the only reality, has
no duties to perform. Final liberation is thus produced, not by
true knowledge along with the performance of duties, but by
true knowledge alone. The wise man has no duties of any kind.
Satikara's interpretation of the Gitii presupposes that the Gitii holds
the same philosophical doctrine that he does. His method of inter-
pretation is based not so much on a comparison of textual passages,
as simply on the strength of the reasonableness of the exposition
of a view which can be consistently held according to his Vedanta
philosophy, and which he ascribes to the Gztii. The view taken in
the present exposition of the Gitii philosophy is diametrically
opposite to that of Sailkara. It has been repeatedly pointed out
that the Gztii "asserts that even the wise man should perform his
allotted duties, though he may have nothing to gain by the per-
formance of such duties. Even God Himself as Kr~.n).a, though
He had no unsatisfied cravings, passions or desires of any kind,
1
Sail.kara's interpretation of the Gitii, n. 69. Yogasrama edition, Benares,
1919.
2
Ibid. III. 4·
XIV] The Gitii Literature 439
performed His self-imposed duties in order to set an example
to all and to illustrate the fact that even the wise man should
perform his prescribed duties 1 .
Anandajiiana wrote a commentary on Sankara's Bhagavad-gltii-
blzii~~ya, called Bhaga·vad-gltii-bhii~ya-vivara'l}a, and Ramananda
wrote another commentary on that of Sankara, called Bhagavad-gitii-
bhii~ya-'Lyiikhyii. He is also said to have written another work on
the Gltii, called GUiisaya. After Sankara there seems to have been
some pause. \Ve have two commentaries, one in prose and one in
verse, by two persons of the same name, Yamunadirya. The
Yamunacarya who was the author of a prose commentary is
certainly, though a viSi~tiid~~aita-viidin, not the celebrated Yamuna,
the teacher of Ramanuja. His commentary, which has been pub-
lished by the Sudarsana Press, Conjeeveram, is very simple, con-
sisting mainly of a mere paraphrase of the Gltii verses. He thinks
that the first six chapters of the Gttii deal with the nature of true
knowledge of God as a means to devotion, the second six with the
nature of God as attainable by devotion and adoration, and the
third six repeat the same subjects for a further clearing up of the
problems involved.
Yamuna, the great teacher of Ramanuja, who is said to have
been born in A.D. 906, summarized the subject-matter of the Gttii in
a few verses called Gitiirtha-sarrzgraha, on which Nigamanta l\1aha-
desika wrote a commentary known as Gitiirtha-sarrzgraha-ra/qii.
This also was commented on by Varavara Muni, of the fourteenth
century, in a commentary called Gttiirtha-sarrzgraha-dtpikii, pub-
lished by the Sudarsana Press, Conjeeveram. Another commentary,
called Bhagavad-gttiirtha-sa'f!lgraha-flkii, by Pratyak!?adevayatha-
carya, is mentioned by Aufrecht. Yamuna says that the object
of the Guii is to establish the fact that Naraya1_1a is the highest
Brahman, attained only by devotion (bhaktz), which is achieved
through caste duties (n·a-dharma), right knowledge and disinclina-
tion to worldly pleasures (vairiigya). Tt is said that the first six
chapters of the Gitii describe the process of attaining self-know-
ledge by self-concentration (yoga) through knowledge and action
along with self-subordination to God, the performance of all
actions for God and detachment from all other things. Nigamanta
~lahadesika notes that karma may lead to self-realization either in-
directly, through the production of knowledge, or directly by itself.
1 Gua, 111. zz.
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitd (CH.
From the seventh to the twelfth chapters the processes of the
attainment of devotion (bhakti-yoga) by knowle<;lge and by actions
are described, and it is held that the true nature of God can
be realized only by such devotion. From the thirteenth to the
eighteenth chapters, the nature of pradhiina, of puru~a, of the
manifested world and of the supreme lord are described and dis-
tinguished along with the nature of action, of knowledge and of
devotion. Yamuna then goes on to describe the contents of the
chapters of the Gitii one by one. Thus he says that in the second
chapter the nature of the saint of imperturbable wisdom (sthita-dhi)
is described. Such right knowledge can be achieved only by a
knowledge of the self as immortal and the habit of performing
one's duties in an unattached manner. In the third chapter it is
said that a man should perform his duties for the preservation of
the social order (loka-ra~ii) without attachment, leaving the fruits
of all his actions to God, and considering at the same time that
the gUTJas are the real agents of actions and that it is wrong to
pride oneself upon their performance. The fourth chapter de-
scribes the nature of God, how one should learn to look upon
actions as implying no action (on account of unattachment), the
different kinds of duties and the glory of knowledge. The fifth
describes the advantages and the diverse modes of the path of
duties and also the nature of the state of realization of Brahman.
The sixth describes the nature of yoga practice, four kinds of
yogins, the methods of yoga, the nature of yoga realization and the
ultimate superiority of yoga as cmnmunion with God. The seventh
describes the reality of God, how His nature is often veiled from us
by prakrti or the gu1Jas, how one should seek protection from God,
the nature of the different kinds of devotees, and the superiority
of the truly enlightened person. The eighth describes the lordly
power of God and the reality of His nature as the unchanged and
the unchangeable; it also describes the duties of those who seek
protection in God and the nature of the true wisdom. The ninth
describes the glory of God and His superiority even when He
incarnates Himself as man, and the nature of devotional com-
munion. The tenth describes the infinite number of God's noble
qualities and the dependence of all things on Him, for initiating
and increasing devotion. The eleventh describes how the true
nature of God can be perceived, and demonstrates that it is only
through devotion that God can be known or attained. The twelfth
XIV] The Guii Literature 44 1
describes the superiority of devotion, methods of attaining devotion,
and different kinds of devotion; it is also held that God is highly
pleased by the devotion of His devotees. The thirteenth describes
the nature of the body, the purification of the self for self-realization,
the cause of bondage and right discrimination. The fourteenth
describes how the nature of an action is determined by the ties
of gu~za, how the gw;as may be made to cease from influencing
us, and how God alone is the root of all the ways of the self's
future destiny. The fifteenth describes how the supreme lord is
different from the pure selves, as well as from selves in association
with non-selves, on account of his all-pervasiveness and his nature
as upholder and lord. The sixteenth describes the division of
beings into godly and demoniac and also the privileged position
of the scriptures as the authority for laying the solid foundation
of knowledge of the true nature of our duties. The seventeenth
distinguishes unscriptural things from scriptural. The eighteenth
describes how God alone should be regarded as the ultimate agent
of all actions, and states the necessity of purity and the nature of
the effects of one's deeds. According to Yamuna karma-yoga, or
the path of duties, consists of religious austerities, pilgrimage, gifts
and sacrifices; jiiiina-yoga, or the path of knowledge, consists of
self-control and purity of mind; bhakti-yoga,or the path of devotion,
consists in the meditation of God, inspired by an excess of joy in
the communion with the divine. All these three paths mutually
lead to one another. All three are essentially of the nature- of the
worship of God, and, whether regarded as obligatory or occasional,
are helpful for discovering the true nature of one's self. When
by self-realization ignorance is wholly removed, and when a man
attains superior devotion to God, he is received into God.
Ramanuja, the celebrated Vai~I).ava teacher and interpreter of
the Brahma-siltra, who is said to have been born in A.D. 1017,
wrote a commentary on the Gitii on visi#iidvaita lines, viz. monism
qualified as theism. Venkatanatha, called also Vedantacarya, wrote
a sub-commentary thereon, called Tiitparya-candrikii. Ramanuja
generally followed the lines of interpretation suggested in the brief
summary by his teacher Yamuna. On the question of the im-
perativeness of caste duties Ramanuja says that the Gitii holds
that the duties allotted to each caste must be performed, since the
scriptures are the commands of God and no one can transgress
His orders; so the duties prescribed by the scriptures as obligatory
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita (CH.
are compulsory for all. The duties have, therefore, to be performed
without desire for their fruits and purely because they are the
injunctions of the scriptures (eka-siistriirthatayii anu~theyam). It
is only when duties performed simply to please God, and as
adoration of Him, have destroyed all impurities of the mind, and
when the senses have become controlled, that a man becomes fit
for the path of wisdom. A man can never at any stage of his
progress forsake the duty of worshipping God, and it is only
through such adoration of God that the sins accumulating in him
from beginningless time are gradually washed away and he can
become pure and fit for the path of knowledge 1 • In interpreting
111. 8 Ramanuja says that the path of duties (karma-yoga) is
superior to the path of knowledge (jiiiina-yoga). The path of
duties naturally leads to self-knowledge; so self-knowledge is also
included within its scope. The path of knowledge alone cannot
lead us anywhere; for without work even the body cannot be made
to live. Even those who adhere to the path of knowledge must
perform the obligatory and occasional (nitya-naimittika) duties,
and it is through the development of this course that one can
attain self-realization by duty alone. The path of duties is to
be followed until self-realization (iitmiivalokana) and, through it,
emancipation are obtained. But the chief duty of a man is to be
attached to God with supreme devotion.
Madhvacarya, or . .:~_nandatirtha, who lived in the first three-
quarters of the thirteenth century, wrote a commentary on the
Bhagavad-gitii, called Gitii-bhii~ya, commented on by Jayatirtha in
his Prameya-dtpil~ii, and also a separate monograph interpreting the
main purport of the Gitii, called Bhagavad-gitii-tiitparya-nir"'}aya,
commented on by J ayatirtha in his Nyiiya-dzpikii. His main em-
phasis was on the fact that God is different from everything else,
and that the only way of attaining our highest goal is through
devotion (bhaktz) as love and attachment (sn~ha). In the course
of his interpretation he also introduced long discussions in
refutation of the monistic theory of Sankara. Since everything
is dominated by the will of Hari the Lord, no one ought to
feel any attachment to mundane things. Duties are to be per-
formed by all. Kr~I).abhatta Vidyadhiraja, the sixth disciple from
1
Anabhismrzhita-phalma kevala-parama-puru~iiriidhana-rupeyiinu#hitena kar-
11za7Jii vidhvasta-mano-malo 'vyiikulendriyo jiiiina-ni~thiiyiim adhikamti. Rama-
nuja's commentary on the Gitii, III. 3· See also ibid. III. 4· Gujarati Press,
Bombay, 1908.
XIVj Gua and Yoga 443
lVIadhva, who lived in the first quarter of the fourteenth century,
wrote a commentary on the Gttii, called Gztii-fikii. Raghavendra
Svamin, who lived in the seventeenth century and was a pupil
of Sudhindra Yati, wrote three works on the Gztii, called Gitii-
'l'ivrti, Gitiirtha-saf!tgraha and Gttiirtha-vi'l'al'a1Ja. Commentaries
were also written by Vallabhacarya, Vijfianabhikl?u, Kesava Bhatta
of the Nimbarka school (called Gitii-tatt'l'a-prakiiSikii), Afijaneya
(called Hanumad-bhii~ya), Kalyal)a Bhatta (called Rasika-rafijinz),
Jagaddhara (called Bhagavad-gztii-pradzpa), Jayarama (called Gitii-
siiriirtha-Sa'f!lgraha), Baladeva Vidyabhu~al)a (called GUii-blzu~a1Ja
bhii~ya), Madhusudana (called Guq_ha.rtha-dzpikii), Brahn1ananda
Giri, l\Iathuranatha (called Bhagavad-gitii-prakiisa), Dattatreya
(called Prabodha-candrikii), Ramakr~l)a, IVlukundadasa, Rama-
narayal)a, Visvesvara, Sankarananda, Sivadayalu Sridharasvamin
(called Subodhinz), Sadananda Vyasa (called Bhiiva-prakiisa),
Suryapan<;lita (Paramiirtha-prapii), Nilakal)tha (called Bhiiva-
dtpikii), and also from the Saiva point of view by Rajanaka and
Ramakal)tha (called Sarvato-bhadra). Many other works were also
written on the general purport of the Gitii, such as Bhaga·vad-
gitiirtha-sa'f!lgraha by Abhinavagupta and Nrsiqilia Thakkura,
Bhagavad-gitiirtha-siira by Gokulacandra, Bhagavad-gitii-lak-
~iibhara1Ja by Vadiraja, Bhagavad-gitii-siira by Kaivalyananda
Sarasvati, Bhagavad-gitii-siira-sa'f!lgraha by N arahari and Bha-
gavad-gitii-hetu-nir1}aya by Vitthala Dik~ita. 1V1ost of these com-
mentaries are written either from the point of view of Sankara's
bhii~ya, repeating the same ideas in other language, or from the
Vai~l)ava point of view, approving of the hold of normal duties
of men in all stages of life and sometimes differing only in the
conception of God and His relation with men. These can claim
but little originality either of argument or of opinions, and so may
well be left out of detailed consideration for our present purposes.
Gita and Yoga.

\Vhoever may have written the Gitii, it seems very probable
that he was not acquainted with the technical sense of yoga as the
cessation of mental states (citta-vrtti-nirodha), as used by Patafijali
in his Yoga-sutra, 1. I. I have elsewhere shown that there are
three roots, yujir yoge and yuj samiidhau, i.e. the rootyujir, to join,
and the root yuj in the sense of cessation of mental states or one-
444 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gttii [cH.
pointedness, and yuj sarrzyamane, i.e. yuj in the sense of controlling.
In the Gitii the word yoga appears to have been used in many
senses, which may seem to be unconnected with one another; yet
it may not be quite impossible to discover relations among them.
The primary sense of the word yoga in the Gitii is derived from
the root yujir yoge or yuj, to join, with which is connected in a
negative way the root yuj in the sense of controlling or restricting
anything to that to which it is joined. Joining, as it means contact
with something, also implies disjunction from some other thing.
When a particular type of mental outlook or scheme of action is
recommended, we find the word buddhi-yoga used, which simply
means that one has intimately to associate oneself with a particular
type of wisdom or mental outlook. Similarly, when the word
karma-yoga is used, it simply means that one has to associate
oneself with the obligatoriness of the performance of duties. Again,
the word yoga is used in the sense of fixing one's mind either on
the self (iitman) or on God. It is clear that in all these varying
senses the dominant sense is that of "joining." But such a joining
implies also a disjunction, and the fundamental and indispensable
disjunction implied is dissociation from all desires for pleasures
and fruits of action (phala-tyiiga). For this reason cases are not
rare where yoga is used to mean cessation of desires for the fruits
of action. Thus, in the Gitii, VI. 2, it is said, "What is called
cessation (of desires for the fruits of action) is what you should
know, 0 Pal)<;iava, as Yoga: without renouncing one's desires
( na hy asarrznyasta-sankalpa) one cannot be a yogin 1 ." The reason
why this negative concept of cessation of desires should be regarded
as yoga is that without such a renunciation of desires no higher
kind of union is possible. But even such a dissociation from the
fruits of desires (which in a way also means sarrzyamana, or self-
control) is to be supplemented by the performance of duties at the
preliminary stages; and it is only in the higher stages, when one is
fixed in yoga (yogiirut}ha), that meditative peace (sama) can be
recommended. Unless and until one succeeds in conquering all
attachments to sense-objects and actions and in giving up all
desires for fruits of actions, one cannot be fixed in yoga. It is by
our attempts at the performance of our duties, trying all the time
1 Asa1{lnyasto 'parityakta~z phala-vi~ayafz saizkalpo 'hhisandhir yena so 'sa1{lnyas-
ta-saizkalpafz. Sankara's commentary, VI. 2. Na sa1{lnyastafz phala-saizkalpo yena.

Sridhara'~ commentary on the above. Yogasrama edition, Benares, 1919.
XIV] Guii and Yoga 445
to keep the mind clear from motives of pleasure and enjoyment,
that we gradually succeed in elevating it to a plane at which it
would be natural to it to desist from all motives of self-interest,
pleasure and enjoyment. It is at this stage that a man can be
called fixed in yoga or yogarur;lha. This naturally involves a con-
flict between the higher self and the lower, or rather between
the real self and the false; for, while the lower self always
inclines to pathological and prudential motives, to motives of
self-interest and pleasure, it has yet within it the higher ideal,
which is to raise it up. Man is both a friend and a foe to him-
self; if he follows the path of his natural inclinations and the
temptations of sense-enjoyment, he takes the downward path of
evil, and is an enemy to his own higher interests; whereas it is
his clear duty to raise himself up, to strive that he may not sink
down but may elevate himself to a plane of detachment from
all sense-pleasures. The duality involved in this conception of
a friend and a foe, of conqueror and conquered, of an uplifting
power and a gravitating spirit, naturally involves a distinction
between a higher self (paramatman) and a lower self (atman). It
is only when this higher self conquers the lower that a self is a
friend to itself. In a man who has failed to conquer his own
passions and self-attachments the self is its own enemy. The
implication, however, is that the lower self, though it gravitates
towards evil, has yet inherent in it the power of self-elevation.
This power of self-elevation is not something extraneous, but
abides in the self, and the Gua is emphatic in its command," Thou
shouldst raise thyself and not allow thyself to sink down; for the
self is its own friend and its foe as welP."
It is only when the self thus conquers its lower tendencies
and rises to a higher plane that it comes into touch with the
higher self (paramatman). The higher self always remains as
an ideal of elevation. The yoga activity of the self thus consists,
on the one hand, in the efforts by which the yogin dissociates
himself from the sense-attachments towards which he was naturally
gravitating, and on the other hand, in the efforts by which he tries
to elevate himself and to come into touch with the higher self.
At the first stage a man performs his duties in accordance with
the injunctions of the sastras; then he performs his duties and
tries to dissociate himself from all motiyes of self-interest and
1 VI. 5·
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gztii [cH.
enjoyment, and at the next stage he succeeds in conquering these
lower motives and is in touch with the higher self. Even at this
stage he may still continue to perform his duties, merely for the
sake of duty, or he may devote himself to meditative concentration
and union with the higher self or with God. Thus the Gitii says
that the person who has conquered himself and is at peace with
himself is in touch with paramiitman. Such a person is a true
philosopher; for he not only knows the truths, but is happy in the
inner realization and direct intuitive apperception of such truths;
he is unshakable in himself; having conquered his senses, he
attaches the same value to gold and to stones; he is the same to
friends and to enemies, to the virtuous as to the sinful; he is in
union (with paramiitman) and is called a yogin 1 • The fact that the
word yogin is derived here from the root yuj, to join, is evident
from a number of passages where the verb yuj is used in this
connection 2 •
The GUii advises a yogin who thus wants to unite himself
with pm·amiitman, or God, in a mt"ditative union, to lead a lonely
life, controlling his mind and body, desiring nothing and accepting
nothing 3 • The yogin should seat himself on level ground, in a
clean place, and, being firm on his threefold seat composed of
kusa grass, a leopard skin and soft linen, he should control his
thoughts, senses and movements, make his mind one-pointed in
(}od (tatra), gather himself up in union, and thus purify himself4 •
The yogin should eat neither· too much nor too little, should
neither sleep too much, nor dispense with sleep. He should thus
1 Yukta ity ucyate yogi sama-lo5{iisma-kaiicanal;l, VI. 8. Sankara, however, splits
it up into two independent sentences, as follows: ya idrso yuktal;l samiihita iti sa

ucyate kathyate; sa yogl sama-lo5{iisma-kaiicanal;l. Sridhara, again, takes a quite
different view and thinks it to be a definition of the yogiirutfha state and believes
yukta to mean yogiirfujluz, which in my opinion is unjustifiable. My interpre-
tation is simpler and more direct than either of these and can be justified by a
reference to the context in VI. 7 and VI. 10.
2 Yogi :yufijua satatam iitmiina1Jl rahasi sthital;l. Ibid. VI. 10.
Upavisyiisane yu1ijyad yogam ii.tma-visuddhaye. VI. 12.
Yukta iisfta mat-paral;l. VI. 14·
Ywijann eva1Jl sadiitmiina1Jz yogi 11iyata-miinasal;l. VI. 15, etc.
3 Ekakl yata-cittiitmii niriisir aparigrahal;l. VI. 10. The word iitmii in yata-
czttiitmii is used in the sense of body (deha), according to Sankara, Sridhara

and others.
4 Both Sankara and Sridhara make tatra an adjective to tisane. Such an
adjective to tisane would not only be superfluous, but would also leave ekiigram
without an object. The verb yufijyiit, literally meaning "should link up,, is
interpreted by Sridhara as "should practise," apparently without any justifica-
tion (vi. 12).
XIV] Gila and Y'oga 447
lead the middle course of life and avoid extremes. This avoidance
of extren1es is very unlil'e the process of yoga advised by Patafijali.
Patafijali's course of yoga formulates a method by which the yogzn
can gradually habituate himself to a condition of life in which
he can ultimately dispenfe with food and drink altogether and
desist from all movements of body and mind. The object of a yogin
in making his mind one-pointed is ultimately to destroy the mind.
According to Patafijali the advancement of a yogin has but one
object before it, viz. the cessation of all movements of mind
(citta-·vrtti-nirodha). Since this absolute cessation cannot be effected
without stopping all movements of the body, desires and passions
are to be uprooted, not only because they would make the mind fly
to different objects, but also because they would necessitate move-
nlents of the body, which would again disturb the mind. The
yogin therefore has to practise a twofold control of movements of
body and mind. He has to habituate himself to dispensing with
the necessity of food and drink, to make himself used to all kinds
of privations and climatic inconveniences of heat and cold and
ultimately to prepare himself for the stoppage of all kinds of bodily
movements. But, since this cannot be successfully done so long
as one inhales and exhales, he has to practise prii1_liiyiima for abso-
lute breath-control, anrl not for hours or days, but for months
and years. l\Ioral elevation is regarded as indispensable in yoga
only because without absolute and perfect cessation of all desires
and passions the movements of the body and mind could not be
absolutely stopped. The yogin, ho\vever, has not only to cut off
all new causes of disturbance leading to movements of body and
mind, but also to practise one-pointedness of n1ind on subtler
and subtler objects, so that as a result thereof the sub-conscious
forces of the mind can also be destroyed. Thus, on the one hand,
the mind should be made to starve by taking care that no new
sense-data and no new percepts, concepts, thoughts, ideas or
emotions be presented to it, and, on the other hand, steps are to be
taken to make the mind one-pointed, by which all that it had
apprehended before, which formed the great storehouse of the
sub-conscious, is destroyed. The mind, thus pumped out on both
sides, becomes absolutely empty and is destroyed. The ideal of
Patanjali's Yoga is absolute extremism, consisting in absolute
stoppage of all functions of body and mind.
TheGUii,on the other hand,prescribes the golden middle course
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gttii [CH.
of moderate food, drink, sleep, movements of the body and activity
in general. The object of the yogin in the Guii is not the absolute
destruction of mind, but to bring the mind or the ordinary self
into communion with the higher self or God. To the yogin who
practises meditation the Gitii advises steadiness of posture; thus
it says that the yogin should hold his body, head and shoulders
straight, and, being unmoved and fixed in his posture, should
avoid looking to either side and fix his eyes on the tip of his nose.
The Gitii is, of course, aware of the proce~- of breath-control
and prii1Jiiyiima; but, curiously enough, it does not speak of it
in its sixth chapter on dhyiina-yoga, where almost the whole
chapter is devoted to yoga practice and the conduct of yogins. In
the fifth chapter, v. 27, it is said that all sense-movements and
control of life-movements (prii1Ja-karmii1Jt) are like oblations to the
fire of self-control. In the two obscure verses of the same chapter,
v. 29 and 30, it is said that there are some who offer an oblation
of prii1Ja to apiina and of apiina to prii1Ja and thus, stopping the
movement of inhalation and exhalation (prii1Jiipiina-gati ruddhvli),
perform the prli1Jiiyiima, while there are others who, taking a low
diet, offer an oblation of prli'l}a to prli1Ja. Such actions on the part
of these people are described as being different kinds of sacrifices,
or yafiia, and the people who perform them are called yajiia-vida/.t
(those who know the science of sacrifice), and not yogin. It is
difficult to understand the exact tneaning of offering an oblation
of prii1Ja to prii1Ja or of prli1Ja to apiiua and of calling this sacrifice.
The interpretations of Sailkara, Sridhara and others give us but
little help in this matter. They do not tell us why it should be
called a yajiia or how an oblation of prii1Ja to prli1Ja can be made,
and they do not even try to give a synonym for juhvati (offer
oblation) used in this connection. It seems to me, however, that
there is probably a reference to the mystical substitution-medita-
tions (pratikopiisanii) which were used as substitutes for sacrifices
and are referred to in the Upani~ads. Thus in the Maitri Upani~ad,
VI. 9, we find that Brahman is to be meditated upon as the
ego, and in this connection, oblations of the five viiyus to fire with
such mantras as prii'l}iiya sviihii, apiiniiya sviihli, etc. are recom-
mended. It is easy to imagine that, in a later process of development,
for the actual offering of oblations to fire was substituted a certain
process of breath-control, which still retained the old phraseology
of the offering of oblations in a sacrifice. If this interpretation is
XIV] GUii and Yoga 449
accepted, it will indicate how processes of breath-control became
in many cases associated with substitution-meditations of the
Vedic type 1 . The development of processes of breath-control
in connection with substitution-meditations does not seem to
be unnatural at all, and, as a matter of fact, the practice of
prii1y1iyiima in connection with such substitution-meditations is
definitely indicated in the 1llaitri Upani~ad, VI. 18. The movement
of inhalation and exhalation was known to be the cause of all
body-heat, including the heat of digestive processes, and Kr~l}a is
supposed to say in the Gztii, xv. 14, "As fire I remain in the body
of living beings and in association with priil}a and apiina I digest
four kinds of food and drink." The author of the Guii, however,
seems to have been well aware that the prii1Ja and apiina breaths
passing through the nose could be properly balanced (samau), or
that the prii1Ja viiyu could be concentrated between the two eye-
brows or in the head (miirdhni) 2 • It is difficult to say what is
exactly meant by taking the prii1Ja in the head or between the
eyebrows. There seems to have been a belief in the Atharva-siras
Upani~ad and also in the Atharva-sikhii Upani~ad that the prii1Ja
could he driven upwards, or that such priil}a, being in the head,
could protect it 3 • Manu also speaks of the prii1JaS of young
men rushing upwards when old men approached them. But,
whatever may be meant, it is certain that neither the balancing
of prii1Ja and apiina nor the concentrating of prii1Ja in the
head or between the eyebrows is a phrase of Patafijali, the Yoga
writer.
In describing the course of a yogin in the sixth chapter the
Gitii advises that the yogin should lead the austere life of a Brahma-
dirin, withdraw his mind from all mundane interests and think
only of God, dedicate all his actions to Him and try to live in
communion with Him (yukta iisita). This gives to his soul peace,
through which he loses his individuality in God and abides in Him
1
See Hindu Mysticism, by S. N. Dasgupta, Chicago, 1927, pp. 18-20.
2
prii'l}apiinau samau hrtvii niisiibhyantara-ciiri'l}au, v. 27. The phrase samau
krtvii is left unexplained here by Sankara. Sridhara explains it as "having sus-
pended the movement of prii'l}a and apana"--prii'l}iipiiniiv iirddhviidho-gati-
nirodlzena samau krtvii kumbhaka'f!l krtvii. It is difficult, however, to say what is
exadly meant by concentrating the prii'l}a •CJiiyu between the two eyebrows,
bhruvor madhye prii'l}am iivesya samyak (VIII. xo). Neither Sankara nor Sridhara
gives us any assistance here. In murdhny cldhiiyiitmanal.z prii'l}am iisthito yoga-
dlzclrn'l}iim (vm. 12) milrdhni is paraphrased by Sridhara as bhruvor madhye, or
"between the eyebrows."
3
Atharva-Siras, 4 and 6 and Atharva-sikhii, 1.
DII 29
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gua [cH.
in the bliss of self-effacement 1 • A yogin can be said to be in union
(with God) when he concentrates his mind on his own higher
self and is absolutely unattached to all desires. By his efforts
towards such a union (yoga-sevayii) he restrains his mind from
all other objects and, perceiving his self in himself, remains in
peace and contentment. At this higher state the yogin enjoys
absolute bliss (sukham iityantikam), transcending all sense-pleasures
by his pure reason, and, being thus fixed in God, he is never
shaken away from Him. Such a yog£n forsakes all his desires and
controls all his senses by his mind, and, whenever the mind itself
seeks to fly away to different objects, he tries to control it and fix
it on his own self. Patiently holding his mind fixed in his self,
he tries to desist from all kinds of thought and gradually habituates
himself to shaking off attachments to sense-attractions. At this
stage of union the yogin feels that he has attained his highest,
and thus even the greatest mundane sorrows cannot affect him
in the least. Yoga is thus sometimes defined as the negation of
the possibility of all association with sorrows2 • One can attain
such a state only by persistent and self-confident efforts and
without being depressed by preliminary failures. When a yogin
attains this union with himself or with God, he is like the
motionless flame of a lamp in a still place, undisturbed by all
attractions and unruffled by all passions3 • The yogin who attains
this highest state of union with himself or witlJ. God is said to
be in touch with Brahman or to attain Brahmahood, and it is
emphatically asserted that he is filled with ecstatic joy. Being in
1 siinti1'fl nirviitza-paramii7Jl mat-Sa7JlSlhiim adhigacchati, VI. xs. The Gitii uses
the words siinti and nirvii1Ja to indicate the bliss of the person who abides in
God. Both these words, and particularly the word nirviitza, have a definite
significance in Buddhism. But the Gltii seems to be quite unacquainted with
the Buddhistic sense of the word. I have therefore ventured to translate the
word nirvii1Ja as "bliss of self-effacement." The word is primarily used in the
sense of "extinguishing a light," and this directly leads to the Buddhistic sense
of the absolute destruction of the skandhas. But the word nirvana is also used
from very early times in the sense of "relief from sufferings·, and "satis-
faction." Thus the Mahii-bhiirata, with which the Gitii is traditionally associated,
uses it in this sense in III. 10438:
sa pltvii sitala7Jl toya7Jl pipiisiirtto mahi-pati/:z;
nirvii1Jam agamad dmmiin susukhl ciibhavat tadii.
Again, in the Afahii-bhiirata, xu. 7150 and 13014, nirvii~ is described as being
highest bliss (parama7JZ sukham), and it is also associated with siinti, or peace,
as it is in the above passage-siinli7JZ nirviitza-paramii7Jl. InMaha-bhiirata, VI.1079,
and in another place it is called a "state of the highest Brahman" (parama1,.n
brahma-ibid. XII. 13239).
2 la7Jl vidyiid du/:zkha-sa7Jlyoga-viyoga'lfl yoga-sa7Jljiiitam, VI. 23.
3 Yathii dipo niviita-stho nengate sopamii smrtii, VI. 19.
XIV] Gitii and Yoga 45 1
union with God, he perceives himself in all things, and all things
in himself; for, being in union with God, he in one way identifies
himself with God, and perceives God in all things and all things
in God. Yet it is no mere abstract pantheism that is indicated
here; for such a view is directly in opposition to the main tenets
of the Gttii, so often repeated in diverse contexts. It is a mystical
state, in which, on the one hand, the yogin finds himself identified
with God and in communion with Him, and, on the other hand,
does not cease to have relations with the beings of the world, to
whom he gives the same consideration as to himself. He does
not prefer his own happiness to the happiness of others, nor
does he consider his own misery and suffering as greater or more
important or more worthy of prevention than those of others.
Being in communion with God, he still regards Him as the master
whom he adores, as the supreme Lord who pervades all things and
holds them in Himself. By his communion with God the yogin
transcends his lower and smaller self and discovers his greater self
in God, not only as the supreme ideal of his highest efforts, but
also as the highest of all realities. As soon as the yogin can detach
himself from his lower self of passions and desires, he uplifts
himself to a higher universe, where the distinction of meum and
teum, mine and thine, ceases and the interest of the individual
loses its personal limitations and becomes enlarged and universal-
ized and identified with the interests of all living beings. Looked
at from this point of view, yoga is sometimes defined in the Gttii
as the outlook of equality (samatva) 1 •
In the Gitii the word yoga has not attained any definite
technical sense, as it did in Pataiijali's Yoga-siltra, and, in con-
sequence, there is not one definition of yoga, but many. Thus
yoga is used in the sense of karma-yoga, or the duty of performance
of actions, in v. 1, and it is distinguished from the sii1flkhya path,
or the path of knowledge, in 11. 39· The word karma-yoga is men-
tioned in III. 3 as the path of the yogins, and it is referred to in
III. 7, v. 2 and XIII. 24. The word buddhi-yoga is also used at least
three times, in II. 49, x. 10 and XVIII. 57, and the bhakti-yoga
also is used at least once, in XIV. 26. The one meaning of yoga that
suits all these different contexts seems to be" association." It has
already been said that this primary meaning of the word is the
central idea of yoga in the Gitii. One of the main teachings of
1 samatva'!l yoga ucyate, 11. 48.
452 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii [cH.
the Gttii is that duties should be performed, and it is this obli-
gatoriness of the performance of duties that in the Gttii is under-
stood by karma-yoga. But, if such duties are performed from
motiv~s of self-interest or gain or pleasure, the performance could
not lead to any higher end. It is advised, therefore, that they
should be performed without any motive of gain or pleasure.
So the proper way in which a man should perform his duties,
and at the same time keep himself clean and untarnished by the
good and bad results, the pleasures and sorrows, the praise and
blame proceeding out of his own deeds, is to make himself de-
tached from all desires for the fruits of actions. To keep oneself
detached from the desires for the fruits of actions is therefore the
real art (kausala) of performing one's duties; for it is only in this
way that a man can make himself fit for the higher union with
God or his own higher self. Here, then, we have a definition of
yoga as the art of performing one's duties (yoga/:z karmasu kausalam
-II. so). The art of performing one's duties, e.g. the art of keeping
oneself unattached, cannot however be called yoga on its own
account; it is probably so-called only because it is the indis-
pensable step towards the attainment of the real yoga, or union
with God. It is clear, therefore, that the word yoga has a gradual
evolution _to a higher and higher meaning, based no doubt on the
primary root-meaning of" association."
It is important to note in this connection that the process of
prii1Jiiyiima, regarded as indispensable in Patafijali's Yoga, is not
considered so necessary either for karma-yoga, buddhi-yoga, or for
the higher kind of yoga, e.g. communion with God. It has already
been mentioned that the reference to prii1Jiiyiima is found only in
connection with some kinds of s11bstitution-meditations which have
nothing to do with the main concept of yoga in the Gitii. The
expression samiidhi is used thrice in the noun form in the Gitii, in
11. 44, 53 and 54, and three times in the verb form, in vi. 7, XII. 9
and XVII. I I; but the verb forms are not used in the technical sense
of Patafijali, but in the simple root-meaning of sam+ ii +v dhii,
"to give" or "to place" (arpm;a or sthiipana). In two cases
(n. 44 and 53) where the word samiidhi is used as a noun it has
been interpreted by both Sankara and Sridhara as meaning the
object in which the mind is placed or to which it is directed for
communion, viz. God 1 • The author of the Gitii is well aware of
1
In 11. 44, however, Sankara considers this object of mind to be antalzkara1Ja
XIV] GUii and Yoga 453
the moral conflict in man and thinks that it is only by our efforts
to come into touch with our higher self that the littlcnes~ of
passions and desires for fruits of actions and the preference of
our smaller self-interests can he transcended. For, once man is
in touch \vith his highest, he is in touch with God. He has then
a broader and higher vision of man and his place in nature, and
so he identifies himself with God and finds that he has no special
interest of his own to serve. The low and the high, the sinful
and the virtuous, are the same in his eyes; he perceives God
in all things and all things in God, and it is this state of com-
munion that is the real yoga of the Gitii; and it is because in this
state all inequalities of race, creed, position, virtue and vice, high
and low vanish, that this superior realization of universal equality
is also called yoga. Not only is this union with God called yoga,
but God Himself is called Yogesvara, or the Lord of communion.
As a result of this union, the yogin enjoys supreme bliss and
ecstatic joy, and is free from the least touch of sorrow or pain;
and this absolute freedom from pain or the state of bliss, being
itself a result of yoga, is also called yoga. From the above survey
it is clear that the yoga of the Gitii is quite different from the
yoga of Pataiijali, and it does not seetn at all probable that the
Gltii was aware of Pataiijali's yoga or the technical terms used by
him 1 .
The treatment of yoga in the Gitii is also entirely different from
its treatment in almost all the Upani!:;lads. The Katlw Upani~ad
speaks of sense-control as being yoga; hut sense-control in the
Gitii is only a preliminary to yoga and not itself yoga. l\Iost of
the yoga processes described in the other Upani~ads either speak
of yoga with six accessories (~ar.j-atiga yoga) or of yoga with eight
accessories (a~tiinga-yoga), more or less after the manner of
Pataiijali. They introduce elaborate details not only of breath-
control or prii!liiyiima, but also of the nervous system of the body,
ir.Jii, pingalii and su~wm:zii, the nerve plexus, muliidhiira and other
similar objects, after the manner of the later works on the $at-
or buddhi. But Sridhara considers this object to be God, and in 11. 53 Sai1l~ara
anJ Sridhara are unanimous that the object, or the support of the union or
communion of the mind, is God.
1 pasya me ·yogam aisvaram, IX. s, etii'!l v.:ibhuti'!l yoga'!' ra, x. 7· In the
above two passages the word yoga seems to have a different meaning, as it is
used there in the sense of miraculous powers; but even there the commentators
S-..r1kara and Sridhara take it to mean .. association" (yukti) and interpret
aisvara1Jt yoga1!J as "associati~cm of miraculous powers."
454 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii .[cH.
cakra system. Thus the Amrta-niida enumerates after the manner
of Pataiijali the six accessories of yoga as restraint (pratyiihiira),
concentration (dhyiina), breath-control (prii~iiyiima), fixation (dhii-
rm:zii), reasoning (tarka) and meditative absorption (samiidhz), and
describes the final object of yoga as ultimate loneliness of the self
(kaivalya). The Amrta-bindu believes in an all-pervading Brahman
as the only reality, and thinks that, since mind is the cause of all
bondage and liberation, the best course for a yogin to adopt is to
deprive the mind of all its objects and thus to stop the activity
of the mind, and thereby to destroy it, and bring about Brahma-
hood. Brahman is described here as being absolutely indeter-
minate, uninferable, infinite and beginningless. The K~urika
merely describes prii~iiyiima, dhyiina, dhiira~ii and samiidhi in
association with the nerves, su~um~ii, pingalii, etc. and the nerve
plexuses. The Tejo-bindu is a Vedantic Upani!?ad of the ultra-
monistic type, and what it calls yoga is only the way of realizing
the nature of Brahman as one and as pure consciousness and
the falsity of everything else. It speaks of this yoga as being
of fifteen accessories (paftca-dasiifzga yoga). These are yama
(sense-control through the knowledge that all is Brahman), niyama
(repetition of the same kinds of thoughts and the avoidance of
dissimilar ones), tyiiga (giving up of the world-appearance through
the realization of Brahman), silence, a solitary place, the proper
posture, steadiness of mind, making the body straight and erect,
perceiving the world as Brahman (drk-sthiti), cessation of all states
and breath-control (prii~a-smrzyamana), perceiving all objects of
the mind as Brahman (pratyiihiira), fixing the mind always on
Brahman (dhiira~ii), self-meditation and the realization of oneself as
Brahman. This is, however, a scheme of yoga quite different from
that of Pataiijali, as well as from that of the Gitii. The TriJikha-
briihmm:za speaks of a yoga with eight accessories (a~tiifzga-yoga),
where the eight accessories, though the same in name as the eight
accessories of Pataiijali, are in reality different therefrom. Thus
yama here means want of attachment (vairiigya), niyama means
attachment to the ultimate reality (anuraktil.z pare tattve), iisana
means indifference to all things,prii~a-sa,.yamana means the reali-
zation of the falsity of the world,pratyiihiira means the inwardness
of the mind, dhiira~ii means the motionlessness of the mind,
dhyiina means thinking of oneself as pure consciousness, and
samiidhi means forgetfulness of dhyiinas. Yet it again includes
XIV) Stif!Zkhya and Yoga in the Gitii 455
within its yama and ni'yama almost all the virtues referred to by
Pataiijali. It also speaks of a number of postures after the hatha-
yoga fashion, and of the movement of priir.za in the nerve plexuses,
the ways of purifying the nerves and the processes of bfeath-control.
The object of yoga is here also the destruction of mind and the
attainment of kaivalya. The Darsana gives an affiiilga-yoga with
yama, ni'yama, iisana,priir.ziiyiima, pratyiihiira, dhiirar.zii, dhyiina and-
samiidhi more or less after the fashion of Pataiijali, with a supple-
mentary treatment of nerves (nii{ii) and the movement of the priir.za
and other viiyus in them. The final object of yoga here is the attain-
ment of Brahmahood and the comprehension of the world as miiyii
and unreal. The Dhyiina-bindu describes the self as the essential
link of all things, like the fragrance in flowers or the thread in a
garland or the oil in sesamum. It describes a iatJ-anga yoga with
iisana, priir.za-sa'f{lrodha, pratyiihiira, dhiirar.zii, dhyiina and samiidhi.
It also describes the four cakras or nerve plexuses, and speaks of
the awakening of the serpent power (kur.z{ialini) and the practice of
the mudriis. It speaks further of the balancing or unifying of priir.za
and apiina as leading to yoga 1 • The object of this yoga is the
attainment of the transcendent state of liberation or the realization
of the paramiitman. It is useless to refer to other U pani!?ads; for
what has already been said will be enough to show clearly that
the idea of Yoga in the Gttii is entirely different from that in
the Yoga Upani~ads, most of which are of comparatively late
date and are presumably linked up with traditions different from
that of the Gitii.
Sarpkhya and Yoga in the Gita.

In the Gttii Sarp.khya and Yoga are sometimes distinguished
from each other as two different paths, and sometimes they
are identified. But though the Gitii is generally based on the
doctrines of the gut.zas, prakrti and its derivatives, yet the word
Sii'f{lkhya is used here in the sense of the path of knowledge or
of philosophic wisdom. Thus in the Gitii, II. 39, the path of
knowledge is distinguished from that of performance of duties.
Lord Kr!?r:ta says there that he has just described the wisdom of
Sarp.khya and he is going to describe the wisdom of Yoga. This
1
Tadrl. prii1Jiipiinayor aikya'!l krt'l.•ii; see Dhyiina-bindu, 93-5 (Adyar LibraPy
edition, 1920). This seems to be similar to prii'}ii.piinau samau krtvii of the Gtta.
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita [cH.
seems to give us a clue to what is meant by Sarpkhya wisdom.
This wisdom, however, seems to be nothing more than elabora-
tion of the doctrine of the immortality of soul and the associated
doctrine of rebirth, and also the doctrine that, howsoever the body
might be affected and suffer changes of birth, growth and destruc-
tion, the self is absolutely unaffected by all these changes; the self
cannot be cut or burned; it is eternal, all-pervasive, unchangeable,
indescribable and unthinkable. In another passage of the Gttii,
XIII. 2 5, it is said that there are others who perceive the self in
accordance with sii'f{lkhya-yoga; and Sankara explains this passage
to mean that sii'f{lkhya-yoga means the realization of the self as
being absolutely different from the three gUtJas, sattva, rajas and
lamas. If this is Sarpkhya, the meaning of the word yoga in this
passage (anye sii'f{lkhyena yogena) is not explained. Sankara does
not expound the meaning of the word yoga, but explains the word
sii'f{lkhya and says that this sii'f{lkhya is yoga, which seems to be
an evasion. Sridhara follows Sankara's interpretation of sii'f{lkhya,
but finds it difficult to swallow his identification of sii'f{lkhya with
yoga, and he interprets yoga here as the yoga (of Patafijali) with eight
accessories, but does not explain how this a~!iiizga-yoga can be
identified with sii'f{lkhya. It is, no doubt, true that in the imme-
diately preceding verse it is said that, howsoever a man may
behave, if he knows the proper nature of puru~a and of the prakrt£
and the gu7J.as, he is never born again; but there is no reason to
suppose that the phrase sii'f{lkhyena yogena refers to the wisdom
recommended in the preceding verse; for this verse summarizes
different paths of self-realization and says that there are some
who perceive the self in the self through the self, by meditation,
others by sii'f{lkhya-yoga and others by karma-yoga. In another
passage it is said that the Sii'f{lkhyas follow the path of knowledge
(jiiiina-yoga), while the Yogins follow the path of duties (Gttii,
III. 3). If the word yoga means" association," as it does in various
contexts, then sii'f{lkhya and sii'f{lkhya-yoga would mean more or
less the same thing; for sii'f{lkhya-yoga would only mean asso-
ciation with sii'f{lkhya, and the phrase sii'f{lkhyena yogena might
rnean either association with sii'f{lkhya or the union of sii'f{lkhya.
It has already been said that, following the indications of the Gttii,
11. 39, Sii'f{lkhya should mean the realization of the true nature of
the self as immortal, all-pervasive, unchangeable and infinite. It
has also been pointed out that it is such a true realization of the
XIV] Siir[lkhya and l 7 oga in the Gitii 457
self, with its corresponding moral elevation, that leads to the true
communion of the self with the higher self or God. Thus this
meaning of sii'f!lkhya on the one hand distinguishes the path of
sii'f!lkhya from the path of yoga as a path of performance of duties,
and at the same time identifies the path of sii'f!lkhya with the path
of yoga as communion with God. Thus we find that the Gitii,
v. 4-, 5, says that "fools only think Sarp.khya and Yoga to be dif-
ferent,not so wise men," since, accepting either of them, one attains
the fruit of them both. The goal reached by the followers of
Sarp.khya is also reached by the Yog£ns; he who perceives Sii1J1khya
and Yoga to be the same perceives them in the right perspective.
In these passages sii'f!lkhya and yoga seem from the context to refer
respectively to karma-sannyiisa and karma-yoga. Sii'f!lkhya here
can only in a secondary way mean the renunciation of the fruits
of one's actions (karma-sannyiisa). The person who realizes the
true nature of his self, and knows that the self is unchangeable and
infinite, cannot feel himself attached to the fruits of his actions
and cannot be affected by ordinary mundane desires and cravings.
As in the case of the different uses of the word yoga, so here also
the word sii'f!lkhya, which primarily means "true knowledge," is
also used to mean " renunciation " ; and since karma-yoga means
the performance of one's duties in a spirit of renunciation, sii1J1khya
and yoga mean practically the same thing and are therefore
identified here; and they are both regarded as leading to the same
results. This would be so, even if yoga were used to denote
"communion''; for the idea of performance of one's duties has
almost always communion with God as 'its indispensable correlate.
Thus in the two passages immediately following the identification
of sii'f!lkhya and yoga we find the Gitii (v. 6, 7) saying that
without karma-yoga it is hard to renounce karma; and the person
who takes the path of karma-yoga speedily attains Brahman. The
person who thus through karma-yoga comes into union (with
Brahman) is pure in spirit and self-controlled, and, having
identified himself with the universal spirit in all beings, he is
not affected by his deeds.
One thing that emerges from the above discussion is that there
is no proof that the word sii'f!lkhya in the Gitii means the discern-
ment of the difference of prakrti and the gu~as from puru~a, as
Sailkara in one place suggests (Gttii, XIII. 25), or that it refers
to the cosmology and ontology of prakrti, the gu~as and their
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii [cH.
evolutes of the traditional Kapila-Sarp.khya. The philosophy of
the gutJas and the doctrine of puru~a were, no doubt, known to the
Gitii; but nowhere is this philosophy called sii:qzkhya. Sii'f{lkhya jn
the Gitii means true knowledge (tattva-jiiiina) or self-knowledge
(iitma-bodha). Saii.kara, commenting on the Gitii, XVIII. 13,
interprets Sii'f{lkhya to mean vediinta, though in verse XIII.
25 he interprets the word as meaning the discernment of the
difference between the gutzas and the puru~a, which would
decidedly identify the Sii'f{lkhya of the Gitii with the Kapila-
Sarp.khya.
The Mahii-bhiirata also refers to sii'f{lkhya and yoga in several
places. But in almost all places sii'f{lkhya means either the
traditional school of Kapila-Sarp.khya or some other school of
Sarp.khya, more or less similar to it: yoga also most often refers
either to the yoga of Patafijali or some earlier forms of it. In
one place are found passages identifying Sii'f{lkhya and yoga, which
agree almost word for word with similar passages of the Gitii 1 •
But it does not seem that the Sii'f{lkhya or the yoga referred to
in the Mahii-bhiirata has anything to do with the idea of Sii'f{lkhya
or yoga in the Gztii. As has already been pointed out, the yoga in
the Gitii means the dedication to God and renunciation of the
fruits of one's karma and being in communion with Him as the
supreme Lord pervading the universe. The chapter of the Mahii-
bhiirata just referred to speaks of turning back the senses into the
manas and of turning the manas into aha'f{lkiira and aha'f{lkiira into
buddhi and buddhi into prakrti, thus finishing with prakrti and
its evolutes and meditating upon pure puru~a. It is clear that this
system of yoga is definitely associated with the Kapila school of
Sarp.khya. In the Mahii-bhiirata, xn. 306, the predominant feature
of yoga is said to be dhyiina, and the latter is said to consist of
concentration of mind (ekiigratii ca manasal}) and breath-control
(prii!Jiiyiima). It is said that the yogin should stop the functions
of his senses by his mind, and the movement of his mind by his
reason (buddht), and in this stage he is said to be linked up (yukta)
and is like a motionless flame in a still place2 • This passage
naturally reminds one of the description of dhyiina-yoga in the
GUii, VI. 11-13, 16-19 and 25,26; but the fundamental idea of yoga,
1
yad eva yogii/:z paiyanti tat siiJ!Zkhyair api driyate ekaJ!Z siiJ!Zkhyaiz ca yogaiz
cayal:z paiyati sa tattva-vit. lvlahii-bhiirata, vn. 316. 4· Compare the Gitii, v. 5·
2
Cf. the Gitii, VI. 19, yathii dipo niviita-stha/:l, etc.
XIV) Siirrzkhya and Yoga in the Gitii 459
as the dedication of the fruits of actions to God and communion
with Him, is absent here.
It is needless to point out here that the yoga of the Gltii is in
no way connected with the yoga of Buddhism. In Buddhism the
sage first practises sila, or sense-control and mind-control, and thus
prepares himself for a course of stabilization or fixation of the
mind (samiidhiina, upadhiira1}a, patifthii). This samiidhi means the
concentration of the mind on right endeavours and of its states
upon one particular object (ekiirammana), so that they may com-
pletely cease to shift and change (sammii ca avikkhi'ppamiinii). The
sage has first to train his mind to view with disgust the appetitive
desires for food and drink and their ultimate loathsome trans-
formations as various nauseating bodily elements. \Vhen a man
habituates himself to emphasizing the disgusting associations of food
and drink, he ceases to have any attachment to them and simply
takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the
final dissolution of all sorrows will come. Secondly, the sage has
to habituate his mind to the idea that all his members are made up
of the four elements, earth, water, fire and wind, like the carcass of
a cow at the butcher's shop. Thirdly, he has to habituate his mind
to thinking again and again (anussatt) about the virtues or greatness
of the Buddha, the Sangha, the gods and the law of the Buddha,
about the good effects uf stla and the making of gifts (ciigiinussatt),
about the nature of death (mara1Jiinussati) and about the deep
nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena
(upasamiinussatz). He has also to pass through various purificatory
processes. He has to go to the cremation grounds and notice
the diverse horrifying changes of human carcasses and think
how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are; from
this he will turn his mind to living human bodies and con-
vince himself that they, being in essence the same as dead car-
casses, are as loathsome as the latter. He should think of the
anatomical parts and constituents of the body as well as of their
processes, and this will help him to enter into the first jhiina, or
meditation, by leading his mind away from his body. As an aid to
concentration the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind
on the inhaling (passiisa) and the exhaling (assiisa) of his breath,
so that, instead of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner,
he may be aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he
ought to mark this definitely by counting numbers, so that by
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gUii [cH.
fixing his mind on the numbers counted he may realize the

whole process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its
course. Next to this we come to brahma-vihara, the fourfold medi-
tation of mettii. (universal friendship), karU1:zii (universal pity),
muditii (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and
upekkhii (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, one's
friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate himself
to meditation on universal friendship, a man should start with
thinking how he would himself like to root out all misery and
become happy, how he would himself like to avoid death and live
cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would
"lso have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to
thinking that his friends, his enemies and all those with whom he
is not connected might all live and become happy. He should fix
himself to such an extent in this meditation that he should not
find any difference between the happiness or safety of himself
and that of others. Coming to jhiinas, we find that the objects
of concentration may be earth, water, fire, wind, colours, etc. In
the first stage of concentration on an object there is compre-
hension of the name and form of the object; at the next stage the
relational movement ceases, and the mind penetrates into the object
without any quivering. In the next two stages there is a buoyant
exaltation and a steady inward bliss, and, as a result of the one-
pointedness which is the culminating effect of the progressive
meditation, there is the final release of the mind (ceto-vimuttz)-
the Nibbiiiza.
It is easy to see that, though Patafijali's yoga is under a deep
debt of obligation to this Buddhist yoga, the yoga of the Gua is
unacquainted therewith. The pessimism which fills the Buddhist
yoga is seen to affect not only the outlook of Patafijali's yoga,
but also most of the later Hindu modes of thought, in the form
of the advisability of reflecting on the repulsive sides of things
(pratipa~a-bhavanii) which are seemingly attractive 1 • The ideas
of universal friendship, etc. were also taken over by Patafijali
and later on passed into Hindu works. The methods of concen-
tration on various ordinary objects also seem to be quite unlike
what we find in the Gitii. The Gitii is devoid of any tinge of
pessimism such as we find in the Buddhist yoga. It does not
anywhere recommend the habit of brooding over the repulsive
1
See Nyiiya-maiijari, Vairiigya-sataka, Siinti-sataka.
XIV] Siil!lkhya Philosophy in the Gua
aspects of all things, so as to fill our minds with a feeling of disgust
for all worldly things. It does not rise to the ideal of regarding
all beings as friends or to that of universal compassion. Its
sole aim is to teach the way of reaching the state of equanimity,
in which the saint has no preferences, likes and dislikes-where
the diiTerence between the sinner and the virtuous, the self and
the not-self has vanished. The idea of yoga as self-surrendering
union with God and self-surrendering performance of one's duties
is the special feature which is absent in Buddhism. This self-
surrender in God, however, occurs in Patafijali's yoga, but it is
hardly in keeping with the technical meaning of the word yoga, as
the suspension of all mental states. The idea appears only once in
Pataiijali's sutras, and the entire method of yoga practices, as de-
scribed in the later chapters, seems to take no notice of it. It seems
highly probable, therefore, that in Pataiijali's sutras the idea was
borrowed from the Gua, where this self-surrender to God and
union with Him is defined as yoga and is the central idea which
the Gua is not tired of repeating again and again.
We have thus completely failed to trace the idea of the Gua
to any of the different sources where the subject of yoga is dealt
with, such as the Yoga Upani~ads, Patafijali's Yoga-siltras, Buddhist
Yoga, or the 1\iaha-bhiirata. It is only in the Paiica-riitra works
that the Gitii meaning of yoga as self-surrender to God is found.
Thus Ahirbudhnya-smphitii describes yoga as the worship of the
heart (hrdayiiriidhana}, the offering of an oblation (havil}) of oneself
to God or self-surrender to God (bhagavate iitma-samarpa1Jam},
and yoga is defined as the linking up (smJlyoga) of the lower self
(jtviitman) with the higher self (paramiitman)l. It seems, therefore,
safe to suggest that the idea of yoga in the Gua has the same
traditional source as in the Paiica-riitra works.
Saipkhya Philosophy in the Gita.

It has been said before that there is no proof that the word
sli'f!lkhya in the Gitii means the traditional Sarpkhya philosophy;
yet the old philosophy of prakrti and puru~a forms the basis of
the philosophy of the Gua. This philosophy may be summarized
as follows:
1 The Ahirbudlmya-sa1Jlhitii, of course, introduces many observations about
the nerves (nti{li) and the vtiyu.f, which probably became associated with the
Panca-rtitra tradition in later times.
Prakrti is called mahad brahma (the great Brahma or the great
multiplier as procreatress) in the Gita, XIV. 3 1 • It is said there
that this prakrti is described as being like the female part, which
God charges with His energy for the creation of the universe.
Wherever any living beings may be born, the great Brahman or
prakrti is to be considered as the female part and God as the
father and fertilizer. Three types of qualities are supposed to be
produced from prakrti (gU1;ta~t prakrti-sambhaviil) )2 • These are
satt·va, rajas and tamas, which bind the immortal self in its
corporeal body. Of these, sattva, on account of its purity, is
illuminating and untroubling (aniimayam, which Sridhara explains
as nirupadravam or siiutam), and consequently, on account of these
two qualities, binds the self with the attachment for knowledge
(jiiiina-smigena) and the attachment for pleasure (sukha-sangena).
It is said that there are no living beings on earth, or gods in the
heavens, who are not pervaded by the three gw:zas produced from
the pralqti3 • Since the gu1JaS are produced from the prakrti through
the fertilization of God's energy in prakrti, they may be said to
be produced by God, though God always transcends them. The
quality of sattva, as has been said above, associates the self with
the attachments for pleasure and knowledge. The quality of 1·ajas
moves to action and arises from desire and attachment {tn~;tii
sanga-samudbhavam), through which it binds the self with ego-
istic attachments for action. The quality of lamas overcomes the
illumination of knowledge and leads to many errors. Tamas, being
a product of ignorance, blinds all living beings and binds t~em
down with carelessness, idleness and sleep. These three qualities
predominate differently at different times. _Thus, sometimes the
quality of sattva predominates over rajas and tamas, and such a
time is characterized by the rise of knowledge in the mind through
all the different sense-gates; when rajas dominates satt·va and
tamas, the mind is characterized by greed, efforts and endeavours
for different kinds of action and the rise of passions, emotions and
desires; when tamas predominates over sattva and rajas, there is
ignorance, lethargy, errors, delusions and false beliefs.
The different categories are avyakta, or the undifferentiated
1
mama yonir mahad brahma tasmin garbha1Jl da,dhiimy a ham. fiV. 3. I have
interpreted mahad brahma as prakrti, following Sridhara and other commen-
tators. Sankara surreptitiously introduces the word miiya between mama and
yoni and changes the whole meaning.
2 Gita, XIV. 5· 3 Ibid. XVIII. 40.
XIV] Siil!lkhya Philosophy in the Guii
prakrti,buddhi (intellect),aha1_nkara (egohooq), manas (mind-organ)
and the ten senses, cognitive and conative. l~lmzas is higher and
subtler than the senses, and buddhi is higher than the manas, and
there is that (probably self) which transcends buddhi. 1llanas is
regarded as the superintendent of the different senses; it dominates
them and through them enjoys the sense-objects. The relation
between the buddhi and aha1_nkara is nowhere definitely stated.
In addition to these, there is the category of the five elements
(mahabhilta)l. It is difficult to say whether these categories were
regarded in the Gita as being the products of prakrti or as sepa-
rately existing categories. It is curious that they are nowhere
mentioned in the Gita as being products of prakrti, which they are
in Sarpkhya, but on the other hand, the five elements, mmzas,
aha1_nkara and buddhi are regarded as being the eightfold nature
(prakrti) of God 2 • It is also said that God has two different kinds
of nature, a lower and a higher; the eightfold nature just referred
to represents the lower nature of God, whereas His higher nature
consists of the collective universe of life and spirit 3 • The gu1Jas
are noticed in relation to prakrti in III. 5, 27, 29, XIII. 21, XIV. 5,
XVIII. 40, and in all these places the gu1JaS are described as
being produced from prakrti, though the categories are never said
to be produced from prakrti. In the Gzta, IX. 10, however, it
is said that prakrti produces all that is moving and all that is
static through the superintendence of God. The word prakrti is
used in at least two different senses, as a primary and ultimate
category and as a nature of God's being. It is quite possible that
the primary meaning of prakrti in the Gita is God's nature; the
other meaning of prakrti, as an ultimate principle from which the
gu1Jas are produced, is simply the hypostatization of God's nature.
The whole group consisting of pleasure, pain, aversion, volition,
consciousness, the eleven senses, the mind-organ, the five elements,
egohood, intellect (buddhi), the undifferentiated (avyakta, meaning
prakrti existing, probably, as the sub-conscious mind) power of
holding the senses and the power of holding together the diverse
mental functions (sa1_nghata) with their modifications and changes,
is called kfetra. In another place the body alone is called kfelra 4 •
It seems, therefore, that the word kfelra signifies in its broader
sense not only the body, but also the entire mental plane, involving
1 2
Gltii, III. 42, XIII. 6 and 7, xv. 9· Ibid. VII. 4·
3 4
Ibid.
Ibid. Vll. 5· XIII. 2.
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gttii [cH.
the diverse mental functions, powers, capabilities, and also the
undifferentiated sub-conscious element. In this connection it may
be pointed out that leyetra is a term which is specially reserved to
denote the complex of body and mind, exclusive of the living
principle of the self, which is called leyetra-jiia, or the knower of
the k~etra, or k~etrin, the possessor of the k~et1·a or the body-mind
complex. It is said that, just as the sun illuminates this whole
world, so does the !?~etrin illuminate the whole k~etra 1 •
It will be remembered that it is said in the Gitii that God has
two different natures, one the complex whole of the five elements,
ahm.nkiira, buddhi, etc., and the other the collective whole of life
and spirit (fiva-bhuta). It will also be remembered that, by the
fertilization of God's power in prakrti, the gut}as, or the charac-
teristic qualities, which pervade all that is living, come into being.
The gu1Jas, therefore, as diverse dynamic tendencies or charac-
teristic qualities, pervade the entire psychosis-complex of aha7Jz-
kiira, buddhi, the senses, consciousness, etc., which represents the
mental side of the k~et1·a. K~etra-jiia, or the k~etrin, is in all prob-
ability the same as puru~a, an all-pervading principle as subtle as
iikiiSa (space), which, though it is omnipresent, remains untouched
by any of the qualities of the body, in which it manifests itself.
It is difficult to say what, according to the Gitii, prakrti is in itself,
before the fertilization of God's energy. It does not seem that
prakrti can be regarded as being identical with God. It appears
more to be like an ultimate principle coexistent with God and
intimately connected with Him. There is, however, no passage in
the Gttii by which the lower prakrti of God, consisting of thecate-
gories, etc., can be identified with prakrti; for prakrti is always
associated with the gu1Jas and their production. Again, it is
nowhere said in the Gttii that the categories aha1JZkiira, senses,
etc., are in any way the products of the gu1JaS; the word gut}a
seems to imply only the enjoyable, emotional and moral or immoral
qualities. It is these gll1;as which move us to all kinds of action,
produce attachments and desires, make us enjoy or suffer, and
associate us with virtues and vices. Prakrti is regarded as the
mother-source from which all the knowable, enjoyable, and
dynamic qualities of experience, referred to as being generated
by the successive preponderance of the gu1JaS, are produced. The
categories of the psychosis and the five elements, which form the
1
Gua., xm. 34·
XIV] Siirrzkhya Philosophy in the Guii
mental ground, do not, therefore, seem to be products of the gm;as
or the prakrti. They seem to constitute a group by themselves,
which is referred to as being a lower nature of God, side by side
with His higher nature as life and spirit. K~etra is a complex of
both the gm;a elements of experience and the complex categories
of body and mind. There seem, therefore, to be three different
principles, the aparii prakrti (the lower nature), parii prakrti or
puru~a, and prakrti. Prakrti produces the gm;as, which constitute
experience-stuff; the aparii prakrti holds within itself the material
world of the five elements and their modifications as our bodies,
the senses and the mind-categories. It seems very probable, there-
fore, that a later development of Sarpkhya combined these two
prakrtis as one, and held that the gu1JaS produced not only the
stuff of our experience, but also all the mind-categories, the senses,
etc., and the five gross elements and their modifications. The gu1Jas,
the::-efore, are not the products of prakrti, but they themselves con-
stitute prakrti, when in a state of equilibrium. In the Gztii prakrti
can only produce the gu1Jas through the fertilizing energy of God;
they do not constitute the prakrti, when in a state of equilibrium.
It is hard to realize the connection between the aparii prakrti and
the prakrti and the gu1Jas. The connection, however, can be imagined
to take place through the medium of God, who is the fertilizer and
upholder of them both. There seems to be hut one puru~a, as the
all-pervading fundamental life-principle which animates all bodies
and enjoys and suffers by its association with its experiences,
remaining at the same time unaffected and untouched by the
effects of the gu1Jas. This naturally presumes that there is also
a higher and a lower puru~a, of which the former is always un-
attached to and unaffected by the gu1Jas, whereas the lower pw·u~a,
which is different in different bodies, is always associated with
the prakrti and its gu1Jas and is continually affected by their
operations. Thus it is said that the puru~a, being in prakrti, enjoys
the gu1Jas of prakrti and this is the cause of its rebirth in good or
bad bodies 1 • There is also in this body the higher puru~a (puru~al;
para/;), which is also called paramiitman, being the passive per-
ceiver, thinker, upholder, enjoyer and the great lord 2 • The word
puru~a is used in the Guii in four distinct senses, firstly, in the
1 Gftii, XIII. 21.

2
upadra~tiinumantii ca bhartii bhoktii maheivarab
paramiitmeti ciipy ukto dehe 'smin puru~ab parab. Ibid. xm. ;3.
D II 30
sense of puru~ottama, or God 1 ; secondly, in the sense of a person 2 ;
and the Gttii distinctly speaks of the two other puru~as as k~ara
(changeable) and ak~ara (unchangeable). The leyara is all living
beings, whereas the ak~ara is changeless. It is this higher self
( uttamal} pur~ab ), different from the other puru~a and called also
paramatman, that pervades the three worlds and upholds them
as tbeir deathless God 3 • God, however, transcends both the leyara
pu1·u~a and the aleyara puru~a and is therefore called puru~ottama 4 •
Both prakrti and the paramatman puru~a are beginningless. The
paramiitman puru~a, being changeless and beyond the sphere of the
gul}as, is neither the agent of anything nor affected by the gu1Jas,
though it rtsides in the body. Prakrti is regarded as the ground
through which all causes, effects, and their agents are determined. It
is the fundamental principle of all dynamic operations, motivations
and actions, whereas puru~a is regarded as the principle which
makes all experiences of joys and sorrows possible 5 • The param-
iitman puru~a, therefore, though all-pervasive, yet exists in each
individual, being untouched by its experiences of joy, sorrow and
attachment, as its higher self. It is only the lower self that goes
through the experiences and is ahvays under the influence of the
gu1Jas. Any attempts that may be made to rise above the sphere
of the gu1Jas, above attachments and desires, above pleasures and
pains, mean the subordination of the lower self to the pure and
deathless higher self. Every attempt in this direction implies a
temporary communion (yoga) with the higher self. It has already
been pointed out that the GUii recognizes a con~ict between the
higher and the lower selves and advises us to raise the lower self by
the higher self. In all our moral efforts there is always an upward
and a downward pull by the higher puru~a on the one side, and the
gu1Jas on the other; yet the higher puru~a does not itself make the
pulls. The energy of the downward pull is derived from the gu1Jas
and exerted by the lower self. In all these efforts the higher self
stands as the unperturbed ideal of equanimity, steadiness, unchange-
ableness in good or evil, joys or sorrows. The presence of this
superior self is sometimes intuited by self-meditation, sometimes
through philosophic knowledge, and sometimes by our moral
1
saniitanas tva1{Z puru~o mato me. Gitii, XI. I8.
tvam iidi-deva!z puru~a!z puriitJa!z. Ibid. XI. 38.
For puru~ottama see ibid. VIII. I, X. IS, XI. 3, XV. I8 and XV. I9.
2 3
Ibid. 11. IS, II. 2I, II. 6o, III. 4, etc. Ibid. xv. I6 and I7.
4 11 Ibid. xm. 20.
Ibid. xv. IS and I8.
XIV] Siirtzkhya Philosophy in the Gztii
efforts to perform our duties without attachment and without
desires 1 • Each moral effort to perform our allotted duties without
attachment means also a temporary communion (yoga) with the
higher self or with God. A true philosophic knowledge, by which
all actions are known to be due to the operations of the prakrti
and its gur.zas and which realizes the unattached nature of the true
self, the philosophic analysis of action and the relation between
God, the higher self, the lower self, and the prakrti, and any
devotional realization of the nature of God and dedication of all
action to Him, and the experience of the supreme bliss of living
in communion with Him, mean a communion with the higher self
or God, and are therefore yoga.
It is easy to notice here the beginnings of a system of thought
which in the hands of other thinkers might well be developed into
the traditional school of Sarpkhya philosophy. It has already been
pointed out that the two prakrtis naturally suggested the idea of
unifying them into the one prakrti of the Sarpkhya. The higher
and the lower puru~as, where the latter enjoys and suffers, while
the former remains unchanged and unperturbed amidst all the
experiences of joy and sorrow on the part of the latter, naturally
remind one of the Upani!?adic simile of the two birds in the
same tree, of whom the one eats tasteful fruits while the
other remains contented without them 2 • The Gttii does not
seem to explain clearly the nature of the exact relation between
the higher puru~a and the lower puru~a. It does not definitely
state whether the lower puru~a is one or many, or describe its
exact ontological states. It is easy to see how any attempt that
would aim at harmonizing these two apparently loosely-connected
puru~as into one self-consistent and intelligible concept 1night
naturally end in the theory of infinite, pure, all-pervasive puru~as
and make the lower puru~a the product of a false and illusory
mutual reflection of prakrti and puru~a. The Guii uses the word
miiyii in three passages (vn. 14 and 15, XVIII. 61); but it seems
to be used there in the sense of an inscrutable power or ignorance,
and not in that of illusory or magical creation. The idea that
the world or any of the mental or spiritual categories could
be merely an illusory appearance seems never to have been
dhyiineniitmani paiymlti hecid iitmiinam iitmatzii

anye siil?lhhyena yogena kanna-yogena ciipare. Gltii, XIII. 25.
2
J-!u1pj.alw, III. I. I and Svetiiivatara, 4· 6.
30-2
contemplated in the Gitii. It is not, therefore, conceivable that the
lower, or the k~ara, puru~a might be mere illusory creation, accepted
as a necessary postulate to explain the facts of our undeniable
daily experience. But it is difficult to say how this k~etra-jiia
puru~a can have a separate existence from the para puru~a (which
is absolutely free from the gut;zas), as enjoying the gul}as of prakrti,
unless the former be somehow regarded as the result of the func-
tioning of the latter. Such a view would naturally support a theory
that would regard the lower puru~a as being only the para puru~a
as imaged or reflected in the gu'l}as. The para purzt~a, existing by
itself, free from the influence of the gutzas, is in its purity. But
even without losing its unattached character and its lonely purity
it may somehow be imaged in the gu'l}as and play the part of the
phenomenal self, the jiva or the lower puru~a, enjoying the gutzas
of prakrti and having the superior puru~a as its ultimate ground.
It cannot be denied that the Gttii theory of puru~a is much looser
than the later Sarpkhya theory; but it has the advantage of being
more elastic, as it serves better to explain the contact of the lower
puru~a with the higher and thereby charges the former with the
spirit of a higher ideal.
The qualities of sativa, rajas and tamas were regarded as the
universal characteristics of all kinds of mental tendencies, and all
actions were held to be prompted by specific kinds of sattva, rajas
or tamas. Mental tendencies were also designated accordingly as
siittvika, riijasa or tiimasa. Thus religious inclinations (sraddhii) are
also described as being of a threefold nature. Those who are of
siittvika nature worship the gods, those who are of riijasa nature
worship the ya~as and the rak~as and those who are of tiimasa
nature worship ghosts and demons. Those who, prompted by
vanity, desires and attachments, perform violent ascetic penances
unauthorized by the scriptures and thereby starve and trouble their
body and spirit, are really demoniac in their temperament. Again,
siittvika sacrifices are those performed solely out of reverence for
the scriptural injunctions and from a pure sense of duty, without
any desire or motive for any other kind of worldly or heavenly
good. Again, riijasa sacrifices are those which are performed for
the realization of some benefits or good results or for the satis-
faction of some vanity or pride. Tiimasa sacrifices are those which
are performed without proper faith, with improper ceremonials,
transgressing Vedic injunctions. Again, tapas also is described as
XIV] Siil{lkhya Philosophy in the Gltii
being threefold, as of body (Siirira), of speech (viinmaya) and of
mind (miinasa). Adoration of gods, Brahmins, teachers and wise
men, sincerity and purity, sex-continence and non-injury are
known as physical or bodily tapas. To speak in a manner that
would be truthful, attractive, and conducive to good and would not
be harmful in any way, and to study in the regular and proper
way are regarded as the tapas of speech (viin-maya tapas). Mental
(miinasa) tapas consists of sincerity of mind, friendliness of spirit,
thoughtfulness and mental control, self-control and purity of mind.
The above threefold tapas performed without any attachment for a
reward is called siittvika tapas. But tapas performed out of vanity,
or for the sake of higher position, respectability in society, or
appreciation from people, is ·called riijasa-such a tapas can lead
only to unsteady and transient results. Again, the tapas which
is performed for the destruction of others by ignorant self-mortifi-
cation is called tiimasa tapas. Gifts, again, are called siittvika when
they are made to proper persons (holy Brahmins) on auspicious
occasions, and in holy places, merely out of sense of duty. Gifts
are called riijasa when they are made as a return for the good done
to the performer, for gaining future rewards, or made unwillingly.
Again, gifts are called tiimasa when they are made slightingly, to
improper persons, in unholy places, and in ordinary places. Those
who desire liberation perform sacrifices and tapas and make gifts
without aiming at the attainment of any mundane or heavenly
benefits. Knowledge also is regarded as siittvika, rajas a and tiimasa.
Siitt·vika wisdom consists in looking for unity and diversity and in
realizing one unchangeable reality in the apparent diversity of
living beings. Riijasa knowledge consists in the scientific appre-
hension of things or living beings as diverse in kind, character
and number. Tiimasa knowledge consists in narrow and untrue
beliefs which are satisfied to consider a little thing as the whole and
entire truth through sheer dogmatism, and unreasonable delusion
or attachment. An action is called siitt·c.:ika when it is performed
without any desire for a reward, without attachment and \Vithout
aversion. It is called riijasa when it is performed with elaborate
endeavours and efforts, out of pride and vanity, for the satis-
faction of one's desires. It is called tiimasa when it is undertaken
out of ignorance and without proper judgment :lf one's own
capacities, and when it leads to waste of energy, harm and injury.
An agent (kartr) is called siittvika when he is free from attachment
and vanity and absolutely unruffled in success and failure, per-
severing and energetic. Again, an agent is called riijasa if he acts
out of motives of self-interest, is impure, is filled with sorrow or
joy in failure or success, and injures others. An agent is called
tiimasa if he is careless, haughty, thoughtless, deceptive, arrogant,
idle, procrastinating and melancholic. Understanding (buddhz) is
said to be siittvika when it grasps how a man has to set himself in
the path of virtue, how to refrain from vice, what ought and what
ought not to be done, of what one has to be afraid and how to be
fearless, what is bondage, and what is liberation. Riijasa under-
standing is that by which one wrongly grasps the nature of virtue
and vice, and of right and wrong conduct. Tiimasa understanding
is that which takes vice as virtue and out of ignorance perceives all
things wrongly. That mental hold (dhrli) is called siittvika which
by unfailing communion holds together the sense-functions and bio-
motor and mind activities. That happiness which in the beginning
appears to he painful, but which is in the end as sweet as nectar,
and which is the direct result of gaiety of mind, is called siittvika
sukha. The happiness arising out of sense-object contact, which in
the beginning is as attractive as nectar, but in the end is as painful
as poison, is riijasa. That happiness which arises out of sleep,
idleness and errors, and blinds one in the beginning and in the
end, is called liimasa. So also the food which increases life, facili-
tates mind-function, increases powers of enjoyment, makes one
healthy and strong, and is sweet, resistible and delightful is liked by
the siitt·vika people. That food is liked by riijasa people which is
hot, sour, salt, dry and causes pain and brings on diseases. The food
which is impure, tasteless, old and rotten is liked by liimasa people.
All this goes to show that the gu7Jas, sattva, rajas and lamas, are
determinants of the tendencies of, or rather the stuff of, the moral
and immoral, pleasurable and painful planes or characteristics
of our experience. Sattva represents the moral and supermoral
planes, rajas the ordinary mixed and normal plane, and lamas the
inferior and immoral characteristics of our experience.
Avyakta and Brahman.

The word avyakla is primarily used in the Guii in the st:nse
of" the unmanifested." Etymologically the word consists of two
parts, the negative particle a meaning "negation," and vyakla
meaning "manifested," "differentiated" or "revealed." In this
XIV) Avyakta and Brahman 47 1
sense the word is used as an adjective. There is another use
of the word in the neuter gender (avyaktam), in the sense of
a category. As an illustration of the first sense, one may refer
to the Gttii, 11. 25 or VIII. 21. Thus in II. 25 the self is described
as the unmanifested; unthinkable and unchangeable. In the
U pani~ads, however, it is very unusual to characterize the self as
avyakta or unmanifested; for the self there is pure conscious-
ness and self-manifested. In all later Vedantic works the seif is
described as anubhuti-svabhiiva, or as being always immediately
intuited. But in the Gua the most prominent characteristic of the
self is that it is changeless and deathless; next to this, it is un-
manifested and unthinkable. But it does not seem that the Gitii
describes the self as pure consciousness. Not only does it charac-
terize the self as avyakta or unmanifested, but it does not seem
anywhere to refer to it as a self-conscious principle. The word
cetanii, which probably means consciousness, is described in the
Gua as being a part of the changeable k~etra, and not the k~etra
jiia1. It may naturally be asked how, if the self was not a conscious
principle, could it be described as k~etra-jfla (that which knows
the k~etra)? But it may well be replied that the self here is calJed
k~etra-jfla only in relation to its k~et1·a, and the implication would
be that the self becomes a conscious principle not by virtue of
its own inherent principle of consciousness, but by virtue of the
principle of consciousness reflected or offered to it by the complex
entity of the k~et1·a. The k~etra contains within it the conscious
principle known as cetanii, and it is by virtue of its association
with the self that the self appears as k~etra-jfla or the knower.
It may not be out of place here to mention that the term lqetra
is never found in the Upani~ads in the technical sense in which
it is used in the Gua. The term lqetra-jfla, however, appears in
Svetiisvatara, VI. 16 and Maitriiya'l}a, n. 5 in the sense of puru~a,
as in the Giiii. The term k~etra, however, as used in the Gttii, has
more or less the same sense that it has in Caraka's account of
Sarp.khya in the Caraka-sa1{lhitii, III. I. 61-63. In Caraka, however,
avyakta is excluded from the complex constituent k~etra, though
in the Gitii it is included within the constituents of kfelra. Caraka
again considers avyakta (by which term he means both the Sa111khya
prakrti and the puru~a) as k~etra-jiia, whereas the Gftii takes only
the puru~a as k~etra-jiia. The puru~a of the Gitii is further
1 Gltii, XIII. 7·
characterized as the life-principle (fiva-bhilta, vn. 5 and xv. 7) by
which the whole world is upheld. The Gttii does not, however, de-
scribe in what particular way the life~prindple upholds the world. In
Caraka's account also the iitman is referred to as the life-principle,
and it is held there that it is the principle which holds together the
buddhi, the senses, the mind and the objects-it is also the prin-
ciple for which good, bad, pleasure, pain, bondage, liberation, and
in fact the whole world-process happens. In the Caraka-sa1J1hitii
puru~a is regarded as cetanii-dhiitu, or the upholder of conscious-
ness; yet it is not regarded as conscious by itself. Consciousness
only comes to it as a result of the joint operation of manas, the
senses, the objects, etc. In the Gitii puru~a is not regarded as the
cetanii-dhiitu, but cetanii or consciousness is regarded as being a
constituent of the k~ttra over which the puru~a presides. Thus
knowledge can accrue to puru~a as k~etra-jiia, only in association
with its ksetra. It may well be supposed that puru~a as k~etra-jiia
and as a life-principle upholds the constituents of the k~etra, and
it is probable that the puru~a's position as a cognizer or knower de-
pends upon this intimate association between itself and the k~etra.
Another relevant point is suggested along with the considera-
tions of the nature of the puru~a as the cognizer, namely, the
consideration of the nature of puru~a as an agent (kartr). It will
be pointed out in another section that the fruition of actions is
rendered possible by the combined operations of adhi#hiina, kartr,
kiirm;a, ce#ii and daiva, and this doctrine has been regarded as
being a Sarpkhya doctrine, though it has been interpreted by
Sankara as being a Vedantic view. But hoth Sarpkhya and the
Vedanta theories are explicitly of the sat-kiirya-viida type. Accord-
ing to the sat-kii1ya-viida of the traditional Sarpkhya philosophy
the fruition of actions is the natural result of a course of unfolding
evolution, consisting in the actualization of what was already
potentially present. On the Vedantic sat-kiirya-viida view all
oper.ations are hut mere appearances, and the cause alone is true.
Neither of these doctrines would seem to approve of a theory of
causation which would imply that anything could be the result of
the joint operation of a number of factors. That whiCh is not cannot
he produced by the joint operation of a collocation of causes. It
may he remembered, however, that the Gitii explicitly formulates
the basic principle of sat-kiirya-viida, that what exists cannot be
destroyed and that what does not exist cannot come into being.
XIV] Avyakta and Brahman 473
This principle was applied for proving the deathless character of
the self. It is bound to strike anyone as very surprising that the
Gltii should accept the sat-kiirya-viida doctrine in establishing the
immortality of the self and should assume the a-sat-kiirya-·viida
doctrine regarding the production of action. It is curious, however,
to note that a similar view regarding the production of action is
to he found in Caraka's account of Sarp.khya, where it is said that
all actions are produced as a result of a collocation of causes-
that actions are the results of the collocation of other entities with
the agent (kartr)l.
The word avyakta is also used in the sense of" unknowability"
or "disappearance" in the Gltii, 11. 28, where it is said that the
beginnings of all beings are invisible and unknown; it is only in
the middle that they are known, and in death also they dis-
appear and become unknown. But the word avyakta in the neuter
gender means a category which is a part of God Himself and from
which all the manifested manifold world has come into being.
This avyakta is also referred to as a prakrti or nature of God,
which, under His superintendence, produces the moving and the
unmoved-the entire universe 2 • But God Himself is sometimes
referred to as being avyakta (probably because He cannot be
grasped by any of our senses), as an existence superior to the
avyakta, which is described as a part of His nature, and as a category
from which all things have come into being 3 • This avyakta which
is identical with God is also called ak~ara, or the immortal,
and is regarded as the last resort of all beings who attain their
highest and most perfect realization. Thus there is a superior
m.:yakta, which represents the highest essence of God, and an
inferior a1.,yakta, from which the world is produced. Side by side
with these two avyaktas there is also the prakrti, which is some-
times described as a coexistent principle and as the miiyli or the
blinding power of God, from which the gu~as are produced.
The word "Brahman" is used in at least two or three different
senses. Thus in one sense it means prakrti, from which the gu~as
are produced. In another sense it is used as an essential nature of
God. In another sense it means the Vedas. Thus in the Gitii,
I Caraka-saT{lhitii, IV. I. 54·
2
Gua, IX. 10, mayiidhyak~et:~a prakrtil; suyate sacariicaram.
3 Ibid. VIII. 20 and VIII. 21; also IX. 4, where it is said, "All
the world is
pervaded over by me in my form as avyakta; all things and all living beings are
in me, but I am not exhausted in them."
474 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gua [cH.
III. IS, it is sai~ that the sacrificial duties are derived from Brahman
(Vedas). Brahman is derived from the eternal; therefore the omni-
present Brahman is always established in the sacrifices 1 • The idea
here is that, since the Vedas have sprung from the eternal Brahman,
its eternal and omnipresent character is transmitted to the sacrifices
also. The word "omnipresent" (sarva-gata) is probably used in
reference to the sacrifices on account of the .diverse and manifold
ways in which the sacrifices are supposed to benefit those who
perform them. In the Gitii, IV. 32, also the word" Brahman" in
Brahmm:zo mukhe is used to denote the Vedas. But in IV. 24 and 25,
where it is said that all sacrifices are to be made with the Brahman
as the object and that .the sacrificial materials, sacrificial fire, etc.
are to be looked upon as being Brahman, the word " Brahman" is
in all probability used in the sense of God 2 • In v. 6, IO, I9 also
the word " Brahman " is used in the sense of God or Isvara; and
in most of the other cases the word is used in the sense of God.
But according to the Gitii the personal God as Is.vara is the
supreme principle, and Brahman, in the sense of a qualityless, un-
differentiated ultimate principle as taught in the Upanil?ads, is a
principle which, though great in itself and representing the ulti-
mate essence of God, is nevertheless upheld by the personal God
or lsvara. Thus, though in VIII. 3 and x. I 2 Brahman is referred to
as the differenceless ultimate principle, yet in XIV. 27 it is said
that God is the support of even this ultimate principle, Brahman.
In many places we also hear of the attainment of Brahmahood
(brahma-bhuta, v. 24, VI. 27, XVIII. 54, or brahma-bhuya, XIV. 26),
and also of the attainment of the ultimate bliss of Brahman
(Brahma-nirvii7:za, n. 72, v. 24, 25, 26). The word brahma-bhuta
does not in the Gitii mean the differenceless merging into one-
ness, as in the Vedanta of Sarikara. It is wrong to think that
the term " Brahman" is always used in the same sense in which
Sarikara used it. The word "Brahman" is used in the sense of
an ultimate differenceless principle in the Upanil?ads, and the
U panil?ads were apprized by all systems of Hindu thought as
the repository of all sacred knowledge. Most systems regarded
the attainment of a changeless eternal state as the final goal of
realization. As an illustration, I may refer to the account of
1
Gua, 111. 15.
2 Sridhara, in interpreting this verse (IV. 24), explains it by saying, tad evam
parameivariiriidhana-lak~a1}a7Jl kar,na jiitina-hetutvena bandhakatvtibhiivtid akar-
maiva.
Sarp.khya given by Caraka, in which it is said that, when a man
gives up all attachment and mental and physical actions, all
feelings and knowledge ultimately and absolutely cease. At this
stage he is reduced to Brahmahood (brahma-bhuta), and the self
is no longer manifested. It is a stage which is beyond all existence
and which has no connotation, characteristic or mark 1 • This state
is almost like a state of annihilation, and yet it is described as
a state of Brahmahood. The word "Brahman" was appropriated
from the Upani~ads and was used to denote an ultimate superior
state of realization, the exact nature of which differed with the
different systems. In the Gztii also we find the word "Brahman"
signifying a high state of self-realization in which, through a com-
plete detachment from all passions, a man is self-contented within
himself and his mind is in a perfect state of equilibrium. In the
Gitii, v. 19, Brahman is defined as the faultless state of equilibrium
(nirdoia1Jl hi sama1Jl brahma), and in all the verses of that context
the sage who is in a state of equanimity and equilibrium through
detachment and passionlessness is said to be by virtue thereof in
Brahman; for Brahman means a state of equanimity. In the Gitii,
XIII. 13, Brahman is described as the ultimate object of knowledge,
which is beginningless, and cannot be said to be either existent or
non-existent (na sat tan niisad ucyate). It is said that this Brah111:an
has His hands and feet, eyes, head, mouth and ears everywhere
in the world, and that He envelopes all. He is without senses,
but He illuminates all sense-qualities; Himself unattached and the
upholder of all, beyond the gu1Jas, He is also the enjoyer of the
gu1Jas. He is both inside and outside of all living beings, of all
that is moving and that is unmoved. He is both near and far, but
unknowable on account of His subtle nature. Being one in many,
yet appearing as many, the upholder of all living beings, the
devourer and overpowerer of all, He is the light of all light,
beyond all darkness, He is both knowledge and the object .of
knowledge, residing in the heart of all. It is easy to see that the
whole concept of Brahman, as herein stated, is directly borrowed
from the Upani~ads. Towards the end of this chapter it said is
that he who perceives the many living beings as being in one, and
realizes everything as an emanation or elaboration from that,
becomes Brahman. But in the next chapter Kr~:r:ta as God says,
nibsrtab sarva-bhiivebhyas cihna1Jl yasya na vidyate.
Caraka-saT[lhitii, IV. 1. 153.
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitti [cH.
"I am the upholder of the immortal and imperishable Brahman of
absolute bliss and of the eternal dharma." In the Gftii, XIV. 26, it
is said that "he who worships me unflinchingly through devotion,
transcends all gm;as and becomes Brahman." It has just been re-
marked that the Gua recognizes two different kinds of avyaktas.
It is the lower avyakta nature of God which has manifested itself
as the universe; but there is a higher avyakta, which is beyond it
as the eternal and unchangeable basis of all. It seems very prob-
able, therefore, that Brahman is identical with this higher a·vyakta.
But, though this higher a'l'Yakta is regarded as the highest essence
of God, yet, together with the lower ll'Z,')Jakta and the selves, it is
upheld in the super-personality of God.
The question whether the Gitii is a Sa111khya or a Vedanta
work, or originally a Sa111khya work which was later on revised,
changed, or enlarged from a Vedanta point of view, need not be
elaborately discussed here. For, if the interpretation of the Gitii,
as given herein, be accepted, then it will be evident that the Gztii
is neither a Sa111khya work nor a Vedanta work. It has been
pointed out that the word sii1J1khya, in the Gitii, does not mean the
traditional Sa111khya philosophy, as found in Isvarakp:;t:ta's Kiirikii.
Hut there are, no doubt, here the scattered elements of an older
philosophy, from which not only the Sa111khya of lsvarakr~t:ta
or the .._';a#i-tantra (of which IsYarakr~t:ta's work was a summary)
developed, but even its earlier version, as found in Caraka's
account, could be considered to have developed. There is no doubt
that the Gitii's account of Sarpkhya differs materially from the
Sa111khya of the $a~{i-tantra or of lsvarakr~t~a, from the Sa111khya
of Caraka, from the Sa111khya of Paiicasikha in the A1ahii-bhiirata
and from the SaJTlkhya of Pataiijali and the Vyiisa-bhii~ya. Ordi-
narily the Sarpkhya of Pataiijali is described as a theistic Sarpkhya
(sei-vara-siirrzkhya); but the lsvara of Patafijali is but loosely attached
to the system of Sa111khya thought as expounded in Yoga. The
lsvara there appears only as a supernormal, perfect being, who
by his permanent will removes the barriers in the path of the
evolution of prakrti in accordance with the law of karma. He thus
merely helps the fulfilment of the teleology of the blind prakrti.
But in the Gitii both the puru{;as and the root of the cosmic nature
are hut parts of God, the super-person (puru~ottama). The prakrti,
from which the gutzas which have only subjectivistic characteristics
are derived, is described as the miiyii power of God, or like a
consort to Him, who, being fertilized by His energies, produces
the gu1_las. The difference of the philosophy of the Gitii from the
various schools of Sa111khya is very evident. Instead of the one
prakrti of Sa111khya we have here the three prakrtis of God. The
gu1_las here are subjectivistic or psychical, and not cosmical. It is
because the Gitii admits a prakrti which produces the subjectivistic
gu1_las by which the puru~as are bound with ties of attachment to
their experiences, that such a prakrti could fitly be described as
gu1_lamayi miiyii (miiyii consisting of gu1_las). The puru$as, again,
though they are many, are on the whole but emanations from
a specific prakrti (divine nature) of God. The puru~as are not
stated in the Guii to be of the nature of pure intelligence, as
in the Sa111khya; but the cognizing element of consciousness
( cetanii) is derived from another prakrti of God, which is associated
with the puru~a. It has also been pointed out that the Gitii admits
the sat-kiirya-viida doctrine with reference to immortality of the self,
but not with reference to the fruition of actions or the rise of
consciousness. The Sa111khya category of tan-miitra is missing in
the Gitii, and the general teleology of the prakrti of the Sa111khya
is replaced by the super-person of God, who by his will gives a
unity and a purpose to all the different elements that are upheld
within Him. Both the Sa111khya of Kapila and that of Patafijali
aim at securing, either through knowledge or through Yoga
practices, the final loneliness of the translucent puru$as. The
Gitii, however, is anxious to secure the saintly equanimity and
a perfect, unperturbed nature by the practice of detachment of
the mind from passions and desires. \Vhen such a saintly equa-
nimity and self-contentedness is achieved, the sage is said to be
in a state of liberation from the bondage of gu1_la-attachments, or
to be in a state of Brahmahood in God. The philosophy of the
Gitii thus differs materially from the traditional Sa111khya philo-
sophy on almost every point. On some minor points (e.g. the absence
of tan-miitras, the nature of the production of knowledge and
action, etc.) the Gttii philosophy has some similarities with the
account of the Sa111khya given in the Caraka-smphitii, IV. I, as
already described in the first volume of this work 1 •
The question whether the Gitii was written under a Vedan tic
influence cannot be answered, unless one understands what is
exactly meant by this Vedan tic influence; if by V edan tic influence
1 A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, 1922, pp. 213-222.
one means the influence of the Upani~ads, then the Gila must
plainly be admitted to have borrowed very freely from the
Upani~ads, which from the earliest times had been revered for
their wisdom. If, however, by Vedantic influence one means the
philosophy of Vedanta as taught by Sankara and his followers,
then it must be said that the Gita philosophy is largely different
therefrom. It has already been pointed out that, though Brahman
is often described in U pani!?adic language as the highest essence
of God, it is in reality a part of the super-personality of God. The
Gua, moreover, does not assert anywhere that Brahman is the
only reality and all else that appears is false and unreal. The word
maya is, no doubt, used in the Gila in three passages; but its
meaning is not what Sankara ascribes to it in his famous inter-
pretation of Vedantic thought. Thus in the Gitii, vn. 14, maya is
described as being of the nature of gu'!las, and it is said that he
who clings to God escapes the grip of the maya or of the gu'!las.
In the Gttii, VII. I 5, the word maya is also probably used in the
same sense, since it is said that it is ignorant and sinful men who,
through demoniac ideas, lose their right wisdom under the in-
fluence of miiya and do not cling to God. In all probability,
here also miiyii means the influence of rajas and lamas; for it
has been repeatedly said in the Gttii that demoniac tendencies
are generated under the preponderating influence of rajas and
lamas. In the Gita, XVIII. 61, it is said that God resides in the
heart of all living beings and moves them by maya, like dolls
on a machine. It has been pointed out that the psychical ten-
dencies and moral or immoral propensities which move all men
to action are produced under the influence of the gu'!las, and that
God is the ultimate generator of the gu'!las from the prakrti. The
miiyii, therefore, may well be taken here to mean gu'!las, as in the
Gitii, VII. 14. Sndhara takes it to mean the power of God. The
gu'!las are, no doubt, in a remote sense, powers of God. But
Sankara's paraphrasing of it as deception (chadmanii) is quite
inappropriate. Thus it is evident that the Gita does not know the
view that the world may be regarded as a manifestation of mayii
or illusion. It has also been pointed out that the word" Brahman"
is used in the Gila in the sense of the Vedas, of faultless
equanimity, of supreme essence and of prakrti, which shows that
it had no such crystallized technical sense as in the philosophy of
Sankara. The word had in the Gttii all the looseness of Upani!?adic
XIV] Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gltii 479
usage. In the Gftii the word avidyii, so famous in Sankara's
philosophy of the Vedanta, is nowhere used. The word ajiiiina
is used several times (v. 15, 16; x. 11; XIII. 11; XIV. 8, 16, 17;
XVI. 4); but it has no special technical sense in any of these passages.
It has the sense of "ignorance" or "misconception," which is
produced by lamas (ajiiiinal!l tamasa}_t phalam, XIV. 16) and which
in its tum produces lamas (lamas tv ajfiiina-jal!l viddhi, XIV. 8).
Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gita.

The Vedic view of the obligatoriness of certain kinds of sacri-
fices or substitution-meditations permeated almost all forms of
Hindu thought, excepting the Vedanta philosophy as interpreted
by Sankara. The conception of the obligatoriness of duties finds its
btst expression in the analysis of ·vidhi in the l\1imarpsa philosophy.
Vidhi means the injunctions of the Vedas, such as,'' Thou should'st
perform such and such sacrifices"; sometimes these are condi-
tional, such as," Those who wish to attain Heaven should perform
such and such sacrifices"; sometimes they are unconditional, such
as," Thou should'st say the three prayers." The force of this ·vidhi,
or injunction, is differently interpreted in the different schools
of l\limarpsa. Kumarila, the celebrated commentator, in inter-
preting Jaimini's definition of dharma, or virtue, as a desirable
end (artha) or good which is enjoined by the Vedic commands
(codanii-lak~m;o 'rtho dharma}_t, Mzmiil!ISii-sutra, 1. 1), says that
it is the performance of the Vedic injunctions, sacrifices, etc.
(yiigiidi}_t) that should be called our duty. The definition of virtue,
then, involves the notion that only such a desired end (on account
of the pain associated with it not exceeding the associated pleasure)
as is enjoined by Vedic commands is called dharma. The sacrifices
enjoined by the Vedas are called dharma, because these would in
future produce pleasurable experiences. So one's abstention from
actions prohibited by Vedic commands is also called dharma, as
by this means one can avoid the undesirable effects and sufferings
of punishments as a result of transgressing those commands. Such
sacrifices, however, are ultimately regarded as artha, or desired
ends, because they produce pleasurable experiences. The im-
perative of Vedic commands is supposed to operate in a twofold
manner, firstly, as initiating a volitional tendency in obedience
to the verbal command (Siihdl bhiivanii), and, secondly, in releasing
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii (cH.
the will to the actual performance of the act enjoined by the
command (iirthz bhiivanii). The propulsion of verbal commands
is not like any physical propulsion; such a propulsion only arises
as a result of one's comprehension of the fact that the per-
formance of the acts enjoined will lead to beneficial results,
and it naturally moves one to perform those acts out of self-
interest1. So of the twofold propulsion (bhiivanii) implied in a
Vedic imperative the propulsio:: to act, as communicated by the
verbal command, is called siibdz bhiivanii; and this is followed by
the actual efforts of the person for the performance of the act 2 •
The prescriptive of the command (vidhi) is comprehended directly
from the imperative suffix (lin) of the verb, even before the meaning
of the verb is realized. If this is so, it is contended that the im-
perative, as it is communicated by the command, is a pure con-
tentless form of command. This contention is admitted by the
Bhatta school, which thinks that, though in the first stage we have
communication of the contentless pure form of the imperative, yet
at the successive stages the contentless form of duty is naturally
supplemented by a more direct reference to the concrete context,
as denoted by the verb with which the suffix is associated. So the
process of the propulsion of bhiivanii, though it starts at the first
instance with the communication of a pure con tentless form, passes,
by reason of its own necessity and the incapacity of a contentless
form of duty to stand by itself, gradually through more and more
concrete stages to the actual comprehension of the duty implied
by the concrete meaning of the associated verb 3 • So the com-
munication of the contentless duty and its association with the
concrete verbal meaning are not two different meanings, but are
1
adr~fe tu vi~aye Jreya~-siidhaniidhigama~ sabdaika-nibandhana iti tad-adhi-
gamopiiya~ sabda eva pravartak~; ata eva sabdo 'pi na SVarilpa-miitTeQa pra-
vartako viiyv-iidi-tulyatva-prasairgiit; ... arthapratftim upajanayata~ sabdasya pra-
vartakatvam. Nyiiya-mafijari, p. 342. The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares,
1895.
2 Liir-iide~ sabdasya na pratlti-janana-miitre vyiipiira~ kintu purufa-pravrttiiv
api; sa cii:yam liir-iidi-vyiipiira~ sabda-bhiivanii-niimadheyo vidhir ity ucyate sa eva

ca pravartaka~ ... yo bhavana-kriya-kartr-v#aya~ prayojaka-vyiipiira~ puru~a-stho
yatra bhavana-kriyiiyii~ kartii svargiidikarmatii1Jl iipadyate so 'rtha-bhiivanii-sab-
dena ucyate. Ibid. p. 343·
3
Y ady apy a1Jlsair asa1JlSP!~1ii1Jl vidhi~ sprsati bhiivaniim
tathiipy asaktito niisau tan-miitre paryavasyati
anuffheye hi vifaye vidhi~ pu1JlSii1fl pravartaka~
a1JlSa-trayeQa ciipilrt;tii1Jl niinuti~fhati bhiivaniim
tasmiit prakriinta-rupo 'pi vidhis tiivat pratlkfate
yiivad yogyatvam iipanna bhavana'nyanapek#1J.l. Ibid. p. 344·
XIV) Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gttii
rather the prolongation of one process of communication, just as
cooking includes all the different associated acts of putting the pan
on the fire, lighting the fire, and the like 1 • These two bhlivaniis,
therefore, mean nothing more than the reasoning of the will and
its translation into definite channels of activity, as the performance
of the sacrifice, etc., and vidhi here means simply the prompting or
the propulsion (vylipliralz prerm:zli-rupalz) ; and it is such prompting
that initiates in the performer the will, which is later on translated
into concrete action.
Another Mimal!lsa view objects to this theory of dual bhlivanli
and asserts that the suffix lin involves the notion of an order to
work (prerm:za), as if the relation of the Vedas to us were one of
master and servant, and that the Vedic vidhi as expressed in the lin
suffix conveys the command (praifJ!a-praijayolz sambandhalz). The
vidhi goads us to work, and, being goaded by it, we tum to work.
It does not physically compel us to act; but the feeling we
have from it that we have been ordered to act constitutes the
driving power. The knowledge of vidhi thus drives us to our
Vedic duties. When a man hears the command, he feels that he
has been commanded and then he sets to work. This setting
to work is quite a different operation from the relation of the
command and the commanded, and comes after it. The essence
of a Vedic sentence is this command or niyoga. A man who
has formerly tasted the benefits of certain things or the pleasures
they produced naturally intends to have them again; here also
there is a peculiar mental experience of eagerness, desire or in-
tention (likuta), which goads him on to obey the Vedic commands.
This akuta is a purely subjective experience and cannot, therefore,
be experienced by others, though one can always infer its existence
from the very fact that, unless it were felt in the mind, no one
would feel himself goaded to work 2 • Niyoga, or a prompting to
work (prerm:za), is the sense of all vidhis, and this rouses in us the
intention of working in accordance with the command. The actual
performance of an action is a mere counterpart of the intention
(likuta), that is subjectively felt as roused by the niyoga or the
1
Y athii hi sthiily-adhisraym:ziit prahhrtyii niriikiiizk~audana-ni$patter ekaiveya1fl
piika-kriyii saliliivaseka-tm:u;luliivapana-darvl-vighattaniisriiva~iidy-aneka-k~a~a
samudiiya-svabhiivii tathii prathama-pada-jiiiiniit prahhrti iiniriikii~a-viikyiirtha
paricchediid ekaiveya't!l iii.bdl pramiti/:z. Nyiiya-maiijarl, p. 345·
2
Ayam api bhautika-vyiipiira-hetur iitmiikilta-vise~o na pramii~iintara-vedyo
bhavati na ca na vedyate tat-Sa'f!lvedane sati ce~tii yadvanta'f!l dntvii tasyiipi tiidrk-
prera~ii'vagamo 'numfyate. Ibid. p. 348.
DII 31
driving power of the vidhi. This view differs from the view of
Kumarila in this, that it does not suppose that the propulsion
of the Vedic command takes effect in a twofold bhiivanii, through
the whole process of th_e conception and the materialization of the
action in accordance with the Vedic commands. The force of the
command is exhausted in prompting us to action and arousing in
us the inward resolution (likuta) to obey the command. The actual
performance of the action comes as a natural consequence (artha).
The force of the vidhi has a field of application only when our
ordinary inclinations do not naturally lead us to the performance
of action. Vidhi, therefore, operates merely as a law of command
which has to be obeyed for the sake of the law alone, and it is
this psychological factor of inward resolution to obey the law that
leads to the performance of action.
Mal).<;iana, in his Vidhi-viveka, discusses the diverse views on
the significance of vidhi. He interprets vidhi as a specific kind
of prompting (pravartanii). He distinguishes the inner volitional
intention of attaining an end and its translation into active effort
leading to muscular movements of the body. Pravartanii here
means the inner volitional direction of the mind towards the
performance of the action, as well as actual nervous changes which
are associated with it 1 • The command of the Vedas naturally
brings with it a sense of duty or of" oughtness" (kartavyatii), and
it is this sense of kartavyatii that impels people to action without
any reference to the advantages and benefits that may be reaped
by such actions. The psychological state associated with such a
feeling of "oughtness" is said to be of the nature of instincts
(pratibhii). It is through an instinctive stimulus to work, proceed-
ing from the sense of" oughtness," that the action is performed.
The Nyaya doctrine differs from the above view of vidhi as a
categorically imperative order and holds that the prompting of the
Vedic commands derives its force from our desire for the attainment
of the benefits that we might reap if we acted in accordance with
them. So the ultimate motive of the action is the attainment of
pleasure or the avoidance of pain, and it is only with a view to
attaining the desired ends that one is prompted to follow the Vedic
1 Bhava-dharma eva kascit samfhita-siidhaniinugu'!lo v.•yiipiira-padiirtha/:z; tad
yathii iitmano buddhy-iidi-janana-pravrttasya manal:z-sa'!lyoga evii'ya'!l bhiiva-

dharmab tadvad atriipi spandas_ tad-itaro vii bhiiva-dharma/:z prav.•rtti-jananii'-
nukillatayii vyiipiira-vise~al:z pravartanii. Vacaspati's Nyiiya-ka'!lika on Vidlri-
viveka, pp. 243, 244·
XIV] Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gitii
commands and perform the sacrifices. In this view, therefore, the
prompting, or prera1_Zii, has not in it that self-evident call of the
pure imperative or the rousing of the volitional tendency through
the influence of the imperative; the prompting felt is due only to
the rise of desires for the end.
Most of the above interpretations of vidhi are of much later
date than the Gitii. No systematic discussion of the nature of
vidhi which can be regarded as contemporaneous with or prior to
the date of the Gitii is now available. But even these latter-day
explanations are useful in understanding the significance of
the force of the notion of the imperative in the Gitii. It IS
clear from the above discussion that the notion of the impera-
tive of vidhi cannot be called moral in our sense of the term,
as has been done in a recent work on Hindu Ethics 1 • For the
imperative of vidhi is limited to the injunctions of the Vedas,
which are by no means coextensive with our general notion of
morality. According to the Mlmarpsa schools just described virtue
(dharma) consists in obedience to Vedic injunctions. Whatever
may be enjoined by the Vedas is to be considered as virtue, what-
ever is prohibited by the Vedas is evil and sin, and all other
things which are neither enjoined by the Vedas nor prohibited
by them are neutral, i.e. neither virtuous nor vicious 2 • The term
dharma is therefore limited to actions enjoined by the Vedas, even
though such actions may in some cases be associated with evil
consequences leading to punishments due to the transgression of
some other Vedic commands. The categorical imperative here
implied is scriptural and therefore wholly external. The virtuous
character of actions does not depend on their intrinsic nature,
but on the external qualification of being enjoined by the Vedas.
1
S. K. l\1aitra's Hindu Ethics, written under Dr Seal's close personal
supervision and guidance.
2
Kumarila holds that even those !'acrifices which are performed for the
killing of one's enemies are right, because they are also enjoined by the Vedas.
Prabhakara, however, contends that, since these are performed only out of the
natural evil propensities of men, their performance cannot be regarded as being
due to a sense of duty associated with obedience to the injunctions of the Vedas.
Kumarila thus contends that, though the Syena sacrifice is attended with evil
consequences, yet, since the performer is only concerned with his duty in
connection with the Vedic commands, he is not concerned with the evil conse-
quences; and it is on account of one's obedience to the Vedic injunctions that
it is called right, though the injury to living beings that it may involve will
bring about its punishment all the same. Sarp.khya and some Nyaya writers,
however, would condemn the Syena sacrifice on account of the injury to living
beings that it involves.
31-2
Whatever is not enjoined in the Vedas or not prohibited in them
is simply neutral. It is clear, therefore, that the term dharma can
be translated as "virtue" only in a technical sense, and the words
" moral " and " immoral " in our sense have nothing to do with
the concept of dharma or adharma.
The Gltii distinguishes between two kinds of motives for the
performance of sacrifices. The first motive is that of greed and
self-interest, and the second is a sense of duty. The Gitii is aware
of that kind of motive for the performance which corresponds to
the Nyaya interpretation of Vedic vidhis and also to the general
Mimarp.sa interpretation of vidhi as engendering a sense of duty.
Thus it denounces those fools who follow the Vedic doctrines and
do not believe in anything else ; they are full of desires and eager
to attain Heaven, they take to those actions which lead to rebirth
and the enjoyment of mundane pleasures. People who are thus
filled with greed and desires, and perform sacrifices for the attain-
ment of earthly goods, move in an inferior plane and are not
qualified for the higher scheme of life of devotion to God with
right resolution 1 • The Vedas are said to be under the influence of
mundane hankerings and desires, and it is through passions and
antipathies, through desires and aversions, that people perform the
Vedic sacrifices and think that there is nothing greater than these.
O:ne should therefore transcend the sphere of Vedic sacrifices
performed out of motives of self-interest. But the Gitii is not
against the performance of Vedic sacrifices, if inspired by a sheer
regard for the duty of performing sacrifices. Anyone who looks to
his own personal gain and advantages in performing the sacrifices,
and is only eager to attain his pleasurable ends, is an inferior type
· of man; the sacrifices should therefore be performed without any
personal attachment, out of regard for the sacred duty of the
performance. Prajapati created sacrifices along with the creation
of men and said, "The sacrifices will be for your good-you
should help the gods by your sacrifices, and the gods will in their
1 Vyavasiiyiitmikii buddhil; samiidhau na vidhiyate. Guii, II. 44· The word
samiidhau is explained by Sridhara as follows: samiidhis cittaikiigryarJZ, para-

mesvariibhimukhatvam iti yiivat; tasmin niscayiitmikii buddhis tu na vidluyate.
Samiidhi is thus used here to mean one-pointedness of mind to God. But
Sankara gives a very curious interpretation of the word samiidhi, as meaning
mind (antal;lkarar;za or buddhi), which is hardly justifiable. Thus he says, samii-
dhzyate 'smin puru~opabhogiiya sarvam iti samiidhir antal;lkarar;zarJZ buddhil;l. The
word vyavasiiyiitmikii is interpreted by commentators on 11. 41 and II. 44 as
meaning niicayiitmikii (involving correct decision through proper pramiir;zas or
proof). -I prefer, however, to take the word to mean "right resolution."
XIV] Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gztii
turn help you to grow and prosper. He who lives for himself
without offering oblations to the gods and supporting them
thereby is misappropriating the share that belongs to the gods."
This view of the Gitii is different from that of the later
Mima111sa, which probably had a much earlier tradition. Thus
Kumarila held that the final justification of Vedic sacrifices or of
dharma was that it satisfied our needs and produced happiness-
it was artha. The sacrifices were, no doubt, performed out of
regard for the law of Vedic commands; but that represented only
the psychological side of the question. The external ground for
the performance of Vedic sacrifices was that it produced happiness
for the performer and satisfied his desires by securing for him the
objects of desire. It was in dependence on such a view that the
Nyaya sought to settle the motive of all Vedic sacrifices. The
N aiyayikas believed that the Vedic observances not only secured
for us all desired objects, but that this was also the motive
for which the sacrifices were performed. The Gitii was well
aware of this view, which it denounces. The Gztii admitted
that the sacrifices produced the good of the world, but its whole
outlook was different; for the Gitii looked upon the sacrifices
as being bonds of union between gods and men. The sacrifices
improved the mutual good-will, and it was by the sacrifices that
the gods were helped, and they in their turn helped men, and so
both men and the gods prospered. Through sacrifices there was
rain, and by rain the food-grains grew and men lived on the food-
grains. So the sacrifices were looked upon as being sources not
so much of individual good as of public good. He who looks to
the sacrifices as leading to the satisfaction of his selfish interests
is surely an inferior person. But those who do not perform the
sacrifices are equally wicked. The Vedas have sprung forth from
the deathless eternal, and sacrifices spring from the Vedas, and it
is thus that the deathless, all-pervading Brahman is established
in the sacrifices 1 • The implied belief of the Gitii was that the
prosperity of the people depended on the fertility of the soil, and
that this again depended upon the falling of rains, and that the
rains depended on the grace of gods, and that the gods could live
prosperously only .if the sacrifices were performed; the sacrifices
were derived from the Vedas, the Vedas from the all-pervading
Brahman, and the Brahman again forms the main content of the
1 Gltii, III. IS.
Vedas. Thus there was a complete cycle from Brahman to sacri-
fices, from sacrifices to the good of the gods and from the good
of the gods to the good and prosperity of the people. Everyone
is bound to continue the process of this cycle, and he who
breaks it is a sinful and selfish man, who is not worth the life he
leads 1 • Thus the ideal of the Gftii is to be distinguished from the
ideal of the Mimarpsa in this, that, while the latter aimed at indi-
vidual good, the former aimed at common good, and, while the
latter conceived the Vedic commands to be the motives of their
action, the former valued the ideal of performing the sacrifices in
obedience to the law of continuing the process of the cycle of
sacrifices, by which the world of gods and of men was maintained
in its proper state of prosperity. When a man works for the
sacrifices, such works cannot bind him to their fruits; it is only
when works are performed from motives of self-interest that they
can bind people to their good and bad fruits 2 •
The word dharma in the Gitii does not mean what Jaimini
understood by the term, viz. a desirable end or good enjoined by
the sacrifices (codanii-lak~ano 'rtho dharma/:1.). The word seems to
be used in the Gitii primarily in the sense of an unalterable cus-
tomary order of class-duties or caste-duties and the general
approved course of conduct for the people, and also in the sense
of prescribed schemes of conduct. This meaning of dharma as
"old customary order" is probably the oldest meaning of the word,
as it is also found in the Atharva- Veda, I8. 3· I (dharma'f!l purii-
1Jam anupiilayanti)3. Macdonell, in referring to Maitriiya1Ja, IV. I 9,
Kiithaka, XXXI. 7 and Taittirzya, III. 2. 8. I 1, points out that bodily
defects (bad nails and discoloured teeth) and marrying a younger
daughter while her elder sister is ,unmarried are coupled with
murder, though not treated as equal to it, and that there is no dis-
tinction in principle between real crimes and what are now regarded
as fanciful bodily defects or infringements of merely conventional
practices. In the Satapatha-briihma1_la, XIV. 4· 2. 26, also we find
dharma for a K~attriya 4 is illustrated as being the characteristic
duties of a K~attriya. The central meaning of the word dharma in
the Gitii is therefore the oldest Vedic meaning of the word, "'hich is
1 2
Gztii, III. 16. Ibid. Ill. 9·
1
dharma, dharman are the regular words, the latter in the IJ.g-veda and both
later, for" law" or" custom." See Macdonell's Vedic Index, p. 390.
' tad etat k~attrasya ~attra'f!l yad dharma/; tasmiid dharmiit parn'f!l niisti.
Dr Albrecht Weber's edition, Leipzig, 1924.
XIV] Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gua
a much earlier meaning than the latter-day technical meaning of the
word as it is found in i\'IImfupsa. Dharma does not in the Gitii mean
sacrifices (yajiia) or external advantages, as it does in Mimarpsa,
but the order of conventional practices involving specific caste-
divisions and caste-duties. Accordingly, the performance of
sacrifices is dharma for those whose allotted duties are sacrifices.
Adultery is in the Vedas a vice, as being transgression of dharma,
and this is also referred to as such (dharme n~te, I. 39) in the
Gitii. In the Gitii, II. 7, Arjuna is said to be puzzled and con-
fused regarding his duty as a K!?attriya and the sinful course
of injuring the lives of his relations (dharma-Sa'f!lmiitjha-cetiil;).
The confusion of dharma and adharma is also referred to in XVIII.
31 and 32. In the Gitii, IV. 7 and 8, the word dharma is used
in the sense of the established order of things and conventionally
accepted customs and practices. In II. 40 the way of performing
one's duties without regard to pleasures or sorrows is described
as a particular and specific kind of dharma (asya dharmasya),
distinguished from dharma in general.
The yajfia (sacrifice) is said to be of various kinds, e.g. that
in which oblations are offered to the gods is called daiva-yajfia;
this is distinguished from brahma-yajfia, in which one dedicates
oneself to Brahman, where Brahman is the offerer, offering and
the fire of oblations, and in which,by dedicating oneself to Brahman,
one is lost in Brahman 1 • Then sense-control, again, is described as
a kind of yajfia, and it is said that in the fire of the senses the
sense-objects are offered as libations and the senses themselves are
offered as libations in the fire of sense-control; all the sense-
functions and vital functions are also offered as libations in
the fire of sense-control lighted up by reason. Five kinds of
sacrifices (yajfia) are distinguished, viz. the yajfia with actual
materials of libation, called dravya-yajfia, the yajfia of asceticism
or self-control,called tapo-yajfia, the yajiia of union or communion,
called yoga-yajfia, the yajiia of scriptural studies, called sviidhyiiya-
yajfia, and the yajiia of knowledge or wisdom, called jfiiina-yajfia 2 •
It is easy to see that the extension of the application of the term
yajfia from the actual material sacrifice to other widely divergent
methods of self-advancement is a natural result of the extension of
the concept of sacrifice to whatever tended towards self-advance-
ment. The term yajfia had high and holy associations, and the
1 2 Ibid. 26-28; see also 29 and
Guii, IV. 24 and 25. IV. 30.
newly discovered systems of religious endeavours and endeavours
for self-advancement came to be regarded as but a new kind of
yajiia, just as the substitution-meditations (pratikopiisanii) were
also regarded as being but new forms of yajiia. Thus, while
thought advanced and newer modes of self-realization began to
develop, the older term of yajiia came to be extended to these
new types of religious discipline on account of the high veneration
in which the older institution was held.
But, whatever may be the different senses in which the term
yajiia is used in the Gitii, the word dharma has not here the
technical sense of the Mimarpsa. The Gitii recommends the per-
formance of sacrifices to the Brahmins and fighting to the K~at
triyas, and thus aims at continuity of conventional practices which
it regards as dharma. But at the same time it denounces the
performance of actions from desire, or passions or any kind of
selfish interest. A man should regard his customary duties as his
dharma and should perform them without any idea of the fulfil-
ment of any of his own desires. When a man performs karma from
a sense of disinterested duty, his karma is no longer a bondage to
him. The Gua does not, on the one hand, follow the old karma-
ideal, that one should perform sacrifices in order to secure earthly
and heavenly advantages, nor does it follow, on the other hand,
the ideal of the Vedanta or of other systems of philosophy that
require us to abandon our desires and control our passions with a
view to cleansing the mind entirely of impurities, so as to transcend
the sphere of duties and realize the wisdom of the oneness of the
spirit. The Gitii holds that a man should attain the true wisdom,
purge his mind of all its desires, but at the same time perform
his customary duties and be faithful to his own dharma. There
should be no impelling force other than regard and reverence for
his own inner law of duty with reference to his own dharma of
conventional and customary practices or the duties prescribed by
the siistra.
Sense-control in the Gita.

The uncontrollability of the senses was realized in the Katha
Upan4ad, where the senses are compared with horses. The Gitii
says that, when the mind is led on by fleeting sense-attractions,
the man loses all his wisdom, just as a boat swings to and fro
in deep waters in a strong gale. Even in the case of the wise
XIV) Sense-control in the GUii
man, in spite of his efforts to keep himself steady, the troubled
senses might lead the mind astray. By continually brooding over
sense-objects one becomes attached to them; out of such attach-
ments there arise desires, out of desires there arises anger, out of
anger blindness of passions, through such blindness there is lapse
of memory, by such lapse of memory a man's intelligence is
destroyed, and as a result of that he himself is destroyed 1 • Man
is naturally inclined towards the path of evil, and in spite of
his efforts to restrain himself he tends towards the downward
path. Each particular sense has its own specific attachments and
antipathies, and attachment (raga) and antipathy are the two
enemies. The Gzta again and again proclaims the evil effects of
desires and attachments (kama), anger (krodha) and greed (lobha)
as the three gates of Hell, being that which veils wisdom as smoke
veils fire, as impurities sully a mirror or as the foetus is covered
by the womb 2 • Arjuna is made to refer to Kr!?Qa the difficulty of
controlling the senses. Thus he says, "My mind, 0 Kp~Qa, is
violent, troubled ~nd changeful; it is as difficult to control it as
it is to control the winds 3 ." True yoga can never be attained
unless and until the senses are controlled.
The Pali work Dhamma-pada is also filled with similar ideas
regarding the control of attachments and anger. Thus it says," He
has abused me, beaten me, worsted me, robbed me-those who
dwell not upon such thoughts are freed from hate. Never does
hatred cease by hating, but hatred ceases by love; this is the
ancient law .... As the wind brings down a weak tree, so l\1ara
ovenvhelms him who lives looking for pleasures, has his senses
uncontrolled, or is immoderate in his food, slothful and effeminate .
... As rain breaks through an ill-thatched house, so passion will
break through an undisciplined mind 4 ." Again, speaking of mind,
it says, "As an arrow-maker levels his arrow, so a wise man levels
his trembling, unsteady mind, which it is difficult to guard and
hold back .... Let the wise man guard his mind, incomprehensible,
subtle, capricious though it is. Blessed is the guarded mind 5 ."
Again, "Not nakedness, nor matted hair, not dirt, nor fastings,
not lying on earth, nor ashes, nor ascetic postures, none of these
things purify a man who is not free from desires 6 ." Again," From
1 2 3
Gltii, n. 6o, 62, 63. Ibid. 111. 34, 37-39; XVI. 21. VI. 34·
4 Dhamma-pada (Poona, 1923), 1. 4, 5, 7, 13. 6 Ibid. III. 36, 38.
6
Ibid. x. 141.
attachment (p£yato) comes grief, from attachment comes fear; he
who is free from attachment knows neither grief nor fear. From
affection (pemato) come grief and fear. He who is free from
affection knows neither grief nor fear. From lust (ratz) come
grief and fear. He who is free from affection knows neither grief
nor fear. From lust (kama) come grief and fear. He who is free
from lust knows neither grief nor fear. From desire ( tatzhii) come
grief and fear. He who is free from desire knows neither grief
nor fear 1 ."
It is clear from the above that both the Gitii and the Dhamma-
pada praise sense-control and consider desires, attachments, anger
and grief as great enemies. But the treatment of the Gitii differs
from that of the Dhamma-pada in this, that, while in the Dhamma-
pada there is a course of separate lessons or moral instructions on
diverse subjects, the Gitii deals with sense-control as a means to
the attainment of peace, contentment and desirelessness, which
enables a man to dedicate all his actions to God and follow the
conventional courses of duties without looking for anything in
them for himself. The Gitii knows that the senses, mind and
intellect are the seats of all attachments and antipathies, and that
it is through the senses and the mind that these can stupefy a
man and make his knowledge blind 2 • All the sense-affections of
cold and heat, pleasure and sorrow, are mere changes of our
sensibility, are mere touches of feeling which are transitory and
should therefore be quietly bome 3 • It is only by controlling
the senses that the demon of desire, which distorts all ordinary
and philosophic knowledge, can be destroyed. But it is very hard
to stifle this demon of desire, which always appears in new
forms. It is only when a man can realize within himse]f the
great being which transcends our intellect that he can control
his lower self with his higher self and uproot his desires. The self
is its own friend as well as its own foe, and one should always
try to uplift oneself and not allow oneself to sink down. The chief
aim of all sense-control is to make a man's thoughts steady, so
that he can link himself up in communion with God 4 •
The senses in the Gitii are regarded as drawing the mind along
with them. The senses are continually changing and fleeting, and
they make the mind also changeful and fleeting; and, as a result of
1 Dhamma-pada, XVI. 212-216. 2 Gitii, III. 40.
3 Ibid. 11. 14. 4
Ibid. II. 61; III. 41, 43; VI. _c;, 6.
XIV) Sense-control in the Gitii
that, the mind, like a boat at sea before a strong wind, is driven
to and fro, and steadiness of thought and wisdom (prajfiii} are
destroyed. The word prajfiii is used in the Gztii in the sense of
thought or wisdom or mental inclinations in general. It is used
in a more or less similar sense in the Brhad-iirm;yaka Upani~ad,
IV. 4· 21, and in a somewhat different sense in the Jl,;fa1pj:ukya
Upani~ad, 7. But the sense in which Pataiijali uses the word is
entirely different from that in whtch it is used in the Guii or the
Upani~ads. Pataiijali uses the word in the technical sense of a
specific type of mystical cognition arising out of the steady fixing
of the mind on an object, and speaks of seven stages of such prajfiii
corresponding to the stages of yoga ascension. Prajfiii in the Gztii
means, as has just been said, thought or mental inclination. It does
not mean jfiiina, or ordinary cognition, or vijiiiina as higher wisdom;
it means knowledge in its volitional aspect. It is not the kriyiikhya-
jfiiina, as moral discipline of yama, niyama, etc., of the Paiica-riitra
work Jayiikhya-sa1{lhitii. It means an intellectual outlook, as in-
tegrally connected with, and determining, the mental bent or
inclination. When the mind follows the mad dance of the senses
after their objects, the intellectual background of the mind deter-
mining its direction, the prajfiii is also upset. Unless the prajfiii
is fixed, the mind cannot proceed undisturbed in its prescribed
fixed course. So the central object of controlling the senses is the
securing of the steadiness of this prajfiii (vase hi yasyendriyii1}i
tasya prajfiii prat#thitii-II. 57). Prajfiii and dhi are two words
which seem to be in the Gztii synonymous, and they both mean
mental inclination. This mental inclination probably involves both
an intellectual outlook, and a corresponding volitional tendency.
Sense-control makes this prajfiii steady, and the Guii abounds in
praise of the sthita-priijfia and sthita-dhi, i.e. of one who has
mental inclination or thoughts fixed and steady 1 • Sense-attach-
ments are formed by continual association with sense-objects, and
attachment begets desire, desire begets anger, and so on. Thus all
the vices spring from sense-attachments. And the person who
indulges in sense-gratifications is rushed along by the passions.
So, just as a tortoise collects within itself all its limbs, so the
person who restrains his senses from the sense-objects has his
mind steady and fixed. The direct result of sense-control is thus
steadiness of will, and of mental inclinations or mind (prajfiii).
1
II. 54-56.
492 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii (CH.
The person who has his prajfiii fixed is not troubled in sorrows and
is not eager to gain pleasures, he has no attachment, no fear and
no anger 1 • He is indifferent in prosperity and in adversity and
neither desires anything nor shuns anything 2 • He alone can obtain
peace who, like the sea receiving all the rivers in it, absorbs all his
desires within himself; not so the man who is always busy in
satisfying his desires. The man who has given up all his desires
and is unattached to anything is not bound to anything, has no
vanity and attains true peace. When a man can purge his mind of
attachments and antipathies and can take to sense-objects after
purifying his senses and keeping them in full control, he attains
contentment (prasiida). When such contentment is attained, all
sorrows vanish and his mind becomes fixed (buddhil:z paryavati-
~thate)3. Thus sense-control, on the one hand, makes the mind
unruffled, fixed, at peace with itself and filled with contentment,
and on the other hand, by making the mind steady and fixed, it
makes communion with God possible. Sense-control is the indis-
pensable precondition of communion with God; when once this
has been attained, it is possible to link oneself with God by con-
tinued efforts 4 • Thus sense-control, by producing steadiness of the
will and thought, results in contentment and peace on the one
hand, and on the other makes the mind fit for entering into
communion with God.
One thing that strikes us in reading the Gttii is that the object
of sense-control in the Gitii is not the attainment of a state of
emancipated oneness or the absolute cessation of all mental pro-
cesses, but the more intelligible and common-sense ideal of the
attainment of steadiness of mind, contentment and the power of
entering into touch with God. This view of the object of self-
control is therefore entirely different from that praised in the
philosophic systems of Patafijali and others. The Gitii wants us
to control our senses and mind and to approach sense-objects
with such a controlled mind and senses, because it is by this means
alone that we can perform our duties with a peaceful and contented
mind and turn to God with a clean and unruffled heart 5 • The
main emphasis of this sense-control is not on the mere external
control of volitional activities and the control of motor propensities
1
Gua., II. s6. 2
Ibid. II. 57·
3
Ibid. II. 65; see also
11. 58, 64, 68, 70, 71. ' Ibid. VI. 36.
5 riiga-dve~a-vimuktais tu v#ayiin indriyais caran
iitma-vasyair vidheyiitmii prasiidam adhigacchati. Ibid. II: 64.
x1v] The Ethics of the Gitii and the Buddhist Ethics 493
in accordance with the direction of passions and appetites, but on

the inner control of the mind behind these active senses. When a
person controls only his physical activities, and yet continues to
brood over the attractions of sense, he is in reality false in his
conduct (mithyiiciira). Real self-control does not mean only the
cessation of the external operations of the senses, but also the
control of the mind. Not only should a man cease from committing
actions out of greed and desire for sense-gratification, but his mind
should be absolutely clean, absolutely clear of all impurities of
sense-desires. Mere suspension of physical action without a
corresponding control of mind and cessation from harbouring
passions and desires is a vicious course 1 •
The Ethics of the Gita and the Buddhist Ethics.

The subject of sense-control naturally reminds one of Bud-
dhism. In the Vedic religion performance of sacrifices was
considered as the primary duty. Virtue and vice consisted in
obedience or disobedience to Vedic injunctions. It has been
pointed out that these injunctions implied a sort of categorical
imperative and communicated a sense of vidhi as law, a command
which must be obeyed. But this law was no inner law of the spirit
within, but a mere external law, which ought not to be confused
with morality in the modern sense of the term. Its sphere was
almost wholly ritualistic, and, though it occasionally included such
commands as" One should not injure anyone" (mii h£1J1syiit), yet
in certain sacrifices which were aimed at injuring one's enemies
operations which would lead to such results would have the
imperative of a Vedic command, though the injury to human
beings would be attended with its necessary punishment. Again,
though in later Saf!lkhya commentaries and compendiums it is
said that all kinds of injuries to living beings bring their punish-
ment, yet it is doubtful if the Vedic injunction "Thou shouldst
not injure" really applied to all living beings, as there would be
but few sacrifices where animals were not killed. The Upani~ads,
however, start an absolut . . ly new line by the substitution of
meditations and self-knowledge for sacrificial actions. In the
1 Cf. Dhamma-pada, 1. 2. All phenomena have mind as their precursor, are
dependent upon mind and are made up of mind. If a man speaks or acts with
a pure mind, happiness accompanies him, just as a shadow follows a man
incessantly.
494 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-guii [cH.
primary stage of U pani~adic thoughts a conviction was growing
that instead of the sacrificial performances one could go through
a set form of meditations, identifying in thought certain objects
with certain other objects (e.g. the dawn as the horse of horse-
sacrifice) or even with symbolic syllables, OM and the like. In
the more developed stage of U pani~adic culture a new conviction
arose in the search after the highest and the ultimate truth, and
the knowledge of Brahman as the highest essence in man and
nature is put forwar·l as the greatest wisdom and the final realiza-
tion of truth and reality, than which nothing higher could be
conceived. There are but few moral precepts in the Upani~ads,
and the whole subject of moral conflict and moral efforts is
almost silently dropped or passes unemphasized. In the Taittirzya
Upam."~ad, 1. II, the teacher is supposed to give a course of moral
instruction to his pupil after teaching him the Vedas-Tell the
truth, be virtuous, do not give up the study of the Vedas; after
presenting the teacher with the stipulated honorarium (at the con-
clusion of his studies) the pupil should (marry and) continue the
line of his fami]y. He should not deviate from truth or from virtue
(dharma) or from good. He should not cease doing good to others,
from study and teaching. He should be respectful to his parents
and teachers and perform such actions as are unimpeachable. He
should follow only good conduct and not bad. He should make
gifts with faith (Jraddhii), not with indifference, with dignity,
from a sense of shame, through fear and through knowledge. If
there should be any doubt regarding his c\.•urse of duty or conduct,
then he should proceed to act in the way in which the wisest
Brahmins behaved. But few Upani~ads give such moral precepts,
and there is very little in the U pani~ads in the way of describing
a course of moral behaviour or of emphasizing the fact that man
can attain his best only by trying to become great through moral
efforts. The Upani~ads occupy themselves almost wholly with
mystic meditations and with the philosophic wisdom of self-
knowledge. Yet the ideas of self-control, peace and cessation of
desires, endurance and concentration are referred to in Brhad-
iirm;,yaka, IV. 4· 23, as a necessary condition for the realization of
the self within us 1 . In Katha, VI. II, the control of the senses
(indriya-dhiira1J.a) is referred to as yoga, and in JJJu1J.tf.aka·, 111. 2. 2,
1
iiinto diinta uporatas titik1ub samiihito bhutviitmany eva iitmiinam paiyati.
Brh. 1v. 4· 23.
XIV] The Ethics of the Gitii and the Buddhist Ethics 495
it is said that he who consciously desires the objects of desire is
again and again born through desires; but even in this world all
desires vanish for him who is self-realized in himself and is self-
satisfied 1 • The idea that the path of wisdom is different from the
path of desires was also known, and it was felt that he who sought
wisdom (·n£dyiibhzpsita) was not drawn by many desires 2 •
The point to be discussed in this connection is whether
the centr~l idea of the Gitii, namely, sense-control and more
particularly the control of desires and attachments, is derived
from the Upani~ads or from Buddhism. It has been pointed out
that the Upani~ads do not emphasize the subject of moral conflict
and mvral endeavours so much as the nature of truth and reality
as Brahman, the ultimate essence of man and the manifold ap-
pearance of the world. Yet the idea of the necessity of sense-
control and the control of desires, the settling of the mind in peace
and contentment, is the necessary precondition for fitness for
Vedic knowledge. Thus Sankara, the celebrated commentator on
the Upani~ads, in commenting on Brahma-sutra, 1. I. I, says that
a man is fit for an enquiry after Brahman only when he knows
how to distinguish what is permanent from what is transitory
(nityiin£tya-vastu-viveka), and when he has no attachment to the
enjoyment of the fruits of his actions either as mundane pleasures
or as heavenly joys (ihiimutra-phala-bhoga-viriiga). The necessary
qualifications which entitle a man to make such an enquiry are
disinclination of the mind for worldly joys (sama), possession of
proper control and command over the mind, by which it may be
turned to philosophy (dama), power of endurance (v#aya-titik~ii),
cessation of all kinds of duties (uparatz), and faith in the philo-
sophical conception of truth and reality (tattva-sraddhii). It may
be supposed, therefore, that the Upani~ads presuppose a high
degree of moral development in the way of self-control and dis-
inclination to worldly and heavenly joys. Detachment from sense-
affections is one of the most dominant ideas of the Gitii, and the
idea of IVIU1JrJaka, III. 2. 2, referred to above, is re-echoed in the
Gitii, 11. 70, where it is said that, just as the waters are absorbed
in the calm sea (though paured in continually by the rivers), so
the person in whom all desires are absorbed attains peace, and
1 kiimiin ya~ kiimayate manyamiinal; sa kiimabhir jiiyate tatra tatra paryiipta-
kiimasya krtiitmanas tu ihaiva sarve praviliyanti kiimiil;. MU1:ujaka, 111. 2. 2.

2
Ka;ha, II. 4·
not the :man who indulges in desires. The Gztii, of course, again
and again emphasizes the necessity of uprooting attachments to
pleasures and antipathy to pains and of controlling desires (klima);
but, though the U pani!?ads do not emphasize this idea so frequently,
yet the idea is there, and it seems very probable that the Gitii drew
it from the Upani!?ads. Hindu tradition also refers to the Upani~ads
as the source of the Gitii. Thus the Gitii-miihiitmya describes the
Upani~ads as the cows from which Kg;Q.a, the cowherd boy, drew
the Gitii as milk 1 •
But the similarity of Buddhist ethical ideas to those of the
Gitii is also immense, and, had it not been for the fact that ideas
which may be regarded as peculiarly Buddhistic are almost entirely
absent from the Gztii, it might well have been contended that the
Gitii derived its ideas of controlling desires and uprooting attach-
ment from Buddhism. Tachibana collects a long list of Buddhist
vices as follows2:
ailganarrz, impurity, lust, Sn. 517.
ahaitkiiro, selfishness, egoism, A. 1. 132; M. III. 18, 32.
mamaitkaro, desire, A. 1. 132; M. III. 18, 32.
mamiiyitaJ?l, selfishness, S.N. 466.
mamattarrz, grasping, egoism, S.N. 872, 951.
apekhii, desire, longing, affection, S.N. 38; Dh. 345·
icchii, wish, desire, covetousness.
ejii, desire, lust, greed, craving, S.N. 751; It. 92.
iisii, desire, longing, S.N. 634, 794, 864; Dh. 397.
pipiisii, thirst.
esii, esanii, wish, desire, thirst, Dh. 335·
iikiiitkhii, desire, longing, Tha. 20.
kiFicanarrz, attachment, S.N. 949; Dh. zoo.
gantho, bond, tie, S.N. 798; Dh. 211.
iidiina-gantho, the tied knot of attachment, S.N. 794·
giddhi, greed, desire, Sn. 328; M. 1. 360, 362.
gedlzo, greed, desire, Sn. 65, 152.
gahanarrz, entanglement, Dh. 394·
giiho, seizing, attachment.
jiilin'i, snare, desire, lust, Dh. 18o; A. II. 211.
pariggaho, attachment, Mahiinid. 57·
chando, wish, desire, intention, S.N. 171, 203, etc.
jatii, desire, lust, S.N. 1. 13; V.M. 1.
jigirrzsanatii, covetousness, desire for, Vibhaitga, 353·
nijigirrzsanatii, covetousness, V.M. 1. 23.
ta'!lhii, tasinii, lust, unsatisfied desire, passion.
1 Sarvopani$ado giivo dogdhii gopiila-nandanal:z.
2
The Ethics of Buddhism, by S. Tachibana, p. 73·
XIV] The Ethics of the Gua and the Buddhist Ethics 497
upiidiinam, clinging, attachment, Dh. II. s8, III. 230.
pa1Jidhi, wish, aspiration, Sn. 8oi.
pihii, de.sire, envy, Tha. I218.
pematfl, affection, love, A. III. 249.
bandho, thong, bondage, attachment, Sn. 623; Dh. 344·
bandhana'f!l, bond, fetter, attachment, Sn. S22, S32; Dh. 34S·
nibandho, binding, attachment, S. II. 17.
·vinibandhanam, bondage, desire, Sn. I6.
anubandho, bondage, affection, desire, M. III. 170; Jt. 9I.
upanibandlw, fastening, attachment, V.M. I. 23S·
paribandho, Com. on Thi. p. 242.
riigo, human passion, evil, desire, lust, passim.
siiriigo, siirajjanii, siirajjitattam, affection, passion, Mahiinid. 242.
rati, lust, attachment, Dh. 27.
manoratho, desire, wish (?).
ruci, desire, inclination, Sn. 781.
abhiliiso, desire, longing, wish, Com. on Peta-vattu, IS4·
liilasii, ardent desire(?).
iilayo, longing, desire, lust, Sn. 53S, 635; Dh. 411.
lohho, covetousness, desire, cupidity, Sn. 367 ; Dh. 248.
lobhanam, greed, Tha. 343.
lubhanii, lobhitattam, do. (?).
·vana'f!l, desire, lust, Sn. II3I; Dh. 284, 344·
vanatho, love, lust, Dh. 283, 284.
ttivesanam, clinging to, attachment, Sn. 470, 8oi.
smigo, fetter, bond, attachment, Sn. 473, 79I; Dh. 397·
iisatti, attachment, hanging on, clinging, Sn. 777; Vin. II. 156;
s. I. 2I2.
visattikii, poison, desire, Sn. 333; Dh. I8o.
santhava'f!l, friendship, attachment, Sn. 207, 245; Dh. 27.
ussado, desire(?), Sn. SIS, 783, 78s.
sneho, sineho, affection, lust, desire, Sn. 209, 943; Dh. 28s.
iisayo, abode, intention, inclination, V.H. I. I40.
anusayo, inclination, desire, A. 1. I32; Sn. 14, 369, S45·
sibbanl, desire(?), Sn. 1040.
kodho, anger, wrath, Sn. 1. 24s, 362, 868, 928; Dh. 221-3; It. 4,
I2, I09·
kopo, anger, ill-will, ill-temper, Sn. 6.
iighiito, anger, ill-will, hatred, malice, D. 1. 3, 3I; S. 1. 179.
pa#gho, wrath, hatred, Sum. I I 6.
doso, anger, hatred, passim.
viddeso, enmity, hatred ( ?).
dhumo, anger(?), Sn. 460.
upaniiho, enmity, Sn. 116.
vyiipiido, wish to injure, hatred, fury, Sum. 21 I; It. II 1.
anabhiraddhi, anger, wrath, rage, D. 1. 3·
vera'f!l, wrath, anger, hatred, sin, Sn. ISO; Dh. 3-5, 201.
virodho, opposition. enmity ( ?).
roso, anger ( ?).
rosanam, anger ( ?).
vyii.ro~a1_lam, anger, Sn. 148.
aiiiiii.~am, ignorance, It. 62.
moho, fainting, ignorance, folly, passim.
mohanam, ignorance, S.N. 399, 772.
aviJ."jii., ignorance, error, passion.
It is interesting to note that three vices, covetousness, hatred
and ignorance, and covetousness particularly, appear under dif-
ferent names and their extirpation is again and again emphasized
in diverse ways. These three, ignorance, covetousness and hatred or
antipathy, are the roots of all evils. There are, of course, sitnpler
commandments, such as not to take life, not to steal, not to commit
adultery, not to tell a lie, and not to take intoxicating drinks, and
of these stealing gold, drinking liquors, dishonouringone's teacher's
hed, and killing a Brahmin are also prohibited in the Chii.ndogya
Upani~ad, v. 10. 9-10 1 . But, while the Chii.ndogya only prohibits
killing Brahmins, the Buddha prohibited taking the life of any
living being. But all these vices, and others opposed to the atthmiga-
sila and dasa-kusala-kamma, are included within covetousness,
ignorance and hatred. The Gitli bases its ethics mainly on the
necessity of getting rid of attachment and desires from which
proceeds greed and frustration of which produces anger. But,
while in Buddhism ignorance (avidyii.) is considered as the source
of all evil, the Gitii. does not even mention the word. In the
twelvefold chain of causality in Buddhism it is held that out of
ignorance (avij}ii.) come the conformations (saizkhiira), out of the
conformations consciousness (viiiiiiina), out of consciousness mind
and body (nii.ma-rilpa), out of mind and body come the six fields
of contact (ii.yatana), out of the six fields of contact comes sense-
contact, out of sense-contact comes feeling, out of feeling come
desires (ta1}hii.), out of desires comes the holding fast to things
(upii.dii.na), out of the holding fast to things comes existence
(bhava), out of existence comes birth (jii.ti), and from birth
come old age, decay and death. If ignorance, or avijjii, is stopped,
1 There is another list of eightfold prohibitions called atthaftgiislla; these
are not to take life, not to take what is not given, to abstain from sex-relations,
to abstain from falsehood, from drinking liquors, from eating at forbidden
times, from dancing and music and from beautifying one's '1ody by perfumes,
garlands, etc. There is also another list called dasa-kusala-kamma, such as not to
take life, not to take what is not given, not to commit adultery, not to tell a lie,
not to slander, not to abuse or talk foolishly, not to be covetous, malicious and
sceptical.
xrv] The Ethics of the Gitii and the Buddhist Ethics 499
then the whole cycle stops. But, though in this causal cycle
ignorance and desires are far apart, yet psychologically desires
proceed immediately from ignorance, and a frustration of desires
produces anger, hatred, etc. In the Gua the start is taken directly
from attachment and desires (kiima). The Buddhist word lNnii
(tanhii) is seldom mentioned in the Gitii; whereas the U pani!?adic
word kama takes its place as signifying desires. The Gua is not
a philosophical work which endeavours to search deepl) into the
causes of attachments, nor does it seek to give any practical course
of advice as to how one should get rid of attachment. The Vedanta
system of thought, as interpreted by Sarikara, traces the origin of
the world with all its evils to ignorance or nescience ( avidyii),
as an indefinable principle; the Yoga traces all our phenomenal
experience to five afflictions, ignorance, attachment, antipathy,
egoism and self-love, and the last four to the first, which is
the fountain-head of all evil afflictions. In the Gua there is no
such attempt to trace attachment, etc. to some other higher
principle. The word ajiiiina (ignorance) is used in the Gitii about
six or eight times in the sense of ignorance; but this "ignorance"
does not mean any metaphysical principle or the ultimate starting-
point of a causal chain, and is used simply in the sense of false
knowledge or ignorance, as opposed to true knowledge of things
as they are. Thus in one place it is said that true knowledge of
things is obscured by ignorance, and that this is the cause of all
delusion 1 • Again, it is said that to those who by true knowledge
(of God) destroy their own ignorance (ajiiiina) true knowledge
reveals the highest reality (tat param), like the sun 2 • In another
place jiiiina and ajiiiina are both defined. Jiiiina is defined as
unvacillating and abiding self-knowledge and true knowledge
by which truth and reality are apprehended, and all that is
different from this is called ajFiiina 3 • Ajiiiina is stated elsewhere
to be the result of lamas, and in two other places lamas is said to
be the product of ajiiiina 4 • In another place it is said that people
are blinded by ignorance (ajiiiina), thinking, "I am rich, I am
an aristocrat, who else is there like me? I shall perform sacrifices
make gifts and enjoy 5 ." In another place ignorance is said to
1
ajiiiineniit•rtmJzjiiiinarfl lena muhyantijantava?z. v. 15.
2 jiliinena tu tad-ajiiiinur_n ye~iim niiiita7JZ iitmana!z. v. x6.
3 adhyiitma-jfiiina-nityatva7f1 talft'a-jiiiiniirlha-durianam etaj-jiiiinam iti prol~
tam ajiiiinam yad ato 'nyathii. Gitii, XIII.@ II
1 lbld. XIV. 16, 17; X. I I; XIV. 8. :; Ibid. v. 16.
32·2
soo The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gttii [cH.
produce doubts (sa7Jzsaya), and the Gitii lecture of Krg1a is sup-
posed to dispel the delusion of Arjuna, produced by ignorance 1 •
This shows that, though the word ajiiiina is used in a variety of
contexts, either as ordinary ignorance or ignorance of true and
absolute philosophic knowledge, it is never referred to as being
the source of attachment or desires. This need not be interpreted
to mean that the Gitii was opposed to the view that attachments
and desires were produced from ignorance; but it seems at least to
imply that the Gitii was not interested to trace the origin of attach-
ments and desires and was satisfied to take their existence for
granted and urged the necessity of their extirpation for peace and
equanimity of mind. Buddhist Hinayana ethics and practical
discipline are constituted of moral discipline (Sila), concentration
(samiidhi) and wisdom (paniiii). The lila consisted in the per-
formance of good conduct (caritta) and desisting (viiritta) from
certain other kinds of prohibited action. Sila means those par-
ticular volitions and mental states, etc. by which a man who
desists from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the
right path. SUa thus means (I) right volition (cetanii), (2) the
associated mental states (cetasika), (3) mental control (sa7Jzvara),
and (4) the actual non-transgression (in body and speech) of the
course of conduct already in the mind by way of the preceding three
silas, called avitikkama. Sm.nvara is spoken of as being of five kinds,
viz. (I) piifimokkha-sal!lvara (the control which saves him who
abides by it), (2) sati-sa7Jzvara(the control of mindfulness),(3) iiiina-
saf!lvara (the control of knowledge), (4) khanti-sa7Jzvara (the control
of patience) and (5) viriya-sa7Jzvara (the control of active restraint).
Patimokkha-sa~nvara means all self-control in general. Sati-saf!lvara
means the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and
good associations, when using one's cognitive senses. Even when
looking at any tempting object, a man will, by virtue of his mindful-
ness (satz), control himself from being tempted by not thinking
of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it as may
lead in the right direction. Khanti-sa7Jzvara is that by which one
can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the proper adherence
to sila all our bodily, mental and vocal activities (kamma) are duly
systematized, organized and stabilized (samiidhiinam, upadhiira1Jam,
patittha). The practice of szla is for the practice of jhiina (medita-
tion). As a preparatory measure thereto, a man must train himself
1
Gztii, IV. 42; XVIII. 72.
xrv] The Ethics of the Guii and the Buddhist Ethics 501
continually to view with disgust the appetitive desires for eating

and drinking (iihiire pafikula-saiiiiii} by emphasizing in the mind the
various troubles that are associated with seeking food and drink
and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating
bodily elements. He must habituate his mind to the idea that all
the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, viz.
k~iti (earth), ap (water), etc. He should also think of the good
effects of sila, the making of gifts, of the nature of death and of the
deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena,
and should practise bralzma-vihiira, as the fourfold meditation of
universal friendship, universal pity, happiness in the prosperity
and happiness of all, and indifference to any kind of preferment
for himself, his friend, his enemy or a third party 1 •
The Gltii does not enter into any of these disciplinary
measures. It does not make a programme of universal altruism or
hold that one should live only for others, as is done in Mahayana
ethics, or of the virtues of patience, energy for all that is good
(~·irya as kusalotsiiha), meditation and true knowledge of the
essencelessness of all things. The person who takes the vow of
saintly life takes the vow of living for the good of others, for
which he should be prepared to sacrifice all that is good for him.
His vow does not limit him to doing good to his co-religionists or
to any particular sects, but applies to all human beings, irrespective
of caste, creed or race, and not only to human beings, but to all
living beings. :Vlahayana ethical works like the Bodhi-caryiivatiira-
pa1Ijikii or Sik~ii-samuccaya do not deal merely with doctrines
or theories, but largely with practical instructions for becoming
a Buddhist saint. They treat of the practical difficulties in the path
of a saint's career and give practical advice regarding the way in
which he may avoid temptations, keep himself in the straight
path of duty, and gradually elevate himself to higher and higher
states.
The Gitii is neither a practical guide-book of moral efforts
nor a philosophical treatise discussing the origin of immoral
tendencies and tracing them to certain metaphysical principles as
their sources; but, starting from the ordinary frailties of attach-
ment and desires, it tries to show how one can lead a normal life
of duties and responsibilities and yet be in peace and contentment
in a state of equanimity and in communion with God. The Gitii
1 See A History of Indian Philosophy, by S. N. Dasgupta, vol. 1, p. IOJ.
has its setting in the great battle of the Mahii-bhiirata. Kr!?Qa
is represented as being an incarnation of God, and he is also the
charioteer of his friend and relation, Arjuna, the great PaQ<;lava
hero. The PaQ<;lava hero was a K!?attriya by birth, and he had come
to the great battle-field of Kuruk!?etra to fight his cousin and
opponent King Duryodhana, who had assembled great warriors,
all of whom were relations of Arjuna, leading mighty armies. In
the nrst chapter of the Guo. a description is given of the two
armies which faced each other in the holy field (dharma-k~etra)
of Kuruk!?etra. In the second chapter Arjuna is represented as
feeling dejected at the idea of having to fight with his relations
and of eventually killing them. He says that it was better to
beg from door to door than to kill his respected relations. Kr!?Qa
strongly objects to this attitude of Arjuna and says that the
soul is immortal and it is impossible to kill anyone. But, apart
from this metaphysical point of view, even from the ordinary
point of view a K!?attriya ought to fight, because it is his duty
to do so, and there is nothing nobler for a K!?attriya than to
fight. The fundamental idea -of the Gitii is that a man should
always follow his own caste-duties, which are his own proper
duties, or sva-dharma. Even if his own proper duties are of an
inferior type, it is much better for him to cleave to them than to
turn to other people's duties which he could well perform. It is
even better to die cleaving to one's caste-duties, than to turn to
the duties fixed for other people, which only do him harm 1 .
The caste-duties of Brahmins, K~attriyas, Vaisyas and Siidras
are fixed in accordance with their natural qualities. Thus sense-
control, control over mind, power of endurance, purity, patienct;,
sincerity, knowledge of worldly things and philosophic wisdom
are the natural qualities of a Brahmin. Heroism, bravery, patience,
skill, not to fly from battle, making of gifts and lordliness are
the natural duties of a K~attriya. Agriculture, tending of cattle
and trade are the natural duties of a Siidra. A man can
attain his highest only by performing the specific duties of his
own caste. God pervades this world, and it is He who moves all
beings to work. A man can best realize himself by adoring God
and by the performance of his own specific caste-duties. No sin
can come to a man who performs his own caste-duties. Even if
one's caste-duties were sinful or wrong, it would not be wrong
1
Gitti, III. 35·
x1v] The Ethics of the Gitii and the Buddhist Ethics 503
for a man to perform them ; for, as there is smoke in every fire, so

there is some wrong thing or other in all our actions 1 • Arjuna is
thus urged to follow his caste-duty as a K~attriya and to fight his
enemies in the battle-field. If he killed his enemies, then he would
be the master of the kingdom; if he himself was killed, then since
he had performed the duties of a K~attriya, he would go to Heaven.
If he did not engage himself in that fight, which was his duty, he
would not only lose his reputation, but would also transgress his
own dharma.
Such an instruction naturally evokes the objection that war
necessarily implies injury to living beings; but in reply to such
an objection Kr~l).a says that the proper way of performing actions
is to dissociate one's mind from attachment; when one can perform
an action with a mind free from attachment, greed and selfishness,
from a pure sense of duty, the evil effects of such action cannot
affect the performer. The evil effects of any action can affect the
performer when in performing an action he has a motive of his own
to fulfil. But, if he does not seek anything for himself, if he is not
overjoyed in pleasures, or miserable in pains, his works cannot
affect him. A man should therefore surrender all his desires for
selfish ends and dedicate all his actions to God and be in com-
munion with Him, and yet continue to perform the normal duties
of his caste and situation of life. So long as we have our bodies,
the necessity of our own nature will drive us to work. So it is
impossible for us to give up all work. To give up work can be
significant only if it means the giving up of all desires for the fruits
of such actions. If the fruits of actions are given up, then the
actions can no longer bind us to them. That brings us in return
peace and contentment, and the saint who has thus attained a per-
fect equanimity of mind is firm and unshaken in his true wisdom,
and nothing can sway him to and fro. One may seek to attain
this state either by philosophic wisdom or by devotion to God,
and it is the latter path which is easier. God, by His grace, helps
the devotee to purge his mind of all impurities, and so by His
grace a man can dissociate his mind from all motives of greed and
selfishness and be in communion with Him; he can thus perform
his duties, as fixed for him by his caste or his custom, without
looking forward to any reward or gain.
The Gztii ideal of conduct differs from the sacrificial ideal of
conduct in this, that sacrifices are not to be performed for any
ulterior end of heavenly bliss or any other mundane benefits, but
merely from a sense of duty, because sacrifices are enjoined in the
scriptures to be performed by Brahmins; and they must therefore
be performed from a pure sense of duty. The Gitii ideal of ethics
differs from that preached in the systems of philosophy like the
Vedanta or the Yoga of Patafijali in this, that, while the aim
of these systems was to transcend the sphere of actions and
duties, to rise to a stage in which one could give up all one's
activities, mental or physical, the ideal of the Gitii was decidedly
an ideal of work. The Gitii, as has already been pointed out,
does not advocate a course of extremism in anything. However
elevated a man may be, he must perform his normal caste-duties
and duties of customary morality 1 . The Gitii is absolutely devoid
of the note of pessimism which is associated with early Buddhism.
The lila, samiidhi and paiiiiii of Buddhism have, no doubt, in the
Gitii their counterparts in the training of a man to disinclination
for joys and attachments, to concentration on God and the firm
and steady fixation of will and intelligence; but the significance of
these in the Gitii is entirely different from that which they have
in Buddhism. The Gitii does not expound a course of approved
conduct and prohibitions, since, so far as these are concerned, one's
actions are to be guided by the code of caste-duties or duties of
customary morality. What is required of a man is that he should
cleanse his mind from the impurities of attachment. desires and
cravings. The samiidhi of the Gitii is not a mere concentration of
the mind on some object, but communion with God, and the
wisdom, or prajiiii, of the Gitii is no realization of any philosophic
truth, but a fixed and unperturbed state of the mind, where the
will and intellect remain unshaken in one's course of duty, clear
of all consequences and free from all attachments, and in a state
of equanimity which cannot be shaken or disturbed by pleasures
or sorrows.
It may naturally be asked in this connection, what is the general
standpoint of Hindu Ethics? The Hindu social system is based
on a system of fourfold division of castes. The Gitii says that God
Himself created the fourfold division of castes into Brahmins,
Kf?attriyas, Vaisyas and Siidras, a division based on characteristic
1 Sankara, of course, is in entire disagreement with this interpretation of the
GJtii, as will be discussed in a later section.
x1v] The Ethics of the Guii and the Buddhist Ethics 505
qualities and specific duties. Over and above this caste division
and its corresponding privileges, duties and responsibilities, there
is also a division of the stages of life into that of Brahma-ciirin-
student, grha-stha-householder, viina-prastha-retired in a forest,
and bhik~u-mendicant, and each of these had its own prescribed
duties. The duties of Hindu ethical life consisted primarily of the
prescribed caste-duties and the specific duties of the different
stages of life, and this is known as var'l}iisrama-dharma. Over and
above this there were also certain duties which were common to
all, called the siidhiira'l}a-dharmas. Thus Manu mentions steadiness
(dhairya), forgiveness (k~amii), self-control (dama), non-stealing
(cawyab~iiva), purity (sauca), sense-control (indri'ya-nigraha),
wisdom (dhz), learning (vidyii), truthfulness (satya) and control of
anger (akrodha) as examples of siidhiira'l}a-dharma. Prasastapada
mentions faith in religious duties (dharma-haddhii), non-injury
(ahil[lsii), doing good to living beings (bhuta-hitatva), truthfulness
(satya-vacana), non-stealing (asteya), sex-continence (brahma-
carya), sincerity of mind (anupadhii), control of anger (krodha-
vwjana), cleanliness and ablutions (abhi~ecana), taking of pure food
(Suci-dravya-sevana), devotion to Vedic gods (-ciSi~ta-devatii-bhakti),
and watchfulness in avoiding transgressions (apramiida). The
caste-duties must be distinguished from these common duties.
Thus sacrifices, study and gifts are common to all the three higher
castes, Brahmins, K~attriyas and Vaisyas. The specific duties of
a Brahmin are acceptance of gifts, teaching, sacrifices and so forth;
the specific duties of a K~attriya are protection of the people,
punishing the wicked, not to retreat from battles and other
specific tasks; the duties of a Vaisya are buying, selling, agri-
culture, breeding and rearing of cattle, and the specific duties of a
Vaisya. The duties of a Siidra are to serve the three higher castes 1 •
Regarding the relation between var'l}a-dharma and siidhiira'l}a-
dharma, a modern writer says that "the siidhiira'l}a-dharmas con-
stitute the foundation of the var'l}iisrama-dharmas, the limits
within which the latter are to be observed and obeyed. For
1 The Gitii, however, counts self-control (sama), control over the mind
(dama), purity (sauca), forgiving nature (k~iinti), sincerity (iirjava), knowledge

(jiiiina), wisdom (vijiiiina) and faith (iistik:ya) as the natural qualities of Brahmins.
The duties of K~attriyas are heroism (saurya), smartness (tejas), power of en-
durance (dh!ti), skill (diik~ya), not to fly in hattie (yuddhe ciipy apaliiyana),
making of gifts (diina) and power of controlling others (zsvara-bhiiva). The
natural duties of Vaisyas are agriculture, rearing of cows and trade. Gztii,
XVIII. 42-44•
so6 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-guii [cH.
example, the Brahmin in performing religious sacrifice must not
appropriate another's property, non-appropriation being one of
the common and universal duties. In this way he serves his own
community as well as subserves (though in a negative way) the
common good of the community-and so, in an _indirect way,
serves the common good of humanity. Thus the individual of a
specific community who observes the duties of his class does
not serve his own community merely, but also and in the same
process all other communities according to their deserts and needs,
and in this way the whole of humanity itself. This, it will be seen,
is also the view of Plato, whose virtue of justice is the common
good which is to be realized by each class through its specific
duties; but this is to be distinguished from the common good
which constitutes the object of the sii.dhiira'l}a-dharmas of the Hindu
classification. The end in these common and universal duties is
not the common well-being, which is being correctly realized in
specific communities, but the common good as the precondition
and foundation of the latter; it is not the good which is common-
in-the-individual, but common-as-the-prius-of-the-individual.
Hence the siidhiira~za duties are obligatory equally for all indi-
viduals, irrespective of their social position or individual capacity1 ."
The statement that the common good (siidhiira'l}a-dharma) could
be regarded as the precondition of the specific caste-duties implies
that, if the latter came into conflict with the former, then the former
should prevail. This is, however, inexact; for there is hardly any
instance where, in case of a conflict, the siidhat·a'l}a-dharma, or the
common duties, had a greater force. Thus, for example, non-injury
to living beings was a common duty; but sacrifices implied the killing
of animals, and it was the clear duty of the Brahmins to perform
sacrifices. War implied the taking of an immense number of human
lives; but it was the duty of a K~attriya not to turn away from a
hattie-field, and in pursuance of his obligatory duty as a K~attriya
he had to fight. Turning to traditional accounts, we find in the
Riimiiya'l}a that Sambiika was a Siidra saint {mum) who was per-
forming ascetic penances in a forest. This was a transgression of
caste-duties; for a Siidra could not perform tapas, which only the
higher caste people were allowed to undertake, and hence the
performance of tapas by the Siidra saint Sambiika was regarded
1 Ethics of the Hindus, by S. K. Maitra under Dr Seal's close personal
supervision and guidance, pp. 3-4.

xrv] The Ethics of the Gua and the Buddhist Ethics 507
as adharma (vice); and, as a result of this adharma, there was a
calamity in the kingdom of Rama in the form of the death of an
infant son of a Brahmin. King Rama went out in his chariot and
beheaded Sambiika for transgressing his caste-duties. Instances
could be multiplied to show that, when there \Vas a conflict between
the caste-duties and the common duties, it was the former that
had the greater force. The common duties had their force only
when they were not in conflict with the caste-duties. The Gitii is
itself an example of how the caste-duties had preference over
common duties. In spite of the fact that Arjuna was extremely
unwilling to take the lives of his near and dear kinsmen in the
battle of Kuruk~etra Kr~t).a tried his best to dissuade him from
his disinclination to fight and pointed out to him that it was
his clear duty, as a K~attriya, to fight. It seems therefore very
proper to hold that the common duties had only a general applica-
tion, and that the specific caste-duties superseded them, whenever
the two were in conflict.
The Gitii does not raise the problem of common duties, as its
synthesis of nivrtti (cessation from work) and pravrtti (tending to
work) makes it unnecessary to introduce the advocacy of the
common duties; for its instruction to take to work with a mind
completely detached from all feelings and motives of self-seeking,
pleasure-seeking and self-interest elevates its scheme of work to
a higher sphere, which would not be in need of the practice of
any select scheme of virtues.
The theory of the Gitii that, if actions are performed with
an unattached mind, then their defects cannot touch the per-
former, distinctly implies that the goodness or badness of an
action does not depend upon the external effects of the action, but
upon the inner motive of action. If there is no motive of pleasure
or self-gain, then the action performed cannot bind the performer;
for it is only the bond of desires and self-love that really makes an
action one's own and makes one reap its good or bad fruits.
~1orality from this point of view becomes wholly subjective, and
the special feature of the Gitii is that it tends to make all actions
non-moral by cutting away the bonds that connect an action with
its performer. In such circumstances the more logical course
would be that of Sankara, who would hold a man who is free
from desires and attachment to be above morality, above duties
and above responsibilities. The Gitii, however, would not advocate
soB The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii [cH.
the objective nivrtti, or cessation of work; its whole aim is to
effect subjective nivrtti, or detachment from desires. It would not
allow anyone to desist from his prescribed objective duties; but,
whatever might be the nature of these duties, since they were
performed without any motive of gain, pleasure or self-interest,
they would be absolutely without fruit for the performer, who,
in his perfect equanimity of mind, would transcend all his actions
and their effects. If Arjuna fought and killed hundreds of his
kinsmen out of a sense of his caste-duty, then, howsoever harmful
his actions might be, they would not affect him. Yudhi~thira,
however, contemplated an expiation of the sin of killing his kins-
men by repentance, gifts, asceticism, pilgrimage, etc., which shows
the other view, which was prevalent in the lliahii-bhiirata period,
that, when the performance of caste-duties led to such an injury
to human lives, the sinful effects of such actions could be expiated
by such means 1 • Yudhi~thira maintained that of asceticism (tapas),
the giving up of all duties (tyiiga), and the final knowledge of the
ultimate truth (avadhi), the second is better than the first and the
third is better than the second. He therefore thought that the
best course was to take to an ascetic life and give up all duties
and responsibilities, whereas Arjuna held that the best course
for a king would be to take upon himself the normal responsi-
bilities of a kingly life and at the same time remain unattached
to the pleasures of such a life 2 • Regarding also the practice of
the virtues of non-injury, etc., Arjuna maintains that it is wrong
to carry these virtues to extremes. Howsoever a man may live,
whether as an ascetic or as a forester, it is impossible for him to
practise non-injury to all living beings in any extreme degree.
Even in the water that one drinks and the fruits that one eats, even
in breathing and winking many fine and invisible insects are
killed. So the virtue of non-injury, or, for the matter of that, all
kinds of virtue, can be practised only in moderation, and their
injunctions always imply that they can be practised only within
the bounds of a commonsense view of things. Non-injury may
1
Mahii-bhiirata, XII. 7• 36 and 37·
2 Thus Arjuna says:
asaktab iaktavad gacchan nil;zsango mukta-bandhanab
samatz iatrau ca mitre ca sa vai mukto mahlpate;
to which Yudhi~thira replies :
tapas tyiigo 'vadhir iti niicayas tv e~a dhimatiim
paraspara1Jl jyiiya eyii1Jl yei(i1{l naibireyasl matib.
Ibid. xu. 18. JI and xu. 19. 9·
xrv] The Ethics of the GUii and the Buddhist Ethics 509
be good; but there are cases where non-injury would mean doing
injury. If a tiger enters into a cattle-shed, not to kill the tiger
would amount to killing the cows. So all religious injunctions
are made from the point of view of a practical and well-ordered
maintenance of society and must therefore be obeyed with an eye
to the results that may follow in their practical application. Our
principal object is to maintain properly the process of the social
order and the well-being of the people 1 . It seems clear, then,
that, when the Gitii urges again and again that there is no meaning
in giving up our normal duties, vocation and place in life and its
responsibilities, and that what is expected of us is that we should
tnake our minds unattached, it refers to the view which Yudhi~thira
expresses, that we must give up all our works. The Gitii therefore
repeatedly urges that tyaga does not mean the giving up of all
works, but the mental giving up of the fruits of all actions.
Though the practice of detachment of mind from all desires
and motives of pleasure and enjoyment would necessarily in-
volve the removal of all vices and a natural elevation of the mind
to all that is high and noble, yet the Gitii sometimes denounces
certain types of conduct in very strong terms. Thus, in the sixteenth
chapter, it is said that people who hold a false philosophy and
think that the world is false and, without any basis, deny the
existence of God and hold that there is no other deeper cause of
the origin of life than mere sex-attraction and sex-union, destroy
thenlSelves by their foolishness and indulgence in all kinds of cruel
deeds, and would by their mischievous actions turn the world to
the path of ruin. In their insatiable desires, filled with pride,
vanity and ignorance, they take to wrong and impure courses of
action. They argue too much and think that there is nothing
greater than this world that we live in, and, thinking so, they
indulge in all kinds of pleasures and enjoyments. Tied with bonds
of desire, urged by passions and anger, they accumulate money
in a wrongful manner for the gratification of their sense-desires.
"I have got this to-day," they think, "and enjoy myself; I have
so much hoarded money and I shall have more later on"; "that
enemy has been killed by me, I shall kill other enemies also, I am
Loka-yiitriirtham eveda1Jl dharma-pravacana1Jl krtam
ahi1JlSii siidhu hi1JZSeti sreyiin dharma-parigrahab
niityanta1Jl gutzavat ki1Jlcin na ciipy atyanta-nirgutzam
ubhaya1Jl sarva-kiiryefu drsyate siidhv asiidhu vii.
Mahii-bhiirati, XII. 15. 49 anti so.
a lord, I enjoy myself, I am successful, powerful and happy, I
am rich, I have a noble lineage, there is no one like me, I perform
sacrifices, make gifts and enjoy." They get distracted by various
kinds of ideas and desires and, surrounded by nets of ignorance
and delusion and full of attachment for sense-gratifications, they
naturally fall into hell. Proud, arrogant and filled with ~he vanity
of wealth, they perform improperly the so-called sacrifices, as a
demonstration of their pomp and pride. In their egoism, power,
pride, desires and anger they always ignore God, both in them-
selves and in others 1 • The main vices that one should try to
get rid of are thus egoism, too many desires, greed, anger, pride
and vanity, and of these desire and anger are again and again
mentioned as being like the gates of hell 2 •
Among the principal virtues called the divine equipment (dai'l'i
sampat) the Gztii counts fearlessness (abhaya), purity of heart
(sattva-sa1{lluddhi), knowledge of things and proper action in ac-
cordance with it, giving, control of mind, sacrifice, study, tapas,
sincerity (a1java), non-injury (ahi1J1sii), truthfulness (satya), control
of anger (akrodha), renunciation (tyiiga), peacefulness of mind
(Santi), not to backbite (apaisuna), kindness to the suffering (bhiite~u
dayii), not to be greedy (alolupatva), tenderness (miirdava), a feeling
of shame before people in general when a wrong action is done
(hrz), steadiness (acapala), energy (te;as), a forgiving spirit (k~iinti),
patience (dhrti), purity (Sauca), not to think ill of others (adroha),
c.md not to be vain. It is these virtues which liberate our spirits,
whereas vanity, pride, conceit, anger, cruelty and ignorance are
vices which bind and enslave us 3 • The man who loves God should
not hurt any living beings, should be friendly and sympathetic
towards them, and should yet be unattached to all things, should
have no egoism, be the same in sorrows and pleasures and full of
forgivingness for all. He should be firm, self-controlled and always
contented. He should be pure, unattached, the same to all, should
not take to actions from any personal motives, and he has nothing
to fear. He is the same to friends and enemies, in appreciation and
denunciation; he is the same in heat and cold, pleasure, and pain;
he is the same in praise and blame, homeless and always satisfied
with anything and everything; he is always unperturbed and
absolutely unattached to all things 4 • If one carefully goes through
1 Gltii, XVI. 8-18. 2
Ibid. XVI. 2 I.
3 4
Ibid. XVI. I-S· Ibid. XII. IJ-19; see also ibid. XIII. 8-11.
x1v] The Ethics of the Gua and the Buddhist .ft'thics 5I I
the above list of virtues, it appears that the virtues are pre-
eminently of a negative character-one should not be angry, hurt-
ful to others, egoistic, proud or vain, should not do anything with
selfish motives, should not be ruffled by pleasure and pain, heat
and cold and should be absolutely unattached. Of the few positive
virtues, sincerity and purity of heart, a forgiving spirit, tenderness,
friendliness, kindness, alertness and sympathy seem to be most
prominent. The terms maitra (friendliness) and karU1Jii (com-
passion) might naturally suggest the Buddhist virtues so named,
since they do not occur in the U pani~ads 1 • But in the Gltli also they
are mentioned only once, and the general context of the passage
shows that no special emphasis is put on these two virtues. They
do not imply any special kind of meditation of universal friendship
or universal piety or the active performance of friendly and sympa-
thetic deeds for the good of humanity or for the good of living
beings in general. They seem to imply simply the positive friendly
state of the mind that must accompany all successful practice of
non-injury to fellow-beings. The Gitli does not advocate the active
performance of friendliness, but encourages a friendly spirit as a
means of discouraging the tendency to do harm to others. The
life that is most admired in the Gitli is a life of unattachedness,
a life of peace, contentment and perfect equanimity and unper-
turbedness in joys and sorrows. The vices that are denounced are
generally those that proceed from attachment and desires, such as
egoism, pride, vanity, anger, greediness, etc. There is another class
of virtues which are often praised, namely those which imply
purity, sincerity and alertness of mind and st~aightness of conduct.
The negative virtue of sense-control, with its positive counterpart,
the acquirement of the power of directing one's mind in a right
direction, forms the bed-rock of the entire superstructure of the
Guli code of moral and virtuous conduct.
The virtue of sameness (samatva), however, seems to be the
great ideal which the Gitli is never tired of emphasizing again and
again. This sameness can be attained in three different stages:
subjective sameness, or equanimity of mind, or the sameness in
joys and sorrows, praise and blame and in all situations of life;
objective sameness, as regarding all people, good, bad or in-
different, a friend or an enemy, with equal eyes and in the same
1
The term maitra occurs only once in the Muktikopani~at, 11. 34, and the
Muktika is in all probability one of the later Upani~ads.
impartial spirit; and the final stage of the achievement of this
equanimity is the self-realized state when one is absolutely un-
perturbed by all worldly things-a state of transcendence called
gu!liitUa. Thus in the Gttii, II. 15, it is said that he whom sense-
affections and physical troubles cannot affect in any way, who is
unperturbable and the same in joys and sorrows, attains immor-
tality. In II. 38 Kr~IJa asks Arjuna to think of joys and sorrows,
gain and loss, victory and defeat as being the same, and to engage
himself in the fight with such a mind; for, if he did so, no sin wocld
touch him. In II. 47 Kr~IJa says to Arjuna that his business is only
to perform his duties and not to look for the effects of his deeds;
it is wrong to look for the fruits of deeds or to desist from per-
forming one's duties. In II. 48 this sameness in joys and sorrows
is described as yoga, and it is again urged that one should be
unperturbed whether m success or in failure. The same idea is
repeated in n. 55, 56 and 57, where it is said that a true saint
should not be damped in sorrow or elated in joy, and that he
should not be attached to anything and should take happiness or
misery indifferently, without particularly welcoming the former or
regretting the latter. Such a man is absolutely limited to his own
self and is self-satisfied. He is not interested in achieving anything
or in not achieving anything; there is no personal object for him
to attain in the world 1 • To such a man gold and stones, desirables
and undesirables, praise and blame, appreciation and denunciation,
friends and foes are all alike 2 • Such a man makes no distinction
whether between a friend and foe, or between a sinner and a
virtuous man 3 • Such a man knows that pleasures and pains are
welcomed and hated by all and, thinking so, he desires the good
of all and looks upon all as he would upon himself-on a learned
Brahmin of an elevated character, on a cow, an elephant, a dog or
a ca!lt},iila; and the wise behave in the same way 4 • He sees God in
all beings and knows the indestructible and the immortal in all
that is destructible. He who knows that all beings are pervaded
by all, and thus regards them all with an equal eye, does not hurt
his own spiritual nature and thus attains his highest 5 • As the
culmination of this development, there is the state in which a man
transcends all the corporeal and mundane characteristics of the
threefold gUt;as, and, being freed from birth, death, old age and
1 Gitii, III. 17, 18. 2 Ibid. XIV. 24, 25. 3
Ibid. VI. 9·
' Ibid. VI. 31; also v. 18. 5 Ibid. XIII. 28.
xiV] The Ethics of the Gltii and the Buddhist Ethics 513
sorrow, attains immortality. He knows that the worldly qualities
of things, the gu~ws, are extraneous to his own spiritual nature,
and by such thoughts he transcends the sphere of all worldly
qualities and attains Brahmahood 1 •
Apart from the caste-duties and other deeds that are to be
performed without any attachment, the Gitii speaks again and
again of sacrifices, tapas and gifts, as duties which cannot be ignored
at any stage of our spiritual development. It is well worth pointing
out that the Gitii blames the performance of sacrifices either for
the attainment of selfish ends or for making a display of pomp
or pride. The sacrifices are to be performed from a sense of duty
and of public good, since it is only by the help of the sacrifices that
the gods may be expected to bring down heavy showers, through
which crops may grow in plenty. Physical tapas is described as
the adoration of gods. Brahmins, teachers and wise men, as purity,
sincerity, sex-continence and non-injury; tapas in speech is de-
scribed as truthful and unoffending speech, which is both sweet
to hear and for the good of all, and also study; mental tapas is
described as serenity of mind (mana/:t-prasiida), happy temper
(saumyatva), thoughtfulness (mauna), self-control (iitma-vini-
graha) and sincerity of mind; and the higher kind of tapas is
to be performed without any idea of gain or the fulfilment of
any ulterior end 2 • Gifts are to he made to good Brahmins in a
holy place and at an auspicious time, merely from a sense of duty.
This idea that gifts are properly made only when they are made
to good Brahmins at a holy time or place is very much more
limited and restricted than the lVIahayana idea of making gifts for
the good of all, without the slightest restriction of any kind. Thus
i~ is said in the Sik~ii-samuccaya that a Bodhisattva need not be
afraid among tigers and other wild animals in a wild forest, since
the Bodhisattva has given his all for the good of all beings. He
has therefore to think that, if the wild animals should eat him,
this would only mean the giving his body to them, which would be
the fulfilment of his virtue of universal charity. The Bodhisattvas
take the vow of giving away their all in universal charity 3 •
Thus the fundamental teaching of the Guii is to follow caste-
duties without any motive of self-interest or the gratification of
sense-desires. The other general duties of sacrifices, tapas and
1 2
Gttii, XIV. 20, 23, 26. Ibid. XVI. II-17.
3
Sik~ii-samuccaya, ch. XIX, p. 349·
Dll 33
gifts are also to be practised by all and may hence be regarded in
some sense as being equivalent to the siidhiira7Ja-dharmas of the
Vaise~ika and Smrti literature. But, if caste-duties or customary
duties come into conflict with the special duties of non-injury
(ahi1JlSii), then the caste-duties are to be followed in preference.
It does not seem that any of the other special duties or virtues
which are enjoined can come into conflict with the general caste-
duties; for most of these are for the inner moral development,
with which probably no caste-duties can come into conflict. But,
though there is no express mandate of the Gitii on the point, yet
it may be presumed that, should a SG.dra think of performing
sacrifices, tapas or gifts or the study of the Vedas, this would
most certainly be opposed by the Gitii, as it would be against the
prescribed caste-duties. So, though non-injury is one of the
special virtues enjoined by the Gitii, yet, when a K!?attriya kills
his enemies in open and free fight, that fight is itself to be re-
garded as virtuous (dharmya) and there is for the K!?attriya no sin
in the killing of his enemies. If a person dedicates all his actions
to Brahman and performs his duties· without attachment, then
sinfulness in his actions cannot cleave to him, just as water
cannot cleave to the leaves of a lotus plant 1 • On the one hand
the Gitii keeps clear of the ethics of the absolutist and meta-
physical systems by urging the necessity of the performance of
caste and customary duties, and yet enjoins the cultivation of the
great virtues of renunciation, purity, sincerity, non-injury, self-
control, sense-control and want of attachment as much as the
absolutist systems would desire to do; on the other hand, it
does not adopt any of the extreme and rigorous forms of self-
discipline, as the Yoga does, or the practice of the virtues on an
unlimited and universalist scale, as the Buddhists did. It follows
the middle course, strongly emphasizing the necessity of self-
control, sense-control and detachment from all selfish ends and
desires along with the performance of the normal duties. This
detachment from sense-pleasures is to be attained either through
wisdom or, preferably, through devotion to God.
1 Gitii, v. xo.
XIV] Analysis of Action
Analysis of Action.
The consideration of the Gttii ethics naturally brings in the
problem of the analysis of the nature of action, volition and agent.
The principal analysis of volition in Hindu Philosophy is to be
found in the Nyaya- Vaise~ika works. Prasastapada divides animal
activities into two classes, firstly, those that are of a reflex nature
and originate automatically from life-functions (jlvana-purvaka)
and subserve useful ends (kiim api artha-kriyiim) for the organism,
and, secondly, those conscious and voluntary actions that proceed
out of desire or aversion, for the attainment of desirable ends and
the avoidance of undesirable ones. Prabhakara holds that volitional
actions depend on several factors, firstly, a general notion that
something has to be done (kiiryatii-jiiiina), which Gangabhatta in
his Bhii!!a-cintiimar.zi explains as meaning not merely a general
notion that a particular work can be done by the agent, but also the
specific notion that an action must be done by him-a sense which
can proceed only from a belief that the action would be useful to
him and would not be sufficiently harmful to him to dissuade him
from it. Secondly, there must be the belief that the agent has the
power or capacity of performing the action (krti-siidhyatii-jiiiina).
This belief of krti-siidhyatii-jiiiina leads to desire (ciklr~ii}. The
Prabhakaras do not introduce here the important factor that an
action can be desired only if it is conducive to the good of the agent.
Instead of this element they suppose that actions are desired when
the agent identifies himself with the action as one to be accom-
plished by him-an action is desired only as a kind of self-
realization. The Nyaya, however, thinks that the fact that an action
is conducive to good and not productive of serious mischief is an
essential condition of its performance.
The Guii seems to hold that everywhere actions are always
being performed by the gur.zas or characteristic qualities of prakrti,
the primal matter. It is through ignorance and false pride that
one thinks himself to be the agent 1 • In another place it is said
that for the occurrence of an action there are five causes, viz. the
body, the agent, the various sense-organs, the various life-functions
and biomotor activities, and the unknown objective causal ele-
ments or the all-controlling power of God (daiva) 2 • All actions
1 Gua, 111. 27; x1n. 29.
2
adhi~thiina1Jl tathii kartii karat}a1Jl ca Prthag-vidham
vividhiiS ca Prthak ce~fii daiva7JZ caiviitra paficamam. Ibid. XVIII. 14.
33-2
being due to the combined operation of these five elements, it
would be wrong to think the self or the agent to be the only per-
former of actions. Thus it is said that, this being so, he who thinks
the self alone to be the agent of actions, this wicked-minded person
through his misapplied intelligence does not see things properly 1 •
Whatever actions are performed, right or wrong, whether in body,
speech or mind, have these five factors as their causes 2 • The
philosophy that underlies the ethical position of the Gitii consists
in the fact that, in reality, actions are made to happen primarily
through the movement of the characteristic qualities of prakrt£,
and secondarily, through the collocation of the five factors men-
tioned, among which the self is but one factor only. It is, therefore,
sheer egoism to think that one can, at his own sweet will, undertake
a work or cease from doing works. For the prakrti, or primal
matter, through its later evolutes, the collocation of causes, would
of itself move us to act, and even in spite of the opposition of our
will we are led to perform the very action which we did not want
to perform. So Kr~I).a says to Arjuna that the egoism through
which you would say that you would not fight is mere false
vanity, since the prakrti is bound to lead you to action 3 • A man
is bound by the active tendencies or actions which necessarily
follow directly from his own nature, and there is no escape.
He has to work in spite of the opposition of his will. Prakrti,
or the collocation of the five factors, moves us to work. That
being so, no one can renounce all actions. If renouncing actions
is an impossibility, and if one is bound to act, it is but proper
that one should perform one's normal duties. There are no duties
and no actions which are absolutely faultless, absolutely above all
criticism; so the proper way in which a man should purify his
actions is by purging his mind of all imperfections and impurities
of desires and attachment. But a question may arise how, if all
actions follow necessarily as the product of the five-fold colloca-
tion, a person can determine his actions? The general implication
of the Gitii seems to be that, though the action follows necessarily
as the product of the fivefold collocation, yet the self can give a
direction to these actions ; if a man wishes to dissociate himself
from all attachments and desires by dedicating the fruits of all
his acti.:ms to God and clings to God with such a purpose, God
helps him to attain his noble aim.
1 Gffii, XVIII. 16. 2
Ibid. 3
XVIII. 15. Ibid. XVIII. 59·
XIVj Eschatology
Eschatology.
The Gttii is probably the earliest document where a definite
statement is made regarding the imperishable nature of existent
things and the impossibility of that which is non-existent coming
into being. It says that what is non-existent cannot come into
being, and that what exists cannot cease to be. In modern times
we hear of the principle of the conservation of energy and also of
the principle of the conservation of mass. The principle of the
conservation of energy is distinctly referred to in the Vyasa-bhii~ya
· on Pata1ijali-siltra, IV. 3, but the idea of the conservation of mass
does not seem to have been mentioned definitely anywhere. Both
the Vedantist and the Sarpkhyist seem to base their philosophies on
an ontological principle known as sat-kiirya-·viida, which holds that
the effect is already existent in the cause. The Vedanta holds that
the effect as such is a mere appearance and has no true existence;
the cause alone is truly existent. The Sarp.khya, on the other hand,
holds that the effect is but a modification of the causal substance,
and, as such, is not non-existent, but has no existence separate from
the cause; the effect may therefore be said to exist in the cause
before the starting of the causal operation (kiira1Ja-vyiipiira). Both
these systems strongly obj~ct to the Buddhist and N yaya view that
the effect came into being out of non-existence, a doctrine known
as a-sat-karya-'l•iida. Both the Sarp.khya and the Vedanta tried to
prove their theses, but neither of them seems to have realized that
their doctrines are based upon an a priori proposition which is the
basic principle underlying the principle of the conservation of
energy and the conservation of mass, but which is difficult to be
proved by reference to a posteriori illustration. Thus, the Sarp.khya
says that the effect exists in the cause, since, had it not been
so, there would be no reason why certain kinds of effects, e.g.
oil, can be produced only from certain kinds of causes, e.g.
sesamum. That certain kinds of effects are produced only from
certain kinds of causes does not really prove the doctrine of sat-
kii1ya-1.:lida, but only implies it; for the doctrine of sat-kiirya-viida
rests on an a priori principle such as that formulated in the Gttii
-that what exists cannot perish, and that what does not exist
cannot come into being 1 • The Gttii does not try to prove this pro-
position, but takes it as a self-evident principle which no one could
1
niisato vidyate bhiivo niibhavo vidyate satafz. Gltii, n. 16.
challenge. It does not, however, think of applying this prin-
ciple, which underlies the ontological position of the Sa:q1khya
and the Vedanta, in a general way. It seems to apply the principle
only to the nature of self (iitman). Thus it says, "0 Arjuna,
that principle by which everything is pervaded is to be regarded
as deathless; no one can destroy this imperishable one. The bodies
that perish belong to the deathless eternal and unknowable self;
therefore thou shouldst fight. He who thinks the self to be destruc-
tible, and he who thinks it to be the destroyer, do not know that
it can neither destroy nor be destroyed. It is neither born nor
does it die, nor, being once what it is, would it ever be again .... ·
Weapons cannot cut it, fire cannot burn it, water cannot dis-
solve it and air cannot dry it." The immortality of self preached
in the Gitii seems to have been directly borrowed from the
Upani~ads, and the passages that describe it seem to breathe
the spirit of the Upani!?ads not only in idea, but also in the
modes and expressions. The ontological principle that what exists
cannot die and that what is not cannot come into being does not
seem to have been formulated in the Upani~ads. Its formulation
in the Gitii in support of the principle of immortality seems,
therefore, to be a distinct advance on the Upani!?adic philosophy
in this direction.
The first argument urged by KP?I).a to persuade Arjuna to
fight was that the self was immortal and that it was the body only
that could be injured or killed, and that therefore Arjuna need not
feel troubled because he was going to kill his kinsmen in the battle
of Kuruk!?etra. Upon the death of one body the self only changed
to another, in which it was reborn, just as a man changed his old
clothes for new ones. The body is always changing, and even in
youth, middle age and old age, does not remain the same. The
change at death is also a change of body, and so there is no
intrinsic difference between the changes of the body at different
stages of life and the ultimate change that is effected at death,
when the old body is forsaken by the spirit and a new body is
accepted. Our bodies are always changing, and, though the different
stages if\ this growth in childhood, youth and old age represent
comparatively small degrees of change, yet these ought to prepare
our minds to realize the fact that death is also a similar change of
body only and cannot, therefore, affect the unperturbed nature
of the self, which, in spite of all changes of body at successive
XIV] Eschatology
births and rebirths, remains unchanged in itself. When one is born
one must die, and when one dies one must be reborn. Birth
necessarily implies death, and death necessarily implies rebirth.
There is no escape from this continually revolving cycle of birth
and death. From Brahma down to all living creatures there is
a continuous rotation of birth, death and rebirth. In reply to
Arjuna's questions as to what becomes of the man who, after
proceeding a long way on the path of yoga, is somehow through
his failings dislodged from it and dies, Kf!?I).a replies that no good
work can be lost and a man who has been once on the path of
right cannot suffer; so, when a man who was proceeding on the
path of yoga is snatched away by the hand of death, he is born
again in a family of pure and prosperous people or in a family
of wise yogins; and in this new birth he is associated with his
achievements in his last birth and begins anew his onward course
of advancement, and the old practice of the previous birth carries
him onward, without any effort on his part, in his new line of
progress. By his continual efforts through many lives and the
cumulative effects of the right endeavours of each life the yogin
attains his final realization. Ordinarily the life of a man in each
new birth depends upon the desires and ideas that he fixes upon
at the time of his death. But those that think of God, the oldest
instructor, the seer, the smallest of the small, the upholder of aU,
shining like the sun beyond all darkness, and fix their life-forces
between their eyebrows, and control all the gates of their senses and
their mind in their hearts, ultimately attain their highest realiza-
tion in God. From the great Lord, the great unmanifested and
incomprehensible Lord, proceeds the unmanifested (avyakta),
from which come out all manifested things (vyaktayal:z sar•D1i/:l},
and in time again return to it and again evolve out of it. Thus
there are two forms of the unmanifested (avyakta), the un-
manifested out of which all the manifested things come, and the
unmanifested which is the nature of the eternal Lord from whom the
former come 1 • The ideas of de•Da-y1ina and pitr-yana, dak#1,.l1iyana
and uttar1iya1Ja, the black and the white courses as mentioned in
the Upani!?ads, are also referred to in the Gua. Those who go
through smoke in the new-moon fortnight and the later six months
(when the sun is on the south of the equator), and thus ta~e the black
course, return again; but those who take the white course of fire
1 Gnii, v1n. 16-23.
in the full-moon fortnight and thP former six months (when the
sun is on the north of the equator) do not t"eturn again 1 • No very
significant meaning can be made out of these doctrines. They
seem to be but the perpetuation of the traditional faiths regarding
the future courses of the dead, as referred to in the Chiindogya
Upani~ad. The Guii, again, speaking of others, says that those
who follow the sacrificial duties of the Vedas enjoy heavenly
pleasures in heaven, and, when their merits are exhausted by the
enjoyments of the good fruits of their actions, they come back to
earth. Those who follow the path of desires and take to religious
duties for the attainment of pleasures must always go to heaven
and come back again-they cannot escape this cycle of going and
coming. Again, in the Gttii, XVI. 19, Kp~l).a says," I make cruel
vicious persons again and again take birth as ferocious animals."
The above summary of the eschatological views of the Gztii
shows that it collects together the various traditionally accepted
views regarding life after death without trying to harmonize
them properly. Firstly, it may be noted that the Gitii believes
in the doctrine of karma. Thus in xv. 2 and in tv 9 it is said
that the \Vorld has grown on the basis of karma, and the GUii
believes that it is the bondage of karma that binds us to this world.
The bondage of karma is due to the existence of attachment,
passions and desires. But what does the bondage of ka1·ma lead
to? The reply to such a question, as given by the Gitii, is that
it leads to rebirth. When one performs actions in accordance
with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of beneficial fruits,
desire for such fruits and attachment to these desirable fruits is
the bondage of karma, which naturally leads to rebirth. The pro-
position definitely pronounced in the Gitii, that birth necessarily
means death and death necessarily means birth, reminds us of the
first part of the twelvefold causal chain of the Buddha-" What
being, is there death? Birth being, there is death." It has already
been noticed that the attitude of the GUii towards Vedic per-
formances is merely one of toleration and not one of encourage-
ment. These are actions which are prompted by desires and, like
all other actions similarly prompted, they entail with them the
bonds of karma; and, as soon as the happy effects produced by the
merits of these actions are enjoyed and lived through, the per-
formers of these actions come down from heaven to the earth and
XIV] Eschatology 521
are reborn and have to pass through the old ordeal of life. The
idea that, there being birth, there is death, and that, if there is death
there is ·also rebirth, is the same in the Gitii as in Buddhism; but
the Gitii form seems to be very much earlier than the Buddhistic
form ; for the Buddhistic form relates birth and death through a
number of other causal links intimately connected together in an
interdependent cycle, of which the Gitii seems to be entirely
ignorant. The Gitii does not speak of any causal chain, such
as could be conceived to be borrowed from Buddhism. It, of
course, knows that attachment is the root of all vice; but it is only
by implication that we can know that attachment leads to the
bondage of karma and the bondage of karma to rebirth. The main
purpose of the Gitii is not to find out how one can tear asunder
the bonds of karma and stop rebirth, but to prescribe the true
rule of the performance of one's duties. It speaks sometimes, no
doubt, about cutting asunder the bonds of karma and attain-
ing one's highest; but instruction as regards the attainment of
liberation or a description of the evils of this worldly life does
not form any part of the content of the Gua. The Gttii has no
pessimistic tendency. It speaks of the necessary connection of
birth and death not in order to show that life is sorrowful and
not worth living, but to show that there is no cause of regret
in such universal happenings as birth and death. The principal
ideas are, no doubt, those of attachment, karma, birth, death and
rebirth; but the idea of Buddhism is more complex and more
systematized, and is therefore probably a later development at
a time when the Gitii discussions on the subject were known.
The Buddhist doctrine that there is no self and no individual
anywhere is just the opposite of the Gitii doctrine of the immor-
tality of the self.
But the Gitii speaks not only of rebirth, but also of the
two courses, the path of smoke and the path of light, which are
referred to in the Chiindogya Upani~ad 1 • The only difference
between the U pani!?ad account and that of the Gitii is that there
are more details in the Upani~ad than in the Gua. But the ideas
of deva-yiina and pitr-yiina do not seem to fit in quite consistently
with the idea of rebirth on earth. The Gitii, however, combines
the idea of rebirth on earth with the deva-yiina-pitr-yiina idea and
also with the idea of ascent to heaven as an effect of the merits
1 Chiindogya Upani~ad, v. 10.
accruing from sacrificial performances. Thus the Guii combines

the different trains of ideas just as it finds them traditionally
accepted, without trying to harmonize them properly. It does not
attempt to discuss the point regarding the power of karma in
determining the nature of rebirths, enjoyments and sufferings.
From some passages {IV. 9 or VI. 4o-45) it might appear that the
bonds of karma produced their effects independently by their own
powers, and that the arrangement of the world is due to the effect
of karma. But there are other passages (xvi. 19) which indicate
that karma does not produce its effects by itself, but that God
rewards or punishes good and bad deeds by arranging good and
bad births associated with joys and sorrows. In the Gitii, v. 15,
it is said that the idea of sins and virtues is due to ignorance,
whereas, if we judge rightly, God does not take cognizance either
of vices or of virtues. Here again there are two contradictory
views of karma : one view ir~. which karma is regarded as the cause
which brings about all inequalities in life, and another view which
does not attribute any value to good or bad actions. The only way
in which the two views can be reconciled in accordance with the
spirit of the Gua is by holding that the Gitii does not believe in
the objective truth of virtue or vice (puT}ya or papa). There is
nothing good or bad in the actions themselves. It is only ignorance
and foolishness that regards them as good or bad; it is only our
desires and attachments which make the actions produce their bad
effects with reference to us, and which render them sinful for us.
Since the actions themselves are neither good nor bad, the per-
formance of even apparently sinful actions, such as the killing of
one's kinsmen on the battle-field, cannot be regarded as sinful, if
they are done from a sense of duty; but the same actions would be
regarded as sinful, if they were performed through attachments or
desires. Looked at from this point of view, the idea of morality
in the Gitii is essentially of a subjective character. But though
morality, virtue and vice, can be regarded from this point of view
as subjective, it is not wholly subjective. For morality does not
depend upon mere subjective conscience or the subjective notions
of good and bad. The caste-duties and other duties of customary
morality are definitely fixed, and no one should transgress them.
The subjectivity of virtue and vice consists in the fact that they
depend entirely on our good or bad actions. If actions are per-
formed from a sense of obedience to scriptural commands, caste-
XIV] God and 111an
duties or duties of customary morality, then such actions, in spite
of their bad consequences, would not be regarded as bad.
Apart from these courses of rebirth and ascent to heaven,
the last and best and ultimate course is described as being libera-
tion, which transcends all that can be achieved by all kinds of
merits attained by sacrifices, gifts or tapas. He who attains this
highest achievement lives in God and is never born again 1 • The
highest realization thus consists in being one with God, by which
one escapes all sorrows. In the Guii liberation (mok§a) means
liberation from old age and death. This liberation can be attained
by true philosophic knowledge of the nature of kfeira, or the
mind-body whole, and the kfeira-jiia, the perceiving selves, or the
nature of what is truly spiritual and what is non-spiritual, and by
clinging to God as one's nearest and dearest2 • This liberation from
old age and death also means liberation from the ties of karma
associated with us through the bonds of attachment, desires, etc.
It does not come of itself, as the natural result of philosophic
knowledge or of devotion to God; but God, as the liberator, grants
it to the wise and to those who cling to Him through devotion 3 •
But whether it be achieved as the result of philosophic knowledge
or as the result of devotion to God, the moral elevation, con-
sisting of dissociation from attachment and the right performance
of duties in an unattached manner, is indispensable.
God and Man.

The earliest and most recondite treatment regarding the nature
and existence of God and His relation to man is to be found in
the Gztii. The starting-point of the Gitii theism may be traced as
far back as the Pur~a-silkta, where it is said that the one quarter
of the purufa has spread out as the cosmic universe and its
living beings, while its other three-quarters are in the immortal
heavens 4 • This passage is repeated in Chiindogya, III. 12. 6 and in
Maitriiym:zi, vi. 4, where it is said that the three-quarter Brahman
sits root upward above (ilrdhva-milla'f!l tripiid Brahma). This idea,
in a slightly modified form, appears in the Katha Upanifad,
vi. I, where it is said that this universe is the eternal Asvattha
2 3
1 Gttii, VIII. 28; IX. 4· Ibid. VII. 29; XIII. 34· Ibid. XVIII. 66.
4 piido 'sya viivii bhutiini
tripiid asyiimrta1Jl divi. Puru~a-sukta.
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitti [CH.
tree which has its root high up and its branches downwards
(urdlzva-mulo 'vak-siikhal;). The Gua borrows this idea and says,
''This is called the eternal Asvattha (pipul tree) with its roots high
up and branches downwards, the leaves of which are the Vedas;
and he who knows this, he knows the Vedas" (xv. 1). Again it is
said," Its branches spread high and low,its leaves of sense-objects
are nourished by the gw:zas, its roots are spread downwards, tied
with the knots of karma, the human world" (xv. 2) ; and in the
next verse, it is said," In this world its true nature is not perceived;
its beginning, its end, and the nature of its subsistence, remain
unknown; it is only by cutting this firmly rooted Asvattha tree
with the strong axe of unattachment (asaizga-sastreya) that one has
to seek that state from which, when once achieved, no one returns."
It is clear from the above three passages that the Gltii has elabo-
rated here the simile of the Asvattha tree of the Katha Upani~ad.
The Gitii accepts this simile of God, but elaborates it by supposing
that these branches have further leaves and other roots, which take
their sap from the ground of human beings, to which they are
attached hy· the knots of karma. This means a duplication of the
Asvattha tree, the main and the subsidiary. The subsidiary one is
an overgrowth, which has proceeded out of the main one and
has to be cut into pieces before one can reach that. The principal
idea underlying this simile throws a flood of light on the Gttii
conception of God, which is an elaboration of the idea of the
Puru~a-szikta passage already referred to. God is not only im-
manent, but transcendent as well. The immanent part, which forms
the cosmic universe, is no illusion or miiyii: it is an .emanation,
a development, from God. The good and the evil, the moral and
the immoral of this world, are all from Him and in Him. The
stuff of this world and its manifestations have their basis, an
essence, in Him, and are upheld by Him. The transcendent part,
which may be said to be the root high up, and the basis of all
that has grown in this lower world, is itself the differenceless
reality-the Brahman. But, though the Brahman is again and
again referred to as the highest abode and the ultimate realization,
the absolute essence, yet God in His super-personality transcends
even Brahman, in the sense that Brahman, however great it may
be, is only a constitutive essence in the complex personality of
God. The cosmic universe, the gw:zas, the puru~as, the mind-
structure composed of huddhi, aha1J1kiira, etc., and the Brahman,
XIV) God and Man 525
are all constituents of God, having their separate functions and
mental relations; but God in His super-personality transcends them
all and upholds them all. There is, however, one important point
in which the Gttii differs from the Upani~ads-this is, its intro-
duction of the idea that God takes birth on earth as man. Thus in
the Gttii, IV. 6 and IV. 7, it is said that "whenever there is a dis-
turbance of dharma and the rise of adharma, I create myself;
though I am unborn, of immortal self and the lord of all beings,
yet by virtue of my own nature (prakrtz) I take birth through my
own miiyii (blinding power of the gutzas)." This doctrine of the
incarnation of God, though not dealt with in any of the purely
speculative systems, yet forms the corner-stone of most systems of
religious philosophy and religion, and the Gttii is probably the
earliest work available to us in which this doctrine is found. The
effect of its introduction and of the dialogue form of the Gltii, in
which the man-god Kr~Da instructs Arjuna in the philosophy of
life and conduct, is that the instruction regarding the personality
of God becomes concrete and living. As will be evident in the
course of this section, the Gitii is not a treatise of systematic
philosophy, but a practical course of introduction to life and
conduct, conveyed by God Himself in the form of Kr~Da to His
devotee, Arjuna. In the Gitii abstract philosophy melts down
to an insight into the nature of practical life and conduct, as
discussed with all the intimacy of the personal relation between
Kr~Da and Arjuna, which suggests a similar personal relation
between God and man. Fm the God in the Gitii is not a God of
abstract philosophy or theology, but a God who could be a man
and be capable of all personal relations.
The all-pervasive nature of God and the fact that He is the
essence and upholder of all things in the world is again and
again in various ways emphasized in the Gitii. Thus Kr~J).a says,
" There is nothing greater than I, all things are held in me,
like pearls in the thread of a pearl garland; I am the liquidity in
water, the light of the sun and the moon, manhood (pauru~a)
in man; good smell in earth, the heat of the sun, intelligence in
the intelligent, heroism in the heroes, strength in the strong, and
I am also the desires which do not transgress the path of virtue 1 ."
Again, it is said that "in my unmanifested (avyakta) form I
pervade the whole world; all beings exist completely in me, but
1 Gltii, VII. ?-II.
I am not exhausted in them; yet so do I transcend them that none
of the beings exist in me-l am the upholder of all beings, I do
not exist in them and yet I am their procreator1 ." In both these
passages the riddle of God's relation with man, by which He
exists in us and yet does not exist in us and is not limited by us,
is explained by the fact of the threefold nature of God; there is
a part of Him which has been manifested as inanimate nature and
also as the animate world of living beings. It is with reference to
this all-pervasive nature of God that it is said that "as the air in
the sky pervades the whole world, so are all beings in 'me' (God).
At the end of each cycle (kalpa) all beings enter into my nature
(prakrti'f{l yanti mamikam), and again at the beginning of a cycle I
create them. I create again and again through my nature (prakrtt);
the totality of all living beings is helplessly dependent on prakrti2 ."
The three prakrtis have already been referred to in the previous
sections-prakrti of God as cosmic matter, prakrti as the nature
of God from which all life and spirit have emanated, and prakrti
as maya, or the power of God from which the three gu1Jas have
emanated. It is with reference to the operation of these prakrtis
that the cosmic world and the world of life and spirit may be
said to be existent in God. But there is the other form of God,
as the transcendent Brahman, and, so far as this form is con-
cerned, God transcends the sphere of the universe of matter and
life. But in another aspect of God, in His totality and super-
personality, He remains unexhausted in all, and the creator and
upholder of all, though it is out of a part of Him that the world
has come into being. The aspect of God's identity with, and the
aspect of His transcendence and nature as the father, mother and
supporter of the universe, are not separated in the Gila, and both
the aspects are described often in one and the same passage. Thus
it is said, " I am the father, mother, upholder and grandfather of
this world, and I am the sacred syllable OM, the three Vedas,
~k, Saman and Yajus; I am the sacrifice, the oblations and the
fire, and yet I am the master and the enjoyer of all sacrifices. I am
the final destiny, upholder, matter, the passive illuminator, the
rest, support, friend, the origin, the final dissolution, the place,
the receptacle and the immortal seed. I produce heat and shower,
I destroy and create, I am both death and the deathless, the good
and the bad 3 ." With reference to His transcendent part it is
1
Gua, Ix. 3-s. 1 Jbid. IX. 6-8. 8 Ibid. IX. 16-19, 24.
XIV] God and Man
said," The sun, the moon and fire do not illuminate it-it is my
final abode, from which, when once achieved, no one returns 1 ."
And again, immediately after, it is said, "It is my part that forms
the eternal soul-principle (jlva-bhuta) in the living, which attracts
the five senses and the man as which lie buried in prakrti, and
which takes the body and goes out of it with the six senses, just
as air takes out fragrance from the flowers 2 ." And then God is
said to be the controlling agent of all operations in this world.
Thus it is said, "By my energy I uphold the world and all
living beings and fill all crops with their specific juices; as fire in
the bodies of living beings, and aided by the biomotor priirw
functions, I digest the four kinds of food; I am the light in the
sun, the moon and fire." Again it is said," I reside in the hearts
of all; knowledge, forgetfulness and memory all come from me;
I alone am to be known by the Vedas; I alone know the Vedas,
and I alone am the author of the Vedanta 3 ." From these examples
it is evident that the Gttii does not know that pantheism and deism
and theism cannot well be jumbled up into one as a consistent
philosophic creed. And it does not attempt to answer any objec-
tions that may be made against the combination of such opposite
views. The Gttii not only asserts that all is God, but it also
again and again repeats that God transcends all and is simul-
taneously transcendent and immanent in the world. The answer
apparently implied in the Gitii to all objections to the apparently
different views of the nature of God is that transcendentalism,
immanentalism and pantheism lose their distinctive and opposite
characters in the melting whole of the super-personality of God.
Sometimes in the same passage, and sometimes in passages of the
same context, the Gitii talks in a pantheistic, a transcendental or
a theistic vein, and this seems to imply that there is no contra-
diction in the different aspects of God as preserver and controller
of the world, as the substance of the world, life and soul, and
as the transcendent substratum underlying them all. In order
to emphasize the fact that all that exists and all that is worthy
of existence or all that has a superlative existence in good or
bad are God's manifestation, the Gitii is never tired of repeating
that whatever is highest, best or even worst in things is God or
1 Gftii, XV. 6.
2
Ibid. xv. 7 and 8. It is curious that here the word lsvara is used as an
epithet of jlva.
3
ibid. xv. 8, 12, IJ, 14, IS.
God's manifestation. Thus it is said, • I am the gambling of
dice in all deceptive operations, I am victory in all endeavours,
heroism of the heroes and the moral qualities (sattva) of all
moral men (sattvavatiim)"; and after enumerating a number of
such instances Kr~I)a says that, wherever there are special gifts
or powers or excellence of any kind, they are to be regarded
as the special manifestation of God 1 • The idea that God holds
within Himself the entire manifold universe is graphically em-
phasized in a fabulous form, when Kr~Q.a gives Arjuna the
divine eye of wisdom and Arjuna sees K~I)a in his resplendent
divine form, shining as thousands of suns burning together, with
thousands of eyes, faces and ornaments, pervading the heavens
and the earth, with neither beginning nor end, as the great cosmic
person into whose mouths all the great heroes of Kuruk~etra field
had entered, like rivers into the ocean. Kr~I)a, after showing
Arjuna his universal form, says, "I am time (kala), the great
destroyer of the world, and I am engaged in collecting the harvest
of human lives, and all that will die in this great battle of Kuruk-
~etra have already been killed by me; you will be merely an instru-
ment in this great destruction of the mighty battle of Kuruk!?etra.
So you can fight, destroy your enemies, attain fame and enjoy the
sovereignty without any compunction that you have destroyed the
lives of your kinsmen."
The main purport of the Gttii view of God seems to be that
ultimately there is no responsibility for good or evil and that good
and evil, high and low, great and small have all emerged from
God and are upheld in Him. When a man understands the nature
and reality of his own self and its agency, and his relation with
God, both in his transcendent and cosmic nature, and the universe
around him and the gu1Jas of attachment, etc., which bind him to
his worldly desires, he is said to have the true knowledge. There
is no opposition between the path of this true knowledge (jiiiina-
yoga) and the path of duties; for true knowledge supports and is
supported by right performance of duties. The path of knowledge
is praised in the Gttii in several passages. Thus it is said, that just
as fire burns up the wood, so does knowledge reduce all actions
to ashes. There is nothing so pure as knowledge. He who has
true faith is attached to God, and he who has controlled his senses,
attains knowledge~ and having attained it, secures peace. He who
1 Gua, x. 36-41.
XIV) God and Man
is foolish, an unbeliever, and full of doubts, is destroyed. He who
is always doubting has neither this world, nor the other, nor does
he enjoy any happiness. Even the worst sinner can hope to cross
the sea of sins in the boat of knowledge 1 • In the Gztii, IV. 42,
Kp~Q.a says to Arjuna, "Therefore, having destroyed the ignorance
of your heart by the sword of knowledge, and having cut asunder
all doubts, raise yourself up." But what is this knowledge? In
the Gitii, IV. 36, in the same context, this knowledge is defined
to be that view of things by which all beings are perceived in this
self or God. The true knowledge of God destroys all karma in the
sense that he who has perceived and realized the true nature of
all things in God cannot be attached to his passions and desires
as an ignorant man would be. In another passage, already referred
to, it is said that the roots of the worldly Asvattha tree are to be
cut by the sword of unattachment. The confusion into which
Arjuna falls in the Gitii, 111. 1 and 2, regarding the relative excellence
of the path of karma and the path of knowledge is wholly unfounded.
Kr~Q.a points out in the Gttii, 111. 3, that there are two paths, the path
of knowledge and the path of duties (jfiiina-yoga and karma-yoga).
The confusion had arisen from the fact that Kr~J).a had described
the immortality of soul and the undesirability of Vedic actions
done with a motive, and had also asked Arjuna to fight and yet
remain unattached and perform his duty for the sake of duty.
The purpose of the Gitii was to bring about a reconciliation
between these two paths, and to show that the path of knowledge
leads to the path of duties by liberating it from the bonds of
attachment; for all attachment is due to ignorance, and ignorance
is removed by true knowledge. But the true knowledge of God
may be of a twofold nature. One may attain a knowledge of
God in His transcendence as Brahman, and attain the philosophic
wisdom of the foundation of all things in Brahman as the ultimate
substance and source of all manifestation and ·appearance. There
is another way of clinging to God as a super-person, in a personal
relation of intimacy, friendship and dependence. The Gitii admits
that both these ways may lead us to the attainment of our highest
realization. But it is the latter which the Gitii prefers and considers
easier. Thus the Gttii says (xn. 3-5) that those who adore the in-
definable, unchangeable, omnipresent, unthinkable, and the un-
manifested, controlling all their senses, with equal eyes for all
1
Gltii, IV. 37-41.
530 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii [cu.
and engaged in the good of all, by this course attain Him. Those
who fix their mind on the unmanifested (avyakta) find this course
very hard. But those who dedicate all their actions to God and,
clinging to Him as their only support, are devoted to Him in
constant communion, them He saves soon from the sea of death
and rebirth 1 •
The most important point in which the Gua differs from the
Upani~ads is that the Gitii very strongly emphasizes the fact that
the best course for attaining our highest realization is to dedicate
all our actions to God, to cling to Him as our nearest and dearest,
and always to be in communion with Him. The Gitii draws many
of its ideas from the U pani~ads and looks to them with respect.
It accepts the idea of Brahman as a part of the essence of God,
and agrees that those who fix their mind on Brahman as their
ideal also attain the high ideal of realizing God. But this is only
a compromise; for the Gua emphasizes the necessity of a personal
relation with God, whom we can love and adore. The beginning
of our association with God must be made by dedicating the fruits
of all our actions to God, by being a friend of all and sympathetic
to all, by being self-controlled, the same in sorrow or happiness,
self-contented, and in a state of perfect equanimity and equili-
brium. It is through such a moral elevation that a man becomes
apt in steadying his mind on God and ultimately in fixing his mind
on God. In the Gttii Kr~Q.a as God asks Arjuna to give up all
ceremonials or religious courses and to cling to God as the only
protector, and He promises that because of that God will liberate
him 2 • Again, it is said that it is by devotion that a man knows
what God is in reality and, thus knowing Him truly as He is, enters
into Him. It is by seeking entire protection in God that one can
attain his eternal state 3 •
But, though in order to attain the height at which it is possible
to fix one's mind on God, one should first acquire the preliminary
qualification of detaching oneself from the bonds of passions and
desires, yet it is sometimes possible to reverse the situation. The
Gitii thus holds that those whose minds and souls are full of God's
love, who delight in constantly talking and thinking of God and
always adore God with love, are dear to Him, and God, through
His great mercy and kindness, grants them the proper wisdom and
destroys the darkness of their ignorance by the light of knowledge 4 •
1 2
Gitii, xu. 6, 7· Ibid. XVIII. 66. 3
Ibid. XVIII. 55. 62. ' Ibid. X. ()-11.
XIV] God and A-fan 53 1
In the Gitii, XVIII. 57-58, Kr~Qa as God asks Arjuna to leave all
fruits of actions to God and to fill his mind with God, and He
assures him that He will then, by His divine grace, save him
from all sorrows, troubles or difficulties. Again, in IX. 30-32 it is
said that, even if a man is extremely wicked, if he adores God
devotedly, he becomes a saint; for he has adopted the right
course, and he soon becomes religious and attains eternal peace
of mind. Even sinners, women, Vaisyas and Siidras who cling
to God for support, are emancipated. Kr~Qa as God assures Arjuna
that a devotee (bhakta) of God can never be lost 1 • If a Ulan clings
to God, no matter whether he has understood Him rightly or not,
no matter whether he has taken the right course of approaching
Him or not, God accepts him in whichever way he clings to Him.
No one can be lost. In whichever way one may be seeking God, one
is always in God's path 2 • If a man, prompted by diverse desires,
takes to wrong gods, then even unto those gods God grants him
true devotion, with which he follows his worship of those gods,
and, even through such worship, grants him his desires 3 • God
is the Lord of all and the friend of all beings. It is only great-
souled men who with complete constancy of mind worship God,
and with firm devotion repeat the name of God, and, being always
in communion with Him, adore Him with devotion. God is easily
accessible to those who always think of God with inalienable
attachment 4 • In another passage (vn. 16, 17) it is said that there
are four classes of people who adore God: those who are enquiring,
those who are in trouble, those who wish to attain some desired
things, and those who are wise. Of these the wise (jfliinin), who
are always in communion with Him and who are devoted to Him
alone, are superior; the wise are dear to Him and He is dear to
them. In this passage it has been suggested that true wisdom
consists in the habit of living in communion with God and in
being in constant devotion to God. The path of bhakti, or devotion,
is thus praised in the Gttii as being the best. For the Gitii
holds that, even if a man cannot proceed in the normal path of
self-elevation and detach himself from passions and desires and
establish himself in equanimity, he may still, simply by clinging
to God and by firm devotion to Him, bring himself within the
sphere of His grace, and by grace alone acquire true wisdom and
1
Gitii, IX. Jo-J2. 2 /hid. IV. I I .
3 /bid. VII. 2o-22. ' /bid. IV. 13-15; V. 29; VII. 14.
532 The P~ilosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii (CH.
achieve that moral elevation, with little or no struggle, which is
attained with so much difficulty by others. The path of bhakti is
thus introduced in the Gitii, for the first time, as an independent
path side by side with the path of wisdom and knowledge of the
Upani~ads and with the path of austere self-discipline. Moral
elevation, self-control, etc. are indeed regarded as an indispensable
preliminary to any kind of true self-realization. But the advantage
of the path of devotion (bhakti) consists in this, that, while some
seekers have to work hard on the path of self-control and austere
self-discipline, either by constant practice or by the aid of philo-
sophic wisdom, the devotee makes an easy ascent to a high eleva-
tion-not because he is more energetic and better equipped than
his fellow-workers in other paths, but because he has resigned
himself completely to God; and God, being pleased with his
devotees who cling fast to Him and know nothing else, grants
them wisdom and raises them up through higher and higher stages
of self-elevation, self-realization and bliss. Arjuna treated Kr~l)a,
the incarnation of God on earth, as his friend, and Kr~l)a in the
role of God exhorted him to depend entirely on Him and assured
him that He would liberate him-He was asking him to give up
everything else and cling to Him as his only support. The Gitii
lays down for the first time the comer-stone of the teachings of
the Bhiigavata-purii1Ja and of the later systems of Vai~l)ava thought,
which elaborated the theory of bhakti and described it as the
principal method of self-elevation and self-realization.
Another important feature of the Gitii doctrine of devotion
consists in the fact that, as, on the one hand, God is contemplated
by His devotees in the intimate personal relation of a father,
teacher, master and friend, with a full consciousness of His divinity
and His nature as the substratum and the upholder of the entire
animate and inanimate cosmic universe, so, on the other hand,
the transcendent personality of God is realized not only as the
culmination of spiritual greatness and the ultimate reconciliation
of all relative differences, of high and low, good and bad, but as
the great deity, with a physical, adorable form, whom the devotee
can worship not only mentally and spiritually, but also externally,
with holy offerings of flowers and leaves. The transcendent God
is not only immanent in the universe, but also present before
the devotee in the form of a great deity resplendent with bright-
ness, or in the personal form of the man-god K~l)a, in whom
XIV) God and Man 533
God incarnated Himself. The Gua combines together different
conceptions of God without feeling the necessity of reconciling
the oppositions or contradictions involved in them. It does not
seem to be aware of the philosophical difficulty of combining the
concept of God as the unmanifested, differenceless entity with
the notion of Him as the super-person Who incarnates Himself on
earth in the human form and behaves in the human manner. It
is not aware of the difficulty that, if all good and evil should
have emanated from God, and if there be ultimately no moral re-
sponsibility, and if everything in the world should have the same
place in God, there is no reason why God should trouble to
incarnate Himself as man, when there is a disturbance of the
Vedic dharma. If God is impartial to all, and if He is absolutely
unperturbed, why should He favour the man who clings to Him,
and why, for his sake, overrule the world-order of events and
in his favour suspend the law of karma? It is only by constant
endeavours and practice that one can cut asunder the bonds of
karma. Why should it be made so easy for even a wicked man
who clings to God to release himself from the bonds of attachment
and karma, without any effort on his part? Again, the Gua does
not attempt to reconcile the disparate parts which constitute the
complex super-personality of God. How are the unmanifested or
avyakta part as Brahman, the avyakta part as the cosmic substratum
of the universe, the prakrti part as the producer of the guflaS,
and the prakrti part as the jlvas or individual selves, to be com-
bined and melted together to form a complex personality? If the
unmanifested nature is the ultimate abode (pararrz dhama) of God,
how can God as a person, who cannot be regarded as a mani-
festation of this ultimate reality, be considered to be transcendent?
How can there be a relation between God as a person and His
diverse nature as the cosmic universe, jzva and the guflaS? In a
system like that of Sankara Brahman and Isvara, one and the
many could be combined together in one scheme, by holding
Brahman as real and Isvara and the many as unreal and illusory,
produced by reflection of Brahman in the maya, the principle of
illusoriness. But, howsoever Sankara might interpret the Gua, it
does not seem that it considered Isvara or the world as in the
least degree illusory. In the U pani~ads also the notion of Isvara
and the notion of Brahman are sometimes found side by side. As
regards God as lsvara, the Gua not only does not think him to be
illusory, but considers him the highest truth and reality. Thus
there is no way of escaping from any of the categories of reality-
the two a'l.-yaktas, pral~rti,jiva and the super-personality of Isvara
comprehending and transcending them all. The concepts of
Brahman, jtva, the unmanifested category from which the world
proceeds, and the gU1:zas are all found in the Upani~ads in passages
which are probably mostly unrelated. But the Gitii seems to
take them all together, and to consider them as constituents of
lsvara, which are also upheld by Him in His superior form, in
which He transcends and controls them all. In the Upani~ads the
doctrine of bhakti can hardly be found, though here and there
faint traces of it may be perceived. If the Upani~ads ever speak
of lsvara, it is only to show His great majesty, power and glory,
as the controller and upholder of all. But the Gztii is steeped in
the mystic consciousness of an intimate personal relation with
God, not only as the majestic super-person, but as a friend who
incarnates Himself for the good of man and shares his joys and
sorrows with him, and to whom a man could cling for support in
troubles and difficulties and even appeal for earthly goods. He is the
great teacher, with whom one can associate oneself for acquisition
of wisdom and the light of knowl~dge. But He could be more
than all this. He could be the dearest of the dear and the nearest
of the near, and could be felt as being so intimate, that a man
could live simply for the joy of his love for Him; he could cling
to Him as the one dear friend, his highest goal, and leave every-
thing else for Him; he could consider, in his deep love for Him,
all his other religious duties and works of life as being relatively
unimportant; he could thus constantly talk of Him, think of Him,
and live in Him. This is the path of blzakti or devotion, and the
Gitii assures us that, whatever may be the hindrances and whatever
may be the difficulties, the bhakta (devotee) of God cannot be lost.
It is from the point of view of this mystic consciousness that the
Gitii seems to reconcile the apparently philosophically irreconcilable
elements. The Gitii was probably written at a time when philo-
sophical views had not definitely crystallized into hard-and-fast
systems of thought, and when the distinguishing philosophical
niceties, scholarly disputations, the dictates of argument, had not
come into fashion. The Gitii, therefore, is not to be looked upon as a
properly schemed system of philosophy, but as a manual of right
conduct and right perspective of things in the light of a mystical ap-
proach to God in self-resignation, devotion, friendship and humility.
XIV] V ~1JU, V iisudeva and Kr~1Ja 535
Vi~Qu, Vasudeva and Kr~Qa.
Vi~l).u, Bhagavat, Narayal).a, Hari and Kr~J.la are often used

in a large section of Indian religious literature as synonymous
names of the supreme lord. Of these Vi!?J.lU is an important
god of the ~g- Veda, who is one of the iidityas and who makes
three strides in the sky' probably as he manifests himself in
the eastern horizon, as he rises to the zenith and as he sets in
the west. He is also represented in the ~g- Veda as a great fighter
and an ally of Indra. It is further said that he has two earthly steps
and another higher step which is known only to himself. But in
the ~g- Veda Vi!?I).U is certainly inferior to Indra, with whom he
was often associated, as is evident from such names as lndrii-vip;zu
(R.V. IV. 55· 4; VII. 99· 5; VIII. ro. 2, etc.). According to later
tradition Vi~I)U was the youngest, the twelfth of the iidityas,
though he was superior to them all in good qualities 1 • His three
steps in the Rg-Vedic allusion have been explained in the Nirukta as
referring to the three stages of the sun's progress in the morning,
at midday and at evening. One of the names of Vi~.Qu in the
]J.g- Veda is Si pivi~ta, which Durgacarya explains as "surrounded
with the early rays" (Sipi-satJifiiair biila-rasmibhir iiv#ta)2 • Again,
the sage praises Vi!?I)U in the ]J.g- Veda in the following terms : " I,
a master of hymns and knowing the sacred customs, to-day praise
that name of thine, Sipivi~ta. I, who am weak, glorify thee, who
art mighty and dwellest beyond this world 3 ." All this shows that
Vi~I)U was regarded as the sun, or endowed with the qualities of
the sun. The fact that Vi!?J.lU was regarded as dwelling beyond this
world is probably one of the earliest signs of his gradually in-
creasing superiority. For the next stage one must turn to the
Satapatha-briihmm:za. In 1. 2. 4 of that work it is said that the
demons (asura) and the gods were vying with one another;
the gods were falling behind, and the demons were trying to dis-
tribute the world among themselves; the gods followed them,
making Vi~I)U the sacrifice as their leader ( te yajiiam eva V #tzU1Jl
puraskrtyeyul; ), and desired their own shares; the demons felt
jealous and said that they could give only so much ground as would
Ekiidaias tathii TvaHii dviidaio Vi~~ur ucyate
jaghanyajas tu sarve~iim iidityiinii1JZ gu~iidhika(l.
1t1ahii-bhiirata, 1. 65. 16. Calcutta, Bangavasi Press, second edition, 1908.
2
Nirukta, v. 9· Bombay edition, 1918.
3
]Jg-Veda, VII. 100. 5, translated by Dr L. Sarup, quoted in Nirukta,
v. 8.
be occupied by Vi!?.QU when he lay down, Vi!?.QU being a dwarf
(viimano ha Viwur iisa). The gods felt dissatisfied at this, and
they approached him with various mantras and in consequence
attained the whole world. Again, in XIV. 1 of the same work,
Kuruk~etra is referred to as being the place of the sacrificial per-
formances of the gods, and it is said there that in industry, rigorism
(tapas), faith, etc. Vi~~u was the best of all gods and was regarded
as being superior to them all (tasmiid iihur v~~ur deviinii1Jl
sre~thab), and was himself the sacrifice. Again, in Taittirzya-
Sa1Jlhitii, I. 7· 5· 4, in Viijasaneyi-sa1Jlhitii, I. 30; II. 6. 8; v. 21,
in Atharva- Veda, v. 26. 7; VIII. 5· 10, etc., Vi~.Qu is referred to
as the chief of the gods (Vz~~u-mukhii devii). Again, Vi~.QU as
sacrifice attained unlimited fame. Once he was resting his head
on the end of his bow; and, when some ants, perceiving that,
said, "How should we be rewarded, if we could gnaw the strings
of the bow," the gods said that they would then be rewarded with
food; and so the ants gnawed away the strings, and, as the two
ends of the bow sprang apart, Vi!?.Qu's head was torn from his
body and became the sun 1 • This story not only shows the con-
nection of Vi~.Qu with the sun, but also suggests that the later
story of Kr!?.Qa's being shot with an arrow by an archer originated
from the legend of Vi!?.QU 's being killed by the flying ends of his
bow. The place of Vi!?.QU (V~~u-pada) means the zenith, as the
highest place of the sun, and it is probable that the idea of the
zenith being the place of Vi~l).u led also to the idea that Vi~.QU
had a superior place transcending everything, which was, how-
ever, clearly perceived by the wise. Thus, at the beginning of
the daily prayer-hymns of the Brahmans, known as sandhyii, it is
said that the wise see always that superior place of Vi~~u, like an
open eye in the sky 2 • The word vai~1.1ava is used in the literal
sense of ''belonging to Vi!?.QU '' in the Viijasaneyi-sa1Jlhitii, v. 21,
23, 25, Taittiriya-Sa1Jlhitii, v. 6. 9· 2. 3, Aitareya-briihma~a, III. 38,
Satapatha-briihma~a, I. 1. 4· 9; III. 5· 3· 2, etc.; but the use of
the word in the sense of a sect of religion is not to be found any-
where in the earlier literature. Even the Gztii does not use the
word, and it is not found in any of the earlier U pani!?ads; it can
be traced only in the later parts of the Mahii-bhiirata.
1Satapatha-briihma1)a, XIV. I •
2tad Vi~tJob parama7Jl pada7Jl sadii pasyanti surayab diVlva cak~ur iitatam.
Acamana-mantra of the daily sandhyii prayer-hymn.
XIV] Vi~~u, Vasudeva and Krr!Ja 537
Again, it is well known that the supreme man, or purzt~a, is praised
in very high terms in the man-hymn (Pur~a-silkta) of the ~g- Veda,
x. 90, where it is said that pur~a is all that we see, what is past
and what is future, and that everything has come out of him; the
gods performed sacrifice with him with the oblations of the seasons~
and out of this sacrifice pur~a was first born, and then the gods
and all living beings; the various castes were born out of him; the
sky, the heavens and the earth have all come out of him; he is the
creator and upholder of all; it is by knowing him that one attains
immortality; there is no other way of salvation. It is curious that
there should be a word niiriiya1J,a, similar in meaning (etymologically
nara + phak., born in' the race or lineage of man) to pur~a, which
was also used to mean the supreme being and identified with
pur~a and Vi~J)U. In Satapatha-briihma1Ja, XIV. 3· 4, puru~a
is identified with niiriiya1J,a (purusa1Jl ha niiriiya1Ja1Jl Prajiipatir
uviica). Again, in Satapatha-briihma1Ja, XIII. 6. I, the idea of
the pur~a-silkta is further extended, and the pur~a niiriiya1J,a is
said to have performed the pafica-riitra sacrifice (paiicariitra1Jl ya-
jiia-krqtum) and thereby transcended everything and become every-
thing. This pafica-riitra sacrifice involves the (spiritual) sacrifice of
puru~a (pur~a-medho yajfia-kratur bhavati, XIII. 6. 7). The five
kinds of sacrifice, five kinds of animals, the year with the five kinds
of seasons, the five kinds of indwelling entities (paiica-vidham
adhyiitmam) can all be attained by the paiica-riitra sacrifices.
The sacrifice was continued for five days, and the Vedic habit of
figurative thinking associated each of the days of the sacrifice with
various kinds of desirable things, so that the five-day sacrifice
was considered to lead to many things which are fivefold in
their nature. The reference to the five kinds of indwelling en-
tities soon produced the paiica-riitra doctrine of the manifestation
of God in various modes as the external deity of worship (area),
inner controller (antar-yiimin), as various manifestations of His
lordly power (vibhava), as successive deity-forms in intimate
association as vyilha and as the highest God (para). This idea is
also found in the later Piinca-riitra scriptures, such as Ahirbudhnya-
sa1J1hitii (1. I) and the like, where God is described as having his
highest form along with the vyuha forms. Pur~a is thus identified
with niiriijla1Ja, who, by sacrifice of puru~a (pur~a-medha), became
all this world. The etymological definition of niiriiya1J,a as" one who
has descended from man (nara),'' as herein suggested in accordance
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gitii (CH.
with Pal).ini, IV. 1. 99, is not, however, accepted everywhere. Thus
Manu, I. 10, derives niiriiyat}a from niira, meaning "water," and
ayana, meaning "abode," and niira (water), again, is explained
as "that which has descended from nara," or supreme man 1 •
The Maha-bhiirata, III. 12,952 and 15,819 and XII. IJ,I68, accepts
lVIanu's derivation; but in v. 2568 it says that the supreme God
is called niiriiyat}a because he is also the refuge of men 2 • The
Taittirzya-Arat}yaka, x. 1. 6, identifies niiriiyat}a with Vasudeva
and Vi~l).u 3 • It may be suggested in this connection that even
the Upani~ad doctrine of the self as the supreme reality is prob-
ably a development of this type of ideas which regarded man as
supreme God. The word puru~a is very frequently used in the
Upani~ads in the sense of man, as well as in that of the highest
being or supreme reality. In the Mahii-bhiirata nara and niiriiyat}a
are referred to as being the forms of the supreme lord. Thus
it is said, "The four-faced Brahma, capable of being under-
stood only with the aid of the niruktas, joined his hands and,
addressing Rudra, said, "Let good happen to the three worlds.
Throw down thy weapons, 0 lord of the universe, from desire of
benefiting the universe. That which is indestructible, immutable,
supreme, the origin of the universe, uniform and the supreme
actor, that which transcends all pairs of opposites and is inactive,
has, choosing to be displayed, been pleased to assume this one
blessed form (for, though double, the two represent but one and
the same form). This nara and niiriiyat}a (the displayed forms of
supreme Brahman) have taken birth in the race of dharma. The
foremost of all deities, these two are observers of the highest vows
and endued with the severest penances. Through some reason best
known to Him I myself have sprung from the attribute of His
Grace Eternal, as thou hast; for, though thou hast ever existed since
all the pure creations, thou too hast sprung from His Wrath. With
myself then, these deities and all the great J3..~is, do thou adore
this displayed form of Brahman and let there be peace unto all
iipo niirii iti proktii iipo vai nara-sunava/:t

tii yad asyiiyana1'{Z piirva1'{Z tena niiriiyatzab smrta/:t. Manu, I. IO.
Water is called niira; water is produced from man, and, since he rested in
water in the beginning, he is called niiriiyatza. KullUka, in explaining this, says
that nara, or man, here means the supreme self, or Brahman.
2
Nariitziim ayaniic ciipi tato niiriiyatzah smrta/:t. Mahii-bhiirata, v. 2568.
3
Niiriiyatzii}'a vidmahe viisudevii)•a dhzmahi tan 110 Vi~tzub pracodayiit.
Taittinya Aratzyaka, p. 700. Anandasrama Press, Poona, 1898.
XIV] VipJu, Vasudeva and Kr~1Ja 539
the worlds without any delay 1 ." In the succeeding chapter (i.e.
Maha-bharata, Santi-parva, 343) nara and niiriiym:za are described
as being two foremost of sages (r~z) and two ancient deities engaged
in the practice of penances, observing high vows and depending
upon their own selves and transcending the very sun in energy.
The word bhagavat in the sense of blissful and happy is a very
old one and is used in the ~g- Veda, 1. I 64. 40; VII. 41. 4; x. 6o. I 2
and in the Atharva- Veda, 11. IO. 2; v. 31. I I, etc. But in the
Mahii-bhiirata and other such early literature it came to denote
Vi~l).u or Vasudeva, and the word bhagavata denoted the religious
sect which regarded Vi!?l).U as Narayal).a or Vasudeva as their
supreme god. The Pali canonical work Niddesa refers to various
superstitious religious sects, among which it mentions the followers
of Vasudeva, Baladeva, Pul).l).abhadda, Mal).ibhadda, Aggi, Naga,
Suparl).a, Yakkha, Asura, Gandhabba, Maharaja, Canda, Suriya,
Inda, Brahma, dog, crow, cow, etc. It is easy to understand why
a Buddhist work should regard the worship of Vasudeva as being
of a very low type; but at any rate it proves that the worship of
Vasudeva was prevalent during the period when the Niddesa was
codified. Again, in commenting upon Pal).ini, IV. 3· 98 (Vasudeviir-
juniibhyiif!l vun), Patafijali points out that the word Vasudeva here
does not denote the Vasudeva who was the son of Vasudeva of the
K~attriya race of V !"~I). is, since, had it been so, the suffix vuii, which
is absolutely equivalent to vun, could well be by Pal).ini, IV. 3· 99
(gotra-k~attriyakhyebhyo bahula1!z vuii), by which vuii is suffixed
to names of K~attriya race. Patafijali thus holds that the word
Vasudeva is in this rule not used to refer to any K~attriya race, but
is a name of the Lord (saf!ljiza~ii tatra bhagavatab). If Patafijali's
interpretation is to be trusted, for which there is every reason,
Vasudeva as God is to be distinguished from the K~attriya Vasu-
deva, the son of Vasudeva of the race of Vr~I).is. It was well estab-
lished in Pal).ini's time that Vasudeva was God, and that His
followers were called Viisudevaka, for the formation of which word
by the vun suffix Pal).ini had to make the rule (IV. 3. 98). Again,
the Ghosul).c_li inscription in Rajputana, which is written in
Brahmi, an early form of about 200-I50 B.C., contains a reference
to the building of a wall round the temple of Vasudeva and
Satpka~al).a. In the Besnagar inscription of about IOO B.c.
1
Mahti-bhiirata, Siinti-parva, 342. 124-129. P. C. Roy's translation, Mok$a-
dharma-parva, p. 817. Calcutta.
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gUii (CH.
Heliodorus, son of Diya, describes himself as a great devotee of
Bhagavat (parama-bhagavata), who had erected a pillar bearing
an image of Garu<;la. In the Nanaghat inscription of 100 B.C.
Vasudeva and Satp.ka~al).a appear together as deities to whom
adorations are addressed along with other gods. If the testimony
of Patafijali is accepted, the religious sect of Vasudevas existed be-
fore PaQ.ini. It is generally believed that Patafijali lived in ISO B.c.,
since in course of interpreting a grammatical rule which allowed the"
use of the past tense in reference to famous contemporary events
not witnessed by the speaker he illustrates it by using a past tense
in referring to the Greek invasion of the city of Saketa (aru1Jad
Yavanafz Siiketam); as this event took place in ISO B.C., it is re-
garded as a famous contemporary event not witnessed by Patafi-
jali. Patafijali was the second commentator of PaQ.ini, the first
being Katyayana. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar points out that Patafijali
notices variant readings in Katyayana's Viirttikas, as found in the
texts used by the schools of Bharadvajiyas, Saunagas and others,
some of which might be considered as emendations of the Viirttikas,
though Patafijali's introduction of them by the verb pathanti," they
read," is an indication that he regarded them as different readings 1 •
From this Sir R. G. Bhandarkar argues that between Katyayana
and Patafijali a considerable time must have elapsed, which alone
can explain the existence of the variant readings of Katyayana's text
in Patafijali's time. He therefore agrees with the popular tradition
in regarding PaQ.ini as a contemporary of the Nandas, who preceded
the l\1auryas. Katyayana thus flourished in the first half of the 5th
century B.c. But, as both Goldstiicker and Sir R. G. Bhandarkar have
pointed out, the Viirttika of Katyayana notices many grammatical
forms which are not noticed by PaQ.ini, and this, considering the
great accuracy of Pal).ini as a grammarian, naturally leads to the
supposition that those forms did not exist in his time. Goldstiicker
gives a list of words admitted into Pal).ini's sutras which had gone
out of use by Katyayana's time, and he also shows that some words
which probably did not exist in Pal).ini's time had come to be
used later and are referred to by Katyayana. All this implies that
Pal).ini must have flourished at least two or three hundred years
before Katyayana. The reference to the Vasudeva sect in Pat:tini 's
sutras .naturally suggests its existence before his time. The allusions
1
Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's Early History of the Deccan, p. 7·
XIV] Vi~~u, V iisudeva and Kr~~a 54 I
to Vasudeva in the inscriptions referred to above can be regarded
as corroborative evidence pointing to the early existence of the
Vasudeva sect, who worshipped Vasudeva or Bhagavat as the
supreme Lord.
Turning to literary references to Vasudeva and Kr~1.1a, we
find the story of Vasudeva, who is also called. by his family name
Kanha and Kesava (probably on account of his bunch of hair), in
the Ghata-jiitaka. The story agrees in some important details with
the usual accounts of Kr~1.1a, though there are some new de-
viations. A reference to the V p~Qi race of K~attriyas is found in
Pa1.1ini, IV. I. I I4 (rfy-andhaka-vrp;zi-kurubhyas ca). The word is
formed by an U7Jiidi suffix, and it literally means "powerful" or
"a great leader 1 ." It also means" heretic" (piifa7JrJa) and one who
is passionately angry (ca7JrJa). It is further used to denote the
Yadava race, and Kr~1.1a is often addressed as Var~1.1eya, and in
the Gltii, x. 37, Kr~1.1a says, "Of the V r~1.1is I am Vasudeva." The
V f~I).is are referred to in Kautilya's Artha-siistra, where the group
of Vr~1.1is (vrp;zi-sangha) is said to have attacked Dvaipayana. The
Ghata-jiitaka also has the story of the curse of Kanha Dvai-
payana as the cause of the destruction of the Vp~Qis. But the
Maha-bhiirata (XVI. I) holds that the curse was pronounced by
Visvamitra, Ka1.1va and Narada upon Samba, the son of Kr~I).a. Two
Vasudevas are mentioned in the Mahii-bhiirata: Vasudeva, the king
of the Paui).9ras, and Vasudeva or Kr~I).a, the brother of Saf!lkar-
~ai).a, and both of them are mentioned as being present in the
great assemblage of kings at the house of King Drupada for the
marriage of Draupadi; it is the latter Vasudeva who is regarded
as God. It is very probable that Vasudeva originally was a name
of the sun and thus became associated with Vi~I).U, who with his
three steps traversed the heavens; and a similarity of Kr~I).a or
Vasudeva to the sun is actually suggested in the Mahii-bhiirata,
XII. 341. 4I, where Narayai).a says, "Being like the sun, I cover
the whole world with my rays, and I am also the sustainer of all
beings and am hence called Vasudeva."
Again, the word Siitvata also is used as a synonym of Vasudeva
or Bhagavata. The word Siitvata in the plural form is a name
of a tribe of the Yadavas, and in the Mahii-bhiirata, vn. 7662, the
phrase Sat'l:atii1J1 vara/.z is used to denote Satyaki, a member of the
Yadava race, though this appellation is applied to Kp}I).a m a
1 Yu.thena vrp;ir ejati, ~g- Veda, I. 10. 2.
542 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gttii [cH.
large number of places in the Mahii-bharata 1 • In the later Bhiiga-

vata-puriitza (IX. 9· so) it is said that the Satvatas worship Brahman
as Bhagavan and as Vasudeva. In the Mahii-bharata, VI. 66. 41,
Sarpkar~aQ.a is said to have introduced the siitvata rites in wor-
shipping Vasudeva. If Satvata was the name of a race, it is easy tc
imagine that the persons may have had special rites in worshipping
Vasudeva. Yamunacarya, the great teacher of Ramanuja in the
tenth century A.D., says that those who adore God (bhagavat), the
supreme person, with purity (sattva), are called bhiigavata and
siitvata 2 • Yamuna strongly urges that Satvatas are Brahmal).as by
caste, but are attached to Bhagavat as the supreme lord. Yamuna,
however, seems to urge this in strong opposition to the current
view that Satvatas were a low-caste people, who had not the initia-
tion with the holy thread and were an outcast people originated from
the Vaisyas3 • The Satvatas are said to be the fifth low-caste people,
who worship in the temples of Vi~Q.U by the orders of the king,
and are also called Bhagavatas 4 • The Satvatas and Bhagavatas
are those who make their living by worshipping images and are
hence low and disreputable. Yamuna urges that this popular view
about the Bhagavatas and the Satvatas is all incorrect; for, though
there are many Satvatas who make a living by worshipping images,
not all Satvatas and Bhagavatas do so; and there are many among
them who worship Bhagavat, as the supreme person, solely by
personal devotion and attachment.
From Pataiijali's remarks in commenting on PaQ.ini, IV. 3· 98,
it is seen that he believed in the existence of two Vasudevas,
one a leader of the Vf~Q.i race and the other God as Bhagavat.
It has already been pointed out that the name Vasudeva occurs
also in the Ghata-jataka. It may therefore be argued that the
name Vasudeva was an old name, and the evidence of the passage
of the Niddesa, as well as that of Pataiijali, shows that it was a
name of God or Bhagavat. The later explanation of Vasudeva
as " the son of Vasudeva" may therefore be regarded as an
1
Mahii-blziirata, V. 2581, 3041, 3334, 3360, 4370; IX. 2532, 3502; X. 726;
XII. 1502, 1614, 7533·
a tatai ca sattviid bhagaviin bhajyate yaih para}; pumiin
te siitvatii bhiigavatii ity ucyante dvijottamaih.
Yamuna's Aga~a-priimii!Jya, p. 7. 6.
8 Thus Manu (x. 23) says:
vaiiyiit tu jiiyate vriityiit sudhanviiciirya eva ca
kiiru~ai ca vijanmii ca maitras siitvata eva ca.
paiicamab siitvato nama Viroor iiyatana7p hi sal;
pi1jayed iijiiayii riijiiii7p sa tu bhiigavatab smrtal;. Ibid. p. 8.
XIV] 543
unauthorized surmise. It is very probable that Vasudeva was
worshipped by the race of Yadavas as a tribal hero according to
their own tribal rites and that he was believed to be an incarnation
of Vi~I).U, who was in his turn associated with the sun. Megas-
thenes, in his account of India as he saw it, speaks of the Sourasenoi
-an Indian nation in whose land are two great cities, 1\'lethora and
Kleisobora, through which flows the navigable river Jobares-
as worshipping Heracles. "l\1ethora" in all probability means
Mathura and "Jobares" Jumna. It is probable that Heracles is
Hari, which again is a name of Vasudeva. Again in the Mahii-
bharata, VI. 6 5, Bhi~ma says that he was told hy the ancient sages
that formerly the great supreme person appeared before the
assembly of gods and sages, and Brahma began to adore Him with
folded hands. This great Being, who is there adored as Vasudeva,
had first created out of Himself Sarpkar~al).a, and then Pradyumna,
and from Pradyumna Aniruddha, and it was from Aniruddha
that Brahma was created. This great Being, Vasudeva, incarnated
Himself as the two sages, Nara and Narayai).a. He Himself says
in the JY/aha-bharata, VI. 66, that "as Vasudeva I should be
adored by all and no one should ignore me in my human body" ;
in both these chapters Kr~I).a and Vasudeva are identical, and
in the Gitii Kr~:I).a says that "of the Vr~:I).is I am Vasudeva."
It has also been pointed out that Vasudeva belonged to the
Kanhayana gotra. As Sir R. G. Bhandarkar says, "It is very prob-
able that the identification of Kr~I).a with Vasudeva \vas due to
the similarity of the gotra name with the name of Kr!?I).a 1 ." From
the frequent allusions to Vasudeva in Pataiijali 's commentary
and in the Maha-bhiirata, where he is referred to as the supreme
person, it is very reasonable to suppose that the word is a proper
noun, as the name of a person worshipped as God, and not a mere
patronymic name indicating an origin from a father Vasudeva.
Kr!?:I).a, Janardana, Kesava, Hari, etc. are not Vr~I).i names,
but were used as personal appellations of Vasudeva. Pataiijali
in his commentary on Pal).ini, IV. 3. 98, notes that Vasudeva, as
the name of a K!?attriya king of the race of V f~I).iS, is to be
distinguished from Vasudeva as the name of God. This God, wor-
shipped by the Satvatas according to their family rites, probably
came to be identified with a Vp?l)i king Vasudeva, and some of
the personal characteristics of this king became also personal
1 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's Vaip_1avism and Saivism, pp. 11-12.
characteristics of the god Vasudeva. The word Kp}I).a occurs
several times in the older literature. Thus Kpgta appears as a Vedic
r#, as the composer of ]J.g- Veda, VIII. 74· In the Mahii-bhiirata
Anukrama1J.l Kr~Qa is said to have descended from Ailgiras.
Kp}Qa appears in the Chiindogya Upanifad (III. 17) as the son of
Devaki, as in the Ghata-jiitaka. It is therefore probable that
Vasudeva came to be identified with Kr~Qa, the son of Devaki.
The older conception of Kr~Qa's being a rtvij is found in the
Mahii-bhiirata, and Bhi~ma in the Sabhii-parva speaks of him as
being a rtvij and well-versed in the accessory literature of the
Vedas (vediiizga). It is very probable, as Dr Ray Chaudhury points
out, that Kr~Qa, the son of Devaki, was the same as Vasudeva,
the founder of the Bhagavata system; for he is referred to in
the Ghata-jiitaka as being Kanhayana, or Kanha, which is the
same as Kr~Qa, and as Devaki-putra, and in the Chiindogya
Upan~ad, III. 17. 6, also he is referred to as being Devaki-putra.
In the Ghata-jiitaka Kr~Qa is spoken of as being a warrior,
whereas in the Chiindogya Upan#ad he is a pupil of Ghora
Ailgirasa, who taught him a symbolic sacrifice, in which penances
(tapas), gifts (dana), sincerity (iirjava), non-injury (ahi1Jlsii) and
truthfulness (satya-vacana) may be regarded as sacrificial fees
(dak#1J.ii). The Mahii-bhiirata, II. 317, describes Kr!?Qa both as a
sage who performed long courses of asceticism in Gandhamadana,
Pu~kara and Badari, and as a great warrior. He is also described
in the Malzii-bhiirata as Vasudeva, Devaki-putra and as the chief
of the Satvatas, and his divinity is everywhere acknowledged there ..
But it is not possible to assert definitely that Vasudeva, Kr~Qa the
warrior and Kgn).a the sage were not three different persons, who
in the Mahii-bhiirata were unified and identified, though it is
quite probable that all the different strands of legends refer to
one identical person.
If the three Kr~Qas refer to one individual Kr!?Qa, he must
have lived long before Buddha, as he is alluded to in the Chiindogya,
and his guru Ghora Ailgirasa is also alluded to in the Kaup,taki-
briihma7J.a, xxx. 6 and the Kathaka-Sa1Jlhitii, I. 1, which are pre-
Buddhistic works. Jaina tradition refers to Kr~Qa as being anterior
to Parsvanatha (8I7 B.c.), and on this evidence Dr Ray Chaudhury
thinks that he must have lived long before the closing years of
the ninth century B.c. 1
1 Early History of the Vai~1Java Sect, p. 39·
XIV] Blziigavata and the Bhagavad-gitii 545
Bhagavata and the Bhagavad-gita.

The Jlfahii-bhiirata (xu. 348) associates the Bhagavad-gUii with
the doctrines of the Ekanti- Vai~J).avas. It is said there that the God
Hari (bhaga·viin H ari) always blesses those that are devoted to God
without any idea of gain (ekiintin) and accepts their adorations,
offered in accordance with proper rites (vidhi-prayukta)l. This
ekiinta religion (ekiinta-dharma) is dear to Narayal).a, and those
who adhere to it attain to Hari, as Nilakar)tha, the commentator
on the JJJahii-bhiirata, points out, without passing through the three
stages of Aniruddha, Pradyumna and Sarpkar~al)a. The ekiintin faith
leads to much higher goals than the paths of those that know the
Vedas and lead the lives of ascetics. The principles of this ekiintin
faith were enunciated by the Bhagavat himself in the battle of the
Pal)<;iavas and the Kurus, when Arjuna felt disinclined to fight.
This faith can be traced originally to the Siima-veda. It is said that,
when Narayal)a created Brahma, he gave him this siitvata faith,
and from that time forth, as the 1l1ahii-bhiirata states, there has
been a host of persons who were instructed in this faith and
followed it. It was at a much later stage briefly described in
the Hari-gUii 2 • This faith is very obscure and very difficult to
be practised, and its chief feature is cessation from all kinds of
injury. In some places it is said to recognize one vyulza: in other
places two, and in others three, vyuhas are mentioned. Hari,
however, is the final and absolute reality; he is both the agent,
the action and the cause, as well as the absolute beyond action
(akartii). There are, hov.·ever, but few ekiintins in the world: had the
world been filled with ekiintins, who never injured anyone, were
always engaged in doing good to others and attained self-know-
1
Ekiintino ni~hiima-bhaktiib, Nilakarytha's commentary on the 1\t/ahii-bhiirata,
XII. 348. 3·
2
kathito hari-gltiisu samiisa-1·idhi-kalpita?1, Hari-gztii. 53· The traditional
teaching of the Gltii doctrines is represented as ancient in the Gztii itself (IV. 1-3),
where it is said that Bhagayan declared it to Vivasvan, and he related it to Manu,
and l\1anu to Ik~vaku, and so on, until after a long time it was lost; it was again
revived hy Kr~rya in the form of the Bhagavad-gUii. In the 1\fahii-bhiirata, xn.
348, it is said that Sanatkumara learned this doctrine from Narayarya, from him
Prajapati, from him Raibhya and from him Kuk$i. It was then lost. Then again
Brahma learned it from Narayarya, and from him the Barhi~ada sages learned it,
and from them J ye!iJtha. Then again it was lost; then again Brahma learned it from
Narayal).a, and from him Dak~a ]earned it, and from him Vivasvan, and from
Vivasvan Manu, and from l\Ianu Ik~vaku. Thus the tradition of the Bhagavad-
f!llii, as given in the poem itself, taHies with the Mahii-bhiirata account.
The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gztii [cH.
ledge, then the golden age, krta yuga, would have come again.
This ekii.nta religion is a faith parallel to that of the Sarpkhya-
yoga, and the devotee who follows it attains Narayal).a as his
ultimate state of liberation. From this description in the Mahli-
bhiirata it seems that the doctrine of the Gitii was believed to be
the ekiintin doctrine originally taught by Narayal).a to Brahma,
Narada and others long before the recital of the Gitii. by K~l).a in
the ll1aha-bhiirata battle. It is further known that it had at least
four or five different schools or variant forms, viz. eka-vyilha, dvi-
vyilha, tri-vyiiha, catur-vyilha and ekiinta, and that it was known
as the Satvata religion.
Yamunacarya in his Agama-priimiil}ya tries to combat a number
of views in which the Bhagavatas were regarded as being in-
ferior to Brahmins, not being allowed to sit and dine with them.
The Satvatas, again, are counted by lVlanu as a low-caste people,
born from outcast Vaisyas and not entitled to the holy thread 1 .
The Satvatas were, of course, regarded as the same as Bhagavatas,
and their chief duties consisted in worshipping for their living in
Vi~I).U temples hy the order of the king 2 • They also repaired or
constructed temples and images for their living, and were there-
fore regarded as outcasts. That the Bhagavatas did in later times
worship images and build images and temples is also evident from
the fact that most of the available Paiica-riitra works are full of
details about image-building and image-worship. The Gttii (IX. 26)
also speaks of adoration with water, flowers and leaves, which
undoubtedly refers to image-worship. Sarpkar~al).a, as the brother
or companion of Kr~l)a, is mentioned in Patafijali's Mahii-bhii~ya
(n. 2. 24) in a verse quoted by him, and in n. 2. 34 he seems to
quote another passage, in which it is related that different kinds
of musical instruments were played in the temple of Dhana-
pati, Rama and Kesava, meaning Balarama, Sarpkar!?al).a and
Kr!?l).a3.
As Yamuna points out, the opponents of the Bhagavata school
urge that, since the ordinary Brahminic initiation is not deemed
vaiiyiit tu jiiyate vriityiit sudhanviiciirya eva ca
kiiril~as ca vijanmii ca maitralz saivata eva ca. }igama-priimii~ya, p. 8.
pmicamalz siitvato niima V#~or iiyataniitfl hi sa
piijayed iijfiayii riijfiii1[l sa tu bhagavatalz smrtalz. Ibid.
Saizkar~a~a-dvitiyasya bala1p Krroasya ardhitam.
Mahii-bhii1ya, II. 2. 27.
mrdanga-saizkha-pa~viilz Prthaiz nadanti satfZsadi
priisiide dhana-pati-riima-keiaviiniim. Ibid. II. 2. 34·
XIV] Bhiigavata and the Bhagavad-gitii 547
a sufficient qualification for undertaking the worship of Vi~I)U,
and since special and peculiar forms of initiation and ceremonial
performances are necessary, it is clear that the Bhagavata forms
of worship are not Vedic in their origin. The fourteen Hindu
sciences, viz. the six vediingas on Vedic pronunciation (Sik~ii), ritual
(kalpa), grammar (vyiikara7Ja), metre (chandas), astronomy (jyoti~a),
iexicography (nirukta), the four Vedas, 1Vlimaf!1Sa, argumentative
works or philosophy (nyiiya-vistara), the mythologies (purii1Ja) and
rules of conduct (dharma-siistra), do not refer to the Paiica-riitra
scriptures as being counted in their number. So the Bhagavata or
the Paiica-riitra scriptures are of non-Vedic origin. But Yamuna
contends that, since Narayal)a is the supreme god, the Bhagavata
literature, which deals with his worship, must be regarded as having
the same sources as the Vedas; the Bhagavatas also have the same
kind of outer dress as the Brahmins and the same kinds of lineage.
He further contends that, though siitvata means an outcast, yet
siitvata is a different word from siitvata, which means a devotee
of Vi!?I.lU. lYioreover, not all Bhagavatas take to professional
priestly duties and the worshipping of images for their livelihood;
for there are many who worship the images through pure devotion.
It is very easy to see that the above defence of the Bhagavatas, as
put forward by one of their best advocates, Yamunacarya, is very
tame and tends to suggest very strongly that the Bhagavata sect
was non-Vedic in its origin and that image-worship, image-making,
image-repairing and temple-building had their origin in that
particular sect. Yet throughout the entire scriptures of the Paiica-
riitra school there is the universal and uncontested tradition that
it is based on the Vedas. But its difference from the Vedic path
is well known. Yamuna himself refers to a passage (Agama-
priimii1Jya, p. 51) where it is said that Sal)Q.ilya, not being able to
find his desired end (pur~iirtha) in all the four Vedas, produced
this scripture. The GUii itself often describes the selfish aims of
sacrifices, and Kr!?t:la urges Arjuna to rise above the level of the
Vedas. It seems, therefore, that the real connection of the Paika-
riitra literature is to be found in the fact that it originated from
Vasudeva or Vi!?I)U, who is the supreme God from whom the Vedas
themselves were produced. Thus the isvara-sa1J1hitii (1. 24-26)
explains the matter, and states that the Bhagavata literature is
the great root of the Veda tree, and the Vedas themselves are but
trunks of it, and the followers of Yoga are but its branches. Its
main purpose is to propound the superiority of Vasudeva, who is
the root of the universe and identical with the Vedas 1 •
The affinity of this school of thought to the U pani~ad
school becomes apparent when it is considered that Vasudeva
was regarded in this system as the highest Brahman2 • The
three other vyz7has were but subordinate manifestations of him,
after the analogy of prajiiii, virllf, ·viS~·a and taijasa in monistic
Vedanta. Patafijali's Jllaha-bhii§ya does not seem to know of the
four 'l')'l71ws, as it mentions only Vasudeva and Sarp.kar~al).a; and
the Gua knows only Vasudeva. It seems, therefore, that the vyuha
doctrine did not exist at the time of the Gila and that it evolved
gradua1ly in later times. It is seen from a passage of the Jl,iahii-
bharata, already referred to, that there were different variations of
the doctrine and that some accepted one 'l')'illza, others two, others
three and others four. It is very improbable that, if the vyulza
doctrine was known at the time of the Gltii, it should not have
been mentioned therein. For the Gitii \Vas in all probability the
earliest work of the ehiintin school of the Bhagavatas 3 . It is also
interesting in this connection to note that the name Karayar;a is
never mentioned in the Gua, and Vasudeva is only identified with
Vi~r;u, the chief of the adityas. Thus Sir R. G. Bhandarkar says,
"It will be seen that the date of the Bhaga·oad-gua, which contains
mahato ·veda-1:rk~asya miila-blu1to maltiin aym!l
slwndha-bhr1tii n:-iidyiis te siildlii-bhz1tiis ca yogina~l
jagau-miilasya vedasya Viisude·vasya mukhyatalz
pratipiidalwtii siddhii mz1la-vediikhyatii d7;_ijii[l.
I svara-sa1!lhitii, I. 2-4-26.
yasmiit samyak pararrt brahma Viisudl"viikltyam ll'l-)'ayam
asmiid aviipyate Stistriij jiiiina-p:irvet;~a lwrma1Jii.
Pau~kariigama, as quoted in Riimiinuja-bltii~ya, 11. 2. 42.
The Chiindogya Upan#ad (vn. 1. 2) refers also to the study of ekiiyana, as in
the passage 'l:liko-viikyam ekiiyana1!l; ekiiyana is also described as being itself a
Veda in Sriprasna-sa1!lhitii, 11. 38, 39:
vedam ekiiyana1!l niima 7-•ediiniim sirasi sthitam
tad-artlzakam paiica-riitram mokFa-da1J'l tat-kriyiivatiim
yasminn eko mok~a-miirgo vede proktab saniitanab
mad-iiriidhana-rupet;~a tasmiid ekiiyanam bhavet.
See also the article "The Pafica-ratras or Bhagavata-sastra," by Govindacarya
s,·amin, J.R.A.S. 1911.
3
That the ekiintin faith is the same as the Satvata or the Paiica-riitra faith is
eYident from the following quotation from the Piidma-tmztra, IV. 2. 88:
sz1ris suhrd blziiga7-'atas siitvatab paiica-kiila-vit
ekii1ltikas tan-mayas ca paiica-riitrika ity api.
This faith is also called ekiil'ana, or the path of the One, as is seen from the
following passage from the li'L·ara-sa1!lhitii, 1. 18:
mokFiiyaniiya vai panthii etad-anyo na vidJ•ate
tasmiid ekiiyana1!l niima pravadanti mani#tJab.
XIV) Bhiigavata and the Bhagavad-guii 549
no mention of the 'lyuhas or personified forms, is much earlier
than those of the inscriptions, the Niddesa and Pataiijali, i.e. it was
composed not later than the beginning of the fourth century before
the Christian era; how much earlier it is difficult to say. At the
time when the Gitii was conceived and composed the identification
of Vasudeva with NarayaQ.a had not yet taken place, nor had the
fact of his being an incarnation of Vi~I)U come to be acknowledged,
as appears from the work itself.... Vi~I)U is alluded to as the chief of
the Adityas and not as the supreme being, and Vasudeva was Vi~Q.u
in this sense, as mentioned in chapter x, because the best thing of
a group or class is represented to be his vibhuti or special mani-
festation 1 .''
The date of the Gua has been the subject of long discussions
among scholars, and it is inconvenient for our present purposes
to enter into an elaborate controversy. One of the most extreme
views on the subject is that of Dr Lorinser, who holds that it
was composed after Buddha, and several centuries after the com-
mencement of the Christian era, under the influence of the New
Testament. l\Ir Telang in the introduction to his translation of
the Bhagavad-gltii points out-as has been shown above-that
the Bhagavad-gitii does not know anything that is peculiarly
Buddhistic. Attempt has also been made to prove that the Gitii
not only does not know anything Buddhistic, but that it also
knows neither the accepted Sa:rpkhya philosophy nor the Yoga of
Pataiijali's Yoga-siltra. This, together with some other secondary
considerations noted above, such as the non-identification of Vasu-
deva with Narayal)a and the non-appearance of the 'l.,yuha doctrine,
seems to be a very strong reason for holding the Gua to be in
its general structure pre-Buddhistic. The looseness of its com-
position, however, always made it easy to interpolate occasional
verses. Since there is no other consideration which might lead us
to think that the Gua was written after the Brahma-siitras, the
verse Brahma-siitra-padais caiva hetumadbhir 'lliniscitail; has to be
either treated as an interpolation or interpreted differently. Sankara
also thought that the Brahma-siitra referred to the Gila as an old
sacred writing (smrti), and this tallies with our other considerations
regarding the antiquity of the Gila. The view of Dr Lorinser,
that the Bhaga'l·ad-gttii must have borrowed at least some of its
materials from Christianity, has been pretty successfully refuted by
1 Vai~~;tm:ism and .Saivism, p. IJ.
55° The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gUii [cH.
"l\Ir Telang in the introduction to his translation, and it therefore
need not be here again combated. Dr Ray Chaudhury also has
discussed the problem of the relation of Bhagavatism to Chris-
tianity, and in the discussion nothing has come out which can
definitely make it seem probable that the Bhagavata cult was
indebted to Christianity at any stage of its development; the
possibility of the Guii being indebted to Christianity may be
held to be a mere fancy. It is not necessary here to enter into
any long discussion in refuting Garbe's view that the Gztii was
originally a work on Sarp.khya lines (written in the first half of
the second century B.c.), which was revised on Vedantic lines
and brought to its present form in the second century A.D.; for
I suppose it has been amply proved that, in the light of the
uncontradicted tradition of the 1\Jahii-bhiirata and the Paiica-riitra
literature, the Gztii is to be regarded as a work of the Bhagavata
school, and an internal analysis of the work also shows that the
Gitii is neithei" an ordinary Sarp.khya nor a Vedanta work, but
represents some older system wherein the views of an earlier
school of Sarp.khya are mixed up with Vedantic ideas different
from the Vedanta as interpreted by Sari.kara. The arbitrary and
dogmatic assertion of Garbe, that he could clearly separate the
original part of the Guii from the later additions, need not, to my
mind, be taken seriously. The antiquity of the Bhagavata religion
is~ as pointed out by Tilak, acknowledged by Senart (The Indian
Interpreter, October 1909 and January 1910) and Buhler (Indian
Antiquary, 1894), and the latter says, "The ancient Bhagavata,
Satvata or Pafica-riitra sect, devoted to the worship of Narayat).a and
his deified teacher Kp;n;a Devaki-putra, elates from a period long
anterior to the rise of the Jainas in the eighth century B.c." And
assuredly the Gitii is the earliest available literature of this school.
As regards external evidence, it may be pointed out that the Gltii
is alluded to not only by Kalidasa and Bal).a, but also by Bhasa in
his play Kan:za-bhiira 1 • Tilak also refers to an article by T. G. Kale
in the Vedic Magazine, VII. pp .•528-532, where he points out that
the Bodhiiyana-Grhya-se~a-sutra, II. 22. 9, quotes the Gitii, IX. 26,
1 Tilak quotes this passage on page 574 of his Bhagavad-gltii-rahasya (Bengali
translation of his Marathi work) as follows:

hato 'pi labhate S'f.Jarga1Jl jitvii tu labhate yaJa}_t
ubhe bahumate loke niisti ni~phalatii ra~e.
which repeats the first two lines of the Gftii, 11. 37·
XIVJ Bluiga'l)afa and the Bhagavad-gUti 55 1
and the Bodhiiyana-Pitr-medha-sutra, at the beginning of the third
prasna, quotes another passage of the Guii 1 • Incidentally it may
also be mentioned that the style of the GUii is very archaic; it is
itself called an Upani~ad, and there are many passages in it which
are found in the lsa (Ua, 5, cf. the Bhaga·vad-gitii, XIII. I 5 and
VI. 29), Jiwujalw (iklu1Jtf. 11. r. 2, cf. the Gltii, XIII. 15), Kiithaka
(n. IS, II. I8 and 19 and II. 7, cf. the Gitii, VIII. II; II. 20
and 29) and other Upani~ads. \Ve are thus led to assign to the
Gttii a very early date, and, since there is no definite evidence
to show that it was post- Buddhistic, and since also the GUii
does not contain the slightest reference to anything Buddhistic,
I venture to suggest that it is pre-Buddhistic, however unfashion-
able such a view may appear. An examination of the Gitii from
the point of view of language also shows that it is archaic and largely
un-PaJ)inean. Thus from the root yudh we have yudhya (viii. 7)
for yudhyasva; yat, which is iitmane-pada in PaJ)inean Sanskrit,
is used in parasmai-pada also, as in VI. 36, VII. 3, IX. I4 and
xv. I 1; ram is also used in parasmai-pada in x. 9· The roots kiifzk~,
vraj, vis and itig are used in PaJ)inean Sanskrit in parasmai-pada,
but in the GUii they are all used in iitmane-pada as well-kiifzk~ in
1. 3I, vraj inn. 54, vis in XXIII. 55 and ifzg in VI. 19 and XIV. 23.
Again, the verb ud-vij, which is generally used in iitmane-pada, is
used in parasmai-pada in v. 20; nivasi~yasi is used in XII. 8 for
nivatsyasi, mii suca!J for mii socl/1 in XVI. 5; and the usage of
prasavi~yadhvam in 111. IO is quite ungrammatical. So yamaf:t
sa'!lyamatiim in X. 29 should be yama~1 sa'!lyacchatiim, he sakheti
in XI. 41 is an instance of wrong sandhi, priyiiyiirhasi in XI. 44 is
used for priyiiyii/:t arhasi, seniinlniim in x. 24 is used for seniinyiim 2 •
These linguistic irregularities, though they may not themselves be
regarded as determining anything definitely, may yet be regarded
1 Bodhiiyana-Grh_ya-se~a-sutra:
tad iiha blw.gaviin,
patram pu~pam phala1J1. toya1J1. yo me bhaktyii. prayacchati
tad aham bhakty-up'lhrtam asnii.mi prayatiitmanal;.
Also Bodhii.yana-Pitr-medha-st2tra: yatasya vai manu~yasya dhruvam marm:zam
iti vijiinlyiit tasmii.j jcl.te na prahr~yen mrte ca na vi~ldeta.
Compare the Gltri., jiitasya hi dhruvo mrtyu!z, etc.
N.B. These references are all taken from Tilak's Bhagavad-guii.-rahasya
pp. 574, etc.
2
For enumeration of more errors of this character see IVlr V. K. Rajwade's
article in the Bhandarkar commemoration volume, from which these have been
collected.
552 The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gtta (CH. XIV
as contributory evidence in favour of the high antiquity of the

Gita. The Gita may have been a work of the Bhagavata school
written long before the composition of the Maha-bha1·ata, and may
have been written on the basis of the Bharata legend, on which
the Maha-bharata was based. It is not improbable that the Gita,
which summarized the older teachings of the Bhagavata school, was
incorporated into the Mahii-bharata, during one of its revisions, by
reason of the sacredness that it had attained at the time.
INDEX 1
ahiidhita, 108 acapala, 5 I o
ahiidhita - svaya'!l - praluliataiva asya Acceptance of gift, 505
sattii, 36 Accessories, 160, Il-iJ, 1X4
Abdomen, 289, 353 Accessory causl', 10<), I~(,
ahlwya, 5 I o Accidental happl'nings, 372
abluiva, I42, I6.z, I93, 227 Accretion, 235 11., 32h; of energy,
abheda, 207 244
abhedo nlla-tad-dhiyofz, 26 n. Acetabulum, 287 n. 2
abhiciira-lwrma, 284 acetana, 36
Ahhidharma-kosa, 58 n. Acid, 337 n., 358, 359, 361, 302
Abhidharma-kosa-t•yiikhyii, 58 n., 62 n. Acidity, 335 11.
abhidluiniibhidlzeya- jiiiina-jiieyiidilak- aci11tya, 362-364
$ll~w!z, 3 n. Action, I.f8, 187, 19-l, 241, 360, 403-
abhiglulta, 339, 4IO 405, 412, 42I, 440, 441, .~f17, 4X8,
ahhihitiinvaya-viida, 227 so7, 508, 515, 516
abhiliiso, 497 Active agent, 244
ablzilii$a, 41 2 Active functioning, 238
Abhinanda, 232 Active operation, I 54
Abhinava~upta, 49, 443 Acti\·e restraint, c;oo
Abhinavanarayar:-a, 78 Activity, 238, 256. 341, 368, 369, 481,
Abhina"\ anaraya•::Iendra Sarasvati, 78, 504, 515; of the self, 197
79 Act of knowledge, 6CJ
abhinh·da, 4 q Acts, I5
abhiprapacyamclna, 3 q Actual, 23 11.; data, 214
Abhipriiya-pral~iisikii, 83, 87 11., 148 n. Acyutakp~l~fmanda Tirtha, 220
abhi~ecana, 505 Additional assistancl', 1X3
ahhi?.•J.•ajyate, 303 adharma, 321, .fOCJ, 411, .p6, -t8.f, 4X7,
ahhi·vyakti, 173 507, 525
ab/zraja, 300, JOI, 33 I 11. adlzilw, JX.f, 385, 3X9 11.
abhyanujiiii, 388 adhilwra~za, 108 11., 35<), 390
ahlzyiisa, 360, 370 A.dhilwra~za-maiijarl, qS 11.
abhyupnf.!mna-siddhiinta, 383 Adhikarm:za-mcilii, X 1
Ablutions, 267, 505 Adhilwrm:za-ratna-1/ttlltl, qX n.
Abnormal states, 335 Adhilwra~za-salu:ati, qX 11.
Abode, 497 adhilwra~za-siddlulnta, 3S3
Abscess, 299 adhimiJil~a. 24-
Absence, I9 adhipati, 342, 352
Absolute destruction, 248 adhi~{htina, II3, ICJ.f. 2/'), 472
Absolute oneness, I 28 adhi~!lziiyalw, 366
Absolute truth, 3 adhymHlSllJ'll, 3 7 3
Absolutist, 5 I 4 adl1yiisa, (), 103
Abstract idea, 2I I Adhyiisa-bhii~ya, 6 n., 222 11.
Abstraction, 28 adhyiitma-vidaft, .fZJ
Abuse, 498 n. ad infinitum, 40, 70, J7f'
Academic dispute, 373 Adoration, 439
Academy of Sciences, I64 n. adrolw, s 1 o
1 The words art! arranged in the order of the English alphalwt. :-ianskrit and
Pali technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books ar{' in italics
w~th a capital. English words and other names arc in Homan with a capital.
Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones.
554 Index
adnta, 207, 306, 36o Agniveia-sa'!llzitii, 277, 432
adr~!iidi-I?Fuhdha'!l, zo6 Agnivda-tantra, 429
adr~!iidi-salwl~rtam, 197 Agnivdya, 228, 230
adr~!iirtha, 383 agraha1Jrt, I04
Adultery, 498 1z. Agrahayal)a, z8z
Advaita-hlzil~a1Ja, 52 n. Agriculture, 502, 505
Admita-bodha-dlpilui, 54, 216 alw'f!zkiira, 75, 102, Io4, 2I7, 23~. 239,
Ad-vaita-brahma-siddhi, 57 245. 257. 262, 305, 347. 458, 463,
Advaita-cmzdrikii, 55 404,496,524
Advaita-cintii-kmtstubha, 56 alza'f!zlii, 235, 237
Advaita-cintiima~zi, 55 a-hetu, 386
Ad?.•aita-dlpikii, 53, 2I6 ahetu-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n.
Advaita-dlpikii-t:i·cara~w, 53 alzetutab, I66
Ad1.•aita-makaranda, s6 alzi'!lsii, 505, 510, 5I4, 544
Advaita-makaranda-tlkii, 193 Ahirbudlmya-sa7Jzhitii, 46I, 537
Adt·aita-maiijarl, 225 alzita, 277, 278, 42I, 422
Advaita-muktii-siira, 57 n. aihika, 253
Advaita-nirl}aya, 2 I9 aikamatya, 282
Advaita-paiica-ratna, 53, 216 aindriya, 2 54
Admita Philosophy, 2 n. Air, 74, I87, I94, 235, 302, 325, 330-
Ad1.•aita-ratna, 54 334,359. 360,362,4I9
Adt•aita-ratna-ko~a, 54 Airy, 357, 359
Ad?.•aita-ratna-rakFa1Ja, 225, 226 Aitareya, 78, 259 n. 3
Advaita-ratna-vyiikhyiina, 54 Aitareya-briihmal}a, 536
Ach-aita-siddlziinta-vidyotmza, 57 n. Aitareyopani~ad-bhii~ya, 78
Ad'l·aita-siddhi, 53. s6, I I8, 198, 199. aitihya, 376, 379
223 n., .us. 226 Ajita, 6I
Ad?.•aita-siddhy-upanyiisa, 225 n. ajiiiina, 3, 9, IO, so, 55, 73, 74, 76,
Advaita-siistra-siiroddlziira, 55 101, 102, 108, IIO, 112, IIJ, 115,
a.:h•aita-sruti, 8o 153. 154. 195. 196, 204, 217, 222,
Adt,aita-viida, 2 I6 389, 479, 499, soo; its nature, de-
adt•aita-viisanii, 218 pendence on self and transformation
Advaitananda, s6, 82 u., 232 into world-appearance, 10; its no-
Ad?.·aitiinubhi'i.ti, 81 tion in Padmapada or Prakasatman
Advancement, 519 different from that of ~agarjuna, 9;
Advayananda, 7Q its transformations, 10, 53; Vacas-
Advayaral)ya, 231 pati's view of its causality, 11
Advayasrama, 204 njnii7la'!l niibhiiva upiidiinatviin mrdvat,
Adyar, 49, 84 n., 87 I97
Affection, 490, 497 ajiiiita-sattviinabhyupagama, I 7, 270
Affections of viita, 336 akartii, 545
Affective tone, 23 Akhai)Qananda, 52, 103, 193
Affirmations, 75, I66, 27I, 387 Akhai)Qananda l\1uni, 10, 31 n.
Afflictions, 22, 304, 4I4, 499 Akha~ujiitma-prakiisikii, 57 n.
agada-tantra, 276 Akhilatman, 99
Agasti, 228, 230 akhyiiti, 87 n.
Agastya, 433 akli~!a, 414
Age, 370 akrodha, 505, 510
Agent, 77, I69, 310, JI4, 358, 368, a-krtaka, 182
44I,469,470, SIS, 5I6 ak~aka-sa'!ljiie, z86 7l. 4
Ag-<.{i, 539 Ak~apada, 393, 394, 398-401
A~-,'lli, 75, 292 fl., 300 n. 2, 303, 304 alaji, 299
Agnihotra, 54 alambuiii, 354
OJ,:11i-karma, 330 alasiilii, 298 n. 6
Agni-Purii~za, 279 n. Alberuni, 426
Agni~tnma, L', 345 n. Alchemy, 426
A~-,'llivda. 393, 395, 399, 424, 429, Alertness, 511; of mind, 511
432 alga1Jcfu, 297
Index 555
All1J1.Sll, 300 Angry, 367
Alkaline, 357, 358 ani/a, 330
All, I95 Animal, 359, 513
Allala Suri, 52 n. Animate, 359, 360
All-pen·ading, 16, 372, 525, 5.26 Aniruddha, 543. 545
All-pervasi,·e, Ioo mzir·vacanlym!l nlliidi, I I I
aloka-SaTfl'l'Tfa, 5 mzir-vacanlyatii. I 55
alolu patva, 5 I o anirvacanlyatii-'l•acmza, I o 5
Alternating, 63 anin:acanlyii, 81), I 17, 203, 224
AlternatiYe, I8, 377 anirviicya. 35, I I I
Altindische Grammatik, 345 n. r.nin•iicyatva, I 94
Amalananda, 52, 57. s8, 74 ll. 86, I03, anirviicyii m•idyii, I 09
I07-I09, I I9, 260 anitya, 22 11., I20
Amaradasa, 54 anitya-sanza, 380 n. 4
Amara-lw~a, 55 aniyata-vipiika. 249
amar~a. 412 Ankle-bones, 284
amiiviisyii, 292 n. Annam Bhatta, 82 n.
AmfVii, 300 Annihilation, 266
amla, 3I.2 n. 3, 357,358, 361 Annotations, 87
Amrtananda, 3I n., 454 anrta, 383
Amulets,277, 281,282,293,294,301, antal:zkara~a-caitanyayor aikyiidhyiisi'it,
:;64 206
amiirta, 254 anta?zkara~as, 34. so, 56, 65, 72, 75 n.,
a1Jlsa, z86 n. 2, 287 76, 77, 88, 89 n., IOI, I04-I06, I09,
a1Jlsa-phalaka, 286 n. 4 I I3, I I4, 2o6-2IO, 217, 268, 292,
aTflSa-pl[ha, 287 n. 2 295, 306, 344, 452, 484 n. I
llTflSiir!zsa-vikalpa, 338 antabkara~za-visi~ta, 33
anabhilapyen(itmanii, 20 anta!zkara~ziivacchinna1Jl caitanyaTfl, 206
anabhiraddhi, 497 anta!z-sau~iryam, 307
anabhi~miga, 373 antarik~aTfl, 292 n.
mzadhigata, 212, 2I3 Antaryiimi-briihma'!la, 25 I
anadhigatatva, 2I3 antaryiimin, 2I5, 537
anaikiintikat·va, 123 Antecedence, I6o, I72
Analogy, 36, 42, 148, I55, 180, 189, Antipathy, 24, IOI, 245, 248, 267,409,
39I; of dreams, 28; of play, 42 4I2-4I4.490,498,499
Analysis, 65; of consciousn{;ss, 62 mztreblzya~z, 288
ananubhii~a!la, 389 n. anubandha, 338 n., 368 n., 389, 497
ananuyojya, 384 anubandhya, 338 n.
ananyathii··siddha, I6o mzubhava, I49
Ananyanubhava, 82 n. Anubhava-dlpikii, 78
anarthaka, 384, 385 Anubhm•a-viliisa, 57 n.
Anatomical texts, 435 -~nubhavananda, s8, 86
Anatomical treatises, 435 anubhmi, I 99
Anatomy, 355, 433 mzubhriti-svahhii?:a, 4 7 I
anm:asthii, I74 Anubhutisvarupacarya, I I6, I92, I94
aniidy-anirviicyiiddyiisraya~uit, 12 anumata, 389, 39I
aniigatiivek~a!lu, 389, 392 anunziina, 139,194,373,376,379,398,
aniilzata-cakra, 355 40I n.
aniikhyam anablzivyaktam, 232 anupadhii, 505
mziimayam, 462 anupalabdhi-sama, 380 n. 4
aniirambha, 4I6 anupasaya, 397
aniisrava, 22 Anupatiila, 300
aniitman, 6 anus, 296, 426
anekatii, 370 anusayo, 497
anekiinta, 389 anutpatti-sama, 380 n. 4
anekiintha, 391 anm.-'rtta, 63
Anger, 267, 333, 373, 409, 492, 4 1J7, Q1lU-'l.')'GVQSll}'ll, I 5 I
499, 509-SII anuyoga, 3 84
Index
anuyojya, 384 a posteriori, 517
mziihya, 2~7 11. 1 Apparatus, 180
Anvaya-pral<iisilui, 56 Apparent reality, 4
tmvaya-vyatirehi, 400 11. Appaya Dik~ita, 10, II, 17, 44, 47, 49,
am:aya - ·vyatireki - siidhya - vise~a7JI. 52-56, 79, 82 n., 106 n., 108, 216 n.,
'l'iidy-ablzimatam siidlzayati, I21 218, 2I9; his date, lineage and
Anvayiirtlw-prahiiSikii, I 16 works, 2I8 ff.
anvayi, 400 n. Appearance, 3, 5, 8, 13, 2o-22, 28,
anvitiibhidhiina-viida, 227 3I, 37, 101, 105, 109, I94, 195,232,
anyatlu'i-hhyiiti, 87 n., 204, 222 235. 236, 239. 252, 371, 438, 517;
anyii pi1r'l•iipurva- bhrama- sa,zskiira/:z, of unity, 65
109 Appetites, 493
anyedyu(t, 297 Appetitive desire, 501
anyonya-milat-lwmala-saddala, 257 Appreciation, 5 12
anynnyiibhiiva, I22, I3I, 132 Apprehension, 22
migam eva alpatt-·iid upiingam, 273 apradhiina, 370
migana1Jl. 496 apramti, 1 28
Angiras, 281, 544 apramiida, sos
A1igirasa-ka/pa, 283 apratibhii, 389 n.
aizgulaya(t, 215 5 apratyak, 63
A1iguttara-nikiiya, 394 apriipta-kiila, 389 n.
mikura, 169 apriipta-priirtlzanii, 412
aiiilii~zmn, 498 apriiptayo/:z priiptil_z S07JI.)'Oga(z, I 58
a~m, 261 a priori, 517
a~m-lzrasva, 189 apsariib, 228
a~m-hras'l'a measure, 190 apz""irva, 8o
al}uhraS'l:a parimiil}a, 189 apiir·va-?.:idhi, 46
aT}~la, 322 n. Ariiya, 300
af>,75. 501 arbuda, 286 11. 3, 314
aparit. 298 fl. 7 arcii, S37
apadcia, 3!59, 39I Ardent desire, 497
apaf.{atai~a~zab, 245 ardha-supta-prabuddha, 264
apalma'l'O-'l'lletma, IOS ardhiinjali-parimii~za, 343 n.
apai.~zma, 51 o Argument, 18, 26 n., 29, 278, 376
apam, 360, 370 arhatatt'l'O, 248
aparam ojas, 3+3 n. Ari~pnemi, 229
aparii prakrti, 465 Arjuna, 487, 489, soo, 502, so7,
aparicchimziilambaniil<iira, 23 so!5, 512, 516, SI8, 525, 529-532,
apamh~a, 6, 63, lOS S4S
aparuk~a-prallli-virodhiit, 194 Armpits, 326 n.
aparoh~ll-'lJJ'a'L·ahiira-yogya, 149 Ar~zava-var7Jana, I26
Aparok~tinublwva, 78 aroga, 334 n.
Aparol<~iinuhhrui. So arpa~za, 452
apa-siddlu'inta, 389 n. Arrogant, 510
Apasmara, 43 I Adas, 430
apa'l·arga, 44, 248 Arteries, 2s6 n., 289, 290
apavmja, 389, 391 artlza, 327, 340, 3S9, 479, 482, 485
apt1na, 25!5-260, 291, 311, 332, 373, artlza-kriyl1-kiiritva, 32, I08
4+~L ++9. 4S5 artlza-kriyii-siimarthya, 18 3
apt'ina 'l:tiyu, 35S artha-kriyii-siimartlzya-sattvam, 30 n.
apc1niiya sviihii, 448 artha-priipakatva, 137
apiiliga, 342, 351 artha-prc1pti, 38+
apiirtlwlw, 384-, 385, 388, 389 n. Artlza-siistra, 274, 541
apekhii. 496 artha'L'atl, 20
apekFi, 9S arthl11ltara, 388, 389 tz.
apek~ti-budJizi, I 57, I S8 arthiipatti, 18, 389, 391
Aperture, 35+ n., 35S, 356 artlziipatti-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n.
Apolw-s:ddhi, 49 Artificial process, 358
Index 557
AruQadatta, 429, 434 a~tiiizga-yoga, 453-455
aru1pi, 29I, 344 11. a~thlvantau, 285
asamprajiiiita, 250 a~thlvat, z85 n. 4
asa1{lsargiigralza, I 54, I 55 Atala, 76
Asariga, I64 Atharva, 274, 390
asaiz!{a, 268 Atharvan texts, 299
asmiga-bhiivanii, 264 AtharvaQic charms, 28I
asailga-sastre~za, s24 AtharvaQic hymns, 28!)
a-sarva-gata, 4I0 AtharvaQic rites, 283, 294
asat, ISS, 373 Athan•a-sikhii Upani~ad, 449
a-sat-kiirya-viida, 39, 179, 473, 5 I7 Atharva-siras Upani~ad, 449
asat-klzyiiti, 87 n. Atharva-Veda, 273-275, 277-.zSo, 283,
asiitmya-arthiigama, 416 .Z84, 288, 290, 29I, 293-295. 301,
Ascetic, 373; life, so8; postures, 489 331, 340, 343 n., 344-346, 364, 486,
Asceticism, 229, 267, so8 536, 539; as Atharva and Arigiras,
Asiatic Society of Bengal, 20,5 .281 ;.~.yur-veda an upii1iga of it, 273;
asmitii, 414 Ayur-veda its upm:eda, 274; diseases
aspanda, 265 and their symptoms in, 30I ff.;
Aspects, 238 diseases mentioned in, 296 ff.; dis-
Aspiration, 497 tinguishes hirii and dhamanl, 344 n.;
Ass, I6o, 386 n. head and brain in, 340; its bone
Assembly, 378 system critically compared and con-
Assimilation, 33 I trasted with that of Caraka. Susruta,
Associated, 501 Vagbhata, 284 ff.; its contents as
Association, IS, 2I, 25, 34, I56, I6Q, arranged by Bloomfield, 295 ff.; its
183, 188, I95, 239, 32I, 358, 369, principal contents, 281 ff.: its prob-
375.451,452,456, soo able priority to J!.g-·ceda. 280, 281;
asteya, 505 its relation with Ayur-veda, 275; its
asthi, 3 I7, 328 siikhiis, 283 ff.; its theory of viiyus,
astlzi-mii1!fsa-maya, 257 291, 292; on sirii and dhamani,
asthira, 230, 24I 289 ff. ; rivalry between drugs and
asti, 386 n. charms in, 293 ff.; theory of the
Astragalus, 284 n. 3 origin of dise:1ses in, 299 ff.; viiyu,
Astringent, 358, 359 pitta and kapha in, 33 I ; what niir/i
Astrology, 436 means in, 345
Astronomy, 49 Atharca- Veda and Gopatha-Briihmm.:za,
asukha, 422 295 n. I, 296 n. I
asukham iiyu/:1, 277 Athart:aveda in Kashmir, 283 n.
asura, 3 I4, 535, 539 Atharvii1igirasa1J, z8 1
Asura-vtda, 274 n. 3 atidesa, 389, 39I
asfiyii, 4I3 atikriintiive~a1Ja, 389, 392
asviidu, 358 atimiUra, 296
asubha, 341 atirikta, 388
asuddha, ]6 atisayiidhiina, I 83
Asvattha, 524 atiyo!{a, 320, 32I, 405
Asvattha tree, 523, 524 atlndriya, 347, 366
a~takii, 292 atlsiira, 296, 430
a~ta-siddhi, 427 Atlta-kiila, 387
A!?tiiQga Ayur-veda, 276 Atomic, 367; changes, 194; measure,
A~tiinga-hrdaya, 364 n., 436 189; theory, I5I, 189
A~tiinga - hrdaya - niima - vaidiiryaka- Atoms, 20, 25, IS7. 187-~90, 193, I99,
bhii~ya, 436 306,37I
A~tiiilga-hrdaya-sa1!lhitii, 425, 432- Atri, 399, 401, 429
434 Attachment, 24, IOI, 243, 304, 4I2-
A~tiiilga-hrdaya-vrtti, 436 4I4, 489, 490, 497-499. SOl, 503,
A~!iiilga-sa1{lgraha, 263, 274 n. 3, 284 504, 507, 510, 51 I, 513, 514, 5I6,
n. 3, 304 n. I, 3I7 n. I, 328, 329 n., 521-523
433 Attention, 23, 24
sss Index
Attentive reflection, 24 avidyii-dvitaya, 109
Attock, 429 avidyii-dvitaya-sacivasya, 109
Attractions, 239 avidyii miiyii mithyii-pratyaya iti, 84
atyanttisat, 194 avidya-nivrtti, 85
atthanga-slla, 498 avidyii-potency, I o
Auditory organ, 344 avidyii-sahita-brahmopiidiinam, 1 I
Auditory sense, 374 avidyii stuff, 104
Aufrecht, Th., 435, 439 avidyii-sakti, 9, 203
aupacarika, 328, 329 avidyopiidiina-bheda-viidins, 90
Aupadhenava, 424 avijjii, 498
Aupadhenava-tantra, 435 avijfiatartha, 389 n.
aupamya, 377, 379 avinabhava, 140, 376, 38o
aupapiiduka, 308 m:isa'J!lviidi, I 3 6
Aurabhra, 424 avise~a-sama, 380 11. 4, 382 n.
Auricular, 353 avi~aya, 6
Auspicious rites, 281 avitikkama, soo
Austerities, 441 avyabhicari, I36, 381 n.
a~adha, 295 avyabhiciirl anubhavab, 135
au~adhi, 359 avyakta, 43, I04, 263, 357, 358, 462,
aU~IJya, 362 n. 463, 470, 47I, 473. 476, 5I9, 525,
Authenticity, 78 530, 533
Autumn, 335, 370 avyakto vyakta-karma, 263
Autumnal fever, 299 avyapadeiatma, 234
avabhtisinz, 3 I 7 avyapadesya, 265,374,401
avaccheda, I o 5 Avyayatman Bhagavat Pujyapada,
avacchedakata, I 24 I98
avaccheda-vada, Io6 avyiikrta, 23 n., 104
avacchinna, 96 avyapya-vrttitva-visepto, I 58
Avadhani YaJva, 218 n. Awaking consciousness, 19
avadhi, so8 Awareness, I3, 14, I7-20, 25-30, 3 In.,
avastha, 44 3 2, 63-6 5 , 6 7 , 68, 70, 71, 73, 117,
a·vastu, 202, 203 118, 134. 151, 197. 201, 206, 2II,
avayavz, I87 212, 214; of blue, 27
avedanmJl, 265 Ayodhya, 230
a·vedyatva, I49, I so ayoga, 321, 405
avedyatve satyaparok~a- 'V):avahara- ayuta-siddha, 191
yogyatva'J!l, 149 n. ayuta-siddkatva, 191
A verrhoa acida, 360 n. iibhiisa, 252
Aversion, 335, SIS iibhiciirika, 281
Aviddhakarl).a, 172 Abhoga, 52, 108
avidyamana, 5 acarya, 420
avidya, s, 6, 8, 9, I2, I3, 44, 48, so, 72, Acarya Dik!?ita, 218
73, 84, Ss, 88-9o, 98, 99, 104, Acarya Jetari, 49
105, 109-111, II7, uS, I48, 187, Acaryasuri, 171
204-206, 209, 22 I, 234, 249, 304, iicchiidya, 112
414, 4I5, 479, 498, 499; de- adiina-gantho, 496
scribed as sakti by Gam;lapada, 8; adhiira, II3, 144
in neither of its senses can be adhiira-cakra, 355. 356
material cause, 12; its meanings, I 2; Adisura, I 26
nature of its causality according to iidityas, 292 n., 535, 549
Anandabodha, also according to iigama, 304
Vacaspati 's Brahma-tattva-samz~a, Jigama-priimii1Jya, 542 n. 2, 546,
1 2; not psychological ignorance, but -547
special technical category, I 2; Pad- Agama-si!stra-vivarm;za, 78
mapada's interpretation regarding aghiito, 497
the creative power of, 9; so called iigneya, 3I3, 329 n., 359
because of its unintelligibility, 12 iihiire pafikula-saiifia, 501
Index 559
Ahrika, I72 Ananda-vardhana, 126 n.
iijiiii-cakra, 353 11., 355, 356 ~nandanubhuva, 57 n.
iikii1ikyii, 496 Anandasrama, I96
iikiiia, 74, 75, I04, I6o, I94, 204, 235, A.nandatman, s8, 86
244, 302, 3I2, 3I5, 360, 362, 367, iintarik~a, 357
37I, 374. 379 Anvik~iki, 390, 392
iikiiia-dhiitu, 307 Anjaneya, 443
Akasagotto, 276 iipa!1, 292 n.
iikaia tmz-miitra, 245 iipta, 280, 373
iikiiiiitma ka, 3 59 iiptopadda, 373, 376, 377
iikt7.ta, 48 I, 4g2 iipya, 359
iilambana, 29, 155 iirambhakar,z, 329 n.
Alamviiyana-sar,zhitii, 435 iirjava, 505 n., SIO, 544
ii/aya-vijiliina, 22, 24 Ar~a-Riimiiya7Ja, 23 I
iilayo, 497 iirtava, 313
iilocaka, 304, 341 iirtaviil:z, 292 n.
iilocaka-pitta, 342 iirthi bhiivanii, 480
iima-garbha, 322 n. Aru~zikopani~ad, 252 n.
iimalaka, 294 .i\ryadeva, 51, 124, I64, 165
Amalananda, 82 Arya-dr~lhiiiaya-pari'prcchii, 5
iimii.iaya, 330, 33 I .Arya-vidyii-sudhii-kara, 1 I 2 n.
iinanda, 223 iisana, 454, 455
Anandabodha, so, 5 I, 70, 89 n., 92, iismiga, 44
116, II7, 124, I48 n., I94, I96; his iisatti, 497
doctrine ofavidyii probably borrow- iisayo, 497
ed from MaJ!<;Jana, 90; as inspirer iisii, 496
of many later works of Vedanta, I I8; iispada, 7
his date and works, I I 6; his interpre- iisriiva, 296
tation of the nature of the self, I 18; iissiisa, 459
his refutation of" difference," I I6, iistika, 420
I I7; his view of the nature of a·vidyii, iistikya; 505 n.
I I7 Asadhara, 434
Anandabodha Bhattarakacarya, I2, 49, iihaya, I9, 23, 85, 357
69, I47 n. iifraya-bhilta!z, 59 n.
Anandabodhendra, 231 Aire~a, 300
Anandabodhendra Bhik!?u, 259 n. 2 Aivaliiyana-irauta-siltra, 394
Anandabodhendra Sarasvati, 23 I Asvini, 432
Ananda-dzpa, 57 n. A~a<;lhavarman, 428
.Ananda-dlpa-tzkii, 57 n. .Ataizka-dlpana, 434
Anandagiri, 43 n., 83, 103, I24, I92, iitiviihika iar'ira, 305
- I93. 344 Atma-bodha, 79, 81
Anandajfi.ana, In., 43, 49-51, 78-81, .Atma-bodha-vyiikhyiina, 81 n., I03
92, 100, II6, II9, I24, I72, I89, iitma-dharmopaciira!z, 2I n.
192, 194, I96, 205, 210, 439; con·· iitma-jiinlndriyii1Ji, 310
tents of his work Tarka-sar,zgraha, .Atma-jiiiinopadeia, 78
193, 194; his criticism of Nyaya- .Atma-jiiiinopadda-tzkii, 193
Vaise~ika categories, I93, 194; his iitma-khyiiti, 87 n.
interpretation of the indescribable- iitma-miina, 24
ness of world-appearance and ajiiii- iitman, 8. 2I, s8, I49. 194. 238, 302,
na, I94, I95; his teachers, I92; his 307 1l. 5, 309, 3 IO, 405, 444, 445,
works, 193 472, 518
Ananda-laharf, 79 iitmanalz sar,zvid-rilpatva, 118, I48,
Ananda-lahari-tarl, 79 151
Ananda-mandiikini, 225 iitma-samaviiyl vi~aya-pralliiio jiiiinam,
AnandapGrJ!a, 52, 57, 83, 87 n., I03, I97
123, I26 n. iitma-sneha, 24
Anandatirtha, 442 Atmasukha, 232
s6o Index
Atmasvarupa, 52 n. ance of do~as according to seasons,
iitma-saktyii, 330 335; divergent views on the develop-
iitma-vinigralza, 5 I 3 ment of the foetus referred to in
.Atmiiniitma-vi'L·eka, 79 Caraka-sa'l!lhitii, 307, 308; divergent
.Atmiirpm:za-stava, 219 views regarding viiyu as narrated in
iitmiisrayatva, 17 Caraka, 332 ff.; do~a as prakrti, 334;
iitmiivalokana, 442 dravya, rasa, mrya, vipiika, pra-
.Atmupadesa-·vidhi, 79 bhiiva, 362-366; early references to,
Atreya, 277, 308, 310, 327, 333, 395, 276, 277; epidemics caused by col-
424 lective evil effects, 408 ff.; equili-
.Atreya bhik~u, 395 brium of dhiitus, 327; ethical posi-
Atreya-Caraka, 284, 293, 295 tion of Caraka, 418; fallacies, 380 ff.;
Atreya-Caraka school, 289 foetal development in Susruta and
Atreya Gautama, 394 Caraka, its different stages, 313 ff.;
Atreya Punarvasu, 276 n., 357, 432 formation of foetus in Caraka, Sus-
iivarm:za, 22, 73 ruta and Vagbhata, 302-304; free-
iivarm:za-sakti, 74 dom of will in, 4I I; Ayur-veda,
iivarm.zatviit, I97 function of dhamanis in, according to
iivartta, 35I Sl!Sruta, 350 ff.; function of the dif-
iiyatana, 395, 498 ferent ducts, 347 ff.; future life, be-
iiyiima, 348 11. lief in, 406; good, conception of,
Ayur-veda, 258 n., 273-276, 278, 28o, 404, 405 ; good life and happy life,
28g, 293. 295. 320, 328 n., 354 n., 422,423; good life in Caraka, 418 ff.;
357, 365, 366, 37I, 372, 383, 385, good of the body and of the mind,
387, 389, 390, 392, 393. 395. 396, 4 I 8, 4 I 9 ; heart in the lJ pani!?ads
398, 399, 402, 422, 423, 436; an contrasted with, 344; heart the vital
upa·ceda of Atharva-Veda, 274; a centre of the prii1Jas in, 340; hetu-
part of Atharva- Veda, 278; aper- vidyii in Caraka, 395; inference in,
tures of the dhamanls in, 3 so; appli- compared with Nyaya and Sarp-
cation of inductive methods for the khya, 399,400; is beginningless,274;
discovery of cause in Caraka, 396 ff.; its relation with Atharva- Veda, 275;
are •viiyu, pitta and kaplza only its theory of dhiitu-siimya and dhiitu-
hypothetical entities? 336 ff.; as a va#amya, 319 ff.; its unbroken tradi-
science of life, 277; a separate Veda tion, 274; jiiti fallacy, conception
superior to the other Vedas, 274,275; of, compared with Nyaya, 380-382;
a vedii1iga, 274; brain the centre of yukti,misrepresentation by Santarak-
manas in, according to Bhela, 340; ~ita, 376; yukti pramiiiJa of, 37 5;
brain the seat of sensations, 346; yukti pramii1Ja refuted by Santarak-
Caraka school closely associated with ~ita, 375, 376; life, its definition,
Atlwrva- Veda, 278, 279; Caraka's 367; literature, 422 ff., 435; manas
view of niicf"i, sirii, dhaman"i and and the senses, 367; manas, its
srotas as ducts, 346 ff.; categories theory, 366, 367; meaning of ojas in,
of Caraka and Vaise~ika, 369-372; 343 n.; medical discussions in, 378;
causes of things according to Sus- 1lii~/i, sirii and dhamanl as ducts in,
ruta, 372; circulation of dhiitu in 345, 346; natural place of viiyu, pitta
growth, 322, 323; cognitive cur- and kapha, 331, 336; nature of pitta,
rents in, 347; constructive and de- 330, 331; necessity of logical tricks
structive operations of viiyu, pitta in, 401. 402; number of sirii, srotas
and kapha, 339; control of body and dhamanl according to Susruta,
and mind, 419, 420; Drc;lhabala's 349; number of siriis in, according
distinction of siriis and dhamanls' to Susruta, 352; number of sniiyus
348 tl.; dhaman"is in relation to cog- in, according to Susruta, 352; origin
nition according to Susruta, 351 in the knowledge of hetu and linga,
ff.; dhiitu-mala in, 33 I ; different 395; origin of the world, Susruta on,
functions of viiyu, pitta and kapha, 410; param and aparam ojas in, 343;
337, 338; different kinds of ducts in, perception, obstruction of, 377; per-
347; dispute, methods of, 377 ff.; ception theory of, 373, 374; period
disputes, tenns of, 379 ff.; disturb- of life in, 402; possible existence of
Index
a pre-Caraka literature of it, 277; views of the different Upani~ads
prajfiiipariidha, according to Caraka, regarding the niiqzs contrasted with,
416, 417 ;pramiit;zas in, 373; priit.za in, 345; viiyu, pitta and kapha and their
263; principles of growth, 321, 322; operations in the building of the
psychological theories of perception body, 334 ff.; what is its nature?
of Bhela in, 341; psycho-physical 276
parallelism in, according to Caraka, Ayur-veda-dtpika, 274n. 2, 275 n., 302,
339; rasas, their number, 357-359; 431
rasas, their origin, 359, 360; rebirth, Ayur-veda-rasiiyana, 434
nature of, determined by past life, Ayur-veda-sutra, 436
406, 407; rebirth, proofs of, 407, iiyu~o 'nuvrtti-pratyaya-bhrlta, 333
408; relation of head and heart in, iiyu~yiit;zi, 295
343; right conduct, rules of, ac-
cording to Caraka, 420 ff.; sm_nyogi- Backbite, 510
pur~a, its conception, 368; saiicaya Backbone, 286
and prakopa of do~as, 335; scheme Bad, 246; deeds, 411
of life in Caraka, 415; seat of prii~za Badness, 507
according to Caraka, 342 ; secretory Ba<;lisa, 3 I6, 357
character of •m1yu, pitta and kaplw, bae~aza, 295 n. 1
338; self and the body, 368; self bae~azya, 295 n. I
and knowledge, 368; self and manas, bahu-sruta, 8 5
369; self and the transcendent self Balabhadra Bhattacarya, 225 n.
(para~ztltmii), 368; self, in association Baladeva, 539
with manas, 373; self, nature of, ac- Baladeva Vidyabhii~al).a, 443
cording to Susruta, 410; sorrows, Balance, 326
cause of, according to Caraka, .ps, bali, 278
416; soul, conception of, 372; special Balkh, 357
categories in Caraka, 3~9; special bandha, 232, 234, 267
categories in Susruta, 389 tf.; springs Bandhaka-tantra, 435
of action and right conduct in, 405; bandlzanartz, 497
springs of action in Caraka com- bandho,497
pared with those of other systems, Barren woman, 234
411 ff.; substance and qualities, Basic concept of mind, 24
360-362; subtle body and self in Basic entity, 23 n.
Caraka, 310; Susruta and Sarpkhya, Basis, 11, 29; of truth, I I
372; Susruta's distinction of siras Battle, 505
and dhamanls, 348. ff.; Susruta's Battle-field, 522
views regarding brain as the seat of BadarayaQ.a, 45, 26o; his philosophy,
cognitive and conative nerves, 342; 42; his philosophy is some kind of
synonyms for srotas, 348 n.; the com- bhediibheda-viida or immanence in
bination of the do~as in different re- transcendence, 42
lations, 338; the organs in relation bt1dha, 222
to the ducts, 348; theory of dlziitus biidhakas tarkaft, 141
and upa-dhiitus, 3 22-3 24; theory of bti"hu, 285 n. 6, 338
do~a according to Susruta, 329, 330; Balabhadra, 55
theory of the formation of the body, Balagopala, 78
334; theory of karma in, compared Balagopala Yogindra, 78
with other theories of karma, 402- Balakr~Q.adasa, 78
404; theory of mala-dhiitus, 325 ff.; Biiliivatiira-tarka, 49
theory of prabhiiva, 323; three classes Balhika, 298 n. 4, 316
of inference in Caraka, 398, 399; BaQ.a, sso
transgressions (prajfiiipariidha) the Ba~pacandra, 428, 431
obstacle to good life, in Caraka, 421, Beard, 325
422; transmigration determined by Beginninglcss, 12, 195,217, 454; avid-
dharma and adharma, 4I I; ultimate yii, 48; contact, I 58; series, I 84;
healing in, 4I5; upiiizga of Atharva- time, 249
Veda, 273; validity of the Vedas Being, 10, 36, 46, 148, 203, 234, 238,
established through it, 279, 280; 50 I
Dll
Index
Being-non-being, 234 Bhiigavata-purii1Ja, 220, 532, 542
Denares, 429 Bhagavata- purii1JQ- prathama- sloka-
Bengal, 126, 225 n. vyiikhyii, 225
Besnagar, 539 Bhagavatism, sso
Bhadanta Yogasena, 184 bhiijana-loka-sannivesa-vijiiapti, 23
Bhadra, 284 Bhiiluki-tmztra, 435
Bhadrakapya, 316, 357 Bhiimatl, I I. 25 n., 29, 36, 52, s6,
Bhadrasaunaka, 427 82, 106-109, I I I , 171, 215 n., 220,
bhaga, :z8s n. 7 222 n., 269 11. 2, 427
bhagandara, 276 Bhiimati-tilaka, 52 n., 108
Bhagavad-bhakti-rasiiyana, 225 Bhiimati-viliisa, 108
Bhagavad-gltii, 79, 442 Bhiimatl-·vyiikhyii, xo8
Bhagavad-gitii-bhii$ya, 439 Bhanuji Dik~ita, 55
Bhagavad-gltii-bhii$ya-vivara~a, 439 Bhiinumatl, 362, 363 n., 425, 435
Bhagavad-gitii-bhii~ya-vyiikhyii, 439 Bhiiradviija-sa'!'lzitii, 43 1
Bhagavad-gltii-guljhiirtha-dlpikii, 225 Bharadvajiyas, 540
Bhagavad-gltii-hetu-nir~aya, 443 bhiira-hiira, 62
Bhagavad-gltii-lak$iibharm:za, 443 Bhiira-hiira-sutra, 61
Bhagavad-gltii-pradlpa, 443 Bharata legend, 552
Bhagavad-gltii-prakiiia, 443 bhiiratf sthiina, 355
Bhagavad-gltii-rahasya, 550, 551 n. 1 Bharati Tirtha, 52 n., 81, 216 n.
Bhagavad-gltiirtha-smJlgraha, 443 Bhargava, 431
Bhagavad-gitiirtha-SaT{lgraha-tlkii, 43 9 Bhasa, 394, 550
Bhagavad-gltiirtha-siira, 443 Bhasarvajna, 122
Bhagavad-gltii-siira, 443 Bhaskara, 43 n., 193, 201, 427, 4.28
Bhagavad-gUii-siira-Sa7J'lgraha, 443 Bhaskara Bhana, 435
Bhagavad-gUii-tiitparya-ni~aya, 442 Bhaskara Dik~ita, 56
Bhagavat, 539-542; and Vi~f.lu, 539, Bhasurananda, 79
540 Bhii1ii-pariccheda, 263 n. 1
bhagiisthi, 285 n. 7 Bhii1ya-bhava-prakiiiikii, 148 n.
bha#ajya, 293, 295 Bhiif)la-dlpikii, 1 OJ
bhakti, 226, 442, 439, 53 I, 53 2, 534 Bhii1ya-#ppana, 78
Bhakti-rasiiya11a, 226 BhiiDJiirtha-nyiiya-miilii, 81
bhaktir iidesyii, 278 Bhiitta-cintiima1Ji, 515
Bhakti-siimiinya-nirupatza, ~25 Bhau Sastri, 11 n.
blzakti-yoga, 440, 441, 451 bhiiva, 193, 412
Bhandarkar, R. G., 540, 543, 548 Bhiiva-dlpikii, 443
Bharadvaja, 229, 308, 395, 399 bhiiva-miitra, 1 9
Bharata, 427 Bhavamisra, 435
Bhartrhari, 171 bhiivanii,235,48o-482
Bhartrprapanca, 1, 36, 43, 44, 1oo; bhiivanii-miitra-siim, 23 5
his philosophy of bhediibheda, 43 Bhiivanii-viveka, 87 11.
Bhattacarya Sivaprasad, 232 Bhiiva-prakiisa, 263, 288 n. 1, 433,
Bhattacharya, B., 20 n., 172 n. 435. 436
Bhatta Ananda, 264 Bhiiva-prakiisikii, 79
Bhana Kallata, 263 bhiiva-rupa, 105, 114
Bhatta Narahari, 425 Bhiiva-iuddhi, 87 n.
Bhatta Raghava, 122, 123 Bhiiva-tattva-prakiiiikii, 98, 148
Bhanoji Dik~ita, 54, 55, 217, 219 bhiivatva, 142
bhautiki, 334 Bhavaviveka, 164, x65
bhava, 498 bhiiviibhiivayor dvayor api paraspara-
Bhavabhuti, 1 1 1, 112 prati~eptitmakatviit, 142
Bhavadasa, 87 n. bhiiviidvaita, 85
BhavaniHha, 126 n. Bhiiviirtha-dipikii, 79
Bhavanisahaya, 434 Bhavivikta, 172
Bhavya, 164 bheda, 92, 116, 218, 401 n.
Bhagavata, 251, 544-547, 552; and the Bheda-dhikkiira, 51, 54, 55, 216,
ekiintins, 545; sect, 545 ff. 218
Index
Bheda-dhikkiira-satkriyii, 51, 55 Bloomfield, 276 n., 295
Bheda-dhikkiira-satkriyojjvalii, 51 Blue, 13, 19, 26, 27, 29, 3o-32, 71,
bhediibheda, 44, 46, 201, 20z; earliest 117, 176, 330, 344; 349; awareness,
references to, 43 ; philosophy of 70,71
Bhartrprapafica, 43 Boastfulness, 373
bhediibheda-viida, 42, 43 Bodha-siira, 57
Bhela, 285 n.6, 340,341, 395, 432; Bodha-vidhi, 79
his psycho-physiological theories, bodhiitmaka, 26 5
340 ff. Bodhayana, 43, 251
Bhela-sm_nhitii, 432 Bodhiiyana-Grhya-ie1a-si"itra, 5 so
bhe~aja, 275, 295, 370 Bodhiiyana-Pitr-medha-sUtra, sso
Bhe~aja-kalpa, 432, 436 Bodhendra, 79
bhe~ajiini, 281 Bodhi-caryii·vatiira-panjikii, 4 n., 501
bhi~u, sos Bodhisattva, 513
Bhi!jma, 543 Bodiless emancipation, 252
bhoga-gandham p( rityajet, 267 Bodily, soo; exercises, 419
Bhoja, 324 n., 427, 428, 435 Body, 248, 261, 320, 325, 327, 331,
Bhoja-tantra, 435 340, 352, 365, 387, 447, 469, 498,
bhoktr, 244 501
Bhrama-ghna, 432 Body-building, 338
bhriijaka, 303, 330, 351 Bolling, 289, 299, 301 n. 2
bhruvor madhye, 449 n. 2 Bond,497
bhrnga-riija, 297 Bondage, 174,181, I87,204,232,24h,
Bhusur:t<_la, 257 252,267,415,470,488,497.520
Bhuval;z, 76 Bone, 278, 279, 317, 324, 348, 352;
Bhuvanasundara Suri, 120, 123 channels, 348
Bhal;z, 76 Bony materials, 347
bhami, 292 n. "Bower Manuscripts," 435
bhiUa, 261, 282, 302 n. 2, 314 n., 315, brahma-bhata, 474, 475
319, 33~. 371 brahma-bhuya, 474
bhma-hitatva, 505 brahma-caitanya, 77
bhzlta-prakrti, 197 br!lhma-cakra, 353 n.
bhuta-su~mail;z, 311 brahma-carya, 505
bhtita-vidyii, 276, 425 Brahmacarin, 282, 449, sos
bhiUa-vikiira, 358 n. Brahmadatta, 99
bhtitiitman, 303, 304, 415 Brahmadeva,427,428
bhtitefU dayii, 510 Brahmagraha, 300
Bibliotheca Indica, 344 n. Brahmahood, 37.SS,8I,92,4S0,475,
Bile, 276,317,325 477. 513
Bilious fever, 298 Brahma-jiila-sutta, 394
Billows, 329 Brahma-knowledge, 43, 47, 56, 8s,
Binding, 497 87, 100, 115, 203, 204, 223, 227,
Biomotor, 261, 515: forces, 75, 259, 252
262; functions, 104 Brahman, 1,2,8, 10, 11,16,28,36-39,
Birth, 498, 512, 519 4I,42,45-48,SI,7 3 ,8o,84,88, 9 o,
Bitter, 242, 337 n., 357, 359 96, 99-102, I04-I06, 110, I 12-I IS,
bzja, 235 118, IZ6, 128, 156, 163, 168, 170,
bljiiilkuravat, 257 1~0, 191, 195. 196, 202, 203, 205,
Blackness, 238 215, 217, 221, 222, 234. 236-238,
Bladder, 289, 290, 336, 348, 351 240, 243-245. 265, 271, 275. 340,
Blame, 512 386, 437. 439. 440, 448, 450, 454.
Blind, 309 473-476, 485, 486, 494. 495. 514,
Biindness, 333, 342 523. 524, 530, 533, 534. 538, 548;
Bliss, 46, 450, 504; of mind. 513 nature of causality, 10, 11
Blissfulness, 223 Brahma na jagat-kiira1Jam, 84
Blood, 282, 298, 304, 307, 313, 317, Brahmanandin, 43 11.
318, 322-324, 329-331, 335, 347, brahma-nii¢i, 354, 356
349, 352, 361, 372; currents, 348 brahman-consciousness, 77
Index
Brahma-nirvii1Ja, 474 Breathing forth, 259
Brahma1Jo mukhe, 4 74 Breath-regulation, 256
Brahma-pari1Jiima-viida, 43 Breeding, 505
Brahma-prakiisikii, 49, 82 n. Broken, 337, 338
brahma-randhra, 353 n., 356 Bronchi, 286 n. 2
Brahma-riik~asa, 282 Bronchial tubes, 289 n. 3
Brahma-siddhi, 83, 84, 86-88, 92, 93, Bronchitis, 386
95, 98, 106, II7, 110 n., 112, I78, Brow, 287
I98, 199 Brhad-iira1Jyaka-bhii~ya-tlkii, I93
Brahma-siddhi-!lkii, 45, 83 Brhad-iira1Jyaka-bhii$ya-viirttika- fikii,
Brahma-siddhi-vyiikhyii-ratna, 83 I93
Brahma-stuti, I48 n. Brhad-iira1Jyaka Upani$ad, I, 73, 78,
Brahma-sutra, 2, 5, 6, 8, 25, 28, 29, 83, 25I, 259 n. 3, 26o, 288 n. I, 344, ,.
43 n., 46, 56, 82, 92, IOJ, I08 n., 345.39I, 394
I48 n., I89, I96, 204, 205, 2I8, 220, Brhad-iira1Jyakopani~ad-bhii~ya, 48, 78
246 n., 250 n., 25I, 39I, 495, 549; Brhad-iira1Jyakopani~ad-bhii~ya-viirt ti-
discussion as to whether it pro- ka,78,98
fesses pure monism or bhediibheda, Brhad-yoga-viis#tluz, 232
44 ff.; does not support Sankara's Brhal-laghu-paiijikii, 428
philosophy, 2 Brhaspati-smrti, 25I
Brahma-siitra-bhii~ya, 30, So, 81, budbuda, 3 12 n. 3
I48 n. Buddha, 22 n., 6I, 276, 424, 459, 498,
Bralzma-sfitra-bhii$ya-vyiikhyii, 82 n. 520
Brahma - sfitra - bhii~yiirtha - sa1Jlgraha, Buddhadeva, 17I
82 n. Buddhagho!?a, I64
Brahma-siitra-dtpikii, 82 Buddhapalita, 164, 165
Brahma-sfitra-·vrtti, 82 Buddhas, 3
Brahma-sutro-pmzyiisa, 82 n. Buddhi, 75, 76, I04, 109, I79-I8I, 238,
Brahma-tattv:a-prakiisikii, 82 n. 239, 245, 262, 305, 34I, 344, 347 n.,
Brahma-tatl"l:a-samlk~ii, I2 369, 373. 386, 387, 458, 463, 464,
Brahma-tattva-saytlhitoddipanl, 45 n. 484 n. I, 524
Brahma-vaivarta, 274, 432, 433 n. Buddhism, 58, 117, 228,450 n. I, 459,
Brahmavada, 283 46I, 495, 498, 504, 52 I; analysis of
Brahma- Veda, 280 n. recognition, 65; and Vedanta on the
brahma-·viciira, 56 notion of self-consciousness and re-
Brahma-vidyii/JhaTa1Ja, 56, 82 n. cognition of identity, 33 ff.; avidyii in,
brahma-v:ihiira, 460, 50I and in Gitii, 498-500; criticisms of the
Brahmavijiiana, 54 concept of God of Nyaya and Yoga,
brahma-yajiia, 487 176-I78; criticism of the Sarp.khya
Brahma, 197, 229, 245, 274, 423, 5I9, pari1Jiima doctrine, I7I ff.; develop-
539, 546 ment of the foetus in the Siili-stam-
Brahmananda Giri, 443 ba·-sutra, 307; ideal life of Mahayana,
Brahmananda Sarasvati, 54, 57 n., 77 n., 50 I; its arguments against the self
79, 81, 82, 251 n., 252 n. as individual entity, 58 ff.; its at-
Brahmiinanda-viliisa, 57 n. tempt to interpret self-identity by
Brahmananda Yati, 82 the assumption of two separate con-
Brahmin Sutik!?Qa, 230 cepts, 68; its criticism of Nyaya-
Brahmopani$al, 25I Vaise!1ika categories, I87 ff.; its criti-
Braiu, 340, 353 n., 356 cism of the V edantic identity of self
Bravery, 502 as shown in memory, 66; its doctrine
BrahmaQas, 292, 295 n. I, 30I, 420 of momentariness and artha-kriyii-
Brahmins,228,469,488,498,5o2,504, kiiritii, I82 ff.; its idealism com-
505-507, 5I2, 5I3, 539 pared with that of Sankara and Yoga-
Breast, 286 viis#tha, 268 ff.; its refutation of
Breath, 259 criticism of the non-permanency of
Breath-control, 268, 444, 447, 448, entities by heretical thinkers, I85 ff.;
455 refutation of the soul theory of
Breathing activity, 7 5 various systems of Indian thought in,
Index
178-181; sz/a in, 500, 501; statUS of ca~ur-vaise#ka, 341
the object in, 35; the Vatsiputriyas cala, 332, 338
doctrine of soul, 59 ff.; Vasubandhu's Caland, W., 345 n.
refutation of the soul theory of the Calcutta University, 2 n.
Vatsiputriyas in, s8 ff.; views, list Camphor, 91
of, in, 496 ff. Canals, 352
Buddhist arguments, 176, 188 Canda, 539
Buddhistic, 119, 151, 170, 395, 521, Candracandana,434
551 Candragomin, 49
Buddhistic idealism, 2, 3, 22 11., 25-27, Candrakirti, 3, 51, 164-168, 171, 307;
29. 30, 35, 205, 270, 398; its ex- and Diimaga, 167
planation of the apparent duality of candramii~z, 292 n.
object and awareness, and the diver- Candrikii, 98, 99, 192, 232
sity of objects, 26; its theory that Canvas, 199
things simultaneous are identical, Ca1Jcfiila, 512
26 n.; that all ideas are due to Car:t<;lesvara Varman, 78
viisaniis, 26 Capacity, 40
Buddhistic nihilism, 2, 3 Caraka, 263, 274, 275, 279, 285 n.,
Buddhist Legends, 248 n. 286 n., 287 n., 292, 301, 302, 304,
Buddhist logicians, 166, 170 307, 312, 314-316, 322 11., 327, 329,
Buddhists, 5, 9, 31, 32, 33, 6s, 67, 332, 334-336, 339. 340, 342, 343.
68, 71, 96, 108, 113, 115, 118, 124, 346, 348, 349, 352, 355-357, 359 n.,
125, 136, 171, 172, 186-189, 269, 360 n., 363-366, 368, 369, 371, 372,
367, 375. 399. 412, 415, 433. 435. 375, 376, 378-380, 38z, 383. 384 n.,
496, 499-SOI, SII, 514, 517, 521; 386 n., 388, 389, 393, 395-397, 399,
deny any being as the ground 400, 401-409, 41I, 415, 417-423,
of world-appearance which is like 427-429, 431-435. 471-473. 475
dreams, 5; their quarrel with Caraka-candrikii, 431
the V edantins regarding the nature Caralw-paiijikii, 43 1
of existence as causal efficiency, Caraka-parisi~Ja, 429
32 Caraka-sm!Lhitii, 273 11., 277, 278, 291,
Buddhist subjective idealists, 211 3021l., 308n., 31011., 31311.,314,
Buddhist writers, 51, 171 315 n., 318 n., 319 n., 323 n., 324,
buddhitviikalanm.n, 236 326 n., 327 n., 33 1, 332 n., 334 n.,
buddhi-vaise#ka, 342 335 n., 336 11., 339 n., 340, 342 n.,
buddhi-vibhra1Jlsa, 416 347, 348 n., 360, 361 n., 363, 366 n.,
buddhi-yoga, 444, 451, 452 367 n., 369, 370 n., 371, 373 n.
buddhy-adhi~thiina, 3 1 6 374 n., 375 n., 376 n., 377, 386 n.,
Bulletin de l'Acadbnie des Sciences de 392, 393, 395, 396 n., 397-4-02, 41 I,
Russie, 59 n., 61 n., 62 n. 416, 422, 426, 427, 429, 47 I, 472,
Burlingame, E. W., 248 473 n., 477
Burning, Q7, 335 n. Caraka-tattva-pradlpikii, 43 1
Buhler, G., sso Caraka-tiitparya-tzkii, 310 n., 431
Cardiac plexus, 355
caitanya, 207 Caritrasirpha, I 26 n.
Caitraratha Forest, 357 caritta, soo
cakra, 355, 455 Cartilages, 286 n., 322
cakra-bhramivad-dhrta-sarlral;, 250 Caste, 501, 503, 505
Cakradatta, 426, 43 I Caste-duty, 486, 487, soz-sos, 507,
Cakrapar:tidatta, 275, 276 n., 277, 302 so8, 5I3, 514
n., 303 n., 304, 308, 310, 312 n., Categorical imperative, 493
313 n., 314, 315, 318, 319 n., 322 n., Category, 12, 15, 24, 146, 147, 157,
323, 324 n., 327 n., 332 n., 335. 163, I70, 187, 191, 237, 366, 369,
338 n., 339 n., 340, 343, 347, 348 n., 372, 389
349· 360 n., 361 n., 362-37 I, 373- Cattle, 301
376, 380 n., 384 n., 395, 396, 405 n., Cattle-shed, 509
406 n., 415 n., 425-428, 430-435 catur-m;uka, 189, 190
Cakra system, 454 Catur-mata-siira-sa1JZgraha, 219
566 Index
cauryiibhiiva, 505 Changing, 189; assoctatwn, 63; con-
Causal, 176, 521; agent, 74, 177; ap- tents, 15; materiality, 51; objects,
paratus, 182; complexes, 4; effi- 33; states, 33
ciency, 32, 95, 136, 137, 185; forces, Channel, 291, 324, 344, 347
174; moment, 185; nature, 184; Character, 15, 18, 27 n., 132, 187,
operation, 25,41, 144, 173, 175, 186, J88
517; state, 37; substance, 172; trans- Character-appearance, 13
formation, 44, 172 Characteristic, 4, 6, 18, 38, 162, 176,
Causality, 31 n., 148, 172, 186, 221, 182,199,200,228,233,25I,37I,512
396; of Brahman, 106; of the world Characterized appearances, 22 n., 23;
due jointly to Brahman and Maya entities, 22
according to Padiirtha-tattva, 10 Characterless entity, 271
Causation, 164, 168 Chariot, 229
Cause, 3, II, 22 n., 38-40, 95, 144, Charm,28o,281,293-299, 301; system,
145, 152, 160, 161, 166, 183, 186, 294
18~. 1<)0, 191, 195. 203, 215, 337. Chandogya, 78, 246, 250 n., 259 n.,
366, 372, 374. 375. 389, 396-3<)8, 260, 276 n., 345, 346, 520
516, 517; and effect, 191; of atoms, Chandugya-bhii~}'a-{ikii, 193
187; of the world, 37; unknown, Chiindog)'a Upan#ad,43 n., 333,344 n.,
360 345 n., 498, 521, 544, 548 n.
Cause-effect, 375, 376 Chiindogya-Upani~ad-viirttika, 43 n.
Causeless, 161, 187 Chayii-vyiikhya, 262
Cavity, 352 chedana, 358
caya, 335 chedanrya, 3 57
caya-kiira'f}a-vidve~a, 335 n. Cheeks, 326 n.
ciigiitzussati, 459 Chemical changes, 3 I-;
CaraJ:ta-vaidya, 283, 284 Chemistry. 357
Carvaka, 387, 402 Chest, 336
Central Asia, 435 chidra-malas, 326 n.
Central ~eat, 357 Chimerical, 13 1
Centres, 16 Chintamani, T. R., 196
Cerebral region, 353, 354 Cholera, 282
Cerebrum, 353 n., 356, 357 Christianity, 550
Ceremonies, 468 Church Street, 14
Cervical plexus, 353 Chyle, 317, 322-324, 328, 330, 331,
Cessation, 21, 234, 242; from work, 348, 349
507; of desires, 444; of work, so8 cic-chiiyiipatti, 89 n.
cena, 327, 472 Cid-ananda-dasaslok1, 79
ce~titam, 371 Cid-iinanda--stava-raja, 79
cetanii, 23, 36, 302, 316, 360 n., 368, cid-iitman, 112
471, 477. 500 cikit5a, 278, 288 n., 392, 430
cetanii-dhiitu, 472 Cikitsii-dariana, 432
cetanii-pratisandhiitii, 366 Cikitsa-kaumudl, 432
cetanii'l-'antal.z, 410 Cikitsii-siira-tantra, 432
cetas, 254, 366 Cikitsii-sthiina, 429
cetasika, 500 Cikitsa-tattva-·l.'ijnana, 43 2
ceto-vimutti, 460 cikitsitam, 276
cetya-sa'!lyoga-cetaniit, 236 cikrr~ii, 5 15
cetyatva, 236 cin-miitra-sambandhinl, 197
Ceylonese, 164 cin-miitriiirita-vi~ayam ajnanam, 85
chadmanii, 478 Cinnabomma, 219
chala, 385, 386 n., 401 cintya, 343
Chandal.z-prasasti, I 26 cira-jiigara, 267
Chandas, 24, 275 n., 496, 547 ciraj-jagrat-sthita, 266
Change, 45 Circular bone, 284 n. 4
Changeable, 16, 221 Circulation, 323
Changeful, 241 Circulatory system, 323
Changeless, II, 13, 240; being, 51 Circumstance, 233
Index
cit, 89, 89 n., 235, 243, 244, 271 Cognitional existence, 58
citra-bhitti, 104 Cognitive activities, 256
Citra-mlmii1f1Sii, 220 Cognitive functions, 256
citri7Jz, 353, 356 Cognitive nerves, 342
citri7Jl niidJ, 354, 356 Cognitive operation, 211
Citsukha, 49-SI, 53. s8, 8J, 86, 8711., Cognitive process, 206
92, u6, 119, 124, 138, 147, 148, 149 Cognitive relation, 213
n., 150 n., 152, 154, 156, 157, r6o- Cognitive senses, 76, soo
I63, 171, 172, 192, 194, 198, 217, Cognitive states, 151, 250, 251
218, 222 n.; awareness of aware- Cognized object, 19, 22
ness impossible, 1so, 15 1 ; his analy- Cognizer, 19, 22, 23, 351
sis of illusion, 155; his criticism of Cognizing, 15; activity, 104, 149;
the atomic theory, 157, I 58; his faculty, 1 8o
criticism of "cause" (kiira7Ja), 160 Coherence, 15
ff.; his criticism of Nyaya categories, Cola country, 148 n.
156; his date and works, 148; his Cold, 242, 301, 320, 321, 332, 337 n.,
definition of self-revealing con- 357, 358, 360, 361, 362 n., 365, 408,
sciousness, 148-1 so; his quarrel 419, 500, 510, 51 I
with Prabhakara on the subject of Colic, 346; pain, 298
illusion, 154 ff.; his refutation of Collar bone, 286 n., 287
the category of time, 156, 157; his Collocating, 138, 160; conditions,
refutation of class-concepts (jiiti), 161
r6o; his refutation of drat•ya, 161, Collocation, 168, 174, 187, 516; of
I 6.z; his refutation of numbers, 158; causes, 161, 472, 473; of things,
his refutation of qualities (gu7Ja), 161
162, 163; his refutation of space, Collyrium, 238
157 ; his treatment of the falsehood Colour, 24, 6o, 181, 186, 188, 191, 194,
of the world-appearance, 152, 153; 199. 289, 327, 330, 355. 360, 367,
his treatment of nescience (ajiiiina), 377; cognition, 180; particles, 25 n.
153 ; main content of his Tattva- Colouredness, 374
pradlpikii, 148 n.; nature of self, 151, Colouring pitta, 326 n.
152 Combination, 189, 360
Citsukha Aciirya, his refutation of the Combinations of atoms, 20
Nyaya definition of perception, 138 Command, 48
cit-svarupiif.z, 411 Commentary, 27 n., 29, 38, 43, 52, 54,
citta, 75, 234, 238, 239, 243, 250, 256, 99, 102, 103, 107, ro8, 196, 219,
258,265,292,305, J06, 341 232, 354 1l.
citta-camatkiira, 236 Commentator, 51, 164
citta-·vimukti, 265 Common duty, sos-so7
citta-vrtti, 264 Common good, so6
cittina!z, 292 n. 5 Common self, 181
Opudru, 299 n. 2 Commonsense, 3; view, 2, so8
Class-concept, 40, ro8, 131, 132, 139, Common well-being, so6
148, 159, 162, 163, 187, 188, 194, Communion, 451, 457-459, 466, 467,
371 470,490,492, sor, SOJ, 504, SJO
Class-duties, 486 Community, so6
Class-nature, 188, 189 Compact, 337 n.
Clavicle, 286 n. 2 Compassion, 511
Cleanliness, 505 Compendium, 214
~tinging .,497 Compilation, 49
Closed, 3 Compilers, 53
Cloth, 189 Complex, 4, 25, 65, 215; quality, 17,
Clouds, 205 18
Coarse, 337 n. Compounding, 370
Coccyx, 285 n., 287 n. Conative senses, 75
Cognition, 18-21, 23, 70, 136, 149, Conceit, 373, 409, 510
153, 18o, 188, 214, 239, 243, 274 Conceive, 254
Cognitional character, 29 Concentration, 460, soo, 504
s68 Index
Concept, 234; of contact, 158 Continuous, 241; appearance, 25 n.;
Conception, 236, 247, 524 perception, 213
Conception of Buddhist Nirvii7Ja, The, Contradiction, 110, 137, 147
164 n., 166 n. Contrary, 17
Concepts of duality, 193 Control, 256, 419; of anger, 505, 510;
Conceptual, :;-.36; activity, 236; crea- of mind, 505, 510
tion, 237, 243, 244 Controller, 215
Conch-sheJl, 6, 101, 114, 134-137. Controversy, 125
155 Cooking, 97, 188, 331
Conclusion, 163, 173, 373, 376-378, Co-operant, 184
383, 387 Co-operation, 11, 326
Concomitance, 19, 121, 140, 141, 194, Cordier, Dr P., 425 n., 427,429
374, 388 n., 397 Co-religionists, 501
Concrete, 25, 235 n.; duration, 212; Coronation ceremony, 282
individual, 239; state, 236 Corporeal, 51 2
Conditional, 142 Correspondence, 134
Conditionality of relations, 142 Cosmic universe, 524
Conditioning knowledge, 18 Cosmic world, 526
Conditions, 16, 182, 184 Costal cartilages, 286 n. 1
Conduct, soo, 503 Cotyloid cavity, 287 n.
Conformations, 498 Cough, 296, 298, 300 n.
Congenital viita, 337 Country, 370
Conglomeration, 164, 166 Courage, 328, 333
Conjeeveram, 98 Course, 519
Conjunction, 40 Covetous, 498, 498 n.
Connection, 355 Covetousness, 497, 498
Connotation, 475 Cow, 159, 420, 509, 512
Conscious, 15, 371; centre, 16; mo- Cranial bones, 287 n.
ments, 62; states, 13, 187 Cranium, 287
Consciousness, 14, 18, 28, 30, 33, 35, Craving, 504
6:z-6s, 69, 71, 72, 148, 149, 153, Creation, 72, 178, 234, 235, 242
164, 199, 201, 2os-2o7, 209, 210, Creationism, 1
213, 215, 222, 234, 271, 310, 314, Creative power, 74
318, 360, 366, 368, 369, 387, 406, Creative thought movement, 235 n.
471, 477, 498, 532; of relationing, Creator, 2, 39, 41, 176, 177
33; pure, 22 Creed, 501
Consequence, 183 Critical thinking, 264
Conservation of energy, 5 17 Criticism, 35, 146, 156, 165, 166, 171,
Constant, 63 192, 204, 388; of qualities, 194
Constituent, 17, 18, 74, 322, 371, 525; Cruelty, 373, 409, 510
elements, 59, 304 Cupidity, 497
Constitution, 334 Curatives, 280
Constitutional, 335 Curator, 205
Constitutive stuff, 48 Curd, 40
Constructive, 331 ; instincts, 23; prin- Cures, 280
ciples, 333; tendencies, 24 Currents of sensation, 340
Consumption, 298, 386 Cursing, 282
Contact, 190,194,360,373,374,381 n.; Customary morality, 504, 523
of atoms, 190 Customs, 127, 489, 503
Contact-points, 188 Cyavana, 432
Container, 22, 144 Cycle, 526
Contemporary, so
Contentless, 182 dahana, 333
Contentment,490,492, 501,503 dahariidhikara7Ja, 205 n.
Content of recognition, 66 daiva, 253-255, 310, 407, 4o8, 472,
Contiguity, 367 515
Continuity, 15, 21; of consciousness, daiva yajiia, 487
18o dai'Vi sampat, 510
Index
dak#1J.ii, 292, 544 507-5I I, 516, 519, 520, 522, 529;
dak#1J.iiyana, 519 bonds of, 268; for life, 405
dama, 495, 505 Desirelessness, 228, 490
Damsel, 229 Desisting, 500
Dancing, 498 n. Destiny, 253, 354, 360, 370, 404, 526
dantolukhala, 287 n. 4 Destroyed cause, I86 n.
darsana, 455 Destructibility, 386 n.
dasa-kusala-kamma, 498 Destructible, 197, 5I2
Dasgupta, S. N., 17, 449 n. 1, 501 11. Destruction, 182, 235, 238; of the
Dasarathapriya, 99 atoms, 191; of citta, 268; of mind,
Dasa-sloki-mahii-vidyii-sfitra, 120 448
Dasa-slokl, 79 Destructive, 33 I; play, 178
Data of experience, 157 deia, 358, 389
Dattatreya, 443 desa-kiila-kri'yii-dravyail.z, 240
Datum of perception, 212 Detached, 452
Days, 156 Detachment, 475
dii~ya, 505 11. Determinant of causality, 186
diina, 505 n., 544 Determinate, 23 ; perception, 97;
Darila, 284, 293 thought, 25
Darila Bhatta, 27 5 Determination, 23 n., 55, 75, 186
diiru'f}a, 332 11. Determine, 23
Death, 248, 299, 336, 498, 501, 512, deva, 3 LJ.
523, 526 Devadatta, 62, 7 5
Deathless, 518, 526 Devagiri, 123
Debate, 377 Devaki, 544
Decay, 498 Devaki-putra, 544
Deccan, Early History of the, 540 Devarama Bhatta, 8I
n. 1 devatii, 43
Decisions, 24, 373, 384 deva-yii11a, 5I9, 521
Decoction, 390 n. Devadada, 283
Deeds, 242, 248 Devendra, 55
Deep sleep, 232 Devesvara, 1 I I
Defeat, 512 Devotee, 532
Defects, 38, 214 Devotion, 439-.HI, 503, 52j, 531,534,
Deficiency, 3I9, 326, 335 547; to Vedic gods, 505
Definition, I27, I36, 143, 145, I59- dhai'rya, 264, 505
I6I, I92 ;of cause, I86 ;of perception, dhamani'(i), 289, 290, 343, 344 n., 346-
137 350, 351 n., 352, 355; its pre-Cara-
deha, 446 11. 3 kian senses discussed, 345, 346
deha-sambhava-hetavab, 330 Dhamma-pada, 248, 489, 490, 493
Dejection, 230 dha11ai~a1J.ii, 405
Delirium, 298, 333 Dhanai1_iaya, 7 5
Deliverance, 267 dhanur-iikiire, 35~
Delivery, 290 n. 3 Dhanur-veda, 274
Delusion, I70, 245, 499, 500, SIO Dhanvantari, 316, 424, 425, 432, 433
Demerit, 249, 409, 4I6 dharma, 21, 22 n., I3I, 199, 327, 4ID-
Demons, 230, 295, 300, 468, 47S, 412, 4I6, 4I9, 479. 483, 484, 486-
535 488,494.503,525,538
Denotation of words, I87 Dlwrma-dlzarmi-'l:iniicaya, 49
Denunciation, 512 dharma-kiiya, 22 n.
Denutritive, 357, 358 Dhannakirti, I37, I7I
Dependence, 10, 529 dharma-ll~etra, 502
Dependent on being, 36 dharma-meglw, 25 I
Desirable, 5 I 2 Dharma-mimii1!lSii-pari'bhii~ii, 220
Desire, 24, 91, 178, 179, 252, 264, Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, 52 n., 53, 54,
324, 360, 370, 373, 375, 409, 41 I, 89 n., 105, I98 n., 208, 212, 2I4, 217
412, 422, 442, 450, 45I, 453. 477, dharma-saTJzketa, I85
484, 488, 495. 498, 501, 503, 504, dharma-siistra, 547
57° Index
dharma-sraddhii, 505 Digits, 285
Dhannatrata, 171 Dihaka, 426
dharma-viciira, 56 dik, 157
Dhannaya Dik~ita, 220 Dinakarl, 264 11.
dharmya,514 Diimaga, 26 n., 27 n., 30, 35, 167, 171;
dhii11ya,317 and Candrakirti, 167
dhiira~a, 328,342,454,455 Direct cognition, 32
dhiirin, 343, 368 n. Direct perception, 374
dhiitu, 22 n., 276, 304, 307, 317, 319, Disciplinary measure, so 1
320, 324-329, 331-333, 343, 347, Discipline, 514
349, 389 Discoveries, 280
dhiitu-mala, 331, 332 Discrimination, 23, 24, 250
dhiitu-rasa, 323 n. Discriminative knowledge, 250, 251,
dhiitu-rupa-rasa, 322 305
dhiitu-siimyam, 327 n. Discussion, 99, 129, 377, 378, 392
dhiitu-vai~amya, 319, 320, 326, 328, Disease, 280, 301, 320, 327-332, 335
329, 339 n., 336 n., 337, 359, 366, 370, 372,
dhiitu-vyfi.hana, 3 I 5 376, 377, 384, 385, 390, 393, 397;
dhl, 328, 505 as modifications of do1as, 329; its
dhz-dhrti-smrti-·vibhra§ta, 416 causes, 320 ff.; its theory according
Dhruva, l\'lr, 400 n. to Sarpkhya and Nyaya, 328, 329 11.
dhruvo, 22 n. Diseases of the legs, 299
dhrti, 373, 470, 505 n., 510 Disgust, 501
dhrti-vibhra1Jlsa, 416 Disinclination, 244, 251, 504
dhilma-pii, 420 Disintegrating, 191, 265, 306
dltumo, 497 Disjunction, 360
dhyiina, 256,342,454,455 Disliking, 358
DIZJ'iilla-bindu, 455 Dispute, 377, 379
dhyii11a-yoga, 448, 458 Dissection, 288
Diabetes, 282, 296 Dissociation, 248, 268, 523
Diagnosis, 301 Dissolution, 37, 109, 177, 191, 194,
Dialectic, 118, 127, 170, 171, 225 tt.; 526; of ignorance, 85
criticism, 156; methods, 119; Na- Distance, 360
garjuna and Vedanta, 163; of Sari- Distasteful, 357
kara, 189; Srihar!1a and Nagarjuna, Distinct entities, 31
163 ff. Distinction, 14, 15, 401 n.
Dialectical, 51, 7 2, 146; arguments, Disturbance, 335
218; criticism, 92; subtleties, 192; Diverse, 367
thought, 147 Diversity, 26, 38, 39, 195, 357, 367;
Diarrhoea, 206, 299, 300 tt. 2 of contents, 14
Diet, 384 Divine equipment, 510
Difference, q., 17, 18, 26 n., 27, 30, Divodasa, 424, 432, 433 n. I
6 3 , 6 5 , 7 6, 88, 9 2, 95-97 , u6, 117, Didhiti, 126 n.
127, 13o-132, 148, 161, 199, 200, dik~ii, 292 n.
202, 209, 210, 370; numerical, 14; Dlpika, 78
of characters, 370; of identity, 370 Doctrine, 227,375, 501, 517, 520,521,
Difference- between - awareness -and- 525
object, 17 Dogs, 291, 512
Difference- of- awareness - from - the- Doing good to living beings, 505
object, 18 Dominant, 358
Different, 28, 64, 358, 359; classes, Dormant, 164
161; effects, 161; measure, 190 dofa,300,319 1 325,327,J28,332,334-
Differentiate, 143 337, 339. 341, 362, 366, 372, 383,
Differentiation, 23 n. 390,413, 497; according to Susruta,
Digestion, 303, 322, 323 n., 336, 361- 329,330
363, 365 n., 370 dofa-prakrti/:z, 334 n.
Digestive fire, 333 dotiibhiiva, 214
Digestive function, 328 Doubt, 141,148,377,383,500
Index 57 1
Dramic.lacarya, 43 dul;zkham, 22 n.
draif!, 88 dubkhiibhiive, 92 n.
drava, 359 n. Dullness, 303, 360, 373, 408
dravya, 187, 193, 359-363, 365, 369, duradhigamatii, 261
371,373 Duration, 156
Dravya-gu7Ja-sa7[lgraha, 364 Durgacarya, 535
dravya-prabhava, 359, 363 Durgagupta, 432
dra•vya-yajiia, 487 durniscaya, 255
dravyiitmakatii gu7Jasya, 191 Dur7_liimii, 300
Dream appearances, 203 Duryodhana, King, 502
Dream conceptions, 240 Dusty, 408
Dream construction, 21, 240 Dutt, Dr U. C., 429
Dream experience, 6, 8, 28, 241, 266 Duty, 373, 438, 439, 442, 444, 445,
Dream ideas, 26 457' 480, 484, 501, 505-508, 520-
Dream knowledge, 310, 355 523
Dreamless sleep, 53, IOI, 154, 215 dfl$ya, 328
Dream life, So Dvaidha-nir7Jaya-tantra, 432
Dream objects, 36 Dvaita, 57 n.
Dream perceptions, So dvaitiidvaita, 44
Dream persons, 266 Dvayii•vin, 300
Dream state, 195, 240 dviidasiinguli, 257
Dreams, 5, 19-21, 25, 26, 194, 269, Dvapara age, 410
270, 283 dviira, 47, II2
Drink, 330, 501 Dvaraka monastery, I 92
droha, 413 dve1a, 267, 370, 413, 414
Dropsy, 282 Dvivraniya, 430
Drought, 370 dvy-a7Juka, 189, 190, 193
Drugs, 277 Dyads, 189, 306
Drug system, 294 dyaub, 292 n.
Drupada, 541 Dying, 182 n.
Dry, 332, 357, 361, 408; country, 370 Dynamical, 234, 238
Dryness, 358, 360, 362 n., 365 Dynamic principle, 334
Drc.ihabala, 348 n., 359, 426, 429-431, l)alhal).a, 273, 277, 279, 286 n. 4, 302
433. 434 n. 2, 303, 313 n. 2., 314 n. 2, 329,
Drc.lhabala sarpskara, 434 330, 336 n., 349, 350, 351 n., 372,
drt/ha-hhiivanii, 256 411' 424-428, 435
V,g-drsya-prakara7Ja, 79
drk. 152, 199 Ear, 325, 326 n.
drk and drsya, zoo Earth, 74, 187, 302, 359, 360, 362,
drk-sthiti, 454 367, 501
drsab adrsyatviit, 199 Earthquake, 283
drsya, 88, 152, 199, 232 Earthy, 357, 359
drsyamiina, 369 Eating, 338, 501
dri!iinta, 194, 375, 378, 381 n., 383 Eclipses, 283
dnfii1lta-sama, 381 n. Ecstatic joy, 450, 453
dri!iinta-•l'imddha, 385 Effect,J, I2,38,39,4I, 145,161,174-
dntartha, 383 176, 183, 184, 186, 190, 329 n.,
dnti. 221 359 n., 360, 374. 396-398, 508, 517
Dri!i-snti. 17 n. Effective tones, 23
Driti-snti school, 16 Effectuation, 27 n.
dri#-sri#-viida, 52, 84, 364 Efficiency, x86, 327
Dual experience, 213 Effort, 248, 253, 254, 360, 369, 371,
Dualistic, 2; writers, 192 373
Duality, 95, IOI, 148, 221, 224, 226, Egg (born from), 309, 322
243 ; of subject and object, 88 Ego, 15, 77, 101, 102, 104, 179, 233,
Ducts, 344 n., 345, 346 235,266,369
dubkha,z17,311 Ego-feeler, 104
dul;zkha-sahiwutii, 419 Egoism, 24, 75, 360, 414, 510, 511
572 Index
Egoistic, 217, 511 Eschatological, 520
ejii, 496 Eschatology, 517
Ejective forces, 327 esse est percipi, 268, 272
elw-jl'l•a-viida, 82 fl. Essence,38,40,129,164,168,236,247.,
Eka-iloka, 78 358
eka-vidhir eva allyavyavacchedal;z, 94 Essenceless, 8,35, 169,233; products, 4
eluinta, 389, 391, 546 Essencelessness, 7, 35, 234
elu'inta-dharma, S45 Essentials, IS9
ekcinta-ha/ana~l, 23~ Established, I9
ekiintiu, S4S Eternal, 24, 63, 73, I21, 179, 18o, 188,
Ekanti-Vai!;'r:tavas, S4S 369, 372, 379, 38o; consciousness,
ekiirammana, 4S9 181; entities, 187; soul, 179; sub-
el<iirtha-kriyci-kiiritii, 184 stances, 161; thing, 191
ekiiyana, 548 n. 3 Eternality, 191, 386 n.
Element, 227, 302, 344, 3s8-36o, 369, Eternity of atoms, 187
372,408, SOI, SIS, SI6 Ether, 302
Elemental, 334; body, 303; world, 21S Ethereal, 3S7, 359
Elephant, s I 2 Ethical ideas, 496
Elevation, S32 Ethics, 500, 501, SI4
Eliminatory, I40 Ethics of Buddhism, The, 496 n. 2
Emanations, I, S24 Ethics of the Hindus, so6 n.
Emancipation, 92, 99, IOO, 115, 148, Ever-existent, I 8
J8I, 185, 204, 227, 229, 234, 242, Evil, 445, 497, 498; effects, 408
24S. 246, 248, 249. 2SI, 266, 383. Evolutes, I72
38s Evolution, 16, 24, 372, 410 n.
Emblic :\lyrobalan, 294 Excitants, 29
Embryology, 273 Excitation, I98
Emotional, 464 Excitement, 409, 4IO
Emotions, I49, 152, 153, 245, 411 Excreta, 317, 325, 327-330, 347, Jso-
Empirical, 366 352; channels, 348
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Exhalation, 2S8, 449, 4S9, 460
289 n. 4, 299, 301 n. 2 Existence, 26 n., 32, 183, 193, 243,
Endeavour, 2SS 498. Sl7; of the soul, 383
Endurance, 49S, so2, 505 n. Existent, I2, ISS, 194,234,239, 373;
Enemy, 29S, SOl, S09-SII, Sl4· entity, 232
Energy, 244, 327, 333, 373, SIO Existing entity, 181-183
Enjoyable, 464 Experience, 20, 22, 27, 33, 34, 44, 58,
Enjoycr, I8I, I86, s26 66, 68, 72, 7S, 84, 94, IOI, III, 129
Enjoyment, I8I, 229, 238, 246, 368, I38, 149. ISO, I67, I79. 187, 20J,
446.470, S09, S22 266, 270, 271, 280, 368, 404, 46S,
Enmity, 497 468,470,499
Entity, I2, xs, 20, 2I, 3I, 31 n., 68, Experimenting, 384
187, 233, 236 Expiating sins, 282
Entrails, 289 Expiation, 508
Envy, 497 Expiration, 259, 262
Epidemics, 408 External, 271; characteristics, 2I; kar-
Epistemological, 32, 89 n. ma, 238; object, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26,
Epistemologically, 36 27, ISI, 269, 270, 272, 282, 366;
Equanimity, 475, 477, soo, 501, 504, senses, 1s6, 344; sensibles, 22;
so8, SII, SI2, S30, S31; of mind, 511 world, 2S, 26, 26 n., 209, 211, 270
Equilibrium, 236, 237, 327, 329 n., Extinction, 249, 501
333. 3S8, 530 Extra-individual reality, 89 n.
Erroneous, 64; appearance, 6 5; im- Extra-mental, 24
positions, 2I Extreme, so8; idealists, 21
Error, 5, 417; of judgment, 416 Extremism, 504
Eruptions, 326 n. Eye, 32S, 326 n.
Erysipelatous inflammation, 299 Eyebrows, 342, 353 n., 355
esanii, esii, 496 Eye-diseases, 246, 298
Index 573
Fact, 236 Fluids, 302
Factor, 5I6 Foam, 329
Fainting, 498 Foe, 512
Faith, 24, 373, 494, sos, si2 Foetal development, 3 I8; according to
Fallacies, I7, I23, I94, 377, 378, 386, Atreya, 309, 3 IO; divergences of
387 view referred to, 3I6; in the Garbha
Fallacious argument, I75 Upani~ad, 3I2 11.; its processes in
False, 20, 27, 65, I29, I52, ISS, I78, Caraka and Susruta, 317 ff.
I82, 2I3, 217; appearance, 6, 25 n., Foetus, 290, 302, 303, 306-308, 3I4-
96,. 113, I 56, 233; association, I54; 3I7,322, 333,346,384,406,408
cognition, I36; creations, 7, 8; ex- Folklore, 295 n. I
perience, I02, I54, ISS; ignorance, Folk-notions, 295 n. I
4; knowledge, 8, 12, I55, 233, Folly,498
4I4; object, 1 I3; perception, 155, Food, 330,348,349,436, 50I
224; predications, 8; presentations, Food-juice, 308, 33I, 345, 347, 350-
155; relationing, I 54; show, 37, 352, 355
38 Foolishness, 415, 509, 522
Falsehood, I 54, 2 I 7, 498 n.; two mean- Force, 253
ings of, I05 Forehead, 354
Falsity, 152; of the world, 434 Forgiveness, 505, 510
Faridpur, 225 n. Forgiving nature, 505 n.
Fasting, 278, 497 Forgiving spirit, 510, 5II
Fat,3I7,3I8,322,324,325,336,347- Formalism, 119, I24, I25
349, 352, 36I; channel, 348 Formative, 4I5
Fatality, 404 Formless, 254
Fate, 404 Foundation, so6
Fatness, 333 Free-will, 252, 255
Faults of expression, I46 Friend, 510-512
Faulty answer, 384 Friendly, 378, 511
Faulty statement, 384 Friendship, 460, 497, 529, 534
Fear, 333, 492, 510 Frogs, I09
Feeble discrimination, 250 Fruition, 255; of actions, 472
Feeling, 23 n., 24, 7I, 178, I79, 263, Fruits, 333
341, 412, 414, 498; as indifference, Fruit-yielding actions, 246, 247
23 n.; of disgust, 461 Fuel, 249
Feeling-stuff, 4I4 Full-moon, 520
Fellow-being, 5 I I Function, 31, I79, 239, 366, 367, 525;
Fermen.ation, 336 n. of thought, 14
Fetter, 497 Fury, 497
Fever, 282,300,396,398
Fibula, 28 5 n. 6 Gadadhara, 428
Fiery, 357, 359; character, 33I Gadadhara Bhanacarya, I I9, I24
Filosofia Indiana, 398 n. gahana'!l, 496
Fineness, 360 Gain, 503, 508, 5I2
Finished discrimination, 250 gala-guiJt/.a, 298 n.
Finitude, I6 Gall-bladder, 288
Fire, 74, 140, I4I, I6o, I87, I94, 238, gandha, 194, 236, 350
302, 331-334. 359, 526 Gandhabba, 539
Firm will, 24 Gandhamadana, 544
Fistula, 276 Gandharva, 300
Five viiyus, 75 gandharva-pattanam, 233
Fixation of will, 504 Gandharva-tantra, 393
Flame, 182, I84 gantii gacchati, 169
Flashing, 64 gantho, 496
Flesh, 29I, 317, 322, 324, 33I, 342, Gangabhatta, 51 5
347, 349, 352, 36I; currents, 348 Ganga, 354
Flies, 409 Gangadhara, 79, 347-349, 380 n. 2.,
Flowers, 333 429-43I
574 Index
Garigadharendra Sarasvati, s6, 220, 23 I 468, 47o-473. 475-479. 483-488,
Garigahari, 79 490, 492, 495, 496, 498-sos, so?-
Garigapuri Bhattaraka, so, 5 I SI7, 5I9-526, 529, 53I-534, 536,
Garigesa, 54, 125, 126, I46 54I, 545. 546, 548, 549. 55I, 552;
Garigesa Upadhyaya, 119 analysis of how actions are perform-
Gar:tanatha Sen, Mahamahopadhyaya, ed, SIS, SI6; avidyii in and in Bud-
337 n., 353 n. dhism, 498-soo; Asvattha simile of
gm;zcfa-miilii, 298 the Upani~ads, how applied in, 523,
Gar:te8a Bhisaj, 434 524; avyakta, its meanings in,
Garbe, R., 550 470 ff.; Brahman, its meanings in,
garbha-karii bhiivii[z, 309 473 ff.; clinging to God, necessity
Garblza Uparzi~ad, 3I2 n. 3 of, 529, 530; conception of siidhii-
garbhiiiaya, 3 I3 ra1Ja-dharma and vanJa-dharma, 505
garbhotpiida, 328 ff.; conflict between caste-duties
Garland, 498 n., 525 and other duties, 513, 514; conser-
Garm;la, 540 vation of energy principle applied to
Gaw;la, 126 the problem of immortality, 5 I 8;
Gauqa Abhinanda, 232 conservation of energy principle in,
Gau<;la Brahmananda Sarasvati, 79 compared with that of Yoga, Ve-
Gauc.lapada, 2, 7, 21 n., 28, 30, 57 n., danta and Nyaya, 5I7; crude be-
78. 8o, 23I, 234, 262 n. I, 272 ginnings of Sarpkhya in, 467 ff.;
Gaucja-piida-kiirikii, 6, 25 I ethical ideas compared with those of
Gaucjapiidiya-bhii~ya, 78 the Upani~adsandBuddhism,493ff.;
Gaudavaho, 1 I 1 ethics, basis of, 498; God and his
Gau~esvara Acarya, s8 doctrine in, 530 ff.; God, his nature
Gaudorvisa-kula-prasasti, I 26 in,464 ff., 524 ff.; idea of God in, and
Gauri, 82 n. in the Upani~ads, 530; ideal as per-
Gautama, 380, 386 n., 387, 394 formance of sva-dharma in, 50 I, 502;
gavaya, I3I ideal in, compared with the sacri-
gam11ikii, 290 n. 3 ficial and other ideals, 503, 504;
gav'lnyau, 290 ideal of self-surrender, 503; ideal of
Gayadasa, 425, 427, 428, 43 I tapas, 5I3; immortality in, 5I8, 5I9i
Gayi, 372, 4Io · important commentaries on, 443;
giih0,496 interpretation by Madhva, 442; in-
Gandhara, 274-, 298 n. 4 terpretation by Ramanuja, 441, 442;
giindhcln, 353 interpretation by Sarikara, 437, 438;
giiyatn, 294 interpretation by Yamuna, 439; its
gedho, 496 conception of dharma and sacrifices,
Generality, 187 486 ff.; its date, 549 ff.; its differ-
Generator, 23 ence from Mimarpsa, 483 ff.; its
Generic, 374 relation to Sarpkhya, 476,477; its re-
Genesis, 235 lation to Vedanta, 4 77 ff.; karma, re-
ghana, 235 n., 244, 3 I4 birth, and liberation, 520 ff.; I?Jetra
ghana-jiigaras, 267 and k~etra-jiia theory of, 463, 464;
ghana-jiigrat-sthita, 266 meaning of Yoga in, 443 ff.; path of
ghana-sa1fWedana, 235 knowledge and of duty, 528, 529;
ghana-spanda-kramiit, 235 n., 245 performance of duties with unat-
ghanzbhztya, 236 tached mind in, 507 ff.; prakrti,
Ghata-jiitaka, 54 I, 542, 544 puru~a and God in, 464-466; prakr-
ghora, 281 ti-purusa philosophy in, 46I ff.;
Ghosur:t<;li, 539 principal virtues in, 510 ff.; puruJa-
gho~a, 350 silkta conception of God and the
Gho~aka, I7I conception of God in, 524; rebirth
giddhi, 496 and life after death, 5 I9, 520; sattva,
Gifts, 267, 437. 441, 50I, SI3, 5I4 mjas and tamas in, 468 ff.; Sarpkhya,
Girvar:tendra Sarasvati, 52 n., 2I6 its meaning different from that of
Grtii, 25I, 4I8, 437-439, 443-448, classical Sarpkhya in, 457, 458;
450 n. I, 452-455, 457-459, 462- siiytlkJ,ya-yoga, discussion on the
Index 575
meaning of, in. 455-457; sense- Gopala Sarasvati, 103
control in, 488 ff.; sense-control in, Gopalananda Sarasvati, 57 n.
different from that of Buddhism, Gopiilika, 87 n.
490; sense-control in, different from Gopikanta Sarvabhauma, 79
that of Pataiijali, 491, 492; some Gopirama, 79
vicious tendencies denounced in, Gopurarak~ita, 424
509, SIO; standpoint of ethics in, Govardhana, 428, 431
compared with the general stand- Government, 204
point of Hindu ethics, 504 ff.; vir- Govinda Sarasvati, 55
tue of sameness, 511, 512; yoga in, Govindananda, 49, 81, 103, 104, 26I
akin to that of Pafica-riitrayoga,461; Grace, 503
yoga in Patafijali, indebted to yoga Grammarian-philosopher, 171
in, 460, 46I; yoga of, different from Grammatical, I42
that of Patafijali, 451 ff.; yoga of, granthi, 104
different from the Upani~ad yoga, Grass, 350
453 ff.; yoga instructions in, 446 ff.; Grating, 338
yoga, its meaning different from that griihaka-gralza, 25
of Buddhism in, 459, 46o; yogin, his griihya-griihakiinusaya, 22
characteristics, 449, 450; yogin, his Greed, 409, 497, 498, 5IO
relation with God, 450, 45I Greediness, 511
Gltii-bhii~ya, 442 Greedy, 510
Guii-bhii~ya-vivecana, I93 Grief, 247, 333
Gua-bhu~a1Ja-bhii~ya, 443 Griffith, 29I n.
G'itii-nibandhana, 226 grl~ma, 335
Gztiirtha-sa'flgraha, 439, 443 grivii(z, 286
Gltiirtha-satrzgraha-dipikii, 439 Gross, 355
Gztiirtha-vivara1Ja, 443 Grossness, 360
GUii-siiriirtha-satrzgraha, 443 Grounds, 17
Gitiisaya, 439 Growing, 36
Gttii-tattva-prakiiiikii, 443 Growth, 29; of the body, 322
Gttii-tiitparya-bodhini, 58 grha-godhikii, 298 n. 7
Gztii-tzka:. 443 grha-stha, 505
Guii-vivrti, 443 Grhya-sfitras, 28 I
Glandular sores, 296 guda, 28s,n.7
Glenoid cavity, 287 n. 2 gudiibhyalz, 288
go, I3I Gujarat, 192
God, 1, 44, 72, 8o, I I2, I76-I78, 197, gulgulu, 393
229, 254, 372, 402, 403, 410 n., 438- gulpha, 284 n. 4
444, 446, 447. 4S0-453. 457. 459. gulphau, 284
461-467, 473. 474. 476, 477. 484, gu1Ja, I62, 174, 175, 187, 188, 190, 194,
490, 492, 499. SOI-504, 509, 510, 292, 3I4 n., 329, 330, 332, 357, 358,
512, 514-516, 5I9, 522-526, 529, 359 n., 360, 361, 363, 366, 367, 369,
533. 537. 542, 545. 547 370, 372-374. 414, 440, 441, 455-
Goddesses, 245 458, 462, 465-467, 476-478, 512,
God's powers, 42 SIS, 524, 525
God's will, 109 gu1Ja-attachments, 477
Gods, 245, 420, 487 gu1Jamayl miiyii, 477
Going, 169 Gu1Ja-traya-viveka, 57 n.
Gokulacandra, 443 gu1Jatva, 143
Gokulanatha Upadhyaya, 126 n. gzt1Javattviityantiibhii<t•iinadhikara~latii,
Gold, 37, 512 r62
Goldstiicker, Th., 540 gu1Jiitlta, 5 I 2
Gomin, 428 gu1Jin, 314 n. 1
Good, 2I,246,271 ,405; and bad, 23 n.; Gupta empire, 164, 435
deeds, 41 1 ; life, 422 guru, 357, 359 n., 420
Goodness, 507 gurv-iidayab, 3 69
Gopatha-Briihma1Ja, 274 n. 3, 276 n., gurv-iidi, 369
28o n., 283 Gucjha-bodlzaka-satrzgraha, 428
Index
Gut}hartha-dipikii, 443 Heracles, 543
Gut}hiirtha-prakiiia. 220 Heramba Sena, 428
Herb, 298, 358 n., 365
Hair, 325 Heredity, 273
hali/q1Ja, 288 Hermaphrodite, 3 I 2 n. 3
Hallucinations, 5, I8o Hermitage, 229
ha7JlSa, 252 n. Heroism, 502, 505 n., 525
Handful, 343 n. hetiiv ir1yu, 420
hanu-citya, 287 hetu, I2D-I23, I48, I94,374,379,38o,
Hanumad-bhiilya, 443 38I n., 386 n., 387, 388, 395
hanvor dve, 287 n. 4 Hetu-tattvopadesa, 49
Happiness, I I3, 501, SI2, 530 hetv-antara, 388
Happy, 277 ; temper, 5 I 3 hetv-artha, 389, 390
Hara-kinkara, I 22 hetv-iibhiisa, I94, 386 n., 388, 389 n.
Hara - kinkara - nyiiyiiciirya - parama- Higher self, 453, 466
pa~z4ita-bhaua-viidindra, I 22 Himalayas, 2.z9, 370
Hardness, 328, 360 hit{lsii, 4I9
Hare's hom, 5, III, 240 Hindu Ethics, 483, 504; standpoint of,
Hari, 442, 535, 543 504 ff.
Hari Dik~ita, 82 Hindu Mysticism, 449 n. I
haridrii indravaru1Ji, 297 Hindu philosophy, SIS
Hari-gltii, 545 HiraQ.yagarbha, 76
Harihara Paramaharpsa, 57 n. HiraQ.yak~a Kausika, 357
H ari-lzlii-vy_iikhyii, 22 5 Hi1·a1}yiikfya-tantra, 435
Harinatha Sarma, I48 n. hirii, 289, 290, 344, 346
Hariscandra, 427, 43 I Hiriyanna, 1 n., 43, 85 n., 86, 98,
Harmful, 357 100 n.
harfa, 313 History of Indian Logic, 392
hasti-jihvii, 353 History of Indian Philosophy, I, 17,
Hate, 489 265 n. 4, 269 n. I, 27I n. I, 477 n. I,
Hatred, 360, 370, 373, 497-499 50I n.
hatha, 268 History of the Vaif1Java Sect, Early,
Hatha-Yoga, 373, 455 544 n.
Hatha-yoga-pradipikii, 354 n. hitii, 277. 344. 405, 420, 422
havi/:z, 46I hitii niir/is, 345
Harita, 397, 427 Hinayana, 500
Hiirrta-sa1Jlhitii, 432 Hinayana Buddhists, I68
Head, 297,336,340,343 Hoemle, R., 279,284 n. 3, 285 n. 4, 286
Headache, 300 n. 2 n. I, n. 2, n. 3, n. 4, 287 n. 5, 329,
Head disease, 296, 340 424.428-43I,433.434
Health, 330, 384 Holes, 332 n.
Hearing, 236, 360 homa, 28I
Heart, 288, 290 n. 2, 3I6, 340, 344 n., Homogeneous, I4, 377
345t 347. 352, 355 Horns, I9I
Heart diseases, 299 Hostile, 378
Heat, I94, 238, 24I, 320, 321, 325, Hot, 242, 3I2 n., 357-359, 36I-363,
328, 33 I, 358, 360, 362 n., 365, 4I9, 365 n.
500, 510, 511 Householder, 505
Heaven,229, 503,520,523 hriisa/:z, 322
Heaviness, 335 n., 358, 360, 36I, 369 hrf, 24, 5IO
Heavy, 337 n., 357 hrdaya, 288, 340 n.
Heels, 284 hrdaya-stham pipiisii-stlziinam, 348 n.
Heliodorus, 540 hrdayotkleda, 335 n.
Hell, 9I, 489, 5IO hrt, 292
hemanta, 335, 370 hrt-padma-yantr'l-tritaye, 258
hemanta-gri1ma-var1iil:z, 32I n. Hultzsch, E., 2I9
Hemadri, 427, 434 Human body, 278, 302
Hemorrhage, 289; of women, 297 Humanity, 506
Index 577
Human passion, 497 73, 134, I52; products, 223; silver,
Human self, 42 1 18; snake, 206 n.
Humid, 408 Ill-will, 497
Humility, 534 Image, 14, 546
Hunger, 254 Imaginary, 271
Hygienic habits, 308 Imagination, 90, 233, 261, 266, 328,
Hypothesis, 12, 26, 64 367, 373
Hypothetical, 337; entities, 233, 336 Imaginative construction, 21
Immanent, 42, 524; self, 271
icchii, 264, 370, 496 Immediacy, 13, 14, 63, 69, 105
Idea, 26, 30, 3I, I82, I86, 375, soi, Immediate, I49, ISO; antecedence,
5IO, 525 144; contact, 2I I
Ideal, 503, 504; creations, 236 Immediateness, 138
Idealism, I9, 2I, 25, 35, I02, 213, 221, Immoral, 23 n., 464, 478, 484, SOl
256, 268, 270; refutation of, 269 Immortal, 473, 476, 502, 512, S2S,
Idealistic, 231; Buddhism, 231, 234, S26
242; monism, 164; philosophy, 234 Immortality, 294, 456, SI2, 5I3, SI8,
Idealists, 402 521, 537
Ideation, 20, 31 Immutable law, 3 1 n.
Identical, 15, 26, 27, 30, 31 n., 32, Impatience, 373
33. 36, 38, 64, 68, 90, 152, 153. 169, Imperative, 483
172, 173, 183, 184, 202, 224; entity, Imperishable, 476, SI7, 518
34, 202; object, 176; point, 20 Impermanent, 230, 241
Identity, 14, 31, 33, 34, 65, 72, 131, Implication, 18, 148, 384, 521
I 52, 227, 370, 526; as a relation, 14; Importance, 370
function ofthought, 14; in diversity, Impossible, IS9, 169, 188
172; of the awareness, 32, 165; of Impotency, 333
cause and effect, 165; of the self, 34, Imprecations, 295
47, 6s, 67 Impressions, 65, 239, 250
Idleness, 333, 373 Improper use, 321
il/.ii, 257, 292 n., 353, 453 Impure, 36, 37, 38, 303, 408; states,
il}ii niil}i, 354 239
Ignorance, I, 3, 4, 5, 8, 24, 73, 74, Impurities, 327, 503, S04
98, 101, 104, 148, 153. 154. 185, 187, Inactive, 36o
203, 204, 251, 267, 333. 409. 413, Inanimate, 36, 3S9. 360
414, 416, 462, 479, 498-soo, 509, Incantations, 278, 281
510, 522, 529, 530 Incarnation, so2, 525
Ignorant, 367, 378 Inclinations, 23Q, 242, 2S 1, 497
ihiimutra-phala-bhoga-viriiga, 49 5 Incomprehensible, 164
Iliac, 348 Inconsistencies, 166
Ilium, 285 n. 7 Inda, S39
Ill-temper, 497 Indefinability of nescience, 222
Illumination, 62, 178, 204, 210, 211 n., Indefinable, 12, 16, 22, 29, 51, 118,
212 127, 128, IS6, 163, 164, 205, 221,
Illuminator, 526 224, 499, S29; nature, ISS; stuff,
Illusion, 3, 6, 9, 11, 16, 25, 29, 32, 36, 221
47. 64, 69, 101, 110, 114, 148, 194, Indefinite existence, 16
197. 198, 200, 204, 223, 239. 241, Independent co-operation, 184
26I, 524; difference in the theory Independent existence, 59
of, between Nagarjuna and Sankara Indescribable, 3S, 36, 48, 147, 164,
and Gauc.iapada, 7 194. I9S. 203, 221, 232-234. 236,
Illusoriness, S33 265, 271; nature, 109
Illusory, 26, 28, 73, 1o1, 109, 181, 221, Indescribableness, 3S
234, 24o; appearances, 101, 113; Indestructible, 33, 512, S38
character, 217; cognition, 18o; crea- Indeterminable, 134
tion, 468; experience, 185; images, Indeterminate, 22, 401, 454; cognition,
180; impositions, 30, 113, 114, 150, 94; experience, 97; knowledge, 21 ;
194; knowledge, 139; perception, materials, 23
Index
Index, I48 n. Initiation, 547
India, 402 Injunction, 509, 520
Indian anatomists, 286 n. 2 Inner change, 22
Indian Antiquary, 550 Inner consciousness, 26 n.
Indian Interpreter, The, 550 Inner dynamic, 24
Indian literature, 256 Inner law of thought, 29
Indian medical men, 377 Inner psychoses, 22
Indian Medicine, 423, 436 Inner states, I85
Indian philosorhy, I I9, 227, 273, 369, Inoperative, I77, 269
377,395, 4I4, 4I7 ;pessimismin,4I4 Inscriptions, S.l., 2I9
Indian thought, 375, 376 n., 408, 42I Insects, 409
Indifference, 246, 50I Insensible, 254
Indigestion, 348 Inseparable, I9I, 3'74; inherence, I8J,
Indignation, 333, 497 37I
Jndische Studien, 288 n. 2 Inseparableness, I9I; of character,
Indispensable, I 8, 523 I9I; of space, I9I; relation, 36o;
Indistinguishable, 377 relation of inherence, 40
Individual, 33. 58-6o, II5, I3I, I39. Insomnia, 337 n.
I 59, I89, 369; consciousness, 77; Inspiration, 262
good, 485; ignorance, 84; members, Instinctive passions, 252
I88; persons, 84, I09; self, 75; soul, Instinctive subconscious roots, 26
72, 205 n. Instincts, 4I5
Individuality, 449 lnstructions,2I,229,501
Indivisible, I57, I99 Instrument, 45
Indo-Iranian, 295 n. I Instrumental cause, I2, 360, 372,
lndra, 229, 295 n. 3, 304, 328, 433 4IO
indrajiila, 244 Instrumentality, II, II 2
Indrii-v#r.zu, 535 Instruments of cognition, I37
indriya, 23, 238, 239, 366 Intellect, 75, 373, 406
indriya-dhiirar.za, 494 Intellectual, 378; states, I79
indriya-nigraha, 505 Intelligence, 89, 268, 320, 32I, 360,
indriya-vijaya, 405 369,373.375.504, 5I6
Indu, 304, 328, 433 Intelligent, 36, 38
Induction, I48 Intelligible, 36
Indulgence, 509 Intense, 25I
Inequality, 229 Intention, 497
Inert, 337 n. Interdependence, 7, 8, 22
Inertia, 360 Interdependent origination, 3 n.
Inexhaustible, 356 Internal canals, 289
Inexplicable, 20, 29, 48, I56, I58, I85 Internal organ, 3IO n. 2
Inference, I8, 26 n., 32, 63, 66, 68, 72, Interpretation, I, 356
I06, II8, I20, I29, I39, I4I, I48, Intervening, I44
159, I67, I76, I92, I94, I98, 2I3, Intestine, 288, 297, 348, 35I
302, 365, 373-376, 380, 396, 398, Intimate relation, 40
408 Intoxicating drinks, 498
Inferential, 77; cognition, I35; know- Intrinsically, 242
ledge, I8 Intrinsic difference, 20I
Inferior, 378 Introduction, 49
Inferiority, 370, 40I n. Intuitive, 73; consciousness, I54, I99;
Infinite, I6, 63, 73, II3, 454; con- perception, I I3
sciousness, 77; differences, I32; Invalid, I8, I4I, I84, I86
number, 358; regressus, 202; time, Invariability, 3I n.
I32 Invariable, I72, I86; antecedence, I45,
lnflammation,282 I86, 326, 386, 398; concomitance,
Inhalation, 258, 259, 449, 459, 46o I39-I42, I48; connection, I76;
Inherence, 360 power, I85; prognostication, 397
Inherent, 22; movement, 20 Invariably and unconditionally asso-
Inhering cause, I44 ciated, 380
Index 579
Invariably associated, 396 J ayacandra, 126
Invisible, 337 n. Jayanandi, 431
Inward resolution, 482 Jayanta, 51, 107, 279, 28o, 307 11. 1,
Iron age, 402 394, 399, 4I3, 414
Irrelevant, 160 I ayarama, 44 3
Ischium, z8s n. 7 Jayatirtha, 442
itllretariisraya, 97 Jayiikhya-satphitii, 491
itaretariiiraya-prasangiit, 9 s Jayolliisa-nidhi, 220
ltihiisa-veda, 274 n. 3 Jiibiila-briihmat;ta, 251
1-tsing, 433 jiiqya, 10
ir~yii, 413 jiigaruka, 338
lia Upani~ad, 551 jiigrad-viisaniimayatviit svapna, 76
liii, 78 jiigrat, 241, 264
lSiiviisya-bhfiD!a-#ppat;ta, I 93 jiigrat-svapna, 266
liopani~ad-bh{4ya, 78 jiigrat-svapna sthita, 267
lsvara, 39, 48, so, 72, 8o, I I2, 176, Jajala, 283, 432
177, 197, 372, 474, 533; its criti- jiilini, 496
cisms by Kamalasila, 176 ff. Janakinatha, 218 n.
isvara-bhiiva, sos n. jiinu, z8s n. 4
lsvarakr!?r:ta, 8o, 171, 372,·428, 476 jiinuno!z sandm, z8s
livara-satphitii, 547, S48 n. 1 Jiitaka, 248 n., 424
lsvarasena, 431 jiiti, 43. IS9. 194. J8o-J82, 387, 401,
livariibhisandhi, 126 498
l~ta-siddhi, 198, 199, 205, 213 Jealousy, 267
l~ta-siddhi-vivarat;ta, 198 J ejjata, 372, 428
b!a-siddhi-vyiikhyii, 198 jhiina,4s9,46o, soo
jigi1pSanatii, 496
Jackals, 409 jijiiiisii, 384
Jacob, G. A., 82 Jina, 49, so, 72, ?S, 84, 8s, 88-9o,
Jacobi, H., 398 n. 205 n., 235, 236, 239, 304
jaqa, 36 Jinadasa, 428, 431
jaqiitmikii, 105 jiva, 104, 105, 109, IIo, 112
jaqiitmikii avidyii-iakti, lOS jzva-bhuta, 464, 472
J agaddhara, 443 jzva-caitanya, 77
I agadisa, 79 jzva-dhiitu, 241
Jagadisa Bhattacarya, 119, 124 Jivaka, 276, 424
jagan-mithyiitva-dipikii, 57 n. Jivaka-tantra, 435
Jagannatha Paiicanana, 79 jivana, 328
Jagannathasrama, 53, s6, 103, 193, 216 jtvana-purvaka, 515
Jaimini, 479, 486 jzvan-mukta, 24s-247, 250
Jaina, 98, 119, 171, 172, 399, S44, sso jzvan-mukta state, 248
J aiyyata, 427 jfvan-muktatii, 24S
jalada, 283 ]tvan-mukti, 246, 251, 2S2
jalpa, 377-379,401 jivan-mukti-viveka, 214, 216, 2SI,
Jalpa-kalpa-taru, 347 n., 380 n. 2 252 n., 268
Janalz, 76 jivann eva, 2SI
Janardana,49,205, S43 jfva-riiSi, 44
Jaruirdana Sarvajiia, 52 n. jfva-sthiti, z6o
jarighe, 28s ]fva-siltra, 436
jangitja, 293, 294, 295 n. 3 j'ivatviipiidikii, I04
Japan, 294 jiviidana,432
jariiyu, 291 }ivananda, 430, 431
jatru, 286 n. 2 jlviitman, 461
J atiikari.J.a, 427, 432 jivita, 368
Jatukart;ta-satphitii, 432 jivntendriya-virodhinl, 21 n.
jafii, 496 jlvotkriinti, z6o
Jaundice, 282, 297, 298 jiiiina, 100, 272, 491, 499, sos n.
Jaundiced eye, 143 jiiiina-gata-pratyak5atva, 207
sBo Index
Jn!naghana, 82 n. against the non-permanency of en-
jiiiina-kanna-samuccaya, 44, 100 tities answered by, 185 ff.; Yogasena's
jiiiina-niitft, 355 criticisms against the doctrine of
jiiiina-pratisandhiitii, 368 momentariness answered by, 184;
Jiiiina-slUflkalinl, 354, 355 his criticism of the concept of God,
jiiiina-sa'l{lSkiira, 250 176 ff.; his criticism of the concept
Jniina-siira, 232 of lsvara or God, 176 ff.; his treat-
Jiiiina-siddhi, 148 n. ment of the different views of the
Jniinavati, 378 nature of momentariness, 186; his
Jiiana-viisi~!ha, 231 criticism of the doctrine of soul
jiiiina-vi~aylkrtena riipet)a siidrlyam, (Nyaya), 178, 179; his criticism of
134 the soul theory of Kumarila, 179 ff.;
jiiiina-yoga,44I,442,456,487,529 his criticism of the Yoga concept of
Jiianamrta, 99 God, 177 ff.; his doctrine of mo-
Jiianamrta Yati, 78 mentariness, 182 ff.; his refutation
JiiiiniirtJava, 432 of Nyaya- Vais~ika categories, 187
Jiianendra Sarasvati, 54, 79 ff.; his refutation of the SaQlkhya
jniinin, 531 theory of soul, 181; his refutation
Jiianottama, s8, 87 n., 98, 99. 148 n., of the theory of the persistence of
198 entities, 182 ff.; his refutation of the
J iianottama Bhattaraka, 82 n. Upani~ad theory of self, 181; his
Jiianottama Misra, 48 theory of causal efficiency (artha-
jniitatii, 152, 211 kriyii-samarthii), 183 ff.
jiiiitur jiieya-sambandhal:z, 105 Kamalasila and Santarak~ita, their
]obares, 543 criticisms of the SaQlkhya doctrine
Joint causality, 177 of pari~iima, 172 ff.; writers men-
Joint nature, 184 tioned in their work Tattva-sam-
Joint operation, 472 graha and its Paiijikii, 171 .
Joints, 331, 336, 348 Kambalasvatara, 171
Joy, 333, 373, 467, 495, 504, 511, kamma, 500
512 Kanauj, 126
Judgments, 341 Kanha, 541, 544
Jug, 143, 151 Kanhayana, 544
juhvati, 448 Kal).ada, 370
jvara, 296 Ka~ii.da-sutra-nibandha, 123
jyotil:z-sthiina, 318 ka~cjarii, 324, 352
Jyoti~, 275 n. Kal).j~ka, 429 n. 1, 431
j'yoti~a, 547 ka~tha, 353 n.
ka~tha-niitfr, 286 n. 2
Kahola-briihma~a. 251 ka~Jhorasol:z sandhil:z, 348 n.
kaivalya, 251, 454 kapiilam, 287
Kaivalya-kalpadruma, 56 kapiilikii, 285 n. 4
Kaivalyananda Sarasvati, 443 kapha, 257 n. 2, 300, 317, 325-331,
Kaivalyananda Y ogindra, 56 333, 334, 335 n., 336, 337, 339,
Kaivalyasrama, 79 35o-352, 361,365,392
kakii{ikii, 287 kaphofj.a, 286 n. 4
Kak~apufa-tantra, 426 kaphofj.au, 286
Kakubha,300 Kapila, 410 n., 477
kalpa, 275 n., 526, 547 Kapilabala, 429
kalpanii, 90, 238, 239, 312 n., 314, Kapila-Sarpkhya, 458
370 Kapila-tantra, 435
Kalpa-sthiina, 424, 429 kar~a, 389
Kalpa-taru, 52 kar~a-sakti-pratiniyamiit, 174
Kalyal).a Bhatta, 443 Karatha, 432
Kamalajanayana, 225 n. Karavirya, 424
Kamala5ila, 25, 27n., 28, 31n., 171, Kariila-tantra, 435
172, 175, 176, 178, 179, 181-185, karma, 101, 104, 185-188, 237-239,
186 n., 187, 188, 375,376; criticisms 243, 249, 253, 255, 256, 302, 310,
Index 581
339. 357, 359. 360, 37I' 383, 402- kiira1}a, I04, I37, I6o, 374, 389, 395,
404, 408, 437. 439. 488, 52Q-522, 472
524, 533 kiira1}a-~Q1}a-nirodha-sama-kiilafz, 2 In.
karma-blja1Jl mana[z-spanda, 238 kiirQ1}a - k~a1Ja - vila~a1Ja - kiiryasya,
karma-niise mano-niiiafz, 238 2I n.
karma-pu~a, 303 n., 373 kiira1}a-vyiipiira, 5 I 7
karma-sannyiisa, 457 Kiirikii, 2I n., 28, 30, 87, 250, 370
karma-yoga, 44I, 442, 444, 45I, 452, Karttika Kut:t<;la, 427, 428
457. 529 Karttikeya, I07
Karl}a-bhiira, 550 Karut:tya, 228, 230
kanJa-sula, 299 kiirya, I6I,374,389
kartavyatii, 482 kiirya-jiiiinam, 3IO n. 3
kartii, 237, 3I4 kiirya-kiirQ1}atii, 376
kartr, 244, 395, 469, 472, 473 kiirya - kiirQ1}a - viidasya vediinta -
kartrtva, 242 bahir-bhutatviit, 22I
kartrtva-bhoktrtvaikii-dhiirafz, I 04 kiirya-phala, 389
Karuma, 300 kiirya-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n.
karU1}ii, 4I 2, 460, 5 I I kiiryatii-jiiiina, 5 I 5
k~iiya, 3I2 n., 357, 358 kiirya-yoni, 389
Kathii-vatthu, 247, 248 n. kiisa, 296, 298 n. 4
Katha Upan#ad, 78, 290 n. 2, 344 n., Kiisika, 297 n. 4
345.453.488,494.523,524 Kasi, 424
Katha-vallf, 2 5 I Kiiil-kha1Jt/.a, 429
kathina, 359 n. Kaslnatha Sastrin, 54
Kathopanifad-bhi'ifya-tlkii, I93 Kasiraja, 432, 433 n. I
katu, 3I2 n. 3, 357, 358, 362, 365 n. Kasmira, 434
kaumiira-bhrtya, 276 Kiismlra-piitha, 430
Kaumiira-tantra, 425 Kasyapa, 427
kausala, 452 Kiiiyapa-sa1Jlhitii, 43 I, 435
KauSika-sutra, 27 5, 282-284, 293 Kiithaka, 486, 55I
Kau~ltaki, 25I, 259 n. 3, 283 Kiithaka-sa1Jlhitii, 544
Kau~ltaki-briihmal}a, 544 Kiithakopani~ad-bhiiDJa, 78
Kau$ftaki-Upani~ad, 344 n. Kathmat:t<;lu, 43I
Kautilya, 54I Katyayana, 540
Kaviraj Gangaprasad Sen, 427 Kiiya-cikitsii, 276, 425
Kaviraj Gat:tanatha Sen, 43 I kediirl-kulyii, 323
Kaviraja, 79 Kenopani~ad, 78, I96
kiihiibiiha, 299 Kenopani~ad-bhii~ya, 78
kiikatiilfya, 27I Kenopanifad-bltii$ya-fippana, I93
kiila, I56,235.3I7,32I,358,359,372, Kenopan#ad-bhii~ya-vivara1}a, 78
389, 4IO Kesava-bhatta, 79, 284, 443, 54I, 543
Kalahasti-sarat:ta-Sivananda Yogindra, kevala-jiigaras, 266
2I9 kevala-jiigrat-sthita, 266
kiiliitlta, 386 n., 387 kevaliinvayi, I20, I2I, I23
Kalidasa, 230, 231, 239, 402, 550 kevaliinvayi-hetor eva nirvaktum asak-
kiilpanika-puru~a-bheda, I I 6 yatviit, I23
kiima, 327, 4I2, 4I3, 489, 490, 496, kevaliinvayini vyiipake pravartamiino
499 hetufz, I2I
kiim api-artha kriyiim, 5I5 Kha/aja, 300
kiimya-karma, 99 khale-kapota-nyiiya, 323
kiinti, 57 n. khanti-sa1Jlvara, 500
Kiinyakubjesvara, I 26 Kha1Jtf.ana-kha1}t/.a-khiidya, 57 n., I03,
Kankayana, 3I6,357 119 n., I26, I27, I32, IJ3 n., I34,
Kiinkiiyana-tantra, 435 I4I, I46, I56, I92
kii1}t/.a, 353 Kha1Jtf.ana-kha1Jtf.anam, 126 n.
Kapya, 333 Kha1Jtf.ana-kuthiira, I26 n.
Kapyavaca, 327 Kha1Jt/.ana-mahii-tarka, I 26 n.
kiiraka-vyiipiira,4I Kha1}t/.ana-ma1}t/.anam, 126 n.
s8z Index
Khm;uf.ana-phakkikii, 126 n. Kr~Qatirtha, 56, I I 5
Kha1Jf/.ana-tlkii, 126 n. Krroala,kiira, 220
Kha1Jf/.anoddhiira, 126 n. KnQananda, 196
khara, 332, 359 n. Knr.tanubhuti, 82 n.
Khara1}ada-sa,hitii, 432 Kr~Qiitreya, 276, 427
kha-ta11-miitra, 236 Krroiitreya-tantra, 435
khyiiti, 87 n., 204 krtaka, 182
Kidney, 288, 348 krta-niisanl, 299
Kidney-bean, 358 n. Krtavirya, 316
kiliisa, 297 krta yuga, 546
Kimldin, 296, 300 krti-siidhyatii-jiiiina, 515
Kindness, 511; to the suffering, 510 Krttika, 396
King Ari!!tanemi, 230 krtya, 293
King Dasaratha, 230 k~amii, 505
King KeJadi-Venkatendra, 219 kfa1Ja, 182 n.
King of Gaw;la, 148 n. K~a1Ja-bhaizga-siddhi, 49
King of Kanauj, I 26 kfa1}ika, I82 n., 367
kiiicana7fl, 496 ~a1Jikasya, 32 n.
k#ta,325, 327,331 ~a7:zikatva, 368
kikasiisu, 286 n. 2 ~ara, 104
Kleisobora, 543 kfara pu~a, 468
klesa, 304 K!jatak!jina, 431
klesa-jiieyiivara1Ja, 22 n. K~atriya, 292, 486, 487, 502-507, 514
kli~ta, 414 k~iinti, 505 n., 5 IO
kloma, 288, 318, 348 k~iira, 357, 358, 466
Knowability, I40 K~iirapii1;zi-Sa7[lhitii, 432
Knowable, I40 K!1emaraja, 263
Knower, 34, I52 kJetra, 463-465, 471, 472, 523
Knowing, 263; faculty, 179, I8o kfetra-jiia, 293, 410, 464, 468, 523
Knowledge, 18, 19, 66, I27, 148, I5I- k~etrin, 464
153, 228, 246, 248, 256, 266, 272, ~etriya, 297, 298, 30I
333. 368, 373. 374. 376, 378, 403, k#pta, 300
437, 440, 462, 469, 475, 499, 5oo- k#ti, 245. 501
502, 505 n., 508, 510, 523, 529, 534 kfl1Ja-jiigaraka, 266, 267
Knowledge situation, 25 K~urika, 454
kodho,497 kuhi1,353
Koka, 300 Kuk~ila, 300
KoQ.c;la Bhana, 55, Io8 kula-ku1;zf/.alinl, 3 55
kopo, 497 Kula-paiijikii, 225 n.
Kotalipara, 225 n. kulattha, 363
krami1}a/;l sahakiiri1}a/;l, 183 Kuliirka PaQ<;lita, 49, 51, 119-121, 123,
kriyii, 238, 260 124, 147 n.; introduction of his
kriyiikhya~iiiina,491 Mahii-vidyii syllogisms, 12o-122
kriyii-spanda, 238 Kulluka, 538 n. 1
kriyiitmaka, 261 Kumiira-sa7[lbhava, 230
krodha, 267, 489 Kumiirasira Bharadvaja, 357
krodha-•varjana, 505 Kumiirasiras, 316
Krkala, 75 Kumiirila, 87, III, 112, 120, 147, 171,
k!17luka, 298 179.197.214,479.482,483.485
Kr~Q.a, 438, 449, 455, 489, 500, 502, kumbhaka,257,258
503, 507, 512, 516, 518-520, 525, Kunhan Raja, Dr, 87
529-532, 535. 54I, 543. 544. 546, kuntiipa, 296
547; and Vasudeva, 541 ff. Kuntr, 4B
Kr~Q.a Acarya, 79 kU1}f/.alinl, 354, 356, 455
Kp?Qabhatta Vidyiidhiriija, 442 kwJ4ali energy, 356
K~Qa Devaki-putra, 550 ku1}f/.al;; sakti, 3_56
Kr~Qakiinta, 79 Kuppusvami Sastri, 43 n., 84 n., 87,
Krroa-kutill,ala niitaka, 225 188 n.
Index
Kuruk~etra, 502, 507, 518, 536 Ligaments, 324
Kurus, 545 Light, 70, 153, 332, 357, 36o; of con-
KusumiiiiJali, 141, 393 sciousness, 207
Kusilla, 300 Lightness, 358, 360, 362 n.
kusa grass, 446 Liking, 358
kusalotsiilw, 501 Limitations, 14, 22, 200, 252
ku~tha, 293, 294, 297, 298 Limited forms, 23
Kuvalayiinanda, 220 Limited self, I 13
kilrca, 279, 284 n. 3 Limited truth, 3
kiirca-siras, 284 n. 3 Limitless, 73
Kurma, 75 Linguistic, 167
kilrpara, 285 liiz, 480
liizga, I06, 139, 198, 293, 395, 398
laghu, 332, 338, 357, 359 "· liizga-deha, 306 n. 1
Laghu-candrikii, 85, 225 "· liizga-pariimarsa, 139
Laghu-Jiiiina-·viisi!!ha, 232 liizga-sarlra, 75
Laghu-mahii-·vidyii-vifjambana, 123 liizgadibala-labdhiikiirollekha-miitret]a,
Laghu-sa7!l!Iraha, 83 213
laghutii, 362 n. liizgz, 293
Laghu-tzkii, 79 Lips, 348
Laghu-viikya-vrtti, So Liquid, 337 n.
Laghu-viikya-vrtti-prakii.Sikii, 8o Liquidity, 360
Lak!m;ziivalz, 1 2 5 Liquors, 498
Lak~midhara Desika, 79 Literature, 377
Lak!?midhara Kavi, 56 Liver, 288, 318, 348
Lak!?minrsirpha, 52, 108 Living beings, 36
lalanii-cakra, 355 Lizards, 409
laliifa, 287 lzlii, 42
Laizkiivatiira-sutra, 22 n., 35, 127, 234, Lzliivatz, 147 n.
272, 398 lobha, 409, 413, 489, 497
Larger intestine, 289 lobhana1fZ, 497
Laryngeal plexus, 355 lobhitatta'!l, 497
Larynx, 286 n. 2, 353 n. locaka, 330
Laukika-nyiiya-muktiivali, 30 n. Localization, 23
lavali, 360 n. Locus, I9, 110
lavm;a, 312 n. 3, 357, 358 Locus standi, 130
Law, 493; of causality, 31 n. Logic, 377, 390, 392; of probability,
laya, 104 376 n.
Laziness, 335 Logical, 191, 373; apparatus, 51;
liighava, 315, 362 n. argument, 164; categories, 389; con-
liilasii, 497 sequence, 12 ; dialectic, I 91 ; dis-
Liifyiiyana-Sa'Jzhitii, 435 cussions, 127; disputes, 401; fal-
Lean, 337 n. lacy, 17; formation, 118, 119, 125,
Leanness, 333 129; methods, 51; tricks, 401
Learned, 378 Logically, 19
Learning, 505 lohinz, 29I
Legal literature, 279 lohita-viisasal;, 344 n.
Leprosy, 297 lohitii, 317
Levi, S., 429 n. 1 Lokanatha, 57 n.
Liberation, 187, 414, 415, 437, 438, loka-rak!ii, 440
455.469.470,523,546 loka-sa1fZvrta, 4
Lie, 498 n. loka-sa1fZVrti-satya, 5
Life, 360, 368, 405, 498 n. loka-vyavahiiral;, 3 n.
Life-functions, 515 Lokayata, I 7 I
Life of Niigarjuna from Tibetan and lokottara, 22
Chinese Sources, 398 n. lokottara-nirvikalpa-Jiiiina-liibhiit, 21
Life of the Buddha, 276, 424 n. 1 Longing, 497
Life-principle, 472 Looseness, 333
Index
Lord, 442; of communion, 453 mahii-muni/:z, 22 n.
Lorinser, Dr, 549 mahii-pralaya, 109
Loss, 512 Maharaja, 539
Lotus, 3 s6; in the sky, 5, 240; stalks, lltahii-Riimiiy~a, 23 I
350 n. mahiisupti, 104
Love, 497 lvlahiitala, 76
Lower prakr#, 464 Mahii-vagga, 276
Lower puru§a, 465, 467, 468 Mahii-vidyii, 49. SI, liS, 119-124;
lubhanii, 497 nature of its syllogisms, uo-122;
Lumbar nerve, 353 referred to, defended and criticized
Lumbar plexus, 355 by Nyiiya and V ediinta writers, 1 IS-
Lumbar vertebrae, 287 n. 1 I 20; syllogisms refuted by Vadin-
Lungs, 288, 318 dra, 122-124
Lust, 490, 497 M ahii-vidyii-daiaslokf-vivara~a, 123
Lustful, 367 1klahii-vidyii-vi4ambana, 103, 119 n.,
Lymph, 317, 318, 325 120, 122
M ahii- vidyii- vi4ambana - vyiikhyiina,
Macdonell, A. A., 259, 288 n., 345, 12J
346.486 Mahii-vidyii-vivara~-fippana, 123
mada, 267, 413 Mahavr~a, 298 n. 4
madana, 391 Mahii-vyutpatti, 288 n. 1
Madatyaya, 430 Mahayana, 501, 513
Madhu-kosa, 434 Mahayana monism, 164
Madhu-mati, 434 n. 4 Mahayanists, 30
madhura, 312 n. J, 357, 358 Mahesvara, 428
Madhusudana Sarasvati, 53, 55, 56, Mahesvara Tirtha, 83, 196
77 n., 79, 81, 116, 118, 124, 198, Mahimna/:z Stotra, 226
199, 223 n., 226, 227, 443; his line- Mahidhara, 232
age, date and works, 225, 226; his maitra, 51 I
philosophy in his Vediinta-kalpa- Maitra, s. K., 483 n. I, so6 n.
latikii, 227 lv!aitriiya~a, 471
Madhva, 125, 192, 442, 443 Maitriiya~i, 486, 523
Madhva-mukha-bhaitga, 220 Maitreyi-briihma~a, 251
Madhva school, 118 Maitrl Upan#ad, 259 n., 344 n., 345,
madhya-sanra, 3 16 412,448,449
madhya-viveka, 250 majjii, 317, 328
Madras, 84 n., 87 majjiibhya/:z, 289
Magic, 37, 38, 244; rites, 281 Major term, 139
Magical creations, 37, 38, 467 mala, 234, 239, 325, 327, 328, 334
Magician, 37, 38, 206 n. mala-dhiitu, 325, 327
Magundl, 300 mala-piitra, 289 n. 1
mahad brahma, 462 Malformations, 333
mahat, 305, 340 n. Malice, 497
mahatparimii~a, 189 Malicious, 498 n.
Mahii-bhiirata, 274, 276, 306, 394, Malimluca, 300
418, 419, 450 n., 458, 461, 476, 502, Malia Bhatta, 79
508 n., 535 n., 536, 538, 539, 541- Malleoli, 284 n. 4
546, 548, sso, 552 mamaitlwro, 496
Mahii-bhiirata Anukrama~i, 544 mamattarrz, 496
Mahabharata period, so8 mamiiyitarrz, 496
Mahii-bhii~a. 546, 548 Man,445
mahiibhilta, 362, 463 Mana/:z, 230
Mahadeva, 122 manab-kalpanayii, 230
Mahadeva Vaidya, 79 manal:z - pari~al:z samvid - vyaiijako
Mahadeva Vidyavagisa, 79 jiiiinam, 198
M ahii-lakpna-paddhati, 22 s mana/:z-prasiida, 513
Mahamahopadhyaya Kuppusvami, manal:z-spanda, 254
219 manana, 22, 24
Index
manas, 23, 75, 76, 104, 156, I87, 194, MaQibhadda, 539
I96, 206, 227, 232-234. 236-239. ma1)i-pura-cakra, 355
24I, 243. 244, 246, 255. 262, 292, mara~tiinussati, 459
303, 304, 307 n. 5, 308, 34I, 343, Marbles, I 34
347 n., 35 I n., 355, 356, 358, 36o, marma, 340 n.
366,367-369,371,373.458,463 marman, 313 n.
manasi, 369 ~arrow, 289, 29I, 317, 322, 324, 347,
manas-cakra, 355 348, 361
manda, 359 n. Marshy, 370
manda-viveka, 250 mastakiibhyantaroparinhiit Sirii-sandhi-
~an-god, 525, 532 sanmpiita, 342
~anhood, 525 ~aster, 526
~an-hymn, 537 masti~ka, 340
~anifestation,23,174,235 ;ofmind,256 mast#ka7Jl siro-majjii, 340 n.
Manifests, 5 I mastuluitga, 340
Manifold world, 203 matiinujiiii, 388 n.
mano-javena, 304 ~aterial, IO; cause, 10-12, 45, 51, 74,
manomaya, 76 I I4, I4J, I95, I97, 334, 360, 372,
manomaya-ko~a, 7 5 389, 4Io; objects, I78; power, 105;
manomaya puru~a, 344 staff, II, 76, I95, 217; stuff, 109;
mano-niisa, 25I, 252 things, 175; world, 2I, I08
Manoramii tantra-riija-ttkii, 225 1\tlateriality, 10, 45, 114, 236
manoratho, 497 Materia Medica, 429
mano-vahii, 347 n. ~athuriinatha, 443
mano-vahii-niitft, 355 ~athuriinatha Bhattacarya, I I 9
mantra, 277, 278, 536 Mathuranatha Sukla, 78
mantr, 35I matsara, 413
~anu, 61, 449, 505, 542 n. 3, 546 matsnii, 2~8 n. 3
~anukuladitya, 45 n. matsniibhyiim, 288
~anuscript, 49, 1 I2, 204, 205 ~atter, 44, 3I2, 526
manya, 290 n. 3 matup, 400 n.
manyu, 4I2, 413 matha, 99
mangala-homa, 278 1vfatmata, 300
Jl1aiiju-bhiip1)i, 79 mauna, 5I3
~aQ9ana,52,82-87,96-Io2, IIO,II2, l\1auryas, 540
148 n., I98, 204, 224, 283, 335 n., Maxim, 27, 32, 66,161,389,391, 392;
482; all relations are mental in, of identity, 20I
95, 96 ; Brahma-kii1)t/.a of Brahma- Madhava, 2I4, 2I5,428,433-435
siddhi holds that perception does Madhava Sarasvati, 232
not apprehend diversity of objects, ~adhva-Kara, 428
88, 89; his divergence of view from Madhyamika, 165-I67
Sarvajfiatma ~uni, 85; his identity Miidhyamika-kiirikii, 164, 398, 426
with Suresvara the author of the ~iidhyamika-Sautrantika, I64
Nai~karmya-s·iddhi disproved, 86; /ttliidhyamika-siltra, 3, 5 n.
his refutation of the category of Miidhyamika-vrtti,I6S n., 166n., 168 n.,
difference, 92 ff.; his refutation of 307 n. 3
"difference as negation," 97; his miigha, 294
view of avidyii and miiyii, 89; his mii hi1_nsyiit, 493
view of Brahman as pure bliss, as Miilati-Miidhava, 112
elaborated by SankhaoaQi, 90; re- mii1rzsa, 285, 312 n. 3, 317
ferences to his doctrine by other mii7JlSa-dharii, 3 17
Vedantic writers, 84, 85; the author miina, 373
of Brahma-siddhi, 83; the content of /ttliina-manohara, 120, 124
the Niyoga-kii1)t/.a and Siddhi-kii1)t/.a miinasa, 469
chapters of the Brahma-siddhi of, 98; miinasa pratya~a, 69
the general content of the fourth Mii1)t/.zikya, 78
chapter of his Brahma-siddhi, 87, 88 Mii~zcfukya - Gautjapiidtya - bhii~ya -
ma1)i, 359 n., 364 vyiikhyii, I93
5s6 Index
Mii1J.l}fikya-kiirikli, 78, 92, 192 Menstrual flow, 351
Mii1J.l]ukya-Upan#ad-bhiiDJa, 78 Menstrual product, 313
M ii1J.l}i1kya- U pani~ad- bhiiDJiirtha-sa7p- Mental, 24, soo, 504; causes, 187; con-
graha, 78 tact, 139; control, soo; creation, 233,
Mara, 489 235, 243, 245; diseases, 418; func-
miirdava, 510 tions, 464; inclinations, 491; modifi-
miirga, 348 n., 350 cations, 243; movement, 238; opera-
l\1arici, 316, 333 tions, 22; phenomena, 186; state, 15,
MarkaQ.<;ieya, 3 16 153. I87, 258, soo; tendencies, 468
Martal).<;ia-tilaka-svamin, 107 Mercy, 373
miiruta, 361 Merit, 248, 249, 416
miirutiidhi~{hiinatviit, 3 16 Meru, 370
miitsarya, 267 meru da7J.l}a, 352, 353 n.
Mathara Aclirya, 171 Messenger, 230
Miithara-vrtti. 400 n., 401 n. Metacarpal, 285
miiyii, 10, II, 16, 36, 41, 44, 45, 47, Metaphorical, 329
48, so, 51, 72, 73. 77. 84, 89, 104, Metaphysical, 191, 192, 499, 501, 502,
106, 163, 197, 215, 217, 221, 224, 514
238, 239. 271, 473. 477. 524, 525, Metatarsal, 285
533; alone the cause of the world, Method of interpretation, 2
1 1 ; as an instrumental cause (Brah- Methodological, 337
man being the material cause) ac- Methods, 29, 166
cording to Sarvajiiatma Muni, 11; Methora, 543
differences of view regarding its re- mettii, 460
lation with Brahman, 1 1 ; scholastic meya - svabhiiviinugiimznyiim anirva -
disputes as to the nature of its canlyatii, 127
causality, 11 meyatva, 121
miiyii-miitram, 37 Mice, 409
miiyii-nirmitatviibhyupagamiit, 203 Middle discrimination, 140, 250
miiyii power, 4 76 Migration, 406
miiyii theory, 42 Milk, 59, 6o, 97, 175, 322-324, 350
Measure, 148, 194, 360, 370 Mind, 35 ,76, 15 4 , 156,217,232,243·
Mechanical, 360, 369 256, 331, 339, 355, 367, 368, 377,
medas, 312 n. 3, 317, 324, 325 406, 419, 447. 469, 498, soo-so2,
medhii, 328,373 soB, 512, 530
Medhatithi, 251, 394 Mind activities, 470
Medhatithi Gautama, 393 Mind-associated consciousness, 34
Medical, 358 n., 372, 373, 376, 37~; Mind-body, 523
formulas, 435; herbs, 277, 294; Mind-contact, 70
literature, 295, 300, 301, 354 n.; Mindfulness, soo
practitioners, 277; science, 276; Mind-object contact, 69
system, 352; treatment, 303 n. 4; Mind-organ, 227, 310, 314, 366
writers (later), 299 Mind-person, 344
Medicinal, 359 n. Mind-structure, 524
Medicine, 275, 279, 280, 320, 357, Mineral, 333
359, 360, 363-365, 370, 371, 389, Minor term, 139
403 Miraculous, 294; effect, 364
iWedicine of Ancient India, 424 n. 2 Mirage, 5, 29, 230, 234; stream, 233
Meditation, 90, 256, 259, 447, 460, Mirror, 180
493, 494, 500, 501, 51 I Misconception, 479
Meditative union, 446 Misdeeds, 408
Medium, 229 Misery, 41, 178
medo-dharii, 317 Mitii~arii, 82 n., 107
Medulla oblongata, 355 Mithila, 119, 125, 394
Megasthenes, 543 mithuna, 392
Memory, 24, 148,26I,264,373,374 mithyii, 105
Mendicant, 505 mithyiiciira, 493
Menstrual blood, 350, 352 mithyii-jiiiinam, 8, 12, 413
Index
mithyii-jnana-nimittafz, 105 Morbid elements, 319
mithyii-satJWrta, 4, 5 Morbidities, 325
mithyiitva, 148, 152 Morbidity, 336, 360, 362, 365
mithyii-yoga, 321, 405 Mosquitoes, 409
Mitra, 292 Mother-energy, 355
Mixed rasa, 359 Motion, 163, 360
Mixing up, 370 Motionless, 408
Mimarp.saka, 46, 54, 72, 385 Motor dhamani, 351
Mimarp.sa, 46, 56, 57 n., 86, 88, 98, Motor organs, 261
117, 120, 154. 219, 389, 441, 479, Mouth, 156, 325
483-488, 577; vidhi conception, Movement, 188, 235, 352, 365, 371;
479 ff.; vidhi conception, diverse of thought, 254
views on, 481, 482 Moving, 332, 361
Mimli'f!lsiidhikara7Ja-miilii, 220 mrdu, 359 n., 361
Mfmii1!£Sii-sutra, 280 n., 400 n., 401 n., mrgatn'IJikiidayafz, 21 n.
479 mrtyu, 299
MJmiirp.sii view, 99 Mucus, 276
Mimarp.sists, So, 99, 125, 171, 172, Mudga, 358 n.
180 muditii, 412, 460
Mode of mind, 15 mudriis, 455
Modes of Brahman, 44 mukhya, 259 n. 3
Modification, 22, 25, 30, 101, 183, 186, Muktiivali, 225
210, 215, 233. 243. 372 mukti, 245, 272
Modifications of miiyii, 35 Muktika, 51 1 n.
Moggallana, 248 Muktika-Upani~ad, 246, 247 n., 511 n.
moha,4I3-417,498 l\llukundadasa,443
mohanam, 498 Mukundasrama, 82 n.
Moist, 337 n., 361 Multiplicity, 243
Moistening, 361 Mumma<Jideva, 232
Moisture, 358, 360, 365 Mumuk~-vyavahiira, 23 1
mok~a, 44, 227, 229, 249, 267, 407, Mundane, 512
523 muni, 233. so6
mok~a-siidhana, 228 Munidasa, 431
mok~a-siistra, 385, 423 muiija grass, 296
Molqopiiya-siira, 232 Mufijavan, 298 n. 4
Molecular, 194 Mu~ufaka, 345, 551
Momentariness, 66, 184, 186 Mu7Jf!aka-bhii~ya-vyiikhyiina, 193
1\llomentary, 5, 32, 63, 70, 71, 96, 177, Mu7JI!.aka-Upm1i~ad, so, 78, 250
182, 184-186, 201, 367, 368; ap- 260, 344 n., 345, 494, 495, 551
pearance, 32; cause, 185; character, Mu7Jf!aka-Upan#ad-bhf¥ya, 78
182 n.; existents, 32; flashing, 31, Muralidhar, P., 424
63; ideas, 30; imaginations, 233; Muscles, 254
individuals, 59 Music, 498 n.
1\lloments, 15, 26 n., 27 n., 6o, 65, 151, Mutual dependence, 159
182, 184, 206, 211 n., 236, 238 Mutual help, 184
Mongolia, 164 Mutual interdependence, 140
Monism, 43 Mutual negation, 122, 200, 226
Monistic, 204; interpretation, 218; Mutual reference, 158
type, 228; Vedanta, 219; view, Mutual relations, 204
203 mufjhii, 378
Moon, 6, 26, 330, 525 muliidhiira, 453
Moral, 23 n., 24, 378, 404, 464, 484, murdhni, 449
511, 523; conflict, 453,495; destiny, murttiimurtta-riisi, 44
206, 207; discipline, soo; efforts, miltriitisiira, 296
466, 467; elevation, 447, 457; in- Mysterious centre, 356
junctions, 278; life, 418; precepts, Mysterious Ku7J4alinf, The, 353 n.
494 Mysterious operation, 364
Morality, 522 Mysterious power, 356
5ss Index
Mystic, 534 Na<,iuvil Matham, 198
Mystical cognition, 491 Naga, 75, 539
Mystical state, 451 Naganatha, 434
Nagarjuna, 3, 4, 7, 8, Io, 30, 5I, 119,
natja,345 124, 127, I63-I6 5 , I68, I70, I7I,
Nagnaka, 300 '372, 398, 424-428, 436; his criti-
Nails, 325, 326 n. cism of causation as interpreted by
nairilpya, 174 Bhavya and Candrakirti, 164, 166;
Nai~adha-carita, 126, 393 his criticism of causation contrasted
Na#karmya-siddhi, 17, 8o, 82, 84, 99, with that of the Hinayanists, I68;
100, 102, 148 n .. 198, 199, 216, 251 his criticism of the concept of
Na#karmya-siddhi-tlkii, 148 n. "going," 168 ff.; his distinction of
N aifkarmya-siddhi-vivara1}a, 99 limited truth (sa7{lvrta) and absolute
naifthikf, 415 truth (paramiirtha), 3; his view re-
Naiyayika, 51, 71, Io8, n8, 120, 124, garding production and nature of
127, 128, I31 1 I34 1 I39, 1441 146, things, 41; his main thesis of "no
163, 167, 171, 172, 176, 182, 185, thesis," 163, 164, 166, I67
189, 227, 329, 412 Nagesa, 262
na ki7Jlcid avedifam, 154 Nagesvara, 55
Na~atra-kalpa, 283 niik~atrii1}i, 292 n.
Nakula, 432 niima-rilpa, 498
nalam, 345 n. niima-rilpiinkura, 307
Nara, 537, 543 N iima-sa7Jlgraha-miilikii, 220
Naradanta, 428 Nanii Dik~ita, 17, 52, 222 n., 225
Narahari, 57, 231, 443 niiniipe~a-pratiyoginii7Jl bheda!z pratl-
Narasiq1ha, 79 yate, 95
N arasiq1ha Bhatta, 55 niira, 538
Narasiq1ha Kaviraja, 329 n., 434 niiriiya1}a,439,535,537,539,541,543o
na svarilpa-dr~ti!z prati- yogy- ape~ii, 545, 546, 548, 549; conception of,
199 537.538
Natural forces, I85 NarayaQ.a Dik~ita, 54 n.
Natural quality, 502 NarayaQ.a Jyotisha, 57 n.
Nature, 358 n., 501, 525; of conscious- NarayaQ.a Yati, 79
ness, 64; of knowledge, 194; of NarayaQiisrama, 53, 54, 216
things, 372 NarayaQendra Sarasvati, 78
Nauseating, 501 niisikya, 259 n. 3
nava, 385 iiiina-Sa7Jlvara, 500
nava-dviira7Jl, 292 N eamess, 360
Nava-nltaka, 435 Necessary antecedence, 186
N ava-siihasiHzka-carita, I 26 Neck, 336
nava-tantra, 385 Negation, 85, 91, 95, 97, no, 117, IJI,
naviibhyasta-tantra, 385 IJ2, 143, 162, 182, 194 1 222, 223,
Navel, 318, 342, 350, 352, 355 271, 438
navya-nyiiya, 1 24 Negative, 117,121, ISJ;criticism, 192;
na vyavahiira-bijam, 89 instances, 121; pleasures, 90
Naya-ma1}i-miila, 219 Negativity, 193
Naya-mayfikha-miilikii, 219 Neither-real-nor-unreal, I 17
Nayana-prasiidim, 147, 156 n. Neo-realist, 269
niibhi, 289 Nepal, s8 n.
niihhi-kanda, 355 Nerve-physical, 356
niit/.i, 257,263, 289n., 290, 29I, 344- Nerve-plexus, 353-356, 453, 455
346,348, 353-356; its meaning, 345; Nerves, 256, 342, 356
its number, 345 n., 348; its pre- Nervous system, 344, 352, 453
Carakian senses, 345, 346 Nescience, 6, 9, 45, 101, 117, 148, 153,
niit/.fkii, 345 195. 22I, 222,227,449
niit/.f-sa7JlSparsanodyata, 2 56 Neutral, 357, 378
Niit/.f-vijiiiina, 354 New bones, 286 n. 1
niit/.f-vra7Ja, 296 New moon, 5I9
Index
New Testament, 549 nivasi~yasi, 55 I
Nibandha, I92, 497 nivesanam, 497
nibandha-prqpii.fijali, 49 nivrtti, 507, so8
Nibandha-sa'lflgraha, 273, 424, 427 niyama,278,454.455,491
nibbii7)a, 460 niyama-viddhi, 46
nidarsana, 389, 392 niyantii, 332
Nidiina, 30I, 395, 397, 428, 430, 432, niyati, 372, 4IO
433 niyoga, 392, 48 I
Nidii.na-prampa,434 Niyoga-kii.7Jt/.a, 87, 88, 98
Nidiina-sthiina, 395, 425, 428 n'ila, 29
Niddesa, 539, 542, 549 Nilakar:ttha, 274, 443, 545
nidrii, I04 Nilakar:ttha Bhatta, 434 n. 4
nigamana, 379, 387 Nilakar:ttha Dik~ita, 219
Nigama-tattva-siira-tantra, 353 n. niliigalasiilii, 298 n. 6
Nigamanta Mahadesika, 439 nflikii, 297
nigraha-sthiina, 388, 401 n'irandhra, 354 n.
Nihilists, 127, 234 Non-appropriation, 506
ni~lSvabhiiva, 35 Non-being, 143, 148, 203, 238
nif:zse~a-karmiisaya, 249 Non-Buddhistic, 164
nib,sviisa, 327 Non-distinction, 207-209
nijigi1JlSanatii, 496 Non-eternal, I20-I22, 386 n., 387
Nimbarka school, 443 Non-etemality, I9I
Nimi, 357 Non-existence, 28, 193, 217, 243, 5I7
Nimi-tantra, 435 Non-existent, I2, 28, 32, 4I, III, I20,
nimitta, 74, 395 I2I, IS2, ISS. I6I, 173. I94. 224,
nimitta-kiira7Ja, 360 234. 235. 244, 259. 517
nimflite, 257 Non-existing effects, 174
niranuyojyiinuyoga, 389 n. Non-injury,469,5os,5o6,so8-si 1,514
nirarthaka, 389 n. Non-momentary, 182
niriikiirii buddhib,, I8o Non-moral, 403
niriispadii, 21 n. Non-perception, 200
nirdeia, 389, 390 Non-permanency of entities, 185
nir7)aya, 389 Non-pleasurable-painful, 23 n.
Nirukta, 275 n., 346 n., 535, 547 Non-production, 249
nirvacana, 389, 392 Non-self, 6, 101; elements, 24
nirvii7)a, 23 I, 247, 450 n. 1 Non-stealing, 505
nirvii7)a-miitra, 233 Non-transgression, 500
nir-vikalpa, 22, 374, 401 Normal, 335; duty, 509, SI4, 516;
nir-vikiira, 368 measure, 319; state, 339
Niscaladasa Svamin, 216 n. Nose, 325
Niscala Kara, 427, 429 Nostrils, 367
niscaya, I73. 373, 384 Nothingness, 16
niscayiitmikii, 484 n. 1 Nourishment, 307
niscayiitmikii antabkara7Ja-vrtti, 7 5 Nrga, 107
niscayiitmikiib,, 367 Nrsi111hasvarupa, 52 n.
ni~karfa7Ja, 169 Nrsi111ha Thakkura, 443
nifkriya, I63 Nrsirphasrama Muni, 17, 31, 43 n.,
ni~prakiirikiiyiib saprakiirakatvena bhii- 5I-s6, 57 n., 72, 78, 92, I03, 124,
vab,, 224 216-218; his date and works, 216;
nitamba, 285 n. 7, 287 n. 2 nature of his Vedantic interpreta-
Nityabodha Acarya, 11 I tions, 217
nityaga, 368 n. Number, 158, 162, I88, 360, 370
nitya-naimittika, 442 Numerical, 14; difference, 370; quali-
Nityanatha Siddha, 427 ties, I62
nitya-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n. Nutrient, 365 n.
nityatva-prati~edhiit, 386 n. Nutritive, 357, 358; elements, I85
nityatviid, 22 n. Nyaya, 19. 40, 51, 57 n., 107, 115, 117,
nityanitya-vastu-viveka, 495 120, 122, 125-127, I37. 143. I46,
Index
Nyaya (cont.) 328,371,372, 515; analysis of voli-
147, 160, 161, 168, 170, 179, 192, tion, 515; criticism of its categories
205, 211, 248, 306, 307, 375. 379. by Sriha~a, 127 ff.; its categories
393, 394, 415, 482, 483 n. 2, 484, criticized by Anandaji'iana, 193, 19-~;
485, 515, 517; its arguments in its categories refuted by Citsukha,
favour of the existence of God criti- 157 ff.; its categories refuted by
cized by Kamalasila, 176 ff.; its idea Kamalasila, 187 ff.; its categories
of emancipation, 248; its theory of refuted by Sankara, 189 ff.
the subtle body, 306; origin of, Nyiiya-viirttika, 106
392 ff.; springs of action in, 412,413 Nyiiya- viirttika- tiitparya - parisuddhi,
Nyaya, categories, 147, 148, 156, 192; 107
definitions, 163; logic, 167; logi- Nyiiya-viirttika-tiitparya-!ikii, 45 n.
cians, 192; perceptions, 168; philo- nyiiya-vistara, 547
sophy, 145, 398; psychology, 414; nyiiyiiciirya, 122
school, 167; system, 374, 408; view, Nyiiyiimrta, 118, 225
178; writers, 124, 127, 146, 157 Nyiiyamrta-tarangi1)f, 118
Nyiiya-candrikii, 57 n., 425, 428 nyuna, 384,385,388,389
Nyiiya-dipiivall, 51, 116, 118, 192
Nyiiya-dlpiivali-tiitparya-!ikii, 116 Object, 17, 19, 25, 27, 29-31, 35, 88,
Nyiiya-dlpikii, 442 358, 367, 401; of awareness, 20, 29,
Nyiiya-kalpa-latikii, 83 209; of consciousness, 64; of know-
Nyiiya-kandall, 83, 85,249 n., 263 n. 1, ledge, 27
306,412 Object-consciousness, 149
Nyiiya-ka1)ikii, 45 n., 83, 85, 87, 107, Objection, 31, 101, 153
482 n. 1 Objective, 21, 22, 24, so8; conscious-
Nyiiya-loka-siddhi, 49 ness, 236; content, 15; entities, 25;
Nyiiya-makaranda, 12, 49, 69 n., 70 n., existence, 21, 149; experience, 102;
89 n., I 16-118, 147 n., 192, 194 ignorance, 77; plane, 73; self, 34;
Nyiiya-makaranda-sa,graha, 192 world, 20, 236
Nyiiya-makaranda-!ikii, 116 Objectively, 236
Nyiiya-makaranda-vivecani, 1 16 Objectivity, 29, 101, 153
Nyiiya-maiijari, 107, 248 n., 278 n., Oblations, 448, 526
307 n. 1, 381, 382 n., 394 n., 399, Obligatoriness, 46
413, 460 n. 1, 480 n. 1 Obligatory duty, 99, so6
Nyiiya-miilii, 81 Observation, 174, 366, 375
Nyiiya-muktiivali, 219 Obstacle, 377
Nyiiya-nibandha-prakiisa, 107 Occasion, 377
Nyiiya-niT1)aya, 193 Occasional, 368
Nyiiya-parisuddhi, 119, 120 Occipital, 287 n. 5
Nyiiya-ra/eyii-ma1)i, 82 n., 220 Ocean waves, 329
Nyiiya-ratna-Jfkii, 45 n. Odour,320, 355,365
Nyiiya-ratniivau, 77 n. Oiliness, 328
Nyiiya-siira, 120, 122 ojas, 293, 315-317, 324 n., 343, 346
N yiiya-siira-viciira, I 22 Old age, 512, 523
N yiiya-siddhiinta-dipa, 54 Older literature, 104
Nyiiya-siddhiinta-maiijan, 218 n. OM, 494,526
Nyiiya-siddhiinta-mafijarf-vyiikhyiina, Omnipresent, 204, 529
218 n. Omniscience, 22, 39, 53
Nyiiya-sudhii, 148 n. Omniscient, so, 118, 177; being, 135;
Nyiiya-sfici-nibandha, 107, 112 God, 72
Nyiiya-siltra, 107, 248, 273, 371, 374, Oneness, 224; of reality, 129
377, 379-38 I, 383 n. I, 386 n., 387, Ontological, 36, 265, 366, 517, 518;
388 n., 393, 394, 398-401 existence, 73; objectivity, 25
Nyiiya-sutra-vrtti, 393 Operation, 144, 177, 198
Nyiiya-siistra, 393, 394 Operative, 177; action, 137; functions,
Nyiiya-sikhiima1)i, 54 76; principle, 333
Nyiiya-tattviiloka, 45 n. Opposite quality, 190
Nyaya-Vaise~ika, 49, 163, 197, JIO, Opposition, 497
Index 59 1
Oppositional relation, 95 pa~e vyiipaka-pratuya-paryavasiina-
Oppositional term, 95 baliit, 121
Organ, 357, 358, 365 pakviiiaya,3I6,317, 330,336
Organism, SIS Palate, 348
Organized, soo Palatine process, 287 n. 4
Organizer, 176 palita, 297
Oriental Hi~torical Manuscripts, 219 Palljaka, 300
Oriental Manuscript Library, 205 Pancreas, z88 n. 3
Origin, 239, 410 n., 526 Pandit, 1711., 217, 222 n., 223 n., 224n.,
Origination, 4, 161, 235; of the sub- 225 n., 270 n.
stratum, 12 Pandit, Mr, 111, II2
Orissa, 164 Panjpur, 429
Orthodox school, 369 panthii, 348 n.
Os calcis, 284 n. 3 Pantheism, 45 I
Oscillating movement, 238 Pantheistic, 1
Oscillation, I s8 Pantzinor village, 429, 430
Os innominatum, 285 n. 7 paiica-dasiiizga yoga, 454
"Osteology," 424, 434 Paiicadasr, 214, 215, 216 n., 251 n.
Otherness, 131, 132 paiica-mahii-bhuta-vikiiriil;z, 3 s8
Oughtness, 482 Paii.canada, 429
Outbursts of pleasure, 245 Paficanallya kiivya, 126
Ovary, 290, 302, 307, 309 Paiica-piidikii, 8, 31 n., 52, 54, 102,
Owls, 409 103, 106, 148, 209, 251
Paiica-piidikii-dhyiisa-bhii~ya-vyiikhyii,
Pada-candrikii, 232, 434 31 n.
Pada-maiijarl, 297 n. 4 Paiica- piidikii- siistra- darpat)a, 3 I n.,
Pada-yojanikii, 79 103
padiirtha, 389, 390 Paiica-piidikii-vivara'l)a, 17, 30, 31 n.,
Padiirtha - candrikii - prabhiisa - nama, 32, 33 n., 34 n., 52, 53, 79, 84, 103,
436 148, 149, 193, 206 n., 208-210 1 214,
Padiirtha-nin:taya, 44 216
Padiirtha-tattva, 10 Paiica-piidikii-vivara'l)a-bhiiva-prakiiSi-
Padiirtha-tattva-nin;.aya, so, S I, 57 n. kii, 31 n.
Padiirtha-tattva-nin:taya-vivara'l)a, I 93 Paiica-piidikii-vivara'l)a-prakiiiikii, 54,
Paddy, 358 n. 103, 217
padma, 356 Paiica-piidikii-vyiikhya, 52 n.
Padmanabha Pai).<;iita, 126 n. Paiica-prakriyii, 52 n.
Padmapada, 8, 9, 30, 3 In., 32, 34, 47, Paiica-riitra, 461, 491, 546, 547,
48, 51, 54, 79, 86, 89 n., 102, Io6, 548 n.
147-149, 151, 209; causality of Paii.casikha, 476
Brahman, 106; his followers, 102, paiica-vidham adhyiitman, 537
103; his view of perception, etc., paiicendriya-gu'l)iivahii, 355
105, 106; meaning of ajiiiina, 104, paiiczkara'l)a, 74 n., 76
105; quarrel with Buddhists re- Paiicikara'l)a-bhiiva-prakiisikii, 79
garding the nature of existence, 32; Paiiclkara'l)a-prakriyii, 79
regarding the nature of self-con- Paiiclkara'l)a-tiitparya-candrikii, 79
sciousness, 33 ff. Paiict.kara'l)a-tlkii-tattva-candrikii, 79
Padma-purii'l)a, 393 Paiiczkara'l)a-viirttika, 79
padma-yugma-traya, 257 Paiiclkara'l)a-viirttikiibhara'l)a, 79
Paila, 432 Paiiclkara'l)a-vivara'l)a, 79, 193
Pain, 175, 181, 203, 242, 248, 343, Paiijikii, 3 I n., 171
360, 366, 369, 371, 373. 412, 463, paiiiiii, soo, 504
470, Sio-SI2 pa'l)idhi, 497
Painful, 23 n., 242 para,36o,369, 370,378
Painting, 203 parab iitmii, 368
Paippalada, 283 paraloka#a'l)ii, 405
pakja, 121, 139 parama-guru, 86
pak~a-dharmatii, 148 parama-ha1Jlsa, 252 n.
592 Index
Parama-hatftSa-Upan#ad, 252 n. Pataiijali, 259 n., 265, 304 n., 403, 408,
parama7Jl pada'J!l, 228 4IO n., 4I4, 431,436,443,447,451-
parama-sulqma, 4I I 455, 458, 460, 461, 476, 477. 491,
Paramananda, I 26 n. 492, 504, 539. 540, 542. 543, 546,
paramiitzu, 189, I9J 548, 549
paramiirtha, 5 Patafijali-sutra, 5 I7
paramiirtha-darsana, 248 Patella bone, 285 n. 4
paramiirtha-prapii, 443 Path of wisdom, 495
paramiirtha-rupa, 4 Pathology, 434
paramiirtha-satya, 3 Patience, J6o, 50o-502,5IO
paramiitman, 445, 446, 455, 46I, 465, Patient, 296
466 patitthii, 459, 500
paramiitma-riisi, 44 pafigho, 497
Paramesvara, 53, 2o6 paurtzamiisz, 292 n.
param ojas, 343 pauru~a, 252-254,272,525
pararrz dhiima, 533 pau~a-viidins, 402
para puru~a, 468 Pau~a, 294
paraspariidhyiisa, I I 3 Pau~kalavata, 424
parasparopakiiritii, I 84 Pau~kaliivata-tantra, 435
para-tantratii, IO pa~#ka, 28I, 296
para-vijfiapti-vise~iidhipatyiit, 21 n. pavamiina, 292 n.
pariidi, 369 pavana, 333
para prakrti, 465 Pamnasa demon, 300
pariirtha, 4I2 piicaka, 303, 330
Parasara, 25 I Piidma-tantra, 548 n. 3
Pariisara-sa'J!lhitii, 432 piika, 362 365, 370
Pariisara-smrti, 83, 252 n. Pal).gava, 502, 545
paribandho, 497 Pal).gya, 2I9
Paribhii~ii, 53 Pal).ini, 297 n., 538-540, 542, 543
Parietal, 287 n. 5 pii'IJi-piida-saliikiidh#thiina, 285 n. 3
pariggaho, 496 piitzi-piidiinguli, 285 n. I
parigraha, 409 papa, 522
parihiira, 388 piiramiirthika, 2, 44
Parimala, Io6 n. piira7Jlparya, 374
paritziima,2I,38,39.44,46, I72, I90, Parasarya, 3 I 6
193, I94, 224, 370, 372, 4IO; cause, piiribhapka, 363
45; doctrine, I7I; view of causation, piirimiitzt;lalya, I89; measure, I90
45 Parsvanatha, 544
paritziimi-kiiratza, 5 I piirft)l, 284
paripiika, 27 n. piirthiva, 359
parisQ7Jlkhyii-vidhi, 47 pf'4atztja, 54I
parispanda, 256 pii§iitzavat-samam, 266
pari~at, 378 Pataii.jala-Sarpkhya, I77
Parjanya, 300 n. 2 piitiila, 76, 300
paro/qatviid acintya7Jl, 316 Patrasvarnin, I72
Particles, I57 Pataliputra, 427
Particular, 63 piifimokkha-sa7JlVara, 500
Partless, I57, 158, 190, I99 Pea, I69
Parts, 40 Peace, 444, 450, 490, 500, 501, 503,
Parvataka-tantra, 435 5II
paryanuyojyope/qatza, 389 n. Peacefulness of mind, 5IO
Passion, 229, 373, 414, 4I9, 45I, 453, Pearl, 525
459, 477, 489, 493. 497. 498, 529, Peculiarities, I59
531 Pelvic bone, 287 n. I
Passionlessness, 47 5 Pelvic cavity, 285
Passive, 24 Pelvis, 340, 348
paiavab, 292 n. pema7Jl, 497
paiyantl, 353 Penances, 539
Index 593
Penis, 296, 326 n. Philosophy, 44, 51, 66, 73, 228, 504,
People, 509 509,517, 525; of BadarayaJ.la, 36
Perceived universe, 241 Phlegm, 299, 300, 325, 365, 391
Perceiver, 22, 67, 135, 139, 155, 2oo- Phlegmatic diseases, 299
202, 209, 234. 341 Physical, 238, 369, 404, 504; diseases,
Perceiving, 330; power, 200; principle, 418; process, 48; propulsion, 48o;
199 sciences, 273; trouble, 512; world,
Perceiving-self, 200 270
Perception, 17, 18, 20, 21, 65, 88, 92, Physician, 277, 278, 328 n., 338, 357,
u6, II7 1 135, 145, 148, 159, 167, 387, 389, 392, 415
x8o, 187, 192, 194, 200, 202, 205, Physiological activity, 331
207, 208, 212, 213, 226, 234, 254, Physiological effects, 360
269, 270, 302, 373. 374. 377. 401, Physiological functions, 261, 263, 331,
407; of identity, 65 333
Percepts, 270 Physiological operations, 332, 335
Perceptual, 77; data, 156; experience, Physiological position, 332
105; knowledge, 77, 192; process, picchila, 359 n., 361
208, 217 pihii, 497
Percipi, 19 Pilgrimage, 230, 441, so8
Performance, 502 Pillar, 26
Perfwnes, 498 n. piizgalii, 257, 292, 353 n., 354, 453,
Pericardium, 284 n. 3 454
Permanence, 186 pi't)tf,a, 43, 312 n., 314
Permanent, 22, 179, 241, 368, 369; pipiisii, 496
consciousness, 71; convictions, 240; pipiisii-sthiina, 288 n. 1
entity, 22; perceiver, 187; self, 71, Pipe, 346
179; subject, 366; substance, 145 pippali, 299 n. I
Persistence, 18, 67; of knowledge, 18 Pischel, R., 345 n.
Persistent, 188, 241 Pisiica, 282, 300
Persisting cause, 183 Pisiica-veda, 274 n. 3
Persisting entity, 183, 184 pitr-yiina, 519, 521
Person, 252, 255, 367 pitta, 257, 276, 282, 296, 300, 317,
Personality, 1 Io, 524 319, 320, 325-337. 339. 341, 344.
Perspiration, 351 ; channels, 348 347. 349. 350, 361, 362, 365, 392,
Pessimism, 414, 504 524; nature of, 330, 331
Pessimistic tendency, 521 pitta-dharii, 317
pen, 314, 318 pittala, 334 n.
Petta Dik~ita, 54 n. pitta-prakrti, 328, 334
phala, 359 pittiisaya, 350
phala-tyiiga, 444 pithara-piika, 194
phale ner~yu, 420 piyato, 490
Phantom show, 1 1 pllu-piika, 194
pha't)0,342,351 Placenta, 291
Pharmacopreia, 277 Planet, 333
Pharyngeal plexus, 355 Plant, 333, 359
Phiilguna, 294 Plato, 506
Phenomena, 177, 501 Playful activity, 42
Phenomenal, 126, 127, 167, 499; Playful instincts, 178
appearance, 48; reality, 167; self, plan, 289
415 Pleasantness, 358
Phenomenon, 374 Pleasing, 337 n.
Philosopher, 38, 446 Pleasurable, 23 n., 242; experience,
Philosophic, 502; analysis, 467; know- 91; state, 181
ledge, 246, 523; truth, 504; view, Pleasure, 68, 175, 247, 248, 343, 360,
2; wisdom, 494 366, 369, 371, 373. 374· 404, 412,
Philosophical, 228, 501 ; development, 452, ~63,487, 504,508-512,520
48; idea, 366; ignorance,417; truth, Pleasure-seeking, 507
230 Plexus, 353 n., 356
594 Index
plihan,288 prajniipariidha, 321, 339, 405, 415-
Pluralistic experience, 204 418,422
Plurality, 38, 39, 95, 161, I95; of prakarat;za, 57 n., 231
causes, I6I Prakarat;za-pancikii, 249
Points of dispute, 389 prakara7Ja-sama,38on., 382n., 386,387
Poison, 359 n., 361, 497 Prakatiirtha-vivaraTJa, 46, 49, so, 72,
Polemic, I26, I27 196-I98, 205, 206, 213; its philo-
Polemical, 204 sophy, dates, etc., 196-I98
Poles, 208 prakiiSa-h~atviit, 197
Politics, 385 Prakasananda, I7-I9, 31 n., 52, S;>,
Polluting agents, 326-328 55, 56, 84, 22I, 223-225, 270; Brah-
Pollution, 4o8, 409 ma and the world in, 224; discus-
Popular belief, 377 sions regarding awareness in, I7-
Positive, 47; cause, 197; entity, 182; I9; discussions regarding subjective
experience, I54; knowledge, 154; idealism in, I7; miiyii in, 224; nature
quality, 152; unity, I53 of ajniina in, 222; nature of iinanda
Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, in,223; negative dialectics of, 18, I9;
253 n., 356 n. quarrel with Vasubandhu of, 19;
Positivity, I93 theory of causality in, 221-223;
Possession, I58 view-point of his work, 220, 221;
Postures, 455 works of, 225
po~aka-rasa, 323 n. Prakasanubhavananda, 17 n.
Potency, 8, JI, 175, 359, 361-363, Prakasatman, 9, Io, 17, 30, 33, 82, 84,
370 89,10J-1o6, II8,148,I49,151,I9J,
Potency-in-chief, 364 208-2I0, 214, 222-224, 234; his
Potential, 23 n.; ajniina, 53; energy, quarrel with the Buddhists regard-
356 ing nature of objects, 30, 31
Potentialities, 24 Prakiisiitma-Sri-carat;zail;, I04
Potter, 249 prakopa, 335 n.
Potter's wheel, 246 prakrti, 42, 72, 101, 104, 109, 175, 177,
Power, 8, 22, 2IS, 243, Sio; of con- I8I, 238, 239, 250, 258, 265, 272,
trolling others, 505 n.; of produc- 334. 335. 372, 388, 4IO, 440, 455,
tivity, 26 n. 457. 461-465, 467, 473. 477. 478,
Prabandha-parisodhinl, 52 n. 482, SIS, SI6, 525, 526, 533. 534
Prabhakara, 66, 67, 69, I47, I54, ISS, prakrti-do~as. 335 n.
I97, 249, 483, SIS; his analysis of prakrti-miina, 335 n.
illusion, I54; his idea of emanci- prakrti'f!l yiinti miimikiim, 526
pation, 249 pralaya, 37, 48, I9I
prabhiiva, 323,362,364-366 pramii, 128, IJ7, I94, 206, 2I2, 213
Prabodha-candrikii, 443 pramiida, 4IJ
Prabodha-candrodaya niitaka, 220 pramii7Ja, 77, I28, 137, I67, 194, 204,
Practical action, 152 222, 254. 373. 375. 376, 379. 380,
Practical discipline, 500 384 fl.
Practical movement, ISS pramiir;a-caitanya, 207, 208
Practice, 487, 500, SI4 Pramii1Ja-manjan, I 20, I 24
prade/a, 389, J9I Pramii1Ja-miilii, 12, I3, 51, 116, 118,
pradhiina, I72, 370,440 148, 192
Pradyumna, 543, 545 pramii1Ja-samuccaya, 44
Pragalbha Misra, 126 n. Pramiit;za-viirttikiilaizkiira, 49
Pragmatic, 371; basis, 152 Pramii1Ja-viirttikiilaizkiira-!lkii, 49
Praise, 5I2 Pramii1Ja-vidhva1J1.Sana, 398 n.
prai~ya-prai~ayofz sambandha/:z, 481 Pramii1Ja-vidhva1JI.Sana-sambh/4ita-vr-
prajii/:z, 292 n. tti, 398 n.
Prajapati, 484 Pramiit;za-vrtti-nirt;zaya, I 98
prajnapti-sat, s8 pramiitr, 77, 105
prajnii, 24,265,491,504,548 prameha, 343 n.
Prajfiakara Gupta, 49 Pram~a-dfpikii, 442
PrajiianAnanda, 79, 196 pram~atviit, 121
Index 595
pramiti, 77 pratyiitma-ved_va, 22
Pramodapurandara Acarya, 225 n. pratyetavya, I9
pra1J.etii, 332 pratyudiiharati, 342
prasaizga, 389, 391 PraUijhiinubhuti, 81
prasaizga-pratidntiinta-sama, 380 n. 4 Pravacana-bhii~a, 250
prasaizga-sama, 381 n. pravartanii, 482
prasiida, 3I8, 325, 492 pravartate, 3 I4
prasiida-dhiitu, 325 pravrtti, 389, 507
prasiira, 336 n. pravrtti-siimarthya, I30
Prasthiina-bheda, 225 prayatna, 238, 369-37I
prasyandana, 349 prayatniidi, 37I
prasama, 335 prayatniinta, 369, 370
Prasastarnati, I72 prayatniintanyaka, 381 n.
Prasastapada, I62, 249, 412, 4I3, 505, prayatniintarlyakatva, 382 n.
5I5 prayojana, 383, 384 n. I
Prasastapiida-bhii~ya, I6J n. priikrta-miina, 3I9, 320
Prasnanidhana, 428 priiktana, 253
Praina-Upan#ad, 78, 290n., 344 n., priimii1Jya, 214
345 prii1Ja,75.76, 104,258-z6o, 262,291,
Prasna- Upan#ad-bhii~a, 78 292, 303, 311, 332, 3J3, 340, 342,
prathamii-bhfimikii, 264 344,346,347,349,352,356,373,448,
pratibandha, I76 449; as depending on the head, 340;
pratibimba, 48 as vibration, 263 ; as vital parts, 342;
pratibimba-viida, I06 channels of, 347, 348 ; heart the
pratijnii, 379, 387 centre of, 340; history of the mean-
pratijfiii-hiini, 388 ing of, 259 ff.; seat of, according to
pratijniintara, 388 n. Caraka, 342
pratijnii-sannyiisa, 388 n. prii1J.Qi~a1Jii, 405
Pratimii-niifaka, 394 n. prii1Ja-karmii1Ji, 448
pratinivi~tii, 378 prii't}amaya-ko~a, 76
pratipak~a-bhiivanii, 460 prii't}a-nirodha, 258, 268
pratipannopiidhau n#edha- pratiyogit- prii~za-sarrzyamana, 454
vam, 222 prii't}a-spanda, 256, 257
pratipannopiidhiiva-pratiyogitva, 217 prii't}a-vahii, 3 I8
pratisa1{lSkartr, 425 priitJa-vahiiniirrz srotasii7p hrdayarrz mil-
prati~!hii, 279, 285 lam, 343
prat#fhiipanii, 379 prii't}a viiyu, 348, 355
prati-tantra-siddhiinta, 383 prii1Jiipiina-gatl ruddhvii, 448
prattkopiisanii, 448, 488 prii1Jiiyasviihii,448
prattta, I9, 128 prii'l)iiyiima, 256, 257, 447-449, 452-
pratitya-samutpiida, 3 n., 8 455, 458
pratyabhijnii, 33,65,67 priipty-apriipti-sama, 38o n. 4, 38I n.
pratyag iitman, 6 priirabdha-karma, 247, 250
Pratyagbhagavan, 147 Priitisiikhyas, 276
Pratyag-rupa-bhagavan, I I9 n. priitlttka-sattva, 270
pratyak, 63 priiyas-citta, 275, 278, 28I, 295, 296
pratyak-cit, I IO Pre-condition, 405, 506
pratyak-citi, 9 Predatory birds, 409
Pratyak-svarupa-bhagavat, I56 n. Predominance, 367
pratya~a, 92, I94, 207, 373, 374, 376, Preferment, 50I
379, 407, 41 I Preparatory measure, 500
Pratyak~adevayathacarya, 439 prera1Ja, 481
Pratyak~a-siinram, 354 n. Presentation of the false, I54
Pratyak-tattva-pradipikii, 222 n., 223 n. Pride, 267, 373, 409, 509-511
pratyaktva, J: 15 Principle of consciousness, 20, 22
praty-anuyoga, 384 Principle of difference, 6o
pratyaya, 395 Principle of intelligence, 20
pratyiihiira, 454, 45 5 Principle of thought, 3 5
Index
Privilege, 505 PuQQabhadda, 539
prl~ana, 328 pu~ya, 522
Probability, 373 pupphusa, 258 n., 3 I8
Probandum, I20, I2I, I39, I40 Puriil)a, 43, 74, 78, 228, 279, 328,
Probans, 139 547
Proceedings and Trallsactionsof the First Purii~a-veda, 274 n. 3
Oriental Conference, Poona, 400 n. Pure, 36, 303; annihilation, 234;
Proceedings of the Madras Oriental awareness, 33; being, I3; bliss, I3,
Conference, 232 90,113,215, 223; blissfulness, 92;
Process, 256, 377 cessation, 234; consciousness, 22,
Procreator, 525 30, 33-35, 46, 65, 7I-74, 77, IOI,
Product, I3, 1~, 23, 33I; complexes, 4 I05, Il8, I79. I8I, 197. 203-207,
Production, II, I8, 25, 32, 37, 38, 4I, 209, 2II, 227, 235, 236, 238, 241-
62,166, I68,I73,I74,I77, I82,I84, 243; essencelessness, 234; extinc-
I86, 187, I9o, 235, 236; of action, tion, 233; happiness, 22; idea, 234;
473; of knowledge, I8 intelligence, 8, I3, 2I, 22, so, 89 n.,
Prognostication, 396, 397 I02, IIQ, 233, 477; negation, 234;
Prohibitions, 504 thought, 24; vacuity, 235
Projection of objectivity, 25 Purificatory rites, 278
Proof, I28 Purity, 469, 502, 505, 5IO, 5II, 5I3,
Proper discernment, I34 5I4, 542; of heart, 510; of mind,
Proper measure, 325 438,44I
Proper proportion, 327 pur~a, 3I7
Property, 357-360, 365, so6 purl~a-dharii, 3I7
Propulsion, 48I, 482 puntat, 344
Prosperity, 50 I puru~a, I81, 234, 24I, 250, 251, 255,
Protection, 505 265, 272, 379. 380, 385, 388, 440,
Proud, SIO, 511 457, 458, 46I, 465-467, 472, 477,
Pr~tha-gatiisthi, 287 n. I 524, 537
Pr~tih, 286 puru~alz parafz, 465
Prthak, 370 puru~a-kiira, 256
Prthaktva, I94, 370 pu~a-niiriiya~a, 537
Prthivi, 75 PurUfa-niicaya, 342 n.
Psychical frame, IOS PurUfa-sukta, 523, 524, 537
Psychical process, 48 purUfiirtha, 547
Psychological, 108, 265, 366; appear- puru~ottama, 55, 4I6, 466
ance, 32; constituents, 58; duality Puru!}Ottama Dik!}ita, I I 5
of awareness, 29; elements, 58-6o; Puru!}Ottama Sarasvati, 79, 225
entities, 59; existence, 73; experi- Puru!}ottamavana, I20
ence, 170; ignorance, 12, I09; pury-anaka, 245
necessity, 25; objectivity, 25; objects Pus, 325, 330
of awareness, 29; self, 9; thought, PUfpiifijali, So
35 puraka, 257, 258
Psychologically, 3 I PurQaprajiia, I 20
Psycho-physical parallelism, 339 PiirQak!}a Maudgalya, 357
Psychosis, 24, 29, 250, 254, 464 Pur~nanda, 232, 354 n.
Psychosis-transformations, 22 Pliil).ananda Sarasvati, 79
Pthisis, 288, 299 PurQananda Tirtha, 78, 79
Pubic, 348; bone, 285 n. 7; nerve, PurQananda Yati, 353 n.
353 purva, 400 n.
Pubis, 285 n. 7 purva-kiila-bhiivitva, I 6o
Public good, 485 purva-pa~a, 389, 39I
pudgala, 58, 59 purva-prajfiii-sarrzskiira, I04
Pudgala-viniscaya, 58 n., 59 n. purva-ropa, 336 n., 396, 397
punar-ukta, 388, 389 n. purvavat, 398-400
Punan·asu, 395 PUrvottara - mimiimsii- viida- naksatra-
Punarvasu Atreya, 393 miilii, 2I9 . .
Pungent, 337 n., 357-359, 363 pu~a. 353
Index 597
pfitikii, 296 riiga, 267,4I3,4I4,4S9,497
piiya, 330 n. riiga-dve~a, 420
riigiidi, 369
Qualification, 1S6 Raghavananda,7S, IIS
Qualitative change, I 5 Raghavendra Svamin, 443
Qualities, 5, 143, I4S, I52, ISS, I6I, Raghavendra Yati, I7 n.
I62, IS7, 190, 359, 360, 369-374, riija-karmii1Ji, 296
37S, 462, 50 I, 505 n., 5 I5 Raja Makhindra, 21S
Quick, 337 n. riijasa, 367, 373, 46S-47o
Quickness, I56 Riija-taraizgi1}t, 43 I
Rajanaka, 443
Race, 50I riik~asas, 2S3
Radius, 2S5 n. 6 Rama, 229,230,255,507,546
Rage, 497 Ramabhadra, 79
Raghunatha, I46 Ramabhadra Dik~ita, 43 I
Raghunatha Siromai).i, II9, I24, Ramabhadrananda, 56
126 n. Ramabhadrasrama, 55
Rains, 59, J2I, 327, 335, 370 Ramacandra, 79, 23S
rajas, 72, 74, 75, 303, 3I4, 3I9, 329, Ramacandra Tirtha, 79
367, 372,4I9,436.4s6,46S Ramacandra Y ajvan, 220
rajas element, 26I Ramacandrarya, Sz n.
rajo-vahana-niifjyal:z, 344 n. Ramadatta, 99
Rajputana, 539 Ramadeva, 23I
Rajshahi, 49 Ramakai).tha, 443
Rajwade, V. K., 55I n. Ramakr~J.la, 53, 216 n., 443
Rak~a!,z, 300 Ramakr~J.la Adhvarin, zoS
rakta, 3I7, 324, 326, 327, 339, 352 Ramakr~J.la Bhatta, 434 n. 4
rakta-dharii, 3 I7 Ramakp;;Qa Dik~ita, 54
rakta-du~ti. 324 RamanarayaQa, 443
ram, 55I Ramanatha, 57 n., 434
Rangaraja Adhvarin, 54 Ramanatha Vaidya, 434
Rangaraja Makhindra, 21S Riimarfidn, 264 n.
Rangoji Bhatta, 55, 1oS Ramatirtha, 52, s6, 79. S5, II I, 115,
raiijaka, 330 I IS, I9J
rasa, I94, 236, 302, JI2 n. 3, 317,322- Ramadvaya, I97, I9S, 204, 205, zoS,
325, 327, 32S, 339, 343 n., 347, 34S, 2I2-2I4; ajiiiinas as many, 2IO, 21 I;
350, 357-366, 390, 391 continuity of perception through a
rasa-dhiitu, 323 rapid succession ajiiiina covering
rasa-du~ti. 324 and its removal in, 2I I; his date and
Rasa-ratniikara, 427 work, 204, 205; his definition of
Rasa-sara, I 23 right knowledge different from that
rasa-sthiina, 350 of Vediinta-paribhii~ii, 212; his re-
rasa-viihim, 34S n. lation with Paiica-piidikii, 209, 210;
Rasiibhivyaiijikii, 56 his theory of Vedantic perception in
Rasiitala, 76 contrast to that of Vediinta-pari-
rasiiyana, 276, 30I bhii~ii and Sikhiima1}i, 225 ff.; his
Rasiiyana-tantra, 425 view different from that of the
Rasika-raiijint, 443 Vediinta-paribhii~ii on the subject of
rati, 490, 497 the continuity of perception, 211;
Ratnakirti, 49 his view of time, 2 11, 2 I 2 ; move-
Ratna-prabhii, IOJ, I04, 429 ment of vrtti and perception, zoS-
Ratna-tfilikii, 56 2IO; place of anta!,zkara1Ja in per-
Ratna Vajra, 49 ception, zoS-2I2; pure conscious-
rauk~ya, 337, 362 n. ness and perception, 2 I I
Ravigupta, 432 Ramajiia Pai).<;leya, 225 n., 226
Ray Chaudhury, Dr, 544, 550 Ramananda, 52 n., Sz n., 439
Radheya, 4S Ramananda Sarasvati, IO, 3 I n., s6.
Ra<;lhamalla, 326 n. So, IOJ, I96
Index
Ramanandatirtha, 79, 232 Relativity, I 57
FUunanuja,43, I25,20I,2I9,262,439, Rele, 353 n., 354
44I,442, 542 Religion, 525
Riimiinuja-bhii~a, 262 n. 2 Religious, 367, 509, 525; discipline,
Riimiinuja-mata-kha1_ujana, 220 488; duty, 505; endeavours, 488
Riimiiya'l}a, 229, 230, so6 Remoteness, 369
Riimiiya'l}a-bhiirata-siira-sa't[lgraha, 220 Renunciation,252,444,457.458,sio,
Riimiiya'l}a-siira, 220 5I4
Riimiiya'l}a-siira-sa't[lgraha, 220 Repentance, so8
Riimiiya'l}a-siira-stava, 220 Repetition, 3 6o
Riimiiya'l}a-tiitparya-niY'l}aya, 220 Reply, 388
Riimiiya1}a-tiitparya-sa1fll5raha, 220 Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts, 2I9
Ramendra Yogin, 57 n. Repository, 22
Ramesvara Bharati, 82 n. Repulsions, 239
riisi, 44 Resemblance, 13 I
React, 23 Resolution, 253
Real, 117, I67, 27I; God, 2;ignorance, Respiratory process, 258 n. 1
4; objects, 26; souls, 2; substance, Responsibility, SOl, sos, 507. soB
23; transformation, 38, 39, 44; Result, 376
world, 2, 20 Retentive power, 373
Realism, 27I Revelation, I3-I6, I97
Realistic, I, 2, 2I3; definitions, I63, Reward, 503
I68; interpretation, 38; logic, I67; Rhetoric, 220
transformation, 38, 39, 44 Rhetorician, I7I
Reality, 5, IS, 20, 73, I IS, I65, I8I, Ribs, 286 n. 2
I86, I93, I95, 206 n., 236, 245, z68, Rice, 358 n.
499 Right cognition, I34, 136, I37
Realization, 233, 239, 524 Right conduct, 405, 406, 423
Rearing, 505; of cows, 505 n. Right knowledg(', 99, I53, I8I, I87,
Reason, I20, I2I, I23, I39, I48, I94, I94, 206, 2I2, 2I3, 229, 239, 248,
375 251, 261
Reasoning, 24, 376, 377 Right perception, 135
Rebirths, 75, 90, 305, 407, 465, 52o- Right thinking, 90
523, 530 Right volition, soo
recaka, 257, 258 Ritual, 547
Recentes Decouvertes de MSS. Midi. Ritualistic, 284
caux Sanscrits dans l'Inde, 425 n. Rockhill, W., 276, 277, 424 n. I
Receptacle, I79, 526 roga-bh#ag-jitiya-vimiina, 377
Recognition, 65, 67, I84 rohi'l}l, 3I7, 396
Recognition of identity, 33, 34, 66; in romiivarta, 342
Buddhism and Vedanta, 33 ff. Root, 347, 365; desires, 243; inclina-
Rectum, 288, 318, 331, 336, 348, 35I tions, 243, 255
Red, 27, 344 n., 349 Rooted instincts, 248
Reed, 346 Root-impression, 3 I
Reflection, 50, 55 Rope,7, 37,73, Io6
Refutation, 127, I46, I47, I6o, I88, Rosy, 349
I89, I92; of action, I88 Roth, 274, 283
Relation, IS, 22, 24, 25, 34, 44, 96, I06, Rough, 332, 338
I2I, I44. 146, IS2, 158, I59. I67, Roughness, 360
I73. 19I, 203, 204, 372, 374. 397; ruci, 497
of identity, 34; of inherence, I48, Rudimentary element, 76
IS8, I87-I89; of inseparability, Rudra, 538
I94 Rug-viniscaya, 434
Relationing, 3I rilk~a, 332, 338, 357, 359, 361, 363,
Relationship, I52 398
Relative concept, 9I rilpa, 377
Relative space, 157 rapatva, 374
Relativistic, I64, 2I3; philosophy, I64 rilpin, 202
Index 599
rilra!z, 298 n. 4 samaveta-samaviiya, 374
~-Veda,28I,345,346,394,486, 535, samaya-viruddha, 385
537 sama-yoga-viihin, 3 19
~g-Vedic, 301; hymns, 28o; sacrifices, samiidhiina,459, 500
281 samiidhi, 24, 251,452,454,455,484 n.,
IJ..ju-vivara1}a, 52 n. 500, 504
~k,274.390, 526 samana,75,258,260,291, 332
~k~griva, 300 sambandhi-svabhiiva-janya, 142
r#, 295 n. 3, 394, 539 sambandhi-svabhiiva-Srita, 142
rtava!z, 292 n. sambhiivanii-bhiiO'a, 103
Sameness, 511; in all situations of life,
sabhiiga-santati-vicchediikhya'!l, 21 n. 511; in blame, 511; in joy, 511; in
Sabhii-parva, 544 praise, 51 1 ; in sorrow, 51 1
sac-chiistra, 267 samlclna, 370
Saccidananda, 79 samuccaya, 389, 392
Sacral nerve, 353 samudga, 287
Sacral plexus, 3 55 samutthiina, 395
Sacrifice, 353 n., 437, 441, 448, 473, Samyagbodhendra Sarpyamin, 52 n.
479, 483, 485, 487, 501, 504-506, samyagjfiiiniidhigama, 249
510, 513, 514, 523, 526, 535, 537 samyak, 135
Sacrificial, 43 n., 494; actions, 493; samyak-paricchitti, 1 34
duties, 474, 479; performance, 522 sa'!lbhava, 384
sacro-coccygeal plexus, 355 SO'!lbhii!ii, 378
Sacrum, 285 n., 287 n. SO'!lbhinnobhaya-riipatviit, 104
sad-asadbhyii'!l vila/qa1}am, 127 sa,ghiita. 463
Sadananda, 55,231 sa1'{lgraha, 49
Sadananda Kasmiraka, 57, 196 SatflhaTIO, 378
Sadananda Vyasa, 443 Sa'!lhitii-kalpa, 283 n.
Sadasiva, 219 Sa'!lhitii-vidhi, 283 n.
Sadasivendra Sarasvati, 82 n. SO'I]'ljfiii, 23
sa-deha-muktatii, 245 sa'!lkalpa, 373
sad-vrtta, 405, 420 sa'!lkalpa-nagarO'!l, 233
Sages, 395, 539 sa'!lkalpa-puTU~a, 233
sagu1}a-brahma, 218 Sarpkaq;ar;ta, 539, 542, 543, 545, 546,
sahabhiita'!l kiiryam, 186 548
Sahadeva,432 SO'Tflkhyii, 370
saha-ka'.Zthikii, 289 n. 3 Sa'Tflklepa-siinraka, 11 n., 17, 43 n.,
sahakiiri, 160 45 n., 52, 54, 56, 85, IIQ-II2, 115,
sahakiiri-kiira1}a, 109 216, 223 n.
Sahapala Deva, 427 Sa'fl/qepa-iiirlraka-sambandhokti, 52 n.
sahasriira, 353, 356 S07!llqepa-iiinraka-siira-s07!lgraha, 1 16,
sahasriira-cakra, 3 56 225
sahopalambha-niscaya, 49 Sa'Tflpriipti, 397 n.
sahopalambha-niyama, 26 n., 35 sa1f!Sarga, 338 n.
sahopalambha-niyamiid, 26 n. S01f!Siira, 44
Saint, 247, 420, 501, 5o6 Sa1f!Siira-tara1}f, 232
Saintly persons, 264 sa'Tflskiira, 65, 36o, 370
Saline, 358, 359 S01f!S!li, 234, 238
Salt, 357 sa'flsaya, 383, 389, 392, 500
Salvation, 228, 305 sa'Tflsaya-sama, 380 n., 382 n., 386, 387
sama, 236 SO'fls/ela, 307
sama-dhiitob, 327 n. sa1flslela-pratyaya, 207
sama-pittiinila-kapha, 334 SO'TflVOra, 500
samatva, 451, 511 sa1Jzvatsariifz, 292 n.
sama-·viita-pitta-ilepnan, 334 n. sa'Tflvedanamaya, 256
samaviiya,4o, 148,183,184,187,189- SO'TflVid, 63, 149, 201, 208, 235, 259
191, 194, 371, 374; relation, 374 sa7!Zvit-karma, 68
samaviiyi-kiira1}a, 143, 360 sa1flt,;t-spanda, 254
6oo Index
SaTflvit-svarupa-bhuto bhedaft, 64 ajfiiina in, I I 5 ; commentaries on his
sa1fZvrta, 3 Sa7Jl~epa-siinraka, 115, 116; differ-
Sa1{lVfltlsa1flVTtiini, 348 n. ence of his view with that of Man-
SaTflvrti, 3, 22; as mithyii-sa7Jlvrti and c,lana, 85; his date, I I2; his view ~f
loka-Sa1fZvrti, 4; its meanings, 3 the causality of miiyii, I I ; nature of
sa7Jlvrti-satya, 3 ajfiiina, I I 2; nature of Brahman,
Sa7Jlyamana, 444 I I4; Vedanta and Buddhism in,
sa1{lyoga, 40, IS8, 194, 373 115
sa1{lyoga-puru~a, 415 sarva-pratyayiinii1{l yathiirthatvam,
sa7Jlyoga-vibhiiga, 370 I48
Sa7Jlyogin, 40 Sarva-siddhiinta-rahasya-fikii, 55
sa1{lyogi-purufa, 368 sarva-srotii1{lsi ayana-bhiitiini, 347
sa1{lyukta-samaviiya, 374 sarva-tantra-siddhiinta, 383
Sa1{lyukta-samaveta-samaviiya, 374 Sarvato-bhadra, 443
Sanaka-sa7Jlhilii, 435 Sar•oiiilga-sundan, 434
sandhiiya S07Jlbhiifii, 378 sarviipahnava, 265
sandhi, 286 n. 2 Sarviirtha-siddhi, I I9 n.
Sandhyakara, 43 I sarve bhiivii anutpanniifz, I67
san kiisafz, 386 sarvendriya-param, 34I
san k~ayafz, 386 sat, I94. 373
sannipiita, 338 n. satas cetyii7Jlsa-cetaniit, 236
sannyiisa, 418 satata-kriyii, 370
sannyiisin, 252 sati, soo
santiinikii, 317 sati-sa1{lvara, soo
santhava1Jl, 497 sat-kiirya-viida, 39, I6S, I72-I74, 472,
Sangha,459 473, 477, 5I7; its criticisms by
Sailghabhadra, I7I Kamalasila and Santarak!}ita, I72 ff.
sailgo, 497 sattii, 10
sankalpa, 75, 264 satthakamma, 276
sankalpa-jiigara, 266 sattva, 72, 74, I83, I93, 197, 206, 250,
sankhiira, 498 303, 308, 3I3, 3I9, 329, 366, 367,
sankhyii, I 94 372,4I9,436,4s6,462,468, 542
sankoca, 348 n. sattva-sa7Jlruddhi, SIO
saficaya, 409 sattva stuff, 2 I I
sarar_ziit siriifz, 347 sattva-iuddhi, 438
Sarasvati, 354 satya, 4, 76, 383, sos, SIO
sarasvatl, 353 Satyabodha, 98
sarga, 177 satya-vacana, sos, 544
Sarpa-veda, 274 n. 3 Satyavan, 306 n. I
sarva-bzja, 22 satya-yuga, 409
Sarva-darsana-sm_ngraha, 2I4 Saubhiigya-vardhinl, 79
Sarva-darsana-siddhiinta-sa7Jlgraha, 55 saukfmya, 3IS
Sarva-dhara, 432 sau~yiit, 349
sarva-dofa-prakopar.za, 416 saumanasyiini, 296
sarva-gata, 474 saumya, 3I3
sarva-jarfopiidiina-bhutii, 203 saumyatva, 5I3
sarva-jfia, I06, I95 Saunagas (grammarians), 540
SarvajnanarayaQ.a, 57 n. Sautrlintikas, 26 n.
Sarvajna-pitha, 98 sa-vikalpa, I07
Sarvajna Sarasvati, 56 sa-vyabhiciira, 384, 386 n.
sarvajfiatii, 22 sa-vyabhiciira hetu, 386 n.
Sarvajna Visve8a, 55 siidhaka, 330
Sarvajnatma Bhagavat, 52 n. siidhana, I I 5
Sarvajnatma Muni, I 1, I7, 43 n., 47, siidharmya-vaidharmya-sama, 380 n. 4
50, 52-54, 57, 72, 8 5 , 105, I I0- siidhiirar.za, 357. so6
112, 115, 116, 223, 224; ajfiiina and siidhiirar.za-dharma, sos, so6, 5I4
truth, 114; ajfiiina in relation with siidhiirar.zatva, 358
Brahman, 112 ff.; association of siidhupad#!a-miirger.za, 252, 253
Index 6or
siidhya, I39, 380, 38I n., 388 n. Siityaki-tantra, 435
siidhya-sama, 386 n., 387 Saym:1a, 79, I87, 2I5, 28o n., 28I, 283,
siidhyiibhiivavad-avrttitvam, I 20 288 n., 289, 290, 292, 293, 298 n.,
Siihasiiilka-carita, 428 299, 344 n., 345 n., 346
Saketa (city), 540 Scapula, 286 n. 4
siik# consciousness, 2I4 Scattering, 337 n.
siik#n, 53, I54 Sceptical, 498 n.
Sarna, 274 Scheme of life, 4I5
siimagrf, I6I, I64 Scholastic, I I, I24; logicism, I24
Saman, 526 Scholasticism, I I 9
siimarthyiitisaya, 97 Science, 73; of life, 278
siimiinya, 371, 397 Scriptural command, 522
siimiinya-chala, 385, 386 Scriptural injunction, 228
siimiinya-pratyiisatti, I39 Scriptural text, 252
siimiinyato-dr~!a, 398, 399, 400 n. Scriptures, I I4, 253, 267
Samin, 57 n. Seal, Dr Sir B. N., 356 n., 483 n.,
Sarpkhya, 36, 37, 42, 74, 89 n., Ioi, 506 n.
I07, 115, I65, I72-175, I8I, 227, Seasons, 389
242, 250, 260, 292, 300, 304, 3I2, Seat of consciousness, 302
3 I4, 328 n., 329 n., 332, 372, 388 n., Second moon, 26
394, 4IO, 4I I, 4I4, 45 I, 455-458, Secretions, 288 n., 325,327, 3JI, 337-
46I, 463, 465, 467, 468, 472, 473. 339, 345
475-477, 493. 5I7, 5I8, 549. 550; Secretive aspect, 33 I
arguments, I73; its general criti- Secretory character, 337 n.
cisms by Kamalasila, I75; philo- Secretory currents, 346
sophy, 273 n., 428; physics, 273; Seed, I6o, I85, 235
prakrti, 74; refutation of its soul Seeds of memory, I 87
theory by Kamalasila, I8I; system, Seeming appearances, 235
366 Self, I, 8, I6, 2I, 23, 24, 33, 34, 42, 65,
Sarp.khya and Nyaya, on the theory of 68, 7I, 73. 76, IOI, II2, I48, I52,
do~as, 328, 329 n. I56, I8o, I8I, I94, I97, 206 n., 211,
Sii'l!lkhya-kiirikii, 8o, I06, I I6, 249, 2I5, 2I7, 223, 308-JIO, 343, 35I,
250 n., 262, 304, 377, 400 n. 367-369, 373. 387, 388, 40I, 444-
Sarpkhya pari1Jiima, criticisms of, by 446, 462, 47I, 473. 5I2, 5I6, 5I8,
Santarak!?ita and Kamalasila, I7 I ff. 525
SiiTJzkhya-pravacana-bhii~ya, 262, 305, Self-abnegation, 228
306 n. I Self-alienation, 240
Sii'l!lkhya-sii.tra, 250, 372 Self-cognizing, 74
Sii'l!lkhya-tattva-kaumudf, 45 n., 305 n. Self-conscious, 235; ego, 238
Sarpkhya-Yoga, 26I, 262, JIO, JI3 n., Self-consciousness, 22, 68, I8I, I95,
4I4, 546; its doctrine of subtle body, 236
304, 305; its idea of emancipation, Self-contained, I4; state, 239
249, 25o;prii1Jain, 26I, 262 Self-contentedness, 477
Sarpkhyic, 3 I I Self-contradiction, I23
Sarpkhyist, I65, I7I, I7J, 234, 5I7 Self-control, 242, 244, 277, 373, 44I,
SiiTJzriijya-siddhi, 56 448,493.500,505, 5IJ, 5I4
sandra, 359 n. Self-controlled, 420
siira, 359 n. Self-criticism, 272
siirajjanii, 497 Self-dependence, I7
siirajjitattam, 497 Self-directed, 236; consciousness, 236
Saranga, I 23 Self-dissociated, I2I
Siirasvata-prakriyii, I 92 Self-evident, IJ, I6, 483
siiriigo, 497 Self-flashing, 236
Siiriirtha, 99 Self-gain, 507
siitmya, 308 Self-good, 405
siittvika, 367, 373, 468 Self-hood, 24
Siitvata, 54I-543, 546, 547 Self-identity, 34, 66-68, 7I
Satyaki, 54I Self-illumination, I48
Index
Self-interest, 470, 486, 507, 508, 5I3 Sense-experiences, 24
Selfish interest, 48 5 Sense-faculties, 23, 24, 58
Selfishness, 503 Sense-functioning, 24
Self-knowledge, 227, 239, 373, 437, Sense-gates, 462
442,493.499 Sense-gratification, 5 IO
Self-love, 24, 4I4, 507 Sense-illusions, 5
Self-luminosity, 70, 73, I04 Sense-impressions, 349, 35I
Self-luminous, 8, 65, 68, 70, 126, I68, Sense-knowledge, 25, 208, 355
199-20I, 217; consciousness, 204 Sense-modifications, 23
Self-manifesting, 8, 69 Sense-object, 23, 62, 76, 77, I8o, I94,
Self-meditation, 466 206, 207, 2I5, 320, 32I, 332, 343.
Self-mortifications, 469 35I, 367, 373. 463
Self-ostentation, 416 Sense-organ, I38, I87, 213, 269, 309,
Self-perception, 67, 73 3IO, 315, 327, 332, 333, 358, 360,
Self-persistence, 67, 68 366, 515
Self-realization, 456, 5I5, 532 Sense-perception, 23, 24, 30, I 16, I67
Self-realized state, 512 Sense-pleasure, 5 I4
Self-recognition, 195 Sense-property, I99, 359 n., 360
Self-reflecting, 235 Sense-quality, 355
Self-restrained, 277 Sense-uncontrollability, 488
Self-revealed, I52, I8o, 20I Sensible, 28, 29, 369
Self-revealing, 69, 72, 74, I04, 110, Sensory consciousness, 357
I56, 197, 201, 221; consciousness, Sensory dhamanl, 35I
33. ISO, I52, I54 Sensory nerves, 349
Self-revelation, 63, I09, 110, I29, I48, Sentence, 236
149. lSI Separateness, I48, I62, I94, 360
Self-same, 97 Separation, I94, 370
Self-satisfied, 512 Sequence, 20
Self-seeking, 507 Series, 23, 26 n.
Self-shining, 15 Serpent Power, 356
Self-shiningness, 36 Sesamum, 97
Self-surrendering, 46I sefvara-Sii'f!lkhya, 476
Self-thinking, 235 Sex-attraction, 509
Self-validity, 214; of knowledge, 2I4 Sex-continence, 421, 469, 505, 513
Selling, 505 Sex joy, 324
Semen, 302, 304, 307, 313, 317, 322, Sex-relation, 498 n.
323 n., 330, 347, 352, 36I, 372; Sex-strength, 276
channels, 348 Sex-union, 509
Seminal fluid, 322-324 Shama Sastry, Dr, 436
Semi-statical creation, 235 n. Shamefulness, 24
Senart, E., 550 Sharp, 361
Sensation, 48, 269; of smell, 342 Sharpness, 360, 362 n., 365
Sense, 23, 35, I5I, 153, 194, 239, 254, Sheath of knowledge, 75
26I, 292, 344. 360, 366, 368, 369, Shivering, 294 n., 30I
401,406,489,493 Shoots, I6o, I69
Sense-affections, 512 Shoulder-blade, 286
Sense-attraction, 450, 488 sibbanl, 497
Sense-channels, 89 n. siddham, 390
Sense-cognition, 58, 73, 349, 367, Siddha-siira-sa7JZhitii, 432
373 Siddha-yoga, 427, 428, 433, 435
Sense-contact, 138, 145, I52, 154, 374, siddhiinta, 383, 385
498 Siddhiinta-bindu, 77 n., 226
Sense-control, 453,459,487,490, 49I, Siddhiinta-bindu-nyiiya-ratniivall, 79
502, sos, SII, 514 Siddhiinta-bindu-sandlpana, 79
Sense-data, 34. s8, 6o, I76, I8o, I88, Siddhiinta-bindu-slkara, 220
35I Siddhiinta-bindu-tlkii, 225 n.
Sense-desire, 5I3 Siddhiinta-candrikii, 434
Sense-enjoyments, 73 Siddhiinta-dlpa, I I 5
Index
Siddhiinta-dlpikii, I7, 57 n. smrti-bhra1!lsa, 417
Siddhiinta-lesa, Io, II, I7, 44, 47, 49, smrti-siistra, 438
so, 53, 72, 2I6 n. smrti-vibhra7JZSa, 4I6
Siddhiinta-lesa-sa1Jlgraha, 220 Snake, 7, 37, 74
Siddhiinta-muktiivali, II, I 7, I 8 n., Snake-charms, 28I
222 n., 223 n., 225, 263 n.; its view sniiv.:a, 289, 346
that miiyii alone is the cause of world- sniiyu, 257, 285 n., JI2 n., JI3 n., JI8,
appearance; and Brahman the basis 352
of miiyii, I I sneha, 328,442,497
Siddhiinta-nidiina, 337 n. snigdha, 357, 359 n., 36I, 363
Siddhiinta-nyiiya-ratna-pradlpikii, 79 Social order, 509
Siddhiinta-ratniikara, 220 Society, 509
Siddhiinta-siddhiiiijana, 56 Sockets, 286 n.
Siddhiinta-tattva-bindu, 55, 79, 225 Soft, 337 n., 36I
Siddhiinta-tattva-bindu-{tkii, 55 Softness, 360
Siddhiinta-viveka, 5 I Solar, 145, I48;vibrations, 156, I57
Siddhi-kiit;uja, 87, 88, 98 soma, 303, 330, 333, 359, 428
Siddhi-sthiina, 357, 426, 429 soma-cakra, 356
Significance, 504 Sorcery, 30 I
sikatiivati, 290 n. 3 Sorrow, 249, 295, 3I I, 4I6, 467, 504,
siliifijiilii, 298 n. SII-513, 530
Silver, 37, 113, 135 Soul,44, I78, 236, 248,3oJ,3o6,3o9,
Similarity, I 3 I, I 34 311, 314, 343, 356, 357, 360, 367,
Simile, 26 n., 329 37I, 372,406,530
Simultaneity, IS6 Soul theory (Kumarila), criticized by
Simultaneous,3I n.,388n.; production, Kamala.Sila, 179 ff.
I78 Soul theory (Nyaya), criticized by
Simultaneously, 26, 27, 3I n., I78 Kamala.Sila, 178, I79
Sin, 246, 404, 4.09, 4I4, 422, 442, so8, Sound, 24, 6o, 182, 355, 367, 382 n.,
522 386 n., 387
Sincerity, 469, 502, 505 n., Sio, 511, Sound-cognition, I8o
5I3, 5I4; of mind, 505 Sound-potential, 236
sineho, 497 Sour, 33I, 357
Sinful, 409 Sourasenoi, 543
Sinner, 5I2 Source, 358, 4Io n.
Sitarama, 82 n. South India, 53
Skanda, 107 Space, I68, 194, 36o, 369, 381 n.
Skanda-purii7Ja, 393 Space-determinations, 23
skandha, 58, 59. 286, 450 n. Space-locations, 29
Skeleton, 288 spanda, 235 n., 244, 254, 263
Skill, 502, 505 n. spanda-sakti, 104, 257
Skin, JI7, 324,330, 348,36I, 367 spandiispandiitmaka, 234
Skull, 279, 352, 353 n. sparsa, I94, 236
Slander, 498 n. Spatial, I6; difference, 370; extension,
Sleep, 257, 26I 25 n.
Sleepiness, 373 Special capacity, 175
Slim, 337 Special efficiency, 97
Slipperiness, 360, 365 Special power, 40
Slippery, 36I Specific, 357, 374; agency, 359; caste-
Slow, 338 duty, 506, 507; duty, sos, 506, 514;
Smaller intestine, 336 ignorance, 77; nature, 358; par-
Smaller self, 45 I ticulars, I48; peculiarities, I87;
Smartness, 505 n. purpose, 359; qualities, IJ9, I89;
Smell, I94, 236, 330, 36o, 367 relation, 3 I
Smoky, 16o, 408 Speculation, 373, 4Io n.
Smooth, 337 n., 357 Speech,24I,254,333,338,469;organ,
Smoothness, 328, 360 346
smrti, 54, 238, 239, 373, 514, 549 Sphota-siddhi, 87 n.
Index
Spider, 74, 178 Subhuti Gautama, 316
Spider's webs, 178 Subject, 27, 29, 31, 35, 88
Spinal column, 287 n., 352, 353 Subject-consciousness, 149, 211
Spinal cord, 353, 355-357 Subjective, 22, 24, 180, 187, 204, 377,
Spine, 353 n. so8, 522; act, 197; character, 522;
Spiral, 355 cognition, 19; conscience, 522; ego,
Spirit, 234, 282 236; experiences, 102, 149; ideas,
Spiritual categories, 467 2 1, 48 ; idealism, 48 ; ignorance, 7i ;
Spleen, 288, 348 illumination, 206; mental, 16; same-
Spring, 335, 370 ness, 51 I ; states, 149; thought, 236
Springs of action, 411, 413 Subjectively, 217, 233
sprhii, 4I3 Subjectivistic, 213
srotas, 29I, 346-350, 352 Subjectivity, 9
Stabilized, soo Subject-object awareness, 29, 33
Stage, 236, 238 Subject-object consciousness, 24
stana, 286 Subject-object knowledge, 250,266
Star, 333 Subject-objectless, 235, 238, 271
State, 236, 250; of deep sleep, 245 Subject-object relation, 88, I<'S, 144,
Statical, 234 146, I 52, 153
Stcherbatsky, s8 n., 59 n., 61 n., I66 n. Subodhinl, 55, 73, 75 n., I 15, 443
Steadiness, 328, 360, 4I9, 505, 5 IO; of Subrahmal)ya, 8 I
mind, 492 Subrahmal)ya Agnicin Makhindra,82 n.
Steady, 491 Substance, 19, 47, 51, 117, I43, 158,
Sternum, 286 n. 161, 162, 167, 172, 187, 188, 191,
sthairya, 419 193, 194, 203, 261, 3 s8-36o, 363,
Sthairya-viciira7Ja, 126 369-371, 373
sthaviriintra, 289 Substanceless, 16, 233
sthiilakas, 286 n. 3 Substance-stuff, 12
sthiilakiirbudas, 286 n. 3 Substantial, 337 n.
sthiina-•djiiapti, 23 Substantiality, 38, 48
sthiiniini, 336 Substantive, 187; basis, 23; reality, 20
sthiipana, 452 Substitution-meditation,449, 452,479,
sthiipanii, 379 488
sthira, 241, 359 n. Substratum, 19, I94, I95
Sthiramati, 19, 21, 22 n. Subtle, 332, 377; states, 245
sthira-pratyaya, 240 Subtle body, 75,245,302,306, 351 n.;
Sthira-siddhi-du~a1)a, 49 in Sarpkhya-yoga, Vaise~ika and
sthita-dhi, 440, 49I Nyaya, 304-306; agreement of the
sthita-priij1ia, 247, 491 Vedanta and Caraka, 3I2
sthiti, I8, I69, I77. 231 Subtler, 368
sthiila, 337 n., 359 n. Success, 512
stimita-gambhira, 232 Succession, 20, 156, 179
Stomach, 330, 33I, 336, 362 Successive processes, 374
Stone, SI2 Sudhindra Y ati, 443
Stormy, 408 Suffering, 238,247,368,373,404,479,
Straightness of conduct, 51 1 522
Strength, 327, 336 Sufficient cause, 18
stn-karmii1)i, 296 Sugar-cane, 361
Student, 505 suhrt, 378
Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, Suitability, 370
279 n., 284 n., 286 n. Suitable, 370
Study, 505, 510, 514 sukha, 22,277,370,422
Stuff, 10; of world-objects, 35 sukha-dul;zkhe yugapaj janyete, 91
Suali, L., 398 n. sukham iiyul;z, 277
Sub-conscious,21, 33, 34; impressions, Sukhaprakasa Muni, s8, 86, I 16, 148 n.
33. 250 sukha-riipa, 217
Subhe~aja, 276 n. sukha-sanga, 462
sublzi~aktama, 293 Sumati, 172
Index 6os
Summer, 327, 335, 370 Sutala, 76
Sun, 330,499,525 su~ma, 305, 332, 337, 359
Suniimii (demon), 300 suk~ma-deha, 304
Suparl_la, 539 suk$ma-sarlra, 75, 76
Superficial changes, 24 sfik~mii?z-Siriilz, 346
Super-imposed, 206 Suryapan<;lita, 443
Super-imposition, I49, 209, 2I3 su.~a. 290
Superior, I78 Su~al).i, 290 n. 4
Superiority, 370, 40I n. Siita-sarphitii, 25 I
Supe:--person, 476, 529, 533 Sutra-bhii$ya-vyiikhyiina, 82 n.
Super-personality, 478, 524, 525 s~ttras, 38, 39. 4I, 44
Support, I43; of miiyii, 45 Sutra-sthiina, 329, 330, 366
Supposition, I 8, 3 I SUtriitman, 76, 2 I 5
Supreme bliss, 453 svabhiiva,4,89, 372,4I0
Supreme essence, I6 svabhiiviitiiaya, I73
sura, III sva-dhanna, 439, 502
Suranandi, 428 svakiirat~a-sattii-samaviiya, 4 I
Surat, I64 sva-lak~a'{la, 167
Suresvaracarya, I n., I7, 46, 48, 5 I, sva-miina, 325
52, 57, 78-8o, 82-87, 98-102, I05, svapna, 264
111, 112, 147 n., I48 n., I92, I98, svapna-jiigara, 266
216; karma and emancipation in, svapna-nara, 266
99; karma andjiiiina, 100; nature of sva-prakiiia, 69, I48, I97
ajiiiina, IOI, I02; nature of self and sva-prakaiatii, 108
self-realization, Ioo, IOI sva-prakiisii cit, I09
Surgery, 276, 330 Svar (world), 76
Suriya, 539 svarilpa-bheda, I 29
susuk~miin, 342 Svarilpa-nirt)aya-tlkii, I93
Susruta, 263, 273, ~75-279, 284 n., sva-sal!ljiiii, 389
285 n., 286 n., 287 n., 302 n., 303 n., sva-sa'l!tvedana-miitrakam, 235
304,3I6,3 I7, 329 n., 330-333, 334n., sva- sa'l!lvin- nairape~etJ.a sphurm;am,
342, 344 n., 348, 349, 350 n., 35I, I97
352, 36I n., 362-365, 372, 389, 410, svastyayana, 278, 281
423-426, 429, 433, 435; his de- svasyiipi svena vedyatviipiitiit, I 5 I
scription of the apertures of the svatalz-priimii~ya, 2I4
dhamanls, 350; his description of the sva-vi~aya-jiiiina-jana.nam, 32
function of the dhamanls, 350 ff.; sva-vyiighiita, I23
on dhiitu-mala, 331; his view re- svaya'l!lbhu-linga, 355
garding the relation of dhamanls to svaya'l!l-Prakiisa, I49
cognition, 35I ff.; his view regard- Svayarpprakasa, 56, 82, I92
ing siriis and dhamanls, 349 ; his Svayarpprakasa Yati, 79
view that the cognitive and cona- Svayarpprakasa Yogindra, 57 n.
tive nerves are attached to the brain, Svayarpprak.asananda, 56
342; his view that iot~ita is a do~a, 329 sviibhiivikalz sambandhalz, I4I
Sufruta-candrikii, 425, 428 sviibhinna- kiirya-janakatvam upiidii-
Sufruta-saTJZhitii, 258 n., 273, 276 n., natvam, 45
277,279,313 n., 3I5 n., 3I8 n., 33I n., sviidh#!hiina-cakra, 355
335 n., 336 n., 342 n., 344 n., 349 n., sviidu, 358
372 n., 377 n., 389 n., 390, 423-429 Svamidasa, 428
Susruta school, 289 Svamikumara, 43 I
Susruta-Siltra-sthiina, 36I n. Svamindraplirl).a, 52 n.
su#riilz, 3 52 Sviinubhuti-prakiisa, 55
SU~Um'{lii, 292, 353-355, 453, 454 sviirtha, 4 I 2
SU~Um'{lii niir}f, 345 Sviitma-yoga-pradlpa, 57 n.
su~upta, 241, 264 sviividyayii, 84
su~upta-sadrsa-sthiti, 264 Sweet, 242, 309, 325, 327, 337 n., 347,
su~uptavat, 245 357-359, 362, 365 n., 366
s~upti, 232, 344 Sweetness, 36I
6o6 index
Syllogism, I 19-I 22, 373 that the world-appearance is mere
Symbolic sacrifice, 544 illusion is dogmatic, as also the
Symbolic syllables, 499 doctrine that the self is the only
Symbols, 337 ground on which all illusions are
Sympathy, 247, 511 imposed, 8; his commentary cannot
Symptoms, 293, 295, 320, 329 n., 336, satisfactorily convince that the sz7tras
337, 348 n. professed unqualified monism, 42;
Syncretist~c, 54; works, 55 his criticism of the atomic theory,
Synonymous, 348 I 89 ff.; his criticism of the theory of
Syrup, 358 samaviiya, I90; his definition of il-
System, 375, 525 lusion, 5, 6; his dialectic arguments,
Systematic study, I 189 ff.; his explanation as to the
Systematized, 500 illusory creation by ignorance: in-
Sabara, 87, I7I terpretation of his explanation by his
sabda, 346, 376, 38I n., 383 other followers, 8; his explanation of
sabda-brahma, 354 n. the causal theory on realistic lines
Sabda-nirpaya, I03 n. as against Nyaya, 39-41; his four
sabda-nyiiyiirtha, 392 important followers and the diver-
sabdatva, 374 gence of their views, 4 7, 48; his
sabdiirtha, I 87 idealism compared with that of Yoga-
saitya, 362 n. viisi~!ha and Buddhist idealism, 268
Saiva, 54, 2I8, 2I9, 443; authorities, ff.; his interpretation of the Brahma-
263; commentary, 218; philosophy, siltra and the U pani~ads as recon-
2j2 ciliation of the pantheistic and dua-
Saiva-bhii~ya, 218, 220 listic tendencies, 2; his interpreta-
Saiva-kalpa-druma, 220 tion of illusion in Gau~apada's Kiiri-
Saivism, 49 kii, 6; his realistic interpretation of
Sakadhtimaje (demon), 300 the Brahma-sz7tras with parenthetic
saktaya~l, 243 reservation, how far justifiable, 39;
sakti. 8, 10, 22, 40, 44. I04, I75. 215, his refutation of Buddhist idealism,
2I8, 362, 363 269, 270; his refutation of Buddhis-
faktimat, 44 tic idealism, 27; his refutation of
iuluna, 297 the charge of the incompatibility of
sulya, 276, 390, 424 the production of the impure world
Salya-tantram, 330 n., 425 from the pure Brahman, 37; his re-
sama, 444. 495. 505 n. futation of the Sarpkhya criticism of
Sambuka, 506, 507 Vedanta, 36, 37; his two different
Sankara, 2, 5-9. I I, 2I, 25, 27-30, 35. analogies regarding the production
37-39.41-44.46,48, 5I,77-?9,8I, of the world from Brahman, 37; his
85-87,89,92,99,Ioo, 102, Io5,Io8, view of the nii(fis and the heart, 344;
III, Il2, II9, I24, I5I, I7I, 172, his views regarding sirii anddhamani,
189, I91, 196, 2I8-221, 228, 23I, 344 fl.; his works and followers,
246, 250, 26o-262, 267, 268, 270, n-82; how far he is justified in
272, 288 n., 311, 344, 346, 437, 438, sometimes taking paripiima analogies
442, 443. 446, 448, 449, 452, 453. and sometimes the view of magical
456-458, 474, 478, 495, 499, 504, creation, 38; originator of Vedanta
507, 533, 549; and some Buddhists dialectics, 163; special nature of his
differ regarding the ontology of dialectic as distinguished from that
illusion, 5; attempts to prove that of Srihar~a and Citsukha, I9I, I92
his philosophy was realistic, 2 ; bhe- Sailkara-bhiiBJa, 1 I, I03, I08, 25I
diibheda interpretation prior to, 43; Sankara-dig-vijaya, 82, 86, I I2
contradicts his own view on ideal- Sankara Misra, I03 n., I26 fl., 356
ism, 28 did not elaborate the exact Sankara school, 3, 30, 44, 62
nature of the causality of avidyii or Sankarasvamin, 172
of Brahman, 1 I ; emphasizes that Sankara Vedanta, I I, 16, 17, 34, 35,
waking experience is as false as III, I48, 214
dream experience in Gau~apada's Sailkara-vijaya, I I I
commentary, 28, 29; his assertion Sankarananda, 82, 86, 2I5,443
Index
smikii, I4I Se~agovinda, 55
sankha, 287 n., 342 Se~anrsirpha, 205
SankhapaQ.i, 83, 87, 89 n., 90, 9I, 94, Se!,>a Sanigadhara, I 19, 196
353. 354 se~avat, 398, 399. 400 fl.
sarat, 335 Sikhiimm;i, 53, 54, 74 n., 208
sar'ira-chidra, 348 n. sik~a. 5 4 7
sanrl, 303 n. 4 Si~ii, 275 n.
Sarku (demon), 300 Si~a-samuccaya, 501, 5I3
Sasadhara Acarya, 54 Singhana, I23
Satapatha-briihmat;a, 279, 286, 289, Sipivi~ta, 535
368,394.424,486,535-537 sirasi ~at, 287 n.
sauca, 505, 510 siras-tiilv-antara-gatam, 34I
Saunaka, 316 sirti, 256, 289, 29I, 3I8, 342, 344, 346,
Saunaka-tantra, 435 348-350, 352, 354
Saunakiya, 283 sirii-sarm;i-kofare, 256
saurya, 328, 370, 505 n. Si~ya-hitai#~u. I 26 n. ,
siibdl bhiivanii, 479. 480 Siva, 82 n., 218, 265
Sakalya, 252 Sivadayalu Sridharasvamin, 443
sakha, 283 Sivadasa, 364, 43I, 432, 435
siikhii-nii.lj'lniim, 290 n. 2 Siva-kar7Jiimrta, 220
Sakunteya, 357 Sivalala Sarman, 79
siiliikya, 276, 424 Siva-lllii71Java, 2I9
Siiliikya-tantra, 425 Siva-purii7Ja-tiimasatva-kha7Jr!atza, 220
Salikanatha, I47 n., 249 Sivarama, 57 n., 103
Siili-stamba-sutra, 307 Siva-sutra-vimarsinl, 263 n.
santa, 234. 235. 28I Siva-sakti-siddhi, I 26
Santarak!,)ita, 25, 28, 3 I n., 58 n.~ I7I. Siva-tattva-viveka, 220
I72, I75, I76, I78, I79, I81-I88, Sivaditya, I47 n.
375, 376; his argument against the Sivaditya Misra, I2J
U pani~adic view similar to that of Siviidvaita-ni71Jaya, 220
Sailkara, 28 Sivananda-lahari, 220
siinti, 450 n., 5 IO ._<;ivananda-lalzari-candrikii, 220
Santi-kalpa, 283 Sivananda Yati, 57 n.
Siinti-sataka, 460 n. I Siviircana-candrikii, 220
Sii7Jf/.ilya-sUtra-!ikti, 225 Siviirka-ma1Ji-dlpikii, 219, 220
siirada, 298 n. Sivopadhyaya, 263
Sanra, 35on., 351 n., 352 n., 415, 469 Sivotkar~a-candrikii, 220
Sanra-brahmm;a, 25 I Sivotkar~a-mafijari, 220
Siinraka-bha~ya, 56, 246 n. sighra, 338
Siiriraka-bhii~ya-prakafiirtha, 49 Sila, 459, 500, 50 I, 504
Siiriraka-bhii~ya-f'lkii, I 93 Strfa, 340
Sariraka-mzmiil!lSii-bha~ya, 56, 78, 8o sir~akti, 296, 299. 340
Siirlraka- mimii1Jlsii- nyiiya - sa1Jlgraha, s"ir$iimaya, 299
30 n., 82 Sita, 332,335, JJ8,J57.359. 36I
Siinraka-mlmii1!1Sii-sa1Jlgraha, 82 n. Sita-virya, 36I
Siinraka - mzmii1JlSii- sfitra - siddhanta- sitOfma-varfa-/ak~aiJiilz, 321 fl.
kaumudl, 82 n. sfto~miinilailz, 314
Siiriraka-nyiiya-ma7Jimiilii, 82 n. ilak~7Ja, 359 n.
Siirtra-padmin'i, 435 sle~ma, 299
Siinra-sthiina, 284 n. sle~ma-dharii, 3 I7
Sarngadhara, 288 n., 326 n., 327 n., sle~mala, 334
435; his view of mala, 326 sle~man, 276, 282, 296, 319, 325, 327,
siistra, 253. 254. 385, 445 328, 330-333, 335, 336, 337 n., 344,
Siistra-darpa7Ja, 82, IOJ, 108 n. 347· 349. 37I, 39I
~<;astra-prakiiSikii, 83, 193 slepna-prakrti, 328, 334
Siistra-siddhiinta-lesa-!ikii, 225 : slermii. 299
siistriintara, 399 sli~. 330
se~a. 4.90 n. ilolw, 230
6o8 Index
Sloka-sthiina, 392 142 ; his refutation of " difference,"
Sloka-viirttika, 428 I 29 ; his refutation of the category of
soci, 297 "difference," 129 ff.; his refutation
sm;zita, 302, 312 n., 329, 330, 335 n., of the definition of cause, 143-145;
350 his refutation of the definition of
sraddhii,292,468,494 perception, 137, 138; his refutation
iriiddha, 282 of the notion of instruments of
Srima (demon), 300 knowledge in, 137; his view that all
Sritii/.l, 340 definitions may be proved false,
Sri, 294 128 ff.; his view that world-appear-
Sribrahma, 428 ances are false because all definitions
Sri-darpm;za, I 26 n. of any of their categories are self-
Sridhara, 49, 147 n., 264 n., 306, 412, contradictory, 147; method of his
444, 446, 449 n., 452, 453 n., 456, dialectic, 133; perception cannot
462, 474. 478, 484 challenge the instruction of the
Srihar~a. 24, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 83, 92, Upanif?ads, 129; precursors of his
IOJ, 119, 124-129, IJI-133, 135, dialectic, KamalasiJa and Santarak-
137-139, 141, 143-147, 163, 164, ~ita, 171 ff.; responsible for the
z68, I7o-172, 192, 194, 218, 248; growth of verbalism in the new
awareness and its object cannot be school ofNyaya, 146 ;similarityofhis
similar, IJ4; Buddhist precursors of dialectic to that of Nagarjuna, 127
pre-Sankara Vedanta dialectic, Ka- Srikal).lida, 354, 355
malasila and Santarak~ita, I7 I ff.; Srikal).tha, 218, 219
compared and contrasted with Na- Srikal).tha Bhatta, 79, 427, 432
garjuna, 170, 171; his assertion of Srikal).tha Datta, 428, 435
indefinability of all appearances is a $rimad-iinanda-iailiihva-panciisya1ft sa-
direct challenge to N ya ya-V aisef?ika, tata1ft bhaje, 193
which thinks that all that is know- Srimad-bhagavad-g'itii, 228, 247, 250
able is definable, 127 ; his criticism Snmad-bhiigavata-tikii, 226
of" being," 142; his criticism of the Srimadhava,427,428
Buddhist definition of right cogni- Srinatha Cu<;lamal).i, 225 n.
tion, 136; his criticism of the defini- Srinivasa, 120
tion of "invariable concomitance," Srinivasa Y ajvan, 57 n.
141, 142; his criticism of the nature Srirailganatha, zo8
of concomitance (vyiipti), 139, 140; Srisirpha, I 23
his criticism of non-being, 142; his Sn-vidyii-paddhati, 225
criticisms often refer to Nyaya irot;zi-guda-Sll1JlSraya, 33 1
definitions rather than to Nyaya sro~'i, 285
thought, 146; his criticism of the iro~li-phalaka, 285 n. 7
N yaya definition of " cause," 144; Sruta-prakiisikii, 262 n.
his criticism of the Nyaya definition S,ngiitaka, 342
of right cognition, I33 ff.; his criti- subha, 341
cism ofthe Nyaya theory of relation, Subhagupta, 172
144; his criticism of the possibility Subhankara, 126 n.
of knowing the class-concepts, 139, Jubhiiiubha, 23 n.
140; his criticism of substance and subhiiiubha-karma-vipiika, 23 n.
quality, 143 ; his criticism of tarka, suci-dravya-sevana, 505
140, 141; his criticism of Udayana, suddha, 36
141; his date, works and followers, suddha-Sa1JlVit-mayii-nanda-rfipa, 264
125, 126; his dialectic compared Suddhananda, 192
with that of Nagarjuna, 163; his sukra, 312 n., 317, 328
dialectic distinguished from that of iukra-dharii, 317
Sankara, 191, 192; his difference sukra-priidur-bhiiva, 3 5 I
with the Madhyamika posttlon, SU'IJ.thf, 363
168; his difference with Vacaspati su#ra-kara, 332 n.
and Mal).<;lana, IOI; his ontologie ~ma, JOO, JOI, 33 I
argument for the existence of Brah- s~mi~o jvarasya, 298
man, 128; his refutation of analogy, Sudra,5o2, 504, so6, 514,531
Index
sula, 298, 346 Tantra school, 354, 355, 357
sunya, 234,27I, 330 Tantra-siddhiinta-dlpikii, 2 I 9
iunyatii, 7 tantra-yantra-dhara~z, 3 32
Sunya-viida, 426 tantra-yukti, 389, 390
Sunya-vada theory, 3 Tailgalva, 300
silnya-viidin, 2, 35 Tanka, 43 n.
Sunya-viidin Buddhists, 7 ta7Jhii,490,496,499
Svayathu, 43 I tapalz,76,229,423,437,469,506,5o8,
svetii, 3I7 5IO, 513, 5I4, 523, 536, 544
Svetiisvatara, 4 7 I tapo-yajiia, 487
iyena sacrifice, 38I n., 483 n. tarka, 140, I4I, 376, 454
~atj-ailga, 343 Tarka-ciirf.iima7Ji, 54
~arf.-anga yoga, 453, 455 Tarka-dlpikii, Io8
~arf.-iisraya, 3 I 2 n. Tarka-kii7Jrf.a, 87,88,92
$arf.-dariatJa-sa1Jlgraha-vrtti, I48 n. Tarka-piida, 84 n.
~arf.-indriya, 366 Tarka-sa1Jlgraha, 49· son., SI, I 16 n.,
$~#-tantra, 476 l19 n., 192, I93, 194 n., 2Io, 211,
$at-cakra-nirupa~ta, 353 n., 354 377
Tarka-viveka, 5 I, 79
Tachibana, 496 tarko 'pratyak~a-jiiiinam, 376
Tactile, I76 taru7.1a asthi, 286 n.
Tactual particles, 25 n. Taste, I8I, 194, I99, 236, 355, 357-
Tactual sense, I 56 360,362-366,370
tad anusandhatte, 238 Taste cognition, I8o
tadiitve, 374 tathya-sa'f!Zvrti, 4
tad-bhava-bhiivitii, 376 tat param, 499
tad-utpatti, I 83 tattva, I93
tadvati tat-prakiiraka-jiiiinatvam, 2I4 Tattva-bindu, 45 n., 87 n., I07
taijasa, 548 Tattva-bodha, 57 n.
taikp;ya, 362 n. Tattva-bodhim, 52 n., 54, 115, 216 n.,
Taittirlya, 78, 486 2I7
Taittirlya-Arm:zyaka, 538 Tattva-candrikii, 79, I93, 43I
Taittinya-bhii~ya-fippm;a, I 93 Tattva-cintiima7.1i, 54
Taittinya-bhii~ya-viirttika-tlkii, I 93 Tattva-cintiima7Ji-prakiiia, 54
Taittirlya-briihma7Ja, 25I, 28on.,29In. Tattva-dlpana, 10, 52, 79, I03, 193,
Taittirlya-priitiiakhya, 3 94 208 n., 210
Taittiriya-sa1Jlhitii, 536 Tattva-dlpikii, 79, 222 n.
Taittirlya Upani~ad, 494 fqttva-jiiiina, 252
Taittinyopani~ad-bhii~ya, 78 Tattva-kaumudl, 250
Taking of pure food, 505 Tattva-kaustubha, 54, 2 19
takman, 298, 299, 300 n. 2 Tattva-muktii-kaliipa, 1 I9 n., 262 n. 3
tala-kurca-gulpha, 285 n. Tattva-muktiivali, 2I9
Taliitala, 76 Tattva-pradlpikii, 51, 83, 119 n., I39,
tamas,72, 74,104,234, 267,30J,304, I47, 148 n.
314, 318, 319, 329, 367, 372, 419, Tattva-samlk~ii,45 n.,83,87, Io6, I07,
436.456,462,468,499 IIOn.,II6
tan-miitras, 74, 236, 245, 305, 477 Tattva-SatJzgraha, 20 n., 25, 27 n., 28 n.,
tanniiiomuktir iitmanalz, 99 31 n., I7I, I72 n., x82 n., x86 1z.
tantra, 276 n., 352 Tattva-sm.ngraha-paiijikii, I74 n.
Tantra anatomy, 356, 357 tattva-sraddhii, 495
Tantra-ciirf.iima7Ji, 353 n. Tattva-iuddhi, 57 n.
Tantra literature, 354 n. tattva-tlkii, 43 n.
Tantra philosophy, 356 Tattva-vaii("iradl, 45 n., 262, 306 n.
Tantra physiology, 273 Tattva-'l.ibhiikara, 250
Tantras, niirf.i-cakras in, 354-356; su- Tattva-vibhiivanii, 8 7 11.
~Um1Jii, its position in, 353, 353 n., Tattva-vivecana, 54
354; system of niiqts in, 352-354 Tattva-vivelw, 54, 72
Tantra-siira, 432 Tattva-Tiveka-dlpana, 54, 217 n.
610 Index
Tattviiloka, 49, so, 193 Thoughtfulness, 513
Tattviinusandhiina, 56 Thought-movement, 235 n., 254
Tattvopadeia, 8 I Thought-principle, 35
Taxila, 276, 424 Thought-processes, 21, 256, 369
Taylor, 219 Thought-stuff, 29
tiidiitmya, 3 I n., 183 Thought-substance, 24
tiidiitmya-pratui, 40 Throat, J3I, 348, 361, 365
tiilu, 287 n. 4 Tibet, I64
ttilu-mula, 288 n. I Tibetan, 59 n., 164
ttilu~aka, 287 n. 4 Tibia, 285 n. 6
tiimasa, 373, 468 Tiger, 509, 513
tiimasika, 367 tikta, 3I2 n. 3, 350, 357, 358
ttimrti, 3 I7 Tilak, 550, 551 n.
Tantric charms, 281 Tilakasvamin, I07
Tal).c;la, 283 Time,68, I48, 156, I57, I07, I94,32I,
Ttirti-bhakti-tarmigitfi, 225 358, 360, 369, 370, 372; and space,
Ttitparyu-bodhini, 216 n. 266
Ttitparya-candrikii, 44 I Tirumalai Nayaka, 219
Ttitparya-praktisa, 23 I, 235 n., 266 tiryag-ga, 351
Tiitparya-!ikti, I07 tl/q1Ja, 359, 361
Teacher, 254, 378, 420, 513, 534 tivratara, 25I
Teaching, 378, 505 tivrii, 291
Technical term, 377 Tongue, 326 n., 331, 348, 367
Teeth, 326 n. Topic, 377
tejas, 236, 24I, 245, 3I2, 313, 362, Tortoise, I09
505 n., 5IO Touch, I94,236,355,358,36o
Tejo-bindu, 454 Toxicology, 435
tejo-dhiitu, 307 toya, 333
Tekka Matha, 49 Trachea, 286 n. 2
Telang, K. T., I22, 123, 549, 550 Trade, 505 n.
Temperament, 378 Tradition, 78, I02, 377
Temples, 287 Tranquillity, 229
Temporal, IS, 16, 342; bones, 287 Transcendence, 5 I 2
n. 5; determinations, 187 Transcendent, 21, 22, 524, 526; re-
Temptation, 50I ality, 16; self, 10, 368; state, 455
Tendons, 348, 50I, 510, 5II, 516 Transcendental, I68; principle, 72
Term, 373 Transformation of Brahman, 42
Terminology, I4 Transformations, 2o-23, 25, 35, 36,
Testicles, 3I8 38, 51, 88, I04, 114, I7I, I77. 198,
Testimony, 39, 114, 170, 373 206, 207, 210, 211, 22I, 224, 232,
Texts, 17 233. 332, 347. 50I
Theist, 226 Transgression, Ioo, 275, 405, 422, 505
Theistic, 1 Transitory, 490
Theology, 525 Transmigration, 372, 4I I
Theory, 357, 501; of creation, I94; Transparent, 337 n.
of momentariness, 3 I ; of pain, 9 I ; trasare1JU, I 57
of perception, I68; of substances, 37 I Trayyanta-bhiiva-pradipikii, 52 11.
Thesis, 19, 2I, 29, I63, I65, 166, I7o, Treta age, 409, 4Io
I83, I89, I94, 232, 387 Triads, 306
Thickness, 360 Trickery, 378
Thing, 359 n., 498, 510 trika, 285 n. 7
Third Oriental Conference, 1 n. trika-sa1{lbaddhe, 286 n. 4
Thirst, 335 n., 348 tri-kiila, 375
Thoracic vertebrae, 286 n., 287 n. I Trilocana, 107
Thought, 23, 189, I91, 236, 266, 302, Trilocanaguru, I07
367, 373.405,4I4 Tri1[liikii, 2I, 22 n., 25, 26 n., 29, 35
Thought-activity, 235, 240, 272 Trinity College, I4
Thought-creation, 235 n., 244 Trinity Street, 14
Index 611
Tripathi, 49. son., I I6, 192, 193 n., 196 Umbilicus, 289
tri-praluim-malzii-sthur;ram, 257 n. 2 Unaffected, 42
Tripurl-prakara1')a-flkii, I 93 Unattached, 510, 511
Trisikha-briihma7Ja, 454 Unattached ness, 511
Triune, 23 Unattachment, 524
trive7Jl, 354 Uncaused, 63
tri-vidha, 401 n. Unchangeable, 24, 33, 42, 45, 63, 73,
Trivikramadirya, 52 n. 164, 179, 206 n., 221, 240, 271, 368,
trivrt-kara7Ja, 74 n. 369, 476; consciousness, 181
Troubles, 501 Uncompounded, 74
True associations, 155 Unconditional, 176
True experience, I 55 Unconditionality, 160
True knowledge, 164, 174, 246, 457 Unconnected, 230
True proposition, 155 Unconscious, 181
True recognition, 155 Unconsciousness, 265
Trunk, 343 Uncontradicted existence, 30
Truth, 3, I 14, 118, 378, 494, 495, 534 Undemonstrable, 22
Truthful, 513 Underlying consciousness, 53, zo6,
Truthfulness, 373, sos, 510 207, 209
trR~ii, 413, 415 n., 499 Undesirable, 5 12
trtlyaka, 297 Undetermined fruition, 249
Tubercles, z86 1z. 3 Undifferentiated, 23 n., 474; aware-
tuccha, 224 ness, 211
tulyiirthatii, 3 71 Unhappy, 277
turya, 264, 267 Unhealthy, 320
turyiitUa, 264, 266 n. Uniform motive, 178
Tlibingen, 283 Unimportance, 370
tyallta-lwrtrtva-vihlzramab, 245 Uninferable, 454
tyiif!a, sos, so8, 510 Unintelligent, 36-38
tyiiga-miitra, 228 Unintelligible, 12, 138, 143
Tippa7Ja, 425, 428 Uninterrupted succession, 25 n.
'Jlkii-ratna, 52 n. Unique, 13, 228; relation, 31
Unity, 8s, 243; of consciousness, 179;
ubhayedyub,, 297 texts, 46, 81
Ubiquitous, 14 Universal, 63, 139, 374; altruism,
ucchlankhau, 285 501 ;characteristic, 159; compassion,
ucchviisa, 327 461; concomitance, 140; duty, so6;
ucitena pathii, 313 friendship, 501, SII; piety, SII;
Udara, 431 pity, 501; self, 6, 9; spirit, 457
udara, 287 n. 1, 289 Universality, 8s, 194
Udayana, 49, 51, 107, II9, 123-126, Universe, I I
134, 140, 141, 147 n.; criticized by Unknowable, 263
Srihan?a on the subject of tarka, 141 Unlimited, 63
udiina, 75, 259, z6o, 332 Unmanifested, 232, 263,357,358,471,
udiislnii, 378 519, 525, 530; state, 236
udiivarta, 391 Unmada, 431
uddeia, 389, 390 Unmiida-cikitsitam, 341 n.
Uddyotakara, 119, 124, 137 n., 147 n., Unnameable, 234
171, 182 n., 186, 384 n., 393, 394, Unperceivable, 138
400n. Unperceived, 199
Ui, H., 398 n. Unperturbed, soo, sro, 512
Ulna, z8s n. 6 Unperturbedness, 51 1
Ultimate, 233, 236; being, 235; caus- Unproduced, 63, 182
ality, ro6; cause, 111, 114, 237; con- Unreal, 127, 271; appearances, 48
sciousness, 22; entity, 232-234; prin- Unreality, 128, 165, 246, 252
ciple, 474; reality, 8, 13, 22, 42, 98, Unreasonable, x86
168, 199,221,271, 454; specific pro- Unrighteous, 409
perties, 371; truth, IS, 494. so8 Unspeakable, 35, 89 n., 203, 204, 221
Index
Unsubstantial, 202, 203 upiidhi, 72, 142
Unsuitable, 370 upiilambha, 388
Unsuitability, 370 upiinga,273, 274,276,279
Untenable, 358 upiiya, 359, 389
Unthinkable, 22, 221, 362-364, 529 upekkhii, 460
Untruthfulness, 373 upek$ii, 23 n.
U7Jiidi, 54 I Upholder, 526
u~l~lulw, 318 Upodghiita, 28o n., 283 n.
Uj>lu·aryate, 26 I Upper worlds, 76
upacaya, 235 ll. uras, 286
upaciira-chala, 386 n. Urinal canal, 296
upadesa, 3~9. 390 Urinary disease, 343
Upadeia-siihasrl, 79, 81 Urine, 325, 327-330, 347, 35o-352
U padesa-siihasri-vi'l.Tti, 193 Uru~uja, 300
upadlzii, 412, 415 ussado, 497
upadlziira~za, 459, soo Usanas-sa1fzlzitii, 435
upa-dhiilu, 324 u~7Ja, 312n., 357,35911.,361
upahiira, 183 Uterus, 313
Upallrama-pariihrama, 220 utlwr~a-prakar~a-rupa, 401 n.
upalabdhi-sama, 380 n., 382 n. utkar$iipakar~a- Var1}yiivar1J.ya-vikalpa-
upalal?,w~w, I I siidhya-sama, 380 n., 38 I tz.
upamii, 3~0 Utpala, 49
upamiina, 148, 377 Utpatti, 231
ufmnaya, 379 utpatti, 232
upaniilzo, 497 utsiiha, 327
upanilwndlw, 497 uttama!z puru~al;, 466
Vpani~<H.1ic, 205 n., 494, 499; simile, Uttamamrta, 99
467 uttara, 380, 391
l lfllllli,wd-ratna, s8 Uttara-sthiina, 433
Upani~ads, I, 2, 8, 37-30, 46, s8, 78, Uttara-tantra, 329, 330, 332, 3~9. 424,
92, 98, 100, II3, 114, II6, 12<), 151, 425, 427, 429
215, 226, 259, 260, 276, 333, 344, Uttara-vasti, 426
448, 453. 455. 47I, 475. 478, 493. uttariiya~za, 519
495, 496, 51 I 1l., SIS, 520, 525, 530, Uveyaka, 172
532, 536, 548, 551; as one consistent Uvula, 259, 355
philosophy borrowed by Sankara iilw, 375, 377
from his predecessors, 2; commen- ilhya, 389, 392
tators before Sankara, I ; ethical firdhva-gii niil]l, 345 n.
ideas in, 494, 495; heart in, 344; firdhva-mula'f!l tripiid Brahma, 523
nature of its philosophy under Gau- firu-nalaka, 285 n. 8
<;lapada's influence, 2; their view of firfi, 285
self criticized by Kamalasila, 181;
their views regarding the niil}is, Vacuity, 21, 234
344 fT. Vacuous space, 59
Upani~ad texts, 8o, 87, 88, 98,132 Vagina, 289, 290 n., 291, 313 n.
upapatti-sama, 3~0 n. 4, 382 n. vahana-piika-snelza, 328 n.
uparati, 495 Vaibha~ikas, 186 n.
upasamiinussati, 459 Vaideha Janaka, 316
Upasama, 231 Vaideha king, 357
upasamana, 358 vaidharmya, 13 2
upasamaniya, 357 vaidya, 385
upasaya, 397 V aidyaka-sarvasva, 432
upatiipa, 293, 309 Vaidyakii$fiiitga - hrdaya - vrtter bhe -
U pavar~a, 43 ~aja-niima-sfici, 436
upaviisa, 278 Vaidyanatha Dik~ita, 81
upm•eda, 274, 276 Vaidyavacaspati, 434
upiidiina, 9, 334,497,498 Vain, SII
upiidiina-kiira~za, 12, 372 vairiigya, 231, 412, 439, 454
Index
Vairiigya-satalw, 460 11. knowledge, 20; arguments of San-
Vaise~ika, SI, ss. 119, I2o, 125, I57. kara for psychological dualitv of
I79. I89-I92, I94. 248, 262, 272, awareness do not apply to Vasu-
302, 307 n., 369, 412, sq.; cate- bandhu, 29; central features of his
gories, 55, I 92; its theory of the philosophy, 24, 25; did not deny
subtle body, 306; philosophy, I93, objectivity of objects of awareness,
332 n., 398 n.; physics, I92, 273; but regarded objects as awarenesses,
springs of action in, 4I2; system, 29; experiences like dreams, 20; his
366, 37I; theory, I90 date, 20 n.; his denial of the doctrine
Vaise#ka-bhii~ya, 162 of pure vacuity, 2I; his idealistic
Vaise#ka-siUras, 356, 369-37I conceptional space, 25; his idealistic
Vaisya, 502, 504, sos, 53I, 542, 546 explanation of physical eYents, 2I;
vai~wnya, 320 his refutation of the atomic theory,
Vai~Dava, I25, I92, 2I9, 44I, 443. 20; his theory of iilaya-vijiiiina, 22;
532 his theory of pure consciousness and
Vai~1_lavism and Saivism, 543 n., 549 n. its power, 22; his theory of thought
Vaitaral)a, 424 transformations, 21; his view of
Vaitara.1Ja-tantra, 435 thought as real substance and its
vaitiina, 283 threefold transformations, 23 ff.; his
V aitiina-sfitra, 284 view that illusory impositions must
Vaiyiisilw-nyiiya-miilii, 8I have an object, 2I; perceptual know-
Vajrii, 353, 354 ledge of the material world not trust-
val?riimuniina, I 20 worthy, 20; salwpalamblw-niyama
Vakulakara, 43 I absent in, 26 n. I; world-construc-
Valabhi, I64 tion as false as dream-construction,
·valaya, 284 n. 4 2I
valayii.sthi, 284 n. 4 Vasumitra, I7I
'lmliisa, 298 n., 299 'L'asv-aizlw-vasu-'l.·atsare, I07
Valid, I2, IS8, I66, I84; means of Vasi~tlza-riima-sm!l'Viida, 229
proof, 236; proofs, I67 'l!asyiitman, 420
Validity, I66, I70 vati, 400 n.
Vallabhacarya, I47 n., 156 n., 443 Vatsapa, 300
Varp.sidhara Misra, 250 n. Vavrviisas, 300
Vll1lll'!l, 497 vii,330
vanatho, 497 Vacaspati 1\lisra, 11, I 2, 25 n., 29,36 n.,
vani~thu, 289 45. 47. 48, SI, 52, s6, 57. 74 n., 8I-
Vanity, 509-511 83, 87, IOI, I03, IOS, I06, I09, III,
Varigasena, 427, 435 I I2, I I6, I I9, I24, I26 n., I96, 220,
Varada PaD<;lita, 57 n. 250, 26o, 262, 272, 305, 306 n., 393,
Vararuci, 432 394; admits jlva as the locus of
Vararuci-saf!llzitii, 432 avidyii and Brahman as its object,
Vardhamana, I07, I26 n. 110; admits two kinds of aj1iiina,
Variability, 384 108; discussions regarding his date
van:za-dharma, 505 and teachers, I07; his account of the
van:zaka, 52 n. Sautrantika view of the existence of
vartJ.iisrama-dharma, 505 the external world, 26 n. 2; his de-
vartJ.ya-sama, 386, 387 finition of truth, 108, I09; his differ-
var~ii, 335 ence with Sarvaji'Hitma lVIuni, no;
Varur:ta, 292, 300 n. 2 his explanation regarding the nature
Varying states, I8o of object, 29; his followers, Io8;
vasanta, 335 his reference to other Buddhistic
Vasi~tha, 229, 257 arguments regarding the falsity of
vasti, 289 n. I, 340, 426 space, 28 n. ; his view of ill us ion, I I o ;
vasti-kriyii, 296, 426 his view of the status of the object
vastu, 203 of knowledge, I I I ; method of his
vastut'L'll, 38 commentary, 108; on the Sarpkhya-
Vasubandhu, I9-21, 25, 26 n., 29, 35, Yoga theory of the subtle body,
s8-6o, 62, 164, I7I; admits pure 305
Index
Viiciirambhm;la, 216 334, 335 n., 336, 337 n., 339, 344,
vada,377.379.401 349, 350, 352, 361, 362 n., 371,
Viidiivali, 57 n. 392
Vadiraja, 443 Viitaja, 300, 301, 331
Vadivagisvara, 196 Viita-kalii-kaliya, 332 n.
Vadindra, 120, 122-124, 196; his date viitala, 334
and works, 122, 123 viita-prakrti, 328, 334
Vagbhata, 274, 284 n. 3, z8s n. 6, viiti, 299
286 n. 1, 288 n. 1, 304, 327, 329, viitlkiira, 299
332, 425, 427, 432-434; diseases as viiti-krta-niisan'i, 299
modifications of do~as, 3 29; his view viiti-krtasya-bhe~ajlm, 300
of do~a, dhiitu and dhiitu-mala, 332; Vatsiputriyas, 59, 6o, 62, 182
his view of do~a, dhiitu and mala, Vatsyayana, 119, 124, 171, 248, 384
327 ff. n. I., 390, 393' 399 n., 400 n., 401 n.,
Vagbhata junior, 363 413
V iigbhata-khm:zr;fana-ma~uJana, 42 5 Vayorvida, 333
Vagisa Gosvamin, 225 n. viiyu, 75, 245, 257 n., 259 n., 260, 262,
Vahata, 263, 433 263, 276, 291, 300, 304, 311, 313,
V iijasaneyi-sa1flhitii, 536 315, 318, 325-331, 33211., 333-336,
·viij'ikara1J.a, 276, 30I 338, 339, 345, 348, 349, 362 n.,
Viijzkara1J.a-tantra, 425 363, 365, 384; according to Caraka,
viik, 346 332 ff.
viik-chala, 385, 386 n. vedanii, 23
'lliikya-do~a, 384, 385 Vedas,44,224,236,274,275,277,279,
Vakyakara, 43 n. .z8o, 294, 333, 390, 405, 407, 438,
·viikya-prasa7JZSii, 385 478, 481, 484, 487, 493. 49•h 514.
viikya-se$a, 389, 391 szo, 524, sz6, 545. 547. 548
V iikya-vivara1J.a-vyiil~hyii, I 9 3 Veda-stuti-flkii, 225
Viikya-vrtti, So, 81 vedaviidina[l, 424
V iikya-vrtti-prakiiiikii, So Vedadhyak~a - bhagavat - pujyapada,
Viikya-vrtti-tzkii, 193 52 n.
Valmiki, 229, 230 Vedananda, 52 n.
viina-prastha, 505 Vedanta, 1, 3. 13, 15, 18, I9, 29, 33,
vii1i-mana[l-sarira-pravrtti, 32 I 34,37.44,47,53,54.S6,S7,69,7I-
•vii1imaya, 469 73, 86, 96, 107, IIS, 118, 124, 125,
Vapyacandra, 431 127, 128, 156, 168, 192, 198, zos,
viira~zii, 353 zo8, 216, 2I7, 220, 223, 224, 227,
'l:iiritta, soo 23I, 234, 242, 261, 271, 310, 311,
viir#ka, 345 410, 438, 472, 474. 476, 478, 479.
Viirttika, 1 n., 48, 52, 78, 83, 84, xoo, 488, 499, 504, 512, SI8, 548, sso;
102 ajiliina and prakrti in, 74; all sub-
Varyovida, 357 jective notions are only contents, and
viisanii, 26, 27 n., 186, 187, 237-239, therefore outside the revelation in,
243, 245, 251, 255-257, 264, 266, 16; analysis of consciousness in, 63
268, 269 ff.; apprehension of objects involving
viisaniibhidhiinab, 242 objective characters, objects and the
viisanii-k~aya, 252 pure immediacy of revelation in, 13;
Vasi!1tha, 230, 231, 238, 255 Anandabodha's arguments in favour
V iisi~!ha-Riimiiym:za, 231 of the self-luminosity of the self
V iis#!ha-Riimiiya~za-candrikii, 231 and its criticism of the Prabhakara
Viis#tha-siira, 232 in, 69, 70; beginnings of the dia-
V iisi~tha-siira-gur;lhiirthii, 23 2 lectical arguments in, s 1 ; Buddhist
viistavl, 224 criticism of the identity of the self
Vasudeva,535,538-s44.548,549;and and its reply in, 66, 67, cognitional
Kr~l).a, 541 ff. revelation not a product in, 13; con-
Viisudevaka, 539 tinuation of the school of Vacaspati
Vasudevendra, 57 n. up to the seventeenth century in, 51,
viita, 258, 282, 296, 319, 327, 330- 52; continuation of the schools of
Index
Suresvara, Padmapada and lVIaQ.Q.ana tent, infinite and non-temporal in,
up to the fourteenth century in, 52, 16; principle of revelation neither
53; continuity of conscious life in, subjective nor objective in, I6;
I 5 ; criticism of Buddhistic analysis quarrel with the Prabhakaras on the
of recognition in, 65; difference be- subject of revelation in, 67; reasons
tween pure intelligence and cog- adduced as to why COh'Tlition cannot
nitional states in, I3; does not admit be cognized in, q.; refutation of the
any relation between the character arguments against the self-luminosity
and the object, but both are mani- of the self in, 68, 69; revelation can-
fested in one simple revelation, I3; not be individuated, I 6; revelation
eleventh century writers in, 49; identical with self in, 15; self-iden-
everything else which is not a prin- tity proved through memory in, 67;
ciple of revelation is miiyii in, I6; seventeenth and eighteenth century
existence of self cannot be proved writers more under the influence of
by inference in, 68 ; existence of self Vacaspati, Surdvara and Sarvaji'iat-
is only proved through its imme- ma than of the Vivara1Ja in, 56. 57;
diacy and self-revelation in, 68, 69; Srihar~a. Citsukha and the nwhii-
general writers after the fourteenth 'l•idyii syllogism of Kularka in, 51;
century greatly under the influence status of the object in, 35; tenth
of the Vivara~w school in, 53; idea century writers in and Buddhism in,
of jlvan-mukti in, 25I; in what sense 48, 49; the evolution of the micro-
CO!-,mizing is an act, in what sense it cosmos and macrocosmos from aj-
is a fact in, I 5;" I" only a particular 1iiina, 74, 75; the self limited by
mode of mind in, I 5; its account of miiyii behaves as individuals anJ as
the anta(!lwmiJa, 75; its account of God in, 72; the theory of trivrt-
the ko~as, 7 5, 76; its account of the kara1J.a and paiici-kanliJa in, 7+;
possibility of recognition, 65, 66; its Vidyarm:rya's analysis of the recog-
account of the universe, 76; its nizer in, 66; Vidyarar:tya 's conten-
account of the 'lYiyus, 75; its central tion that the self-identity cannot be
philosophical problem, 47; its chief explained by the assumption of two
emphasis is on the unity of the self, separate concepts in, 67, 68; writers
72, 73; its conception of identity from the seventeenth to the nine-
differentiated from the ordinary log- teenth century in, 57 n. 1; writers
ical concept of identity, I4; its cos- inspired by Jagannathasramai\irsirp-
mology, 73-77; its diffccence with ha and Appaya in, 55; writers in-
the Mahayanists regarding nature spired by Kr~r:tananda of the seven-
of objects in the Vivarm:za school, 30; teenth century in, 56; writers of the
its theory of the subtle body, 311; sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
its three opponents, Buddhist, Nai- in, 55
yayika and Mimarpsaka, 71, 72; its Vedanta arguments, uS, 128
twofold \Tiew, 13; logical explana- Vedanta dialectic, 125; history of its
tion as regards the nature of identity rise and growth, 12+, 125; malzii-
in, 14; meaning of cognizing in, 15; vidyii syllogisms of Kularka as its
meaning of prii1Ja in, 260, 261; direct precursor in, 124, 125
memory does not indicate aware- Vedanta dialectics, 57 n., 163, I7I;
ness of awareness in, 67; mental forerunners of, 171 ff.
states and revelation in, 15 ; nature Vedanta epistemology, 149, 154.
of ajiiiina and its powers in. 73, 74; Vediinta-hrdaya, 57 11.
nature of the anta/:zlwra1J.a in, 76, 77; Vedanta idealism, 151
nature of the obligatoriness of its Vt'diinta-lwlpa-latihii, 225, 226
study in, 46; no cognition camtot Vediinta-kalpa-taru, 108, 119 11., 260
be cognized again in, 14; notion of Vediinta-kalpa-taru-maiijarl, 108
" I" as content in, 15; possible bor- Vediinta-kalpa-taru-parimala, 1oS, 226
rowing of its theory of perception Vediinta-kaumudl, 52, 53, 197, I98,
from Sarpkhya by Padmapada in, 204-206, 209, 210, 211 n.
89 n.; principle of revelation de- Veda1lta-kaumudi-'L)'iildzy(/na, 205
signated as self or iitman in, I 6; Vediinta-lwustubha, g~ 11.
principle of revelation is self-con- Vediinta-naya-hhfi~a1Ja, sr,, ~2
Index
Vediinta-pariblu'i~ii, 17 11., 30 n., 54, Verbal definitions, 146
74 n., 75 n., 105, 207, 2o8, 209 n., Verbalism, I71
2I 1 n., 217, 223 n. Verbal nature, 163
Vediinta-pariblui~ii-prakiiSilu"i, 54 n. Verbal repetition, 385
Vedanta philosophy, 19, 51, 62, II2 Verbal sophisms, 146
Vediinta-siira, 54, 55,73 n., 75 n., 8111., Verbal usage, I84
IOJ, 26I Vertebrae, 287 11. I
Vt•diinta-siddlziinta-candrikii, 56 Vertebral column, 285 11. I, .287 n. 1,
Vediinta-siddhiinta-muktiivalt, 57 n., 353
270 vibhava, 537
Vediinta-siUra, 228, 260-262 'l>ibhriga, I s8, 194, 360
Vcdiinta-sfilra-nmhtiivali, 82 Vibhrama-vivelw, 87 11.
Vecliinta-silduimm;i, 54 'l•iblulti, 549
V edtinta-tattva-dlpana-v:ytikhyii, 54 Vibration, 256; of the prii7Ja, 256
rTedtlnta-tattva-lwwmuli, 45 II. Vibratory, 254; activity, 257, 258, z61;
Vedtinta-taltva-vi'l'elw, S·h 216, 2I7 n. movement, I88
Vedanta teachers, 17, 30 'l'iclira, 358, 359
Vedanta texts, +7 victlrmJ.tl, 264, 373
Vedanta topics, XI Vice, 194, 248, 305, 373, 487, 493,
Vedanta writers, 55 498, 507, 510, 511, 522
Vedantacarya, 441 'l·icil~ilstl, 4 I 3
Vt:dantic, 3I 11., 52 n., <)2, 3I I; attack, Vicious,22,23,409, 414; endll·ssseries,
I 25; circle, 55; concqlt of salvation, 130; infinite, 40, 70, I 17, 132, 162,
227; conct:pts, 14H; cosmolo~y. 73, 174, 178, 185; infinite regress, 128,
226; development, 48; doctrines, 255
228; idealism, 36; influence, 477, Viciousness, 373
478; interpretation, 49; interpreta- Victory, SI2
tion by Bhartrprapai'ica, 1 ; inter- 'l.1iddt"!O, 497
preters, 208; monism, 224; pro- Videha, 427
blems, 228; self, 33; texts, 90, 98, 'l'l"deha-mukti, 252
<)<), 102; writers, 44, 53 Videha-tantra, 435
Veuantin, 30, 234 vidhiina, 389, 391
Vedantist,I2,JI,96, I24, I25, 128,I57, vidhi, so, 479-483
107, I68, 225, 517 Vidhi-rasiiya11a, 220
vedtt1if?a, 274, 276 V idhi:.rasiiya11opajl'l'anl, 2 20
Vedii1it-:a-stlra, 432 Vidhi-viveka, 45 n., 86, 87, 106, 482
Vedii.rtha-sa1!tgraha, 43 n. 'l'idhura, 3 51
Vedic commands, 479, 48I-4-86 vidhurii, 342
Vedic commentator, 215 vidradha, 299
Vedic dharma, 533 Vidvan-ma11orami"i, 79
Vedic duties, 43 n., 46, 99, IOO, 437 Vid'l•an-mano-raiijmzl, 261 11. 1
Vedic index, 345 n., 346 n., 486 n. 3 vidvat-sm.nnyiisa, 251, 25211.
Veuic India, 301 Vidyabhusan, Dr, 393, 394
Vedic injunctions, 468 'l'idyli, 12, 238, 239. 505
Vedic knowledge, 495 Vidycibhara~ra, 126 n.
Vedic religion, 493 'l'idyiibhltVa 1 I 2
Vedic texts, 74 11., 98, 129 'l'idyiibhlpsita, 495
Vedisdze Studien, 345 n. Vidyadhaman, 79
'l.'ega-pravartmw, :P7 Vidyclmrta-var#7Jl, 1 15
Vegetables (horn from), 309 Vidyarar:tya, 52, 53, 57, 69, 70 11., 78,
Veins, 256, 289, 290, ~p8 82, 83, 86, IOJ, 214, 216, 251, 252;
Venis, 17 11. a fol1ower of the Vivara7Ja view, 215;
Veti.kata, 43 11., 82 11., 119, I2o, I23, his date and works, 214, 216; his
200 idea of ]lvan-muhti, 251 ; his view
Veri.katanatha, 441 that miiyli and Brahman are the
Verikatesa, 432 joint cause of the world-appearance,
vermJz, 497 21 5; the writer of Paficadast and
Verbal cummanu, 4 79 of the ]lvan-mukti-viveka, ::!51 11.
Index
Vidyarar.lya 1\Juni, 66, 67 Vindhyasvamin, I7I
Vidyaratna, K., 2 11. vinibandhanam, 497
Vidyii siiNarl, I03, 126 11., I32, I34 n. 'l'in1iii1la, 498
Vidyii-surabhi, 99 Violent, 408
l 7 idyii-srl, 82 11. viparlfa-dharmat'l.'a, 6
·oidyi:-taru, I07 viparyaya, xo. 381, 39I
Vidyatirtha, 2IS n. viparyiisa, 5; {error), four kinds of, 5
View, 366, 369, 378; of things, I3 vipiika, 22-24, 362-364, 366, 391
Vigorous, 303 'l•iral?ti, 25 I, 252
Vigraha-'l•yii'l'artanl, 165 viriij, 43
'l•z:r;rhya-sm!zhhii~ii, 378 viriit, 21 5, 548
Vijayanagara, 219 virclw, 3 IS
Vijaya-prasasti, 126 Virility, 301, 333
Vijayarak~ita, 428-430, 432, 434, 435 'l'iriya-Sllt!IVllYll, 500
vij1iapti, 20 'l•irodho, 497
'l•ijfiapti-miitratii, 22, 24 Virtue, 194, 248, 305, 373, 404, 493,
Vijiiapti-mlitratii-siddhi, H) n. 508, 5IO, 51 I, 514, 522
'l,jjiiiina, 23, 127, I64, 307, 343, 373, Virtuous, 23, 367, 414, 51 I, 5I2, 514;
491, 505 n. deeds, 246
Vijiiiina-bhairava, 264 'l'iruddlw, 384, 385, 386 n., 388
Vijnanabhikt:'u, 262, 443 viruddha hetu, 386 11.
vijiiiina-dhiitu, 307 visalpa, 299
Vijiiiina-kaumudl, 264 'l'isalpalw, 299
'l•ijiiiina-l~riyii-salai-dvayiisraya, I 04 visarga, 370
'l•ijiiiinamaya, 76 'l'isarpa, 299, 430
'l't}iiiinamaya-ko$a, 75 t•isattikii, 497
•m:iniina-miitra, I<), 22, 234 Visible, I 57, 337 n.; do$a, 337 n.
t#1iiina-pari~u1ma, 2 I Vision, 333
t•z}fiiina-viida, 20, 209, 228, 27:!. Visual, 176; consciousness, 6I; organ,
·mjiiiinn-'l'iidins, 2, 242 31; perception, 20,25 ll.; st·nse, IS6
Vijiiiiniimrta-bhiirJ•a, 262 'L•iSada, 332, 359 n., 361
·vikalpa, 75 n., 236, 2Cn, 389, 392, 'l'ise~a, 148, 187, 1~9. 371,397
401 n. 'l'isi~tn-dl·t·atii-hhal\ti, 505
vikalpa-viisanii, 23 'l·iH${asyai•va iinanda-padiirthatviit, 223
vi lliira, 320. 3 69 Visi~tadvaita, 57 n., 441
Vikrama-sarpvat, 107 ?·iSi,f[t"idvaita-'lJ/idin, 439
Vikramasila, 49 ?•iSuddlw-calu·a, 3 55
'l'ikrti, 334, 335, 358, 386 n., 388 'l•is?•a, 76, 54S
'l'ik~epa, 73, 389 11. Visvahharati, 58 11.
?•ik$epa-sakti, 7 4 Visvadeva, I 15
vih$ipati, I I 2 Visvamhhara, 79
t•ilayana-riipii vrddhil; pralwpa?z, 335 n. Visvanatha Tirtha, 220
t•iliipanl, 264, 265 Visvarupa Acarya, 82, 83, 86, 87, 251
vimukta, 251 vis?·a-rilpatii, 241
Vimuktatman, I98, 199, 201, 203-205; Visvamitra, 230, 54I
criticism of the bhcdiibheda view by, Viivamitra-sa1Jlhitii, 432
20I, 202; criticism of the sahopa- Visvesvara, 443
lambha-niyamiit by, 201; his date and Visvesvara Pa~:t~iita, So
works, 198; his refutation of" differ- Visvesvara Sarasvati, 55
ence," I 99, 200; nature of pure con- Visvesvara Tirtha, 78
sciousness in, 199; tries to prove an Visvdvarananda, 82 n.
intrinsic difference between aware- Visvesvarasrama, 57 n.
ness and its ohject, 201 ; world- t'ifvodarii, 353
appearance like a painting on a vi~ama-pravartanii, 4I6
canvas in, 203 visama-vijiitlna, 416
Vi'T!lsatihii, 19, 20 n., 2I n., 26 n., 29 vi~amiihiiropayogitviit, 334 n.
Vinaya-Pitaka, 276 Vi~a-tantra, 425
viniisa-prati;odhiit, 386 n. Vi$aya, 23, 30, 104, I 10, 11~ 1 152
Index
vi~aya-caitanya, 207 Vomiting, 348
vijaya-gata-pratyak§atva, zo8 vra't)ah, 330 n.
v#aya-titik~ii, 495 Vrddha-Vagbhata, 3I7 n. I
vi~aya-viJnapti, 22 vrddhii};,, I03
vi~aya-vi~ayi-bhiiva, I44, I52 vrddhi, 322
v#ayiin indriyii't]iim, 34I vrkka, 3I8
vi~ayopalabdhi, 373 Vrnda, 427, 435
Vi~Qu, 535, 536, 538, 546-549; and Vp:mis, 539, 541, 543
bhagavat, 539, 540; conception of, vnya, 323, 365 n.
535, 536; conception of, and of vrtti, s6, 70, 87, zo6, 207, 210, zs6,
niiriiya't]a, 537, 538 306
Vi~Qubhatta, 52 n. vrtti-caitanya, 208
Vi~'t]u-dharmottara, 279 n. vrtti-Jniina, 77
Vi~'t]u-mukhii, 536 vrttilliira, 43
Vi~'t]u-pada, 536 Vrtti-prabhiikara, 216 n.
Vi~'t]u-purii't]a, 25I vrtti transformation, 206
V#'t]u-purii1}a-tikii, I48 n. Vrtti-viirttika, 220
V#'tJu-smrti, 279 n. vyakta, 470
Vital centres, 340 vyakter apaiti, 386 n.
Vital currents, I79 vyartha, 388
Vital element, 3I5, 3I6 vyatireki, 400 n.
Vital functions, 357, 487 vyavasiiya, I07, 384
Vitality, 241, 328, 336 vyavasiiyiitmikii, 484 n. I
Vital parts, 342 vyiidhi, 336 n.
Vital powers, 2I Vyiidhi-sindhu-vimardana, 43 2
Vital principle, 24I Vyiikara't)a, 275 n., 547
vita't]qii, 377, 379, 401 Vyiikarm;za-viida-nal?~atra-nuilii, 219
Vitthala Dik~ita, 443 vyiikhyiina, 389, 39:a
Vivara't]ll, 53. 54. 56, IOJ, 208, 201), Vyiillhyiina-dlpikii, 123
216 n., 222; line, 104; school, 34, 53, Vyiikhyii-sudhii, 55
57 vyiikulita-miinasa.~, 3 I 2 n. 3
Vivara~za-prameya-smpgraha, 52, 53, vyiina, 259, 260, 291
63 n., 65 n., 66 n., 67, 70 n., 83, 84, vyiipiido, 497
86, 87, 103, 214, 216 'lryiipiira, 137, 186
T'ivara1_Za-siddhiinta-candrikii, 434 vyiipiirab prera{zii-rupalz, 48I
rri·varm:za-siddhiinta-cinttimm;i, 329 n. 'L'}"iipti, 120, 139, 148, 194
Vi't·ara't)a-tiitparya-dlpikii, 148 n. vyiipti-graha, 148
Vivara1_Zopanytisa, 10, 31 n., 103, 2I6 n. vyiiro~a1}am, 498
Vivara1Jopanyiise Bhtiratmrtha-vaca- Vyasa, 78, 87, 259 n. 2
nam, 216 n. Vyiisa-bhii~ya, 25I, z6z, 265, 305, 408,
vivarta, 38, 39, 224; cause, 45; view, 476, 517
46, 215; view of causation, 224 Vyasatirtha, I 18, 225, 226
vivarta-kiira1_Za, so, 51 Vyasasrama, 119
Vh•eka-cii.dtinza't]i, 79 'L'yiivahiirika, 2, 44
vi·l:eka-ni~patti, 250 vyiivrtta, 63
vividi~ii-smrmyiisa, 252 n. vyiiyiima, 419
Virasi1Jzhti•valokita, 436 vyuha, 545, 546, 548
virya, 241, 351, 359, 36I-366, 370,
39I, SOl \Vackernagel, 345 n.
vita, 256 Waking experiences, 6, 8, 28
Vocal activities, 500 Waking ideas, z6
Vocal organs, 254 Waking life, 8o, I I 5
Void, 272 Waking state, 26, 240, 241, 257
Volition, 23, 24, 71, 152, 153, 463, Walleser, 398 n.
SIS Warm, 358,361,408
Volitional states, 179, 18o Washerman, I6o
Volitional tendency, 479 Waste-products, 325, 327, 33I, 337
Voluntary, SIS Watchfulness, 505
Index
VVater,74,I87,I94.302,33I-334,347, yasmin sunya'!l jagat sthitam, 234
349, 352, 357-360, 362, 364, 367, Yasomitra, 58 n., 62
so1 ; channels, 348 .yathiirthiinubhava, 2 I 3
VVatery, 33I, 357, 359; character, 331 yathiirthiinubhavab, pramii, 13 3, 2 1 2
VVay, us, 367 yathii-vidhi, 294, 295
VVeak, 338 Yaugacaryas, 120
VVealth, 5Io Yadava, 54I, 543
VVeber, Dr Albrecht, 288 n., 486 n. Yadaviibhyudaya, 220
VVell-being, so9 Y iidaviibhyudaya-{ikii, 220
VVhirlwind, 408 Yadavananda Nyayacarya, 225 n.
VVhite, 349; leprosy, 282 Yajftavalkya, I07, 252, 286 n. 1
VVhitney, VV. D., 340 n. Yiijiiavalkya-Dharma-siistra, 279 n.
VVhole, 20, "t-o, I52, I57, I87 Yamunacarya, 43<J-441, 541, 546, 547
VVill, I49, 248, 402, 4I s; force of, 264; yiitudhiinas, 296, 300
to live, 4I4 Yellow, 27, I76, 330; awareness, 70,
VVilling, 263 7I
VVill-power, 242 Yellowness, I43
VVindpipe, 286 Yoga, 107, Io9, 2so, 258, 265, 356,
VVinter, 327, 335, 370 389, 390, 415, 439. 440, 443-445.
VVisdom, 24, 257, 442, 444, 49I, 494, 447. 451-453. 456, 457. 460, 461,
soo, S02,504, sos, 514,530,532 466, 467, 489, 499. 504, 512, 514,
VVise, 378, 531 519, 547; concept of God criticized,
VVish, 497 I77; springs of action in, 414
VVorld, I, 3, 11, SI, 114, 230, 236 yoga-dhiirm:zii, 449 n. 2
VVorld-appearance, I, s, 9-I2, I9, 45, Yoga discipline, 242
46,48,55,74,98, IOI,IOS, 106, IIO, Yoga literature, 354 n.
III, 117, 118, I47, I52, I68, I70, Yoga practices, 273, 436, 440, 44~,
2I5 1 2I7 1 221, 224, 230, 233-236, 477
239-24s, 256, 268 Yoga processes, 453
VV orld -construction, 21 yoga-sevii, 450
VVorld-creation, 39, 42, 242 Yoga-siUra, 5 n., 251, 265, 304 n., 403,
VVorld-experience, 3, 4, I70 408,443.45I,461, 549
VVorldly life, 521 Yoga-sutra-bhii~ya, 87
VVorld-manifestation, 410 n. Yoga system, 436
VVorld-objects, 2I, 28, 36 yoga-sataka, 425, 436
VVorld-order, 533 Yoga Upani~ads, 455, 46I
VVorld-phenomena, so yoga-viihitviit, 332 n.
VVorld-process, 73, I7o Yoga-viirttika, 262, 355
VVorms, 297, 298, 300 Yoga-viis#tha, 17, 57 n., 228, 23011.,
VV orship, 537 231-234. 237. 240, 246, 247. 250 11.,
VVounds, 330 251-254. 259. 263, 264 n., 26S-26~,
VVrath, 497 270-272, 402 n.; citta and move-
VV rong construction, I 54 ment, 258; conception of fivan-
VV rong notion, 9 mukti, 245 ff.; denial of daiva in,
VVrong perception, I37 255; energy and its evolution, 34-3 ff.;
energy and world-appearance, 243 ff.;
yad antar-jiieya-rilp01fl, 27 n. estimate of its philosophy, 271,
yadrcchii, 372, 410 272; free-will and destiny, 253; its
yajna, 292 n., 448, 487, 488 doctrine of priirabdha-kamw, 246,
yajna-vidab,, 448 247; its idealism compared with
Yajii.esvara Makhindra, 2I8 n. that of Prakasananda, 270, 271 ; its
Yajus, 274, 390, s26 idealism compared with that of
Yakkha, 539 Sankara and Buddhist idealism, 268
J·akna, 288 ff.; jivan-mukti and Nyaya eman-
yak~as, 283, 468 cipation, 248; jlvan-mukti and the
ya~man, 297 n. s, 298 Prabhakara idea of emanicpation,
Yama, 25I, 311, 432, 454, 455, 49I 249; jlvmt-mukti and the Sarpkhya
yantm, 257 idea of emancipation, 249, 250; fi-
620 Index
Yoga-viisi$/ha (cont.) Yoga-vas#tha-tiitparya-prakiiSa, 240 n.
van-mukti and the Sarpkhya-yoga Yoga-vdsiltha-tiitparya-smpgraha, 232
idea of emancipation, 249-251 ;jfvan- Yogacara, 164
mukti and Vidyaral)ya's doctrine of Yogananda, 57 n.
jivan-mukti, 251; jivan-mukti com- Yoganandanatha,436
pared with Buddhist sainthood, 247, yogiiriiljha, 444, 445, 446 n.
248; jivan-mukti compared with Yoge$vara, 453
sthita-priijiia, 247; karma, manas Yogins, I89, 256, 440, 444. 446-451,
and the categories, 237-239; nature 454
of kartrtva, 242 ff.; nature of the Yogi-yiijiiavalkya-sa7Jlhitii, 354
work, other works on it and its date, Yogisvara, 57 n., 122
228-232; origination of the world yogyatii, 150
through thought-movement, 235- yoni, 358
237; place of free-will in, 254; prii1Ja yuddhe ciipy apaliiyana, 505 n.
and priir.ziiyiima in, 257 ff.; prii1Ja yudh, 551
vibration and knowledge in, 256; Yudhi~thira, so8, 509
right conduct and final attainment Yugasena, 172
in, 267, 268; stages of progress to- yuj,443.444,446
wards saintliness in, 264 ff.; theory yujir, 443, 444
of spanda, 235-237; ultimate reality yujir yoge, 443, 444
is pure intelligence, 232,233; viisanii yuj samiidhau, 443
and prii1Ja vibration in, 256, 257; yukta, 446 n. 1, 458
world-appearance is entirely mental yukta iislta, 449
creation and absolutely false, 233, yukti, 359, 360, 370, 373, 375, 376
234 Yukti-dipikii, 45 n.
Yoga-viisi$tha-Riimiiya'!fa, 228, 232 Yukti-prayoga, 49
Yoga-viisiuha-sa7Jlk$epa, 232 yuiijyiit, 446 n. 4
Yoga-viisi$tha-siira, 232
Yoga-viisi${ha-siira-sa1Jzgraha, 232 Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenliindi-
Yoga-viisi${ha-slokiib, 232 schen Gesellschaft, 345 n.

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A HISTORY

First printed 1932

First printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGA- V ASI$THA

SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS

I Ayur-veda and the Atharva- Veda 273

THE treatment of the school of Sankara Vedanta in the preceding

dve satye samupiisritya buddhiiniirrz dharma-desanii

stuff that actually undergoes transformation 1 . Vacaspati lVIisra

avidyiitvam. Brahma-tattva-samfk~ii as quoted in Pramii'l}a-miilii, p. 10, Chow-

Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta.

(vi_j1Iiina-'Viida) ofVasubandhu all appearances are but transforma-

no real objective existence, though perception leads us to believe

'sty upaf?antm.yo yatra iitma-dharmopactira!z pravartate. Ibid. Compare Sai1kara's

pravarttate. Ibid. p. 16.

new points. He says that spatial extension, as perceived in visual perception,

Diimaga-sahopalambha-niyamiid abhedo nlla-tad-dhiyo(l bhedai ca bhrtinti-

vacanlya1Jl nlliiditi. Bhiimati, 11. ii. 28.

nllasya pratibhiisiinyathiinupapattyii; k~m;ikasya tv iigantuka-sambandhiibhiive . ..

justification of the doctrine are briefly stated.

which however hardly appears to be convincing. He thinks that an awareness,

Sailkara's Defence of Vedanta; Philosophy of BadarayaQa

luirm;a-pratiJilii-virodha iti at; 1u;; avidyiitmak~-niillw-rfipa-hija-vyiik;lrtl~liipek­

Conference, quotes a passage from Venkata's Tattva-tikO. on Ram~nuja's com-

cosmic. These are the avasthas or modes of Brahman, and re-

commentary on the Brahma-sutra he wrote many other works and commentaries

Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta.

1 Allala Suri, son of Trivikramacarya, wrote a commentary on the Bhiimatl,

called the Bhiimatl-tilaka.

Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist

A.blzidharma-koia, and are based on Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of the ap-

des Sciences de Russie, p. 830.

varfiita-piibhyii1Jl kirrz vyomnai carmat}y-asti tayob phalam

fUr-iidfny upiidiiya riipam prajiiiipyate. Ibid.

existence of colour to be a cognitional one? And would cognitional

artha-kriyii-samarthiis te~iiTfl ciibiidhitarrz sthiiyitvam astui vadati. Vivara7Ja-

internalness of any cognition or feeling. Against the third opponent,

Sarikara and his School.

MaQqana, Suresvara and Visvariipa.

concerning avidyii-nivrtti in l\lar;J9ana's view as admission of negation.

Mal)4ana (A.D. Boo).

1 Citsukha, the pupil of Jnanottama, also wrote a commentary on it, called

Abh£priiya-pmkiis£kii, almost the whole of which, except some portions at the

and Sphota-siddhi. Of these the Vz"dhi-viveka was commented upon by Vacaspati

discovered. In the Brahma-kiit;u)a chapter Mal). <;lana discusses the

vibhaktam asa'!lsnfa1Jl tayii cetyata iti dur-avagamyam. Ibid. _

argument in his Nyiiya-makaranda regarding the unspeakable nature of avidyii,

na m(/yii sytlt. Ibid.

vacchedal.z ubhayarrt vii. Brahma-siddhi, II.

only when the presented object was perceived as "this before"

vidhi-piirva eva, iuktikii-siddhis tu virodhi-ni~edha-purva ucyate; vidhi-pll.rvatii

aniidi-viisanii-vasiit pratibhiisita'!l janitam ida'!l nedam iti vika!po bhiivabhii-

na bhedo vastuno rilpatp tad-abha·va-prasailgata[l

sva-hetu-priipitodaye~u sva-bhii·va-vyavasthite~u vastu~u sva-bhiiva-sthitaye vastv-

luirm;a-pratiJilii-virodha iti at; 1u;; avidyiitmak~-niillw-rfipa-hija-vyiik;lrtl~liipek