TAC Attack March 1961 How high in the sky

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

ATTACK
GENERAL F. F. EVEREST COMMANDER TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
LT GEN .1. E. SMART VICE COMMANDER

FOREWORD THIS ISSUE

Commanders and all maintenance personnel now realize that AFM 66.1 with
its rnechani7ed data reporting systems is here to stay. implementation of DESTRUCTIVE DISTRACTION . . 1
AN,

this program began in TAC in the Fall of 1958, and since that time we have
seen steady progress in improvement of our maintenance effectiveness. We OLD TAT 2
are consistently achieving higher quality maintenance and increased
production from our personnel and materiel assets. With the ever-present TAC TIPS 6
squeeze on dollars and personnel it is evident that we must continue to get
the most out of what we hove. To this end commanders must take every NOVi HIGH IN THE .
advantage of the data available from the AFM 66-1 mechanized systems and
use it to improve maintenance techniques, i.e., reduce inspection require-
ments, specifically identify those aircraft systems which ore excessive
TAC EVAL . . AI
consumers of maintenance manpower, etc. The end result will be to validate
maintenance manpower requirements. Let's collectively put our efforts GIVE THE BIRD A BRAKE . . 12
toword effective use of this data so the system works for us as on aid in
forecasting trends rather than working with offer- the -fact information os we
have so often hod to do in the past.
CHOCK TALK . . . ...... 14
7-1 AIR MUNITIONS 16

/ MARVIN L. MreNICKLE
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy for Materiel

Editor - Major Karl K. Dittmar Assistant Editor - Major James G . Swenson

Art and Production - T/Sgt Heinz E. Hirsch

Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved before material can be republished by other than Air Force
by Hq USAF. organizations.
Articles, accident briefs and associated material published Contributions ere most welcome as are comments and
in this magazine ore nun-directive in nature. All suggestions criticism. We reserve the right to make any editorial changes in
and recommendations are intended as helpful and remain within manuscripts which we believe will improve the material without
the scope and intent of existing directives. altering the intended meaning. Direct correspeeciarice with the
Information used in briefing accidents is extracted from USAF Editor is authorized.
Forms 14 and may not be construed as incriminoting under
Article 13 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. All names, COVER PHOTO
dates and places used in accident stories are fictitious. Air
Force units are authorized and encouraged to republish the ,Maintenance men from the 314th Troop Carrier
material contained herein; however, contents are not for public Squadron (Reserve) conduct a periodic inspection
release. Written permission must be obtained from Hq TAC on one of their aircraft at McClellan AFB, Calif.

USAF Recurring Publication 62.12

 Destructive distraction 1

Investigators went over the wreckage, exam ined

t ire marks and soot marks (from the exhaust blast),
talked to the experienced F-100 pilot manning mobile
control , queried everyone else who watched the take-
off, and soon had a pretty good idea of what had
happened.
When the I P placed his throttles outboard, the
right AB failed to light, but the left operated properly.
He took a quick look in the cockpit to see if he
could determine the source of trouble. While he was

T
WO RF-101's taxied onto the active for
take-off. After completing their pre-take-off looking, the rapidly accelerating machine veered to
check, the student pilot in the lead ai rcraft the right hand edge of the runway due to the uneven
looked over at the instruct or pilot on his wing. The thrust and possibly a mildly dragging right brake.
IP transmitted "all set," and brakes were released. The Board calculated that the aircraft was
As the aircraft started rolling, both pilots moved traveling about 100 knots when it veered complete ly
their throttles full forward and then outboard into AB. off the runway. Assuming uniform acceleration, this
Three sharp reports followed and both a ircraft would indicate that the aircraft had rolled about
thundered down the runway with the lead a ircraft fourteen secctnds before it left the runway and only
rapidly pull ing away from the number two machine. nine seconds before the right wheel went off into the
The number two aircraft swung to the righ t and as it grass. (11 00 feet from start of roll and 550 feet from
approached the edge of the runway, t he instruct or at start of roll, respectively.}
its controls apparently realized he was veering off Since the IP initiated a left correction about 180
the runway and applied left rudder. His correction feet before the right wheel hit the grass, we can
was too late. The right wheel rolled off t he runway safe ly assume that he had only been rolling abou t s ix
less than 600 feet from where take-off was started. seconds before he discovered that he was veering off
Once the right wheel was off the runway, the pilot the runway. Undoubtedly, he used three or four of
was unable to bring the aircraft back on ; nevertheless, these seconds to select full throttle, kick in the AB
he continued his attempt to get airborne. and rea Ii ze that he had experienced an AB rna Ifunction.
Crossing an intersecting runway, the aircraft Certainly, pilots should limit the time they d ivert
bounced into the air only to touch dow n some thousand their attention to cockpit instruments to one or two
feet further on. Then skipped along for about 1500 seconds at the most .•.• and should certainly abort a
feet before the nose gear broke off, followed short ly take-off if their aircraft have veered to the extent
by the right main gear. After the right gear failed, the that one or more wheels have left the hard surfaced
right wing tip dug in and moments later the machine runwaY.. Had this pilot done this, it is doubtful if any
started breaking apart. The instructor pilot crawled great amount of damage would have been done to
out of the wreckage with major injuries. anything except his pride. e

MARCH 1961
 i""w® 1'~©w~w f~~r
~lNII$@®~@ lWiJ
£11£'fi~ ~ ""
~\tc.oo•

Old Tat

B
ACK IN THE GOOD old days when the '86 He went t hru the motions work ing pretty fast •••
was THE status symbol amongst fighter only he forgot to duc k wh i le blowing the canopy, had
pilots, TAT had to investigate a fatal to look down to fin d the trigger, and then just sat
accident involving one of his close friends. Seems there without unfastening the seat belt or pu IIi ng the
th is friend found himself with an inflight fire shortly D-ring.
after take-off in an F-86F, and elected to eject. It was qu ite clea r to all who watched that this
A ltitude, when he made this decision, was sufficient troop wou ld ne ve r have hacked an emergency ejection.
for the equipment of that era •• • but he went in with Since then , we've seen that murderous canopy
the bi rd. We were never able to locate the exact phase out wit h the '86F . We've watched the auto
sourc e of the fire, but surmised that it was a fuel or chute release phase in, followed all too slowly by
hydraulic lea k in the PTO sect ion. (He was p icking the auto lap bel t and its assortment of keys ••• and
the bird up fr om a n IRAN foci lity and we were having of course, our ol d pal .• that ba i ling wire fix • • t he
s ome difficulties wi th quality control.) zero lanyard came next, followed in tu rn by rocket
Ano ther pilot ha d obse rved him jettison the canopy seats. Ye s si r, the s l ippery st ick set has been busy-
at abo ut two or three thou sand feet. We were neve r even if too proud to borrow ideas and designs from
able to lo cate the ca nopy since the area was heavily other nat iona l ities which would've made most of their
timbered. Despite th is, we came to the conclusion outpu t obsolete. But busy as they've been, we still
that he was whopped on the head by the canopy, have some k ille r items which can trap an excitable
because we were never able to find all of his hard man in a hurry •. • witness t he number of low level
hat, and because he stayed with the machine after fatalities which continue to nibble away at the ronks
transmitt ing h is intention to eject. of our jet quali fied heroes.
Because of this accident, we initiated a survival From those who made the grade, we hear stor ies
tra in ing program. As part of this program we conducted about having troub le f inding the seat handle or having
a lecture at a pi lots' meeting using the seat from t o grab two or t hr ee ti mes to get the tr igger, or try ing
a nother '86 (graciously furnished by another pilot to blast off by s q ueez ing the wrong gimm ick (such as
who successfully ejected) and a young Rock volunteer just part of t he handle or even the sur viva I kit
from our captive audience. handle). Design is partly responsible--but not entirely.
After getting our volunteer well strapped in, we After all , t he designe r does his best to make things
qu ietly outlined the conditions of flight ••• two fool proof . . . it ' s just that some people act worse
thou sand feet, cl imbing, etc. Suddenly using an than a fool when they panic. A good percentage of the
urgent inf lection, we yammered at him, "You've difficulty can be traced to lac k of training or
experienced an explosion! The controls won't orientat ion . The average p il ot sits for several hundred
respond ! Get out! Eject! Go, man, go!" hours in the seat of his fly ing machine and doesn't

2 TAC ATTACK
have the foggiest notion of what the go handle looks ?•
like. He has never seen it pulled up, i n position and
ready for business. We think all pilots should look at
it in this condition at least twice a year, working the
handle and trigger so it won't be a stranger to them
should they need it in a hurry. Apparent ly some other
people had the same idea 'cause that's what is
required by T AC Reg 50-20.
You've heard the story about the passenger rocket
bound for Europe? After everyone was on board, the
door closed and a sweet female voice came over the
PA system to announce, "This is Flight 421 bound
for Paris, France. Flight altitude wi II be 210 miles,
time enroute will be 32 minutes. This rocket is
operated automatically, every t hing, including this
announcement, is being done electron ically; therefore, THE DRIVER of a century series fighter was
there is absolutely no possibility that anything can given some tactical info just before being cleared
go wrong ... go wrong ... go wrong .. . go wrong .•.. '' onto the active. He interrupted his pre-takeoff check
TAT feels much the same way about automatic to copy the necessary poop, then taxied into position,
belts and opening devices . . . . which is why we f logged the horse, and trundled down the 8000-foot
have made up our mind not to stick with an ailing launching pad. At 125 knots he attempted to raise the
machine below 1000 feet unless we are fairly certain nose and found he had to use quite a bit of aft stick
that we have everything under contro I and can make a pressure. While he was contemplating this, the air·
suitable landing area. Should we have to go, we wi II craft accelerated to 150 knots and lifted off. But the
do our utmost to beat the auto equipment by reaching aft stick requirement was quite excessive, so he
for the lap belt right after squeez ing t he trigger, then decided not to go, chopped power to idle, deployed
kicking and pushing ourself away from the seat. If the drag chute ... and, worried about the remaining
low, following thru by going for the D-ring. Having runway being rapidly consumed, yanked up the rollers.
experienced one ejection, we firm ly believe the The machine slid to a halt some feet short of the
automatic equipment will win such a race if it works first of two operational barriers.
correctly. If we beat it, fine, the chute opens that Meanwhile his wingman, who had started his
much quicker. blast-off 30 seconds behind, was told to abort. He
So think it over, lads, come to a conclusion, make did ... within 200 feet of where his leader had started
your own plan of action, then dri II yourself on that his abort. .. only he left his gear down. He made a
plan of action, using a de-armed seat if at all possible. one-eighty on the runway almost a thousand feet short
But, for your own sake, whatever plan of action you of the leader's tattered bird, and blithely taxied back
follow should definitely include pus hing away from to the ramp!! Smart aleck, the least he could have
the seat. done would have been to slide to a stop beside his
leader.
So much for the relative merit of trying to brake to
a halt versus sliding. Cause of the nose heavy
condition was failure to trim for takeoff .•• a result of
the interrupted pre-takeoff check. Inci dentally, the
leader was worrying about his mother who was
critically ill, which may have affected his judgment.
Being rather simple-minded, TAT has difficulty
appreciating the effect of emotional stress on
judgment. Frankly, when we crawl into an aircraft it
consumes our complete undivided attention regardless
of spats with Mrs. TAT or other such problems ••. we
just can't find time to consider anything except the
aircraft. If we ever start mulling over such problems
while taxiing out, we sincerely hope that we will have
enough smart to taxi right back to the parking ramp!

MARCH 1961 3
 UTILIZATION OF FLYING TIME •• rather lack of Meanwhile he noticed that he was bearing down
utilization .•• has long been one of our pet subjects. on the preceding a ircraft, which was contentedly
We've flown with too many troops who are content concll:.lding its landing roll in the center of the runway.
to tool aimlessly, wasting precious hours doing He steered around it and ended up being well off
nothing. center of the runway with insufficient room to swerve
We see no reason why a conscientious CRT type back. So, although the engagement was a success, it
pilot cannot actually increase his proficiency rather was hard ly consummated to anyone's satisfaction.
than just maintain it while flying eight hours per One wing tip smacked a barrier stanchion and both
month. By our way of thinking some pilots have 2000 main gear collapsed during the roll out.. or should we
hours experience while others merely have 20 hours say, slide out.
experience, 100 times. The board determined that operator error was the
primary cause because the pilot failed to take a wave
off from a hot long approach.
Contributing causes were operator error for not
using manual braking when the anti-skid cycled
excessively; drag chute failure, and supervisory error
on the part of the mobile control officer for not sending
him around.
TAT has o n ly one raised eyebrow on this one •.•
Investigators couldn't find anything wrong with the
anti-skid system, and we can't help but wonder if the
excessive cycling was due to the brakes being
applied with too much gusto •.. If so, use of the
emergency system would have surely resulted in
blown tires, possible loss of directional control, and
perhaps a dent or two in the aircraft he eventually
passed.
There is no substitute for proper speed on an
approach and it has been our experience that the Dash
One figgers are pretty hard to beat. They have just
enough padding t o keep us less ski lied desk drivers
from falling out of the sky, yet get the machine slow
enough to perm it stopping without things getting too
slippery with sweat.
Another factor which was overlooked by both the
investigators and the people who indorsed this
accident was the questionable procedure used by the
preceding aircraft. Most units flying drag chute
equipped machinery have long since adopted a
procedure which would have made this accident less
likely. They have aircraft land on the center of the
A PILOT TRANSITIONING into the (RF-84F)
runway, then clear to the e::lge of the runway nearest
found himself with a few problems on his sixth ride in
the ramp after they get a successful chute. Those
the contraption. Coming in fo'r a landing, he pitched
failing to ge-t a chute clear to the opposite edge .
behind another '84. To get adequate spacing, he made
Simple, neh?
his pattern a bit wide and due to this, co lm winds,
and other factors ended up with 14 or 15 surplus knots
on final. His instructor had a sick transmitter so WHILE BREEZING THRU the positive control
couldn't do anything but watch. area the other day, we heard the following exchange.
T ou·chdown was made about 2000 feet down the "Indianapolis Center, this is Item Able SugarTwo,
8000 foot runway and the pilot decided he'd best get ahh, we were P ittsburg 02, Flight level 390, Appleton
started stopping, so lowered the nose and flung out 16, Dayton , over. "
the laundry ••• that's right, no chute. He then applied "Roger Ab le Sugar Two, request you reply code 32
brakes only to encounter heavy cycling of the anti- mode three . "
skid system. "Sugar Two squawking 32 on three."

4 TAC ATTACK
 "I don't read you Two; request you reply IP."
"Roger, Indianapolis; replying IP." • ,
"I still don't have you, Sugar Two; could you have
another aircraft in your flight reply code 32 mode
three?"
"Roger, Center, number two is already squawking."
With an obvious "the light has daw ned" inflection,
the controller replied: "Your transponders must be
canceling each other out! Have your wingman place
his on standby."
"Roger. Item Able Sugar Two Two strangle your
parrot."
An unfamiliar voice, "Roger."

.
"0. K. Sugar Two, I have you now twelve and a
quarter miles due East of Appleton. "
Nuff said?
TAT'S SWEATY SECONDS SECTION: Near the
land of sweet senoritas and beeg bulls, an F-104 jock
CLIMBING OUT on a local YFR on top mission, lifted his missile into the blue following his gallant
a B-57 pi Iot entered the overcast at 6000 feet and leader. Coming out of AB he heard a loud POP,
broke out on top at 8000. He flew the mission at flight followed by engine vibration and loss of thrust. As
level 350, descending to 20,000 jus t prior to pene- the engine unwound thru 70 percent he stopcocked,
trating. During penetration he entered the undercast hit the airstart switch, waited until the RPM hit 60
at 18,000, started penetration turn at 16,000 and percent, then shoved the throttle to full military.
immediately broke out under the clouds. He made a Altitude was 2000 feet. The engine accelerated to
quick recheck of his altimeter and found it reading 100 percent and ran nicely while the pilot happily
six instead of 16 thousand. He was 2000 feet above circled the field until the fuel load was reduced to a
the terrain at the time. reasonable amount. Landing was without incident.
TAT welcomes this honest pilot to the club. It Flame-out was caused by a maintenance goof. Tbe
is hard to appreciate how easy it is to misread this IGV running null was inadvertently set at 18 degrees
instrument until it happens to you. We joined a few instead of 17. Si Si. One sweaty degree wasn't
years back, much to our embarrassment ... and the close enough to keep this troop from having a close
great amusement of a safety observer in the front one.
seat. Joining can be anything but a musing if on
actual instruments or at night in an unpopulated area.
Cure is not so simple ... and involves a great BEEP ••• BEEP ••• BEEP ••• "For corn sake,
deal of check, check and double check. With B-57's Chari ie, can't you find a quiet channel up there?"
and multi- place machinery the best preventative BEEP .•• BEEP .•• BEEP ••. "Now, it's com ing
1n on guard."
is having another occupant read off each 5000-foot
interval during descents. BEEP ... BEEP ... BEEP ... "Strangle guard then !"
BEEP •.. BEE .... "0. K., how's that?"
"Fine. What in thunder was that?"
"Beats me. Sputnick, I guess."
This was a typical reaction to an actual trans-
mission on guard. The transmission was coming from
a pilot's emergency locator beacon which had been
inadvertently turned on. This signal is supposed to
alert air-sea-rescue to the fact that a Navy airman
has ejected or has gone into the drink and needs
picking up. All it did was annoy a few troops and
force others to utilize tactical frequencies (instead of
Navy common). Should you hear this signal on UHF
guard, recognize it for what it is. If your aircraft is
equipped with an ARA-25 radio, use the direction
finding feature and lend a hand for a gob's sake!

MARCH 1961
• 5
 tac tips

COUSIN WEAK EYES? Since we received this report THE LONG LINE. Sa lvaged ai rc rew helmets
from the Far East, we suspect Fifth Air Forces' complete w ith headsets are being worn by crew
infamous Cousin Weak Eyes accomplished another chiefs in one organization dur ing eng ine starts and
"repa ir" job. Seems he did some touch-up painting pre•taxi checks in the F-lOOD. The helmet is fitted
in the plenum chamber area of aT-bird, but neglected with a li p mike and a long extension cord is plugged
to clean off grease and dirt before spraying on the into the outside com-jack located in the nose wheel
paint. The paint promptly flaked off and made its well. Th is not only provides clear and easy commun i·
way into the engine air/ oi I turbine bearing fi Iter cation between the pilot and crew chief during
screen, block ing it. The clogged screen caused the sys tem checks, but also protects the crew chief's
number three and number four bearings to fa i I. head from the many head-banging objects protrud ing
Fortunately, this condition was found dur ing a from the air mach i ne.
periodic inspection instead of shortly after lift off
on a cold, dark night.

COCKPIT LIGHTS: With gear down in the t raff ic

pattern and the cockpit light switch of an F-lOOF in
t he dim position, the right main and nose gear showed
unsafe in the rear cockpit. The nose and left main
g e or showed unsafe in the front cockpit. When the
c oc kp it light switch was positioned to bright, the
gear indi cated safe. Maintenance investigators found
four re si stors shorted in the Iandi ng gear d im Ii ght
circuit. T he lights were checked on preflight; how-
ever, the ma intenance preflight card says to check
for i l luminat io n, but not both bright and dim circuits.
It is unlikely t hat all resistors shorted out on the
f light, s o thi s con dit ion probably existed for some PREVENTION PLUGS. Unsatisfactory Repor t s
t ime. Both th e bri gh t and dim circuits should be pertaining to sa fety of flight are an exce I lent source
tested on a ll ma intenance preflights ... Then if a of information. Flying Safety Officers at each base
pil ot gets a safe indication on e ither the bright or should set up a file on those UR's which are of
d im c ircuit, he can safely assume the gear i s down interest to rated personnel. Many contain a wealth of
a nd locked. information and c an be ut i lized at flying safety
meeti ngs to inform p i Iots of malfunctions and
symptons . Add it ionally, incoming T . O.'s often conta in
informat ion tha t directly affects the operation of
aircraft. Flying safety officers should extract and
condense this i nforma t ion to help keep pilots informed
of the latest changes.

PREFLIGHT INSPECTIONS. During recent years the

pilot's walk a round inspection has been almost as
detai led as the maintenance preflight. Having reached
this extreme, the pendulum is now swinging back.
Several of the latest fl ight manuals have deleted
many items from the p ilot's walk around. These are

6 TAC ATTACK
checks which appear on the maintenance preflight and TO ERR IS HUMAN .•. but to make the same
postflight inspections. In several ways this is a good mistake twice is a disgrace. And when the same
trend, giving final responsibility back to the experts difficulties ore reported on consecutive flights
where it belongs. Maintenance supe rvisors wi II have there is cause to question the adequacy of corrective
to make certain that these maintenance inspections action taken by maintenance personnel. Some aircraft
are done correctly since under the old system many accidents have occurred after discrepancies ha~
ground crewmen grew careless knowing that these been reported on the same item several times. Mainte•
things would also be checked by t he flight crew. nonce personnel must insure that positive action is
taken to correct discrepancies.
SKILL DRILL. To keep honed sharp on emergency SAFETY REPORT. The first Annual USAF Safety
procedures, pilots of the 137th Tactical Fighter Congress Report contained some interesting dis·
Squadron up in White Plains, New York scribble out cussions and sound recommendations. The following
the answer to a question on emergency procedures are of special interest to maintenance personnel :
found on the~r local clearance. Questions are stamped
on the clearance and answers checked by operations
PROBLEM: Failure to receive vital information on a
timely basis has contributed to aircraft accidents.
people. We presume pilots who submit incorrect
answers find it financially embarrassing. DISCUSSION: This problem is caused by poor
communications between organizations and lethargy
in transmission.
SOMEONE GOOFED. A dollar nineteen was drooling
fluid from a hydraulic selector valve assembly, so RECOMMENDATIONS: Major air commands should
maintenance personnel replaced the valve with one review distribution procedures to insure oircrew
which had been overhauled at a repair depot. After members receive vital information such as T.O.'s and
completing the installation, they fired up the machine Safety of Flight Supplements immediately. (This
to taxi it to the hangar to run a retraction test. The applies to all organizations.) Each should review
right gear retracted shortly after the engines were distribution procedures to make certain that this type
started, allowing the right wing tip, right propeller of information is distributed not only to aircrews but
and fuselage to hit the concrete. Damage was to maintenance personnel and detached units.
extensive. Someone at the depot had reproven a
PROBLEM: Failure to comply with directives or to
certain shrewd Irishman's law by reversing the
follow established TOC procedures and check lists
internal wiring on the selector valve assembly. This creates potential hazards and induces accidents.
caused the gear to retract, although the gear selector
handle was in the down position. Unfortunately, the DISCUSSION: Commanders and supervisors must
two maintenance men involved forgo t to make sure instill a desire to comply with proper procedures.
the landing gear ground lock pins were installed After suitable instruction, most people develop a
before they started engines •.• aad the initial goof respect for regulations, check lists and T. O.'s .
was allowed to boomerang into an expensive mishap. RECOMMENDATION: Quality control personnel and
standardization teams must insist on strict com·
pliance with check lists, T.O. provisions and safety
standards.
PROBLEM: Continued pilot education in the proper
use of the Form 781 series is necessary to improve
maintenance standards.
DISCUSSION: Maintenance requires accurate records
for proper maintenance actions. Pilots need this
information to determine the statu' of aircraft.
Difficulty is caused by inadequate pilot entries 1n
Form 781' s.

RECOMMENDATION: Flight Safety Officers, with

t he maintenance officer, should review Form ?81's to
see if write-ups ore concise, accurate and complete.
If needed, an educational program should be insti·
t uted. e

MARCH 1961 7
how high in the sky

I
T WAS LATE afternoon and the B-57 mode its or was someone fudging on their altitude?
way smoothly toward the setting sun at flight Was it possible for this near miss to be a result of
level 350. one or both pi lots foiling to, or incorrectly, applying
The weather was clear and visibility excellent. the dash one altitude correction foetor? These were /
In fact the pilot hod just remarked to the navigator some of the questions asked when the OHR on this ~~
that he could see almost half way across Texas. occurrence was processed through T AC Headquarters.
Glancing at the instrument panel he noticed with You'll fi nd the answers interesting.
satisfaction that the course deviation indicator was L et's toke these questions in their reverse order.
perfectly centered and that the altimeter was reading Thumbing through the T -33 and B-57 handbooks we
about 50 feet below 35,000 feet. Close enough. The find both have about the some altitude correction
range drum indicated 58 miles out. He glanced forward foetor for normal cruise at 30,000 to 35,000 feet. This
and sow the sun glisten off metal or gloss. "Another foetor is roughly minus 100 feet; close enough to
bird," he thought, "and I i ned up with the horizon ... ignore. Hod one pilot applied this foetor incorrect-
he must be about on my altitude." ly (and after reviewing recent guidance on application
Observing more c Iosel y, he detected movement of this foetor, this could easily happen) and hod the
across the windscreen. He thought, "He' II miss, but other pi lot mode no correction, the error induced
it will be close; I better attract his attention." He would have been slightly over 300 feet ..• no sweat.
conked gently to increase the spacing and a T-33 Was someone fudging on their altitude? Perhaps,
whistled by going East. Ten full seconds elapsed but both pi lots filed on OHR and both claimed they
before a disturbed voice co me over the UHF. "San were on their assigned altitude. The B-57 driver
'Tone Center this is Air Force jet one five five IFR at 350 and the T-33 VFR at 340. We will give
se ven two. I would like to report a near miss with a them the benefit of doubt--after all both ore officers
B-57, over.'' and gentlemen and should be honest to a fault.
The calm undisturbed voice of the controller Were the altimeters within tolerance? First, just
answered, "Roger five five seven two. Understand how close is this tolerance? A trip to the bose
you jus t hod a near miss with a B-57. What is your instrument shop supplied the answers. There, we
position heading and attitude?'.' found a technician checking two altimeters using a
The disturbed voice replied, "Five seven two low pressure chamber attached to a mercury barometer
indicating 34,000 feet, with 29.92 set in the window. with a vernier scale. By exhausting air from the
Heading 77 degrees, approximately seven minutes chamber he was able to run it up to a synthetic
outbound from Oil town Omni." altitude of 80,000 feet, checking this altitude on the
The B-57 pilot decided he had better protect his mercury barometer. By comparing the readings with
interests, pressed the mike switch and transmitted, those of the altimeter being checked, he was able to
"Air Force five five seven two. This is MorkThirty- enter a correc t ion foetor on a form. This foetor wi II
two, the B-57 flying West which passed to your left. eventuo lly find its way into the cockpit.
Be advised that I was indicating 35,000 feet with At 35,000 feet one of the altimeters being tested
29.92 set at the time, over." was within 20 feet; the other was about 425 feet off.
"Roger boy, that was close." A reject? Not on your life. T. 0. 5F3-4-2-3 permits
"I hod you in sight, seven two, and was taking on error of plus or minus 450 feet! A letter from
evasive action." MAAMA dated 17 Nov 60, requiring bases to test all
"Understand." altimeters and make up correction cords specifies a
But did he understand? Why were these aircraft tolerance of plus or minus 250 feet for altitudes above
flying at almost the some actual altitude despite 30,000 feet. Unfortunately, very few altimeters ore
almost 1000 feet of separation in their indicated meeting this requirement and to keep from grounding
altitudes? Were one or both altimeters out of tolerance the fleet, the T. 0. is being used as the limiting

8 TAC ATTACK
factor by most bases.
It isn't hard to see what could. have happened to
that 1000 feet now, is it? Near misses such as this
have defined this problem and are the principal
reason your bird now has (or soon wi II have) an
altitude correction card. This innovation is just now
being adopted. Unfortunately, applying this correction
is going to be just as confusing as applying the
correction factor from the dash one {wh ich can be a
monstrous figure on supersonic aircraft, being as
much as 6000 feet at certain speeds and configurations a sneaky trick. To help explain how these corrections
on one machine). are applied we will give two examples and include
At this point let's identify the two errors and the dash one wording so you can compare it with the
show how to apply their correction factors. They are handbook for your a·i rcraft.
called Instrument Error and Altimeter Position First, assume an F-104 pilot and an F-100 pilot
Error. The Instrument Error Correction will be given are both scheduled for cross country flights at 30,000
on the correction card in the cockpit while the feet and both decided to cruise at350 knots indicated
Altimeter Position Error Correction will have to be (.9 mach). In addition we will assume that both
computed from the table in Appendix 1 of the dash aircraft are equipped with altimeters requiring an
one for the aircraft being flown. Instrument Error Correction of minus 200 feet.
At this writing the Instrument Error Correction While completing his flight plan, the F-104 pilot
and the Altimeter Position Error Correct ions given turns to the Altimeter Position Error Correction table
in the T-33, F-104, and F-105 handbooks are being in Appendix 1 and reads, "Add correction to Indi-
given backwards. In other words, if they are minus, cated Pressure Altitude to obtain correct Pressure
you will have a higher reading on your altimeter and Altitude." For .9 mach at 30,000 feet this factor is
if they are positive, you will have a lower reading in 715 feet. He subtracts this from 30,000 to get his
order to get the desired flight level. We think th is is indicated altitude uncorrected for instrument error

MARCH 1961 9
and jots down 29,285 feet on his Form 21a. After in the cockpi t, he observes that the Instrument Error
crawling into the cockpit, he notes that the Instrument Correction Card specifies minus 200 feet for flight
Error Correction card specifies minus 200 feet at 30,'000 fe~t. He adds t his to 29,175 and gets
opposite 30,000 feet. He adds this to 29,285 feet 29,375 feet. Go ing thru 23,500 feet he places 29.92
and gets 29,485 feet. Going thru 23,500 he places in the Kollsma n window, levels off at 29,375 feet
29.92 in the Kollsman window, levels off at 29,485 and attempts to hold that indication.
feet and holds this altitude. Since the correction ca rd is just being brought
On completing his flight plan, the F-100 pilot into general use, it is imperative that the method
turns to the Altimeter Error Correction table in used be aligned wi th the system used in the hand·
F-100, Appendix 1, and reads •.• and it helps if he's books, and t hat the handbooks be standardized.
a guard house lawyer, "Subtract altitude correction From a pilot's standpoint, the proper system is to
from True Pressure Altitude to obtain Indicated apply corrections to the desired altitudes •.• and not
Pressure Altitude." For 350 knots at 30,000 feet to subtract positive numbers and add negative ones.
the altitude correction is 825 feet. Subtracting th is Hope you agree, because these are the recommen-
from 30,000 he jots down 29,175 feet on his knee dations we've sent to those who can correct this
board and jogs out to the bird. After getting settled situation. e

ol' Sarge says:

started descending into the room.
The assista nt ma intenance officer, his eyes start·
ing to water, decided his only salvation would be to
keep the serge talking so he asked, "They blame the
manufacturer no doubt."
"Aye,· that they do," retorted the Sarge. " Bu t I
showed ' em where the other two squadrons were
THE OLD SARGE came into the office with a gust operating smooth ly ••• and I told 'em why. The other
of wind that sent papers flying in all directions. squadrons have been pretty carefu I hand Ii ng hydrau Ii c
Retrieving those that fell to the floor, he .j ammed fluid, making su re they don't contaminate the stuff
them angrily back on the desk, shucked off his grease- getting it from can to crate •• they've been following
sta ined jacket, and dropped wearily into the battered the T.O.' s to the Tee and they just don't have a
swivel chair. The chair let out a squeal as he tilted problem."
it back. He started fumbling for his pipe. As he "Seems to me," said the assistant maintenance
fumbled, he let off steam. officer, "that you shouldn't have much trouble selling
"People are just naturally lazy," he mu t tered, 'em on better practices."
"but it never ceases to amaze me how often they "That's what I tflought," said the Sarge rather
make extra work for themselves, thinking they're sadly. " This all happened last week and I had
saving time." He snorted and began packing in a everyone all fired up to follow the T.O., particularly
huge charge of Old Bar[lsmell in the bowl of his pipe. 44H3.1-3 ••• but I walked by this morn ing and saw this
Everyone in the room winced. bunch yank off an aft section and leave all the lines
The assistant maintenance officer glanced furtively a-danglin ' without one cotton pickin' cap on 'em.''
at the window, considered opening it, but remembering He puffed furious ly on the old corn cob until the
the 'wind, reconsidered and resigned himself to the assistant maint enanceofficer had a coughing fit, then
fate of many a ham and herring. Instead he ventured, abruptly asked , "You all right, Lt? You better quit
"What did you run into this time, Sarge?" smoking so ma ny cigarettes; they're hard on your
"That bunch down in the Twelfth Squadron. throat.'' Without waiting for an answer, he continued,
They're way behind again, due mostly to unscheduled "I asked 'em how come they were ignoring the reg
maintenance on hydraulic system components. They've and you know what they had the stupidity to say?
been plagued by pump failures, erratic operation write· They said, 'Gee, Sa rge, we're gonna reconnect 'em
ups on the control systems .•. you name it, they got in a few minutes • • and we're too busy to do the job
it." He paused to strike a safety match; he held it rea I fancy Iike that.'"
over his pipe and promptly sucked out the flame. The Sarge kinde grinned, then said, "Well we
After two more failures, he bunched four matches had ourself quite an audience before I got through
together, struck them into a magnificent flame, and drscussing the situation ••• and maybe they'll shape
played it over the bowl until the weed inside glowed up just to keep from having to Ii sten to another
un iformly. A pale blue fog covered the ceiling and lecture." e

10 TAC ATTACK
 TAC Eval

THE SKILLED AND THE DEAD. The pi lot of a T -33 of oxygen from the bailout bottle were both due to
started a descent from 38,000 feet when he noticed the oxygen hose becoming disconnected at the
that the right armament door had come open. Immedi- ejection seat. Reason for this was not given. But it
ately he extended speed brakes and the door closed. should be noted that this pi Iot used exceptionally
Simultaneously, with the opening of the armament good reasoning when he disconnected the supply
door, all radio contact was lost. A straigh.t-in hose. This allowed the check valve in the T-block
approach was made without incident, using 140 knots connector to close and oxygen was then directed from
on final. Investigation revealed that the right the bailout bottle to the mask rather than out the
armament door rear latch was missing. During his open hose.
preflight check of the armament doo rs, the pi lot had
noticed that although all latches were definitely
closed and locked, the rear latch was under greater
tension than the other latches. After the incident it
was discovered that there were 150 pounds too much
ballast. The ballqst was too close to the latch
which prevented proper adjustment. Then we have
the case where two pilots were scheduled for a
navigational flight in another T-33. They stowed
their clothes in the right armament compartment and
completed a hurried preflight, with one pi lot checking
the left side and the other checking the right.
Immediately after becoming airborne, the pi lot
notified the tower that the right armamen t door had
opened and that he would re-enter traffic and land.
The aircraft crashed from a descending right turn and
both pilots received fatal injuries. The pilot not PITFALL FOR PRECISE PILOTS. Normally the
only had failed to latch the· armament compartment Course Deviation Indicator {vertical bar) is the most
doors securely during preflight inspection, but also reliable indicator for the omni. In fact, it is so
had failed to follow the emergency procedures in reliable, a lot of skilled drivers are apt to assume it
T.O. 1T-33A-1. The importance of completing is in business as long as the flag is out of sight.
thorough preflight inspections and knowing emergency These troops are a Iso prone to attribute a centered
procedures cannot be over-emphasized. And how bar to their superior skill at course holding. They
about maintenance overlooking that slight (150 lbs!!!) should adopt the attitude oftheir less-skilled brethern
extra Sallast and improperly adjusted latch! {who seldom see the thing in the center) and treat
this indication with a certain degree of suspicion. It
is possible for the ID-249 to be unreliable with the
DISCONNECT FOR HYPOXIA. Early one morning red flag down and good sounds in the headset. This
while cruising at flight level 360, the pilot of a condition results from partial failure of the power
B-57 made his customary check of the oxygen supply to the instrument, coupled with a slight over-
blinker and noted that it was operating normally. voltage condition. The red flag is held in the "off"
Ten minutes later he was experienc ing hypoxia position by electrical power going to both sides of
symptoms and found that the blinker was no longer the deviation indicator. When power is lost to one
blinking. He immediately initiated a letdown and side, the flag normally goes to half-mast. However,
pulled the bailout bottle lanyard, but noted neither if voltage is above normal, it will hold the flag full
relief nor oxygen pressure in the mask. He then down. If suspicious of a firmly held course, give the
disconnected the supply hose from the T-block course selector knob a twist and note the reaction.
assembly, and immediately received pressure and If the bar stays centered, use the number two needle
his hypoxia rapidly cleared. Hypoxia and initial loss or the bird dog. e
MARCH 1961 11
 GIVE THE 8111/J
A 8/IAK£.1

H
IGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT have forced at high speed than you wi II at slow speed. With a
us to make a lot of changes in the way we uniform rote of dece leration, it takes just as long to
have been flying traffic patterns during the slow from 30 to 20 knots as it does from 90 to 80, or
past decade. We've had to abandon the bank and from 120 to 110 knots •.. but look how far you travel
yank, seat-of-the-pants affair in favor of a more during each t ime interval while slowing between
comfortable pattern with power on approaches held to these speeds. To emphasize this, let's carry our
closely (?) calculated speeds. Despite this, our assumption fur t her and consider an aircraft that is
barriers ore not exactly getting rusty from disuse and slowed from 120 knots to a full stop in exactly one
we still get reports on an occasional unscheduled minute. It wi II use 6000 feet of runway for the stop
trip into the boon docks. (wet runwa y, of course) and wi II travel 192 feet slow-
Most of these occurrences involve drag chute ing from 120 to 110, 142 feet from 90 to 80, and only
failure coupled with either anti-skid failure·, a slick 40 feet slowing from 30 to 20.
runway, or both.' Almost without fail when damage is But remember, we assumed a uniform rate of
sufficient to classify the mishap as on accident, the deceleration and this isn't exactly a correct
cause is assessed to pilot error. Why? Because the assumption. Two things affect deceleration: aero-
experts charged with i nvesti gating such things dynamic drag a nd wheel braking. Aerodynamic drag
invariably take the aircraft handbook, calculate the is highes t at h igh speed and decreases as speed
landing roll for the conditions which existed and come falls off. Without a drag chute in a clean modern
up with a number that is smaller than the runway aircraft, aerodynamic drag isn' t as good as it used to
length. And why, you might ask, couldn't these be with di rtier aircraft , particularly if a little excess
unfortunate birdmen stop in that distance? Usually speed prevent s the aircraft from assuming a nose
the investigators find that for one reason or another h igh attitude. Wheel brakes, on the other hand, are
they had flown their final approach five or ten knots more effective at low speed due to effect of lift on
above recommended speed and had touched down a the foot print pressure and because the coefficient
little hot, a little long, or both. But five or ten of friction is reduced by speed under certa in
knots .•• shouldn't that be close enough for government conditions .
work? The answer is an emphatic "No! Not no more!" The classic example of a change in coefficient of
Let's take a look at the Iandi ng roll to see why. friction occurs on we t runways where at high speed
On a maximum performance stop you wi II travel further water doesn 't have t ime to squeeze out from between

12 TAC ATTACK
tire and runway, causing the tire to li terally slide on high speed until there isn't enough left to stopon
a film of water. Grooves in the tire help to drain after the aircraft is slowed to wl.ere this technique
this water off and this is why smooth' old tiFes or is effective. As you can see from our discuss ion of
those with dimpled treads are so hazardous under the differences in the coefficient of friction between
such conditions. On dry surfaces and on ice the wet conditions and icy conditions, some aircraft
coefficient of friction remains relatively constant might require slightly different techniques for each.
with changes in speed, except when temperatures are If so, the dash one gives 'em.
just below freezing. Then, an icy runway gets worse Somewhere during the Iandi ng runout, speed wi II
as speed decreases because the increased foot print be reduced to the point where wheel braking is more
pressure causes the surface to melt and become self effective than aerodynamic braking. Near this point,
lubricating. or even prior to reaching this point, it will be to your
Except on very slick surfaces, aerodynamic drag advantage to increase the weight on the wheels (icy
{again, no drag chute) at high speed is not as effective runway with temperature just below freezing excepted).
as wheel brakes at slow speed, which increases the Procedures for accomplishing this vary with aircraft
importance of landing at the proper speed ••• and types. Raising the flaps and applying full aft stick,
helps explain why that extra five or ten ltnot s causes while braking, does wonders on aircraft like the old
so much trouble. T-bird. Some get little benefit, and again the dash
On very slick surfaces we find that some of our one tells the story. But regardless of the aircraft, if
aircraft, such as the F-100 and F-105, are forced to you are trying to land on a runway that is slick, it
rely on aerodynamic braking to obta in a maximum pays to arrive at the proper touchdown point, at the
performance stop. As we've hinted, a little excess proper speed, in the proper attitude, and to do every-
speed prevents these machines from reaching that thing possible to slow the aircraft early ••• and th is
horrendous angle of attack needed for such occasions. includes using wheel brakes as carefully and firmly
The resu Its are the same ••• the runway flashes by at as possible immediately after touchdown. e

at Cannon AFB and found that others had experienced

SEAT SNAG similar difficulties. His solution to the problem was

to run the shoulder harness over the hose instead of
under it. The photos tell the story. In the photo on
the left, the shoulder harness is placed under the

A few days ago Lieutenant Fred Nelson shut.

down his F-100 and started to clamber out.
As he stood , he was rudely braked to a halt
by the right shoulder harness strap. The strap had
oxygen hose. The center photo indicates the shoulder
harness wedged in the T-block as the pilot starts to
leave the seat. The right hand photo shows the safer
way to place the shoulder harness. Tests performed
wedged between the T-block oxyge n connector and by pilots at Cannon indicate no binding of the hose
the attaching plate. Know ing that this would be with this arrangement. Thanks a lot, Fred; passing
serious during an ejection, Lieutenant Nelson on the word should help keep someone from getting
checked with his fellow pilots in the 430th Squadron some unneeded lumps. e

i
/

:'
.I ........
;s_
~

MARCH 1961 13
 chock talk

established at Sewart AFB to evaluate the propeller

at 150 hours and again a t 300 hours. Based on th i s
evaluation, TBO was raised to 300 hours on 15
February 1960, and to 600 hours in June, 1960.
Tea rdown at 30 0 hours had revealed a cam roller
bearing deficie ncy and an improved cam roller and
other des ign im provements were incorporated in the
-63. conf iguration. Sewart was granted interim
authority t o opera t e the propeller up to 800 hours and
in November 1960 ten 800-hour propellers were
shipped to WRAMA for teardown. As a result of this
800-hour inspect ion the operational l ife of the
propeller was extended to 1200 hours. However, a
THE MONEY TREE. Remember the story of the man few with early destgn cam rollers will be removed for
who spent his life looking all over the world for overhau I a t 800 hours.
d iamonds only to find them in his own back yard? He
now has company. We in the Air Force will soon be KB-50 ENGINE INTERCHANGEABILITY. The
try ing to find a "Money Tree." Although we may not modificat ion to allow interchange between "J" and
find this tree in our back yard, there are many ways "K" ser ies KB-50 aircraft (T . O. 1B-50(K)K-501 )
we con pluck its fruit, particularly when t·he rising began at Langley AFB on 7 Nov 1960 and terminated
cost of buying and maintaining newer more complex 27 Jan 1961. A ll QEC's hove been modified except
weapons systems is considered. This effort is being those installed on one aircraft, which is in crash
called Project Money Tree. Although Money Tree is damage status at Lajes AB, Azores.
primarily concerned with the materiel field, it wi II
affect everyone in the Air Force. First phase of the
project has been completed. Objectives have been
established and Headquarters USAF has been
advised. In the second and third phases, the plan wi II
be implemented and results measured. These phases
are just starting and will be in effect the rest of the
year. Instructions will be outlined in a TAC numbered
letter. Basically, Project Money Tree will be an all-
out effort to reduce waste and increase efficiency
and capability ..• this should be of considerable
interest to us as tax payers and members of the
defense team. Our commander has assured Hq USAF
that we ore wholeheartedly behind this program. So
MAINTENANCE FATIGUE. Just as pilot fatigue may
look forward to the T AC numbered letter and support
contribute to an aircraft accident, consideration also
the program.
should be give n to t he possibility of maintenance
error caused from fat igue. Needless to say, quality
C-130B PROJECT "BLUE BLAZE." The 54H60-39 maintenance is comprom i sed when mechanics must
propeller installed on C-130B aircraft was given a perform duty under a fatigued condition. We have seen
T ime Between Overhaul (TBO) of i50 hours because publicity releases depicting rna intenance men working
it had not qualified at the time production aircraft around the clock to get aircraft in commission. Under
were accepted by USAF. Since propellers had been certain extreme conditions this may be necessary,
purchased for a TBO of 600 hours, spares were but the peri I of foti gue and rna i ntenance error shou Id
becoming critically short. Project "Blue Blaze" was not be overlooked.

14 TAC ATTACK
KB-50 QEC OVERHAUL. A contract for overhaul of C-123B CORRODED FUEL LINES. Corroded fuel
48 TAC QEC's has been awarded Air ·Mod Div'ision lines in the wing leading edges of C-123B aircraft
of Cook Electric Company, Vandalia, Ohio. Input assigned to Troop Carrier Squadrons will be replaced
started in Jan, 1961 and the program should be by Fairchild Aircraft Corporation, during FY-61.
completed in July. A contract to overhaul remaining Replacement in C-123B support aircraft will 'take
QEC's with over 2,000 hours (approximately 45) is place in FY-62.
being negotiated.

M37-T1 PORTABLE JET ENGINE TEST STAND.

Two M37-T1 portable jet engine test stands are
scheduled for delivery to each CASF committed
tactical wing between March and June, 1961.
Although test stands were procured for support of
CASF overseas movements, they may be used at the
home base to relieve the excessive workload imposed
on semi-portable jet engine test stands. Regardless,
the M37- T1 portable test stand must be maintained in
a state of readiness and assigned maintenance
personnel must remain proficient in its use and
application. Although TAC will issue instructions
before M37-T1 test stands are rece ived, essentially
one will normally be in use for training and checkout
while the other is in a ready standby status.
TRAINING FILM, MB-3 AUTOPILOT AND LABS.
T-33 WING FLAP ASSEMBLY. Once again T-33 TIG Brief 1f: 26, Volume XII, 23 Dec 60, listed a new
wing flaps have made the failure report. A T-33 tra1n1ng film titled "MB-3 Autopilot and LABS
pilot had his aircraft roll sharply to the right. He Adjustments, FT A 442d."
analyzed this as a possible split flap and promptly
retracted flaps. The aircraft leveled out with the GENERAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE. Apparently
control stick in neutral and the pilot made an unevent· many TAC maintenance sections do not understand
ful landing. The right flap actuating mechanism the purpose of the aircraft cycle modernization and
attaching bracket had broken through the bolt hole modification programs, and are allowing routine
that attaches the actuator arm to the bracket maintenance discrepancies to accumulate on aircraft
(Reference Figure 10, Index 66, page 2-29, T. 0. scheduled for modification. Presumably, this is on
1T-33A:4). Inspection revealed that t he bracket had the premise that these write-ups will be corrected as
been cracked for some time prior to complete failure. a part of the modification cycle. This is incorrect.
This bracket is hard to get at, so it takes some very Routine rna i ntenance is not a scheduled or programmed
close looking to find these cracks. workload item and if the contractor or depot has to
perform it, the aircraft will be delayed. Commanders
and supervisors can assure a faster turn around and
at the same time improve the quality of maintenance
in their unit by straightening out this misconception.

T-33 LANDING GEAR ICING. The left main gear

failed to extend when the pi lot attempted to lower
his gear at the high key point in a simulated flame-
out pattern. Several attempts to recycle the gear
were ineffective. The emergency gear Ioweri ng
system was actuated, and the left gear broke loose
and locked in position. Subsequent investigation
revealed no cause for the malfunction, and it could
not be duplicated on the ground. It is believed that
the gear fairing door roller contained moisture which
froze at altitude.e

MARCH 1961 15
 MUNITI
Air Munitions

LABS TIMER MALFUNCTIONS. Some practice bombs

were inadvertently released from on F-104C aircraft
when the drop-lock switch was placed in the ready
position. Tests of the aircraft system revealed that
the LABS Timer, P / N M6437-A, was internally
defective. The timer hod been i nsto lied in accordance
with T. 0. 1 F-1 04C-528. Investigation by DAAFD
determined that three different Haydon Timers were
involved in simi lor mishaps. Alternate improved
timers, manufactured by Globe Industries, ore being
forwarded to Kirtland and George for evaluation.

MF-1 TRAILERS. Several organizations ore modifying

MF-1 towbors by welding reinforcements at the point
of weakness. This keeps them in business but there GUN BARREL INSTALLATION. An airman, AFSC
is no standardization since everything from angle 46250, removed and improperly replaced the gun
iron to armor plate is being used. For this reason barrel on on M-39A2 20mm gun at the harmonization
T.O. 11N-H5002-1001 will soon be published and range. When the gun was fired the resulting
distributed. malfunction injured several airmen standing nearby.
This is one mo re illustration of the need for improved
supervision.

ERROR IN CHECKING SYSTEMS. A highly skilled

technician and on F-100 pilot both foiled to check
the pylon load switch so on MN-1A dispenser was
inadvertently released during a training mission.
Personnel errors such as this ore costly and con be
prevented by tightening supervision . . . and by
requiring everyone to follow established procedures.

MN-1A TRAINER. Don't be alarmed if you notice a

slight separation between the four lugs and the
cylinder of t he plunger assembly PI N GMD-52-30027-1
F-105 BOMB BAY ACTUATOR. Several inadvertent on the ejector assembly of the MN-1A Trainer (figure
re leo ses hove occurred during Ioodi ng, while the and index number 9-6-6 of Technical Order 11 N-PD
shape was being hoisted with the bomb boy actuator. (MN-1A)-2). Separation results from the lugs being
Following one incident, a tear-down inspection of the welded on top 1nsteod of on the bottom where the
octuotot revealed improper drilling of the pneumatic ejector receives the force of impact when the bomb is
ports for the main trigger and auxiliary air passage ejected. With this slight separation, the lugs make
in the solenoid release valves. Urgent action interim contact w ith the inner surface of the ejector bose but
T. 0. 1F-105-579, subject "Inspection and Test of w iII in no way hamper operoti on of the ejector, or
Bomb Boy Actuator Cylinder Solenoid Release require replacement of the plunger assembly. How-
Valves," 26 J•n 61, will show how to find defective ever, replacement is required if the weld itself
actuators. crocks, or if a lug breaks off.e

16 TAC ATTACK
 ' I
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tac tally

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F- lOS
F- 104 1
RF- 101
F- 100 1 1
F-86
F- 84 1
T-33
CONY. 1 1

ACCIDENT RATE
JANUARY
TYPE A/C 1960 1961
Five major aircraft accidents and ten aircraft incidents were
F- lOS o.o o.o reported in Tocticol Air Command dur i ng January 1961. This is
one less occident .and twelve less incidents than were reported
F-104 60.6 54.1 in January 1960, wh ich is o trend in the right direction.. We don 't
hove t he findings of the investigat i ng boards os yet so can't
F- 101 0.0 0.0 make cny pos itive statements about co use factors, but let's
examine the incidents. Out of the ten, eight resulted when
F- 100 17. 5 13.6 various pieces of hardware fell from aircraft in flight. The items
ranged from on F-100 landing geor fairing door to jet engines lost
F- 84 0.0 97.8 from two KB-SO's. Foct is, in addition to these three items we

T- 33 12.4 0.0 lost two MH-1A bomb dispensers, o type VIllA pylon, o 275-
gollon tonk, o 450-gollon tonk, on F-104 escape hatch and o
KB- SO 0.0 o.o B-66 ejection hatch. Fortunately no one was beaned by any of
this foiling junk, and we rue the day when it does. True, many
C-123 0.0 o.o items foil while aircraft ore on bombing and gunnery ranges, but
this should not be reason to relax practices and procedures which
C-130 0. 0 0.0 influence safe mission conduct. Increased vigilance on the port
of pilots and maintenance personnel should help reduce the
U-3A 543.5 0.0 frequency of these in-flight losses of aircraft equipment.

ALL TYPES 11. 9 11. 0

L..AFB 1•377
·ccu:r:u..e.. . . enor-·l·ng . . . o.· . . e··I·C·1·e·nc1es :
c•·•:•:• t••· ~~·• • t • • • •· · • ~•:•·:• siFEI't Of·•·•f,IDHJ·•·,,••