Pakistan's Military Strategy: Challenges and Response

Electronic Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1: Issue I
www.eresearchjournal.com Jan-Mar 2019
Pakistan’s Military Strategy: Challenges and Response
by
Sehrish Naz
Fellow of M Phil (Sociology)
University of Sargodha
Email: sehrishnaz705@gmail.com
Abstract
Pakistan has remained marred with paradoxical security challenges. This

plethora of security and other challenges, weak and unstable political system, and
military actions has resulted in absence of unanimously accepted national security
strategy and with it a defined military strategy. The contours of security threats
have dictated Pakistan’s military strategy, it applications and development of armed
forces. The paper explores Pakistan’s military strategy and the challenges faced by
Pakistan as a country and the response of these challenges.
Key Words: Pakistan’s Military, Military Strategy, Pakistan & India, Pakistan’s security
constraints
Introduction:
Etymology of Strategy is derived from French stratégie and from Greek stratēgia
‘generalship’, from stratēgos The Oxford Dictionary defines Strategy as “A plan of action designed
to achieve a long-term or overall aim”. The same source further defines strategy as the art of
planning and directing overall military operations and movements in a war or battlei. Not only
Oxford Dictionary, but many other sources also define strategy and military strategy under the
same heading. It could have been true in the past but in contemporary time each domain under a
sovereign government has to design and define its strategy to achieve the overall strategic
objectives of the government, including defense and military strategy. Strategists and historians
have made extensive efforts to explain military strategy in accordance with their time, geographic
conditions and culture (Sun Tzu; the art and science of options,ii Clausewitz: a successful military
strategy may be a means to an end, but it is not an end in itselfiii thus leading to varying definitions,
forms, scope and limitations of military strategy. The documented definition of Military Strategy
in Pakistan describes it as:
• The application of military resources to help achieve grand strategic objectives.iv It
is the military component of the grand strategy and is formulated from the political
directive. It is concerned with the military strategic objectives and desired end state
required to achieve grand strategic aims, the military actions needed to achieve
those objectives, the resources to be allocated and the constraints to be applied.
• As per the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan (Article 245); the Armed Forces shall,
under the directions of the Federal Government, defend Pakistanv against external
aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called
upon to do so.vi
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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Armed forces are complemented by paramilitary forces (commonly known as Civil Armed
Forces of Pakistan) under Ministry of interior. Pakistan Armed Forces are virtually central actor
in many of today’s most pressing security challenges haunting Pakistan. In recent years the military
had to simultaneously combat a vicious internal insurgency, suppress international terrorist groups,
and respond to Pakistan’s worst floods, all while squaring off against a much larger rival in one of
the most strategically complex regions in the world that continues to threaten to explode into war
for a fifth time since 1947. Furthermore, Pakistan’s armed forces oversee the world’s fastest-
growing nuclear arsenal.
Concurrently, the civil- military relations also remained questionable which lead to military
imposing martial law on at least three occasions. At the political government level, a declare
comprehensive national security strategy (inclusive of traditional and non-traditional security) is
still not available (policy documents like National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy
issued by US Government have not been issued). While a national security policy has been issued
(dealing with internal threat under the ambit of Ministry of Interior), a comprehensive military
strategy as a document, even if formulated, is not available on open sources.
This article aims to analyze Pakistan geo-strategic security constraints leading to strategic
threats that dictate contours of Pakistan Military Strategy and its application for threat mitigation.
The sensitive contents of the subject, non-availability of primary sources for research and distant
locale compel the scribe to optimize on available open sources through internet only. Furthermore,
the subject being highly debated with many contrasting opinions, the views expressed in the article
are strictly scribes own and do not in any way reflect the official position of Government and
Armed forces of Pakistan.
Geo-Strategic Constraints to National Security of Pakistan:
From both traditional and non-traditional security perspectives, Pakistan has been
confronted with threats emanating from both internal and external actors. Since its inception,
Pakistan has been confronted with external threats on its eastern and western borders. On its east,
sharing a 2912 km long boarder, India posed unprecedented threats. Pakistan shares a disputed
porous 2430 km Durand linevii with Afghanistan on its West. Pakistan and China have also a 523
km shared border. Similarly, Pak-Iran border is 909 km long.viii
Due to the peculiar geo-strategic, global strategic cultural components; cold war, unipolar
world, Sino-US new cold war eruption, New Great Game, GWoT, UN’s unsatisfactory role, India's
hegemonic ambitions, major powers politics in the region, and Pakistan’s national cultural
components (like history, political, constitutional, economic, socio-cultural, and military) the
traditional security has always overshadowed the nontraditional security in the Pakistan. Under the
competitive strategic environment, security priorities of Pakistan have always been found dynamic
and undergone through various national security priorities however, a comprehensive consensus-
based national security policy has never been seriously considered.ixA brief description of strategic
constraints at each level are appended in ensuing paragraphs:
Global Strategic Constraints:
Cold War Security Priorities:

During the Cold War era, Pakistan has caught in strategic competition between two
opposing ideologies (capitalism and communism). The then leaders tended to support
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western powers and entered into defense pacts like South East Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). During that period the external
security remained a dominant discourse in Pakistan’s foreign policy, however, the internal
threats to its security remained unnoticed. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan
turned the geo-strategic scene at the global and South Asian regional levels. The then
military dictator, General Zia-Ul-Haq sided with America against former Soviet
Union.xAmerica and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia used Pakistan as a proxy and frontline state
against former Soviet Union. US and Pakistan spy agencies trained the students of religious
seminaries (Madaris), indoctrinated Muslim youth from across the globe with the spirit of
holy war (jihad), and provided arms and money to them against Soviets.
Post -Cold War till 9/11 Episode:
The United States withdrew from Afghanistan after the collapse of former Soviet Union.
With the withdrawal of American troops and lack of any post- Soviet Union defeat strategy,
civil war broke out among various Afghan factions which finally lead to imposition of
Taliban Government in 1996.xi While Pakistan remained supportive of Taliban
Government, Iran continued to support the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The 9/11
incident and subsequent Global War on Terror (GWoT) have drastically changed the
security priorities of Pakistan.xii Pakistan in general and Tribal Areas and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province in particular faced a wave of terror along with problems like
insurgencies, US drone attacks, military operations, etc. The repercussions of US war in
Afghanistan has massively impacted Pakistan's security paradigm.
Regional Strategic Constraints:
Indian factor and Kashmir Issue:
Kashmir is a disputed issue between Pakistan and India resulted due to notorious Redcliff
Award. Pakistan has supported the indigenous freedom movement in Indian occupied
Kashmir started in 1989 against Indian atrocities. Various freedom fighting groups like
Harkat-Ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-i-Muhammad and Lashkar-i-Tayba started guerrilla warfare
against the Indian troops. From 1947 to 1999 Pakistan and India fought 4 wars over
Kashmir. After the September 11, 2001 India found an opportunity to start propaganda
against the indigenous movement for self-determination in Kashmir and equate it with
terrorism.xiii
Cold Start Doctrine: Indian Offensive Defense Policy:

The ultimate designs behind this doctrine were the use of offensive or pre-emptive strikes
against Pakistan under the shadow of nuclear weapons. Through this doctrine all three-
armed services will launch an integrated strike without employing nuclear weapons. Indian
offensive war doctrine was seriously taken into account among the policy makers and
military leadership in Pakistan, resulting in redefining warfighting concepts for Pakistan.
The Instability in Afghanistan:
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The unstable Afghanistan has serious ramifications for Pakistan’s security and
regional security as well.xiv As earlier stated that America used Afghanistan as a proxy state
against Soviet Union and after collapse of the latter, it was left in rubbles without taking
any practical steps for its reconstruction. It has become a land for proxy war against
regional powers.xv India is trying to use Afghanistan as a proxy state against Pakistan
through its spy agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). xvi Being an immediate
neighbor of Afghanistan, Pakistan cannot remain as silent spectator to witness the damages
of its national interests.
Complicated relations with Iran:

Mutual suspicions hamper opportunities for Pakistan and Iran to jointly confront the Baloch
insurgencies faced by both nations. Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, Iran worked against
Pakistani interests by supporting the Northern Alliance against the Pakistan-backed Taliban, while
Iran accuses Pakistan of supporting Jundullah, the group believed responsible for several suicide
attacks against Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officers and other Iranian sites in cities near
the Iran-Pakistan border.xviiGiven the contentious relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the
close historical ties between Riyadh and Islamabad continue to irritate Tehran which has fueled
sectarian conflicts within Pakistan.xviii
National Strategic Constraints:

Zia’s Jihadist policy:
General Zia-Ul-Haq’s policy of jihad against communist Soviet Union
institutionalized the role of religious seminaries in the political system of country. This
promoted sectarian terrorism, religious extremism, and Kalashnikov (militant and violent)
culture in the society. His domestic policy of Islamization has further aggravated the
situation and divided the society.xix Both the political and military leadership in Pakistan
could not foresee the repercussions of using students of religious seminaries on Pakistani
society. These fighting groups were left without knowing their future objective except to
establish an Islamic regime in Afghanistan and across the globe. These fighting groups
reorganized themselves, opened training camps and also established a global
network.xxThe same Jihadist who were trained against former USSR, thus became a
strategic threat to Pakistan. The jihadist groups are further augmented by the militant wings
of politico regroups parties which have come out to be presently the gravest threat to
national security. With war being waged on western border, a deteriorated political and
security situation throughout the country, Gen Musharaf’s could not design a
comprehensive national security policy during his rule from 1999 to 2008.xxi
Insincere and Weak Political Leadership:
As per the Objectives Resolutions Annexed to 1973 Constitution of Pakistan,xxii

governance system in Pakistan is to be Constitutional Democracy.xxiiiAfter the demise of
Muhammad Ali Jinnahxxivand assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan,xxvsincere political
leadership vacuum was created. Consequently, democracy in its real sense could not take
roots in the weak political system of Pakistan since its independence. This provided
opportunities to military leadership to impose martial law in the country several times. The
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military has ruled Pakistan for 33 of the country’s 71-year history. Two key reasons help
explain its dominance: first, upon gaining independence in 1947, Pakistan retained 17% of
colonial India’s revenue streams but inherited 33% of the military. xxviThis gave the armed
forces a proportional advantage in the new government. Second, the immediate
disagreement between India and Pakistan over the fate of the Muslim-majority state of
Kashmir fueled a belief within some Pakistani circles that “Hindu” India was against
“Muslim” Pakistan.xxviiTogether, these factors informed two beliefs that profoundly shaped
Pakistan's political developmentxxviii namely, that India is an existential threat, and that the
military is Pakistan's greatest guardian against that threat.xxixOn the other hand, outside the
military rule, the parliament was filled in with the feudal and industrial classes of the
society with dynastic politics which is the major hindrance in the way of an effective and
actual participatory democracy. In short, pseudo-democracy prevails in Pakistan. Role of
politicians in the formulation of a feasible national security doctrine is found
unsatisfactory.
Unrest in Baluchistan:
Baluchistan has the strategic importance the country due to its geostrategic
significance. The Gwadar Port and execution China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
passing through the province has furthered its significance and given an internationalized
strategic importance.xxxMany external hands are involved to destabilize Baluchistan by
exploiting the sentiments of the dissident groups in Baluchistan.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability: A Thorn in eyes of USA:

The conventional preponderance of India and discriminatory global nuclear non-
proliferation regime left the strategic policy makers in Pakistan with no option except to
acquire nuclear weapons to strengthen its defense capability and to ensure minimum
nuclear deterrence capability. Washington has always targeted Pakistan’s nuclear program
by imposing economic and military sanctions on Pakistan as retaliation against Pakistan’s
nuclear program. Military sanctions were lifted after Pakistan joined the US lead war on
terror in 2001, however, recently US government under Donald Trump has frozen military
aid to Pakistan.xxxi
Conclusions from geo-strategic constraints:

Sandwiched between India and Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Security perceptions have largely
been influenced by its state of relationship with India and Afghanistan superimposed with its
relation with US. In short Pakistan is confronted with triple threat scenario which define the
contours Pakistan National Security and Military Strategies:
• The perennial conventional, non-conventional and sub-conventional threat from
India.
• Emerging Traditional/non-traditional threats from Afghanistan with its genesis
embedded over the difference on Durand Line and poor diplomatic relations
accentuated through Indian interference.
• The internal threat from highly volatile domestic situation with external linkages.
Deep internal fissures resulting in sectarian violence between proxy militant outfits
supported by regional countries.
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Application of Military Strategy:
In 72 years, Pakistan from military point of view, fought four major wars, lost significant
territory to a secessionist movement, served as a frontline for a superpower proxy confrontation,
and endured major militant insurgencies and terrorist campaigns. Continued extremist violence
against the state and its citizens, and US demands to support operations in neighboring Afghanistan
highlight the prominence of Pakistan’s armed forces. Drawing even more attention, Pakistan’s
engagement in a regional nuclear arms race tests the limits of the global non-proliferation regime
and significantly raises the stakes and inherent destructiveness in a future war. This Security
picture, along with periods of turbulent civilian rule and internal unrest, has historically
empowered the military to take what it considered necessary action to defend the Pakistani
state.xxxiiApplication of military strategy against the envisaged threat described earlier will be
discussed in ensuing paragraphs:
India:
India is Pakistan’s principal strategic competitor and has been the single largest
factor in the development of the Pakistani military’s conventional and nuclear
capabilities.xxxiiiWhile Pakistan is the 36th largest country in the world in terms of total
land area, it has numerous geographic vulnerabilities. For example, it is so narrow at its
midpoint that an Indian advance of 300-400 kilometers, the range of Indian tanks prior to
refueling could effectively cut the country (and its forces) in half. Furthermore, Pakistan’s
lines of communication, most importantly the highway that runs between Lahore and
Karachi, run perpendicular to a probable Indian advance and could be easily severed if
Indian forces gained ground.xxxivMany of Pakistan’s major population centers, like Lahore,
also lie within relatively easy striking distance of the border. In practical terms, while
Pakistan’s military could perhaps stem an Indian offensive for a few weeks or months,
India’s ability to commit more men and resources to the fight would likely ultimately
undermine Pakistan’s defenses in a prolonged conventional engagement.xxxv
Pakistan’s Military strategy to counter any Indian threat is “Strategically
defensive”, but “operationally offensive”. Realizing the danger of losing territory in a war
against India, Pakistan Army has developed a “Riposte” strategy which calls “strike” corps
to take the initiative in a war with India, pushing deep into Indian territory, while other
corps hold back the initial Indian advance relying upon initial momentum against a
numerically superior enemy. Post Indian Parliament in 2001, the Indian government
articulated an increasingly aggressive military doctrine in the form of a “Cold Start
doctrine” (CSD) positioning quick strike military units near the Pakistani border. It remains
unclear whether Cold Start indeed existed or exists as a viable plan as acknowledged by
current Indian Army Chief Gen Bipin Rawat in 2017,xxxvior was an elaborate bluff as denied
by a former Indian Army Chief General V K Singh in 2010.xxxvii
Pakistan’s response to CSD has been two-fold, first the induction of Tactical
Nuclear Weaponsxxxviiiin a bid to lower its nuclear redlines along with a blunt refusal to
“No First Use” of nuclear weapons policy,xxxixsecond shoring up its conventional
capabilities. Considering India’s military capability and its declared Cold Start Doctrine,
Pakistan Military strategy had to be prepared according to adversaries “capabilities” and
not “intentions”. Between 2009 and 2013, the Pakistan Army adopted a “New Concept of
War Fighting” (NCWF) that aims to improve mobilization time of troops and enhance
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inter-services coordination, especially between the Army and the Pakistan Air Force.xlWith
the implementation of the NCFW, the Pakistan Army will be able to mobilize even faster
than India.xli
Afghanistan
Pakistan’s geographic vulnerability in case of military contest with, India limits its
military’s ability to strategically retreat in the event of a full-scale Indian invasion.
Maintaining a friendly regime in Kabul, gives Pakistan the potential to achieve “strategic
depth”. This is only a Western comprehension of Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan,
However, forcefully denied by Pakistan.xliiIn realist terms, for Pakistan the term strategic
depth is an alternate for ensuring that Afghanistan does not pose a threat to Pakistan on its
western border in the event of a war against India. Thus, freeing forces from western border
to counter Indian numerical superiority on eastern border. For Pakistan from a military
perspective, worse than an unfriendly regime in Afghanistan would be a pro-Indian
government.xliiiIn the 1990s, Pakistan supported the Taliban that satisfied Pakistan’s basic
security needs in Afghanistan. India’s diplomatic and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan
have increased many folds since fall of Taliban government, which has fed military
concerns for Pakistan. The ongoing dispute over Durand Line, along with Afghan claims
on Pashtun and Baloch regions within Pakistan, are a source of concern to Pakistani
military. Despite 17 years of military operations in Afghanistan and the combined efforts
of NATO (ISAF) and Afghan National Army (ANA) have not been able to subdue the
militant Taliban. While Afghanistan had been accusing Pakistan of propping up and
providing sanctuaries to the Afghan Taliban on its soil,xlivPakistan also blames Afghanistan
particularly after the December 16, 2014 terrorist attack on a military-run school in
Peshawar claimed by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or TTP.xlv
Seventeen years of protracted war in Afghanistan has proven that Militarily the
United States cannot defeat the Taliban, if indeed this is the objective, without Pakistan
joining the war, which Pakistan will not. Diplomatically, the turmoil in Afghanistan
cannot be negotiated without Pakistan. And Pakistan will not join a negotiated
settlement if America’s position towards it remains unfriendly, if not hostile, and if
Pakistan’s concerns about India’s role in Afghanistan are not satisfied.xlviOn the military
side, Pakistan is fighting Taliban and other terror outfits inside its territory. However, it
becomes an unsustainable position to open every front with every outfit simultaneously.
This will only lead to more bloodshed and more terrorism. To stop spillover of terrorist
outfit members on either side is Pakistan has commenced fencing its porous border with
Afghanistan that is to be manned and mined. If supported by both sides it will be a greater
success than if done by Pakistan alone.xlvii
War Against Internal Threats:

In the prevailing environment the internal threat with its external linkages remains
most dominant threat. Pakistani armed forces have acquired some hard-earned lessons in
its hard-fought battle against terrorism and extremists elements in Pakistan society since
2001. In its fight against terrorism although a substantial assistance in the form of hardware
was provided by US. However, Pakistan also had to tolerate a number of drone strikes by
US in the border areas adjoining Afghanistan which had serious ramifications for Pakistan.
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Despite a huge human cost and tenacious military operation against terrorist hideout in
boarder areas with Afghanistan, Pakistan gets blamed by US (and of course India) for
providing safe heavens to terrorist elements. This is vehemently denied by Pakistan at both
diplomatic as well at military fronts. The present Pakistani Prime Minister very vividly
announced that Pakistan has suffered the most in the ongoing war on terror, both in terms
of human life as well as economically, and that Pakistan would no further engage itself in
someone else’s war.xlviiiNotwithstanding the spat between governments of Pakistan and US
over counter terrorism, domestically Pakistan has taken substantive steps to root out the
evil of terrorism in all its forms.
Although at present the counter terrorism efforts are being spear headed by the
Armed forces especially the Army, Constitutionally, the subject remains under the domain
of Ministry of Interior with armed forces being requisitioned to support the federal and
provincial governments. The effective counter terrorism and counter extremism efforts
involve a number of organizations and agencies. These organizations were working in
isolation and thus either hindering each other’s performance or duplicating the efforts. In
order to harmonize and synergize the collective performance of all organizations at
different levels National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was established in 2013.
NACTA derives its mandate from Article 4 of NACTA Act 2013 which is to coordinate
counter terrorism planning and actions. In 2014 Ministry of interior also issued first-ever
policy document on internal security and counter-terrorism. The National Internal Security
Policy (NISP 2014) was conceived and prepared based upon “principles of mutual
inclusiveness and integration of all national efforts.”xlixThe Composite Deterrence Plan
included the concept of National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA comprising Police and
Civil Armed Forces), filling its inadequacies through strengthening and capacity building
and its coordinated anti-terrorist effort through National Internal Security Operations
Centre (NISOC) under the oversight of the Federal Government.l
After Army Public School attack on 16th of December 2014, a national consensus
was evolved to come down hard on terrorists through a concerted national effort.liWhereas
the National Internal Security Policy pointed out the broad policy guidelines and reforms
in various state institutions, a need to felt to formulate "Action Plan" with specific,
quantifiable and time-bound agenda to curb the scourge of terrorism.liiA 20 Points National
Action Plan (NAP) for countering terrorism and extremism was chalked out by NACTA/
Ministry of Interior in consultation with the stakeholders and approved on 24th of
December, 2014 by the Parliament.liiiThe National Action Plan, spelled out the specifics
for the counter-terrorism drive in the country and still in progress.
Role of the Armed Forces:
The way Pakistan Army and other security forces dealt with the terrorism and tried to
secure the borders and maintain internal peace of the country is truly visible and indeed
remarkable. The efforts were and are being carried out in the situation, where there exist extreme
political instability and the indigenous problems like lack of religious harmony, sectarianism,
poverty, serious border problems etc. Governments in Pakistan have remained cognizant of
military specific requirement ensuring allocation of resources for functioning of the armed forces.
For year 2018-19 approximately US$ 9.6 Billion was allocated in the federal budget (18% higher
than previous year).liv
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Pakistan Army:
Since 1947, the army was trained and equipped to fight conventional battles against
a known superior enemy. The induction into tribal areas to fight against an amorphous and
well-equipped enemy was new to the Army. Despite having experiences of three wars and
counter insurgency operations Baluchistan, East Pakistan and even under UN Flag away
from home, the war on terror opened a new chapter. During the initial years of the
operation, Pakistan Army was neither adequately equipped nor properly trained for frontier
warfare in the tribal areas. It lacked mobility both on the ground and in the air because of
the difficult terrain and geography. In recent years, Pakistan Army has made very
momentous advancement in shifting its strategy and focus from conventional warfare to
irregular warfare and low intensity conflicts. Pakistan Army sought the effective
coordination and support of other law enforcement agencies to deal with the insurgency,
worsening situations on the borders, target killings, suicide bombings and hitting of
military convoys etc.
These military operations have substantially improved the overall security situation
in the country. All bases of operations and safe havens of militant organizations in
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)lvand settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KPK) called PATA (provincially administered) have been dismantled and flushed out
through countrywide Operations Raddul Fasad and Zarb e Azab Another tangible step is
the fencing of the western border to prevent cross border infiltration.lviContinuous
intelligence based operations and the stringent measures introduced under NAP including
the re-institution of the death penalty, new cybercrime laws, the renewal of the Afghan
Refugee Registration, the revival of the Pakistan Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (PAFIS), and the establishment of the Integrated Border Management System
(IBMS). As a result of successful operations in the tribal areas, both FATA and PATA has
been formally merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province through the 25th Constitutional
Amendment.lvii
Pakistan Air Force (PAF):

No two CT campaigns can be the same in terms of reasons/counter measures. The
ground forces have fought with commitment, courage and dedication in extremely difficult
and unfriendly terrain in north-western region of Pakistan against an adversary equipped
with sophisticated warfighting arsenal.lviiiPAF was thus brought into action to engage the
targets with precision and effectiveness thereby softening the ground for friendly forces.
The core of CT operations is equally understood and professionally executed by Pakistan
Armed Forces through tailor-made procedures acclimatized to meet the exist environment.
The joint operation of Army and the Air force not only synergized the battle field tactics
but have also evolved the strategies to fight unconventional warfare.
Since intelligence is a key attribute of CT operations, PAF actively undertakes ISR
operations in the area of interest for provisioning of real-time target information to own
fighters as well as to Pakistan Army. For effective deployment and subsequent
engagement, the ground troops require a detailed assessment of target which is also met by
PAF through launching ISR missions in the area of interest, providing accurate geo-
location, identification of target and detailed picture of terrain. Assessment of damage and
confirmation of target engagement is also undertaken by PAF through ISR platforms. The
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battle damage assessment missions provide useful information for effective engagement of
target, specifically by ground forces. The activities of terrorist elements along the porous
western border made it crucial to destroy their focal point and leadership which has been
achieved through precision strikes by PAF on terrorists’ concentration, training
camps,lixleadership and logistic reserves in support of Pakistan Army. lxPAF’s instant
response and application of precision guided munitions have ensured in-time and accurate
engagement of targets with negligible collateral damage.lxi
Pakistan Navy:
Pakistan Navy become part of CTF 150 in 2004 to achieve maritime security in
North Arabian Sea. Similarly, Pakistan became part of CTF 151 in 2009 to combat threat
of piracy in Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin and North Arabian Sea.lxiiThe main aim of joining
these collations is to contribute devotedly towards regional peace and security. Pakistan
Navy was successful in curbing unrestricted movements of terrorists in North Arabian Sea,
Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa and Mediterranean Sea. During this tenure, Pakistan Navy
carried out various tasks and operations, which compelled the world to acknowledge
dedication, passion and professional competence of Pakistan Navy.lxiii
Recently, Pakistan's Navy has pulled out of collation operations following
disagreements with the US to cut fuel subsidies for Pakistani ships. However, Due to
excessive trade activities in Indian Ocean and in order to safeguard national interest in
CPEC; Pakistan Navy decided to establish Regional Maritime Security Patrols in the
region. Independent Maritime Security Patrols is a Pakistan Navy’s initiative to curb
terrorism and piracy. Maritime peace in the region is the primary concern of all littoral
states of IOR.
Strategic Forces:
Pakistan attained it Nuclear weapons status in 1998 and has an elaborate nuclear
command and control mechanism comprising National Command Authority, Strategic
Plans Division and Strategic Forces Command (Army, Navy and Air Force). From
minimum credible deterrence, Pakistan has modified nuclear posture to create a full-
spectrum deterrence with new short-range nuclear-capable weapon systems to counter
military threats below the strategic level. The efforts seek not only to respond to nuclear
attacks, but also to counter an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani territory. After
successful testing of Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) BABUR-III on 9
January 2017, Pakistan has completed its nuclear tiradelxiv.
Pakistan Future Military Programs:

Traditionally Pakistan military hardware was west based. However, the military equipment
and spare supportability has been marred due repeated US/Western Countries sanctions. Although
these sanctions have forced Pakistan military development programs to be more indigenous and
home grown, it has also compelled Pakistan to look towards other partner, like China, Russia and
Turkey to meet its defense equipment requirements.
Military projects with China like joint production of Al-Khalid Main Battle Tank, JF-17
Fighter Aircraft and construction F-22P Frigates have already been completed. Pakistan has also
acquired gunship helicopters from Russia (Mi-35 M)lxvand ATAK helicopters being acquired
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through Turkey.lxviPakistan Airforce have achieved massive impetus through induction of air to
air refuellers and AWACS aircraft would advance it JF-17 Project to maturity through production
of JF-17 Block III.lxviiRealizing the importance of maritime stability, the Navy’s budget for 2018-
19 was increased by 21.4%.lxviiiPakistan Navy has already contracted construction of 8 Diesel
Electric submarines with China (4 would be constructed in Pakistan),lxix4 MILGEM corvettes with
Turkey (2 Would be constructed in Pakistan including transfer of technology)lxxand 4 Type 054 A
Frigates from China.lxxi
Conclusion:
Owing to the legacy of belligerence, a lingering core issue like Kashmir, territorial
sensitivities, internal vulnerabilities and restricted defense budget, Pakistan‘s security strategy has
multifarious challenges. Despite unfavorable and hostile conditions, Pakistan Armed forces have
been fully able to execute their constitutional mandate of defending the country's sovereignty.
Threat of conventional and nuclear forces will have to be adroitly balanced in land, air, maritime
and strategic domains against superiority in numbers "to deny the much-craved space for limited
war" to India. In view of financial constraints, the comprehensive national security strategy
challenge for Pakistan lies in utilizing full spectrum strategic deterrence to avoid an arms race with
India, while equitably maintaining core military capabilities. Redress of these vulnerabilities in a
regular war will only be possible through increased unity of command through a well-articulated
military strategy to synergize all military actions.
Cited Works and Endnotes:

i
Definition of Strategy in English. (n.d.). Retrieved November 28, 2018 from
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/strategy
ii
Sun Tzu on Strategy. (n.d.). Retrieved November 28, 2018 from
http://www.strategybydesign.org/sun-tzu-on-strategy/
iii
Handel, M. I. (1991). Sun Tzu and Clausewitz; ‘The Art of War and ‘On War’ compared.
Retrieved November 28, 2018 from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a239084.pdf
iv
Makus, M. (2003). In pursuit of conceptual excellence; The evolution of British Military in Post
Cold War era 1988 -2002. Peter Lang
v
Constitution of Pakistan. (1973) Retrieved November 28, 2018 from
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part12.ch2.html
vi
Ibid.
vii
Durand Line is a boundary established in the Hindu Kush in 1893 running through the tribal
lands between Afghanistan and British India, marking their respective spheres of influence;
in modern times it has marked the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The
acceptance of this line, which was named for Sir Mortimer Durand, who induced Abdor
Raḥmān Khān, amir of Afghanistan, to agree to a boundary may be said to have settled the
Indo-Afghan frontier problem for the rest of the British period.
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viii
Khan, A. , Jaspal, Z. N. & Yasmin, S. (2016). The National Security Policy paradox in Pakistan:
strategic constraints, ramifications and policy recommendations. The Dialogue, Volume
XII; Number I. pp. 15-36
ix
Ibid.
x
General Zia ul Haq seized power from Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto in a coup on July 5, 1977, and became
chief martial-law administrator while retaining his position as Army chief of staff. He sided
with USA against Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. He also broadened his
base of support and worked for the Islamization of Pakistan’s political and cultural life. He
died in an airplane crash in 1988.
xi
xii
Ibid.
xiii
Ibid.
xiv
Ibid.
xv
Ibid.
xvi
Ibid.
xvii
Aguilar, F., Bell, R., Black, N., Falks, S., Rogers, S. & Peritz, Aki. (2011). An introduction to
Pakistan’s military. Harvard Kennedy School; Cambridge
xviii
Ibid.
xix
xx
Ibid.
xxi
Pervez Musharraf is ex - Pakistani Chief of Army who took power in a coup in 1999. He served
as president of Pakistan from 2001 to 2008.
xxii
Constitution of Pakistan. (2019). Retrieved November 28, 2018 from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Pakistan
xxiii
The Constitution of Pakistan, The Objectives Resolution; Annex 2(A). (1973). Retrieved
December 1, 2018 from http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/annex.html;.
xxiv
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, also called Quaid-i-Azam (Arabic: “Great Leader”), founder and first
governor-general (1947–48) of Pakistan.
69

xxv
Liaquat Ali Khan, first prime minister of Pakistan (1947–51).
xxvi
History.com Editors. (2010). India and Pakistan win independence. Retrieved
December 1, 2018 from https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/india-and-pakistan-
win-independence
xxvii
Pervaiz, F. (2018). Why the military rules in Pakistan? Retrieved December 1, 2018 from
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-military-rules-pakistan
xxviii
Pervaiz, F. (2018). Pakistan’s military- democracy complex. Retrieved. December 1, 2018
from https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/pakistans-military-democracy-complex
xxix
Pervaiz, F. (2018). Why the military rules in Pakistan? Retrieved December 1, 2018 from
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-military-rules-pakistan
xxx
CPEC is a joint project that China and Pakistan agreed to finance through Chinese and Pakistani
investments. While the project has been welcomed by Greater Eurasia (including Russia,
Iran, and Central Asia) besides the United Kingdom and Western European countries,
albeit vehement opposition by India.
xxxi
Sampathkumar, M. (2018). Trump Administration Freezes Military Aid to Pakistan. Retrieved
December 1, 2018 from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-
politics/trump-pakistan-aid-latest-suspended-frozen-state-dept-news-a8142691.html.
xxxii
Aguilar, F., Bell, R., Black, N., Falks, S., Rogers, S. & Peritz, Aki. (2011). An introduction to
Pakistan’s military. Harvard Kennedy School; Cambridge
xxxiii
Ibid.
xxxiv
Ibid.
xxxv
Ibid.
xxxvi
Sood, M. (2017). Pakistan’s response to cold start doctrine. Retrieved December 1, 2018 from
http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1480584591_NEWLATESTIssueBriefMeen
akshiSood(23March2017)(1).pdf
xxxvii
Doshi, Y. (2010). The Cold End of Cold Start Doctrine. Retrieved November 30, 2018 from
http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=3258
xxxviii
Pakistan has opted to develop a variety of short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons, called
Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW), as a defensive, deterrence response to an offensive
doctrine by India
xxxix
Mirza, A. M. (2015). The Debate on Nuclear First Use and No First Use: The Case of Pakistan;
Retrieved December 1, 2018 from https://southasianvoices.org/the-debate-on-nuclear-
first-use-and-no-first-use-the-case-of-pakistan-3/
70

xl
Yousuf, K. (2013). Countering Cold Start: Military to Adopt New War Concept. Retrieved
November 19, 2018 from https://tribune.com.pk/story/558604/countering-cold-start-
military-to-adopt-new-war-concept/
xli
Sood, M. (2017). Pakistan’s (non-nuclear) plan to counter ‘cold start.’ Retrieved November 19,
2018 from https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistans-non-nuclear-plan-to-counter-cold-
start/
xlii
Pakistan seeks no Strategic Depth in Afghanistan, US told. (2012). Retrieved November 30,
2018 from https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/625312-pakistan-seeks-no-
strategic-depth-in-afghanistan,-us-told
xliii
Weinbaum, M. G. (1991). Pakistan and Afghanistan - The Strategic Relationship; Asian Survey;
Vol. 31, No. 6 (Jun., 1991), pp. 496-511
xliv
Khattak, D. (2018). Are We Finally Seeing a Breakthrough in Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations?
Retrieved December 1, 2018 from https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/are-we-finally-seeing-
a-breakthrough-in-afghanistan-pakistan-relations/
xlv
Ibid.
xlvi
Hussain, T. (2018). What Pakistan needs from America’s Afghan war effort; Retrieved
November 30, 2018 from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-pakistan-needs-
americas-afghan-war-effort-25040?page=0%2C1
xlvii
Ali, Y. A. (2018). Does Pakistan have an Afghanistan strategy? Retrieved November 30, 2018
from https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/02/06/does-pakistan-have-an-afghanistan-
strategy/
xlviii
Pakistan Will Not Fight Any Other Country’s War: PM Imran Khan (2018). Retrieved
December 1, 2018 from https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-will-not-
fight-any-other-country-s-war-pm-imran-khan/story-7lNfiQ6ozMfYeO5KBlz05N.html
xlix
National Internal Security Policy, 2014 (2014). Retrieved November 30, 2018 from
https://nacta.gov.pk/nisp-2014/
l
Ibid.
li
Peshawar school massacre was the terrorist attack in which seven heavily armed Taliban terrorists
stormed an army-run primary and secondary school in Peshawar, Pakistan, on December
16, 2014, killing 150 people, of whom at least 134 were students
lii
Lorell, M., Graser, C. J. & Cook, C. R. (2019). Price-Based Acquisition. Issues and Challenges
for Defense Department Procurement of Weapon Systems. Retrieved
December 1, 2018 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235168976_Price-
Based_Acquisition_Issues_and_Challenges_for_Defense_Department_Procurement_of_
Weapon_Systems
71

liii
National Action Plan 2014. (2014). Retrieved December 1, 2018 from https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-
2014/
liv
Baqar, S. S. (2018). Budget 2018-19: Rs 1.1 trillion proposed for the defense. Retrieved
December 2, 2018 from https://www.dawn.com/news/1404337
lv
Territories of Pakistan include Federally Administered Tribal Areas referred to as FATA
(seven agencies along the Afghan border, adjacent to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The British
colonial administrators of India created a buffer state as a safeguard against Russian
expansionism in Central Asia. Colonial administrators oversaw but never fully controlled
the region, through a combination of British-appointed agents and local tribal elders
through imposition of tribal laws instead of the general laws of the country.
lvi
Raja, A. H. (2018). Progress achieved by Pakistan in counter terrorism. Retrieved December 2,
2018 from https://dailytimes.com.pk/260912/progress-achieved-by-pakistan-in-counter-
terrorism/
lvii
The Gazette of Pakistan. (2018). Retrieved December 2, 2018 from
https://fata.gov.pk/Global.php?iId=28&fid=2&pId=23&mId=13
lviii
PAF’s Counter-Terrorism Campaign. (2018). Retrieved December 2, 2018 from
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/pafs-counter-terrorism-campaign.553935/
lix
Ibid.
lx
Ibid.
lxi
lxii
Combined Task Force 151. (2018). Retrieved December 2, 2018 from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Task_Force_151
lxiii
lxiv
Club, T. N. (2017). Pakistan Enters the Nuke Triad Club. Retrieved December 2, 2018 from
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/pakistan-enters-nuke-triad-club
lxv
Gady, F. S. (2018). Pakistan begins receiving advance attack helicopters from Russia; Retrieved
December 2, 2018 from https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/pakistan-begins-receiving-
advanced-attack-helicopters-from-russia/
lxvi
Gady, F. S. (2018). Pakistan to receive 30 helicopter gunships from Turkey. Retrieved
December 2, 2018 from https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/pakistan-to-receive-30-
helicopter-gunships-from-turkey/
72

lxvii
Global Security; JF-17 Thunder; Retrieved December 2, 2018 from
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/jf-17.htm
lxviii
Baqar, S. S. (2018). Budget 2018-19: Rs 1.1 trillion proposed for the defense. Retrieved
December 2, 2018 from https://www.dawn.com/news/1404337
lxix
China to Provide Eight Submarines to Pak Navy. (2016). Retrieved December 2, 2018 from
https://pakobserver.net/china-to-provide-eight-submarines-to-pak-navy/ viewed 2 Dec 2018.
lxx
Pakistan Navy Procuring 4 MILGEM Type Corvettes from Turkey. (2018). Retrieved
December 2, 2018 from http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-
news/2018/july-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/6337-pakistan-navy-procuring-4-milgem-type-
corvette-from-turkey.html
lxxi
Two More Type 054 A Frigates from China for Pak Navy. (2018). Retrieved December
2, 2018 from http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/june-2018-
navy-naval-defense-news/6261-two-more-type-054a-frigates-from-china-for-pakistan-navy.html
73

Pakistan's Military Strategy: Challenges and Response

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Pakistan's Military Strategy: Challenges and Response

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Electronic Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1: Issue I

www.eresearchjournal.com Jan-Mar 2019

Pakistan’s Military Strategy: Challenges and Response

Pakistan has remained marred with paradoxical security challenges. This

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Geo-Strategic Constraints to National Security of Pakistan:

Global Strategic Constraints:

Cold War Security Priorities:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Post -Cold War till 9/11 Episode:

Regional Strategic Constraints:

Indian factor and Kashmir Issue:

Cold Start Doctrine: Indian Offensive Defense Policy:

The Instability in Afghanistan:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Complicated relations with Iran:

National Strategic Constraints:

Insincere and Weak Political Leadership:

As per the Objectives Resolutions Annexed to 1973 Constitution of Pakistan,xxii

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability: A Thorn in eyes of USA:

Conclusions from geo-strategic constraints:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Application of Military Strategy:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

War Against Internal Threats:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Role of the Armed Forces:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Pakistan Air Force (PAF):

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Pakistan Future Military Programs:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Cited Works and Endnotes:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576087

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