China and Strategic Culture
China and Strategic Culture
China and Strategic Culture
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Andrew Scobell
May 2002
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An earlier version of this monograph was presented to the “China’s
Use of Force” Conference organized by the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA). This monograph benefited from a research trip to Asia which was
partially funded by the DIA.
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ISBN 1-58487-090-7
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vi
“Peace is Precious.”
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National Unification.
Threat Perceptions.
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Active Defense.
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Analysis.
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Recommendations.
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ENDNOTES
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5. Of course, this dynamic works both ways. See, for example, Susan
M. Puska, New Century, Old Thinking: The Dangers of the Perceptual
Gap in U.S.-China Relations, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, April 10, 1998.
6. On images of the United States in the late 20th century, see for
example, David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991. For a more recent effort, see Phillip
Saunders, “China’s America Watchers,” The China Quarterly, No. 161,
March 2000, pp. 41-65. On images of Japan in the late 20th century, see
Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1989; and Michael Pillsbury, China
Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National
28
29
30
31
25. Ibid. See also Chen Zhou, “Zhongguo xiandai jubu zhanzheng
lilun yu Meiguo youxian zhanzheng lilun zhi butong,” [Differences
between China’s theory of modern local war and America’s theory of
limited war], ZGJSKX, No. 4, 1995, p. 6; Interviews with civilian and
military researchers in Beijing and Shanghai, May-June 1998
[hereafter “Interviews, 1998”].
26. The five principles, first outlined by Zhou Enlai in the 1950s, are
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression,
noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence.
33. “Liu Huaqing Refutes Argument,” p. 31. See also Xing Shizhong,
“China Threat Theory May be Forgotten.”
32
48. Zhang Jing and Yao Yanjin, Jiji Fangyu Zhanlue Qianshuo
[Introduction to Active Defense Strategy], Beijing: Jiefangjun
Chubanshe, 1985, p. 137.
33
53. A first strike is only just if China can claim that the attack was
launched to preempt an attack being prepared by an opponent.
34
59. See, for example, Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao,
New York: Random House, 1994; Liz Sly, “A State of Paranoia,” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1999, pp. 38-43; Michael
Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment,
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000.
61. For recent use of this slogan, see, for example, Gao Jiquan,
“China Holds High Banner of Peace,” Jiefangjun Bao, June 27, 1996 in
FBIS, July 12, 1996.
63. The 1969 clash with the Soviet Union and the 1979 Vietnam
conflict are similarly labeled. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun junguan
shouce (lujun fence), pp. 514-515.
64. Iain Johnston contends that the term “defense” is employed for
propaganda purposes so that every military action can be labeled as
defense and hence more justified than anything called “offensive.” See
Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy,” pp. 249-250, especially
footnote 63.
65. Chen Zhou, “Zhongguo xiandai jubu zhanzheng,” p. 46. See also
Mi Zhenyu, “Zhongguo jiji fangyu zhanlue fangzhen” (China’s strategic
plan of active defense), in Shi Boke, ed., Zhongguo Daqushi
(Megatrends China), Beijing: Hualing Chubanshe, 1996, p. 53.
68. Jianxiang Bi, “The PRC’s Active Defense Strategy: New Wars,
Old Concepts,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 31, No. 11, November 1995, p.
94.
35
75. Li Jijun, “lun zhanlue wenhua,” p. 12. This image was reinforced
by the author’s interviews with civilian and military analysts in Beijing
and Shanghai, September 2000.
76. Ibid.
81. Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 127, 196; interviews, 2000.
36
84. See, for example, Allen S. Whiting, “The PLA and China’s Threat
Perceptions,” The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996, pp. 607-609;
Mel Gurtov and Byung Moo Hwang, China’s Security: the New Roles of
the Military, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 70-73.
37
91. Peng Huaidong, “Lun zhan Xi Zhan-Zhong guan zhi yancha yi,”
p. 127; interviews, September 2000.
103. Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhuo, Mei-E xin junshi geming [the
new revolution in military affairs in the United States and Russia],
Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1996, pp. 41-45, cited in Pillsbury,
China Debates the Future, p. 67.
38
111. Andrew Scobell, The U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2001, p. 11. This does not
mean that China would be completely deterred from launching an
operation against Taiwan, but it does make Chinese military planning
much more complicated and significantly lessens the probability of
success.
114. On why the Army is suited for this lead role, see Scobell, The
U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific, pp. 31-32.
39
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Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven Metz
Author
Dr. Andrew Scobell
Director of Publications
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
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Composition
Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell