Pakistan Foreign Policy Trends Op 54

IDSA Occasional Paper No.
54
PAKISTAN’S
FOREIGN POLICY
Trends and Challenges
SUMITA KUMAR
PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES |
1
IDSA OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 54
PAKISTAN’S
FOREIGN POLICY
TRENDS AND CHALLENGES
SUMITA KUMAR
2 | SUMITA
KUMAR
 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
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ISBN: 978-93-82169-86-4
First Published: August 2019
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PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES |
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PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES
INTRODUCTION
Pakistan’s foreign policy, like that of any other country, is
determined by its geography and to a considerable extent, by its
domestic politics. Anti- Indianism and an urge to establish a pliable
government in Afghanistan have been constant features of
Pakistan’s foreign policy since its creation. It was to acquire
strategic parity with India that Pakistan entered into alliances
with external great powers, like the United States (US) first and
China later. The endeavours to establish pliable governments in
Afghanistan came in the way of friendly relations with its Western
neighbour, which itself was always wary of Pakistan’s intentions
and refused to recognise the Durand Line as the border
between the two countries.
Pakistan’s domestic politics was characterised by the interference of

Islamist parties that wanted to determine the shape of Pakistan’s
Constitution in accordance with the dictates of Islam. While the
successive Pakistani regimes, both civilian and military, accommodated
these views in shaping the political system, a time came when the
Pakistan Government thought it useful to harness the religious
extremist groups in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives. That is
when such groups were given the stewardship of jihad against
Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan in 1979.
In the foreign policy architecture of Pakistan, the sustained

antipathy towards India, the support of external powers like the US
and China and interference in the affairs of Afghanistan to
acquire “strategic depth” became regular features. After the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan diverted the trained
Islamist jihadis to Kashmir to intensify anti-India insurgency, under
the security of the newly acquired nuclear weapons capability by 1987.
Simultaneously, Pakistan supported the Taliban
4 | SUMITA KUMAR
rule in Afghanistan, which facilitated the massive terrorist attack by

Al- Qaeda on America’s heartland on September 11, 2001. This was
the origin of the “war on terror” unleashed by America against the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan perceiving it to be the epicentre of
terrorism. The US coerced Pakistan into joining the war on terror in
Afghanistan. While this war on terrorism is continuing till date, the
US has remained completely dissatisfied with the sincerity of
Pakistan’s role and has often accused Pakistan of being
duplicitous in its promises.
Although China has been cultivating Pakistan as a strategic ally to

countervail India since the 1960s, the rise of China in the twenty-first
century and the emergence of Xi Jinping as an ambitious leader
concretised China’s vision to give special importance to Pakistan in its
designs to expand its influence. The most glaring example of this is
China’s announcement of the US$ 62 billion China–Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, with Gwadar as its terminal point.
Meanwhile, as if Pakistan supported insurgency in Kashmir was not
enough, Pakistan-supported militant groups like Jaish-e- Mohammed
(JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) attacked high-value Indian targets
like the Kashmir Legislative Assembly in October 2001; the Indian
Parliament in December 2001; Mumbai commercial centres in
November 2008; and later, security targets like the Pathankot Air
Force base in January 2016, the army camp in Uri in September
2016, and the convoy of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in
Pulwama in February 2019.
It is against the background of such tumultuous developments that

this paper tries to discern recent trends in Pakistan’s foreign policy,
specifically with reference to the most critical areas of Pakistan’s
concerns, like the attitude of the US, the indulgence of China, the
unpredictabilities with Afghanistan, the deadlock with India and the
revived interest of Russia in dealing with Pakistan. The attempt will
be to examine the extent to which these trends are durable and
beneficial to Pakistan and whether its strategy is likely to keep
Pakistan in a state of confused and rudderless existence,
constantly ill at ease with itself.
The paper looks at the likely impact of reduced economic and

security- related American aid to Pakistan. It focuses on the
possible fallout of Pakistan’s overdependence on China. It discusses
the peace process in Afghanistan which involves the participation of
external powers like the
PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES | 5
US, China and Russia, and how it is likely to serve the interests of
Pakistan. It examines the continuing tension with India, which is
accusing Pakistan of being directly responsible for heightened
insurgency in Kashmir, and its impact on Pakistan. It also explores
whether Pakistan’s improved relations with Russia will expand its
strategic options and give it a greater sense of security or land it in
the arena of competition among major powers.
ALIENATION OF THE US
More than a decade-and-a half after having been coerced into
joining the US-led war on terrorism and having received the attendant
benefits flowing from its major non-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization) ally status, Pakistan has managed to completely
alienate the US. The actions of Pakistan’s political and military
leadership, which are guided by the country’s strategic objectives, have
made the US question Pakistan’s intentions towards countering terrorist
groups, particularly the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. The
most obvious manifestation of this was US President Trump’s
address to the nation on August 21, 2017 where he earmarked
plans for engaging with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. He took a
strong stand emphasising the need for Pakistan to do more to
eliminate terrorism emanating from within the country if it valued
its “partnership” with the US.1 The underlying threat was not lost on
Pakistan’s strategic community. The possibility of unilateral action
which could be taken by the US on Pakistani soil was enhanced
after the removal of certain restrictions on the use of drones.
Pakistan’s persistent fears about increasing Indian influence in the
region, especially in Afghanistan, were stoked not only by President
Trump’s speech where he emphasised the need to strengthen the
“strategic partnership with India”,2 but also by former US
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s address at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
1
“Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South
Asia”, Fort Myer, Arlington, Virginia, August 21, 2017, at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-
afghanistan-south-asia/. (Accessed June 20, 2018).
2
Ibid.
6 | SUMITA KUMAR
Washington, DC, on October 18, 2017, where he focused on

“shared values” between India and the US and the expectation
that both the countries would work towards stabilising the Indo-
Pacific region.3
Strong reactions emerged within Pakistan. An intense debate took

place within the country about the importance of the US for
Pakistan and the need to safeguard its sovereignty. The National
Security Committee (NSC) of Pakistan questioned the role
envisaged for India and a statement emphasised that “India
cannot be a net security provider in the South Asia region….”4 The
army chief briefed the parliament on the emerging national security
situation in the context of the hardening US stance, in an attempt to
assuage the rising indignation amongst the leadership and activists
of political parties, elders in the tribal areas and the public in
Pakistan.
In real terms, the US dissatisfaction due to Pakistan’s continued

support for terrorist groups fomenting trouble in Afghanistan was
reflected in the reduction of security assistance to Pakistan. For
instance, the US Department of State confirmed on January 4,
2018 that it would suspend Foreign Military Financing amounting to
US$ 255 million earmarked for fiscal year (FY) 2016 as Pakistan
had not taken “decisive action” against “the Taliban and the
Haqqani network” enjoying “safe havens” within Pakistan.5
Further, US$ 900 million that was supposed to be reimbursed
3
CSIS, “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century: An
Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson”, October 18, 2017,
at https:// www.csis.org/analysis/defining-our-relationship-india-next-century-
address-us- secretary-state-rex-tillerson. (Accessed June 20, 2018).
4
“NSC Rejected India Role as Security Provider in the South Asia Region”,
Pak Tribune, August 25, 2017, at http://paktribune.com/news/NSC-rejected-
India- role-as-security-provider-in-the-South-Asia-region-279366.html. (Accessed
June 20, 2018).
5
US Department of State, “Background Briefing with Senior State Department Officials
on Security Assistance to Pakistan”, January 4, 2018, at
https://www.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/ps/2018/01/276858.htm. (Accessed June 20,
2018). Also see “US Blocks
$255m Military Aid to Pak”, The Asian Age, January 3, 2017; Varghese K.
George, “Trump Regime Suspends Security Aid to Pakistan”, The Hindu,
January 6, 2018; and Li Hongmei, “What Trump’s Pakistan Policy Means
for China”, The Diplomat, April 18, 2018, at
https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/what-trumps-
pakistan-policy-means-for-china/. (Accessed May 21, 2018).
to Pakistan under the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) for FY 2017

was suspended by the US Department of Defense.6 As per the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2018, the release of 50
per cent of the CSF, amounting to US$ 350 million, will be contingent
on action against the Haqqani network.7 The provision to restrict
payments based on an assessment of Pakistan’s action against the
Haqqani network has been invoked since 2015. The US has, over
the years, tried to leverage its security aid and reimbursements to
Pakistan as and when it saw fit; and these decisions are reflective
of the US discontent with Pakistan.
Pakistan’s inclusion on the “grey list” on June 27, 2018 by the

Financial Action Task Force (FATF), of which the US was then
president and which makes it necessary for Pakistan to take
stringent steps against money laundering and financing of terrorism,8
has pushed Pakistan into a corner. Pakistan’s failure to show
adequate progress has resulted in continued pressure to ensure
compliance from the FATF, as was evident at the conclusion of
the plenary meeting held in Orlando on June 21, 2019. The
possibility of stringent action against individuals in the Pakistan
military and intelligence services suspected of supporting militants
cannot be ruled
6
Laura Koran, Michelle Kosinski and Ryan Browne, “US Suspends Security
Assistance to Pakistan”, CNN, January 8, 2018, at https://edition.cnn.com/
2018/01/04/politics/us-suspends-security-assistance-to-pakistan/index.html.
(Accessed June 20, 2018); and Hongmei, “What Trump’s Pakistan Policy
Means for China”, n. 5.
7
“US Committee Wants Riders on Aid to Pak”, The Asian Age, May 9, 2018;
and US Congress, “National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year
2018”, December 12, 2017 at
https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ91/PLAW- 115publ91.pdf
(Accessed June 20, 2018).
8
Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan Placed on FATF Grey List”, Dawn, June 28,
2018, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1416598 (Accessed July 6, 2018); also see
Usman Hayat and Shahid Karim, “Pakistan on FATF’s Grey List: What,
Why, and Why Now?”, Dawn, July 6, 2018, at
https://www.dawn.com/news/1418143/ (Accessed July 6, 2018).
8 | SUMITA KUMAR
out.9 The most striking feature of Pakistan’s relations with its old ally in
the last couple of years therefore is that the US has been estranged
from Pakistan; however, more recently, the US has fallen back on
Pakistan’s help to conduct peace negotiations with the Taliban.
Is the US Dispensable?
The responses from Pakistan to the statements from the US, were
partly predicated on the fact that with upcoming elections in July
2018, it became even more important for the civilian government
to show that it would not cower down under US anger. The
Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, at the outset
made it clear that leadership in Pakistan could not be expected to
“appease anyone” and that it would act keeping in mind the
country’s “national interest and national policy”.10 Despite the fact that
in the immediate aftermath of Trump’s speech some high-profile visits
of US officials to Pakistan had to be postponed at Pakistan’s
insistence, such meetings were slowly resumed, showing the
inability of Pakistan to disregard the US completely.
Statements emanating from Pakistan suggested that Pakistan

could do without financial assistance from the US. In fact, the
economic assistance to Pakistan as well as security aid provided
over the years by the US has reduced drastically as compared to
when Pakistan joined the US-led war on terror (see Table 1).
9
Dan De Luce, “Is Trump Ready to Dump Pakistan?”, Foreign Policy, March
26, 2018, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/26/is-trump-ready-to-
dump- pakistan/. (Accessed July 12, 2018).
10
Asad Hashim, “Pakistan in the Crosshairs of Trump’s Afghan Strategy”, Al
Jazeera, August 24, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/pakistan-
crosshairs-trump-afghan-strategy-170824052758366.html. (Accessed July 12,
2018).
Table 1: Direct Overt US Aid Appropriations for Pakistan

FY 2002–FY 2018
(in millions of dollars)
Programme FY FY FY FY FY FY FY Programme FY
or Account 2002 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 or Account 2018
–FY (est.) Total (req.)
2011
Total
Security- 5710 849 361 371 343 322 303 8259 134
related
Total
Economic- 7556 1067 834 608 561 246 223 11095 211
related
Total 13266 1916 1195 979 904 568 526 19354 345
Source: Available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf. (Accessed
July 12, 2018).
Note: Final obligation and disbursement totals often are lower than
programme account appropriations.
It is apparent from the given table that total security-related aid

averaged US$ 634 million in the nine-year period from 2002–11.
However, it has drastically reduced to US$ 134 million in 2018, a
drop of almost 80 per cent in less than 10 years. Similarly, economic-
related aid averaged US$ 839 million in the nine years from 2002–11
and dropped by 75 per cent in the period from 2011 to 2018, to
a figure of US$ 211 million.
While this may be so, Pakistan’s economy continues to be in dire

straits. Given the precarious balance-of-payments situation, along
with a widening current account deficit and dwindling foreign
exchange reserves evident at the end of FY 2017–18, a fall back to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) remained a possibility. Prime
Minister Imran Khan approached China, Saudi Arabia and United
Arab Emirates (UAE) for financial assistance. Though some help
has been forthcoming, it has not precluded the need to hold
prolonged negotiations with the IMF to ensure financial stability of
the country. Pakistan has finally had to agree to undertake
10 | SUMITA KUMAR
structural reforms of the Pakistan economy and accept strict

conditions put forth by the IMF in return for expected funds
amounting to US$ 6 billion to be disbursed over a little more
than three years. Pakistan’s dependence on the US will remain on
account of the latter’s considerable influence in international financial
institutions on which Pakistan relies for help in propping up its
faltering economy. While this is not the first time Pakistan has
been placed on the FATF “grey list”, how things eventually turn out
for Pakistan will depend on Pakistan’s compliance and the goodwill of
the US.
Pakistan has also been a major beneficiary of arms from the US

ever since it joined the US-led war on terror. These transfers have
included not only those used to combat terrorism and insurgency but
also those which are geared towards conventional warfare. Continued
intransigence on the part of Pakistan has already put highly valued
arms transfers, like that of additional F-16 fighter jets, on hold. While
the US arms exports to Pakistan have decreased since 2013, China
has continued to be Pakistan’s biggest arms supplier in the last
decade.11 Yet, this does not take away from the fact that Pakistan
would probably need to rely on the US for spares and for
maintenance of weapons of US origin.
Pakistan’s location makes it continually relevant for the US in the

latter’s attempts to stabilise Afghanistan. It remains a mainstay
for the US operations in Afghanistan on account of its ports and air
and land routes used for transporting supplies. Its importance on this
account can be gauged from the situation that arose after the NATO
attack on the Salala check post on November 26, 2011, after
which vital supply routes for NATO trucks crossing Pakistan’s
border into Afghanistan were closed for a prolonged period and
were only opened after an apology from the US. Pakistan’s
relevance came to the fore once again as President Trump wrote to
Prime Minister Imran Khan in December 2018 seeking Pakistan’s
help
11
Pieter D. Wezeman, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Nan Tian and Siemon
T. Wezeman, “SIPRI Fact Sheet: Trends in International Arms Transfers,
2017”, March 2018, p. 9, at
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/
fssipri_at2017_0.pdf. (Accessed July 12, 2018).
to bring about a peace settlement in Afghanistan. Of course,

dependence on Pakistan could lessen if US plans to reduce
American troops in Afghanistan by half leads up to an
eventual exit of US troops.
As has been evident on earlier occasions, the US willingness

to accommodate Pakistani interests became apparent when provisions in
the NDAA 2018 were narrowed down to only include action
against the Haqqani Network to qualify for release of US aid to
Pakistan, rather than it being contingent on action taken against the
LeT also, as was earlier envisaged.12 This underscores the fact that
Pakistan is able to negotiate favourably with the US on matters
where the interests of both the countries do not conflict. The US has
acted on Pakistan’s demands for help in reigning in the Pakistani
Taliban, an example of which is the killing of Mullah Fazlullah in
a drone strike in June 2018.
Given the US interests in the region, the US will continue to play

an important role in negotiating peace in Afghanistan, which
makes it imperative for Pakistan to keep its relationship with the
US intact. Also, Pakistan continues to hope that US will use its
influence with India to convince it to take a softer stance vis-à-vis
Pakistan. Hence, the challenge for Pakistan will be how to continue
to deal with the US so that it is not denied the benefits that flow
from its relationship with America and yet it does not yield to
American pressure. America’s inescapable involvement with Pakistan as
it seeks security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and restraint in the latter’s
nuclear and missile programmes, as well as the traditionally strong
ties between the Pentagon and the military in Pakistan, all are likely
to enable Pakistan to do just that. Meanwhile, it remains to be seen
whether the momentum of talks with the Taliban, which has picked up
with Zalmay Khalilzad at the helm, succeeds in bringing about a
settlement satisfactory to the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
12
Anwar Iqbal, “Trump Signs Bill that Includes $700m Reimbursement
for Pakistan”, Dawn, December 14, 2017, at
https://www.dawn.com/news/print/ 1376517. (Accessed July 12, 2018);
and “US Bill Delinks LeT from Haqqani Network”, Dawn, November 14,
2017, at https://www.dawn.com/news/ 1370332. (Accessed July 12,
2018).
12 | SUMITA KUMAR
EXCESSIVE DEPENDENCE ON CHINA

Alienated from the US and condemned by various other countries
for supporting terrorism, Pakistan has tended to increasingly rely on
China to be bailed out of its diplomatic and economic travails. Not
only has China repeatedly sprung to Pakistan’s support and
commended it for its actions against terrorism in the face of
international opprobrium, it has until recently, also blocked India’s
attempts to get the chief of Pakistan-backed JeM, Masood Azhar,
designated as a terrorist at the United Nations (UN). China’s
opposition to India’s inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group on the
plea that a formula should be evolved which would take into
account possible membership of other non-Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) members obviously caters to Pakistan’s concerns on this
account. Pakistan’s traditional reliance on China for nuclear weapons
and missile capability, along with military hardware, has become
even more entrenched with the transfer of advanced weapons and
co-production. For instance, the Pakistan Air Force’s operational
capabilities have undoubtedly been enhanced by the induction of the
JF-17 multi-role fighters jointly built by Pakistan and China.
Pakistan’s defence capabilities can be expected to improve further in
the light of reports that a special economic zone would be set
up for producing a new generation of fighter jets in Pakistan. It is
expected that the two countries will work together to build navigation
and radar systems and on-board weapons.13
China’s initiative to finance the $57 billion (later billed to be $62
billion) CPEC has meant the deep involvement of China in
developing infrastructure of Pakistan, helping it mitigate its energy
crisis and giving a boost to its economic growth. One of the key
indicators of this is China’s quantum of investment in Pakistan which
has grown from US$ 695.8 million in 2013–14 to more than US$ 1.5
billion in 2017–18 (see Table 2). This assumes greater significance
when compared with the US investment which decreased from US$
212.1 million in 2013–14 to US$ 92.3 million
13
Maria Abi-Habib, “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Plan in Pakistan Takes a
Military Turn”, The New York Times, December 19, 2018, at
https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/12/19/world/asia/pakistan-china-belt-road-
military.html. (Accessed January 4, 2019).
in 2017–18. China’s total direct investment in Pakistan amounted to US$

4.8 billion in the five-year period from July 2013 to June 2018. Again, this
becomes more noteworthy when compared to the total amount of US$
586.1 million that the US invested in the same period.
Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China and the

US to Pakistan
Year FDI in (US$ million) FDI in (US$ million)
July–June China US
2013–14 695.8 212.1
2014–15 319.1 223.9
2015–16 1063.6 13.2
2016–17 1211.7 44.6
2017–18 1585.8 92.3
Total 4876.0 586.1
Source: Government of Pakistan, Board of Investment, Foreign
Investment, at http://boi.gov.pk/ForeignInvestmentinPakistan.aspx. (Accessed
September 3, 2018).
The data clearly indicates that while the US has been an important
source of FDI in Pakistan in earlier years, US investors are not only
keeping away from new investments but are also moving out.14 One
of the reasons is Pakistan’s dismal security situation coupled with the
ongoing energy crisis which has made foreign companies wary of
investing in the country. Yet, given its long-term strategic interests,
China has continued to increase its stakes in the country. According
to the Islamabad-based Security and
14
“Other Countries Pull Out, China Increases Investment in Pakistan”, The
Express Tribune, June 18, 2016, at
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1124973/countries- pull-china-increases-
investment-pakistan/ (Accessed July 2, 2018); also see “US Investors Pull
Out as FDI Drops 24%”, The Express Tribune, November 18, 2015, at
https://tribune.com.pk/story/993402/july-october-us-investors-pull- out-as-
fdi-drops-24/. (Accessed July 2, 2018).
14 | SUMITA KUMAR
Exchange Commission, 77 Chinese companies were registered in

Pakistan in 2017.15
The increasing Chinese presence in different spheres of Pakistan’s

economy indicates China’s growing leverage with Pakistan. An
aspect of this is Pakistan’s burgeoning trade deficit with China
which is indicative of the imbalance in the economic relationship
between the two countries. The trade deficit of US$ 6.65 billion
during the period July 2016–January 2017 grew to US$ 7.1 billion
during July 2017–January 2018 (see Table 3). This remains a thorny
issue in relations between the two countries as numerous
negotiations on terms of trade thus far have not yielded
substantive outcomes. While the second phase of the Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with China was signed on April 28, 2019 during
Prime Minister Khan’s visit to China for the Second Belt and Road
Forum it remains to be seen whether its implementation will redress
the trade imbalance.
Table 3: Exports and Imports of Pakistan (US$)
Country July 2017- US$ July 2016- US$

January January
2018 2017
Pakistan Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance
to China from of Trade to China from of Trade
China China
779.92 7.88 (7.10 783.60 7.43 (6.65
million billion billion) million billion billion)
Source: Data taken from Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of
Statistics, at
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/tables/14.07_0.pdf and
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/tables/14.06_0.pdf (Accessed
September 3, 2018).
15
Ismail Dilawar, “China, Not US, is Pakistan’s New Best Friend if You Go
by these Investment Numbers”, April 13, 2017, Bloomberg, at
https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/chinas-
silk-road- push-in-pakistan-edges-out-us-
investments/articleshow/58159546.cms. (Accessed July 2, 2018).
Another aspect of Chinese involvement is China’s loan of US$ 1

billion to give a fillip to Pakistan’s falling foreign currency reserves in
June 2018. This highlights Pakistan’s increasing dependence on
China for extricating it from difficult economic situations. It is
interesting to note that Pakistan had already received US$ 1.5
billion in bilateral loans and US$ 2.9 billion in commercial bank
loans, primarily from Chinese banks, from July 2017 to May 2018.16
However, the outcome of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to China
in November 2018 raises doubts about the extent to which China
would be willing to help extricate Pakistan from its difficult financial
situation.
Given the Chinese largesse, Pakistan needs to be on constant alert

about ceding too much ground to China. This was apparent in
November 2017 when Pakistan, though desperate for funding to
construct the Diamer- Bhasha Dam located in Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir (PoK), was forced to pull out this dam from the CPEC
framework after the Chinese imposed conditions pertaining to
“ownership of the project, operation and maintenance cost, and
securitisation” of the project which were unpalatable to Pakistan.17 At
the diplomatic level too, China has tried to help develop greater
understanding between the leadership of Pakistan and Afghanistan and
has offered its assistance towards peace and reconciliation in
Afghanistan. It is willing to work together with Pakistan and
Afghanistan to extend the CPEC to Afghanistan as well.
Is Pakistan being Colonised by China?
A question being raised by Pakistani analysts is whether too
much dependence on China at the cost of relations with other
countries is going to compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty and
eventually make it look like China’s colony, to deliver it strategic and
economic gains more than to Pakistan. When the idea of the CPEC
was first floated, it heralded great hopes of improving the
economy. It was supposed to not only help
16
“China Lends $1bn to Pakistan to Boost Plummeting Forex Reserves”,
Dawn, July 1, 2018, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1417181. (Accessed July 2,
2018).
17
Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan Stops Bid to Include Diamer-Bhasha Dam in
CPEC”, The Express Tribune, November 15, 2017, at
https://tribune.com.pk/story/ 1558475/2-pakistan-stops-bid-include-diamer-
bhasha-dam-cpec/. (Accessed July 2, 2018).
16 | SUMITA KUMAR
increase growth, and increase the supply of energy, but also create
jobs. While it has brought large amounts of foreign investment into
the country, the question that perturbs many is whether the Pakistan
economy is going to be crippled by heavy debt instead. The
projects are being funded by Chinese banks through low-interest or
interest-free loans. Yet, many times, the interest rates are higher
than those of the World Bank or IMF. The expectation that the
extensive construction activity undertaken for putting in place
massive infrastructure would provide huge job opportunities for
those in Pakistan did not fructify as Chinese firms prefer to employ
labour from their own country. There has also been concern about
the lack of transparency about the details, terms and financing of
many of the energy and infrastructure projects.
There are fears that the projects may leave Pakistan with
unserviceable debt which may, in turn, force Pakistan to yield to
Chinese demands at the cost of its sovereignty. For instance, the
Gwadar Port has been leased to the China Overseas Port Holding
Co. on a build, operate and transfer model over a period of 40
years. It gets a whopping 91 per cent of the revenue collected
from operations.18 There are apprehensions that in the future, a
debt-ridden Pakistan may be drawn into a web similar to that drawn
by the Chinese around Sri Lanka in the Hambantota Port deal.19
18
“Gwadar Port Revenue Sharing Formula Revealed: China 91%, Pakistan
9%”, Balochistan Voices, November 28, 2017, at
http://balochistanvoices.com/2017/ 11/gwadar-port-revenue-sharing-
formula-revealed-china-91-pakistan-9/ (Accessed July 12, 2018); and
“China will Receive 91 pc Revenue from Gwadar Port for 40 Years”,
Pakistan Today, November 25, 2017, at https://
profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/11/25/china-will-receive-91pc-revenues-
from-gwadar-port-for-40-years/. (Accessed July 12, 2018).
19
While the Chinese willingly gave loans for the development of this port, the
Sri Lankan Government was forced to ask for rescheduling of payments
as it was mired in debts. Eventually, Sri Lanka was forced to give up
control over the Hambantota Port and surrounding areas to China in
exchange for debt relief. It is interesting to note that in the interim period,
the Sri Lankan Government, when faced with a huge debt burden and
difficulties in paying back the Chinese, had to turn to the IMF for rescue.
See Khurram Husain, “Lessons of Hambantota”, Dawn, June 28, 2018,
at https://www.dawn.com/news/1416611. (Accessed July 12, 2018); and
Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port”, The New
York Times, June 25, 2018, at https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html (Accessed July 12, 2018).
While the Chinese involvement in infrastructure projects, including

power plants, roads, railways, ports and airports, has been much
discussed and publicised, there are other aspects of potential
Chinese involvement in Pakistan which are less known. For
instance, in the agricultural sector, it is planned that Pakistan will
lease large tracts of land to the Chinese. The Chinese will be
allowed to run their own farms and processing facilities, and loans
would be made available for the purpose from the Chinese
government and the China Development Bank.20 According to the
CPEC long-term plan unveiled by Dawn, a leading daily newspaper in
Pakistan, in June 2017, the Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps will bring mechanisation and scientific techniques to help in
livestock breeding and agriculture in Pakistan. For China, the aim is to
develop Kashgar Prefecture, a poverty-ridden region within Xinjiang.
While Chinese companies may bring better techniques which may
benefit agriculture in Pakistan, there is concern that Pakistan may
give up too much in return.21
A deep penetration of the industry in Pakistan is also on the anvil.

The western and north-western zone have been earmarked for
mineral extraction, with potential for exploring chrome ore, gold
reserves and diamonds. The central zone is considered fit for
cooperation in textiles, household appliances and cement. In the
southern zone, the plan envisages development of petrochemical, iron
and steel, harbour industry, engineering machinery, trade processing
and auto and assembly of auto parts. Out of all potential areas of
cooperation mentioned, if one looks more closely at China’s interest
in the textile industry, it really pertains to procuring cheap raw
material like yarn and coarse cloth from Pakistan so as to develop
the textiles and garments industry in Kashgar by employing the
surplus labour available.22
20
Andrew McCormick, “Is Pakistan Agriculture Ready for CPEC?”, The
Diplomat, May 17, 2018, at https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/is-pakistani-
agriculture- ready-for-cpec/. (Accessed July 12, 2018). Also see Khurram
Husain, “Exclusive: CPEC Master Plan Revealed”, Dawn, June 21, 2017, at
https://www.dawn.com/ news/1333101 (Accessed July12, 2018).
21
Husain, “Exclusive: CPEC Master Plan Revealed”, n.20; and McCormick,
“Is Pakistan Agriculture Ready for CPEC?”, n. 20.
22
Husain, “Exclusive: CPEC Master Plan Revealed”, n. 20.
18 | SUMITA KUMAR
China has been claiming that the CPEC is mainly an economic

project and one which would allow China to trade with West
Asian and African countries through shorter and less costly
shipping routes. It would also give it access to exit routes
independent of the existing chokepoints for its shipping in the East.
However, over the years, there has been enough speculation about
Gwadar being developed for strategic military purposes by China.
There have been suggestions recently that if Gwadar does not
become an economically sustainable venture, it is possible that it
may become a naval outpost for China. There are reports that
China may “expand its marine corps and station new marine
brigades in Gwadar.”23 Furthermore, there is speculation that Pakistan
may allow China to establish a new military base on the Jiwani
Peninsula which is located between Gwadar and the Iranian border.
According to a Washington Times report, Jiwani would provide joint
naval and air facilities for Chinese forces. Pakistan has
apparently been asked to undertake development of the existing
airport which would then have the capacity to handle large military
aircraft.24 Although China has officially denied such reports,25 if
things proceed as suggested, Pakistan would be enabling China not
only to protect its shipping lanes—as Jiwani is close to the Strait of
Hormuz on the Persian Gulf—but the possibility of the base being
used for intelligence purposes remains.
23
C. Christine Fair, “Pakistan Can’t Afford China’s ‘Friendship’”, Foreign
Policy, July 3, 2017, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/03/pakistan-cant-
afford- chinas-friendship/. (Accessed July 15, 2018).
24
Bill Gertz, “China Building Military Base in Pakistan”, The Washington Times,
January 3, 2018, at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/3/china-
plans- pakistan-military-base-at-jiwani/. (Accessed July 15, 2018). Also see “China’s
Second Overseas Naval Base to be in Pakistan?”, The New Indian Express, January
9, 2018, at http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2018/jan/09/chinas-
second- overseas-naval-base-to-be-in-pakistan-1748554.html. (Accessed July
15, 2018).
25
“China Denies Plans to Set Up Military Base in Jiwani in Pakistan’s
Balochistan”, LiveMint, January 9, 2018, at
https://www.livemint.com/Politics/ stB8WVXUBhca96JR3YtvKP/China-
denies-plans-to-set-up-military-base-at- Jiwani-in-Paki.html (Accessed July 15,
2018); and “China Dismisses Speculations of Military Base near
Gwadar”, Dawn, January 10, 2018, at https://
www.dawn.com/news/1381843. (Accessed July 15, 2018).
While Pakistan has been relying on China for diplomatic support

at international forums, it may eventually become difficult for
China to continue to back Pakistan on the issue of terrorism for
fears that its image may become tarnished internationally. For
instance, the statement that emerged at the Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa (BRICS) summit held in Xiamen, Fujian
province, China, in September 2017, made a mention of four
terrorist groups banned by the UN and which are considered
threats to regional security but are active in Pakistan. Again, China
had no recourse but to give in at the FATF meeting which included
Pakistan in the “grey list”. At the plenary meeting held on February
20, 2018 in Paris, China was one of the countries which was
opposed to Pakistan being placed on the watch list. Yet, it withdrew
its opposition in the second meeting held on February 22, 2018 as it
could no longer garner the support required to stall the move.26 In
June 2018, Pakistan was officially included in the “grey list” of the
FATF. Most recently, China was forced to accede to concerted
pressure by the US, United Kingdom (UK) and France, finally
paving the way for Masood Azhar to be listed as a global terrorist
by the UN Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee on May 1,
2019.
In a country that has over the years been losing foreign investment
due to uncertain security conditions, the additional stigma of being on
the FATF list is likely to make it even less attractive as a destination
for investors. If Pakistan fails to take satisfactory steps, then
member countries of the FATF could influence international lending
agencies to squeeze loans to Pakistan. China’s support in the case
of Masood Azhar has earned wide disapproval. In the future, if
China is constrained to yield, like it did at BRICS, at the FATF,
and at the UN what will be Pakistan’s recourse? Pakistan is
becoming more and more dependent on China to help weather its
problems. Yet, in the future, Pakistan could be in an unenviable
position as China faces resistance of most countries of the Indo-
Pacific region due to its assertiveness.
26
“China Says ‘Highly Recognises’ Pakistan’s Efforts Against Terror
Financing”, Dawn, February 27, 2018, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1392085.
(Accessed July 15, 2018).
20 | SUMITA KUMAR
PEACE OVERTURES TO AFGHANISTAN

In the last couple of years, Pakistan has made attempts to normalise
relations with Afghanistan. As is well known, Pakistan’s policy towards
Afghanistan is determined by its desire to acquire strategic depth
by installing a government which is fully or partially controlled by
it. That explains Pakistan’s determination to fully support the
Afghan Taliban in a bid to enable it to capture power in
Afghanistan. This endeavour of Pakistan was being obstructed by
the US which perceived the Taliban as the primary source of
terrorist threats to American interests.
The usual clamour from the US asking Pakistan to help stabilise the
situation in Afghanistan was joined by influential voices from China
encouraging Pakistan to patch up things with Afghanistan. The
context was the prevailing highly vitiated atmosphere between the
two countries after the initial attempts at developing a better
understanding with Pakistan by President Ashraf Ghani came to
naught. Ashraf Ghani slowly became critical of Pakistan and made it
clear that he expected Pakistan to deal with the safe havens for the
Taliban within Pakistani territory. Pakistan was finally forced to
respond at the prodding of China for whom ensuring the stability
of Afghanistan has become an important consideration given its
need to safeguard its investments in Afghanistan and the
momentum of its connectivity initiatives.
Discussions between the leadership of China, Pakistan and

Afghanistan on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) summit in Beijing in June 2017 focused on
the need for more cooperation on counter-terrorism and the
revival of the Afghan peace process. This was soon followed up by
the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Kabul and
Islamabad, during which it was proposed to set up a trilateral
mechanism which would enable cooperation aimed at peace
and reconciliation in Afghanistan and coordination on counter-
terrorism between Pakistan and Afghanistan.27 This proposal was
formalised at the foreign minister-level trilateral dialogue held in
Beijing on December 26,
27
“China Begins Push for Pak-Afghan Détente”, Dawn, June 25, 2017, at https://
2017.28 The second ministerial dialogue was held at Kabul on

December 15, 2018 where the three parties agreed to “continue”
working towards “building mutual trust” and reiterated their
“support” for “reconciliation, development cooperation and
connectivity, security cooperation and counter-terrorism.”29 A
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Counter-Terrorism
Cooperation was also signed.30
At the bilateral level too, Pakistan’s inclination to improve relations

with Afghanistan became apparent. The NSC, in a meeting in
August 2017, made known its resolve “to work…with the people
and government of Afghanistan for removal of all irritants.”31 The
multiple exchange of visits and meetings held between the political,
military and intelligence leaders and officials of the two countries over
the months were an attestation of the improved environment for
dialogue that had been created. Pakistan also repeatedly projected
its efforts towards fencing and installing check posts on the border
with Afghanistan as an example of its commitment towards
improving the security situation.32 Yet, the tenuous nature of the
working relationship was evident as Afghanistan accused Pakistan
of conducting air strikes within its territory and Pakistan, in turn,
accused Afghanistan of conducting cross-border raids on
Pakistani posts.33
28
“China Hosts Meeting to Improve Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations”, Xinhua,
December 26, 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/26/
c_136853473.htm. (Accessed July 15, 2018).
29
“Text of Joint Statement of the 2nd Afghanistan–China–Pakistan Foreign
Ministers’ Dialogue”, Kabul, December 15, 2018, at
https://www.mfa.gov.af/ news/joint-statement-of-the-2nd-afghanistan-china-
pakistan-foreign-ministers’- dialogue. (Accessed January10, 2019).
30
Ibid.
31
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Top Security Body Wants Ties with Kabul
Normalised”, Dawn, August 17, 2017, at
https://www.dawn.com/news/1352079. (Accessed July 15, 2018).
32
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “‘Steady Progress’ being Made in Afghan Border Fencing”,
Dawn, June 21, 2017, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1340860. (Accessed July 18,
2018).
33
“Islamabad, Kabul Trade Charges Ahead of Abbasi’s Visit”, Dawn, April
6, 2018, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1399878/islamabad-kabul-
trade- charges-ahead-of-abbasis-visit (Accessed July 18, 2018); and “Foreign
Office Deplores Attacks from Across Afghan Border”, Dawn, April 13,
2018, at https:/
/www.dawn.com/news/1399878/islamabad-kabul-trade-charges-ahead-of-
abbasis-visit. (Accessed July 18, 2018).
22 | SUMITA KUMAR
Continuing strains in the relationship have been exemplified by

Afghanistan’s anger over Prime Minister Imran Khan’s remarks in
March 2019 that forming an interim Afghan government would help
the talks between the US and the Taliban.
The inaugural meetings of the five working groups under the

Afghanistan and Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity
(APAPPS) were held in Kabul on July 22, 2018. While a whole
gamut of issues, including counter-terrorism and security, peace
and reconciliation, bilateral trade and transit, connectivity and the
repatriation of Afghan refugees, are being dealt with under this
framework,34 it remains to be seen whether the commitments
undertaken by the two countries help to assuage each other’s
concerns.
Complexities in Afghanistan’s Response
The US forces in Afghanistan stepped up operations and air strikes
against the Taliban in consonance with President Trump’s policy
announced in August 2017. Yet, there were ample indications
about the staying power of the Taliban and their increasing
control over large parts of Afghan territory. According to a report
by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR), as on January 31, 2018, 229 districts were under the
control of the Afghan government (about 56.3 per cent of the
country), 59 districts were under rebel control (approximately 14.5
per cent of the country) and 119 districts (about 29.2 per cent)
were contested.35 Besides, the Taliban staged high-profile terrorist
incidents throughout the country, showing themselves to be a major
threat to peace and stability in Afghanistan. Such a scenario seems
to have convinced the US that it was not going to be able to
dislodge the Taliban so easily. There
34
“Inaugural Session of the APAPPS Working Groups—Kabul 22 July 2018”,
Press Release, Embassy of Pakistan, Kabul, July 23, 2018, at http://
www.pakembassykabul.org/en/inaugural-session-of-the-apapps-working- groups-
kabul-22-july-2018/. (Accessed July 27, 2018).
35
Alia Chughtai, “Afghanistan: Who Controls What”, Al Jazeera, June 5, 2018,
at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/afghanistan-
controls-160823083528213.html. (Accessed July 18, 2018).
has been evidence of China and Russia also wanting to recognise

the reality of the Taliban being a dominant power and wanting to do
business with them. Lately, both the countries have been actively
involved in various negotiating processes with the Taliban. Both the
countries have also supported the US efforts towards building
peace and a consensus on the importance of an intra-Afghan
dialogue is visible in the joint statement agreed on by
representatives of the three countries on April 25, 2019.36
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made efforts to draw the Taliban

into talks in the backdrop of the unremitting violence at the
beginning of 2018. The incentives offered by him at an international
conference in Kabul in February 201837 did not immediately evoke a
favourable response from the Taliban leadership, even though he was
willing to accord various political concessions to them. Implicit in this
offer was the assumption that if the Taliban agreed to talks, they
would have to give recognition to the Afghan government and abide
by the law.38 The Taliban instead expressed their preference to
talk to the US.39
The Taliban went on to announce their spring offensive in April

2018.40 In the midst of heavy fighting, Ashraf Ghani unilaterally
announced a ceasefire
36
US Department of State, “Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting on
Afghan Peace Process”, April 26, 2019 at https://www.state.gov/joint-
statement-on- trilateral-meeting-on-afghan-peace-process/ (Accessed
May 10, 2019).
37
This was during the second meeting of the Kabul Process for Peace and
Security Cooperation in Afghanistan. “Ghani Makes Taliban an Offer to
Join Peace Process”, Tolo News, February 28, 2018, at
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/ ghani-makes-taliban-offer-join-peace-
process. (Accessed July 20, 2018).
38
Hamid Shalizi and James Mackenzie, “Afghanistan’s Ghani Offers Talks ‘Without
Preconditions’”, Reuters, February 28, 2018, at
https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-afghanistan-taliban/afghanistans-ghani-
offers-talks-with-taliban-without- preconditions-idUSKCN1GC0J0.
39
Memphis Barker and Julian Borger, “Taliban Publish Letter Calling on US to
Start Afghan Peace Talks”, The Guardian, February 14, 2018, at
https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/taliban-publish-letter-
calling-us- start-afghan-peace-talks. (Accessed July 20, 2018).
40
James Mackenzie, “Taliban Announce Spring Offensive, Dismisses
Peace Overtures”, Reuters, April 25, 2018, at
https://in.reuters.com/article/afghanistan- taliban/taliban-announce-spring-
offensive-dismisses-peace-overtures- idINKBN1HW0RW. (Accessed July
20, 2018).
24 | SUMITA KUMAR
during Eid celebrations.41 The Taliban’s unanimous support for the

ceasefire raised hopes that negotiations could pave the way forward.
Building upon progress signified by the first day of peaceful
ceasefire, Ghani reiterated that his government was ready for
“comprehensive peace and talks”. He even showed willingness to
discuss what has been a major stumbling block in initiating peace
talks with the Taliban, that is, “the future role of international
troops” in the country. The US military officials offered to “support,
facilitate and participate” in such talks.42
Several rounds of peace talks have been held over the years.
Pakistan’s importance as a facilitator in talks with the Taliban is well
recognised. Equally well understood is its propensity to derail any
negotiations which are inimical to its interests. For instance, before
the Afghan Government and the Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani
Baradar could have substantive talks in 2010, he was detained by
the intelligence services of Pakistan in a joint operation with the
CIA. Again, as peace talks between the Afghan Government and
the Taliban got off the ground in July 2015, the news of the death of
Mullah Omar Abdullah, who had died much earlier, was revealed
and the next round of peace talks was postponed.43 Questions were
also raised about the legitimacy of the representatives involved in
the talks. Omar Abdullah’s successor, Mullah Mansour, was killed
in a
41
“Afghanistan Announces Ceasefire with Taliban for Eid”, Dawn, June 7,
2018, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1412613. (Accessed July 20,
2018).
42
Pamela Constable with Sayed Salahuddin, “Afghanistan Extends Cease-fire
with Taliban as Fighters Celebrate Eid with Civilians”, The Washington Post,
June 16, 2018, at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghan- government-
extends-cease-fire-with-taliban-as-fighters-join-civilians-to-celebrate-
eid/2018/06/16/a3fcecce-7170-11e8-b4d8-eaf78d4c544c_story.html?utm
_term=.876abc7a6d1b. (Accessed July 20, 2018).
43
Ahmad Bilal Khalil, “The Tangled History of the Afghanistan–India–Pakistan
Triangle”, The Diplomat, December 16, 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/
12/the-tangled-history-of-the-afghanistan-india-pakistan-triangle/ (Accessed
July 20, 2018); and Pamela Constable with Sayed Salahuddin, “Omar’s Death
Revelation could Divide Militants, Undermine Peace Talks”, The Washington
Post, July 29, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-
officials-prepare-comment-amid-reports-of-taliban-leader-death/2015/07/29/
a60a6396-35d9-11e5-b673-1df005a0fb28_stor y.html?utm_ter m=.
b6bc6ae17ae8. (Accessed July 20, 2018).
drone strike by the US in May 2016 as there were doubts about

his willingness to take part in peace negotiations.44 Peace talks
were held between the Taliban and the Afghan Government in
Qatar after Mullah Mansour was killed.45 In January 2018, a
delegation from Qatar, which had the approval of the Taliban
leader Mullah Akhundzada, visited Islamabad for discussions on
restarting negotiations for peace.46 The release of Mullah Baradar in
October 2018 was expected to help facilitate the peace process
and he was later made head of the Taliban political office in Doha,
Qatar.
Pakistan got an opportunity to play its most coveted role as the

unavoidable peacemaker in Afghanistan when President Trump
wrote to Imran Khan in December 2018 to help in negotiating a peace
settlement with the Taliban. Pakistan agreed to the US request and
participated in various rounds of talks. Although details of these
talks are not fully known, the specific information made known to
the public after the talks in Qatar in January 2019 was that the US
has agreed to withdraw its troops in return for guarantees by the
Taliban not to give shelter to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups like
the Islamic State (IS). The US tried to persuade the Taliban to talk
to the Afghan Government as well, to which the Taliban did not
agree. An agreement on a ceasefire was also one of the critical
components of the negotiations. The crisp statement made by
Zalmay Khalilzad after the talks was: “Nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed.”47 This can be
44
Jon Boone and Sune Engel Rasmussen, “US Drone Strike in Pakistan
Kills Taliban Leader Mullah Mansoor”, The Guardian, May 22, 2016, at
https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/21/us-airstrike-taliban-
leader- mullah-akhtar-mansoor. (Accessed July 20, 2018).
45
James Rothwell, Mohammad Zubair Khan and Bilal Sarwary, “Taliban Holds
‘Informal’ Peace Talks with Afghanistan”, The Telegraph, October 18, 2016, at
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/18/taliban-holds-informal-
peace-talks-with-afghanistan/. (Accessed July 20, 2018).
46
“Taliban Leader ‘Approved’ Islamabad Meeting on Peace Talks”, Tolo
News, January 18, 2018, at https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/taliban-
leader-
%E2%80%98approved%E2%80%99-islamabad-meeting-peace-talks. (Accessed
July 20, 2018).
47
Siyar Sirat, “Nothing is Agreed until Everything is Agreed: Khalilzad”, Tolo
News, January 27, 2019, at https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/khalilzad-
says-%E2%80%98nothing-agreed-%E2%80%99-qatar. (Accessed February 7, 2019).
26 | SUMITA KUMAR
interpreted to mean that differences still remain on certain vital

issues between the US and the Taliban. However, the fact that the
talks have continued (seven rounds of direct talks have taken place
between the US and the Taliban) to be held does mean that there is
a certain degree of seriousness on the part of all parties and
Pakistan will continue to be relevant to this negotiating process.
Even though Pakistan has been a participant in peace negotiations
being held at multiple forums in Doha, Moscow and other places, it
is obvious that it is giving due importance to the US–Taliban talks.
Pakistan even hosted a conference for a large number of Afghan

politicians and tribal elders on June 22, 2019 in an attempt to
bolster the peace process. This was soon followed by the visit of
President Ashraf Ghani to Pakistan on June 27-28, 2019 at the
invitation of Pakistan and a wide range of issues were discussed. In
this context, it cannot be ruled out that Pakistan may be involved in
behind-the-scene consultations with the Afghan Government so as to
ensure that, in any final settlement, Pakistan’s interests are taken
care of by whoever captures power in Afghanistan.
The Taliban have not only rebuffed President Ghani’s offer of talks
with the Afghan Government, but they launched their spring offensive
on April 12, 2019. An expected summit between the Taliban and
Afghan officials to be held in Doha in the third week of April
fell through over who should participate in the talks. A Loya Jirga
was held in Kabul over four days beginning on April 29, 2019 to
build domestic consensus on the peace process. Further, the
Taliban rejected President Ghani’s offer of a ceasefire made in early
May this year. Developments such as these again indicate the
enormous complexities that still underlie Pakistan’s endeavours to
bring about a favourable outcome of its strategy vis-à-vis
Afghanistan.
STALEMATE WITH INDIA

India–Pakistan relations have been deadlocked for nearly three years.
There has been no dialogue on critical issues plaguing the two
countries, nor has there been any initiative taken by Pakistan in
response to India’s demands that credible action should be taken
against those responsible for the Mumbai attack of November 2008
and anti-India terrorist activity on its soil should be stopped.
Under the government of Prime Minister Modi, India had started

with great hope of improving relations with Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif
’s visit to Delhi at the swearing in of Modi in May 2014 and
subsequent occasional meetings between the two leaders and
other senior officials in the years 2014 and 2015 had raised the
possibility of progress on contentious issues. It was in that spirit that
Prime Minister Modi landed unscheduled in Lahore on December 25,
2015 to join the birthday celebrations of Nawaz Sharif.
The attack on the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot by a Pakistan-

based terrorist organisation—JeM—on January 2, 2016 came as a
rude shock to India. This attack on a high-value security target was
deemed by India as a serious violation of India’s sovereignty. It was
obvious that the establishment in Pakistan, without whose
acquiescence such attacks cannot take place, was not in a mood to
allow any improvement of relations with India. The anger that
was aroused in India as a result was compounded by the fact that
while India allowed Pakistan’s joint investigation team to visit the site
of the terrorist attack, Pakistan denied permission to the National
Investigation Agency (NIA) from India to visit Pakistan to further
probe evidence about the involvement of the suspected
terrorists.48
This incident derailed the momentum built as a consequence of

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ’s positive response to Prime
Minister Modi’s initiatives. The immediate fallout of the attack was
that it disrupted the comprehensive bilateral dialogue which was to
be held at the foreign secretary level in January 2016.
Any hopes of improvement in ties were further doomed by the

strike by JeM terrorists on the Indian Army camp at Uri on
September 18, 2016. India retaliated by conducting surgical strikes
on a number of launch pads across the Line of Control (LoC) on
September 29. This was a well- considered move by India to
convey a message that continued cross- border attacks by Pakistan
supported militants will no longer be tolerated
48
“Pakistan Makes it Official, Says No to NIA Visit to Probe Pathankot
Attack”, News18, April 7, 2016, at
https://www.news18.com/news/india/pakistan- backstabs-india-on-
pathankot-attack-probe-says-no-to-nia-visit-1226754.html. (Accessed, July
30, 2018).
28 | SUMITA KUMAR
and Pakistan will have to pay a heavy price for that. The
consequence was a highly raised level of tension between the two
countries, further reducing the chances of a dialogue. Even though
Pakistan continued to deny that any Indian strike took place across
the border in its territory, the Pakistani reaction was angry and
hostile.
Pakistan felt the heat of India’s tough diplomatic messaging with the
boycott of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) summit to be held in Islamabad in November 2016.
Pakistan’s discomfort became all the more acute as five more
members, apart from India, decided to boycott the SAARC
summit in protest against Pakistan’s policy of supporting terrorism.
Pakistan had no choice but to cancel the summit. As relations
nosedived, staff from the missions in both the countries were
recalled over charges of being involved in espionage activities.
Both countries also blamed each other for harassment of diplomats
and staffers of their respective missions. Pakistan continuously denied
consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav, an Indian national charged
with allegedly spying for India.
There were occasional efforts on both sides to engage at

appropriate levels in order to diffuse tensions. For instance, a
meeting was held in Bangkok on December 26, 2017 between the
national security advisers (NSAs) of both countries and the issue of
cross-border terrorism was discussed.49 Earlier, on November 10, a
meeting was held at Wagah– Attari border at the director general
(DG) level between the Rangers Sindh and the Border Security
Force.50
Pakistan occasionally expressed a desire to talk to India to break

the stalemate. For instance, the Pakistan Army chief suggested in
April 2018
49
“India, Pakistan NSAs Met in Bangkok; From Terror Talks to Cross
Border Issues, Here is All You Want to Know”, Financial Express, January
12, 2018, at https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/india-pakistan-
nsas-met-in- bangkok-from-terror-talks-to-cross-border-issues-here-is-all-
you-want-to- know/1011662/. (Accessed July 30, 2018).
50
A.G. Noorani, “Pak-India Relations”, Dawn, January 6, 2018, at https://
that “the route to peaceful resolution of Pak-India disputes—

including the core issue of Kashmir—runs through comprehensive
and meaningful dialogue.”51 Yet, there was no sign of Pakistan
taking action against the LeT, which was responsible for the
Mumbai attacks, or JeM, which was responsible for the
Pathankot attack.
The admission by former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif

in a statement on May 11, 2018 that Pakistan had played a role in
the Mumbai attacks52 only served the purpose of infuriating Pakistan’s
military, thereby negating any chances of a dialogue with India. The
Indian position on the revival of a comprehensive dialogue was
reiterated by Sushma Swaraj, the then External Affairs Minister of
India, in May 2018: “We are always ready for talks with Pakistan but
a caveat that terror and talks cannot go together…There cannot be a
comprehensive dialogue till Pakistan shuns terror.”53 This position of
the Indian Government has been reiterated from time to time.
Expectations that a meeting would take place between the foreign
ministers of the two countries on the sidelines of the UN
General Assembly meeting in New York in September 2018 did
not fructify.
The suicide attack on a CRPF convoy by JeM militants in Pulwama

on February 14, 2019 further queered the pitch for any possible
further movement towards a dialogue. Pakistan Prime Minister
Imran Khan in a televised address to the nation on February 19,
2019 said that Pakistan was
51
“‘Comprehensive Dialogue’ the Route to Restoring Peace in Kashmir:
COAS”, Dawn, April 14, 2018, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1401592.
52
In an interview with leading Pakistani daily, Dawn, on May 11, 2018, Nawaz
Sharif said, “Militant organisations are active. Call them non-state actors,
should we allow them to cross the border and kill 150 people in Mumbai?
Explain it to me. Why can’t we complete the trial?” See Cyril Almeida, “For
Nawaz Its Not Over till Its Over”, Dawn, May 12, 2018, at
https://www.dawn.com/news/ 1407192. (Accessed July 30, 2018).
53
“No Comprehensive Dialogue with Pakistan till it Shuns Terrorism: Sushma
Swaraj”, The Times of India, May 28, 2018, at
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ india/no-comprehensive-dialogue-with-
pakistan-till-it-shuns-terrorism- sushma-
swaraj/articleshow/64354825.cms. (Accessed July 30, 2018).
30 | SUMITA KUMAR
ready to take action if India provided “actionable intelligence”

about Pakistan’s involvement in the attack.54 In a first of its kind,
India resorted to punitive action by launching an air attack on a
JeM training camp in Balakot deep inside Pakistani territory across
the LoC on February 26. On the basis of “credible intelligence” that
the JeM could carry out further attacks, India conducted a ‘non-
military pre-emptive’ strike in Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province, and claimed to have eliminated a large
number of terrorists stationed in these camps by employing 12
Mirage 2000-5 fighters. On February 27, within a day of Indian
strikes Pakistan tried to target Indian military establishments across
the LoC. In the dogfight that took place between the Pakistani
planes and the Indian aircraft, Pakistan claimed to have downed an
IAF MiG 21 that had entered its airspace and captured Wing
Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, pilot of one of the MiGs. Indian
pilot Abhinandan was released as a “peace gesture”55 Pakistan
being mindful of the expectations of the international community. It
was also obvious from this gesture that Pakistan thought it wise to
de-escalate the situation.
In addition, India showed its resentment by taking certain other
steps which further led to a deep freeze in India-Pakistan relations.
For instance, India withdrew the Most Favoured Nation status for
trade with Pakistan on February 15, 2019 and suspended cross
LoC trade from April 19, 2019.
Will There be a Breakthrough?

The cyclical pattern of engagement and disengagement with Pakistan is
hardly new. However, there have been attempts to diffuse tensions
along the LoC given that the period from January to May 2018 saw
the number of ceasefire violations go up to 1,300 with 908 incidents
having occurred
54
For excerpts of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s televised address to the nation
on February 19, 2019 see “Pakistan Will Hit Back if India Strikes, says
Imran”, The Hindu, February 20, 2019.
55
For excerpts of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s televised speech to the Joint
Session of Parliament on February 28, 2019 see “IAF Pilot to be Freed
Today: Imran”, The Hindu, March 1, 2019.
along the LoC and the rest of them along the International Border.56
The directors general of military operations (DGMOs) of the two
countries, in a conversation conducted on the hotline on May 29,
2018 agreed to “fully implement the 2003 ceasefire understanding
in letter and spirit.”57 Yet, ceasefire violations continued through the
second half of the year.
Pakistan has been under tremendous international pressure to curb

its support to terrorism and has faced isolation at various international
forums. At the regional level, as mentioned earlier, Pakistan faced
isolation in the aftermath of the Uri attack when it was forced to
cancel the SAARC summit to be held in November 2016 as five
other member states opted out of attending in sympathy with
India. The BRICS declaration of September 2017 condemned
terrorism and the violence caused by various terrorist groups, including
those based in Pakistan, reflecting the concerns of all the member
countries. Hafeez Saeed, the chief of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD),
accused by India of masterminding the Mumbai attacks of 2008,
was put under house arrest and assets of the JuD and its arm for
charity, the Falah-e-Insaniyat, were seized. These measures were taken
in order to show compliance with the requirements of the FATF and
thus avoid any US moves to place Pakistan on the FATF watch
list.58
India’s demands for taking effective action against terrorism have not
been met. Though Hafeez Saeed was put under detention, he was later
released and was able to campaign for the elections and thereby
enter the political mainstream. His candidates contested elections
under the umbrella of Allah- o-Akbar Tehreek. Also, the Anti-
Terrorism Ordinance passed by the president in February 2018 with
regard to the banning of the JuD and the Falah-e-Insaniyat
Foundation lapsed without the parliament’s approval as was
disclosed in October 2018.
56
Rajat Pandit, “India, Pakistan DGMOs Hold Talks on Ceasefire Violations
and Terrorism”, The Times of India, May 30, 2018, at https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-pakistan-dgmos-hold-talk-on-ceasefire-
violation-and-terrorism/articleshow/64372018.cms. (Accessed July 30, 2018).
57
Ibid.
58
Khurram Husain, “Banning Terror Groups”, Dawn, February 15, 2018, at https:/
/www.dawn.com/news/1389433; and Amjad Mahmood, “Punjab Govt Moves
to Seize Assets of JuD, its Welfare Wing”, Dawn, February 15, 2018, at
https:// www.dawn.com/news/1389524. (Accessed July 30, 2018).
32 | SUMITA KUMAR
On February 22, 2019 the Punjab government took administrative

control over the JeM headquarters at Bahawalpur. On March 5,
2019 a number of people belonging to proscribed organisations
including Masood Azhar’s son and brother were taken into preventive
detention. A decision was also taken to ban the JuD and the Falah-
e-Insaniyat Foundation at a meeting of the NSC on February 21,
2019 followed by a notification by the interior ministry on March
5, 2019.59 However, this was possibly a direct consequence of the
international pressure faced by Pakistan post Pulwama, as the UN
Security Council condemned the attack. Such steps were perhaps
also taken in the hope that Pakistan may be taken off the ‘grey list’
during review meetings of the FATF Asia-Pacific Group held in
Paris from February 18-22. Even so it is doubtful that any
government in Pakistan will be able to deliver satisfactorily on
terrorism in the foreseeable future, given the fact that militant
organisations and their ostensible objectives seem to have
acquired wide acceptability and minimal resistance within
Pakistan’s society.
Various civilian governments in Pakistan have tried to mend fences

with India, but the military has continued to adopt a hard line,
intermittently allowing space for the civilian leadership to achieve
some tactical gains through dialogue. The deeply ingrained
attitudes of the religious right have also been influencing the
behaviour of the military and are not likely to undergo any drastic
change in the near future. The military, on its part, has tried to keep
the Kashmir issue alive through cross-border violations, which are
invariably linked to sending infiltrators into Kashmir, in order to
internationalise the Kashmir issue.
After the elections, though Imran Khan highlighted the importance

of trade ties with India during his victory speech, he reiterated that
“Kashmir is a core issue.”60 This was in keeping with the goals
mentioned in his party
59
Sanaullah Khan, NSC Orders Acceleration of Anti-Terrorism Ops;
Reinstates Ban on JuD, Charity Arm FIF”, Dawn, February 21, 2019
at https:// www.dawn.com/news/1465212 (Accessed May 10, 2019); for
notification see Government of Pakistan, National Counter Terrorism
Authority, Islamabad at https://www.nacta.gov.pk (Accessed May 10,
2019).
60
“Imran Khan’s Speech in Full: Transcript of the Victory Speech by
PTI Chairman”, Al Jazeera, July 26, 2018, at
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/ 07/imran-khan-speech-full-
180726124850706.html. (Accessed July 30, 2018).
manifesto that had earmarked “the resolution of the Kashmir dispute”

as one of Pakistan’s “core national interests”.61 This makes it obvious
that his thinking is very closely aligned to that of the military in
Pakistan. Initial attempts to defreeze the relationship by both
sides only ended in a reiteration of their well-known positions.
Both the countries have initiated the process of opening up a new

route allowing Sikh pilgrims to visit the other country and negotiations
are being held in this regard. The new route will allow Sikh
pilgrims from India to visit Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Kartarpur,
Pakistan. The corridor would also enable Sikh pilgrims from
Pakistan to visit the Dera Baba Nanak Gurdwara in Gurdaspur,
India. India and Pakistan discussed details regarding
operationalisation of the Kartarpur Corridor at Attari on March 14,
2019. This was followed up by a discussion between technical
experts of both sides on March 19, 2019 at the proposed “zero
points” i.e. the points at which the Indian and Pakistani side of
the corridor will meet. Another meeting of experts and technicians
was held on April 16. India had earlier called off talks which were to
be held on April 2, 2019 due to concerns that alleged supporters of
Khalistan separatists had been included in a committee dealing with the
corridor by Pakistan.62 Apart from this, there is not much hope that
any meaningful progress will occur in India– Pakistan relations
anytime soon.
The attack on the CRPF convoy by JeM militants on February 14,

2019 yet again underscores the fact that Pakistan continues its
strategy of destabilising India and that it does not serve its purpose
to wind down its reliance on terror infrastructure. India’s aerial counter
attack on Balakot on February 26 called the bluff of escalation to the
nuclear level in case India resorted to a conventional attack.
A dossier with details about the JeM’s involvement in the Pulwama

attack, and the presence of JeM camps and top cadre in Pakistan
was handed
61
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Manifesto 2018, “The Road to Naya
Pakistan”, p. 54.
62
“India Conveys Concerns to Pakistan over Presence of Khalistani Separatists on
Kartarpur Panel”, The Hindu, March 29, 2019.
34 | SUMITA KUMAR
over to Pakistan. The ground level position stated by India with

regard to its attitude towards Pakistan i.e. no dialogue unless there
is “verifiable” action by Pakistan against terrorism remains the
same even after the re- election of Narendra Modi as the Prime
Minister of India. There has been an exchange of warmly worded
letters between the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of
Pakistan and India after the Indian election but there has been no
indication on the part of India that there will be an unconditional
dialogue with Pakistan in the near future.
OPENING UP TO RUSSIA
One of the trends in Pakistan’s foreign policy has been
improvement of relations with Russia. Pakistan’s relations with
Russia during the Cold War were characterised by mutual distrust
verging on hostility. The Islamic state’s aversion for communism and
the communist state’s perception of Pakistan as an ally of the US
did not allow them to come closer. Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979 and Pakistan’s stewardship of the anti- Soviet jihad in
Afghanistan reinforced the antagonism between the two countries.
Russia’s close diplomatic and military ties with India and reluctance to
engage with Pakistan also played a role in creating distance
between them.
While the possibility of the two countries being able to engage

deeply with each other may have seemed remote some time back,
both Pakistan and Russia have been recently faced with certain
developments which induced rethinking on their part. India’s cosying
up to America and signing a nuclear deal with it in 2008 as part of a
strengthened strategic partnership was not received well by Russia.
Pakistan’s relationship with the US has been faltering due to its
inability to take credible action against terrorists based in Pakistan
and carrying on insurgency in Afghanistan. A resurgent Russia,
meanwhile, is making efforts to re-establish itself as a major power
on the world stage and is actively involved in trying to expand its
sphere of influence by broadening its footprint in South Asia as
well. Russia has, of late, shown interest in working together with
Pakistan on multiple fronts and Pakistan is enthusiastically making full
use of the opportunity to recreate its ties with Russia.
The first major sign of the changing dynamics between the two
countries was the signing of the defence cooperation agreement in
November 2014.
The wide-ranging agreement, which included “exchange of

information on politico-military issues; cooperation for promoting
international security; intensification of counter-terrorism and arms
control activities; strengthening collaboration in various military
fields…and sharing experiences in peacekeeping operations”,
was signed in Islamabad during the visit of Russian Defence
Minister Sergey Shoigu on November 20, 2014.63 This agreement
took place in the backdrop of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and
military intervention in Ukraine, which had led to tensions with the
West. During this visit, discussions also took place on tackling the
problems of international terrorism and drug trafficking jointly.64
Russia’s concerns about terrorism stem from fears that such

problems could spill over to the regions in its “periphery”, which had
already been the target of terrorism from time to time. As such,
besides initiatives at the bilateral level, Russia supported the inclusion
of Pakistan as a full member of the SCO.65 While China’s support for
Pakistan’s candidature was never in doubt, the support of Russia
also underscored its rising perception of Pakistan as an important
actor in mitigating the problem of terrorism in the region. Pakistan
was formally inducted into the SCO at the summit held in Astana
on June 9, 2017.66
Pakistan benefitted from the Russian perception that India was slowly
and surely moving into the US embrace and was attempting to
diversify its weapons imports. This perceived shift, along with
Russia’s need to bolster its defence exports, made Russia look for
alternative options. Pakistan fit the bill as a new destination for
Russian defence equipment.67 Russia’s reluctance to cooperate with
Pakistan on military matters over the decades,
63
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan, Russia Sign Landmark Defence Cooperation
Agreement”, Dawn, November 21, 2014, at https://www.dawn.com/news/
1145875. (Accessed August 4, 2018).
64
Ibid.
65
“Pakistan Joins Security Bloc Led by China, Russia”, Dawn, June 10, 2017,
at https://www.dawn.com/news/1338647. (Accessed August 4, 2018).
66
Ibid.
67
Sanjay Pulipaka, “Russia’s New Approach to Pakistan: All About Arms
Sales”, The Diplomat, September 28, 2016, at
https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/russias- new-approach-to-pakistan-all-about-
arms-sales/. (Accessed August 4, 2018).
36 | SUMITA KUMAR
keeping Indian concerns in mind, gave way to a willingness to part

with advanced military systems to Pakistan. Pakistan, on its part, is
widening its options given its constantly conflictual relationship with
the US which has been one of its major supplier of arms. The
Pakistan Army Aviation Corps received four Mi-35M “Hind E”
attack helicopters worth US$ 153 million from Russia in August
2017 as per a deal signed in August 2015.68
Besides the transfer of weapons, both the countries have also

undertaken joint military exercises. For instance, the Pakistan Army
and Russian Army undertook a joint training exercise (Druzhba-III) in
Pakistan in October– November 2018.69 Previously, the special
forces of Pakistan and Russia conducted a joint exercise in
November 2017, which focused on counter- terrorism operations,
hostage and rescue, and cordon and search operations.70 Their
first joint military exercise was held in September– October 2016. It
has also been agreed that troops from Pakistan will receive
training at Russian military institutes. This decision was taken during
the first meeting of the Russia–Pakistan Joint Military
Consultative Committee held in Islamabad in August 2018.71 An
MoU for naval cooperation has also been signed between the two
countries in July 2018.72
68
Gabriel Dominguez, “Russia Delivers Four Mi-35M Helos to Pakistan, Says
Report”, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 30, 2017, at
https://www.janes.com/ article/73439/russia-delivers-four-mi-35m-helos-to-
pakistan-says-report. (Accessed August 4, 2018).
69
“Russian Forces Arrive in Pakistan for Third Joint-Military Drill”, The
Economic Times, October 22, 2018, at
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ defence/russian-forces-
arrive-in-pakistan-for-third-joint-military-drill/
articleshow/66315007.cms. (Accessed January 10, 2019).
70
“Druzba 2017: Pakistan, Russia Hold Anti-Terror Exercise”, The Express
Tribune, September 25, 2017, at
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1515661/pakistan-russia- begin-military-drills/.
(Accessed August 4, 2018).
71
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Accord with Russia Signed for Training of Pakistani
Troops”, Dawn, August 8, 2018, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1425673.
(Accessed January 10, 2019).
72
Maqbool Malik, “Pakistan, Russia Sign MoU for Naval Cooperation”, The
Nation, August 1, 2018, at https://nation.com.pk/01-Aug-2018/pakistan-
russia-sign- mou-for-naval-cooperation. (Accessed January 10, 2019).
Earlier, it was speculated that Russia turned down the transfer of

Su-35 jets to Pakistan as they were more advanced than the Su-30
MKI which had been sold to India.73 While this may or may not
be true, Russia’s defence cooperation with Pakistan is likely to
proceed within certain limits.
Pakistan and Russia seem to have developed convergence of interests

in another strategically important area, which is the support for
Afghan Taliban. Russian fears due to the increasing presence of the
IS in Afghanistan and its potential to create trouble in the Central
Asian Republics has led it to support the Taliban to effectively
counter the IS. Russia is also found to be supporting the peace
process in Afghanistan in a bid to reconcile the differences between
the Taliban and the Afghan Government.74 Moscow hosted talks
between the Taliban and the High Peace Council of Afghanistan
in November 2018. It then facilitated a meeting between the Taliban
and Afghan opposition leaders in February 2019. In May end Russia
again hosted talks between the Taliban and senior Afghan politicians,
including those who may be challenging Ghani in the presidential
elections to be held in September 2019. Pakistan would naturally
encourage such Russian efforts towards reconciliation.
Russia also acknowledges, to a certain extent, that Pakistan is

playing a positive role in combating terrorism. This is significant at a
time when it is in the dock vis-à-vis the US in this respect.
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, visited not
only China but also Russia75 to garner support after being
castigated by President Trump for not doing enough to counter
terrorism. Both Beijing and Moscow were critical of the US position
on Pakistan and were of the opinion that not only should Pakistan’s
vital role for peace in Afghanistan be recognised but also the
73
“Russia Turns Down Pak Request for Su-35 Jet Buy; Russian Media”,
Defense World, November 15, 2015, at
http://www.defenseworld.net/news/17658/
Russia_Turns_Down_Pak_Request_For_Su_35_jet_Buy Russian_Media#.W2zBgELrZnI.
74
Uzair Younus, “Pay Attention to Russia’s South Asia Strategy”, The
Diplomat, June 7, 2018, at http://thediplomat.com/2018/06/pay-attention-
to russia’s- south-asia-strategy/. (Accessed August 6, 2018).
75
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif went to China
in September 2017 and to Russia in February 2018.
38 | SUMITA KUMAR
sacrifices made by it in the fight against terrorism.76 In February

2018, Russia named an honorary consul to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
bordering Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, where the IS has
established a strong presence. Mohammad Arsallah Khan,
belonging to an influential business family in north-west Pakistan, is
expected to promote commercial ties with Russia in the hope that
such ties would help tackle the problem of terrorism.77
Some developments pertaining to economic cooperation between Pakistan

and Russia, particularly in the energy sector, have also been
witnessed recently. An MoU was signed in June 2018 between
the ministries of energy of both the countries for a feasibility study
for the installation of an undersea gas pipeline.78 Besides, an
agreement for the construction of North–South gas pipeline was
signed by the two countries in October 2015. The gas pipeline, with
a capacity of 12.4 billion cubic metres per year and stretching over
1,100 kilometre, is expected to join the liquefied natural gas
terminals at Karachi Port with Lahore. While commissioning was
planned for 2018, there have been delays due to disagreements over
the gas transit tariff.79 The two countries have also been
conducting negotiations for upgradation of a 600 megawatt (MW)
gas-fired power plant at Jamshoro with Russian investment.80
76
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Asif to Embark on Three-Nation Tour to Discuss US
Policy”, Dawn, August 26, 2017, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1354043.
77
“Analysis: Why is Russia Warming Up to Pakistan?”, Dawn, February 27, 2018,
at https://www.dawn.com/news/1392060. (Accessed August 6, 2018).
78
“Pakistan, Russia Ink MoU to Conduct Feasibility Study for Undersea
Gas Pipeline”, Pakistan Today, June 8, 2018, at
https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/ 2018/06/08/pakistan-russia-ink-mou-to-
conduct-feasibility-study-for-undersea- gas-pipeline/. (Accessed August 6,
2018).
79
“Russia’s Rostec Set to Launch Construction of North–South Gas Pipeline in
Pakistan in 2018”, TASS, April 27, 2018, at http://tass.com/economy/1002160.
80
Khaleeq Kiani, “Russia to Join CASA-1000, Set Up 600MW Plant in
Jamshoro”, Dawn, October 6, 2016, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1288247.
Pakistan has also invited Russia to join the CASA-1000 project

by transmitting thermal energy from Russia to Pakistan on
transmission lines which would be available during periods of
low hydel electricity transmission from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.81
Further, Pakistan’s strategic location could enable it to play a central
role in future regional connectivity projects that may come about as
a result of the expected merger of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) with the Eurasian Economic Union.82
The improvement of Pakistan’s relations with Russia certainly

boosted its morale at a time when Pakistan’s economy was in a bad
shape and its international image had taken a beating because of its
abetment of terrorism. However, it remains to be seen whether
Russia will go the whole hog in meeting Pakistan’s demands in
various fields given Russia’s relations with India and the competition
that it would face from the US in this region. Pakistan offered a
“multidimensional strategic partnership” to Russia in May 2018.83
Most recently, a convergence of views was apparent as Pakistan and
Russia signed a joint statement on ‘No First Placement of Weapons
in Outer Space’ on the sidelines of the SCO Council of Foreign
Ministers meeting held at Bishkek in May 2019.84
It must be noted that Pakistan’s opening up to Russia and

the multidimensional relationship outlined above are very
significant
81
Zafar Bhutta, “Pakistan Invites Russia to Join CASA-1000”, The Express
Tribune, October 6, 2016, at
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1194194/bolstering- cooperation-pakistan-
invites-russia-join-casa-1000/. (Accessed August 6, 2018).
82
Gregory Shtraks, “Next Steps in the Merger of the Eurasian Economic
Union and the Belt and Road Initiative”, The Jamestown Foundation, China
Brief, Vol. 18, No. 11, June 19, 2018, at
https://jamestown.org/program/next-steps-in- the-merger-of-the-eurasian-
economic-union-and-the-belt-and-road-initiative/. (Accessed August 6,
2018).
83
Kamran Yousaf, “Pakistan Offers Russia ‘Strategic Partnership’ for the First
Time”, The Express Tribune, May 2, 2018, at https://tribune.com.pk/story/
1700256/1-pakistan-offers-russia-strategic-partnership-first-time/. (Accessed
August 6, 2018).
84
“Pakistan, Russia Join Hands to Prevent Outer Space Becoming Arena of
Military Confrontation”, The Nation, May 23, 2019, at
https://nation.com.pk/23-May- 2019/pakistan-russia-join-hands-to-prevent-
outer-space-becoming-arena-of- military-confrontation (Accessed May 27,
2019).
40 | SUMITA KUMAR
achievements in the overall foreign policy architecture of

Pakistan. Nevertheless, it will have implications for India too in the
long run. Keeping in mind the nature of India-Russia relations,
Russia is likely to keep in mind Indian concerns as it develops its
relationship with Pakistan. This is apparent from the Sochi summit
between India and Russia in May 2018, which testified to the
durability of India-Russia relations.
CONCLUSION
The trends in Pakistan’s foreign policy noted here brings one to
the conclusion that while Pakistan’s geopolitical situation has given
it certain advantages, its inability to control terrorism emanating
from its soil has earned it the alienation of some major powers
and the antipathy of its neighbours. It was Pakistan’s strategic
location which led the US to rope it in as a member of its alliance
during the Cold War days and continue to rely on it to be the
vanguard of the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Again, it was
because of its geographical location that China found it useful to
cultivate it as a countervailing force against India. But Pakistan
became a prisoner of its own excessive dependence on militant
Islam as an instrument of its foreign policy, which prevented it from
taking credible action against the Afghan Taliban operating from its
territory. This led to disillusionment of the US with Pakistan, even
though it continues to rely on Pakistan for certain limited purposes
like peace talks with the Taliban.
As far as China is concerned, there is considerable degree of

romanticism in its relationship with Pakistan. China hopes that
Pakistan’s dire need to countervail India with the help of China and
to have a substitute for US as a source of economic and military
aid would enable it to dominate Pakistan and use it as an extremely
valuable strategic outpost. While this “higher than the mountains”
friendship may seem tempting in the current circumstances and may
even endure for a decade or two, it is likely to cut into Pakistan’s
sense of self-respect, sovereignty and strategic autonomy anytime in
the future.
There is no doubt that Russia has entered as a new player in

Pakistan’s foreign policy structure with promises of defence
cooperation and convergence of approach in the Afghanistan
peace process. But Pakistan must also realise that when leading
global players like the US, China and Russia enter a strategically
important but a highly conflicted region like
Afghanistan–Pakistan, they have their own objectives to achieve.

The interplay of their interests is more likely to make the entire region
an object of their long-term competitive presence, rather than
serving Pakistan’s interests.
Pakistan’s peace overtures to Afghanistan will depend for their

success on the outcome of the settlement between the Afghan
Government, the Taliban, the US and to some extent, China and
Russia. The Afghan Government is not an independent actor
because of its highly limited military and economic capability and
excessive dependence on foreign forces. Therefore, Pakistan will
not find it easy to normalise its relations with Afghanistan until a
satisfactory peace settlement is arrived at, which will take time because
of sharply conflicting interests of the parties involved.
As far as Pakistan’s attitude towards India is concerned, there is no

genuine step being taken which would give hope that India’s
demand for credible action against terrorists operating from
Pakistan would be satisfactorily met. India’s policy in the last three
years has shown that it is not in a hurry to hold a dialogue with
Pakistan unless there is any forward movement on its part.
Dialogue for the sake of dialogue makes no sense. And in a
situation when Pakistani militant groups have been mainstreamed to
enable them to have a greater voice in Pakistan’s power structure,
there is no hope that the stalemate between Pakistan and India
would be broken anytime soon.
P
akistan's most critical foreign policy concerns in the last few
years relate to the deadlock in relations with India and India's
success in isolating Pakistan regionally and internationally due
to its support
for terrorism. The success of its peace overtures to Afghanistan are
constrained by various complexities arising out of the unpredictable
situation in Afghanistan and the role of external powers like the US,
China and Russia in the ongoing peace process. It has felt the impact
of US dissatisfaction with its role in the war on terror with a reduction
in economic assistance and security related aid and though it would
like to believe that it can function independent of US patronage, it has
discovered that it may not be easy to do so given the latter's
diplomatic outreach and clout in international financial institutions.
While Pakistan has continued to rely on China for diplomatic and
economic gain, it will have to figure out how to maintain its
sovereignty and strategic autonomy vis-à-vis China. Pakistan's
relations with Russia have improved considerably given a
convergence of interests, yet the extent to which this will expand
Pakistan's strategic options remains to be seen. This paper explores
such trends in Pakistan's relations with important countries and
challenges it faces in the formulation of its foreign policy.
Ms. Sumita Kumar is Senior Research Associate with the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses. She specialises on South Asian security
issues with a focus on Pakistan. Her research publications have covered
a diverse range of issues concerning Pakistan's foreign policy, internal
politics and security, energy security, economy and role in regional
cooperation. She has published chapters in books and articles in journals
published in India and abroad, as well as the Indian media. Her
publications include an edited book on Stability and Growth in South Asia,
(IDSA & Pentagon Press, 2014) and a co-edited book titled India's
Neighbourhood: Challenges Ahead, (IDSA & Rubicon Publishers, 2008).
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg,
Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010
Tel.: (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax: (91-11) 2615 4191
E-mail: contactus@idsa.in Website: http://www.idsa.in

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IDSA Occasional Paper No.

IDSA OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 54

 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted

First Published: August 2019

Published by: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

Pakistan’s domestic politics was characterised by the interference of

In the foreign policy architecture of Pakistan, the sustained

rule in Afghanistan, which facilitated the massive terrorist attack by

Although China has been cultivating Pakistan as a strategic ally to

It is against the background of such tumultuous developments that

The paper looks at the likely impact of reduced economic and

Washington, DC, on October 18, 2017, where he focused on

Strong reactions emerged within Pakistan. An intense debate took

In real terms, the US dissatisfaction due to Pakistan’s continued

to Pakistan under the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) for FY 2017

Pakistan’s inclusion on the “grey list” on June 27, 2018 by the

Statements emanating from Pakistan suggested that Pakistan

Table 1: Direct Overt US Aid Appropriations for Pakistan

It is apparent from the given table that total security-related aid

While this may be so, Pakistan’s economy continues to be in dire

structural reforms of the Pakistan economy and accept strict

Pakistan has also been a major beneficiary of arms from the US

Pakistan’s location makes it continually relevant for the US in the

to bring about a peace settlement in Afghanistan. Of course,

As has been evident on earlier occasions, the US willingness

Given the US interests in the region, the US will continue to play

EXCESSIVE DEPENDENCE ON CHINA

in 2017–18. China’s total direct investment in Pakistan amounted to US$

Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China and the

Exchange Commission, 77 Chinese companies were registered in

The increasing Chinese presence in different spheres of Pakistan’s

Country July 2017- US$ July 2016- US$

Another aspect of Chinese involvement is China’s loan of US$ 1

Given the Chinese largesse, Pakistan needs to be on constant alert

While the Chinese involvement in infrastructure projects, including

A deep penetration of the industry in Pakistan is also on the anvil.

China has been claiming that the CPEC is mainly an economic

While Pakistan has been relying on China for diplomatic support

PEACE OVERTURES TO AFGHANISTAN

Discussions between the leadership of China, Pakistan and

2017.28 The second ministerial dialogue was held at Kabul on

At the bilateral level too, Pakistan’s inclination to improve relations

Continuing strains in the relationship have been exemplified by

The inaugural meetings of the five working groups under the

has been evidence of China and Russia also wanting to recognise

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made efforts to draw the Taliban

The Taliban went on to announce their spring offensive in April

during Eid celebrations.41 The Taliban’s unanimous support for the

drone strike by the US in May 2016 as there were doubts about

Pakistan got an opportunity to play its most coveted role as the

interpreted to mean that differences still remain on certain vital

Pakistan even hosted a conference for a large number of Afghan

STALEMATE WITH INDIA

Under the government of Prime Minister Modi, India had started

The attack on the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot by a Pakistan-

This incident derailed the momentum built as a consequence of