Major Arms Control Agreements:

NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty):

The NPT aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of disarmament. The Treaty establishes
a safeguards system under the responsibility of the IAEA, which also plays a central role under
the Treaty in areas of technology transfer for peaceful purposes.
The central theme of NPT was not to transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive
devices, or their technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state. Nuclear weapon States Parties
are also obligated, under Article VI, to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Treaty was opened for signature on 01 July 1968, and signed on that date by the United
States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 59 other countries. The Treaty entered into
force with the deposit of US ratification on 05 March 1970. China acceeded to the NPT on 09
March 1992, and France acceded on 03 August 1992. In 1996, Belarus joined Ukraine and
Kazakhstan in removing and transferring to the Russian Federation the last of the remaining
former Soviet nuclear weapons located within their territories, and each of these nations has
become a State Party to the NPT, as a non-nuclear-weapon state. In June 1997 Brazil became
a State Party to the NPT.[ CITATION Sve10 \l 1033 ]

The NPT is the most widely accepted arms control agreement; only Israel, India, and Pakistan
have never been signatories of the Treaty, and North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003.

In accordance with the terms of the NPT, on May 11, 1995 more than 170 countries attended
the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) in New York. Three decisions and
one resolution emanated from NPTREC. First, the NPT was extended for an indefinite duration
and without conditions. Second, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament were worked out to guide the parties to the treaty in the next phase of its
implementation. Third, an enhanced review process was established for future review
conferences. Finally, a resolution endorsed the establishment of a zone free of weapons of
mass destruction in the Middle East.

There have been no confirmed instances of official states party transfers of nuclear weapon
technology or unsafeguarded nuclear materials to any non-nuclear-weapon states party.
However, some non-nuclear-weapon states, such as Iraq, were able to obtain sensitive
technology and/or equipment from private parties in states that are signatories to the NPT.
South Africa conducted an independent nuclear weapons production program prior to joining the
NPT, however, it dismantled all of its nuclear weapons before signing the Treaty. In 1994, the
United States and North Korea signed an "Agreed Framework" bringing North Korea into full
compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. In 2003 North Korea announced
it was withdrawing from the Treaty effective immediately, and on October 9, 2006 became the
eighth country to explode a nuclear device.[ CITATION Dar20 \l 1033 ]

SALT Treaties:
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), negotiations between the United States and the
Soviet Union that were aimed at curtailing the manufacture of strategic missiles capable of
carrying nuclear weapons. The first agreements, known as SALT I and SALT II, were signed by
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1972 and 1979, respectively,
and were intended to restrain the arms race in strategic (long-range or
intercontinental) ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons. First suggested by U.S.
Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967, strategic arms limitation talks were agreed on by the two
superpowers in the summer of 1968, and full-scale negotiations began in November 1969.
Of the resulting complex of agreements (SALT I), the most important were the Treaty on Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems and the Interim Agreement and Protocol on Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Weapons. Both were signed by Pres. Richard M. Nixon for the United States
and Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, for the U.S.S.R. on
May 26, 1972, at a summit meeting in Moscow.[ CITATION Glo16 \l 1033 ][ CITATION Glo16
\l 1033 ]

The ABM treaty regulated antiballistic missiles that could theoretically be used to destroy

incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched by the other superpower. The
treaty limited each side to only one ABM deployment area (i.e., missile-launching site) and 100
interceptor missiles. These limitations prevented either party from defending more than a small
fraction of its entire territory, and thus kept both sides subject to the deterrent effect of the
other’s strategic forces. The ABM treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate on August 3, 1972.
The Interim Agreement froze each side’s number of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) at current levels for five years, pending negotiation of a more detailed SALT II.
As an executive agreement, it did not require U.S. Senate ratification, but it was approved
by Congress in a joint resolution.

The SALT II negotiations opened late in 1972 and continued for seven years. A basic problem in
these negotiations was the asymmetry between the strategic forces of the two countries, the
U.S.S.R. having concentrated on missiles with large warheads while the United States had
developed smaller missiles of greater accuracy. Questions also arose as to new technologies
under development, matters of definition, and methods of verification.
As finally negotiated, the SALT II treaty set limits on the number of strategic launchers (i.e.,
missiles that can be equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles [MIRVs]),
with the object of deferring the time when both sides’ land-based ICBM systems would
become vulnerable to attack from such missiles. Limits were put on the number of MIRVed
ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, heavy (i.e., long-range) bombers, and the total number of strategic
launchers. The treaty set an overall limit of about 2,400 of all such weapons systems for each
side. The SALT II treaty was signed by Pres. Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18,
1979, and was submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification shortly thereafter. But renewed
tensions between the superpowers prompted Carter to remove the treaty from Senate
consideration in January 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The United States and
the Soviet Union voluntarily observed the arms limits agreed upon in SALT II in subsequent
years, however. Meanwhile, the renewed negotiations that opened between the two
superpowers in Geneva in 1982 took the name of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).
Startegic Arms Reduction Talks: (START)
Arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union (and, later, Russia)
that were aimed at reducing those two countries’ arsenals of nuclear warheads and of the
missiles and bombers capable of delivering such weapons. The talks, which began in 1982,
spanned a period of three eventful decades that saw the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end
of the Cold War, and the major crises of the early 21st century.

START I

The START negotiations were successors to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the 1970s.
In resuming strategic-arms negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1982, U.S. Pres. Ronald
Reagan renamed the talks START and proposed radical reductions, rather than merely
limitations, in each superpower’s existing stocks of missiles and warheads. In 1983 the Soviet
Union abandoned arms control talks in protest against the deployment of intermediate-range
missiles in western Europe (see Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). In 1985 START
resumed, and the talks culminated in July 1991 with a comprehensive strategic-arms-reduction
agreement signed by U.S. Pres. George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The
new treaty was ratified without difficulty in the U.S. Senate, but in December 1991 the Soviet
Union broke up, leaving in its wake four independent republics with strategic nuclear weapons—
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia. In May 1992 the Lisbon Protocol was signed, which
allowed for all four to become parties to START I and for Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
either to destroy their strategic nuclear warheads or to turn them over to Russia. This made
possible ratification by the new Russian Duma, although not before yet another agreement had
been reached with Ukraine setting the terms for the transfer of all the nuclear warheads on its
territory to Russia. All five START I parties exchanged the instruments of ratification in Budapest
on Dec. 5, 1994.

The START I treaty set limits to be reached in a first phase within three years and then a
second phase within five years. By the end of the second phase, in 1999, both the United States
and Russia would be permitted a total of 7,950 warheads on a maximum of 1,900 delivery
vehicles (missiles and bombers). This limit involved reductions from established levels of about
11,000 warheads on each side. Of the 7,950 permitted warheads, no more than 6,750 could be
mounted on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The treaty included demanding verification measures, including on-
site inspection, monitors at the Russian mobile ICBM factory at Votkinsk, and access to
missile telemetry, which provides details of the characteristics of missiles being tested. By early
1997 Belarus and Kazakhstan had reached zero nuclear warheads, and Ukraine destroyed its
last ICBMs in 1999. The United States and Russia reached the required levels for the second
phase during 1997.

A third phase was to be completed by the end of 2001, when both sides were to get down to
6,000 warheads on a maximum of 1,600 delivery vehicles, with no more than 4,900 warheads
on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Although there had been concerns that this goal would not be
achieved because of the expense and difficulty of decommissioning weapons, both sides
enacted their cuts by 2001. The START I treaty expired on Dec. 5, 2009.
START II

Even as they agreed on the outline of START I in 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union
accepted that further reductions should be negotiated. However, real negotiations had to wait
for the elections that established the leadership of the new Russian Federation in 1992. The
START II treaty was agreed on at two summit meetings between George H.W. Bush and
Russian Pres. Boris Yeltsin, the first in Washington, D.C., in June 1992 and the second
in Moscow in January 1993. Under its terms, both sides would reduce their strategic warheads
to 3,800–4,250 by 2000 and to 3,000–3,500 by 2003. They would also eliminate multiple
independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on their ICBMs—in effect eliminating two of the more
controversial missiles of the Cold War, the U.S. Peacekeeper missile and the Russian SS-18.
Later, in order to accommodate the delays in signing and ratifying START I, the deadlines were
put back to 2004 and 2007, respectively.

START II never actually came into force. The U.S. Senate did not ratify the treaty until 1996,
largely because the parallel process was moving so slowly in the Russian Duma. There the
treaty became a hostage to growing Russian irritation with Western policies in the Persian
Gulf and the Balkans and then to concerns over American attitudes toward the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty. The Russian preference would have been for far lower final levels, as
Russia lacked the resources to replace many of its aging weapons systems, but achieved at a
slower pace, because it also lacked the resources for speedy decommissioning. In 2000 the
Duma linked the fate of START II to the ABM Treaty, and in June 2002, following the United
States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the Duma repudiated START II. [ CITATION Jef05 \l
1033 ][ CITATION Jef05 \l 1033 ]

START III/ SORT

Part of the Duma’s objection was that the proposed cuts were not deep enough. A more radical
treaty therefore might have a better chance of ratification. In March 1997, U.S. Pres. Bill
Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin negotiating START III, which would bring each side down to
2,000–2,500 warheads by Dec. 31, 2007. Discussions then got bogged down over the ABM
Treaty, as the Russians sought to link reductions on offensive systems with the maintenance of
the established restraints on defensive systems. Nonetheless, it still suited both sides to
demonstrate progress, and the risks of agreement were limited by making provisions reversible
if circumstances changed. Proposals from both sides began to converge in 2001, and on May
24, 2002, U.S. Pres. George W. Bush and Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). That treaty, sometimes referred to as the Moscow Treaty,
was ratified without difficulty by both the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma, in March and May
2003, respectively.

SORT would reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by Dec.
31, 2012. It did not require the elimination of delivery systems; it allowed nondeployed warheads
to be stored instead of destroyed; and for verification it relied on mechanisms outlined in START
I. Implementation of SORT proceeded without problems, although it was apparent from the
beginning that difficulties might arise if START I were to lapse on schedule in 2009 without
replacement. Agreement to negotiate a replacement to START I was made difficult by tensions
on a range of issues, including the United States’ occupation of Iraq in 2003, Russia’s invasion
of Georgia in 2008, and U.S. plans to install ballistic missile defense systems in eastern Europe
in order to deter a potential threat from Iran’s growing missile force.

NEW START
By early 2009, however, agreement between the two sides was possible, with a new
administration in Washington under Pres. Barack Obama. Negotiations continued through the
formal expiration of START I in December, and Obama and Russian Pres. Dmitry
Medvedev agreed to work out a new treaty by December that would build on the verification
arrangements of START I and reduce strategic weapons on each side to 500–1,000 warheads
and 1,500–1,675 delivery systems. The negotiations proved to be more difficult than anticipated,
but by April 8, 2010, agreement was reached on a new treaty that would limit each side to
1,550 deployed strategic warheads on up to 800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (deployed
and nondeployed). Under the new treaty, no more than 700 of the delivery vehicles would be
deployed ballistic missile launchers and nuclear-armed bombers; the rest would be systems for
training and testing or launchers without missiles. Outside these limits, there was freedom to
mix types of systems to suit the two sides’ respective force structures.

The targets set by the so-called New START are some 30 percent below the levels set by
SORT in 2002. The new limits must be reached seven years after ratification by the Senate
(which came in December 2010) and the Duma (which voted to ratify in January 2011). The
verification procedures of START I have been streamlined to do away
with redundant monitoring procedures—for instance, ending the permanent monitoring at
Votkinsk and reducing telemetry access. The New START does, however, call for more on-site
inspections.

UNITED NATION AND ARMS CONTROL

Throughout history, countries have pursued disarmament to build a safer, more secure world
and to protect people from harm. Since the foundation of the United Nations, disarmament and
arms control have played a critical role in preventing and ending crises and armed conflict.
Heightened tensions and dangers are better resolved through serious political dialogue and
negotiation—not by more arms.

Weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, continue to be of primary concern,

owing to their destructive power and the threat that they pose to humanity. The excessive
accumulation and illicit trade in conventional weapons jeopardize international peace and
security and sustainable development, while the use of heavy conventional weapons in
populated areas is seriously endangering civilians. New and emerging weapon technologies,
such as autonomous weapons, imperil global security and have received increased attention
from the international community in recent years.

Measures for disarmament are pursued for many reasons, including to maintain international
peace and security, uphold the principles of humanity, protect civilians, promote sustainable
development, foster confidence and trust among States, and prevent and end armed conflict.
Disarmament and arms control measures help ensure international and human security in the
21st Century and therefore must be an integral part of a credible and effective collective security
system.
The United Nations continues to celebrate the efforts and involvement of a range of actors
contributing to a safer, more peaceful common future through disarmament, arms control and
non-proliferation efforts.

In a world threatened by weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms and emerging

cyberwarfare, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres presented a new agenda for
disarmament to save humanity, save lives and secure our common future.[ CITATION Gut20 \l
1033 ]

Guterres, A. (2020). Disarmament: Securing Humanity's Future. united nations. Retrieved from united
nations: https://www.un.org/en/observances/disarmament-week

Jeffrey Arthur Larsen, J. M. (2005). Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament. Scarecrow
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Kimball, D. (2020, march). arms control. Retrieved from

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact

Lotha, G. (2016). britannica. Retrieved from STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS:

https://www.britannica.com/event/Strategic-Arms-Limitation-Talks/additional-info#history

Sverre Lodgaard. (2010). Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free

World?