Nonproliferation, Arms Control Treaties

https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaties/

● Proliferation - spread of weapons capabilities among countries, other actors

(terrorist groups), concerns weapon of mass destruction, meaning nuclear,

biological, chemical weapons, can also refer to small arms, other capabilities as well

○ Vertical proliferation - increase in capabilities by a party that already

possesses them

○ Horizontal - acquisition

● Nuclear Umbrella - US guarantee for security for non nuclear allies

● https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/alberque_npt_origins_nato_nucle

ar_2017.pdf

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (1968, 1970) (PH

signatory)

● Landmark intl treaty aiming to prevent spread of nuclear weapons, weapons tech,

to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, further goal of

achieving nuclear disarmament, general, complete disarmament; signed 1968 by 43

States, entered into force 1970 w 3 depositary States (US, USSR, UK); 2005 189 State

Parties, only India, Israel, Pakistan, NoKor (withdrew 2003) (all nuclear-capable

states) not signatories

● Represents only binding commitment in multilateral treaty to the goal of

disarmament by nuclear-weapon states; cornerstone of global nuclear non-

proliferation regime

● Three objectives: 1) nonproliferation (Art. I, II), 2) disarmament (Art. VI), 3) peaceful

uses of nuclear energy (Art. VI)

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 ● Known states to have nuclear weapons: China, France, India, Israel, NoKor, Pakistan,

Russia, UK, US

● 1947 initial efforts to create intl system enabling all states to have access to nuclear

tech under appropriate safeguards, terminated in 1949 due to political differences

bw major powers

● 1953 US Pres Eisenhower proposed Atoms for Peace during 8th UN Gen Ass

session, creation of intl org to disseminate peaceful nuclear tech, guard against devt

of weapons capabilities in addtl countries; 1957 establishment of the Intl Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) - promotion, control of nuclear tech, can refer NPT non-

compliant countries to UNSC for sanctions, punitive measures

○ Safeguard mechanism : Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) -

required for non-NWS under NPT, optional for non-NPT; states declare

nuclear material

● Mid-1960’s negotiations for NPT started, finalized 1968

● Article X - Conference convened 25 years after entry into force to decide whether

NPT should continue in force, May 1995 States agreed NPT (w/out vote) to extend

NPT INDEFINITELY, review held every 5 years

● Nuclear Weapon States - States that have built, tested nuclear explosive device

before 1 Jan 1967 (China, France, Russia, UK, US)

NPT Review Conference 2010

https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-proliferation-and-disarmament-

initiative-npdi/

https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/npt/npt-review-conferences

● Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) (Sept 2010)

○ Aus, Canada, Chile, Germ, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, PH (joined

24 Sept 2013), Poland, Turkey, UAE

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 ○ Ministerial-level group of states w/in NPT focused on practical steps that will

promote consensus outcomes of the 2010 NPT Review Conference; held 22

Sept 2010, meets 2 a year thereafter; does not have a formal consti or

permanent secretariat, decisions are made by consensus (agreement, not

unanimity)

○ Thematic priorities include

■ Encouraging greater transparency surrounding nuclear disarmament

efforts

■ Addressing lack of substantive work in Conference on Disarmament

across the four core issue on its agenda

■ Increase support for & conclusion of key legal instruments that

safeguard, govern nuclear activities

■ Strengthen NPT regime

NPT Review Conference 2015

https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_0708/Features/The-2015-NPT-

Review-Conference-and-the-Future-of-The-Nonproliferation-Regime

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987,

1988) https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm

● Cold War-era (1947-1991) US-USSR arms control agreement remaining in effect;

after the fall of the Soviet Union, US sustained treaty w Russian Fed, successor

states

● Covers both nuclear & conventionally armed missiles

● Treaty required Former Soviet states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan), US to

destroy ground-launched ballistic & cruise missiles (500-5500 km)

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 ● Prohibits signatories from possessing, producing, flight-testing

● First agreement to reduce nuclear missile stocks instead of establishing limit;

required elimination of missile bodies, launchers but did not result in the

elimination of nuclear warheads

● w/ effectivity of the Treaty in 1988, US destroyed 800, USSR 1,800 missiles including

launchers

● Pillar of the treaty VERIFICATION REGIME - includes on-site inspection, both sides

came into full compliance in summer of 1991 (before USSR dissolution)

● Treaty also established SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION for parties to address,

resolve compliance concerns

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1996)

● China, India, DPKR, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistran, US has not ratified

● PH signatory, has ratified

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT,

2006) (PH part of)

● Coordinate intl efforts to detect, investigate, respond to proliferation by nonstate

actors; voluntary partnership of 88 nations, 6 intl orgs (EU, IAEA, INTERPOL, UN

Interregional Crime & Justice Research Inst., UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, UN

Office on Drugs and Crime)

● US, Russian Fed Co-Chairs of GICNT; Finland - Implementation & Assessment Group

(IAG) under guidance of co-chairs, implements priorities identified by Plenary,

ensuring activities are coordinated, complementary to other intl efforts

● Statement of Principles (SOP)

○ Improve acctng, control, protection of nuclear/radiological material

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 ○ Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities

○ Detect, suppress illicit trafficking of nuclear/radiological material

○ Improve ability to search for, confiscate, establish safe control of

nuclear/radiological material

○ Assure denial of safe haven, resources from terrorists seeking to acquire n/r

○ Ensure adequate legal frameworks to combat activity related to nuclear

terrorism

○ Respond to, mitigate consequences of nuclear terrorism

○ Promote info sharing to prevent, respond to acts of nuclear terrorism

Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 1969-1972)

● Produced the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and Interim Agreement

○ ABM Treaty - limited strategic missile defences to 200 (later 100) interceptors

each; June 2002 US withdrew unilaterally

○ Interim Agreement - executive agreement that capped US & Soviet

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missile

(SLBM) forces, both sides pledged not to construct new ICBM silos, not

increase size of existing silos significantly; capped no of SLBM launch tubes,

SLBM-carrying submarines; agreement did not include strategic bombers,

warhead numbers

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II 1972-1979)

● Replace Interim Agreement with long-term comprehensive Treaty providing broad

limits on strategic offensive weapons systems; US objectives to provide for equal

numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for the sides, to begin the process of

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 reduction of these delivery vehicles, impose restraints on qualitative devts w/c could

threaten future stability

● 1974 Pres Ford, Gen Sec Brezhnev agreed to a basic framework (Aide-Memoire) for

the SALT II agreement; Aide-Memoire says new agreements will last until 1985

○ 1320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV (multiple independently targetable

reentry vehicle) systems

○ Ban on construction of new land-based ICBM launchers

○ Limits on deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms

○ Important elements of the Interim Agreement would be incorporated in the

new agreement

■ 2400 equal aggregate limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles

(ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers)

● SALT II has three parts:

○ Protocol (3 yrs) covering certain issues such as cruise missile constraints,

mobile ICBM limits, qualitative constraints on ICBMs, deferring further

negotiations on these issues to SALT III

○ Joint Statement of Principles - agreed set of guideline for future negotiations

○ Treaty - until 1985 based on Vladivostok Accord

● Pres Carter, Gen Sec Brezhnev signed completed SALT II 18 June 1979

○ 22 June Pres Carter transmitted to Senate, 1980 Pres Carter requested

Senate majority leader to delay ratification due to Soviet Invasion of

Afghanistan; although unratified, each Party was individually bound under

terms of intl law to refrain from acts which would defeat the object, purpose

of the Treaty until it had made its intentions clear not to become party to

Treaty

○ Same year Pres Carter announces US would comply with Treaty provisions as

long as USSR reciprocated; USSR made similar statement

○ 1982 Pres Reagan states to not undercut SALT agreements as long as USSR

showed equal restraint, USSR abides

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 ○ 1984, 1985 Pres Reagan declares USSR violated political commitment to

observe SALT II Treaty, however interim framework of mutual restraint

remained in US interest, June 1985 declared US would continue to refrain

from undercutting

○ 1986 Pres Reagan states USSR has not complied with political commitment to

observe SALT agreements, including SALT II Treaty, USSR has not indicated its

readiness to join in a framework of truly mutual restraint

Nuclear Suppliers Group

● 46 advanced nuclear states; prohibits transfer of civilian materials or tech to states

outside NPT, or those that do not fully comply with IAEA safeguards

● Not legally binding; US, Russia, China have taken advantage of this to pursue civilian

nuclear projects w non-NPT members

Multilateral Agreements

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START, 1992,1994-2009)

● 1st treaty to provide for deep reductions of US & USSR strategic nuclear weapons

● Collapse of Soviet Union led to lag in entry into force

● Lisbon Protocol (1992) - 4 post-Soviet States (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine)

parties to START in place of USSR, only Russia designated as NWS

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (2015,2016)

● P5+1 and Iran negotiation over 2 years; Obama admin said JCPOA aims to set back

Iran’s nuclear program so that if Iran were to produce enough fissile material -

breakout time- it would take at least a year

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 ● Endorsed by UN SC Reso 2231; Iran’s compliance w nuclear-related JCPOA

provisions will be verified by IAEA

○ 16 Jan 2016 JCPOA’s entry to force,IAEA certifies Iran has taken key steps in

restricting nuclear program

○ Oct 2023 Transition Day - triggers UN to lift missile restrictions, Iran to seek

ratification of addtl protocol, EU to terminate all remaining nuclear sanctions,

US to remove certain entities from sanctioned list, seek legislative term of

certain sanctions

○ Oct 2025 supposed Termination

● Established the Joint Commission to monitor implementation, dispute resolution,

majority vote of members can grant access to IAEA inspectors to suspect undeclared

nuclear sites; chaired by EU Foreign Policy Chief;

● May 2018 Pres Trump announced US to withdraw, reinstate US nuclear sanctions on

Iran

● Agreement requires uranium enrichment at Fordow, Natanz be restricted, heavy-

water reactor (at Arak) have its core rendered inoperable

● Limits on numbers, types of centrifuges, sizes of its caches of enriched uranium

Iran can operate

● Aside from fear of US sanctions, corruption, mismanagement, aging infra are factors

to non-investment in Iran, per IMF, non-nuclear growth 4%; economic stagnation,

rising inequality drove a week of widespread protest that began at the end of 2017

● US withdrawal = greater pressure for Iran retaliation (incrementally ramp up nuclear

program)

● P5+1 urge US to remain in JCPOA; EU could seek to insulate Euro firms from US

secondary sanctions, facilitate oil trade w Iran, but JCPOA could still erode if Euro

measures to preserve are not sufficient for trade, investment to continue, much less

increase

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Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (5)

Regional approach to strengthen global nuclear nonproliferation and diasramaments

norms, consolidate intl efforts towards peace & security

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America & the

Carribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco 1967)

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga 1985)

Treaty on the SE Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok

1995)

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba 1996)

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of

Semipalatinsk 2006)

https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-weapon-free-zones