Intelligence Services - a complete analysis

Intelligence Services Intelligence services are government agencies responsible for the collection, analysis and disclosure of information considered relevant to the decision-making process and the implementation of public policies in the areas of foreign policy, national defense, and public order. These government agencies are also known as secret services or information services. Although the use of spies and specialized informants goes back to antiquity in areas as dispersed as Chennai, the Near East, and the Roman Empire, intelligence activity has acquired a new operational scale as a social, professional and permanent occupation of the modern state in Europe. Even then, intelligence services, as we know them today, really only began to institutionalize in the twentieth century. After the end of the Cold War, in many countries the necessity and role of these services was debated, which might indicate that their growing institutional weight was in fact only a passing phenomenon, a product of the two world wars and the Cold War itself. During the first half of the 1990s, the services of intelligence had in fact had their budgets reduced significantly while the new international context became more volatile and, as a result, the demands for information became more demanding and diversified. On the other way, the emergence and rapid growth of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) enabled private companies to offer information on insurance issues on a global scale, competing in many areas with the services of intelligence for the attention and government resources. The response of the intelligence services to these challenges initially tended to be reactive, adapting to the new budgets and to the new international scene. However, as the 21st century commenced and intelligence services continued to be a stable part of the government apparatus of the countries, the typical response to the challenges of the new international reality tended to shift to a much more " IOIU profile "on the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence services in fulfilling their goals. In the context more direct competition with other information providers, more scarce resources and a changing international situation, the search for agility would correspond to a strategy based on three integrated axes: 1) Speed: the processes of collection, analysis and dissemination 2) Capacity: how raw data collection and production technologies have vastly exceeded the capacity for processing, production and retrieval of "finished" intelligence. An increase in capacity in these areas becomes crucial for intelligence organizations to be able to add higher-value-added inputs to the decision-making processes of the national security area. 3) Flexibility: to the extent that crises and external political issues appear and disappear without much notice overlapping it, the increasingly demanding agenda of governors, the cost and benefit relationships of resources invested in intelligence organizations involve increasing pressures for greater flexibility and also for greater integration between the various agencies. Although Frederick Martin's Freeman deals extensively with the several technological difficulties and organizational culture for the realization of this concept of "agility" in North American intelligence agencies, problems arising from the especially characteristics and the operation of intelligence activities are largely underestimated. This, in general, is a problem little explored by the specialized literature. Acronyms such as CIA, KGB, MOSSAD are relatively familiar to the public, but the average knowledge about their activities and structures is restricted to some picturesque facts or images distorted by the imagination and fictional literature. In this sense, is a persistent trajectory of the intelligence services and just their relative opacity, the secret mantle that surrounds their activities. As the transparency of governmental acts and one of the most valued requirements of the political practice contemporary (and the main unfulfilled promise of democracy), it is not surprising that the mere existence of intelligence services generates detachment and insecurity in the citizens that question themselves who have such organizations. The negative view that the citizens tend to have of the services of intelligence of their own poses makes transparency a great challenge in the process of the use of these activities. To introduce the theme, let us return to the text of Italo Calvino. According to Calvino, visibility as a literary value involves not only the ability to see the reality of the world and tradition, but in originality and invention, the capacity for abstract imagination is absent and decisive and will be negatively affected by the saturation of pre-fabricated images. This phenomenon would seem to be imperative, which Calvino calls the "pedagogy of imitation". an education that enables us to express verbally and through writing the polymorphic visions obtained through the eyes and the soul. Although the idea of visibility in Calvino is incomprehensible in relation to the idea of three dimensions as a dilemma of nationalisation, it is suggestive because it evokes the kind of ambiguity and challenge that must be dealt with in approaching the phenomenon of the transparency of governmental acts. Ambiguity that is expressed including, for the fact that transparency can mean both visibility and invisibility. For example, non-transparent visual transparency used to highlight the invisible ownership of interfaces, which ensures that users can use resources and solve problems without having to go through all the steps and interoperable operations performed by the system. In general, the so-called state activities (where information-gathering activities are included for decision-making) were, in this case, transparent to the citizens, who would look through them to visualize and control the acts of the rulers in relation to the ends considered desirable by the political community. However, bureaucratic inefficiency, and corruption make the administrative environment opaque and its own governmental acts more conducive to the emergence of a republican principle it's democratic associated with it does not value the invisibility of the system, but rather it seeks the capacity - on the part of the citizen - to visualize and judge for itself what governments are doing in the various spheres of political action. This ability to make use of his own tenderness is in the sense that it brings transparency and brings it closer to educated visibility, as Calvino expresses fearlessly. For David Luban (1996: 154-198), the transparency of governmental acts, norms, and policies is a necessary condition for the development of the popular struggle that underpins the democratic institutions and legitimizes the governments' desires to obtain collaboration and obedience from governed. The principle of publicity is a moral proposition and also a principle of institutional design. No governmental agency or area of government argues, to remain consistent with the principle of third party should be built according to operating lines that depended on the secret to its effectiveness and efficiency. However, intelligence services are just organizations that depend on secrecy about their methods of inquiry and their sources of information to operate effectively. To the extent that the process of institutionalizing this type of organization implies not only an effort to become stable, but also a quest for recognition and value in the eyes of citizens, which depends on transparency. In truth, as David Luban himself says, government secrecy and intelligence activities are compatible with the pre-eminence of the party only when the justification for its existence can be made, itself, in public. In these terms, the Luban's proposal provides an interesting starting point for the analysis of the complexities, tensions and conditions of possibility associated with transparency as a non-institutional requirement. Although the two normative present themselves as challenges in the trajectory of any organization, rule or procedure and, in the limit, they constitute a double dilemma of institutionalization. It is not a matter here of reiterating the technocratic argument about the existence of a trade-off mechanism between agility and transparency, through which gains in one form or another would be at the expense of the other. The authoritarian implications of such an argument are very clear in suggesting, for example, that government efficiency would largely depend on secrecy and bureaucratic insulation. Or, from the angle, that institutional gain in this respect necessarily limits the ability of the organizations. While it is reasonable to suppose that the secret of a functional requirement is less or less relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of certain government actions, this does not eliminate the problem of public justification (transparency) about the very need for those secrets. On the other hand, although it can be argued that legitimacy is one of the conditions that ensure the efficiency and effectiveness (agility) of government action, it is equally wrong to assume that all problems of agility could be re-established through institutional gains in transparency. "There are a number of ongoing international research initiatives currently underway, both in the area of intelligence studies of the Intellectual Property Association (IISAI), and in the field of intelligence. British SWD Group on Intelligence, the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS), the Consortium for the SWD of Intelligence (Georgetown University), the Harvard's Intelligence and Policy Program (John Kennedy School of Government) History Group (IIHG, headquartered in Germany) to name but a few. In general, we can situate intelligence studies as a material in the field of Strategic Studies, which can be defined as the field of studies that have the main objective of analyzing the phenomena associated with the use of the force to compel. 1 -Intelligence: Operational Dynamics "Intelligence is concerned with that component of the struggle between nations that deals with information." Intelligence seeks to learn all about the world. But intelligence can never forget that attainment of the truth: involves a struggle with human enemy who is fighting back and that truth is not the goal but rather only means to victory. " Abraham Shulsky, Silent Warfare, 1992. p. 197. There are two main uses of the term intelligence outside the scope of the cognitive sciences. A broad definition says intelligence and all information collected, organized or analyzed to meet the demands of any decision maker. For intelligence, intelligence and a specific layer of aggregation and non-analytical treatment in an informational pyramidal, formed on the basis of raw data and, in the vertex, reflexive knowledge. The increasing technological sophistication of information systems that support decision-making has made the use of intelligence more common to designate this function of its size, be it in the routine of the government, in the middle enterprise or even in social organizations. In this sense, intelligence, and even the knowledge or information analyzed. It is certainly possible to theorize about the nature of information and the impact of total flows of information on the economy, the state and social life in a general way. However, the intelligibility of this work refers to more limited sets of information structured information flows. In this case, a narrow definition states that intelligence and the collection of information without consent, cooperation, or even knowledge on the part of the targets of the action. In this restricted sense, intelligence is the same as secret or secret information. To ignore the narrow definition would imply losing sight of what makes this problematic activity ultimately. In the real world, however, intelligence service activities are broader than espionage and are more restricted than providing information in general on any issues relevant to government decision-making. This poses a very concrete difficulty for a precise action of the activity of intelligence which pervades it differs from the excessively broad notion of information and the excessively narrow notion of espionage. While the first statement highlights the special means used to collect information without the cooperation and / or the knowledge of an advisor, this second dimension and analysis basically says that intelligence differs from mere informing by its explanatory and / or predictive capacity. The combination of these two faces or dimensions are the basis of the concept of intelligence is an organization of the work process involved. This approach has been more precisely described by Michael Herman as a trenching process, separate from a collecting and specialized collection system, and sources of information (single-sources collection), followed by a stage of analysis of the information obtained from the various single sources and other non- structured flows. The persistent association between intelligence and conflict is strong precisely because the two dimmers of the concept are indissociable in the praxis of the organizations in charge of providing this type of information and knowledge. Both the practical difficulties and the criteria for a differentiation of the activity that supports this association between intelligence and conflict can be demonstrated through two epistemic delimitations, each of them based on one of the faces of the concept. In relation to the analytical description of the concept, the difference between the analyzes and estimates elaborated in the field of intelligence activities and any other analyzes of governmental technical advisory bodies is for the purposes of intelligence analysis: to increase the level of awareness of adversaries and to problems affecting national and state security (situational awareness). They differ from geography and statistical institutes or from centers of economic research, intelligence and services geared to the understanding of economic relations and therefore most of their targets and problems are mainly international and "difficult". Intelligence deals with the "other" study and seeks to elucidate situations in which relevant information is potentially manipulated or hidden, where there is an organized effort on the part of an adversary to misinform, to render opaque the understanding and to deny with effect. The security intelligence services have many purely economic objectives, but even these share the condition of others in the eyes of the constitutional party and the constituted political order. The argument applies even to the study of facts and problems not directly related to a specific actor. Not all national and international issues that are potentially relevant to a government are adequately addressed by intelligence services. Even though the list of issues on which agencies need to inform their users is growing, ranging from cultural aspects of societies to details of technologies. Even though the list of issues on which agencies need to inform their users is growing, ranging from cultural aspects of societies, to details of technologies for use, new items should be incorporated the work agenda of intelligence agencies only when they have the ability to "add value" in areas that are not their specialty, but where their sources and methods are deemed necessary by civilian and military users. Finally, the more open the sources of information and the less conflicting the issues and situations, the more intelligence analyzes will contribute to the decision-making process of the mind. This is a criterion that emphasizes the value of a narrow definition of irrelevancy. The frontier of analytical work in intelligence needs to be broken in relation to some connection with the detachment of the analyzed to the processes of governmental decision in international politics, national defense and provision of public order. Regarding the operative meaning of the concept, the difference between the collection of information for purposes of intelligence production and / or after government operations involving the systematic collection of information on actors and problems relevant to national security and more nebulous, impossible to trace, two typical situations in which this difference can be seen are the diplomatic relations between states and military operations. Normally, countries maintain diplomatic relations and each sovereign state allows the formal representations of the other States in their territories to send reports to their governments and countries. While intelligence officials have been open to discussion, it is quite possible that certain private sources of the ambassadors overlap the sources of the spies. In contrast, the differences between an activity and a relatively small number of activities, especially with respect to the degree of fragility of diplomatic sources or information overloads in relation to security measures of the targets. Most of the sources of a diplomat are pretentious and do not cease informational illusion when the government of the host country increases its security procedures, which tends to occur with the sources of intelligence officers. It is sufficient it to say that diplomats, military attachés or international experts suspected of espionage are decelerated persona non grata, expelled from the country of lodging and returned to their countries of origin on the basis of the Vienna Diplomatic Relations Conference. Efforts to obtain information through diplomatic channels and through intelligence operations are re-evaluated as different by the actors involved, mainly on the basis of the different means used. In the case of military operations, it may be more appropriate to speak of a continuum of combat intelligence and intelligence. Even in combat situations, however, certain specificities have led to intelligence activity. The most obvious is the degree of control that intelligence organizations have over each type of information flow. In the case of combat information, this will normally be the data obtained as a function of the direct contact of the troops with the enemy - and which are used immediately for operational alert or for the decision on immediate action. Although some of these data can later be integrated into the information flows that feed into the production and dissemination stage of intelligence reports, these data are controlled by the (rather than the intelligible) functions of the command structures of the forces. The combat information remains an activity distinct from intelligence activities, In spite of this pragmatic criterion on who controls the means of collection and the resulting informational flows, it is not always easy to apply the criterion. In the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the United Nations military reconnaissance was supported by North American satellites and analysts controlled by the CIA and Pentagon intelligence agencies, as well as counting on intelligence operations . Both the intelligence work and the battle information management depended heavily on the airborne command and control systems such as the AWACS (Airbome Waming and Control Systems) and JSTARS (Joint Swerve Target Attack Radar Systems), subordinated to the allied command in the theatre. In other words, with a greater integration of joint military operations, operational control of specific intelligence resources and combat information can change the sphere of command depending on the needs, as in the case of the military units of tactical intelligence collection eventually used by the artillery or satellites transmitting signals and / or decoding processed directly on the command of unit commanders in the operating theatre. Timelines and the growing sophistication of resources available for the generation of combat information (targeting, alerting, and electronic warfare operations) also contribute to the creation of new shadow areas between intelligence and operational information combat, especially between the areas of intelligence of operations of support of electronic warfare. In particular, when it comes to localize, it identifies and produces countermeasures in the electronic radar and warning systems, and it is difficult to know where one thing starts and another. Intelligence cycle The uncommon descriptions of the intelligence cycle are able to detect up to ten steps or main steps that characterize the activity, namely: 1) Informational requirements. 2) Planning. 3) Management of the technical means of collection. 4) Collection from singular sources. 5) Processing. 6) Analysis of the information obtained from various sources. 7) Producing reports, reports and studies. 8) Dissemination of products. 9) Consumption by users. 10) Evaluation feedback. The idea of intelligence culture must be seen as a metaphor. a simplified model that does not exactly correspond to any truly existing intelligence system. On the other hand, this lack of descriptive perception is not what matters, since the characterization of activities is intelligence, while a complex and directional process of work is important so that qualitative changes can be distinguished that the information suffers during a cycle uninterrupted and interrelated work. The main contribution of the idea of the intelligence cycle is precisely to help understand this As the activity of intelligence and itself a subordinate function of the processes of formulas, decision and implementation of foreign policy, defense and public security, we can also think of the cycle of intelligence as a sub-set of activities of the so-called "public policy cycle": a cycle made by the emergence of problems (issues, the establishment of an agenda, the formation of policies and lines of action, the processes of decision-making, implementation and evaluation. "In this sense, information that intelligence services collect and analyze should be determined by their needs and priorities usuries. Ideally, decision makers, whether elected politicians, ministers, senior civilian bureaucrats, military commanders or police chiefs, identify gaps and information needs, set priorities, and pass them on to intelligence leaders. These, in turn, transform those needs perceived by users into information requirements for the responsible sectors through collection and analysis. Given that even the resources of the countries are scarce, those responsible for the various collection disciplines need to plan the use of the technical means and human resources available to produce the maximum possible synergy and meet the demands of the policymakers. The management of the technical means of collection, depending on the platforms used (airplanes, fixed intercepting units, satellites, etc.), and a specialized activity and highly complex. It is important to point out this difference between the general planning of information collection and the management of technical means, ss Michael Herman (1996: 283-304) and Mark Lowenthal (2000: 40-521) point out in most situations policymakers do not have the time or the clarity to specify the kinds of information they need or will need for what In these cases, the lists of demands tend to be geriatrics (for example, a request for reports on the "situation" in Colombia), or they are formulated without the intelligence officers having a precise idea about the purpose of the information in the general context of the challenges faced by the government (for example, a requirement on the performance of troop transport helicopters of a particular Russian manufacturer, without revealing the area of intelligence that that report is necessary for decision-making regarding the alternatives of action in relation to the conflict in Colombia.) That is, the uncertain nature of politics and the pressure of patterns of thought derived from experience s more or less recent trends tend to make user "requirements" somewhat more structured than the initial assumption of the model. These formal requirements legitimize and provide an authorization for agencies to mobilize their means for the production of intelligence on a particular problem or target, but rather is not the only factor determining the intelligence activity cycle. It will, therefore, fit into the areas of intelligence and use a set of organizational and analytical tools to complete, detail, and address those demands, putting them into more effective informational requirements. While it is imperative that intelligence agencies act on this specification to avoid a "failure of requirements" that would jeopardize the entire cycle, there is a clear risk of intrusion and autonomy of agencies in areas that would be the prerogative of the host authorities. Even taking into account such risks, Michael Herman 11996: 288) maintains that a proactive role of agencies is preferable and compatible with the maintenance of a high level of responsiveness, provided that it is accompanied by procedures for the systematic evaluation of the satisfaction of users with the intelligence products received and external control mechanisms. According to Lisa Krizan 11999: 13-201. even with the correct use of tools aimed at identifying the needs of users (eg taxonomy of problems, lists of questionnaires and timing and scope), and bear in mind that the information flows associated with the requirements present complexity. In addition to structured requirements to meet the needs of the various types of end users, which are communicated to collection agencies by the national and also consider that many of these users communicate their needs directly to collection agencies. And that individual critique analysts call for not only information on the current requirements of users, but also a wider range of information needed for database design and / or a wider understanding of targets and problems on which analysts are working. Finally, it should be noted that collecting agencies also work from opportunities created by eventual security failures of the adversaries. Therefore, procedural, cognitive, and even resource scarcities show that the so-called intelligence activity cycle depends much more on the initiative of the intelligence agencies themselves than the metaphor of a cycle initiated and directed by formal user requirements would indicate the first view. Collection and Processing The specialized collection activities absorb between 80% and 900/0 of government investments in the area of intelligence in the countries Most of these resources are dedicated to the platforms, sensors and technological systems for collecting and processing information, especially the satellites in the case of the United States, Russia, China, France and other few countries that operate such fleets. The volume of raw data and primary information collected is much larger than the reports actually received by the final users. According to an estimate of the 1980s, only 10% of the information collected would come out of the walls of intelligence systems. The means of collecting and the typical sources of information define disciplines which are specialized in intelligence, which the international literature refers to by means of acronyms derived from the use of the United States in the: humid language for information obtained from human sources, sights for the information obtained from the interception and decoding of communications and electromagnetic signals for the information obtained from the production and interpretation of photographic and multispectral images, masint (measurement and signature intelligence) for the information obtained from the onset of other types of emancipation, such as the characteristic and individualized signals of vehicles, platforms and weapons systems. In addition to these disciplines, involving both natural and ostensible sources, when collecting information exclusively from public, private, or electronic sources, this collecting activity is then called osint open sources intelligence. See briefly each of these disciplines. Humint The English word for this discipline (humint) is typically American euphemism, embedded in international jargon because it avoids the use of the espionage term, much heavier from a legal and political point of view. The acronym also is used to indicate that the intelligence obtained from human is far from being summarized as archetypes of espionage. And you need to basically differentiate between two kinds of ties in this area: the intelligence officers, that is those career workers who will work for an intelligence service and are accountable for the information - gathering operations, and their sources, some of which are agents. The current civil and military humint organizations are responsible for but are also affected by a variety of non-natural sources. Base non the pyramide de humint are the less glamorous sources, with access to the less sensitive information and insulated value. Secure services maintain systematic services in ideal interviews; with persons who have access to countries or areas that are "difficult" or difficult, for which information from travellers and occasional travellers, academic experts, business contacts or even refugees and individuals from oppressed communities may be useful. In war situations an important source of information is the populations of occupied areas and the prisoners of war IPOWs interrogated by the intelligence units of the armed forces. In neither of these cases are sources of formal intelligence service and such programs tend to be conducted by other officers of the organization, not the responsible by the espionage operations themselves. However, no. measured in which it passes from the relatively passive exploitation of what the sources already know for a more active attempt to solicit certain types of information (Tasking, this means a certain progression upward in the pyramid.) In this intermediate layer of sources are ad hoc informants, political exiles, opposition parties, etc. The degree of clandestinely in contacts with this type of source can vary, ranging from the formal approach to the provision of specific information, to the manipulation of sources and the obtaining of information without the target having even conscience of the relationship with an intelligence agency, often disguised as a newspaper or commercial contact. On top of secret sources that regularly transmit information that may not be numerous, but tend to be better value-added and high-sensitivity. These regular agents, who are aware that they are spying on their own government or organization and provide more or less vital information to national security for foreign intelligence services, may be both agents recruited by intelligence officers and people who would volunteer to perform such In general, volatile agents are viewed with much disagreement by foreign intelligence services as they may be part of the operations of the security services of the target country and have as their mission misinforming, or infiltrating the intelligence service that it accepts. On the other hand, excessive suspicion may prevent access to a well-placed source. And in the past, the goals by which someone corrodes to spy on an adversary is rather varied and change over. From the point of view of the intelligence services responsible for directing the programs and recruited agents, it is necessary to differentiate two basic categories of intelligence officers from abroad: those operating with official coverage and the others. Official coverage refers to the integration of intelligence officers into the diplomatic corps of the embassy or consulate, disguised as a cultural attaché, political adviser, technician, assistant to the military attaché, representative of the ministry of agriculture, secretary or any other government official an offense to be in that country, and also to grant diplomatic immunity in case of detection of their true activities, since international law requires that such officers be declared personae non grata and expelled from the country. In addition, the authorities of the country being spied on and the security provided by the embassy and consulates, so that the intelligence officers can maintain their archives and comprise themselves with the headquarters of their service, country of origin. The most senior officer conducting intelligence operations in a foreign country heads the "station" (in the North-American jargon, or the rezidentura , in the Russian jargon) of his intelligence service, official coverage facilitates the work of counter-espionage surveillance teams of the target population, limits the types of persons with whom intelligence officers may contact without raising suspicion, and in extreme cases where diplomatic relations are interrupted, this deconstructs the work of collecting information. The use of officers without "official" coverage (N0 in the jargon, or "illegals" in the jargon) are located in the greater flexibility and efficiency of operations. Setting up coverage scenarios that can relate to a variety of social and professional strata representatives of foreigners, foreigners of a third nationality, ecologists, members of the clergy, doctors, etc.), intelligence services amplify the range of possible targets for the recruitment of agents and informants, and make work difficult of counter-espionage surveillance. On the other hand, this may limit contact with the official world, expose the service frameworks to a much higher level, not to mention that nongovernmental coverage requires a much longer maturation and training period, as well as logistical requirements and communications are much more complex. In general, intelligence obtained from human sources (humint) is not only the oldest and cheapest way of obtaining secret information, but it is also the most problematic. Management problems range from the enormous pressure on staff recruited, no matter what kind of promotion has led them to spy, to the difficulties associated with controlling the credibility of the source and the reliability and accuracy of information, in addition to the risks represented counter-espionage operations of adversaries which attempt to neutralize the agents or then corrode them as double agents, there is a risk always present in the sources themselves, tempted to fill certain informational data with information made in paper mills. In addition to security issues and difficulties in controlling the quality of the information obtained, other operational features of the humint area are derived from the long processes of identification and recruitment of agents, from restricted committees between agents and their controllers, and of all the cognitive and intellectual systems inherent in direct human obeisance. Despite these limitations, it is irreplaceable as a source of information. Especially when it comes to discovering the real intentions of an actor, intercepted messages (sigint) or photographs (imint) are insufficient evidences. Documents and oral explanations present, at least potentially, a degree of comprehensiveness that the other disciplines of collection have not yet been able to obtain. Spying is often indispensable for an effective exploitation of other sources of information, as the that the production of copies of coded books and ciphered materials has always helped the cryptology area of the sigint organization. Based on this flexible and specialized organizational track record of Michael Herman (1996: 65-66), there is a tendency for organizations specialized in humint to function as multipurpose organizations, ranging from actual espionage to the pioneering development of new forms of collection of information through technical means. Sigint The second ancient discipline of collecting information is known as intelligence of sin or siqint (signals intelligence). Historically, siqint has originated from interception, decoding, translation and analysis of samples by a third party, besides the issuer and the intended offender. With the increasing use of communications written for military or diplomatic purposes in the modern world, the disciplines of cryptography (use of codes and figures to ensure the inviolability of messages and cryptology [deciphering and / or decoding of intercepted messages. Intelligence is divided into two compliant fields, called comint (communications intelligence) and elint (electronics intelligence). Intelligence of communications, or comint, and obtained through the interception, processing and pre-analysis of the communications of governments, organizations and individuals, except for the monitoring of public radio and television broadcasting, which fall in the area of osint. In addition to the access to the content of the transmitted messages, one can also monitor the traffic patterns of messages between different points (traffic analysis and also through direction-indices -DF) traffic and localization of transmissions are an integral part of the comint discipline. In turn, electronic intelligence, or elint. and obtained through the interception, processing and pre-analysis of non-communicative electromagnetic signals emitted with civilian equipment, with the exception of the ernissces resulting from nuclear explosions, which fall in the area of masint specialization (see below). The first targets of the elint operations were the radars of the air defense systems With the development of the missiles and the proliferation of the use of electronic equipment throughout the Cold War, they will have other prioritary targets for various types of radar, mainly operating systems (target acquisition, browsers, mobile phones, etc.) and command, control, communication, and intelligence systems. According to Jeffrey Richelson (1999: 182-1851), the ease with which communications and / or electronic signals can be intercepted and interpreted depends on three factors: the method of transmission the frequencies employed, and the use of defensive measures, especially encryption. The most secure way of transmitting important and non-communicable information, but "radio silence" policies and emission reduction programs run counter to the needs of communication of complex organizations and human failures, or less inevitable. At a less demanding level, large amount through land and sea cables, especially fibber optic cables, are also safer. The interception of this type of traffic depends on the physical access to the tapping cables, a low productivity and costly operation, which is extremely difficult in the case of fibber optic cables. In the other hand, since the advent of the wireless telegraph, the transmission of electromagnetic signals transmitted by air has made it physically simpler to collect information, raising the potential for the importance of safety measures and the need to According to these measures, sigint organizations now face not only sophisticated, commercially available cryptographic and scrambling features but also a variety of technologies, technologies, and communications systems for military use that challenge interception and decoding. Throughout the INTELSAT International Telecommunications Satellite Organization satellites network, more than two-thirds of all international telephone traffic passes, virtually all international trunks of television signals, as well as most digitized fingers and - mail, video and teleconferences. Given the disparity of media in the area of intelligence gathering, the capacity such as the United States and, to a lesser extent, the other Western European countries of NATO, Russia and China, tends to be much higher than the capacity of other governments or companies guarantee the safety of their Icomsecj commissions, even with the cheapening of new ITIC information and communication technologies. As was widely publicized during European Parliament investigations in 1999 on the so-called Echelon, only the United States network of ten fixed stations monitoring global satellite communications intercepted a monthly volume. about the number of messages, including Internet, telephony, cell telephony, bank transfers, fax services, and other signals. In fact, considering all other systems and platforms combined, the interception capacity of the United States and much larger than that. According to Matthew Aid (2000: 17-21, as early as 1995 the central agency of the US INSA) was able to intercept a volume of signals equivalent to all the information volume of the Library of Congress (1 quadrillion bits) every three hours of operation of platforms and sensors in the whole world. The major problem of the sigint area would be the lack of agility to process such huge volumes of intercepts. Existing estimates for the United States point to a re-examination of one input system for each reporting. And the processing of the volume of intercepted traffic are no less important than the low yield of useful material in re-reading of the total volume. While the NSA was able to process 20 percent of everything that was intercepted in the 1980s, since the explosion of new technologies in 1990, the agency would not be able to process more than 1% of all intercepted material. Processing, decoding, translation, storage, retrieval, and dissemination of systems are as important as or more decisive for investment in research and development, such as technologies, sensors and collection platforms. Especially in the North American and Russian cases, in addition to large terrestrial traffic interception stations, listening posts are also used in foreign capitals (for interception of official short-distance communications, including cellular phones), operation centers and from mobile aircraft and drones (UAVs) to ships and submarines equipped with sensors and personnel specialized in the collection of sigi. Since the 1960s, however, no platform has been so important and how much the satellites of electronic surveillance and interception of communications. These large "ears" or "aspirators" began to be placed in space orbit even before the imaging satellites and constitute the majority of the fleets of spy satellites.61 Basically, they existed currently main types of satellites of sigint. Imint Although visual evidence has been important for military operations long before the invention of photography, the emergence of the imint area as a specialized discipline of information gathering and subsequent use of the military aircraft for reconnaissance and surveillance during and after the two wars of the twentieth century. Photographic images, televised images and other types of visual evidence are also obtained by intelligence officers, reconnaissance patrols, and surveillance teams on land and at sea. However, the development of imint as a specialized discipline for the collection of information was mainly based on the use of photographic cameras and aerial-space platforms. According to William Odom (19 97: 791 and Jeffrey Richelson 11999: 1501), the historical roots of collection and use of visual evidence for the production of intelligence go back to the drawings made by military officers in reconnaissance missions. terrain, panoramas, fortifications, ports, etc.) have historically been part of the necessities for the planning and execution of military operations. However, current aerospace platforms for the collection of visual evidence have had recent roms in the company of aerostiers (balloons) organized by the French after RevCucec of 1789. or in similar attempts to use haloes for reconnaissance missions by troops of the United States during the American Civil War of 1861-1865, and later in the late 19th century by the British and German armies. As of World War I, photographic work began to be installed on sent airplanes in reconnaissance missions, the greater reach of the aircraft at the time of the Second War allowed a bold use of air reconnaissance flights covered by enemy territory. By using everchanging chambers, films, and lenses for vertical and oblique photos, mounted on pocketable aircrafts and adapted bombers, an intense and systematic exploration of visual evidence in the production of in- of the Cold War after 1945, the nature of the territory of the Soviet Union and the lack of access to other sources of information led the United States to intensify high-altitude aerial photographs over Soviet territory and in its more immediate periphery the development of systems and specialized platforms in intelligence collection has since added a specific layer to the competitive and conflictive policy that would mark the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The diplomatic-military revenues derived from the violation of the air space of nations and represented by the enhancement of defensive countermeasures for detecting and intercepting spy planes, have led most countries to a relatively restricted use of flights to destinations of reconnaissance. Until 1960, however, the United States used several types of aircraft for reconnaissance missions over the Soviet territory, especially because for some time U-2s, high-speed, range and altitude were unreachable by Soviet interceptors, although these airplanes were and still are used in a variety of places and missions, the episode of the overthrow of one of them by Soviet planes in 1960 was the milestone of a new stage in the development of the area of imint. At the beginning of the decade, the United States, and soon afterwards the Soviet Union, succeeded for the first time in orbiting spy satellites capable of flying over adversarial territories and photographing targets on an impermissible scale with the systems then available. Despite the high degree of secrecy surrounding military satellite image programs, between 1967 (when the Outer Space Treaty was signed) and 1992 (when the Open Skies Treaty was signed), or the restricted club of the powers that have collection capacities of immin from space platforms more or less tacitly accepted the inevitability of these over flights. With much more limited resources than those available to the United States and Russia, these countries include (or will include in the next years) France, China, India, China, Israel, South Africa, Canada, North Korea, and Taiwan. Over the last decade, some of the technical and political advantages of satellites have even affected the countries that have their own fleets, as far as they are concerned in which commercially sold images with better resolution will be made available. In general, these developments have contributed for the discipline of imint every time central to the operational dynamics of the collection activities of intelligence. In the first place, image satellites can cross the territory of a country without being considered by international law as a violation of the national airspeed. Basically, image satellites move in relatively low altitude circular orbits than sigint satellites (eg the North American imaging satellites known as KH-11 advanced operate with 241km of perigee and 965km of apogee. orbits, the orbital altitude, and defined according to the needs of a greater accuracy of the images collected, or with a greater amplitude of area to be coherent in each periodical passage in the same areas of interest to the orbital plane of the Earth, one can rotate the orbiter gradually along the annulus to compensate for the effect of the passage of Earth around the sun. This ensures that the photographic images of a region will always be in the same conditions of sunlight, in addition to the work of photogrammetry and interpretation the successive generations of satellite image were improved in relation to the permanence period in orbit, for the adjustment of orbital parameters, to data transfer systems and in relation to payload. While the first satellites recover their images in films that once exposed, were ejected and needed to be collected after their re-entry into the atmosphere, with the use of digital systems since the 1980s, photographs and other digital images were automatically transmitted to the station from ground to ground directly. This has led to an increase in the useful life of the satellites and greater agility in the collection and processing cycle. Masint Indeed, the area known as intelligence derived from generalizing in the United States since 1986, as an attempt to classify and agitate an array of activities, programs, and specialized agencies that are not easily accommodated in the most established collection practices of visual or communicative evidences from the use of the media. The unification of this set of activities under the same rubric was due more to an organizational need than to some common trace between phenomena observed, or even among the technical merits used for monitoring. In the North American context, they are part of the masin area from the collection and technical processing of hyperspectral and multispectral images, to the interception of telemetry signals from foreign missiles being tested, including the monitoring of geophysical phenomena (acoustic, seismic and magnetic by the measurement of levels of nuclear radiation in the earth's surface and in space by recording and analyzing unintentional radiation from electronic equipment and radars, and to stay here, by collecting and analyzing physic-chemical materials (effluents, particles, waste, parts of foreign equipment etc.). According to Jeffrey Richelson 11999: 214-2401, at least three types of North American satellites carry dedicated sensors for the collection of masts: 1) The satellites of the DefInP Program IDSPI are equipped with infrared sensors (different from the sensors used for the production the data derived from these sensors allow the identification of the types of buses used and the spectral signatures associated with different systems of missiles. In theory, any terrestrial events that generate enough radioactivity infrared sensors to be detected from the space can be measured and identified by the DSP satellite sensors) NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites are equipped with nuclear INUDETj. Although the primary mission of NAVSTAR satellites is to provide accurate location data for target acquisition and navigation purposes, the orbit of the 17,700-kilometer orbit of the constellation of 21 NAVSTAR satellites has made the Pentagon also use for the global monitoring of nuclear detonations, which can be detected by x-ray, gama and pulse electromagnetic. Also, weather-using satellites IDMSPj are equipped with sensors for electromagnetic radiation and "tracking" of pieces of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. In addition to sensors installed in spacecraft, other technical means used by the United States for collecting masts involve airborne platforms for detecting and collecting samples of chemical and bacteriological agents in the atmosphere, fixed straps for monitoring missiles [such as the station radar "phased COBRA DANE, located on Shemya Island, Alaska], seismological laboratories at Air Force technical intelligence center, passive radars boarded on war ships, for monitoring of re - entry space vehicles, hydrophone undersea networks for acoustic monitoring submarines, and spacecraft over the ocean etc Unfortunately, the limited information available on the nature of the masint activities pertains to that country. Such a diversity of means of collection and types of data collected stems not only from the technical-scientific complexity of the phenomena observed, but also of the scale of the operations and military forces of the United States. One of the main functions of the masint area and the collection of information on singular characteristics - the signatures - of weapon systems, combat vehicles, aircraft, ships and radars for the assembly of databases and later employment in systems of acquisition of target, or for the production of military intelligence and monitoring of international treaties, especially in the nuclear area. Osint The dissemination of electronic bases accessible via the Internet has vastly increased the role of collecting intelligibility from more or less specialized ostensible sources. The charitable intelligence of ostensible sources or osint (open sources intelligence) has always been important to any governmental intelligence system, but there is a reasonable consensus in literature that its importance has recently grown in the context of the so-called "informational explosion" of intelligence. In general, it consists of the legal issuance of official documents without security restrictions, direct and non-clandestine observation of political aspects. military, and economic aspects of the internal life of other countries or targets, the monitoring of media, radio and relaying, legal filing of specialized books and journals of a scientific and natural character, in a more or less extensive range of available sources and permitted in the strictest security restrictions. When open political regimes and strict measures of security of a target for the circulation of information, plus the amount of intelligence potentially obtained from political programs, Under the most restrictive conditions, the volume of available ostensible information tends to be very high. For example, it is now known that during the Cold War a joint program of the CIA and the. U.S. Air Force summarized and / or fully translated most of the technoscientific publications of the Soviet Union. As early as 1956, $ 50 meant the actual content of 328 scientific journals and about 3,000 books and monographs per year. With the end of the Cold War, the acceleration of the. globalization and the advent of new information and communication technologies the availability of ostensible sources increased enormously. According to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence IDDCII, in 1992 the CIA foreign media watch service (0 Foreign Broadcast Information Service - FBISI monitored 790 hours of TV programming per week in 50 countries and 29 different languages. The FBIS monitoring events were then located in places as different as Abidjan, Aran, Asuncion, Bangkok, Panama City, Hong Kong, Islamabad, Key West, London, Mbabane, Nicosia, Okinawa, Seoul, Tel Aviv and Sierra. of techno-scientific publications and conventional media, in 1997 the CIA and OIA osint programs already had commercial access to nearly eight thousand databases of electronic data via the Internet, in addition to the signing of two thousand electronic journals? In the case of the United States, the main programs and offices available for the collection of ostensible information are the agencies and departments in charge of the analysis stage in the intelligence cycle. Information Security and Counterintelligence The most elementary operational dynamics of the area of ineligibility is also less understood by outside observers, and the one engendered from its conflict with the security measures that are taken by a potential target to protect its information. Starting from the restrictive practice of intelligence running the risk of exaggerated formalisation-while intelligence seeks to conquer what the co managers and rulers who direct it need to know about the problems and problems related to the identity of the State and the citizens, the area of information security , or i for atio ’s security seeks to protect the information that, once obtained by an army or an enemy-for example, after the intelligence operations of a foreign govern could make the state and the citizens clear and unstable. The area of intelligence and the area of security exert symmetrical and mutually dependent factors. From the operational point of view, while the main task of the lobby area is to try to find the "or", the main part of the area of information and ensure that the "others" that we know what they know about us. The two objectives are fulfilled in the contemporary State by distinct organizations, and security can be considered as a managerial function in organizations and a responsibility of the command in military organizations. But psychosis occurs because both activities exist simultaneously and interact in a more or less synergistic fashion for each actor involved in an informational conflict. On the other hand, the dialectic between intelligence and security is more complex than the mere offensive dichotomy. Information security can be thought of as consisting of three relatively autonomous components: ISCMI security countermeasures. counterintelligence [Cl] and security of IOPSEq operations. The first component is formed by the protective measures that "mirror" the adverse capacities of obtaining information. Such measures range from programs for the classification of government secrets, special storage, rules of custody and transfer of documents, physical restrictions on access to prisons and archives for unauthorized persons, investigations of personnel employed prior to the granting of credentials of access to the classified information and surveillance of their contacts with foreign and foreign personnel, the various policies and layers of electronic security in computer networks and the use of cryptography for the preservation of the segregation of communications (comsec). In the military area, this set of ISCM countermeasures, or seizures, also includes the use of muffling to evade the signals of imminent enemy forces, reductions in intentional signatures and "signatures" "as measures against masint, training to withstand interrogatories and other preventive measures against the collection of humint. Educational programs in the area of protection of knowledge fall into this first "family" of actions in the field of knowledge » the second set of measures of intelligence depends on the identification of intelligence operations of an adversary, the detection and neutralization of the intrusive means of obtaining information used by a government or organization considered hostile. Although the traditional foe of the ICI counterintelligence area has been counter-espionage, the scope of the neutralization measures of intelligence gathering operations of an adversary goes far beyond the identification and repression of its humint collection networks. As Michael Herman (1996: 168) wrote, an agent may be arrested, a foreign intelligence officer acting under diplomatic cover may be expelled from the country after being declared persona non grata, but also microphones and telephonic tapping may be " and can be felled or forced to save, collection races of siqint can be captured in case of breach of territorial waters, and so on. For all these measures, knowledge accumulated by the counterintelligence area is fundamental. Thirdly, due to the safety of the operations (hereinafter referred to as the set of procedures aimed at identifying which information on equipment, operations, capabilities and intentions would be critical for an individual to obtain. However, in this analysis, it proposes a set of measures to actively deny such information to the Adviser. Although it also involves some programs for the reduction of noise and unintended signals, radio alerts, camouflage, and others, which could confuse this area of operational security stands out fundamentally for its active dimension, especially what military literature calls deception operations, used to mislead and induce an enemy to error through the use of accomplishment, deceit, deceit, concealment, and dissimulation, causing it to produce a misleading analysis of the situation. Covered Operations The so-called covert operations are named differently and cover varied activities in different countries, but have been widely used by major international potentials throughout the twentieth century, which is even more controversial than conventional moos intelligence operations. In the United States, these are called covert actions (CAs or covert Actions), and, in England, by the simple name of special political actions ). Although it is not possible to develop here a more complete analysis of the problems associated with this type of activity, at least one of these aspects deserves a brief summary. The first aspect relates to the types of operations encompassed by the concept, while the second aspect relates to the relationship between such covert operations and the collection activities analysis and counter-intelligence discussed here. Covered events are used by a government or organization to attempt to systematically influence the behaviour of another government or organization through the manipulation of economic, social, and political aspects relevant to that actor, in a manner conducive to the interests and values of the organization or government it sponsors the operation. The two main characteristics of the covert issues in the field of power are, according to Mark Lowenthal (2000: II-113) and Abram Shulsky (1992: 83-85), their instrumental character for policy implementation and the plausibility requirement for denial of authority. The first feature is that covert operations as coercive tools in the implementation of an external policy, such as the one. for example, economic embargoes or the range of options relating to the use or threat of use of the force. The second character emphasizes the denial of authorship, rather than the centrality of the operation itself. It is possible to classify the hidden operations according to the scale and intensity of the use of force means and the degree of plausibility of the denial of authorship. Four types of covert operations can be selected. - The first type and the most extraneous, involving the membership of existing groups for financing and organizing groups for the war and underground warfare, paramilitary operations, guerrilla warfare, counter-terrorism or terrorism campaigns. The involvement of a government in such cases can range from financial support and the provision of weapons, explosives, and equipment, to a more direct engagement in logistics, training, intelligence, and combat fighters specializing in special operations."). Historical examples of such operations include, among many others, the "secret" war conducted by the United States in Laos 1960 -1975 and the British counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya 1950. - A second set of covert operations involves so-called "wet affairs", ranging from support for coups d'état and attempted assassinations of leaders of the government forces, including irregular military operations at a border, sabotage and perpetration of acts terrorists. Examples of such operations are the CIA-sponsored coups in Ira (1953) and Guatemala 19541, the American campaign of destabilization of the Allende government in Chile (19701973), the assassination of Palestinian leadership by the services Israeli secrets in the 1980s, or the sinking of Greenpeace's Rainbolu tVanior by the French secret services in 1985. - The third type involves operations of economic and political sabotage against opposing forces or, on the other hand, governments and allied forces, such as political parties, neogovernmental organizations. communication means etc. The CIA campaign to prevent the victory of communists in the Italian elections of 1947 and an example of this type of operation. as well as the sale of weapons to Iraq (led by the United States presidency in 1986, with Israeli and Saudi intervention). The training of the security forces and intelligence of the post-revolutionary regimes of the Yemen in the 1970s by the East German foreign intelligence service, or the help of the Soviet Union's Communist Party to about parties and groups in foreign countries until the 1980s. On the other hand, the fourth type of covert operations comprises a set of measures to try to influence the perceptions of a government or even of society as a whole, through agents of influence, disinformation, and falsification of money or documents, in addition to the various types or types of transactions. This is the type of covert operation and there are examples, perhaps the most fertile ones were the Free Europe and Liberty radios, clandestinely established by the CIA in Europe in 1949 and 1951.