Defence and Security

This study examines the role of political factors in attitudes toward World War II in contemporary Ukraine. The question under examination is which factors determine public views of the principal warring sides and their leaders in Ukraine. This paper uses a representative national survey specifically designed for this research project and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in 2012. It analyzes the roles of regionalism, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, age, and sex in attitudes toward the Red Army, Soviet partisans, the German Army (Wehrmacht), and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during the war, as well as toward the wartime leaders of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and the UPA. The analysis of the survey data shows that regional values, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, and age have significant effects on views of the Soviet Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the war and attitudes toward the wartime activities of Joseph Stalin and Roman Shukhevych. Public perceptions of the German Army and Adolf Hitler in Ukraine do not vary much across regions, political parties, and ethnic, language, age, and sex groups.

This essay will criticize the notion of terrorism and asserting the extremist morphology to prevail in the issue and its impact in the context of the international peace and security in the contemporary controversies.
It will weigh the actions and outcome as evident rather than quoting the statement or claimed vision as the ground analysis albeit contradictions should be exhibited for argument.

With cybercrime’s yearly revenues estimated at $1 trillion and national security networks probed daily and often breached, cyber security is a vital concern for public and private organizations globally. This research ponders the problem of improving information security by looking at organizations under the lens of Socio-technical systems. The main objective of this study is to ascertain if Net Assessment, one of the principal frameworks for analyzing the United States’ national security strategy, can be used to improve an organization’s capabilities in the field of information and cyber security through its multidisciplinary and holistic approach. To reach this goal, the study identifies and analyzes the aspects Net Assessment offers which are not
included in current information security risk management and assessment methodologies.
The research follows an inductive process, designed using a qualitative approach which makes use of content analysis, comparative analysis and purposive sampling. The first step drafts
a list of current information security risk assessment and risk management methodologies, and then isolates a representative sample. The second step identifies and analyzes existing metaanalytical methods and models devoted to the appraisal, selection, and indexing of risk management and assessment methods. It then defines a categorization framework capable of
accurately capturing the different risk management and assessment method’s functionalities. A third step maps the coverage of the two selected methodologies (NIST and ISO) against the identified functionality categories. After a critical analysis of Net Assessment, and a reasoned estimate of its main differences and capabilities in the context of information security, Net Assessment’s features are mapped in the category list.
The comparison of the features of the three methodologies identifies Net Assessment as a very credible avenue for improving multiple aspects currently neglected by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) frameworks. The study results maintain that, if implemented as a companion to these standards, Net Assessment may improve an organization’s security strategy, its allocation of funding for security, provide more accurate estimates of risks and threats, better alignment between potential risks and countermeasures, and improve the inputs for real time and automatic tools.

Değişen güvenlik anlayışının doğal sonucu olarak çatışma ortamları da değişmiştir. Dolayısıyla İnsansız Hava Araçları (İHA) ve Silahlı İnsansız Hava Araçları (SİHA) günümüzün değişen çatışma ortamları için hayati derecede önemli görülen araçlar haline gelmiştir. Çalışmanın amacı, bu değişen çatışma ortamlarında SİHA'ların durumunu tespit etmek, kullanımına ilişkin karar mekanizmaları bağlamında yetki ve sorumluluk ilişkisini açıklamaktır. Çalışmanın yöntemi, görsel ve yazılı basın ile doküman ve literatüre bakılarak tanımlayıcı bir araştırma yöntemidir. Abstract Conflict environments have also changed as a result of changing security. So that Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (AUAV) have become vital vehicles for today's changing conflict environments. The aim of this study is to determine the status of the AUAVs in these changing conflict environments and to explain the relationship between authority and responsibility in the context of decision-making mechanisms. The method of the study is a descriptive research method based on visual and printed media, documents and literature.

Italy’s new Defence Minister Elisabetta Trenta has stressed that NATO should do more for the Southern flank, while reassuring partners of Italy’s intention to fulfil its commitments on the Eastern one. Grounded in an uneasy and unprecedented alliance between the Lega and M5S, the government’s priorities in foreign and defence policy will need to trace a difficult balance between the radical change each coalition partner has promised its electorate, and the institutional (and budgetary) constraints of governance that have generally led Italian executives to embrace pragmatism in foreign and defence policy.

Society expects the heads of institutions to uphold an ongoing ethical commitment and to manage public and private organisations with the greatest level of responsibility possible. This expectation is reflected in legislative reforms in Spain and in the growing implementation of the current Spanish strategy for social responsibility by the Public Administration.

This paper sets out the proactive role that ethical leadership and social responsibility should play as two levers for improvement in the running and management of security and defence institutions in Spain, as well as for helping to promote the commitment, innovation and quality of public services.

The exercise of ethical leadership is based on justice, respect for people, transparency, participation and sustainability. A culture of responsibility should be developed in line with the current Spanish strategy for social responsibility in order to foster the improvement of institutions at all levels, an increase in efficiency, and the provision of a better service to society.

Wie hat sich der Schweizer Sicherheitsbereich seit Ende des Kalten Krieges entwickelt? Wer arbeitet heute mit wem zu welchen Gefahren? Basierend auf einer umfassenden und einzigartigen Datenerhebung kartiert dieser Beitrag die Entwicklung des gesamtschweizerischen Sicherheitsbereichs. Die Darstellung der praktischen Arbeitsteilungen, inneren und äusseren Kooperationen, beruflichen Profile und Werdegänge schafft einen analytisch differenzierten und empirisch fundierten Beitrag zu anhaltenden Diskussionen über die landesweite sicherheitspolitische Steuerung.

There is now available a nonlethal brain-based, scientifically-verified, field-tested, human resource-based technology to create lasting peace. Armed forces and civilian groups worldwide have been and are currently deploying this cost-effective approach known as Invincible Defense Technology (IDT). Militaries use IDT to stop and prevent war, terrorism, crime and to make their homelands secure. IDT has been quietly demonstrated by these groups in particularly conflict-prone regions to be the ultimate approach for conducting operations other than war (OOTW). In defense-related circles IDT is gaining attention as leaders realize this is the ultimate OOTW strategy. The nation that properly deploys IDT becomes invincible, unconquerable, and incapable of being defeated; attaining victory BEFORE war by preventing enemies from ever arising. With IDT so easy to implement and so effective at creating invincibility, why haven't all militaries deployed this strategy? The answer can be found in Dr. Carla Linton Brown's Harvard University doctoral dissertation and subsequent paper published in the Journal of Social Behavior and Personality on attitudes towards Invincible Defense Technology. ,,,Italian airpower advocate General Giulio Douhet's strategy still applies today:  "Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the change in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur." ...We may never know who would be inspired by this document to take action in India as well as other countries worldwide to utilize IDT as an OOTW strategy to creating lasting peace.

It is observed that the biggest problem or complication that the cyber world is facing at present is not of its being a universal domain but being a domain which is still highly unregulated. For a domain which is clearly three decades old, the existing regulations are clearly not sufficient. Cyber space is replete with conflicts, and threatened by a variety of threats caused by different players like unethical hackers/crackers, terrorists and non-state actors, and also by the use of covert cyber capabilities by nation states. However, the global cyber community is more focussed on enhancing and upgrading the technology in use, rather than taking coherent measures to stabilise and secure the domain, in spite of awareness about the growing threat perceptions. This is evident from the fact that new advances and further upgradation in technology are taking place daily and, as a result, new threats are emerging, while safety and security related developments are put on the back burner, and are not so often in the news. Hence, there is an urgent need to rectify this scenario and a pragmatic solution has to be found to regulate cyber space to the extent possible.

"The aim of this monograph is to present the European Defence Agency (EDA), an institution of the European Union, established in July 2004. The author focuses on the description of the Agency as such, analyzes its activities until 2011, as well as presents possible scenarios of its development, especially on the basis of current predictions of future international security environment. This publication is a complex scientific description of the European Defence Agency subject and its transfer on the ground of polish science which until now had no monograph on this matter.

The first chapter characterises EDA, historical context and reasons behind its establishment. Author describes and analyzes Agencies’ legal basis and its functioning, as well as outlines its internal structure. Moreover, he pictures Agency relations with other institutions within the European Union institutional framework and with these outside the EU, having an influence on EDA’s functions and tasks.

Chapter II depicts activities of the European Defence Agency in the years 2004 – 2011. Author characterises Agencies’ and its member state’s struggle with the realization of four main goals for which EDA has been established. He presents its previous successes in the field of creation of military capabilities and points out magnitude of work still to be done.

Third and final chapter tries to anticipate the future of the European Defence Agency. Author illustrates respectively: security challenges for Europe yet to come; future of Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU and implications for the development of defence capabilities; as well as the most important external and internal factors, which will have an influence on EDA in the second decade of XXI century and more distant future.

Conclusions of the monograph allow to place the thesis that European Defence Agency is already an important part of the European defence capabilities creation landscape. Despite uncertain future and dependency on the good will of its member
states, EDA has the potential to become one of the main pillars of European defence."

2021. gads visā pasaulē turpināja ritēt COVID-19 pandēmijas zīmē, tostarp ietekmējot arī Latvijas aizsardzību ziskajā un virtuālajā telpā. Neskatoties uz pandēmiju, aizsardzības nozare turpināja līdzšinējo gadu a īstības virzienu, lai gan nozares problēmjautājumi savu aktualitāti saglabāja. 2021. gadā apritēja arī pirmā desmitgade, kopš Latvijā faktiski izveidota nacionāla mēroga kiberdrošības sistēma. Vienlaikus 2021. gads bija sava veida paradoksu gads. Komandantstunda tika ieviesta, un civilās mobilizācijas mēģinājums notika atbildē uz pandēmiju, bet ne reaģējot uz militāru apdraudējumu. Savukārt bruņoto spēku vienības tika nosūtītas uz robežu ar Baltkrieviju, bet ne uz robežu ar Krieviju. Tas lika vēlreiz pārdomāt gan drošības risku diapazonu, gan arī mūsdienu karadarbības vides transformāciju.

This thesis is an investigation of the factors relating to the translation of United Kingdom strategic direction into military capability. Concentrating on decisions taken below the political level, by the military officers and civil servants in the most senior positions within the Ministry of Defence and at the very top of the armed forces, it answers the question ‘why does the United Kingdom have the military that it has?’ In doing so, this thesis has identified the factors that have shaped capability choices and determined why those choices have had the effect that they have. Its analysis has drawn on historical trends and contemporary elite interviews to assess whether the nation’s current methodology to link strategic direction and the development and maintenance of military capability will fare any better than its predecessors.

The participation of the Republic of Angola in the African Peace and Security Architecture represents, in the current sub-Saharan context, the example of a search for strategic affirmation of a rising regional power, through a participatory, influential foreign policy and commitment, bet at strategic balance duality in which the Angolan Armed Forces are an instrument of military cooperation and conflict resolution in Angolan´s conjectural interest space in a context about to be non-permanent member of the Security Council in the United Nations

A participação da República de Angola na Arquitectura de Paz e Segurança Africana representa, no atual contexto subsariano, o exemplo da procura de afirmação de uma potência regional em ascensão, que através de uma Política Externa participativa, influente e de compromisso, aposta numa dualidade estratégica de equilíbrio, em que as Forças Armadas Angolanas são empregues como instrumento de cooperação militar regional e de resolução de conflitos no seu espaço de interesse conjuntural, num quadro geopolítico em que a república de Angola se constitui como membro não permanente do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas.

This article presents a critical view on the current situation with Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW). It analyzes a set of official documents in an attempt to empathize the reason behind the existing lack of field operationally useful NLW. On the one hand, it points at the significant necessity for less-lethal capabilities formulated by the official vision on future security environment. On the other, it claims that the definition of requirements from current, developing and future NLW misleads military industrial complex from developing NLW that will answer this emerging necessity. The article argues that the current detrimental situation with NLW is not a result of an enormous technological gap, but rather an outcome of the mis-definition of NLW requirements that fail to correspond with defined future threats.

A Szovjetunió felbomlását követően a NATO keleti bővítése szinte végig teljes mértékben az USA és nyugati szövetségesei elképzelései szerint alakult. Az identitás-válságban szenvedő, útját kereső, súlyos gazdasági gondokkal küzdő, gyenge Oroszországot a nyugat részéről meg lehetett győzni arról, hogy a német újraegyesítést követően a NATO keleti bővítése nem fog folytatódni. A továbbiakban a NATO keleti bővítése nem ütközött különösebb ellenállásba vagy akadályba, Moszkva tehetetlenül tudomásul vett mindent. Ez egészen az ukrajnai és grúziai háborús konfliktusig folytatódott, amikor Oroszország először tanúsított érdemi és történelmi következményekkel járó ellenállást, elhalasztva Ukrajna és Grúzia felvételét a NATO-ba.
A NATO keleti bővítése elleni orosz ellenállás radikalizálódásának és új minőségi szintre lépésének mérföldköve a 2021 decemberében az USA számára átadott, majd rövidesen nyilvánosságra hozott orosz biztonság- és védelempolitikai kezdeményezés. Ez radikálisan új helyzetet teremt (!). Minden jel arra mutat, hogy Oroszország alaposan átgondolta az egészet és nem blöfföl.  Moszkva a továbbiakban nem tűri el a NATO további keleti bővítését és nyugati együttműködés hiányában saját katonai-technikai (katonai infrastruktúra telepítése) és katonai eszközeivel (katonai beavatkozás) fogja garantálni érdekei érvényesítését. Az orosz álláspont lényege, hogy a nyugat „vagy arrébb megy” a katonai fenyegetéssel, vagy „arrébb lesz téve.”
Szinte teljesen kizárt, hogy az USA és a NATO elfogadja az orosz kezdeményezésben foglalt, leglényegesebb pontokat,    mivel ehhez a nyugat részéről a korábbi elvek és a gyakorlat teljes felülvizsgálatára,  illetve korábbi „alapelvek” jelentős részének feladására lenne szükség.  Marad tehát az orosz érdekérvényesítés katonai dimenziójának megtapasztalása, mint „végső érv”.  Mindez nem jelent NATO-orosz háborút, ugyanakkor a Szövetség keleti bővítésének végét valószínűleg igen, emellett az eddigiekben nem látott mértékű gazdasági adok-kapok játszmát is valószínűleg igen. Emellett várható a nyugat és kelet harcának további éleződése, aminek többek között az orosz-kínai együttműködés minden eddiginél sokkal szorosabbra zárása valószínűleg következménye lesz.  Ez a küzdelem egy negatív végösszegű játszma, ami a nyugat relatív hanyatlását és a kelet további felemelkedését fogja gyorsítani.

Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine highlighted NATO as a military danger to the Russian Federation. NATO was listed explicitly in first place among these dangers - specifically the “striving to ascribe global functions to the force capability of NATO, implemented in breach of international law, and bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by means of enlarging the bloc”.

Significantly for our interpretation of Russian statements, NATO is listed as a military danger not as a military threat. The distinction in Russian doctrinal lexicon is important – a “danger” is a situation with the potential “under certain conditions” to develop into an immediate military threat, rather than a threat per se. Clear definitions for both military threat and military danger are included in the Doctrine, as well as the distinction between military conflict and armed conflict. Previously to be found in other doctrinal statements, these definitions are essential for a precise understanding of the threat picture as expressed by official Russia.

Other military dangers include deployment of foreign forces on territory adjacent to Russia and its allies, not only on land but also at sea; the creation of strategic missile defence forces; and the development of strategic non-nuclear precision weapons systems.

Development of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a fundamental task in deterring and preventing armed conflict, alongside cooperation with other international organisations including, interestingly, NATO. Russia will also contribute forces to the CSTO’s rapid reaction group and for deployment as CSTO peacekeepers. Furthermore, the CSTO’s collective defence provision, similar to but more binding than NATO’s Article 5, is now explicitly included in Russian doctrine.

Despite widespread reporting that the new Doctrine would display increased readiness for first use of nuclear weapons, this provision is if anything subtly rolled back from the 2000 version of the Military Doctrine – instead of first use “in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation”, the criterion is now “when the very existence of the State is under threat”. The related provision promising no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states acting alone has been dropped. But Russia’s precise stance on nuclear use is detailed in a classified addendum to the Doctrine, so remains unclear.

The provision for use of Russian forces overseas “to defend the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and to protect international peace and security” is included. Operations overseas to remove threats or suppress aggression can also be undertaken at the instigation of the UN “or other bodies”.

Preparation for mobilisation receives substantial attention, with several sections retained verbatim from the 2000 Doctrine and others new or re-drafted. These provisions concern both the economy and the military, with no regard to the substantial reorganisation of the military during 2009 towards permanent readiness and away from a mobilisation army.

Information warfare (a concept which largely overlaps with what we might term cyber operations) is largely ignored in the Doctrine, except as a military danger and for the stipulation that the means to prosecute it must be developed. Meanwhile, the largely outdated Information Security Doctrine of 2000 remains in force.

La Secretaría de Asuntos Estratégicos (SAE), dependiente de la Presidencia de la República Federativa de Brasil ha elaborado en 2004 el primer documento del Programa Brasil 3 tiempos (2007, 2015, 2022).  A partir de lo cual se han generado los procesos y las acciones tendientes a viabilizar los objetivos estratégicos que se fueron definiendo a partir de ese momento.
El presente trabajo busca identificar el marco legal que avala las acciones del estado en esta materia, en especial aquellas relacionadas con el área defensa y su interrelación con el desarrollo social.    Se hace foco en el Proyecto "Calha Norte", que desde 1985, promueve el desarrollo sostenible y seguro de la Región Amazónica.

1800'lerde Aydınlanma Çağının bir ürünü olan bilimsellik ve aklın kullanımı, 30 yıl ve 80 yıl savaşlarından sonra gelen 1648 Vestfalya Anlaşması, Üniter Devlet felsefesinin yerleşmesine ve modern devletlerin tarihte boy göstermesine yol açmıştır. Weberci Devlet anlayışının da yerleşmesi ile üniter devletler uluslararası toplum içerisinde kaybolmamak için topraklarını ve üzerinde yaşayan insanlarını korumak için güvenlik politikaları geliştirmişlerdir. Tarihin ilerleyen sayfalarında 1900'lerin başında ve ortasında tecrübe edilen iki Dünya Savaşı öncesinde ve özellikle sonrasında ülkelerin savunmalarını sağlamak için planlama yapmaları gerektiğini ortaya koymuştur. 1900'lerin sonuna gelindiğinde geleneksel yapılan planlamaların çok da başarılı olmadığı, nükleer silahlar başta olmak üzere kitle imha silahları ve teknoloji yoğun silah sistemlerinin çok büyük insan kıyımı ile ekonomik çöküşe sebep olduğu görülmüştür. Küreselleşme ile insanlığın sert güç kullanımından ziyade yumuşak güç kullanarak uluslararası barışı sağlamada başarılı olması felsefesi yerleşmeye başlamakla birlikte ulusların kendilerini sadece fiziksel değil birçok parametre ile geniş güvenlik anlayışı ile koruma ihtiyacı devam etmiştir. Gelişen dünya düzeninde devletler artık sadece tahmin edilebilir bir gelecek kalmadığından belirsizliklerden oluşan bir manzume içinde yaşayabilmenin metodlarını bulmak zorunda kalmıştır. Devletlerin, topraklarında yaşayan insan ve canlılarla birlikte yaşamlarını sürdürebilmek ve özel şirketler ise karlılıklarına etkin bir şekilde başarıyla devam etmek için uzun vadeli planlama yapmaları şart olmuştur. Bilgi sistem teknolojilerindeki son gelişmeler uzun dönem planlamalarını, analitik ve yeni bilimsel metodolojiler ile pratik ve kullanılabilir şekilde yapılabilmesini sağlamıştır. Devletlerin güvenliğinden sorumlu olan savunma birimleri ülkenin savunmasını sağlamak için kısa, orta ve uzun vadeli planlamalarını birçok yöntem ile gerçekleştirir iken bu kitap bölümünde belirsizliklerin bol olduğu ortamlarda güçlü yönleriyle öne çıkan bir yöntem olan senaryo analizi yaklaşımı üzerinde durulacaktır. İlerleyen bölümlerde sırasıyla savunma planlaması ile günümüzde geleceğe dair yaşanan belirsizlikler, stratejik planlamada kullanılabilecek bazı bilimsel metodlar, bu metodlardan özel olarak güçlü ve zayıf tarafları ile senaryo analizi, senaryo analizinin gerçekleştirilme aşamaları anlatılacaktır.

Surrounded by a halo of confusing information and deliberate propaganda, the appearance of volunteer battalions in post- Maidan Ukraine and their continued engagement in military operations in the Donbas remains contentious. At a time when the Us is still considering whether to provide Ukraine with defensive lethal weapons to withstand the offensive in the east, the question as to whether the Ukrainian forces are cohesive, disciplined, law-abiding and loyal to the country’s institutions is extremely important. Recognised for their crucial role in the early days of the hostilities, volunteer battalions are equally feared for their increasing politicisation. Yet they represent a massive resource of motivation and commitment that, if properly channelled, has the potential to revitalise and keep in check unreformed military institutions.

India is arming and modernizing its military with its land forces receiving equipment in an unprecedented manner while its navy is growingly becoming a blue water navy capable of projecting power way beyond its shores and is rapidly arming its air force to become a strategic force capable of playing an independent role. The international environment is favourable for India, which is further adding impetus towards indigenization and modernization of Indian defence and military capabilities while providing an opportunity for the economy to flourish even more. The paper is an endeavour to analyze, assess, predict and prescribe the potential upshots and outcomes of indigenization, local and licensed manufacturing and joint ventures initiated by India in defence and military sectors – and the likelihood of such choices and actions in becoming a vital strategic and security concern for Pakistan.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions, include a wide variety of systems for acquiring and processing information needed by national security decision makers and military commanders, thus forming the principal elements of defense capabilities of any country. ISR systems range in size from hand-held devices to orbiting satellites. Some collect basic information for a wide range of analytical products; others are designed to acquire data for specific weapons systems. Some are "national" systems intended primarily to collect information of interest to the Intelligence agencies; others are "tactical" systems intended to support military commanders on the battlefield. Shoghi's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) products and programs (sensors, platforms, systems and services) are designed and developed for our Intelligence customers, to provide them with auto processed Intelligence feed. Shoghi has considerable years of experience providing pre-integrated or site installable Intelligence collection and Automated Signal processing systems to our military and defence customers. Shoghi's solutions for Communication Surveillance and Intelligence include communication intercept and collection systems, signal analysis and processing tools and high end stand-alone decoding and demodulation systems which can be integrated into customer's existing intelligence systems. Shoghi provides a total turnkey solution that can be installed at the customer site. This includes all related civil works, antenna installation, equipment integration, on-site customer extensive training and lifelong maintenance programs. Get more Information's Download brochures

Il en va des mots et des idées comme des vêtements : ils sont sujets aux modes. Assurément, le concept « d’autonomie stratégique » est à la mode, à Paris comme à Bruxelles. La Revue stratégique sur la Sécurité et la Défense nationale française de novembre 2017 en fait un usage abondant pour ne pas dire excessif et rares sont devenus les documents du Conseil, de la Commission ou du Parlement européen en matière de défense qui ne s’y référent pas.

Non seulement, ce concept abonde dans les déclarations politiques mais il est en train de faire son entrée dans le domaine juridique. Le règlement en cours d’élaboration pour le Programme européen de développement de l’industrie de défense (EDIDP) en fait l’un des objectifs du programme et peut être l’un des critères à l’aune duquel sera examinée l’éligibilité des bénéficiaires des fonds européens.

Mais qu’est-ce que « l’autonomie stratégique » ? Car si ces deux mots sont désormais accommodés à toutes les sauces, les définitions précises qu’affectionnent les juristes font défaut.

Is nuclear strategic reason rational? Barack Obama’s April 2009 speech looking towards a world free of nuclear weapons appeared to promise positive new directions in global disarmament and non-proliferation. Yet it came on the heels of one of the most destabilising periods in global nuclear security since the early 1980s. This article argues that the growing interpenetration of nuclear and conventional conflict, and the dangers of nuclear terrorism, provide disarmament with compelling security logic. However, progress will hinge on key states adopting nuclear postures that reduce nuclear dangers and can acknowledge the fundamental impossibility of nuclear strategy as a system of reason: one that has never been able to connect nuclear means and security ends in a way that is either viable or legitimate. In an era of radically asymmetric conflict and competition, disarmament is an imperative, but to succeed it must find a rational way through strategic irrationality.

In May 2015, the Italian Ministry of Defence published its White Paper for International
Security and Defence. In this article, Andrea Gilli, Alessandro R Ungaro and Alessandro
Marrone examine the important domestic changes outlined in the document, including
those made to the policy-making processes and the internal discussion about strategic
issues. The document restricts Italy’s focus to the Euro-Mediterranean region but sees a
more active role for its armed forces – if and when necessary. European co-operation is
also prioritised, especially with regards to military technology and procurement. It also
puts forward reform of the defence ministry aimed at shaping an integrated approach
and promotes further jointness, starting from the strengthening of the Joint Operational
Command that will take responsibility for any future military operation.

The security landscape in and around Europe since 2014 has experienced significant changes. As a result, in the 31 European countries considered by this study defence spending will grow by an estimated average of 8.3 per cent in 2016, compared to 2015. This represents a break with the structural trends experienced in previous years. Yet, increased defence budgets are no guarantee that the countries will spend their money better or with more intra-European cooperation than before 2015. The whole landscape of defence cooperation in Europe is particularly diversified and fragmented. The study analyses six trends which mark current cooperative patterns, for example in relation to bilateralism, regionalism, as well as the role of Germany and the United States. Finally, it discusses five driving factors, including Russia’s aggressive posture and non-conventional threats, which are likely to shape the European defence cooperation landscape in the short-medium term. - See more at: http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/defence-budgets-and-cooperation-europe#sthash.u5m0FHTO.dpuf

This chapter briefly reviews and analyzes the key contributions on organized violence within historical sociology. It explores both the macro-and micro-level studies that have influenced recent debates within the field. The first section looks at war and warfare, the second section analyzes the clandestine political violence, the third section explores the revolutions, and the final section engages with the scholarship on genocides.

This volume explores the way governments endeavoured to build and maintain public support for the war in Afghanistan, combining new insights on the effects of strategic narratives with an exhaustive series of case studies.

In contemporary wars, with public opinion impacting heavily on outcomes, strategic narratives provide a grid for interpreting the why, what and how of the conflict. This book asks how public support for the deployment of military troops to Afghanistan was garnered, sustained or lost in thirteen contributing nations. Public attitudes in the US, Canada, Australia and Europe towards the use of military force were greatly shaped by the cohesiveness and content of the strategic narratives employed by national policy-makers. Assessing the ability of countries to craft a successful strategic narrative, the book addresses the following key areas: 1) how governments employ strategic narratives to gain public support; 2) how strategic narratives develop during the course of the conflict; 3) how these narratives are disseminated, framed and perceived through various media outlets; 4) how domestic audiences respond to strategic narratives; 5) how this interplay is conditioned by both events on the ground, in Afghanistan, and by structural elements of the domestic political systems.

This book will be of much interest to students of international intervention, foreign policy, political communication, international security, strategic studies and IR in general.

RESUMO: Com a saída dos militares do centro do governo e o fim da guerra fria ganha corpo um debate sobre o papel das Forças Armadas no Brasil contemporâneo. Nessa direção, o presente trabalho começa abordando o que se convencionou chamar de crise de identidade militar como uma porta de entrada à análise da construção de novas missões de ordem e segurança internas pela instituição militar no panorama pós-guerra fria. Ao lado disso, com uma agenda específica para as Forças Armadas latino-americanas, os EUA passaram a propugnar e pressionar o envolvimento dos militares em tarefas policiais rotineiras em detrimento da clássica função de defesa externa. Dentro desse quadro mais amplo, a "Operação Rio" foi utilizada como importante teste crítico às forças sociais interessadas na questão da participação das FFAA em missões de tipo policial. Efetivamente, ela viria a abrir as portas a uma participação mais ativa dos militares nas mais distintas missões ligadas à temática interna durante o primeiro governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso, com a definição prática de uma missão militar de ordem interna e o início da superação da crise de identidade militar então existente. Tal como está configurada hoje, a missão militar acha-se assentada em bases precárias, sendo o principal traço a destacar o da manutenção da vocação interna, sobretudo por intermédio do Exército.

A partir da formulação de uma genealogia do conceito de entorno estratégico brasileiro, este trabalho busca avaliar como a projeção brasileira para o Atlântico Sul, e os principais desafios estratégicos advindos desta ação, foram importantes na reconfiguração do entorno estratégico do Brasil – com a inclusão das regiões do Atlântico Sul e Antártida – e nas formulações dos projetos estratégicos das Forças Armadas brasileiras, com destaque para a Marinha do Brasil. O trabalho usa como recorte temporal os dois governos de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, devido ao avanço das discussões e práticas relacionadas ao entorno estratégico brasileiro e, também, às questões referentes aos Atlântico sul. A metodologia que guia a pesquisa é a qualitativa analítica, tendo como método a investigação de documentos como a Estratégia de Defesa Nacional e o Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional, além da análise dos projetos da Marinha do Brasil acerca da atuação brasileira no Atlântico Sul. Também são avaliados os discursos e apresentações no âmbito da Comissão de Relações Internacionais e Defesa do Congresso Nacional. Buscou-se, por conseguinte, avaliar como o Atlântico Sul tem se tornado cada vez mais central, no escopo das preocupações da política brasileira de defesa, tendo o governo brasileiro, com a reafirmação do Atlântico Sul como parte de seu entorno estratégico, formulado e implementado políticas e estratégias que buscaram assegurar a proteção da região marítima de jurisdição brasileira – a Amazônia Azul -, assim como uma intenção de manter o Atlântico Sul como uma região de ensejo maior à cooperação com os países lindeiros a este oceano, inclusive na área de defesa.