Violent Non-State Actors

ارتبط الاهتمام بدراسة الفاعلين العنيفين من غير الدول Violent Non State Actors (VNSAs بالتحولات التي شهدتها الدولة منذ نهاية الحرب الباردة، سواء من حيث طبيعة دورها، أو من حيث بنيتها، وعجزها عن ممارسة وظائفها التقليدية، علي النحو الذي صورها به هوبز حين رآها الليفياثان العظيم الذي سينهي حالة حرب الكل ضد الكل، كما لم تعد الدول كما رأي كينيث والتز "المحتكر الوحيد للقوة". ويعد الاهتمام بدراسة VNSAs، بصفة خاصة، والفاعلين من غير الدول بصفة عامة، في مجال العلاقات الدولية حديثا نسبيا، مقارنة بدراسة الدولة، كما أنه تال علي وجود هذا النمط من الفاعلين. ففي عهد الإمبراطورية الرومانية مثلا، انتشرت عصابات الجريمة، التي هي صورة من صور VNSAs، ودخلت مع الدولة في حروب. ومع القرن العشرين، انتشرت حركات التحرر الوطني، التي هي صورة أخري للفاعلين العنيفين، والتي نجحت في التأثير في سياسات الدول الاستعمارية الكبري حينها: فرنسا، وبريطانيا، وألمانيا.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

CAN ACUN, BÜNYAMIN KESKIN, BILAL SALAYMEH

EL-KAIDE’DEN HTŞ’YE: NUSRA CEPHESI
Suriye’de devlet otoritesinin aşınmasından dolayı ortaya çıkan boşluk devlet dışı silahlı aktörler tarafından doldurulmaya başlanmıştır. Bu gelişmeler yaşanırken kriz ve çatışma bölgelerinde söz konusu aktörler egemen devlet düzenini sarsarak alışılmış olan uluslararası sistemi tehdit etmeye devam etmiştir. Önce El-Kaide daha sonra DEAŞ gibi örgütler bu meydan okumanın baş aktörleri haline gelmiştir. Suriye’de yaşanan krizlerle birlikte “cihadi” ideolojiyi benimseyen bu örgütlerin bir uzantısı olarak Nusra Cephesi ortaya çıkmıştır. 2011 yılı itibarıyla Arap Baharı’nın bölgede yayılmasıyla birlikte cihadi örgütler kendilerine hakimiyet alanı arayışına girmişlerdir.
El-Kaide’nin Irak’taki kolu Irak İslam Devleti (IİD) örgütü 2007 yılından itibaren aldığı ağır darbelerden yeni toparlanmaya çalıştığı bir dönemde ABD Irak’tan çekilmiş ve bünyesinde Suriyelilerin de bulunduğu IİD lider kadrosu Suriye’de ortaya çıkan krizle yeni bir genişleme alanı oluşturacağını düşünmeye başlamıştır. IİD örgütünün o dönemler Musul bölgesinde komutanı olan Suriyeli Ahmed Hüseyin Şara (Ebu Muhammed Culani) IİD’nin yeni lideri Ebubekir Bağdadi’ye Suriye’de örgütlenilmesi teklifinde bulunmuştur.
Sonuç itibarıyla El-Kaide merkezinin onayıyla Suriye’ye yedi kişilik
bir ekiple 2011 yaz aylarında geçiş yapılmıştır. Bu çekirdek kadro Suriye’deki iç savaşı derinden etkilemiştir. Nusra Cephesi’nin kuruluşu ise 2012’nin Ocak ayında Culani tarafından yapılan bir açıklamayla duyurulmuştur. O günden bu yana farklı süreçlerden geçmek suretiyle evrimleşerek muhalifler arasında en güçlü gruplardan biri olan Heyet-i Tahriru’ş-Şam’a dönüşen yapıyı beraberinde getirmiştir.
Bu rapor Suriye sahasında etkin aktörlerden biri olan Nusra Cephesi’ni ele almaktadır. Raporun hazırlık aşamasında Nusra’nın güçlü olduğu çatışma bölgeleri başta olmak üzere Suriye’de saha çalışması gerçekleştirilmiş ve buralarda bazı isimlerle mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Grubun ideolojik gelişimi ve bunun ardında yatan sebepler de raporun konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Aynı zamanda raporda örgütün yönetim modeli ve örgütlenme biçimine dair bilgiler de yer almaktadır. Ayrıca çalışmanın sonunda Nusra’nın liderleri ve örgütte ön plana çıkan isimlerin profil bilgileri de sunulmuştur.

The present text focuses on discovering the concept of an armed actor in the XXI century, for the purpose it is direct to the characterization of, it that was not define by international treaties and that has elusively been developed by international jurisprudence in the courts international criminal. In this framework, a study of the history of the formation of the right to make war and crosscutting in international conferences, serves as an illuminating element of this initial approach, as is the concept of an armed actor. Finally, a review of three cases atypical to the contradictory cases such as the case of the Zetas in Mexico, the bacrim in Colombia, and the Islamic State on alert, with the application of the criteria of common criteria to establish whether a new form of armed actors can be found in the diversification of the armed structures of power.
Keywords: organized armed weapons of power r, International humanitarian law, Armed groups, Peace of Westfalia, International criminal law, Armed conflict.

Why do some organized crime groups (OCGs) carry out face-to-face killings where perpetrators debase their victims and defile their bodies? Leading criminologists contend that OCGs carry out extreme killings deliberately to attain specific performance objectives. Conversely, psycho-sociological scholars argue that extreme killings only occur in situations that affect perpetrators' reasoning and emotions. In their view, these situations are largely beyond OCGs' control. I argue that analyzing extreme killings as organizational rituals can contribute to reconciling these seemingly conflicting views. More specifically, I contend that the OCG known as Los Zetas ritualizes executions to generate the conditions that make extreme violence possible. Through ritualization, Los Zetas influences executioners' perceptions of extreme behavior from something abhorrent into something valued, desirable, and enjoyable. Once the conditions conducive to extreme violence emerge, Los Zetas exploits it to attain utilitarian objectives.

The US Consulate in Guadalajara, Jalisco was attacked with two grenades in the hours before Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (ALMO) was sworn in as Mexico’s new president. The attack, which occurred around 2300 hours on Friday, 30 November 2018, involved two grenades thrown at the consulate. While the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)—has been mentioned as a possible suspect group in the attack—which yielded no injuries the CJNG denies involvement.

Elaborating on a newly compiled dataset of all Security Council resolutions passed under Chapter VII in the thirty years from 1990 to 2019, this Article is the first attempt to survey aggregated Council practice with a view to analyzing the ways in which the Council's non-forcible measures have been transformed as a consequence of the growth in importance of non-state actors in international relations. The data demonstrate that the Council has increasingly adopted resolutions that apply and draw in individuals and other non-governmental actors more than what previous studies merely suggest. Related is the second, and more significant, finding of the Article: in light of the aggregate practice analyzed, the Article argues that, by expanding the preventative use of its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the SC has inserted itself into a new interface between international lawmaking and peacebuilding. It has operated in the context of both conflict prevention and actions on generalized threats, adopting non-forcible measures that not only address the immediate objective of crisis management, but also increasingly engage in mapping out future regulation and structure of governance. Though the further expansion of these developments remains uncertain, the Article also contends that their normative implications are already significant. To mention the most salient: the establishment of direct international duties on armed groups and individuals by the Council; its growing influence on the external articulations of statehood and the internal dynamics of transitions towards peace; the mediated imposition on associations and corporations established under private law of prophylactic obligations; the creation, via its quasi-legislative resolutions, of a completely regulated international sphere where terrorists and proliferators are starved of means and chances to perpetrate attacks.

Scholarship on the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (or drones) mainly focuses on states’ use, sidestepping the consequential proliferation of drone technology to violent nonstate actors (VNSAs). Meanwhile, an increasing corpus of media, military, and policy publications underscores the latter’s importance. The source of the gap is that existing proliferation models overlook civilian drone technologies. Applying supply- and demand-side proliferation models, we confirm conventional wisdom that military-grade drones are not likely to proliferate to VNSAs. Including civilian drones inverts proliferation logic across the boards. Shifting from cost-prohibitive, inaccessible, and technically complex military technologies to cheap, simple civilian platforms, we demonstrate that VNSAs have the resources, capacity, and interest to effectively incorporate drone programs to advance their aims. Furthermore, in context of state and nonstate actors’ security environments and normative constraints, the proliferation of civilian drones matters for international security. Norm-abiding states need expensive, high-performance, norm-enabling drones. For norm-defying VNSAs, civilian platforms are sufficient, even efficient, to advance their agendas.

‘Leaderless resistance’ and ‘lone wolf terrorism’ are concepts that have steadily gained importance in in the study of oppositional subcultures and terrorist groups, being use to describe the operational realities of a variety of terrorisms, from groups like al-Qaeda to Anders Breivik.  In this article, I seek to describe leaderless resistance as a rhetorical construct, a meaning-conferring ‘ideology of effervescence’ that lifts the spirits of both movement progenitors who advocate the strategy as well as incipient lone wolves who consider responding to their exhortations.  Through an examination of the case of Wiebo Ludwig and the EnCana pipeline bombings of 2008-2009, I show how these rhetorics emerge in the interactions between activists and their political enemies.  With this conception, we can, a) understand more fully the discursive/rhetorical dynamics involved in asymmetrical struggle, b) problematize the acceptance of the organizational reality of leaderless resistance in the terrorism literature, and, c) question the assertion of some terrorism scholarship that refers to leaderless resistance and other ideologies of effervescence as hallmarks of the ‘new terrorism.’

This curated collection "Criminal Drone Evolution: Cartel Weaponization of Aerial IEDs" documents the evolution of drone usage by criminal cartels, gangs, and criminal armed groups (CAGs) in Mexico and beyond. Cartel Drone Evolution demonstrates the development spread of drone technology and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) among criminal actors while also pointing toward future potentials.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes form part of standard post-conflict peacebuilding tools regularly applied in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. Yet, the limitations of such templates become evident when peacebuilders are confronted with unconventional settings, such as the urban environment. So far, there is a scarcity of research on UN-led DDR efforts in cities, even though the proliferation of urban armed groups is projected to pose an intractable challenge for decades to come. Based on six months of fieldwork in Port-au-Prince, this article presents new empirical evidence on innovative DDR programming in Haiti, the only country where a United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) tried to implement a traditional DDR programme for gang members. As this attempt proved to be a failure, the mission subsequently changed its approach to a more community-focused armed violence reduction and prevention programme which aims to disincentivize at-risk sections of the population from joining gangs. Even though the current community violence reduction approach is better adapted to the unconventional conflict environment in Haiti and is seen by many practitioners today as a role model, it shares a number of limitations with traditional DDR programmes and is not a panacea for urban peacebuilding.

After conquering large swaths of Syria and Iraq, the IS undertook an aggressive sectarian campaign in which they not only enacted horrific violence against the Shia people, but also damaged or destroyed several key Shia mosques and shrines. Drawing on Social Movement Theory (SMT), this article analyzes the response by various Shia nonstate actors—militia leaders, religious clergymen, populist preachers, and seminal poets. It argues that they used the IS threat to Shia holy sites to develop and deploy a mobilization frame that has come to be referred to as the “shrine protection narrative.” The article also documents the manifold consequences of the shrine protection narrative: it underpinned a mass recruitment drive that saw tens of thousands enlist; it legitimized foreign Shia militias to enter the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq; it justified the formation of entirely new militias who declared the centrality of shrine protection to their mandate; and it mobilized them to enact political violence. In doing so, this article extends existing studies of SMT to demonstrate that “sacred spaces”—and particularly the need to protect religious sites from specific threats—can serve as a powerful mobilization frame towards political violence.

This article aims to analyze the evolution of Brazilian criminal organization Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC—First Command of the Capital), especially its transformation from a group advocating human rights to a transnational violent non-state actor. Created in the late 1990s by inmates at Taubate Prison, PCC is currently a key trigger of violence in South America. Since a massive attack performed in 2006 against security forces, the group continues to be highly operative, also coordinating drugs and arms smuggling in Brazil and abroad. A combination of sources supported this analysis of PCC’s evolution, mainly Brazilian official judicial minutes, NGOs reports, and news released from reputable sources. The article shows that PCC has gained strength in the 2010s, expanding illicit business operations in cooperation with other criminal groups. The results suggest that PCC's expansion has changed significantly since their beginnings, into an actor that poses a challenge for the building of peaceful society in all of South America.

Transnational gangs challenge states in a variety of way. First, they transcend geographical and jurisdictional boundaries. Second, when left unchecked, they can erode the legitimacy of state institutions, co-opt state officials, and exceed state capacity to control their actions. A combination of crime, corruption, and impunity can empower criminal enterprises—gangs and criminal cartels—at the expense of the state. Finally, transnational crime blurs the distinctions between crime and war, local and global, and state and non-state violence. This essay examines these challenges and the evolution of gangs and criminal cartel conflict.

This introductory course presents a survey of theoretical, conceptual and practical approaches to the study of peace and justice. This includes examining theories of violence, peace, war and rights, as well as more focused discussions of social movements, transformative justice, education and engagement. In pursuing these areas, students will have the opportunity to focus on issues both historical and contemporary and through both ‘traditional’ and ‘alternative’ lens. The course seeks to critically address a range of topics—from non-violence to theories of inter-state war—providing students with a variety of perspectives and understandings of an inter-disciplinary field. Students will be challenged to interpret issues of social inequality, oppression and structural violence at numerous levels; from the interpersonal, to the local, and outward to international conflict. We will begin this learned endeavor by co-creating our own equitable and peaceable educative environment. This will involve a collaboration between instructor and student to foster an environment that is horizontal, non-coercive and utilizing a critical pedagogy, modeled by the professor and used by students. An array of readings will make up the course including scholarly articles, philosophical texts, political texts, primary source documents from perpetrators and survivors of violence, and film. Early in the semester, enrolled students will have the option of adding a community-based learning (CBL) component involving their work with marginalized and underserved individuals or groups (or organizations working with and for such individuals or groups), structured to meet community-defined needs.

Uluslararası ilişkilerin temel aktörü olan devletler günümüze kadar silahlı çatışmaların da temel aktörü olmuştur. Devlet dışında pek çok aktörün ortaya çıkması ve etkinlik kazanmasıyla bu durum değişmeye başlamıştır. Devlet dışı aktörlerin silahlı çatışmalara doğrudan veya dolaylı etkisi artmaktadır. Devleti temel aktör olarak kabul eden uluslararası hukuk, devlet dışı aktörlerin silahlı çatışmalarda oynadıkları rolü yeterince kapsamamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı devlet dışı aktörlerin yetki ve sorumluluklarını incelemektir.

This book offers valuable perspectives on the evolution of Colombia’s armed conflict, the war’s changing territoriality, the logic of violence against the civilian population, and the consequences of war and violence for society on a variety of levels. The authors utilize primarily qualitative approaches and conduct their analysis at both the national and sub-national level as well as comparatively with other intra-state wars. Bringing together social scientists from the fields of political science and government, international relations, economics, geography, and criminology, among others, the book accounts for the recent changes of Colombia’s armed conflict.  It is a relevant contribution for scholars and policymakers with an interest in Colombia’s intra-state war, in particular, and, more broadly, in internal conflicts, warfare and violence. Its findings are especially relevant given the ongoing peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the nation’s largest and oldest guerrilla group/Este libro ofrece una valiosa perspectiva sobre la evolución del conflicto armado en Colombia, la territorialidad cambiante de la guerra, la lógica de la violencia contra la población civil, y las consecuencias de la guerra y la paz para diferentes sectores de la sociedad en distintos niveles. Los autores utilizan aproximaciones cualitativas y conducen sus investigaciones al nivel nacional y sub-nacional así como de manera comparada con otras guerras intra-estatales.  Los autores pertenecen a diversas disciplinas de las ciencias sociales como ciencia política, relaciones internacionales, economía, geografía y criminología. El libro en su conjunto da cuenta de los cambios en el conflicto armado en Colombia. Es una contribución relevante para académicos y tomadores de decisiones interesados, en particular, en el conflicto armado colombiano y, en general, en la temática de las guerras intraestatales, la conducción de las mismas y la violencia. Las conclusiones son particularmente relevantes dado el actual proceso de paz entre el gobierno y las FARC.

In the aftermath of globalization, it has become increasingly easier for non-state
actors to develop in transnational networks, thus jeopardizing domestic security and
political stability of states. Studying the influence of transnationalism on non-state
actors could help these states develop new strategies of dealing with criminal networks. The present thesis is trying to answer the following research question: “What is the states’ response to transnationalism in terms of their dealing with human trafficking networks?” It examines the way the state is adapting itself to transnational security challenges posed by violent non-state actors (VNSAs). To this end, comparative case studies method is used by means of comparing Russia and Turkey’s responses to human trafficking. The basic conclusion of the author is that Russia and Turkey’s responses to human trafficking have been very different due to the impact of two main factors. First, it is the degree of the international pressure that determined the state’s willingness to take human trafficking challenge seriously. Second, the degree of the state’s success in its anti-trafficking policy is also influenced by the political regime of this state. Thus, international pressure and political regime both have an impact on the state’s response to the transnational security threat of human trafficking.

IS is a new phenomenon in the face of an on-going conflict in the Middle-East in what I refer to as the Shami theatre. It evolved from a fledgling affiliate of al Qaeda into a powerful and organised “pseudo-state” under the leadership of Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi and operates largely in the Shami theatre. The Shami theatre with its core group of actors has been scripted into a region of conflict, through a toxic approach from 1916 till now (2017), a hundred years and counting. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), of the 203097 civilian deaths recorded from March 2011 until November 2016, IS has been responsible for 1.48% (2998) of the deaths. Considering this fact alone, it had to be asked, “Why the obsession with IS”? This project considered the rise and development of IS and its choice of violence in the context in which it exists. Violence and the defining of violence have been contested for centuries, mainly because violence involves and refers to different conditions, actions and processes. The consequences of violence may be immediate, short-term or long-term and may be contextualised within an interpersonal framing or as the result of an inherent social condition. What is peculiar about the way in which violence is defined and which aspects of the definition of violence are included or excluded will determine the human experiences being examined and the conclusions drawn. In this regard the study examined the various templates of violence and interrogated the manifestation of these different forms of violence in the context in which IS functions. The research considered a plurality of reasons and motivations drawn from IS’s magazine Dabiq and other academic and news sources to explain IS’s lure for foreign fighters, its use of violence and the claim about its “clash” with western values. It then considered the difference in terms of theodicy vs. theology, so that the question was no longer “why are Muslims so violent?” but “why has this specific group of persons resorted to violence?” Significantly, consolidation of persons under extreme circumstances does not necessarily imply a ‘unity of ideology.’ From this aspect of the theorisation it became evident that limiting the discussion on IS and its attacks on foreign soil to a monologue about religion or demanding a theological reform of Islam to more ‘liberal traditions,’ or to claim that the genesis of IS is to be found in theology has largely been disingenuous. Widening the lens of analysis is a tool of academic integrity when the research demands it, and is not an attempt at denying religious ideology. There is an element of religious ideology certainly, but it cannot be divorced from its social context. What it does is to animate the role and impact of human action. IS has used the tools of language, religion and sectarianism to justify its violence. IS has destroyed shrines, libraries and schools, exhibited blatant intolerance of difference and independent lifestyles and choices and it has specialised in significant levels of barbarity, the killing of the elite and citizens. In this regard the study interrogated the “clash of civilisations” claim by exploring the possibility of explaining the violence and actions of IS in terms of western epistemological fraud and western methods of violence learned from the violence of colonialism/coloniality.  The study linked all of these issues to the continuity of the history of dehumanisation and control of the space, bodies and belief of the Muslim subject.  Although IS has attacked westerners, the majority of its victims are Muslims. The rabid sectarianism of Maliki and the unspeakable torment and torture committed by Assad has spurred further extremism which will at some point contribute to the rise of IS 2.0 unless an amicable and just political solution is achieved. All the templates examined ultimately led to the plausible conclusion that the violence of IS is motivated by revenge, the greed for power and control and in many ways manifests as the dark side of modernity. Religion is the currency invoked to draw supporters, sympathy and recognition, and to seek legitimacy. But religion, specifically Islam does not constitute the motivation for the violence. This study concluded that IS and those powers unleashing violence on the largely Sunni Syrian and Iraqi populations have been targeting a very specific enemy, with the aim to completely destroy it – they are attacking Islam and the Islamicate. The narrative, the tactics, the behaviour, the propaganda, the ongoing epistemicide and the pacts between Assad, the changing Iraqi regimes, the US, and IS all point to this. And attacking Islam and the Islamicate includes attacking the inheritors of Islam. This is the consolidation of the theorising.

Te Black Blocs made a spectacular entrance into the Movement for Global  Justice on November at the “Battle of Seattle,” when they smashed thewindows of McDonald’s, Nike, Gap, and a few banks. In April , almost ten years later, a Black Bloc is involved in skirmishes with police at Strasbourg during the NATO Summit. The aim of this article, which is largely based oninterviews with militants, analyses of their discourses, and first-hand observa-tions of demonstrations, is to identify how the Black Bloc tactic originated and spread, and to understand the political factors that led activists to adopt it. Three intrinsically political questions are addressed: ( 1 ) Who should determine the plan of action within a group of militants? (2) Who should determine the plan of action during a demonstration? (3)
Who should determine the criteriato assess the effectiveness of the actions taken by a social movement and speakon its behalf? To answer these questions, the notion of “respect for a diversity of tactics” and the links between the Black Blocs and other militant organizations(both radical and reformist) as well as other blocs (the “Tute Bianche” or WhiteOveralls and the Pink Blocs) are discussed.

The focus of my dissertation is put on three of the most prominent and ambiguous figures in 20th century Iran: Nematollah Nassiri (1910-1979), Tayyeb Hajj Rezai (1912-1963), and Shaban Jafari (1921-2006). All three can be seen as paradigmatic actors who in their specific milieus possessed the capacity to control and conduct violence. All three actors are highly polarizing figures, bundling the public discourses both in the historical moment and in retrospective commemorative cultures. Therefore, the protagonists ideally demonstrate the processes, in which configurations of masculinity are determined and embedded in the discursive substructure of the prevailing gender order. Additionally, the different paths of life of these three men crossed on several significant occasions, coinciding with major events in Iranian history. Furthermore, evaluating the interactions of these actors is theoretically framed in terms of the theory of rackets of Horkeimer and Adorno, because the actors exemplify and confirm the hypothesis that cliquishness and racketeering are the fundamental factors in the formation of all societies.

This paper outlines the process in which refugee’s impact countries and regions through their migration. Often the issue is not that they are migrating but what is imported along with them. The flow of refugees from one country to another, particularly in Central Africa, had detrimental consequences which led to a series of wars and destabilization of the region. Many refugees fleeing for reasons of persecution can have a tendency to trigger broader issues. This paper asserts that both refugee-sending states and refugee-receiving states are more likely to initiate in militarized disputes against each other. The broader goal of this paper is to contribute toward research that examines the mutually reinforcing relationship between the state and the refugee, and how they influence each other’s paths toward eventual policy. Often, the issues and actors in civil wars span national boundaries and become part of a regional security dynamic, blurring line between what is an internal war affecting the external region through its course of action.

Driven by globalization, Internet communications technology (ICT), and new economic forms the nature of states may be changing. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) – including what are commonly known as cartels – are early adopters to the new political/economic landscape. In addition to seeking to rule the illicit economy, criminal actors (networked cartels and gangs) are challenging states through high-order violence and leveraging nascent social/spiritual movements (narcocultura) to potentially usher in a new political dynamic. These violent non-state actors (criminal soldiers) are insurgent actors. They are waging new forms of insurgency – criminal and possibly spiritual – that have the potential to reconfigure states.

The proliferation of irregular armed actors which defy simplistic definition has caught public and academic attention alike, not least in the pages of this journal. To move the debate on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) forward, this article seeks to enhance our conceptual understanding of parochial armed groups which are not primarily driven by ideological or religious objectives. Thus, this article clarifies similarities as well as differences between subtypes of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) on the one hand, and between CBAGs and other NSAGs, on the other hand. By doing so, a typology is developed that classifies militias, gangs and vigilantes on the basis of their political, economic and security-related dimensions. The resulting ideal types are discussed through the lenses of different explanatory frameworks and policy debates in the field of contemporary security studies. A major typological issue is the tendency for CBAGs to ‘turn bad’ and become threats to the stability they were expected to transform, becoming a serious problem in countries where they operate. It is concluded that the challenge of CBAGs ultimately needs to be addressed by putting in place a functioning state that can tackle the underlying woes that led to their proliferation in the first place.

Instead of state governments, rebel groups have become the most prolific landmine users. However, rebels display significant variation in the way they restrict the use of landmines. While some armed groups seek to limit their effects to government forces, some indiscriminately lay mines irrespective of collateral damage, and others directly target civilians with landmines. Furthermore, some rebels have renounced the use of anti-personnel mines and engage in mine action. In this thesis, I seek to explain this empirical variation. I argue that civilian victimisation caused by landmines creates significant legitimacy costs to rebels, thus increasing incentives to exercise restraint. It follows that the more legitimacy-seeking behaviour rebels display, the more likely they are to exercise restraint on landmine use. I test this hypothesis in a structured focused comparison of three rebel groups from the Philippines. The case studies support the hypothesis, as legitimacy-seeking behaviour had a positive effect on restraint on landmine use in the selected groups. This thesis contributes to the field mainly in two ways. First, I conceptualise and measure restraint on landmine use, which had been neglected in previous studies. Second, I develop a theoretical argument specifically explaining variation in restraint on landmine use.

This paper examines relations between the United States and Pakistan in relation to the current War in Afghanistan. It examines the reasons for Pakistan's alarming and apparently incoherent behavior as a state. Finally, it demonstrates that Pakistan's cooperation is essential to any kind of success in Afghanistan and that the United States and NATO must therefore come to terms with this troubled ally.

Edited version of published paper presented at 'Is Black and Red Dead?' Conference, Centre for the Study of Social and Global and Justice (CSSGJ) University of Nottingham, 7-8 September, 2009

https://socialhistoryportal.org/news/articles/110943

Rights of resistance find their roots in the victims’ human rights, interpreted in accordance with the right to personal self- defense as a general principle of law. Forcible resistance can also be understood as an exercise of the right to an effective remedy for human rights violations where no effective remedy can be directly obtained from the state authorities. However, international law recognizes a right to resist state authorities only in exceptional circumstances, because states have a legitimate interest to preserve their authority and monopoly on theuse of force, as this forms the basis for the rule of law and effective protection of human rights.
At the individual level, human rights entitle persons to use necessary and proportional force against present or imminent human rights violations by the state that pose a real risk of serious and irreparable harm. In particular, resistance is lawful against extrajudicial killings, torture, and inhuman treatment. Conversely, there is no right to resist arbitrary arrest and detention in states where the rule of law and related due process rights are otherwise upheld. Victims of such violations have to assert their rights through the appropriate judicial processes.
In times of armed conflict, civilians may collectively defend themselves against war crimes and other international crimes without losing their protected status under international humanitarian law. They must not be prosecuted or otherwise punished for exercising such collective self- defense, nor may they be targeted as if they were combatants. However, collective self- defense has limits that
emerge from the general requirement of self- defense and international humanitarian
law. In particular, civilian defense groups must not directly participate in the hostilities. This would notably be the case if they defended combatants or military objectives from attack. They also lose their protected status where they achieve such a degree of military organization and capacity that they must be considered an organized armed group participating in the conflict.
At the level of military organized armed resistance, it is widely considered that international law recognizes a right of peoples to wage an armed struggle to defend against forcible denial of their right to self- determination through colonial domination, unlawful alien occupation, and racist regimes. However, force must be used only as a last resort within the bounds of necessity, proportionality,and international humanitarian law.
There would be good reasons to recognize a right of militarily organized armed resistance against the mass atrocities of genocides, crimes against humanity, and widespread war crimes. Through the rigorous application of self-defense requirements, this right could be reasonably framed to distinguish rare legitimate uprisings from illegitimate rebellions through the use of international law. However, state practice does not yet recognize such a right. Instead, international law is neutral on rebellions against oppressive states, neither prohibiting nor allowing them.