State Constitutional Law

Across the United States, voters in many states have enacted initiative constitutional amendments that abrogate protections for equality and fundamental rights. In most cases, state supreme courts have upheld the validity of these amendments, undermining protections for fundamental rights at the state level. This Article proposes a novel solution to this problem: it argues for the application of the basic structure doctrine in the review of constitutional amendments by state supreme courts. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court of India (like constitutional courts in other nations) asserted the power to invalidate amendments that abrogate "basic features" of the Indian Constitution as defined by the Court. Drawing on this doctrine, this Article seeks to provide a methodological framework for articulating which foundational principles and rights should be entrenched within the constitutional framework. For instance, the application of the basic structure doctrine would help address several flaws in the California Supreme Court’s revision-amendment standard applied in Strauss v. Horton. In Strauss, the majority upheld Proposition 8, the initiative measure banning same-sex marriage, as a constitutional amendment.

Constitutional review at the state level is likely to garner increased attention as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Hollingsworth v. Perry and U.S. v. Windsor. These decisions can arguably be read to stand for "rights federalism," the concept that state governments will have the final say in defining the range and scope of fundamental rights protections. Although the U.S. Supreme Court may define and set a "floor" of guaranteed federal constitutional rights, in light of the decisions in Perry and Windsor, state supreme courts will continue to play a key role on these issues.

This Article frames the potential application of the basic structure doctrine at the state level within theories of constitutional change, and the tension between conceptions of popular sovereignty and rights federalism. I argue that the basic structure doctrine would advance the cause of "rights federalism" by enabling state supreme courts to provide for stronger protections of fundamental rights than does the Federal Constitution. State constitutions are far more malleable than the federal Constitution and consequently, state supreme courts can play a crucial role in shielding rights from abrogation by popular majorities. The Article concludes by exploring the potential implications of adoption of a basic structure doctrine for democratic theory and theories of constitutional change, the tension between popular sovereignty and federalism.

This is a review of the novel FH Batacan.

Relatively, this discusses how the concept of the "law" is present in the mentioned literature. A thorough discussion of how justice was attained and how it was hindered is the main goal of the review.

A Comparison of the Influence of Religious Law in Israeli & Palestinian Basic Laws


This study aims to examine to what extent the Israeli and Palestinian constitutions are based on or influenced by religious law and how that reflects on the situation on the ground in each case. The prediction is that the Israeli constitution will represent Religious Law over a mainly secular, mixed population, with the religious elements representing many different faiths. Palestine was predicted to be secular law ruling over a mixed religious (mainly Christian and Muslim) population. In both cases the assumption was that many articles of their respective constitutions or state laws would be quite incongruent with the realities on the ground, as is often the complaint about constitutions. The actual findings ran contrary to some of these expectations, adding yet another dimension to this fascinatingly complex field of study, unfortunately fueled by catastrophic realities which affect, as well as being affected by, the global community and international politics.

In recent years, constitutional jurisprudence emerging from state courts has assumed increasing importance. The assertiveness of state courts, however, has generated considerable backlash, most often involving adverse reactions to particular court rulings, and commonly expressed in efforts to oust the judges responsible through the electoral or appointive processes by which judges in most states maintain their positions. In New Hampshire, there was a backlash involving a deeper challenge to the legitimacy of the entire judicial branch of government, driven by concerns about judicial accountability to citizens and officials in the elected branches. This Article looks at the impeachment of Chief Justice David Brock in 2000, in terms of its antecedents and its aftermath. The authors place the impeachment in the context of legislative-judicial relations over the course of the state's history and examine steps taken since the impeachment to help restore stability in those relations.

El artículo pretende reiterar, desde las aportaciones teóricas y académicas, el impacto que supuso la consolidación del Estado Social de Derecho en los Derecho Económicos, Sociales y Culturales que permite la construcción de un modelo democrático teniendo como eje central al ser humano, sus necesidades y la dignidad como valor supremo del que nacen todas las demás libertades. Se propone una metodología descriptiva que recopile de forma precisa las diferentes propuestas teóricas alrededor de las dos anteriores premisas planteadas. Las ideas y discusiones teóricas aquí abordadas y retomadas son producto del ejercicio investigativo de tipo académico del semillero de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Santo Tomás - Medellín dentro del proyecto denominado “Incorporación de los instrumentos normativos internacionales referentes a los Derechos Económicos Sociales y Culturales en las sentencias de la Corte Constitucional sobre Derechos Sociales como tendencia hacia el reconocimiento de los DESC como derechos fundamentales autónomos”.

Abstract
This article intends to reiterate from the theoretical and academic contributions the impact that supposed the consolidation of the rule of law in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that allows the construction of a democratic model having as central the human, their needs and dignity as the supreme value of being born all other freedoms. A descriptive methodology to accurately collect the different theoretical proposals about the above two premises raised is proposed. The ideas and theoretical here addressed and resumed discussions are the result of the research performance of academic nature of seedling Human Law St. Thomas University - Medellin within the project “ Incorporation of international legal instruments relating to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in judgments of the Constitutional Court on Social Rights as a trend towards recognition of DESC as autonomous fundamental right.”

Not all federal systems permit their constituent units to adopt constitutions. This Article considers whether, and under what circumstances, subnational constitutions tend to contribute to the volatility or stability of their respective federal systems. By examining the role that subnational constitutions played in South Africa’s celebrated democratization, this Article observes that a transitional federal state can increase its flexibility and adaptability by merely authorizing subnational constitutions. The Article concludes that federal systems, particularly those undergoing fundamental change, can be better equipped to manage regime-threatening conflicts and perpetuate a democratic political culture if they permit constituent units to adopt constitutions.

Across the United States, voters in many states have enacted initiative constitutional amendments that abrogate protections for equality and fundamental rights. In most cases, state supreme courts have upheld the validity of these amendments, undermining protections for fundamental rights at the state level. This Article proposes a novel solution to this problem: it argues for the application of the basic structure doctrine in the review of constitutional amendments by state supreme courts. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court of India (like constitutional courts in other nations) asserted the power to invalidate amendments that abrogate "basic features" of the Indian Constitution as defined by the Court. Drawing on this doctrine, this Article seeks to provide a methodological framework for articulating which foundational principles and rights should be entrenched within the constitutional framework. For instance, the application of the basic structure doctrine would hel...

Confronting persistent and widening inequality in educational opportunity, advocates have regarded the right to education as a linchpin for reform. In the forty years since the Supreme Court relegated that right to the domain of state constitutional law, its power has surged and faded in litigation challenging state school finance systems. Like so many of the students it is meant to protect, however, the right to education has generally underachieved, in part because those wielding it have not always appreciated its distinctive forms and function. Deconstructed, the right to education held by children has been formulated doctrinally as both a claim-right, imposing affirmative duties on the state to act, and an immunity, disabling certain state action. These two strands — oft-manifested as the claim-right to educational “adequacy” and an immunity entailing “equality” of educational opportunity — once considered irreconcilable are actually interlocked by the right’s core, historical f...

Constitutional doctrine has little addressed on the General Comptroller of the Republic and its controlling function of public resources execution and management. Efforts have been made to explain this situation in other realities, regarding high budgetary, accounting and auditing content needed to carry out auditing activities constitutionally assigned to this kind of entities. Nevertheless, identifying competences of the General Comptroller of the Republic and its nature of autonomous constitutional body shapes an important expression of Constitutional State and the principle of powers division. This entity controls State’s Public Budget execution contributing to constitutional property protection, legality of budget implementation and the appropriate management of public resources, also the «efficiency» of social needs, proper functioning of public administration and prevention of corruption, among others duties. This article analyzes the constitutional mission of the General Comptroller in a Constitutional State promoting the process of given a constitutional status to the legal system in its area of influence, also optimizing constitutional properties protected. For such purpose, the 29622 recent law («Law that modifies the 27785 Organic Law of National Control System and the General Comptroller of the Republic extending powers in order to sanction in accordance of functional administrative responsibility») shall be used as object of constitutional analysis.

This is an extremely ambitious book. Its point of departure is that the study of the origins, status and functions of constitutions was a central element of early sociology. It is argued that classical sociological scholars such as Tönnies, Durkheim and Weber initiated a break with the normative ideals of the Enlightenment and established the defining features of a positive-descriptive political sociology through the study of constitutions. The strong centrality of the study of constitutions in political sociology, however, drastically declined in the post-war period. Instead, constitutional theory and practice became dominated by formalist-normative approaches developed within the realm of legal and political philosophy. The book is aimed at turning this development around by introducing a fully-fledged empirically founded, essentially positivist, sociological theory of constitutions capable of re-establishing constitutional sociology as a specific sub-discipline within law, politics and sociology.

Since its admission to statehood in 1819, Alabama has operated under six constitutions. The first state constitution gave broad powers to the legislative branch of government, including extensive power over the selection, tenure and removal of judges. Over time, however, legislative power over judges has gradually dwindled. Though judges were at first selected by the legislature to serve for good behavior, constitutional changes subsequently provided for partisan election of judges by voters every six years.  In 1875, legislative power to remove judges from office by address to the governor was eliminated; and legislative removal of judges by impeachment was restricted to judges of the state supreme court, with all other judges to be removed only after trial by the judiciary. In 1973, a constitutional amendment authorized a two-tier judicial discipline system, providing for a “court of the judiciary” to sanction or remove judges for ethical violations or mandate retirement for disability. As a consequence of these developments, the Alabama legislature now has little involvement in efforts to remove judges from office. There has been no proceeding since 1832 to have a judge removed from office by legislative address to the governor.  Even though legislative impeachment of judges is still constitutionally possible, there has been no legislative proceeding to remove a judge by impeachment since 1845.  All judge removal proceedings since then have taken place in the judiciary or in a judicial disciplinary process.

State constitutional amendment rules are often criticized for their poor design.  The most common criticism is that the frequent use of direct democracy bypasses the virtues of representative decision making and effectively surrenders constitutional politics to well-financed special interests.  Indeed, many initiative states need to improve the democratic quality of their amendment procedures.  They need effective ways to foster constructive public deliberation, incentivize meaningful citizen participation, and provide checks on the influence of special interests.  In this essay, I consider whether states might achieve some of those improvements if they changed the process for ratifying citizen-initiative amendments to require debate and approval by locally-elected governing bodies rather than a public referendum.  The specific proposal that I explore is whether initiative states could improve their amendment processes by changing amendment rules to require ratification of citizen-initiatives by some majority of existing county governing bodies rather than a statewide referendum.  Sending amendment ratification decisions to locally-elected bodies could have the beneficial effect of keeping constitutional decision-making close to citizens while at the same time retaining many of the virtues associated with representative decision-making.  It might also help undermine special-interest capture by dividing the amendment power across numerous independently elected bodies rather than centralizing it within a state legislature or popular majority vote.
Of course, a county-ratification model is not a panacea.  There are many difficulties and costs associated with this approach.  It might, for example, make the citizen-initiative too difficult to use, which would effectively shift all amendment power to the legislature.  County representatives might also be ill-suited to decide statewide constitutional issues because of mismatched expertise and limited resources.  A county-ratification model could also result in unconstitutional voter-dilution because of significant population differences between counties.  These issues, among others, represent serious difficulties with the county-ratification model that cannot be overlooked.  My goal in this essay is only to suggest that the county-ratification model deserves serious consideration as states struggle with how they might improve their amendment processes.

The local election as a democratic practice at Indonesian area is Constitutional mandate contained in Article 18 paragraph (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The legal basic that is the referensec elections, whic conducted directly and inderctly, but in the fact the local election mechanism with  direct and directly have problem. The Government decide to reform the local election of system into the election simultaneous plans the 7 stage of 2015, 2017, 2018, 2020, 2022, 2023, 2027. The first stage of local election hald in 2015 and one of areas is Sout of Sulawesi with the 11 regency but the community participation is not maximum. Therefore the authors formulate the problem as follows: (1) How is communities participation in the local elections simultaneously in the South of  Sulawesi Province. (2) Why the communities participation in the local elections simultaneously in South of Sulawesi Province  has not been maximized ? (3) How is an effort to increase public participation in the elections simultaneously in the future in South of Sulawesi Province in order to improve the quality of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia ?. This study aims to give provide icreased communities participation in the simultaneous election to come.
This study used a legal-sosiology. The legal-sosiology research is qualitative because emphasis on social observation in communities and the depth of quality. The qualitative study sought for understanding the phenomenas in the field then interpret and described to answer the reaserch objectives.
From this analysis concluded that (1) public participation in the in the local elections simultaneously in South Sulawesi in 2015 is quite varied and did not increase significantly even declined. (2) factors that cause public participation include social, political, administrative, cultural, education,employment and the lack of socialization (3) efforts to improve participation by improving the regulation is ot appropriate to the context and invole stakeholders.
Keywords: Democracy, local of elections simultaneously, communities particiapation, South of Sulawesi.

At this juncture in American history, some of our most hard-fought, state-level political struggles involve control of supreme courts.  New Hampshire witnessed one of the most dramatic of these, culminating in the impeachment of Chief Justice David Brock in 2000. 

In the last decades of the twentieth century, constitutional amendments granted the state’s judiciary a much higher level of independence than it had historically enjoyed.  A bipartisan body of legislators, however, viewed this break from the past with suspicion.  Clashes over court administration and judicial corruption, then a protracted battle over court rulings on educational funding, deepened their antipathy.

When information emerged regarding some of the Chief Justice’s administrative actions, that antipathy exploded into an impeachment crisis.  Brock’s trial was followed by a broad effort to recalibrate legislative-judicial relations in the state.  It also raised significant questions about state-level judicial autonomy, and about impeachment itself as a feature of democratic governance, that resonant far beyond New Hampshire’s borders.

John Adams is gaining new respect today both for his political shrewdness and his religious wisdom. Both these talents were on full display in the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution that Adams largely crafted. Striking a via media between defenders of the traditional Congregationalist establishment and religious dissenters, Adams' constitution established one public religion but granted freedom to all peaceable private religions. This juxtaposition reflected Adams' political and religious philosophy. Every state and society, he believed, had to establish by law some common values and beliefs to undergird and support the plurality of private religions that it embraced. The notion that a state and society could remain neutral and purged of any public religion was, for Adams, a philosophical fiction. Absent a commonly adopted set of values and beliefs, politicians would invariably hold out their private convictions as public ones. But every state and society also had to respect and protect a plurality of forms of religious exercise and association. The notion that a state could coerce all persons into adherence and adherents to a single established religion alone was, for Adams, equally a philosophical fiction. Persons would make their own private judgments in matter of faith and conscience, even if they pretended to conformity.

El presente artículo da cuenta de los resultados de la investigación terminada, que giró alrededor del análisis de las decisiones que con objeto de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad ha proferido la Corte Constitucional de Colombia con el objeto de resolver las demandas contra el tipo penal de aborto. El análisis de dichas decisiones parte de valorar si la Corte ha tenido en cuenta en su argumentación la discusión en torno a la libertad de las mujeres frente a la decisión de interrumpir un embarazo, tomando como puntos de partida las discusiones que desde la filosofía se han dado alrededor de la libertad y los precedentes de la Corte en los que ha resuelto otros conflictos de principios y en los que se decide dando prioridad al principio de libertad.

El análisis de los pronunciamientos de la Corte permitió deducir que la corporación no ha tenido en cuenta una valoración de las libertades como centro del debate constitucional y que sus tesis partieron de una visión conservadora extrema a una tesis moderada en la sentencia del 2006. En este análisis se partió del análisis crítico de las jurisprudencias a partir de una pauta de análisis documental.

Abstract. This paper delivers the results of the finished research that took as a topic the analysis of the decisions taken by the Constitutional Court of Colombia over object things outside of constitutional order, in order to resolve the law suits against the penal kind of abortion. The analysis of such decisions starts from the valuation of whether the Constitutional Court have had in mind in its argumentation the discussion around the freedom of women of terminating a pregnancy, taking as starting points the discussions that, from the philosophy, have been given about freedom; and the foregoing of the Court, especially those in which the Court have resolved other conflicts of principles, decided giving priority to the principle of freedom. The analysis on the pronouncements of the Court allowed to deduce that the Corporation haven’t had in mind a valuation of the freedoms as a constitutional center of debate, and its Thesis started from an extreme conservative gaze to a moderate thesis in the 2006’s Judgment. In this Analysis the start point is a critic analysis of the Jurisprudence from a pattern of documental analysis.

In the American system of dual sovereignty, states have primary authority over matters of state law. In nonpreemptive areas in which state and federal regimes are parallel — such as matters of court procedure, certain statutory law, and even some constitutional law — states have full authority to legislate and interpret state law in ways that diverge from analogous federal law. But, in large measure, they don’t. It is as if federal law exerts a gravitational force that draws states to mimic federal law even when federal law does not require state conformity. This paper is the first to explore the widespread phenomenon of federal law’s gravitational pull. The paper begins by identifying the existence of a gravitational force throughout a range of procedural and substantive law felt by a host of state actors, including state rulemakers, legislators, judges, and even people themselves. It then excavates some explanatory vectors to help understand and appreciate why federal law exerts a gravitational force. Finally, the paper considers some normative concerns with state acquiescence to the federal gravitational pull.

In most federal systems, constitutional decision-making occurs at both the national and subnational levels, and therefore, a more complete and accurate understanding of constitutional law requires careful study of subnational constitutional dynamics as well as the relationship between national and subnational issues.  This articles reviews Constitutional Dynamics In Federal Systems – Subnational Perspectives (Michael Burgess & G Alan Tarr, eds., 2012) (“Constitutional Dynamics”), which includes studies analyzing issues of constitutional change in eleven different political systems from the unique perspective of subnational law and politics. 
    The article contends that this bottom-up perspective reveals two important themes.  First, subnational politics have become a hotbed for popular constitutional involvement and activism.  Drawing on the studies presented in Constitutional Dynamics, the article discusses the mechanisms for direct democracy that appear across federal systems and then explores several unique incentives that may explain why there is generally greater popular involvement in constitutional politics at the subnational level than at the national level.  Second, the article identifies two pathways of bottom-up constitutional change within federal systems.  Bottom-up constitutional change can occur when subnational units formally adopt new constitutional laws that percolate through the federal system and result in constitutional change at the national level.  In those instances, subnational constitutions facilitate systemic change because they provide an institutional home for a new norm to germinate.  Bottom-up change can also occur more aggressively when subnational groups capitalize on opportunities such as constitutional litigation and political campaigning to bring issues to the national agenda.  In those instances, subnational constitutions provide an entry point for groups to bring conflicts and reform proposals within the existing political system.

This Article examines the significance of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Paulsboro for redevelopment and property rights in New Jersey. It suggests that Gallenthin has resulted in the revival of meaningful judicial review of municipal redevelopment designations. Specifically, the Authors contend that Gallenthin confronted two pervasive problems concerning judicial review of redevelopment designations. First, since 1947, when New Jersey adopted a constitutional provision that specifically authorized the legislature to pass laws permitting the taking of property for redevelopment of “blighted areas,” courts have unduly acquiesced to legislative and municipal interpretations of “blight.” Gallenthin addressed this trend by reaffirming that the judiciary is responsible for ensuring that only “blighted areas” are subject to redevelopment. Second, although municipal fact-finding is entitled to deference if supported by substantial evidence, courts often deferred to municipal redevelopment designations based on an expert’s conclusory testimony that the property satisfied the statutory requirements for redevelopment. Gallenthin clarified that judicial deference is proper only if a municipality presents meaningful, quantitative evidence that directly correlates to the relevant statutory criteria. Indeed, post-Gallenthin judicial review provides property owners with great protections without frustrating legitimate redevelopment initiatives.

The use of constitutional language and concepts has enjoyed a widespread expansion in recent decades. From the relatively narrow confinement within national constitutional law discourses it has, in the wake of globalisation, crept into almost all legal sub-disciplines as well as into political science, international relations and sociology. Does this development mark the triumph of constitutionalism or is it rather an indication of its demise taking the form of an increasingly desperate attempt to maintain the constitutional outlook in the face of structural developments which threaten to undermine state-based constitutional orders? This crucial question, which goes to the core of the future of democracy and the rule of law, is the topic of this brilliantly edited volume.

Conventional theories of constitutional design suggest that frequent formal amendment of a constitution’s text likely has a restraining effect on the practice of judicial review. On these theories, courts are more likely to favor the status quo when construing a constitution that is amended frequently, and more likely to issue transformative rulings when a constitution is difficult to amend. This Article investigates these claims by analyzing an original data-set of hand-coded opinions from state high courts in the United States. Because state constitutional amendment rates vary widely, these data provide a meaningful opportunity to explore how judges practice judicial review when operating under constitutions of varying degrees of flexibility.

The findings suggest that prevailing theories fail to fully capture the complex factors influencing the pathways of constitutional change. Many states with high amendment rates also experience high rates of judicial activism, and many states with low amendment rates experience low rates of judicial activism. After accounting for other influences on judicial decision-making (such as methods of judicial selection and retention, docket size, constitution age and length, etc.), the data suggest a tipping point where judicial activism begins to accelerate as amendment frequency increases. Contrary to prevailing theories, the data indicate that high amendment rates are reliably associated with high rates of judicial activism. These findings have implications for constitutional design because they underscore the highly contextual nature of constitutional change and challenge the notion that amendment flexibility is an effective strategy for constraining courts.

"Across the United States, voters in many states have enacted initiative constitutional amendments that abrogate protections for equality and fundamental rights. In most cases, state supreme courts have upheld the validity of these amendments, undermining protections for fundamental rights at the state level. This Article proposes a novel solution to this problem: it argues for the application of the basic structure doctrine in the review of constitutional amendments by state supreme courts. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court of India (like constitutional courts in other nations) asserted the power to invalidate amendments that abrogate "basic features" of the Indian Constitution as defined by the Court. Drawing on this doctrine, this Article seeks to provide a methodological framework for articulating which foundational principles and rights should be entrenched within the constitutional framework. For instance, the application of the basic structure doctrine would help address several flaws in the California Supreme Court’s revision-amendment standard applied in Strauss v. Horton. In Strauss, the majority upheld Proposition 8, the initiative measure banning same-sex marriage, as a constitutional amendment. Constitutional review at the state level is likely to garner increased attention as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Hollingsworth v. Perry and U.S. v. Windsor. These decisions can arguably be read to stand for "rights federalism," the concept that state governments will have the final say in defining the range and scope of fundamental rights protections. Although the U.S. Supreme Court may define and set a "floor" of guaranteed federal constitutional rights, in light of the decisions in Perry and Windsor, state supreme courts will continue to play a key role on these issues. This Article frames the potential application of the basic structure doctrine at the state level within theories of constitutional change, and the tension between conceptions of popular sovereignty and rights federalism. I argue that the basic structure doctrine would advance the cause of "rights federalism" by enabling state supreme courts to provide for stronger protections of fundamental rights than does the Federal Constitution. State constitutions are far more malleable than the federal Constitution and consequently, state supreme courts can play a crucial role in shielding rights from abrogation by popular majorities. The Article concludes by exploring the potential implications of adoption of a basic structure doctrine for democratic theory and theories of constitutional change, the tension between popular sovereignty and federalism. "

Beginning in the 1970s, scholars and judges became interested in state constitutional law, arguing that state constitutions had been too long ignored especially in cases involving rights arguments. Empirical studies discovered, however, that actual application of state constitutional law in rights cases was uneven and limited over time, across issue areas, and between courts. This article seeks to deepen our understanding of variations in state constitutional application by exploring how and when litigants in state courts offer state constitutional rights arguments. I argue that it is important to examine the signals sent by state courts and how lawyers respond to those signals. Under the leadership of Justice Hans Linde, the Oregon Supreme Court embraced a powerful expectation that all issues of state law should be settled prior to any federal issue. Litigants responded to this signal by offering state arguments more often and in greater depth than litigants in other states. Linde’s legacy normalized state constitutional law, making it part of the everyday fabric of constitutional litigation in Oregon.

Indonesia adalah negara kesatuan yang melaksanakan sistem ketatanegaraannya pada Pancasila dan UUD 1945 sebagai negara hukum. Untuk melaksanakan negara hukum diperlukan instrumen hukum yang saling menopang dan mendukung dari tingkat tertinggi sampai ke tingkat terendah, karena sistem hukum menurut Hans Kelsen tersusun dalam bentuk piramida yang disebutnya sebagai Stufenbau theorie. Setelah amandemen UUD 1945 keran demokrasi dibuka seluas-luasnya dan menimbulkan implikasi yang luas salah satunya adalah munculnya fenomena tentang perda syari’at yang terjadi di Aceh yang kemudian diimitasi oleh banyak daerah di Indonesia di luar Aceh. Fenomena tersebut menimbulkan munculnya perda-perda bernuansa syari’at di luar Aceh yang kebanyakan diundangkan tanpa tujuan yang jelas dan cenderung bertentangan dengan sifat Constitutional patriotism yang tercantum dalam UUD 1945.
Kata kunci: Konstitusi, perda syari’at, perda bernuansa syari’at, Constitutional patriotism

Indonesia is a nation state that implements it state system based on Pancasila and UUD 1945 as the rule of law. To implements rule of law required law instruments that staked and sustained each other from the highest to the lowest, since law system based on Hans Kelsen structured on pyramid form that he cited as Stufenbau theorie. After the amandement of UUD 1945 Indonesia’s democracy flow gained and surfacing broad implicationt one of it was the awakening of perda syari’at that happened in Aceh. That phenomena also awake perda bernuansa syari’at outside Aceh which most of them enforced with no particular reason and tend to contradicted with Constitutional patriotism trait that mentioned on UUD 1945.
Keywords: constitution, perda syari’at, perda bernuansa syari’at, Constitutional patriotism

To most lawyers and judges, constitutional amendment rules are nothing more than the technical guidelines for changing a constitution's text. But amendment rules contain a great deal of substance that can be relevant to deciding myriad constitutional issues. Indeed, judges have explicitly drawn on amendment rules when deciding issues as far afield as immigration, criminal procedure, free speech, and education policy. The Supreme Court, for example, has reasoned that because Article V of the U.S. Constitution places no substantive limitations on formal amendment, the First Amendment must protect even the most revolutionary political viewpoints. At the state level, courts have cited to flexible amendment rules in state constitutions to support judicial restraint. Although largely unnoticed by scholars, it seems that amendment rules are creeping into other areas of constitutional law. This Article provides the first systematic investigation and assessment of ''amendment creep''-the phenomenon where judges explicitly draw on amendment rules to interpret constitutional provisions unrelated to formal amendment. It concludes that federal and state amendment rules contain constitutional substance that can assist judges and lawyers in resolving many diverse constitutional disputes. Based on an extensive review of relevant Supreme Court and state high court opinions, the Article constructs a typology of amendment-based arguments. The Article concludes that amendment creep is an extension of a familiar form of constitutional reasoning known as structuralism, and that it may have several normative benefits for constitutional adjudication-such as promoting overall constitutional coherence and ensuring that judges give appropriate consideration to the democratic values that amendment rules embed in the constitutional framework.

When we think of “human sacrifice”, perhaps the ancient civilizations of the Mayas and Aztecs come to mind, and maybe to a lesser extent the Incas...So, what is my point? I want the reader to consider the images carefully, not so much to understand their anthropological, archaeological, or historical significances or the why-s about human violence. Rather, such historical examples are provided as a broader analogy about “human sacrifice” and current happenings with COVID-19 quarantining here in the United States. More specifically, what state governors are doing, either unwittingly or willfully ignorant in relation to opening businesses in their states as early as tomorrow Friday, April 24th, 2020, notably Georgia governor Brian Kemp. And worse, unfortunately, it may be likely that other Southern States may follow the example of Governor Kemp. For example, Texan Governor Greg Abbott is currently considering loosening its social restrictions on businesses by Monday, April 27th as well and other states like Florida, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and South Carolina may follow, or have already relaxed some social limitations.

The progress of judicial federalism, the independent interpretation of state constitutions, has generally been limited. This article explores how lawyers have contributed to the development of state constitutional rights law in the search and seizure context. Through a comparative study of lawyers in New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington, I argue that the ideational support provided by lawyers in the form of constitutional arguments has varied widely across the states in response to the legal signals sent by their high courts and the United States Supreme Court. In essence, the argument is that lawyers need law and in the area of judicial federalism have largely waited for their state courts to provide some measure of leadership.

Exploring legal development requires more than simply examining the votes of judges because legal development embraces the actions of multiple actors. At a minimum, courts require lawyers to develop and present cases to them for adjudication. While courts need lawyers, lawyers need law; in other words, courts rely on lawyers to develop cases for their review, but the law provided by those courts shapes the actions of lawyers. This article examines the development of state constitutional law by exploring the interactions between lawyers and the Washington Supreme Court after the court required specific brief- ing practices for state constitutional arguments and the degree to which Washington lawyers responded. Utilizing legal briefs in Washington and some comparative data, I argue that the court was moderately successful at encouraging more thorough constitutional claims. This highlights the importance of con- sidering how lawyers respond to court signals not only in the presence or absence of certain legal argu- ments but also in the content of those arguments.