Russian Military Theory

The work "MILITARY CONCEPT OF THE MODERN BREAKTHROUGH,
CREATED BY GEN. ALEKSEI A. BRUSILOV" is a military theory essay which attempts to explore the possibilties of a new modern offensive attack.

Luis Lazaro Tijerina, Vermont, United States

This handbook provides an introductory guide to the Russian concept of information warfare, including elements of cyber warfare.  The guide also functions as a source book for further detailed research as required.

The period since the Russian seizure of Crimea in early 2014 has seen a large number of new publications on the topic of Russian cyber and information warfare, of widely varying quality. Most of these works discuss a specific aspect of the challenge, and many were highly time-sensitive and are therefore already outdated.  The aim of this handbook is instead to circumvent the need for extensive ab initio research by providing a guide to the Russian approach which is both comprehensive and durable.

The guide takes as its basis material already in the public domain; this material has been collated from a wide range of disparate and sometimes obscure publications in Russian and other languages. Where possible, key concepts and approaches are illustrated and explained by direct quotations from senior members of the Russian defence and security communities. Unless otherwise specified, quotations in the text are from Russian sources, in many cases authoritative papers and essays on the theory and practice of warfare from military journals and conferences. Although not all the sources quoted are ordinarily available to the public, no classified material has been used.

In addition to extensive citations in footnotes, each section concludes with a list of recommended reading for deeper research on specific topics. Russian-language titles here and in the citations have been translated into English. URLs for online access to publications have been provided where they are known and available.

The goal of the study is to examine hybrid warfare's role and place in the Russian military thought. Hybrid warfare is a Western term and was largely missing from the Russian military literature until 2014. Russian theorists have started to use the notion broadly only after hybrid war has become the popular Western term to label the Russian warfare seen in Ukraine. Ironically, in the Russian understanding it is the West (i.e. the United States) that wages hybrid war, and as such the notion is a synonym for Russian expressions like "new type" or "new generation" war. While Moscow's perception on events of the Arab Spring-which are seen as cases for Western warfare-is distorted, Russian military thinkers probably correctly evaluate how the development of technology (particularly information technology) will change the content of war. Russian forecasts on the primacy of information domain in high-tech future wars preceded Western thinking about the subject. However, today similar thoughts on the preeminent role of information space are widely held by Western military thinkers, too. The paper argues, that in the Russian understanding the so-called hybrid war is the general form of future war.

Opinio Juris Law & Politics Review “Dottrina Gerasimov: la strategia militare non convenzionale di Mosca” 30-38
https://www.opiniojuris.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Aprile.pdf  https://www.opiniojuris.it/dottrina-gerasimov/ 

Nel 2013 il Capo di Stato Maggiore delle Forze Armate Russe Valery Gerasimov elaborò una nuova dottrina militare russa, incorporandola nella dottrina ufficiale del 2014. La Cosiddetta Dottrina Gerasimov ha rielaborato l’espressione di Guerra Ibrida nel panorama accademico degli esperti militari; ne ha messo in luce sei punti fondamentali, in cui si evidenziano i nuovi strumenti, necessari per attuare la strategia della “Guerra Ibrida”.

O presente trabalho tem como objeto de estudo as políticas e mecanismos adotados no mandato do presidente russo Vladimir Putin (2000 – 2008), e sua “diarquia” com Dmitry Medvedev (2008 – 2012) com a finalidade de realocação das receitas obtidas pela indústria extrativa – sobretudo a exploração de petróleo e gás natural – para impulsionar a modernização e diversificação econômica, sobretudo no seu complexo industrial-militar e aeroespacial. Por consequência, essas medidas contribuíram para a retomada do protagonismo geopolítico experimentado pela Federação Russa nessa primeira década do século XXI. O objetivo é verificar o impacto dessas políticas públicas como catalisadores para impulsionar o desenvolvimento estratégico, tecnológico e militar russo; E como essas medidas contribuíram para a reinserção geopolítica e estratégica no sistema internacional.

The present work has as object of study the policies and mechanisms adopted in the mandate of Russian President Vladimir Putin (1999-2008), and his "diarchy" with Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012) for the purpose of reallocating the revenue obtained by extractive industry – especially oil and natural gas exploration – to boost modernization and economic diversification, especially in its aerospace and military-industrial complex. Consequently, these measures contributed to the resumption of the geopolitical role experienced by the Russian Federation in this first decade of the 21st century. The goal is to verify the impact of these public policies as catalysts to boost the strategic, technological and military development of Russian Federation; And as these measures have contributed to their geopolitical and strategic reinsertion in the international system.

The first week of March 2019 was very exciting for Western experts on Russian military affairs. On March 2, the Russian Academy of Military Sciences held its annual defense conference with Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, giving the keynote address. Two days later, official Ministry of Defense newspaper Krasnaya Zvesda published the main outlines of Gerasimov’s speech, igniting a new wave of discourse on Russian military affairs among Western experts.1 The New York Times’ claim that “Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War” was augmented by an interpretation claiming that Gerasimov had unveiled “Russia’s ‘strategy of limited actions,’” which was “a new version of the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’” that was to be considered the “semi-official ‘doctrine’ of the Russian Armed Forces and its General Staff.”2 Interestingly enough, this echo chamber–style interpretation of Gerasimov’s speech emphasized only the one small part of it that discussed information/propaganda/subversion/nonmilitary aspects of war. The main question, however, is whether this part deserves such attention—after all, this topic was discussed only in one short paragraph entitled “Struggle in Informational Environment.” Was there something in his speech that deserved greater attention? And if so, why was it missed?

This is a polemic. It is a polemic against the use of the term the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ to describe a supposed dramatic turn in Russian strategic thinking. It is a polemic against the way that pseudo-technical terms and jargon can be mobilised and appropriated not simply to obscure the truth but also to drive a hawkish political-security agenda. It is also an apologia, because to a degree, it is all my fault.

In recent years, Western experts have generally portrayed the Kremlin's actions as either strategic or tactical. Yet this proposition raises a very important question: how closely does the West's interpretation of Russian strategy reflect the country's own definitions? While many military historians have sought to interpret Russian strategy, 'Strategiya' takes a different approach. It brings together, in English, the classic works of the Russian art of strategy, which were rediscovered after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of explaining his analysis of Russia's contemporary strategy, Ofer Fridman offers his translation of and commentary upon the founding texts of Russia's own Clausewitzes, Baron Jominis and Liddell Harts, who have been inspiring Russian strategic thinking--both its conceptualisation and its implementation--from the moment Moscow rejected the exclusive role of Marxism-Leninism in strategic affairs. Russian contemporary strategists draw their inspiration from three main schools of thought. While works by Soviet military thinkers have already been translated into English, those by both Imperial strategists and military thinkers in exile have remained almost inaccessible to the Western reader. Filling this lacuna, 'Strategiya' offers a fascinating glimpse inside the foundations of Russian strategic thought and practice.

A revisionist Russia is increasing its military capabilities and threatening U.S. allies and partners across Eurasia and the Middle East. In multiple theaters Russia is conducting sophisticated campaigns that combine economic pressure, disinformation, cyberspace activities, and the use of conventional and unconventional military forces to influence neutrals and intimidate U.S. allies and partners. It is likely that a perceived reduction in the United States’ comparative military advantages emboldens Russian actions. To deter Russia and other revisionist powers that may emulate Russian capabilities (e.g. China, North Korea, and Iran), and to ensure effective response to aggression that threatens the security of the United States and its allies, the U.S. Army requires improved capabilities, increased capacity, and revised warfighting doctrine.

The study examines the lessons of the war in Ukraine and their impact on the Russian thinking on hybrid war, dedicating special attention to the works of Russian military thinker, Aleksandr Bartosh. Bartosh finds that Clausewitz's notions of "friction" and "fatigue" are even more relevant in a hybrid war than in a conventional one, due to the multiple proxies and simultaneous application of a broad range of non-military and military means. Present paper enumerates the practical examples of friction and fatigue in the Ukraine War and concludes that Russian hybrid war is expected to be more centralized and better coordinated in the future.

This paper examines contemporary Russian military thinking in relation with the concept of modern warfare and its adequateness to manage future threats and challenges. After providing an analysis on Russia’s defence and security policies and the historical transformation of its military, this paper argues that the concept of full spectrum operations has been key factor to plan and develop the 2008 Russian Military Reform. In addition, it provides a framework to both analyse Russia’s international policy and its influence on the international system, and endorses this reform as a remarkable case study for the discipline of military sciences.

Foreword by Adèle Cain Renowned military historian Luis Lázaro Tijerina has turned his sharp analytical mind to the subject of the modern military concept of the "Breakthrough on the battlefield", a concept created by the Brusilov Offensive of summer 1916, a noted Russian victory in the First World War. The relevance of looking again at Brusilov and the concept generally of the Breakthrough becomes all the more apparent when the author draws our attention to the military buildup at the Russian-Ukrainian border and the danger of it escalating to war. As he notes: "National chauvinism is the putrid smell of death on both sides of the Russian and Ukrainian border."

Adddendum
This essay was written before the Great Ukranian War in 2022.
Luis Lazaro Tijerina, Burlington, Vermont, United States

Recent Russian adventurism in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine have wholly put to rest any doubt about the continued relevance of studying Russian military thought. Even standing alone, these acts have made it imperative that, as military professionals, we understand the conceptual basis for Russian military operations. In addition to Russia’s re-emergence as a strategic adversary, those wishing to understand U.S. military doctrine would do well to possess a firm grounding in the operational theories developed by the Red Army during the interwar era. The work of Soviet military theorists during the 1930s has been especially influential on U.S. Army doctrine since at least 1982 and the publication of FM 100-5 Airland Battle. These concepts remain central to U.S. operational doctrine to this day.

La Guerra Electrónica, como elemento capaz de compensar el desequilibrio convencional ruso respecto a los EE.UU. y sus aliados, se ha convertido en los últimos años en la más preocupante de las herramientas en manos de unas FF.AA. rusas que consideran la "información" como la materia prima y el auténtico centro de gravedad de cualquier ejército moderno. En la medida en que siga liderando los avances en este ámbito, mantendrá la capacidad de mermar considerablemente las capacidades desarrolladas al albur de la RMA de la Información, limitando severamente la efectividad de los sistemas occidentales.

A cikk a hibrid hadviselés elméletének változását járja körül, különös figyelmet szentelve Alekszandr Bartos, orosz hadtudományi gondolkodó munkáinak. Miközben Bartos-más orosz katonai szakértõkhöz hasonlóan-a Nyugatnak tulajdonítja a hibrid hadviselés alkalmazását, megállapításai-jelen tanulmány szerzõje szerint-valójában az ukrajnai háború orosz tapasztalatain alapulnak. Amennyiben Bartos gondolatait valóban az ukrajnai háború tanulságai ihlették, akkor azok a hibrid hadviselés elméletének változására, egyben a hibrid hadviselés korlátjaira mutatnak rá.

Minsk II: Anniversary yang tidak bahagia untuk Ukraina dan Uni Eropa

Sejak bulan Maret 2014 perang kembali mengamuk di jalur Eropa, berubah secara progresif menjadi semacam yang tidak disaksikan secara kontinyu sejak Perang Rusia-Georgia tahun 2008, meski jauh lebih dalam lingkup, kehancuran, dan lamanya. Pada Konferensi Keamanan Munich baru-baru ini (MSC), Ukraina kembali tampil menonjol dalam agenda tersebut.

Secara khusus, ketakutan dari pejabat Rusia dan Barat disuarakan sehubungan dengan perang yang tidak terkendali jika tertinggal pada lintasannya saat ini. Terlepas dari ritual "passing of the buck" yang berkaitan dengan perang, dan kepada siapa atau apa kesalahannya harus ditetapkan, MSC tidak boleh dipandang sebagai konsekuensi atau terobosan kebijakan; Sementara pejabat Rusia dan Ukraina bertemu, pertemuan yang direncanakan dengan angka berlawanan Jerman dan Prancis (menciptakan kembali Normandia Format) dibatalkan oleh pihak Prancis karena "konflik penjadwalan".

Solusi tidak mungkin dan konflik mengamuk melanda rawa-rawa konflik bersenjata lainnya. Ukraina adalah perang di kaki Eropa. Ini adalah Gajah Hitam di dalam ruangan.

Soon after the outbreak of open conflict in Ukraine, it became fashionable to interpret the conflict as a kind of “hybrid warfare.”[1] However, the military and political dimensions of the war have expanded well beyond the concept. The Ukraine conflict has been more of a “compound” war than a “hybrid” one; the means and methods parties have employed are typical of the early post-Soviet period, combined with some new military-technical elements as well as classical Cold War-era warfare and strategies. The conflict has demonstrated the renewed significance of land-based troops and armaments for European security. It has also likely set the standard for any potential future conflicts in the post-Soviet region.

Over the last two decades, conventional (non-nuclear) deterrence in Russia's military strategy has changed from being a sub-tactical, sub-strategic warfighting tool to being a separate military-political factor—a self-contained component in Russia's strategic deterrence concept. Soon after Russia revised its military doctrine in 2014, it applied this conventional deterrence concept in its Syria campaign—against the backdrop of being under international pressure vis-à-vis the Ukraine conflict and Russia-NATO tensions. In Syria, Russia fired new types of long-range, precision-guided missiles, showcasing these weapons both as battlefield tools and as geopolitical instruments of deterrence. The " Second Conventional Age " After the era of World Wars and nuclear arms races, a conventional deterrence renaissance took place. This so-called " second conventional age " was marked by the development of modern conventional weapons: long-range, precise ballistic and cruise missiles that use advanced intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance systems. These modern technologies include not only classic strike platforms—ballistic and cruise missiles, artillery systems, other precision-guided munitions (PGMs)—but also weapons based on new physical principles, for example, hypersonic weapons, self-maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs), anti-satellite and space weapons, and new types of non-kinetic, non-nuclear weapons (cyber, radio-electronic, electromagnetic). According to Russian military experts, the technological development of conventional weapons by many countries " has made such progress that the destruction of a single element of infrastructure, communication, and control systems can lead to a catastrophe, able to throw a country back many years in its development. " Conventional weapons have reached such a combination of range, accuracy, and lethality that even leading

Applying a military sciences’ methodology namely DOTMLPF, this paper examines the 2008 Russian military reform to determine whether or not it will prepare Russia to face contemporary threats and challenges. Analysing published studies with the results of a DOTMLPF assessment and essentials of modern military thinking, this paper offers conclusions on the effectiveness of the reform. Besides, it provides a new perspective when analysing military reforms and emphasises the significance of Russia and its military capability for the global balance of power.

Soon after the outbreak of open conflict in Ukraine, it became fashionable to interpret the conflict as a kind of “hybrid warfare.”[1] However, the military and political dimensions of the war have expanded well beyond the concept. The Ukraine conflict has been more of a “compound” war than a “hybrid” one; the means and methods parties have employed are typical of the early post-Soviet period, combined with some new military-technical elements as well as classical Cold War-era warfare and strategies. The conflict has demonstrated the renewed significance of land-based troops and armaments for European security. It has also likely set the standard for any potential future conflicts in the post-Soviet region.

By employing well-known methods of warfare, but in innovative ways and with the help of new technologies, Russia’s concept of operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine took many in the West by surprise. Almost immediately, Western analysts embarked on a search for definitions for this ‘new’ approach, most of them within the West’s own theoretical framework. These have included the Gerasimov Doctrine, hybrid warfare and hybrid threat, non-linear warfare, fourth-generation warfare, and most recently ‘gray zone’ conflict. Nevertheless, a vast volume of Russian theoretical debates about new ways of warfare has remained under-studied. This has resulted in misconceptions in the characterization of Russian strategy, through molding it to fit Western theoretical constructs as opposed to those within which it was developed. Rather than helping assess the real options open to Russia, each of the aforementioned terms has tended to be unhelpful, as none reflects Russia’s doctrine or assumptions about the nature of war in the 21st century. This article’s main aim is to describe the Russian way of ‘sub-threshold warfare’ as defined by Russia itself. This was done by researching more than 30 years of Russian military literature, case studies from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine built from interviews with Ukrainian military and security personnel, and information on the Syrian case based on Russian sources. An analysis of the Russian military literature when compared to the empirical evidence of Russian tactics in Ukraine and Syria shows that its strategy is multi-layered and comprehensive. It is counterproductive to frame the Russian strategy within artificial frameworks established outside of the threat context, such as Hybrid Warfare. The Russians have their own framework that, although influenced by Western military doctrine, is the result of their own theoretical developments.

Over the last two decades, conventional (non-nuclear) deterrence in Russia's military strategy has changed from being a sub-tactical, sub-strategic warfighting tool to being a separate military-political factor—a self-contained component in Russia's strategic deterrence concept. Soon after Russia revised its military doctrine in 2014, it applied this conventional deterrence concept in its Syria campaign—against the backdrop of being under international pressure vis-à-vis the Ukraine conflict and Russia-NATO tensions. In Syria, Russia fired new types of long-range, precision-guided missiles, showcasing these weapons both as battlefield tools and as geopolitical instruments of deterrence. The " Second Conventional Age " After the era of World Wars and nuclear arms races, a conventional deterrence renaissance took place. This so-called " second conventional age " was marked by the development of modern conventional weapons: long-range, precise ballistic and cruise missiles that use advanced intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance systems. These modern technologies include not only classic strike platforms—ballistic and cruise missiles, artillery systems, other precision-guided munitions (PGMs)—but also weapons based on new physical principles, for example, hypersonic weapons, self-maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs), anti-satellite and space weapons, and new types of non-kinetic, non-nuclear weapons (cyber, radio-electronic, electromagnetic). According to Russian military experts, the technological development of conventional weapons by many countries " has made such progress that the destruction of a single element of infrastructure, communication, and control systems can lead to a catastrophe, able to throw a country back many years in its development. " Conventional weapons have reached such a combination of range, accuracy, and lethality that even leading

В статье рассматривается проблема доносительства и жалоб в русской армии на примере карьеры генерала М.И. Драгомирова. Проблема доносов в русской армии стояла довольно остро, и генерал Драгомиров был среди тех, кто относился к ней весьма неоднозначно. С одной стороны, он старался преследовать подателей жалоб, а с другой, проводил по ним проверки.

В статье предпринята попытка взглянуть на украинский кризис с точки зрения философии войны. Предлагается ответить на специфические вопросы: кому и для чего нужна война на Донбассе, а также, какие последствия она несет для культурного пространства русского мира.