Russian Military

Статья посвящена рассмотрению армии как социального института, выполняющего общественную функцию в обеспечении безопасности личности, общества и государства военными средствами. Проанализированы место и роль Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации в контексте мировых тенденций развития армий и характер использования военной силы в мировой политике.

The article is consecrated to consideration of the army as a social institute that realizes a social function of providing personal, social and state security with military means. The author analyses place and role of The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the context of global tendencies and character of use of military power in global policy.

Russia has been using an advanced form of hybrid warfare in Ukraine since early 2014 that relies heavily on an element of information warfare that the Russians call “reflexive control.” Reflexive control causes a stronger adversary voluntarily to choose the actions most advantageous to Russian objectives by shaping the adversary’s perceptions of the situation decisively.
Moscow has used this technique skillfully to persuade the U.S. and its European allies to remain largely passive in the face of Russia’s efforts to disrupt and dismantle Ukraine through military and non-military means. The West must become alert to the use of reflexive control techniques and find ways to counter them if it is to succeed in an era of hybrid war.
Reflexive control, and the Kremlin’s information warfare generally, is not the result of any theoretical innovation. All of the underlying concepts and most of the techniques were developed by the Soviet Union decades ago. Russian strategic theory today remains relatively unimaginative and highly dependent on the body of Soviet work with which Russia’s leaders are familiar. Russian information operations in Ukraine do not herald a new era of theoretical or doctrinal advances, although they aim, in part, to create precisely this impression. Russia’s information warfare is thus a significant challenge to the West, but not a particularly novel or insuperable one.
It relies, above all, on Russia’s ability to take advantage of pre-existing dispositions among its enemies to choose its preferred courses of action. The primary objective of the reflexive control techniques Moscow has employed in the Ukraine situation has been to persuade the West to do something its leaders mostly wanted to do in the first place, namely, remain on the sidelines as Russia dismantled Ukraine. These techniques would not have succeeded in the face of Western leaders determined to stop Russian aggression and punish or reverse Russian violations of international law.
The key elements of Russia’s reflexive control techniques in Ukraine have been:
• Denial and deception operations to conceal or obfuscate the presence of Russian forces in Ukraine, including sending in “little green men” in uniforms without insignia;
• Concealing Moscow’s goals and objectives in the conflict, which sows fear in some and allows others to persuade themselves that the Kremlin’s aims are limited and ultimately acceptable;
• Retaining superficially plausible legality for Russia’s actions by denying Moscow’s involvement in the conflict, requiring the international community to recognize Russia as an interested power rather than a party to the conflict, and pointing to supposedly-equivalent Western actions such as the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in the 1990s and the invasion of Iraq in 2003;
• Simultaneously threatening the West with military power in the form of overflights of NATO and non-NATO countries’ airspace, threats of using Russia’s nuclear weapons, and exaggerated claims of Russia’s military prowess and success;
• The deployment of a vast and complex global effort to shape the narrative about the Ukraine conflict through formal and social media.
The results of these efforts have been mixed. Russia has kept the West from intervening materially in Ukraine, allowing itself the time to build and expand its own military involvement in the conflict. It has sowed discord within the NATO alliance and created tensions between potential adversaries about how to respond. It has not, however, fundamentally changed popular or elite attitudes about Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor has it created an information environment favorable to Moscow.
Above all, Russia has been unable so far to translate the strategic and grand strategic advantages of its hybrid warfare strategy into major and sustainable successes on the ground in Ukraine. It appears, moreover that Moscow may be reaching a point of diminishing returns in continuing a strategy that relies in part on its unexpectedness in Ukraine. Yet the same doctrine of reflexive control has succeeded in surprising the West in Syria. The West must thus awaken itself to this strategy and to adaptations of it.

Russia has modernized its forces to execute what it calls New Generation Warfare. Ukraine is the frontline, but Putin declared in 2014 that Russia has the right and the obligation to protect Russians anywhere in the world. What does this mean for Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia or Belorussia? Will Eastern Europe see renewed war in 2017? If so, can the US and NATO deter Russian moves? Dr. Phillip Karber, an internationally recognized expert on the fighting in Ukraine, says that the US and NATO have been slow to react to the new Russian threat.

Ukraine has become a conflict zone between the West and Russia resulting in disastrous consequences for Ukrainian society. The roots of the conflict stretch far beyond Ukrainian national intentions. It is a conflict between the Western World and Russia, where European, Russian and Ukrainian interests are jeopardized mostly for the benefit of US foreign policy goals. The US plays an essential role in the Western attempt to remove Ukraine entirely from the Russian sphere of influence.
It is unlikely that Russia will abandon her foreign and security policy goal of herding Ukraine back into the Russian orbit or at least forcing Ukraine to serve as a “buffer zone” between Russia and the West. Ukraine is unable to resolve the crisis on her own and is unfit to become a member of the EU or NATO. The most probable outcome of the crisis will most likely permanently damage Western-Russian relations, which will fulfil the Russian expectations regarding the future status of Ukraine.
KEYWORDS: foreign and security policy, crisis, hybrid and information warfare, Russia, Ukraine, West, US

O presente trabalho tem como objeto de estudo as políticas e mecanismos adotados no mandato do presidente russo Vladimir Putin (2000 – 2008), e sua “diarquia” com Dmitry Medvedev (2008 – 2012) com a finalidade de realocação das receitas obtidas pela indústria extrativa – sobretudo a exploração de petróleo e gás natural – para impulsionar a modernização e diversificação econômica, sobretudo no seu complexo industrial-militar e aeroespacial. Por consequência, essas medidas contribuíram para a retomada do protagonismo geopolítico experimentado pela Federação Russa nessa primeira década do século XXI. O objetivo é verificar o impacto dessas políticas públicas como catalisadores para impulsionar o desenvolvimento estratégico, tecnológico e militar russo; E como essas medidas contribuíram para a reinserção geopolítica e estratégica no sistema internacional.

The present work has as object of study the policies and mechanisms adopted in the mandate of Russian President Vladimir Putin (1999-2008), and his "diarchy" with Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012) for the purpose of reallocating the revenue obtained by extractive industry – especially oil and natural gas exploration – to boost modernization and economic diversification, especially in its aerospace and military-industrial complex. Consequently, these measures contributed to the resumption of the geopolitical role experienced by the Russian Federation in this first decade of the 21st century. The goal is to verify the impact of these public policies as catalysts to boost the strategic, technological and military development of Russian Federation; And as these measures have contributed to their geopolitical and strategic reinsertion in the international system.

The entire concept of the Western world to install a “moderate” opposition government in Syria has hopelessly failed. The strategic analysis of the Russian intervention takes into account the assessments of the so called “Arab Spring”, the situation in Syria, the policies of the allies of the Assad regime as well as its opponents or enemies. All these aspects are focused on the realities and the prospects of the Russian military intervention.
Key words: Arab Spring, Assad regime, civil war, ISIS1, Kurds, military intervention, Russia, Syria, US, West

This is a polemic. It is a polemic against the use of the term the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ to describe a supposed dramatic turn in Russian strategic thinking. It is a polemic against the way that pseudo-technical terms and jargon can be mobilised and appropriated not simply to obscure the truth but also to drive a hawkish political-security agenda. It is also an apologia, because to a degree, it is all my fault.

The article describes the author's approach to the interpretation of development of military sociology. In Russia this branch of sociology has gone through the periods of rapid development and upswing and periods of complete oblivion and harsh existence in the rigid ideological limits. The analysis of accumulated theoretical approaches and the research methods allows to conclude about substantial potentialities and prospects of the military sociology.

Foreign policy towards Russian Federation. Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been considered major  ally of the United States since its emergence as an independent state 14 August 1947. It  participated in pro- Western Alliances as SEATO and CENTO. Peshawar Air Base was once used as an  airfield for US recon- aissance flights over the USSR. Western part of Pakistan plaid significant  role as a backstage of US- supported struggle of the Afghans against the Soviet aggression in 1979.  But the relations had deteriorated because of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan once again  became important US ally after 9/11. But the situation has changed dramatically when the USA  decided to sign an agreement on strategic nuclear partnership with India in 2009. New opportunities  occurred when Russia invaded Ukraine and had captured Crimea in 2014. The USA and EU imposed  economic sanctions on Russia. Such new cir- cumstances as well as cooling of US-Pakistan relations  after killing of Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil in 2011 pushed Moscow and Islamabad in to  cooperation. The Author is analyzing present events and status of cooperation and future  perspectives. South Asia is one of the most dangerous regions of the World because both India and  Pakistan possess nuclear weapons. So involvement of both or just one of them in to geopolitical  conflict will change balance of power, especially if we concern possible conflict with China over South Asia Sea.

A revisionist Russia is increasing its military capabilities and threatening U.S. allies and partners across Eurasia and the Middle East. In multiple theaters Russia is conducting sophisticated campaigns that combine economic pressure, disinformation, cyberspace activities, and the use of conventional and unconventional military forces to influence neutrals and intimidate U.S. allies and partners. It is likely that a perceived reduction in the United States’ comparative military advantages emboldens Russian actions. To deter Russia and other revisionist powers that may emulate Russian capabilities (e.g. China, North Korea, and Iran), and to ensure effective response to aggression that threatens the security of the United States and its allies, the U.S. Army requires improved capabilities, increased capacity, and revised warfighting doctrine.

We are witnessing a new era where NATO and Russia are engaged in deep a confrontation, including its military dimension. The West – especially the US and some countries on the Eastern borders of NATO – equal the Russian threat against Europe to that of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and Ebola. Plenty of studies examine Russian use of hybrid warfare in “aggressions” against independent states, including Ukraine, Georgia, and last but not least Estonia, a member of the Alliance.
The portrayal of Russia, as the leading military threat against NATO is a hopelessly flawed threat perception that makes no sense at strategic level, unless it serves unstated and concealed geopolitical goals of some great powers. Both a conventional and a nuclear war between NATO and Russia are completely irrational and in nobody’s interest, since it will inflict enormous damage and there could be no real winner.
If a conventional military incident might occur between NATO and Russia, the parties will most likely restrain themselves to avoid a major war, as they did in several confrontations briefly analysed in the article. If a nuclear confrontation occurs, the capabilities of both parties are far more than enough to change living conditions on Earth beyond recognition, when the remnants of humanity will struggle to survive.
It is in Europe’s interest to reverse the confrontational course with Russia, while the perception of an “aggressive” Russia as a key military threat mainly serves US interests. The ultimate paradox is that Russia would truly become a leading threat to peace and security if the West succeeds destabilising her.

M.A.D. The concept of 'Mutually Assured Destruction' which posited the prospect of a global catastrophe in the event of a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union was one which permeated the popular consciousness of the people of both nations as indeed it did the rest of the world during the era of the Cold War. The realisation of Armageddon beckoning, replete with apocalyptic imagery of modern cities being turned into vast swathes of wasteland and of mass human annihilation, informed the policies of the respective superpowers. Although severely divided by diametrically opposed ideological standpoints and ranged against each other via the military alliances respectively of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, the leaders of America and the Soviet Union were nonetheless consistently united in the idea of diffusing tension. While they may have fought proxy wars in far-flung theatres such as Vietnam, Angola and the Ogaden region of the Horn of Africa, the desire to maintain a state of coexistence as well as the prolongation of human existence spurred them to making a succession of treaties which sought to ban or reduce forms of nuclear testing, weapon capabilities and stockpiles of arsenal. Deterrent strategies such as related to 'first-strike' and 'massive retaliation' doctrines became modified by a flexible response doctrine. However, since the ending of the Cold War, there appears to be little by way of public debate about a clear departure from the modus operandi of the past. Battlefield doctrines of both United States and Russian militaries now permit the deployment of nuclear munitions. Contrary to public perception and even the words uttered during a recent debate between the present contestants for the US presidency, both countries refute a 'No First Use' policy and reserve the right to initiate a pre-emptive strike using nuclear weapons. The period elapsed since the ending of the Cold War has witnessed significant developments that have had an impact on nuclear policy: the expansion of NATO towards the borders of Russia, the abrogation of anti-ballistic missile treaties as well as the development and deployment of so called 'missile shields' by the United States around Russia. Yet, these matters have not been made issues of public concern and subjected to a level of scrutiny which they arguably should be. The American public, it appears, remains blissfully unaware or unconcerned about the possibility of nuclear

The Russian Federation is involved in at least three continents (Europe, Asia, Africa) where it owns military facilities. Their infrastructure in foreign territories includes airports, bases, proving grounds, radar stations and navy installations. The process of expanding the military potential has begun in the previous century but strategic investments and contract extensions are being undertaken nowadays. The Russian Federation is aware that global rivalry is unlimited and that the key to maintaining the status of a world power is constant, intensive and unconventional use of influence in several regions at the same time. Only such a strategy makes it possible to enter into negotiations in a privileged position. While the reality of the Cold War allowed Russia to have an unlimited military presence, primarily in its own spheres of influence, after 1991 the Kremlin was forced to leave bases and strategic facilities in various parts of the world — from Cuba to Vietnam. In Europe, this resignation was parallel to the loss of Russian influence and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the former Eastern Bloc countries and some post-Soviet republics. Military degradation was taking place in those bases that were not defunct. Their main function in this period was to mark the Russian sphere of influence, and therefore to be a tool of political involvement and pressure on local authorities, as well as an element preventing NATO’s further expansion into the post-Soviet area. Military facilities abroad are an element of international competition and a manifestation of superpower ambitions. It is also a proof that the country still takes part in the global game, not staying behind the U.S. or China. The Russian Federation is trying to maintain its influence in the former U.S.S.R. territories and is constantly seeking opportunities to increase its military potential in Asia and Africa, which would enable the development of cooperation with countries in these regions — not only of a military, but also political and economic nature.

Russia’s military intervention in Syria is the only direct military intervention there by a state from outside the region. Iran was there first, but its intervention took different forms. No state, be it Arab or foreign, has sent experts and fighters against the Syrian regime – direct intervention by foreign states has worked exclusively for the benefit of Assad’s regime.
Examining Russia’s recent military campaign through the prism of world powers competing with each other in Syria and the wider region is futile. Those who speak on behalf of the conflicting sides consider any foreign intervention that is to their advantage as an act of solidarity, and that which benefits the other side as imperialist intervention. The intention here, rather, is to explore the intervention from the perspective of Russia’s own motivations. Sadly, it is not the powers in the Arab world at present that decide who will intervene militarily in our region, they might be able to call for or condemn the intervention, but they do not get to decide.
What has become very clear in Syria is that the states allied with the respective parties there are not differentiated from each other on the basis of their morality. States are supporting one side over the other for reasons entirely disconnected from the Syrian people’s cause. Hence the burden of the justice of the cause falls exclusively upon those struggling in Syria, and it is they who will have to answer to history in the future.

Since its foundation after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation has experienced numerous (attempts of) military reforms. Until the restructuring initiated by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 the previous modernisation plans to a large extent have been in vain. In the 1990s, during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, military reforms mainly focussed on troop reductions and changes in the format and number of services. In the first decade of this century, under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the minimalist approach of military restructuring of the previous decade was continued. The only crucial exception was that Putin financially prepared the way for a huge rearmament. Although the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 resulted in a victory for Moscow, it also demonstrated the status in decay of the Russian Armed Forces. Realizing that these shortcomings prevent military power from being a useful tool in Russia’s security policy, soon after this conflict President Medvedev announced huge military reforms. Other than those of his predecessors, his modernisation plans bring about a watershed with the past: a radical change from the traditional large-scale conflict orientated mobilisation army to fully filled, sophisticated equipped and well trained permanent ready forces, aimed at regional power projection. What are the chances that Medvedev’s military reforms will be carried out successfully? And if the modernisation and restructuring of the Russian Armed Forces is (partly) fruitful, does this have any consequences for military build-up and operations of the West and NATO in particular?

The Obama administration had made firm commitments: to no longer send men on the ground to fight in the indescribable chaos of the Near and Middle East. Combat drones, or soldiers of their Sunni allies would do the dirty work in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and the jungles of Mindanao and Jolo in the Philippines...

В статье выявлена позиция журнала «Вестник Европы» по проблемам войны и мира в период 1903–1905 годов. Проанализирована эволюция взглядов издания на причины, ход и последствия русско-японской войны с позиций миротворчества. /
The article reveals the position of the “Vestnik Evropy” Magazine (“Herald of Europe”) on issuesof war and peace in the period of 1903–1905. The evolution of views on the publication causes, courseand consequences of the Russian-Japanese war in terms of peacemaking is analyzed.

El objetivo del presente análisis es revisar la evolución que tuvo el llamado complejo militarburocrático-industrial soviético y el desarrollo que ha tenido, en la posguerra fría, el complejo militar-industrial ruso, así como los desafios que enfrenta este último de cara al siglo xxi. Existen grandes diferencias entre uno y otro. El primero se comportó conforme a consideracio nes estratégicas estrechamente relacionadas con el entorno bipolar y la premisa de la sumacero. El segundo, en cambio, opera sobre todo a partir de criterios estrictamente comerciales, donde la supervivencia hace a un lado los riesgos que entraña la venta indiscriminada de pertrechos militares a países cuya conducta, en las relaciones internacionales, no es del todo predecible. Con todo, Rusia está recuperando rápidamente una posición preponderante en el comercio internacional de armamento, y su principal rival en esta empresa es Estados Unidos, el beneficiario más importante del colapso soviético en términos del abastecimiento de sistemas de armas a los principales consumidores y clientes de la ex URSS.

Last year, the Russian Federation unleashed a non-acknowledged war on Ukraine. In February, Russian Armed Forces’ units covertly occupied Crimea, facilitating an illegal annexation. In April, Moscow sent proxy forces to fight in Eastern Ukraine while denying any involvement. From August, Russia has deployed regular forces on Ukrainian territory, albeit without officially acknowledging their presence or Russia being at war.
Waging inter-state war may be said to be an extreme form of foreign policy. That it is denied does not make it less of a challenge for the rest of Europe. From a security policy perspective it is therefore important to shed light upon who ran this non-acknowledged war – civilian officials or military officers?
Civil-military relations is the research field devoted to understanding the interplay between civilian and military decision-making. One of the most prominent theories in the field has been offered by Samuel Huntington in his seminal book The Soldier and the State (1957). To what extent can Huntington’s theory contribute to our understanding of which decisions are made by politicians and which are made by the military in Russia?
In this paper, we will try to explain Russian civil-military relations in the war on Ukraine using Huntington’s theoretical frame-work. The aim is to further our understanding both of an essential aspect of the execution of Russian foreign policy and of civil-military relations theory.

В статье выявлена позиция журнала «Вестник Европы» в отношении проблемы войны и мира в период восточного кризиса 1875–1878 гг. и русско-турецкой войны 1877–1878 годов. /
The position of the magazine «Vestnik Evropy» on the issues of war and peace during the 1875– 1878 Eastern crisis and the Russian-Turkish war is revealed in the article.

Makalede Rusya’nın özellikle 2008 yılından başlayarak askeri alanda kaydettiği kayda değer yetenek sıçramaları ve bu sıçramaların Türkiye açısından yarattığı zorluk ve komplikasyonlar ortaya konmaya çalışılmaktadır. Ortaya çıkan tablo, Rusya’nın Türkiye karşısındaki açık ve eksiklerini süratle kapatarak askeri açıdan üstün ve kontrolü elinde bulunduran taraf konumuna evrildiğine, ayrıca Rus karar vericilerin algılarının da artık bu mecraya kaydığına işaret etmektedir. Kuvvet denkleminde ve taraflardan en azından birisinin algısında yaşanan bu değişimin, iki ülke arasındaki askeri, güvenlik, dış politika ve ilişkiler bütünü üzerinde bazı yansımalarının olması kaçınılmazdır. 2016 yaz aylarından itibaren tarafların söylemlerine yansıyan stratejik ortaklık ve işbirliği ruhunun tekrar tesis edildiği savının gerçek ve sürdürülebilir olup olmadığı irdelenirken, askeri ve savunma alanında son birkaç yılda yaşanan dönüşümün, ilişkilerin geleceğini belirlemekteki etkileri ve yansımalarının göz önünde bulundurulmasında büyük fayda vardır.